analysis fortheirvaluablecomments. * law andtherefore alsoequalitybefore thelaw.* tion, particularly from the perspective of a democratic state, which is expected to uphold the rule of regulated by law. It will, however,even beequally–andperhaps more –harmfulthancriminalcorrup- groupings in power at the time. Thistype of corruption neednot be criminal; it may even be legal, positions, rights,etc.)thatfavoursaparticulargroupgoods (suchasfunds, –forinstance,thepolitical terms ofthemanifestationparticularisminpubliclife. Thismeansthedistributionofvariouspublic reduce corruption to corruption crime alone. It is more than that – a phenomenon best described in Right government, whichhasbeeninpower since2015. Tothis discrepancy, understand wecannot ber of scandals, affairsandother activities that skirt or even break the law taking place in the United tinued undertheLawandJustice(PiS) government. Theimproving perception contrasts withthenum- who thinkthatthisisaseriousproblem hasbeenfallingsteadily for manyyears–atrend thathascon- The results of opinion polls on the perceived scale of corruption show that the percentage of people Summary Grzegorz Makowski (anti-)corruption activitiesin2015–2019 corruption”: thePolishgovernment’s Laying thegroundwork for“grand ating legalframeworks andinstitutions that assure themaprivileged position andfacilitate access Groupstheir interests intentonpursuing arecorruption inthesystem,cre capableofembedding - The authorthanksProf. AndrzejRychard forhisreview andtheparticipantsindiscussiononpreliminary versionofthis 1

1 Stefan Batory Foundation within therulingcamp;ideally, ifitwere formedby autonomous groupings. formation ofcoalition governments. Themutualchecks andbalancesbetweenpowers shouldstart ed asafurthersafeguard guaranteeing balancebetweenthe branches ofpower andfavouring the islative and executive power in the hands of onepolitical grouping. Thenew system should betreat- Reform ofthe electoral system is also crucial to minimise the future risk ofthe concentration of leg- organs oftheexecutive. opposition, must have the chance to exercise its control function towards the government and other between the executive and the legislature is therefore essential. The parliament, and especially the structures of the state and publiclife requires systemic solutions. Prioritising restoring the balance A policy for tackling corruption that bears the hallmarks of a systemic phenomenon embeddedin the hits mediaoutletscriticalofthegovernment hard. such ascivil service posts, stategrants andsubsidies,state companies’ advertisingbudgets.This has also led to inequalities – not only regarding the law, but also in access to specific public resources, the ruleoflaw.abandoning This has giventherulingpartyandassociatedcircles extreme privilege. It ers andthesystem of mutualcontrol betweentheexecutive, legislative and judicial branches, while laidthe Rightcoalition United the 2019, and groundwork forthe development of “grand corruption” by doing away with 2015 the separation of pow- between in government, term first its During people, too. crises andthedegeneration ofpubliclife,whichhasaninexorable impactonthe lives of ordinary ruling party. So-called“grand corruption” develops imperceptibly, butitalwaysleadstodeeppolitical to getajobatstateorlocal-government institutionjustbecausethey donotshare theviews ofthe society; forexample,“ordinary” when to losecasesadjudicatedby peoplebegin or fail partisanjudges to befeltmoreclientelism –willsoonerorlaterbegin of informalconnectionsand broadlyaffect and network a growing internationally, image country’s the to damage state, efficient less a – sequences from theaverage citizenanddoesnotaffectoureveryday livesdirectly. Yet itisstill a threat, asitscon- of thepoliticalelitesthroughdoings our own, negative experience. Corruptiontodayislocatedfar istrative issues. As we see corruption less often, we are no longer so quick to judge the state or the to getourchildaplaceintheschoolsystem,goinghospitalordealingwitheveryday admin- trying when corruption encounter if ever, seldom, ago. We years ten or even unlikefifteen decisions, faces it in personlessoften.It is nolongersowidespread andnolongeraffectsthesimplest public It also seemslikely that theaverage Pole is hasagreater tolerance forcorruptionbecauseheorshe ruling camp. lic life, explains to a great extent why Poles are less concerned aboutthescandalsandaffairsin echelons ofpower.place intheupper Thismechanism,whichcanalreadyin Polishpub bediscerned ing onimproving their quality of life in the short term,become less sensitive to the corruption taking situation is relatively good andsocial programmes are being developed. Ordinary people,concentrat- business elites, it can be more difficult for the average citizen to notice, especially when the economic However, ifcorruptionisintegratedconcentrated inthesystemand political, administrative among or tion as“monopoly plusdiscretion minusaccountability”. corrup- of Klitgaard’sdefinition Robert classic keepingwith in errors– or power,negligence of abuse to the public eye and therefore less transparent. This reduces the risk of them being held to task for to public resources. At the same time, it is in these groups’ interest for their actions to be less visible -

