TURKEY: THE PKK AND A KURDISH SETTLEMENT Europe Report N°219 – 11 September 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. MEANS OR END? THE PKK’S ARMED STRUGGLE .............................................. 7 A. THE ORGANISATION .................................................................................................................... 7 B. THE LEADERSHIP ......................................................................................................................... 9 C. COMPETING LEADERSHIP FACTIONS .......................................................................................... 11 D. THE INSURGENT FORCES ............................................................................................................ 12 E. FINANCING ................................................................................................................................ 13 F. IDEOLOGY .................................................................................................................................. 13 III. THE PKK OUTSIDE TURKEY .................................................................................... 15 A. THE PKK IN THE MIDDLE EAST ................................................................................................. 15 B. SYRIA ........................................................................................................................................ 15 C. IRAQ AND IRAN .......................................................................................................................... 17 D. THE DIASPORA .......................................................................................................................... 18 IV. THE BDP: A POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE? ............................................................. 20 A. AN UPHILL STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION ................................................................................. 20 B. THE COMPETITION FOR THE KURDISH VOTE .............................................................................. 20 C. THE CURSE OF THE TERRORIST LABEL ....................................................................................... 21 D. THE BDP’S DILEMMAS .............................................................................................................. 24 E. YOUTH RADICALISATION ........................................................................................................... 25 V. KURDISH GRIEVANCES AND DEMANDS .............................................................. 26 A. FULL LANGUAGE RIGHTS FOR KURDISH .................................................................................... 27 B. AN END TO DISCRIMINATION IN THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS ................................................ 28 C. GREATER SELF-GOVERNMENT, NOT INDEPENDENCE ................................................................. 29 D. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION ..................................................................................................... 30 E. DEMOBILISATION FOR INSURGENTS, SECURITY FOR VILLAGERS ................................................ 30 VI. A TWO-STAGE PROCESS ........................................................................................... 32 A. THE PRIME MINISTER’S CRUCIAL ROLE ..................................................................................... 32 B. SEPARATING THE PKK PROBLEM FROM THE KURDISH PROBLEM ............................................... 33 C. NEGOTIATE DEMOBILISATION AFTER REFORMS ARE COMPLETE ................................................ 34 VII.CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 36 APPENDICES A. MAP OF TURKEY .............................................................................................................................. 37 B. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................. ...................................... 38 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 39 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE SINCE 2009 .................................................... 40 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 41 Europe Report N°219 11 September 2012 TURKEY: THE PKK AND A KURDISH SETTLEMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Turkey’s Kurdish conflict is becoming more violent, with mote the armed struggle, radical youth defy more moderate more than 700 dead in fourteen months, the highest casu- leaders, and hundreds of young men and women volun- alties in thirteen years. Prolonged clashes with militants in teer to join the insurgency. European and U.S. counter- the south east, kidnappings and attacks on civilians sug- terrorism officials still accuse the PKK of extortion and gest hardliners are gaining the upper hand in the insurgent drug dealing. Mixed messages have convinced mainstream PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). The government and public opinion that Turkey’s Kurds seek an independent mainstream media should resist the impulse to call for all- state, even though most just want full rights within Turkey. out anti-terrorist war and focus instead, together with Kurds, The Kurdish movement needs to speak with one voice and on long-term conflict resolution. There is need to reform honour its leaders’ commitments, if it is to be taken seri- oppressive laws that jail legitimate Kurdish politicians and ously in Ankara and its grievances are to be heard sympa- make amends for security forces’ excess. The Kurdish move- thetically by the rest of the country. ment, including PKK leaders, must abjure terrorist attacks and publicly commit to realistic political goals. Above all, Finding the way to a settlement is hard, as terrorist attacks politicians on all sides must legalise the rights most of Tur- continue and the PKK mounts increasingly lengthy offen- key’s Kurds seek, including mother-language education; sives. Turmoil in neighbouring Syria, where a PKK-affil- an end to discriminatory laws; fair political representation; iated group has taken control of at least one major Kurdish and more decentralisation. Turkey’s Kurds would then have area near the border with Turkey, worries Ankara and full equality and rights, support for PKK violence would may be inflating the insurgents’ sense of power. Some on drop, and the government would be better placed to nego- both sides are talking again of winning militarily and tiate insurgent disarmament and demobilisation. seem to have accepted many hundreds of dead each year as the cost, even though after nearly three decades of in- The government has zigzagged in its commitment to Kurds’ conclusive fighting, public opinion among Turks and Kurds rights. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) alike increasingly concedes that military action alone will initiated a “Democratic Opening” in 2005, but its com- not solve their mutual problem. mitment faltered in 2009. At times, AKP leaders give posi- tive signals, including scheduling optional Kurdish lessons What has been missing is a clear conflict resolution strat- in school and agreeing to collaborate in parliament with egy, implemented in parallel with measured security efforts other parties on more reforms. At others, they appear in- to combat armed militants, to convince Turkey’s Kurds tent on crushing the PKK militarily, minimise the true ex- that their rights will be gradually but convincingly ex- tent of fighting, fail to sympathise with Kurdish civilian tended in a democratising Turkey. Now is a good time for casualties, openly show their deep distrust of the Kurdish this to change. An election (presidential) is not expected movement, do nothing to stop the arrest of thousands of for two years. A new constitution is being drafted. The non-violent activists and generally remain complacent as AKP has a secure parliamentary majority. Prime Minister international partners mute their criticism at a time of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan should seize the opportunity to Middle East turmoil. champion democratic reforms that would meet many of the demands voiced by most of Turkey’s Kurds. This would Contradictory signals have also come from the Kurdish not require negotiations with the PKK, but the prime min- movement, including leaders of legal factions and the PKK, ister should engage with the legal Kurdish movement, which is condemned in Turkey and many other countries take its grievances into account and make it feel owner- as a terrorist organisation. They have made conciliatory ship over reforms. statements, tried to stick to legal avenues of association and protest in the European diaspora and repeatedly called Major misapprehensions exist on the question of what the for a mutual truce. At the same time, few have disavowed Kurdish movement is and what it wants. The actions rec- the suicide bombings, car bombs, attacks on civilians and ommended below would move the conflict closer to reso- kidnappings that have increased in 2012. Hardliners pro- lution than military operations alone. Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement Crisis Group Europe Report N°219, 11 September 2012 Page ii RECOMMENDATIONS 9. Stop demanding