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IMPEACHMENT POWERS Ch IMPEACHMENT POWERS Ch. 14 § 3 privilege and offered a resolution for impeachment and conviction (H. Res. 158) impeaching numer- as ‘‘treason, bribery, or other high ous members and former members crimes and misdemeanors.’’ A fur- of the Federal Reserve Board. ther provision of the Constitution During the reading of the resolu- which has been construed to bear tion, a point of order against it upon the impeachment of federal was raised by Mr. Carl E. Mapes, judges is article III, section 1, of Michigan: which provides that judges of the I wish to submit the question to the supreme and inferior courts ‘‘shall Speaker as to whether or not a person hold their offices during good be- who is not now in office is subject to impeachment? This resolution of the haviour.’’ gentleman from Pennsylvania refers to When the House determines several people who are no longer hold- that grounds for impeachment ing any public office. They are not now exist, and they are adopted by the at least civil officers. The Constitution provides that the ‘‘President, Vice House, they are presented to the President, and all civil officers shall be Senate in ‘‘articles’’ of impeach- removed from office on impeachment’’, ment.(20) Any one of the articles and so forth. I have had no opportunity may provide a sufficient basis or to examine the precedents since this ground for impeachment. The im- matter came up, but it occurs to me that the resolution takes in too much peachment in 1936 of Halsted L. territory to make it privileged. Ritter, a U.S. District Court Speaker Henry T. Rainey, of Il- Judge, was based on seven arti- linois, ruled as follows: cles of impeachment as amended by the House. The first six articles That is a constitutional question which the Chair cannot pass upon, but charged him with several in- should be passed upon by the House. stances of judicial misconduct, in- cluding champerty, corrupt prac- The resolution was referred on motion to the Committee on the tices, violations of the Judicial Judiciary.(19) Code, and violations of criminal law. Article VII charged actions and conduct, including a restate- § 3. Grounds for Impeach- ment of some of the charges con- ment; Form of Articles 20. Jefferson’s Manual states that: [B]y the usage of Parliament, in impeach- Article II, section 4 of the U.S. ment for writing or speaking, the Constitution defines the grounds particular words need not be speci- fied in the accusation. House Rules 19. 77 CONG. REC. 4055, 73d Cong. 1st and Manual (Jefferson’s Manual) Sess. § 609 (1973). 1955 Ch. 14 § 3 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS tained in the preceding articles, The various grounds for im- ‘‘the reasonable and probable con- peachment and the form of im- sequence’’ of which was ‘‘to bring peachment articles have been doc- his court into scandal and disre- umented during recent investiga- pute,’’ to the prejudice of his tions. Following the inquiry into court, of public confidence in his charges against President Nixon, court, and of public respect for the Committee on the Judiciary and confidence in the federal judi- reported to the House a report ciary.(1) However, in the Senate, recommending impeachment, Judge Ritter was convicted only which report included the text of a on the seventh article. The re- resolution and articles impeaching spondent had moved, before com- the President.(4) As indicated by mencement of trial, to strike arti- the articles, and by the conclu- cle I, or in the alternative to re- sions of the report as to the spe- quire election as to articles I and cific articles, the Committee on II, on the ground that the articles the Judiciary determined that the duplicated the same offenses, but grounds for Presidential impeach- the presiding officer overruled the ment need not be indictable or motion and his decision was not criminal; articles II and III im- challenged in the Senate. The re- peached the President for a course spondent also moved to strike ar- of conduct constituting an abuse ticle VII, the ‘‘general’’ article, on of power and for failure to comply the ground that it improperly cu- with subpenas issued by the com- mulated and duplicated offenses mittee during the impeachment already stated in the preceding inquiry.(5) The committee also con- articles, but this motion was re- cluded that an article of impeach- jected by the Senate.(2) ment could cumulate charges and At the conclusion of the Ritter facts constituting a course of con- trial, and following conviction only duct, as in article II.(6) on article VII, a point of order was raised against the vote in that the 4. See § 3.1, infra. 5. See § 3.7, infra, for the majority article combined the grounds that views and § 3.8, infra, for the minor- were alleged for impeachment. ity views on the articles of impeach- The President pro tempore over- ment. ruled the point of order.