2 Stefan Batory Foundation tion meansmoreHowever, thanbackhanders. it isstill widely seenmostly as acrime.Thispicture of laundering” asaparticularly dangerous formof corruption.Ingeneral, though,weknow thatcorrup- “money so-called classifies and companies private between bribery penalises also law, international ing power, and election bribery. Perhaps we are less aware that the Polish penal code,following guish other forms, such as influence peddling, public servants failing to perform their duties or abus- description. institutional deficiencies would require analysis from a different perspective, and therefore a different er. Theproblem ofhow toreact directly to cases ofcorruptioninasetting of fundamentallegal and fundamental structures to make it more resistant to particularism andtheassociatedabusesofpow- analysis does not ignore current events, but focuses on what should be done at the level of the state’s This article focuses not so much onrecent cases of corruption as on the longer-term situation. The structural solutionsthatcanlimititsriskandnegativeconsequences. be minimal.Inthisstudy, Itherefore concentrate onthesystemicthreats from corruptionandthekey of these“precise” instrumentsrespondingto concrete problems andthreats linked to corruption will effectiveness the power, of levels highest the at corruption fight to possible it make that institutions improve thestate’sBut withoutrestoring capacitytocombatcorruption. structural thefundamental, significantly would Poland in lacking solutions Many decisions. public in participation of form parent also legalentities,Itisnecessarytoregulate liableforcorruption. lobbying tomake itatrans- abuses ofthesysteminworkplace,orproducing legislation that holdsnotonlyindividuals,but report who whistle-blowers protecting law a passing system, disclosure financial the of streamlining Another important subject is the creation of various “technical” solutions, such as the digitisation and of officialcorruption. for the privileged ruling party to tap. Thisconstitutes a direct path to the multiplication of the cases Without this, the public administration will turn into a nomenklatura, one more reservoir of resources ments tothehigheststate positions mustbebasedonmerit,rather thanpurely political concerns. Appoint- officials. service civil and officials political of corps the between division clear a incorporate legal standards ofoperation ofthecentral administration andcreate auniformcivil service. Thismust terest, rather thanthe short-term interest of the ruling party. It is therefore crucial to standardise the tral administration structure allowing officials to actually carry out public service, acting in citizens’ in- An important element ofsystemic countermeasures againstgrand corruptionis the creation of acen- suspected ofparticipatingincorruption. of the legislature and the executive, especially when its representatives are in conflict with the law and only afundamentalfeature oftherulelaw. They are alsothemainconditionforaccountability not are office prosecutor’s the of autonomy and judges of independence The politics. on dependent It is essential to create conditions in which the judiciary and public prosecutor’s office are not directly 1 are longgone. almost exclusivelyThe timeswhencorruptioninPolandwasunderstood taking bribes as givingand that itisaproblem? What understandingofcorruption shows See T. Chrustowski, Prawne, kryminologiczneikryminalistyczneaspektyłapówkarstwa 2 1 Poles today are aware that corruption is a much broader phenomenon. We distin- We phenomenon. broader much a is corruption that aware are today Poles , Warszawa 1985.

3 Stefan Batory Foundation Poland’s current situation. why it is so dangerous – particularly from the point of view of a contemporary, democratic state and on corruptionasactingagainstthelaw, wewilllosesightofmanyimportantaspectsthatshow just for corruptioncrimes.Ifwedisregard thisbroader socialaspectofcorruption andconcentrate solely tions that are by no meansnecessarily “criminal” (they might belawful),butthatcreate fertile ground others. Heorshetherefore looksforawayout–example, through briberyorinfluencepeddling. This meansthat anybody whotries to obtain a particular good has to struggle againstthe privilege of and discriminates against another. Furthermore, this division takes place in an untransparent way. ceptible they will be to corruption, i.e. to dividing public goods in a way that privileges a specific group particular, themore agivensociety and state are guidedby the logicofparticularism,more sus- In concepts. narrowing of terms in problematic are that questions several clarifies and analysis the Examining corruptionfrom thepointofview oftheparticularism–universalism dichotomy expands embodiment ofwhichistotalitarianandauthoritarianregimes. happen to be in power and can impose the rules. This is the essence of particularism, the extreme not exist. They are dominatedby discretion. People live and actaccording totherulesofthosewho relations. In systems following the logic of particularism, the concept of equality before the law does like thelegal system, is not areference pointthatshapes thefullsetofsocial, political and economic specific religious or ideological worldview. The separation of powers (although it might exist formally), a formed by community or faction, group, political ethnic an as group, such specific a to belonging is segregating, particularistic norms. In these societies, the guarantee of havingthe full range ofrights est system of normsisthelaw. Onthe otherside,wehavesocieties organised according toexclusive, liberal,a democraticwherehigh- of state, the idea Western aspirerealiseuniversalist societies to the of the iceberg. tions andthatcorruptioncrimes–even asdiversethoseoutlinedinthepenalcode–are justthetip Researchsociology,in beyondshowsgoes defini- economics corruption legal or that science political tion isnotlimitedtocrimesdefinedinthepenalcode. corruption dominatesinthemediaandopinionpolls sometimes give this impression, too. Yet corrup- 2 larism anduniversalismhasbecomemore popularinrecent years. The approach to research oncorruptionthat describes it in terms of a dichotomy between particu- Corruption asparticularism bia/48912957.pdf, pp.25–36,accessed: 23September2019. 3 See Do it:CorruptioninPost-communistSocieties ed. G.Ritzer,ThousandOaks2004; Makowski, społeczny,Warszawa 2008;R.Karklins, Korupcjajako problem See G.LaFree, “CorruptionasaGlobalSocialProblem”, in: Contextual ChoicesinFightingCorruption: LessonLearned 2 The baseofthis iceberg is in society; in culture, customs, practices and social institu- , Taylor &Francis 2005. Handbook of Social Problems. AComparativeInternationalPerspective Handbook ofSocialProblems. , ed.A.Mungiu-Pippidi,2011,http://www.oecd.org/countries/zam 3 To putitsimply, contemporary The SystemMadeMe - ,

