Militant Landscape of Balochistan Muhammad Amir Rana* Balochistan has been experiencing terrorist violence from multiple shades of militant groups including Baloch nationalist insurgent groups, so-called religiously inspired local and international militant groups such as Pakistani Taliban and ISIS-affiliates, and violent Sunni and Shia sectarian groups. Some religious-nationalist groups have also been active along the province’s border with Iran mainly Iranian Jundullah and its splinter Jaishul Adl. While the Baloch insurgent groups aim to achieve nationalist goals, including also secessionist, the religiously inspired militant and sectarian groups have largely religious- political goals, which at times also overlap. There has been a gradual decline in incidence of terrorist violence in Balochistan, in particular since 2013. Weakening of different brands of militant groups due to a continuing counterterrorism campaign across the country including in Balochistan is the main factor. A huge security infrastructure is also deployed in the province, including also to protect CPEC-related projects mainly Gwadar Port, which has also significantly dented militants’ operational capabilities. Still many assert that undercurrents of Baloch insurgency are though largely dormant currently but the factors of conflict are still there which could retrigger the insurgent violence. 1. Nationalist Insurgency Baloch nationalist insurgency was once largely confined in tribal areas and led by tribal chieftains. As the middle class grew and literacy rate increased in central and southern or coastal Balochistan, mainly in Makran region, a new cadre of young nationalists also emerged. Some of these middle class youth gradually took over the control of the insurgency in their region including Awaran, Kech and Gwadar, etc. Before the rise of these so-called urban-based, middle-class groups, mainly the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), tribal elders-led insurgent groups like Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Republican Army (BRA) were the beneficiaries of the human resources coming from different streams mainly through Baloch Students Organization (BSO) and nationalist political movements. Therefore the leaders of BLA and BRA, Hyrbiyar Marri and Barhamdagh Bugti, respectively, had concerns about the emergence of a new leadership in the folds of BLF, Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB) as well as hardline factions • Muhammad Amir Rana is Director of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). He has authored several books, most recently of “The Militant: Development of a Jihadi character in Pakistan”, which won the German Peace Prize in 2014. of (BSO). While the BLA and BRA were traditionally stronger in central and eastern districts of Balochistan, the rise of BLF and LeB made the insurgency more active in southern districts attracting human resources from different regions. Despite causing confrontation among the insurgent groups, this divide also changed the characteristics of the whole insurgent movements. The leadership of the tribal insurgent groups (BLA, BRA) lived in exile mainly in Europe from where they operated through their commanders. Many of these local commanders were not trustworthy as they kept shifting their loyalties from one group to another and many had surrendered before the government and security forces. The leaders of the urban insurgents however led from the front keeping full control on their organizations. They also considered tribal system oppressive as well as expedient to reconcile with the power elites of the country without caring for the interests of the Baloch people. In this process, the profile of the insurgent leadership has also changed; many middle class insurgents got education out of Balochistan, which helped them to absorb new ideas and develop new paradigms on nationalism.1 They come from the cities like Kech, Panjgur, Gwadar, Quetta, Khuzdar, Turbat, Kharan, Lasbela or even Karachi. The tribal- led organizations were also forced to bring innovations in their structures. The non-Marri BLA was reorganized and restructured on the lines of BLF by Aslam Achu, who was killed in Kandhar in a suicide attack in December 2018.2 While the geographical balance of the insurgency has largely shifted to the southwest of the province, the insurgents have also changed the operational strategies and tactics. The perpetration of suicide attacks by the nationalist insurgents in 2018 is a case in point, which indicates a major shift in their operations. The tribal insurgent groups were following classical guerrilla tactics of hit and run and damaging the state infrastructure. Internal Fissures among Insurgent Groups Various Baloch insurgent groups lack mutual harmony for now. The BLA, BRA, BLF, Lashkar-e-Balochistan etc., and others have separatist and secessionist agendas. They don’t subscribe to the moderate nationalist view of attaining political autonomy and control over Balochistan’s natural resources while remaining within the framework of the federation. Although Lashkar-e-Balochistan also has an anti-state agenda but it was formed to counter the growing ambitions of the BLA and the BLF, and to maintain the influence of Mengal sardars in the province. 