(3) 6. See § 3.3, infra, for the majority and minority views on article II. 1. See § 3.2, infra. In its final report the Committee 2. See § 3.4, infra. on the Judiciary cited a staff report 3. See § 3.5, infra. by the impeachment inquiry staff on 1956 IMPEACHMENT POWERS Ch. 14 § 3 The grounds for impeachment of that a federal judge could be im- federal judges were scrutinized in peached for judicial conduct which 1970, in the inquiry into the con- is either criminal or a serious duct of Associate Justice Douglas abuse of public duty, or for non- of the Supreme Court. Concepts of judicial conduct which is crimi- impeachment were debated on the nal.(8) floor of the House, as to the ascer- Cross References tainability of the definition of an impeachable offense, and as to Amendments to articles adopted by the whether a federal judge could be House, see § 10, infra. impeached for conduct not related Charges not resulting in impeachment, see § 14, infra. to the performance of his judicial Grounds for conviction in the Ritter im- function or for judicial conduct not peachment trial, see § 18, infra. criminal in nature.(7) A special subcommittee of the Collateral Reference Committee on the Judiciary was Articles of Impeachment Voted by the created to investigate and report House of Representatives, see Im- on the charges of impeachment peachment, Selected Materials, Com- mittee on the Judiciary, H. Doc. No. against Justice Douglas, and sub- 93–7, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., Oct. 1973. mitted to the committee a final re- port recommending against im- peachment, finding the evidence insufficient. The report concluded Form of Resolution and Arti- cles of Impeachment the grounds for presidential im- peachment, prepared before the com- § 3.1 Articles of impeachment mittee had proceeded to compile all are reported from the Com- the evidence and before the com- mittee on the Judiciary in mittee had proceeded to consider a the form of a resolution. resolution and articles of impeach- ( ) ment. While the report and its con- On Aug. 20, 1974, 9 the Com- clusions were not intended to rep- mittee on the Judiciary submitted resent the views of the committee or to the House a report on its inves- of its individual members, the report is printed in part in the appendix to 8. See § 3.13, infra. this chapter as a synopsis of the his- 9. H. REPT. NO. 93–1305, Committee on tory, origins, and concepts of the im- the Judiciary, printed in the Record peachment process and of the at 120 CONG. REC. 29219, 29220, 93d grounds for impeachment. See § 3.6, Cong. 2d Sess., Aug. 20, 1974. For infra, and appendix, infra. complete text of H. REPT. NO. 93– 7. See § § 3.9–3.12, infra. 1305, see id. at pp. 29219–361. 1957 Ch. 14 § 3 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS tigation into charges of impeach- lawful entry of the headquarters of the able offenses against President Democratic National Committee in Richard Nixon. The committee in- Washington, District of Columbia, for the purpose of securing political intel- cluded in the text of the report a ligence. Subsequent thereto, Richard resolution and articles of impeach- M. Nixon, using the powers of his high ment which had been adopted by office, engaged personally and through the committee: his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or plan designed to Impeaching Richard M. Nixon, Presi- delay, impede, and obstruct the inves- dent of the United States, of high tigation of such unlawful entry; to crimes and misdemeanors. cover up, conceal and protect those re- Resolved, That Richard M. Nixon, sponsible; and to conceal the existence President of the United States, is im- and scope of other unlawful covert ac- peached for high crimes and mis- tivities. demeanors, and that the following arti- The means used to implement this cles of impeachment be exhibited to course of conduct or plan included one the Senate: or more of the following: Articles of impeachment exhibited by (1) making or causing to be made the House of Representatives of the false or misleading statements to United States of America in the name lawfully authorized investigative of- of itself and of all of the people of the ficers and employees of the United United States of America, against States; Richard M. Nixon, President of the (2) withholding relevant and mate- United States of America, in mainte- rial evidence or information from lawfully authorized investigative of- nance and support of its impeachment ficers and employees of the United against him for high crimes and mis- States; demeanors. (3) approving, condoning, acqui- escing in, and counseling witnesses ARTICLE I with respect to the giving of false or misleading statements to lawfully In his conduct of the office of Presi- authorized investigative officers and dent of the United States, Richard M.
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