4 Stefan Batory Foundation corruption Table 1.From– characteristicsto universalism particularism of government andthethreat of could lawfullydeductthese “costs” from theirtaxes. Thesepractices were notdelegaliseduntilafter countries who bought off foreign officials and politicians in relation to investments in other countries these from Companies Belgium. and FranceGermany, Netherlands, the including countries in 1990s bribery of public officials from third countries by Western companies. These were still used in the late to it. A now historical but strong example of this kind of “legal corruption” was the legal sanctioning of ruption almostinspiteofthemselves,oratleastcreating institutional and legalsolutions conducive tion is not necessarily a crime. This is because democratic, liberal states are capableoflegalising cor- and liberal, there mightbemanydifferent areas ofparticularism.Inthiscase,notby chance,corrup- a broadAdopting perspectiveshows that,even insocieties and statesthatcallthemselvesdemocratic Source: prepared by theauthorbasedonMungiu-PippidiA.(ed.) (2011), http://www.oecd.org/countries/zambia/48912957.pdf, p.13,accessed:23September2019. Rule oflaw institutions of public Accountability Mentality institutions Formal/informal private sphere Public sphere– public resources Distribution of institutions of state Autonomy power Distribution of Characteristics None None Collectivist institutions of informal Dominance differentiation No predictable Narrow Appropriation centralised Hierarchical, corruption high threatof particularism, Maximum Characteristics ofgovernments Façade government change of Only during individualism elements of with Collectivist institutions of informal Supremacy specific cases Limited to unpredictable Narrow account results into taking election Appropriation narrow groups concentrated in Structured, Contextual ChoicesinFightingCorruption:LessonLearned Narrow scope Occasional Mixed institutions and informal between formal “Competition” differentiation Weak Mixed responsibility areas ofstate of individual Appropriation elites” “competition of structured, Weakly Standard level Continual andmulti- Individualistic Complementarity Clear differentiation Universal/egalitarian guarantees institutional-legal appropriate supported by Major autonomy participatory Egalitarian, threat ofcorruption universalism, low Maximum ,

5 Stefan Batory Foundation national’s estimates showing that corruption increases the costs of households’ access to water – the conditions andimprove them. Adrastic example oftencitedinthiscontext are Transparency Inter- access to fundamental goodsandservices, thereby denying peopleofthechanceto live in decent The secondmainissueraised inthiscontext is howrights byhuman damages corruption blocking ing publictendermarkets, whichbillions intaxpayers’money passthrough, from beingcompetitive. economic growth by creating uncertainty among businesses,discouraging investment and prevent- damages corruption how mention SDGs the of fulfilment the on Documents corruption. of scale the description ofthecircumstances inwhichtheSDGscouldbeachieved emphasisedtheneedtoreduce goal was to reduce inequalities between the developed and the developing world. Not by chance, the es aparticularisticredistribution ofgoods,towhichaccess shouldbefundamentallyopenandequal. norm is not the most important thing. Whether something is corruption depends on whether it caus- legal the contravenes action another or this Whether system. the to intrinsic almost phenomenon a Corruption should beviewed in broad terms; not as unlawful conductor even a set of crimes, but as transparency on inpubliclife,whichwillbediscussedbelow. bill the is example such One rights. civil fulfilling for opportunities and good public certain a to ti-corruption” intheirnamescanalsobeparticularisticandcorrupt in practice, asthey restrict access and withtheassentoflarge numbersofvoters. In unfavourable conditions,even initiatives with “an- using legalmethods(althoughthey sometimesviolate the Polishconstitution or internationallaw) peddling. influence e.g. corruption, of forms werecriminal have to tive changes these introducedYet recep- is that environment institutional and social a create reckoning final the in and posts, public to state institutions to theinterest oftherulingpartyandpromote party particularisminappointments Poland by the UnitedRightgovernment sinceit came to power in2015. These changessubjectmany range of changes to the justice system (specifically, the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office) in trary and untransparent decisions. An example that we will return to later in the analysis is the broad arbi- as well as groups, specific for privilege of space a creating by indirectly it to contribute they ly, adhere tothelogicofparticularism.Evenifthey donotlegalise a particularformofcorruptiondirect- Even today, there is no shortage of policies that, although created by liberal democratic governments, business transactions in1997. in international