1 Zofia Mroczek , “A new society in Pakistani Balochistan,” Analysis no 266, July 2014, ISPI. 2 “Consulate attack mastermind killed in Afghanistan: Marri,” The Nation, December 26, 2018 https://nation.com.pk/26-Dec-2018/consulate-attack-mastermind-killed-in-afghanistan-marri Two views prevail regarding the nature and level of the current insurgency in Balochistan. According to one viewpoint, it is violent anarchism rather than a classical insurgency. Analysts subscribing to this view opine that the present insurgent movement not only lacks a charismatic leadership unlike past insurgencies in Balochistan but it is also divided amid frequent infightings and lacks coordination. The Baloch insurgency in 1958 was led by Nawab Nauroz Khan, who was highly revered by his followers. Similarly, the second insurgency from 1963-69 was led by Sher Muhammad Marri. The Parari guerrilla movement of the 1970s was led by Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, who also enjoyed the support of notable Baloch leaders such as Sardar Attaullah Mengal, Sher Muhammad Marri and Nawab Akbar Bugti. The perceived leaders in the present conflict are hardly a comparison, as Nawab Akbar Bugti’s grandson Brahamdagh Bugti is hiding in Switzerland while Baloch nationalist leader Khair Bakhsh Marri’s son Harbiyar Marri is based in London.3 The other school of thought categorizes the insurgency as a manifestation of the legitimate cause of disenchanted Baloch segments, which has all the makings of becoming a mass movement of the young educated middle class. They hold that public support for the movement is not waning. They also argue that low level of insurgency is due to heightened securitization of the province. Proponents of this view believe that as nothing is being done for the frustrated and unemployed young Baloch, who feel relatively deprived, left out and neglected, they remain vulnerable to joining the insurgents irrespective of tribal divisions and internal differences. They also allude to a ‘growing realisation’ among the Baloch insurgent groups to get united for their cause, and the formation of BRAS – an alliance of BRA, BLA and Baloch Republican Guards – which claimed a lethal attack on security personnel in Ormara near Gwadar is one case in point. The Advantages to Insurgents Strategic and counter-insurgency experts classify the current Baloch insurgency as a low- level guerrilla warfare or low-intensity internal armed conflict. The intensity of violence fluctuates from low to medium and occasionally high levels. Waging of such low-level guerrilla warfare does not require heavy weaponry or huge sums of money. Some analysts believe that Baloch insurgent groups not only receive funds from Baloch Diaspora but some regional countries, particularly India, are also funnelling money to Baloch separatists. The geographical features of the province including deserts, mountain ranges, huge size of territory and sparse population, and rugged and difficult terrains as well as long 3 Amir Mateen, “Is it more anarchy, than an insurgency,” The News, July 26, 2010. international borders with Iran and Afghanistan are all in the favor of the insurgents in the province. According to classical guerrilla warfare expert, David Gallula, such factors determine the scale and spread of an insurgency.4 Balochistan also has long coastline at the mouth of the Gulf and different ranges of mountains and deserts. The Balochistan coastline extends over 750 km from near Karachi at River Hub to the Gwadar Bay on Pak-Iran border. The Baloch insurgents come from diverse topographical background and the insurgent groups know well where they can use their human resource best. Those who belong to coastal region could be assigned the task of attacking non-Baloch settlers working on various infrastructure projects in these areas. The labor from south Punjab and Sindh has been the prime target of these groups during the construction times of costal highway between Karachi and Gwadar and highway between Gwadar and Sorab. Now their prime target are the trucks and vehicles, which carry the material related to the constructions of Eastern Bay highway, port and other infrastructure related projects in Gwadar.5 However the insurgents hailing from small towns of Turbat, Panjgur, Washak districts are trained in attacking the security check posts