officials public foreign of bribery combating on convention OECD the of ratification 5 4 tive changes totheenvironment andensure betteraccesstohealthcare andeducation. that countries around theworldshouldachieve by 2030 to minimise poverty and hunger,halt nega- (SDGs) Goals Development Sustainable the defined UN the 2015, In Nations. United the by ago time some was noticed This efficient. less state the and affluent less is society where countries, veloping in access to diverse public resources. Of course, this consequence ofcorruptionis most visible in de- inequalities. To simplify, if corruption is particularism, the most serious problem is in fact inequality and mostseriousoutcome,however,quences ofactualcorruption.Itsfundamental isgrowth insocial (e.g. organisedcrime), are allaseriousproblem. Yet they are justsymptoms,by-products orconse- state and anincreasing numberof corruption crimes,aswell as others that are usually related to it it demands acomprehensive response from society and thestate.Demoralisation, loss oftrustinthe Here wecometothesecondimportantaspect,whichreveals how dangerous corruptionisandwhy Corruption asasourceofinequality See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/, accessed: 23September2019 ofLaws] 2001,no.23,item264. Dz.U. [Journal 4 5 Inshort,the

6 Stefan Batory Foundation of corruptionandits perception. various types of social services, inequalities, perception of corruption, andthe assessment of the risk the University of Maryland.Uslaner analysed a vast amount of dataoneconomic growth, access to public procurement. within usually benefits, illegal for opportunities seeking or bribes pay to citizens forcing like income, tionaries, especially public officials, who are therefore more likely to seek illegal, additional sources of func- their to remuneration decent provide to unable are They trust. public gain not do definition by and what we might call more objective factors (such as global economic crises). Failing states almost health service,security, etc.).Thisisusuallyduetodisorganisation, thecorruptionofpolitical elites able, forvariousreasons, tooffertheircitizensfree accesstofundamentalpublic services (education, ties. Themainonerefers to“corruptionthe inequalitytrap”. and Theprimevictims are countriesun- Uslaner proposed several interesting hypotheses on the link between corruption andsocial inequali- states onaglobalscale. between comparisons of level the at identified be can correlation this trust, social or governance of suggest that this link is obvious). Yet if we take other indicators into account too, such as the quality exis- tence ofaconnectionbetweencorruptionandthelevel ofinequality(althoughcommonsensewould the prove to easy not is it perception), and inequality, of level the measuring coefficient, Gini tion and social inequalities. In theliteraturethere oncorruption, are manyinteresting worksontheconnectionbetweencorrup- but aconstantfactorfordecisionmakers toconsiderandanelementofpublicpolicy. and a factor in social inequalities is therefore clearly not only discussed in an academicenvironment, public policy that reduces inequalities. Corruption as a form of particularistic distribution of goods discussed below) that only an effective government onthecommongoodcanimplement focused is the“right Itiscorrectly togoodgovernment”. (and alsoshown assumed by empiricalevidence, as inequalities social and corruption between connection the of analysis in identified aspect third The and publicposts–canalsobecomemore expensive andtherefore lessaccessible. before average citizens begin to feel it first-hand. This can pave a way from which there is no return. no is there which from way a pave can This first-hand. it feel to begin citizens average before links between corruption andstate erosion, which, farfrom being sudden,might go on for years particularistic distribution ofgoods,leadingto extreme social inequalities. They also reveal the direct analyses demonstrateUslaner’s the complexities of corruptionandits close connections with the almost from scratch. and simply collapses. After that, the population can attempt to build a more efficient andcrisis fairerin system mired fully becomes state the when emerges improvement for opportunity only the 1980s, late the in deficient and corrupt extremely already were systems administrative and political whose spiral ishard toescape.Asshown by thePolishPeople’s Republicand other EasternBloc countries, bed, expensive medication or aplaceat a goodpublicschool.Thisincreases distrustin the state. The a hospital regulation, legal a favourable – service a public to access gaining privileged, are official or most basicpublicgoodimaginable–by asmuch30%. 6 , ed.A.Mungiu-Pippidi, The AnticorruptionReport,vol.3,Berlin‒TorontoGovernment FavouritisminEurope 2015. 9 7 8 org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9876.pdf, accessed:23September2019. See M. Fazekas, “The PoliticalEconomyofGrandM. Fazekas,“The CorruptioninPublicProcurement in: intheConstructionSectorofHungary”, One oftheearliestanalysesonthis subject waspublishedin1998b See E.Uslaner, Global CorruptionReport2008intheWaterSector Corruption, Inequality,andtheRuleof Law 9 Inequalities are growing, becausethose who can afford to pay off a politician 7 Perhaps the most experienced researcher in this field is Eric Uslaner of Uslaner Eric is field this in researcher experienced most the Perhaps 8 He found that, atthelevel Hefound of simplecorrelations (e.g. betweenthe , CambridgeUniversityPress, Cambridge2008. , Cambridge2008. y theInternationalMonetaryFund; see https://www.imf. 6 Othergoods–education,thejustice system

7 Stefan Batory Foundation 1999. more than penal policy. It isimportant,then,toavoidreducingcorruption toacrime.Similarly, anti-corruptionpolicymustbe a comprehensive anti-corruptionpolicy Contemporary corruptionrequires tegration ofpublicinstitutions,systemiccrisisanddeepsocialinequalities. avalanche of abuses that will sooner or later lead to the general demoralisation of society, the disin- those in power to avoid a situation in which the state’s general failings set off an almost unstoppable and peoplebeginto oppose the corrupt statusquo.Uslaneralso points to the huge responsibility on Sometimes, many bad thingsneedto happen before the public becomes aware of this complexity i wdrażania strategiiantykorupcyjnej dlaPolski 10 cessfully, thefoundationsonwhichthey are builtare alsoimportant.Thismeansthegeneral social, It is worth noting that, apart from the institutions mentioned, forcorruption to be combated suc- clearly inthediagram below. and concisely illustrated is concept NIS The life. public of quality declining a and inequalities social chances ofit being reduced, theruleoflawbeingobserved,andcorruptionnotleading to growing various publicandprivateinstitutions work andcollaborate toreduce corruption,the greater the such peopleaswhistle-blowersucate andsupport who expose abusesare essential, too. Thebetter social organisations thatreported- corruption, inform thepublicabout theneedtooppose abuses, important. Independent courts with the capacity to enforce justice are equally crucial. The media and priate legalinstruments.Lawenforcement bodiescapableofdetectingcorruptioncrimesare noless that operate transparently and withintegrity and are abletocreate and subsequentlyapplyappro- To sum up: an efficient system for combating corruption includes legislative and executive authorities ment isneededtoprevent corruption. importance ofthemedia,private sector and non-governmental organisations, whoseengage of thehumanrightscommissioner(ombudsman)andpolitical parties. Thisconceptalsopointstothe lature, executive and judiciary – and the public administration, law enforcement authorities, the office nature of corruption, also to various social institutions: the three main branches of power – the legis- tively combating this problem. This refers not only to state institutions but, owing to the complex when certain fundamental institutions operate properly and are capable ofboth preventing and ac- only corruption to resistant be can state and society a that assumes System Integrity National The This approach istheNationalIntegritySystem(NIS)created by Transparency International. understanding ofthenatureand what countermeasures ofcorruptioninPolandand shouldbetaken. spective on anti-corruption policy for the purposes ofthis analysis, while offers a better description make society and thestate more resistant to corruption,rather thanrepression. Iadaptonesuchper- Modern anti-corruptionprinciples emphasise prevention and thecreation of systemic solutions that approach tounderstandingandcombatingitisanall-encompassingone. secure power. Basedonthecurrent state of knowledge oncorruption,wecanconcludethatthebest brutal death, like in China, this will not deter those who see it as an opportunity to make a fortune or byto thelistofcrimesorincreasing continually adding penalties.byEven ifcorruptionispunished a tainly not theanswer.Theproblem ofcorruption(andothercrimes,too,incidentally) cannot besolved G. Czubek,Kopińska,A.Sawicki, Wojciechowska-Nowak, J.Wojciechowicz, Jakwalczyćzkorupcją? Zasadytworzenia 10 There is no “happy medium” for combatingcorruptionandrepression is cer- , Warszawa 2010;H.Sutch, Strategia walkizkorupcją –teoriaipraktyka , Warszawa -

8 Stefan Batory Foundation In Poland’s current situation,Iargue thatthemostimportant“pillars” ofthesystemintegrity of comprehensive response to the problem, and will attempt to analyse selected issues using its logic. I share the views ofthecreators of this concept onthe complexity of corruptionandtheneedfora process. Thisarticle,ofcourse,isnot anNISanalysisinthestrictsense. Figure 1.Diagram showingtheNational IntegritySystem society andthatstateallow theseelementstocombatcorruptionmore orlesseffectively. perform anaccurate diagnosisofthesources ofcorruption,aswellthestrong andweakpoints of eral characteristics of the political and economic system. Only by describing all these elements can we from religious worldview to political convictions (e.g. more right-wingorleft-wingviews) andthegen- cultural, political andeconomicconditions;forexample, theaxiological system dominantinsociety, 12 2019. 11 ti-corruption policy. been repeated several times), providing valuableinformationandrecommendations regarding an- been analysed based on the NIS concept in several dozen countries so far (in several, this analysis has in a specific area or institution, but above all how capable they are of counteracting it. Corruption has Furthermore, analysingcorruptionfrom thisperspectivemeans askingnotonly whether it takes place Law andSocialChange Source: A.J.Brown, F. Heinrich,“NationalIntegritySystems–Anevolving approach toanti-corruptionpolicyevaluation”, Crime, states, including Poland. Ibid. https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/activity/european_national_integrity_systems_project, accessed:23September 2017,no.68(3),pp.283–292. 11 In 2009–2012, NIS analyses were conducted in all the European Union member Union European the all in conducted were analyses NIS 2009–2012, In 12 Performingtheminfullisanexpensive, painstakingand time-consuming

9 Stefan Batory Foundation controls andchecks. in check. Inademocratic system, there should beanetworkofinstitutions to enable these mutual but they should complement one another, and,most importantly for this analysis, keep each other others, the dominate to chance the have should them of None way”. other’s each in “get to – it put authorities having fullpower. Yet they musthavethecapacity – asscholarsofthisissuesometimes islature, executive and judiciary. Thesenseofthis separation comes down to none ofthese state Another safeguard istheseparation ofpowers, whichboilsdown tothedistinctionbetweenleg- nutshell, istheideaofrulelaw. for changesistheconstitution.Its provisions are above otherlawsandeachgovernment. This,ina cordingto therulesoflawitself.Themostimportantcollectionframework oftheserulesand its practical meaning. Thelawcannotbechangedsolely based ontherulers’will, but above all ac- cannot be shaped by the legislature and executive or by courts, whose pronouncements formulate by the phrase “the law is sovereign”. Of course, this does not mean that the law is immutable and interested in controlling the government that they appoint. Nonetheless, even in these circumstances, like Poland,where political parties are dominatedby theleaderandparliamentarymajorities are not between executive and legislative bodies isoftenonly a formality. Thisis especially true incountries At thesametime,weshouldremember thatincontemporary democracies theseparation ofpower power corruptsabsolutely.” the sameasLord JohnActondidmore thanacenturyearlier:“Power tendsto corrupt, andabsolute lawlessness and,consequently,into corruption. into that isnotbalanced by another power cannot be expected not to circumvent the law and slide 15 executive andthelegislature involvesnumerous legalandinstitutional tools. veto ofbillsthathavebeenpassedor theabilitytorefer themtotheConstitutionalTribunal. Inpractice, thebalance betweenthe questions toministers.Anexample oftheexecutive’s checksandbalancesofthelegislature istheinstitution ofthepresidential of noconfidenceisvotedthrough). Another instrumentofparliamentarychecksandbalancesthe executive isparliamentary which eachgovernment mustobtainfrom aparliamentarymajoritybefore itbeginstooperate (itcan also losethistrustifavote 14 citizens. Liberalism in theclassic,political sense regards liberty as freedom from fear–ofthestate and ofother from turningitintothetyranny ofthemajority(aswasoftencasein ancientdemocracies). freedom inthechoiceofrepresentatives, butalsocontainsafeguards preventing therulingmajority resentatives or abidanceby fundamental civil liberties. (Liberal) democracy should notonly guarantee tioning ofthecontemporary democratic state,apartfrom theopportunity tochooseone’s publicrep- A particularly important factoristheseparation ofpowers, themainguarantee ofthe proper func- (especially thecivilservice). of the legislature, executive and judiciary, the public prosecutor’s office and the central administration public lifethat anti-corruption policy should concentrate on are mutualrelations between thecentres 13 formula C=M+D–A(“corruption equalsmonopolyplusdiscretion minusaccountability”. the is corruption of definitions classic the of one that accident no is It actions. and discretionary entirely law the disregarding towards step first the is accountability of Lack abuses. and neglect its or is crucial. From thepointofviewpolicy, ofanti-corruption and balancesinstitutions thesystemofchecks Controlling Corruption R. Klitgaard, Controlling An example ofaspecificinstitutionenablingchecksandaccountabilitybetweenthesepowers isthevoteofconfidence, S. Kautz,“Liberty, YaleJournalofLaw&theHumanities Justice,andtheRuleofLaw”, 13 One of thesafeguards guaranteeing freedom is the ruleoflaw, whichcanalso be expressed If it existsworks, itispossibletoholdthegovernment and accountable foritsdecisions 14 , UniversityofCaliforniaPress, 1988. Robert Klitgaard’s formulaessentially says 1999,no.11(2),pp.435–468. 15

Power 10 Stefan Batory Foundation United Rightgovernment’s anti-corruptionpolicyin2015–2019. the problems intheseareas,it isworthexamining though, the thescaleofcorruptionisinPolandand public life – the judiciary, the public prosecutor and the public administration. Before discussing and theweakeningbetween corruption as theconnection ofsuccessivepillarsintegrityin relations in this field is key to understanding the greatest threat of corruption in Poland, as well and executive and the question of mutual checks andbalances between them. legislature the on firstly focus therefore I corruption, contemporary of sources main the Analysing and rightsoftheparliamentaryopposition–more onthislater. the separation of powers alongthis line still makes sense;forinstance,inthecontext of theauthority 17 16 individual events with major media reach (e.g.corruption scandals).Despite an advancedstatistical of influence the under change perceptionmay because only if distance, certain a interpretedwith be therefore should and perception reflects index the suggests, name its As risk. political and economic this). The CPIisbasedonsurvey research onsamplesofexperts, includingspecialists in evaluating ing results over time(owing totheindex’s statistical procedures, itsprevious editionsdidnotallow compar- of possibility the is advantage methodology,its in change a after 2012, Since 1995. in lished Index The best-known(CPI) by index istheCorruptionPerception Transparency International first pub decisions are frequently madeonthisbasis. investors to compare countries in terms of the threat of corruption.Concrete political and business eral picture. Despitethelackofprecision, they are mostoftenusedby internationalinstitutions or Let ustherefore beginby discussingtheindexes describingcorruption,whichprovide themostgen- Corruption inPolandasshownby theavailabledata been developed over thepasttwodecades, research and diverse indicators describing this phenomenon with varying degrees of directness have of results the resources, information Although task. difficult a is corruption of scale the Determining policy in2015–2019 Corruption inPolandandthegovernment’s (anti-)corruption problem of a dark figure. dark a of problem veys inwhich respondents are asked abouttheirpersonalexperiences withcorruptionalsohavethe Sur- reported). or recorded not are but place, took that crimes of number unknown (the figure dark how oftencorruptionoccurs.Secondarydata,andespecially criminal statistics, is encumbered witha the scale of corruption precisely. Surveys only inform us about perception, which tells us little about determine to us enable these of surveys,None on too. are based which usually corruption, of indices of kinds various have also We statistics. criminal especially data, secondary of types various and veys much betterthaninmostdeveloping countriesandeven manyEUmemberstates. is Poland in situation the states), Scandinavian the or Zealand New as (such corrupt least the as seen of corruptionin Poland are by no meansdramatic. Although we are a long way behind the countries Using whatwehaveavailable, we cansuggestthatthegeneral picture andpublicsenseofthethreat therefore: itdependshow youlookatit. See C.Sampford, A.Shacklock,C.Connors,MeasuringCorruption , AshgatePublishing,2006. http://anticorrp.eu/, accessed:23September 2019. 17 Theanswertoquestionsabouthow bigathreat corruptionisinPoland 16 itisimpossibletogetawayfrom twotypesofdata–sur- The interference in - 11 Stefan Batory Foundation points respectively. The EU average was 66. By this measure, Poland is only slightly only is Poland measure, this By 66. was average EU The respectively. points among the180 states covered. In mostrecent CPI(2019, published in2020), Poland received 58 points, puttingitin41st place ed considerable interest amongjournalists,politiciansandinvestorsaround theworld. tively. Thisisalsothebasisofranking ofcountries,which,formore thantwodecades,hasprompt- measure- ments. Theindex ranges from 0to100lowest– thehighestand level ofperceived corruptionrespec- similar other and CPI the from eliminated fully be never can fluctuations these formula, published in1996).However, itremains aperception index, like theCPI. first was it time the from comparisons as well as scales, other on presented be to results its enables opinions. Itcangiveavaluefrom -2.5 to 2.5(thisindex’slevel higher ofmethodologicaladvancement opinion polls and surveys of representatives of social organisations, sois not solely based onexpert larger than that in Transparency International’s index. For example, the World Bank takes into account going into detail, we should note that the corruption index is based ona set of datathat is similar but Without law. of rule the and law the of quality governance, of effectiveness stability, political ability, account- of terms in states describing Indicators, Governance Worldwide six of set a of part is This index, created similar the Bank a published, World was CPI first the after year A Source: prepared by theauthorbasedon:https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018, accessed:23September2019. sition init2012–2019 Chart 1. Changes inTransparency International’sPerception Corruption Index and Poland’s po- Poland intermsofcorruptionslowly worsened. 18th place). the second-best result of all the countries of the former Eastern bloc, after Estonia (with 74 points and rank has been falling for years), Slovakia (50 points) and Bulgaria (43 points). In 2019, Poland obtained average. It has a much better perception than Hungary, scorewith just 44 points (the country’s and 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 (the higherthebetter) Corruption Perception Index Indeks Percepcji Korupcji (CPI) (im wyżej tym lepiej) wyżej (im (CPI) Korupcji Percepcji Indeks 2012 Yet 41 58

while itsresult improved in 2012–2014, between 2015 and 2019 the perception of 2013 38 60 Denmark, New Zealand and Finland came first with 87, 87 and 86 and 87 87, with first came Finland and Zealand New Denmark, 2014 36 63 2015 63 29 2016 62 29 countries (thelower thebetter) Poland’s positioninranking of Miejsce Polski w rankingu państw (im niżej tym lepiej) tym niżej (im państw w rankingu Polski Miejsce 2017 60 36 2018 Control ofCorruption. Control 60 36

behind 2019 58 41

the EU 12 Stefan Batory Foundation sising several conclusionsthatresult from the2017survey. control) corruption. but also– as theindex’s name suggests – the perception ofa state’s capacity tocounteract (or This mightmean,forexample, a greater emphasis not onlyonperceptions ofcorruption growth trend, which wouldsuggest increasinglythat Polandisdealing with corruption well. Poland’s results intheWorld Bankindex in2007–2017 are stableand,interestingly, reveal a 18 getting into a discussion about theshortcomingsandvirtues of CBOS’s research, asked them about it in 2017. It asked them about their perception and their own experiences. Without (CBOS), which hasbeensurveying Poles’ views oncorruption thelongestandmostsystematically, last Polish surveys oncorruptionmightalsoseemreassuring.The Centre forPublicOpinionResearch this shouldnotbereassuring (Iwillreturn tothisquestionattheendofchapter). of Civic Platform (PO) and thePolishPeople’s Party(PSL), but itisneither radical nordeep–although perceptionthe UnitedRightgovernment canbeobservedduring compared tothe previous coalition and towhatextent itmightbeathreat. Thispictureof isnotunequivocal.Acertainworsening es provide a certainpicture of how Poland compares to othercountriesin termsofcorruption theyAlthough onlymeasure perception, theTransparencyand World International Bankindex- Source: prepared by theauthorbasedon:https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/, accessed:23September2019. changes in1996–2018. of theWorldwideChart 2.Selected indicators Governanceand corruption concerning Indicators 2015. ability and the Rule of Law indexes. Here, the Rule of Law index shows a drop in Poland’s score after and does not reduce crime). The World Bank index should be interpreted with the Voice and Account- a goodimpression onpublicopinion,andeven experts,later itproves although tobeunenforceable even if they do not work in practice (new, tougher legislation often plays a placating role and makes various anti-corruptionsolutions,especiallylegalregulations, whichare usuallyperceived positively, G. Makowski, społeczny... Korupcjajako problem , pp.120–136. 0,2 0,4 0 0 1 , , , 0 1 6 8 2 1996 0,71 0 1,04 , 77 1998 0,82 0 1,09 , 0,18 86 1998 0 2000 This perception might seem higher, if only because ofthe continual increase in 0 0,71 0 1 , , , , 16 21 71 08 Rozliczalność Accountability Voice and 2002 0 0,71 1,09 , 40 2003 0,56 0 1 , , 42 01 2004 0,14 0,42 1 , 02 2005 0,27 0 0,94 , 48 2006 0 0 0,40 , , 27 80 2007 0,88 0 0 , , 43 30 Rule ofLaw Rządy prawa Rządy 2008 0 0,95 , 0,46 55 2009 0,63 1,03 0 , 45 2010 0,68 1 , 0 04 , 50 2011 0,56 0 1,03 , 77 2012 0 0 1 , , , 66 78 06 2013 0,60 0,82 1 , 00 Kontrola korupcji Kontrola Control ofCorruption 2014 0,64 0 1,11 , 84 18 2015 0,67 0 1,04 it is worth empha- , 80 2016 0,64 0 0 , , 74 84 2017 0,72 0 0 , , 78 47 2018 0 0,72 0,43 per se, , 64 13 Stefan Batory Foundation Question: DoyouthinkthatcorruptioninPolandisabigorsmallproblem? Chart 3. Opinions onthe scale of corruptioninPoland1997–2017 according to CBOS polls. given theright-winggovernment’s manycontroversial actionsandaffairsin2017. however,less negative,evenfor thebetterandismuch is changing itisclearthatthisopinion 76% of Poles still said that they see corruption as a significant problem. survey. For the first time for 26 years, the percentage of these responses fell below 80%. Despite this, 2017 the in again abruptly fell percentage this below, shows chart the – As responses). and moderate – big” “rather both strong account into (taking problem significant a is corruption that claimed people of 80% than more because though, assessment, its in guarded was public Polish The 40%. to centage of respondents in 2009 who said that corruption is a very big problem in Poland fell from 67% per- the survey, 2006 the to compared that, note can we past, the into further little a back Reaching ty-w-poludnie,98/sytuacja-w-ochronie-zdrowia-sondaz-dla-faktow-tvn-i-tvn24,972760.html, accessed:23September2019. html, https://pulsmedycyny.pl/65-proc-polakow-zle-ocenia-publiczna-opieke-zdrowotna-902870, https://fakty.tvn24.pl/fak- 19 a result ofcorruption,butdisorganisation andbadstatepolicy. quality of thehealthservice. Most peopleevidently realised that thehealthservice’s problems are not service. In thelatter case, this is only a seemingparadox, considering theworseningevaluation of the to previous results. Opinionsimproved markedly withregard topoliticians and especially the health poll 2017 the compare we if interesting are changes Two government. central and government local office, prosecutor’s public the and courts service, health the politicians, invariably are identified ones When it comes to Poles’ views on the areas of social life especially susceptible to corruption, the main Source: prepared by theauthorbasedon:https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_063_17.PDF, accessed:23September2019. See https://www.rp.pl/Sondaze-wyborcze/191009542-Sondaz-Co-trzeci-Polak-uwaza-ze-nikt-nie-zreformuje-sluzby-zdrowia. 10 20 30 40 50% 60% 70% 80 0 % % % % % % VII 91 38 33 % % VIII 38 39 % % 91 II 92 37 49 % % VII 40 46% 00 % Bardzo dużym Very big VIII 25% 68% 01 II 03 23% 68% XII 03 65 25% % V V 75% 20 04 % XII 71 23% 05 % II 67% 26 06 % 19 Rather big Raczej dużym IV IV 49% 40 Compared to previous years, 09 % IV IV 43 44 10 % % VI 13 VI 43 40% % XI 13 XI 39% 48% V 17 31 45% % 14 Stefan Batory Foundation life. Inwhichoftheseareas doyouthinkcorruptionismostwidespread? to CBOS polls. Question:Every so oftenwetalkaboutcorruptioninvariousareas ofourpublic Chart 4.Opinionsonthemainareasis widespreadcorruption inwhich in 2001–2017, according there is a beliefthat to get manythingsdoneit is necessary to give a bribe.Haveyou had asituation Poland In bribes. taking and giving mean we corruption about talk we when often “Very was: it 2006, you hadtogivesomeonea present ormoney togetsomething doneorspeedit up?”; in2000 and where situation a in ever you were years, four past the “In was: it 1999, and 1997 in bribe?”; a give to years, werefour past “In the 1993 thequestion was: In you ever situation wherea in you were forced Source: prepared by theauthorbasedon:https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_072_17.PDF, accessed:23September2019. the pastthree or four years,were you everwhere in asituation you were forced to give a bribe? Chart 5.Declarations aboutpaying bribes in 1993–2017, according toCBOS polls. Question:In Source: prepared by theauthorbasedon:https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_063_17.PDF, accessed:23September2019. 100% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 10% 20% 30 40 50% 60 70 80 90% 0% 0 % % % % % % 16% 77 X 93 7 X 01 13% 29% 37% 47% 54 % % % Central officesandministries Courts andpublicprosecutor’s office Politicians –partyactivists,coucillors,deputies,senators urzędy centralne i ministerstwa sądy i prokuratura politycy 38% IV IV 20% 74 6 % 97 VI 02 VI – % 12% 25% 33% 42% 52% działacze partyjni, radni, posłowie, senatorowie Yes 29% Tak VII VII 19% 73 8% 99 % VI 03 VI 11% 29% 33% 43% 60% 37 XI XI 14 85% 1 % % 00 % VI 04 VI 11% 30% 37 42% 64% %

VI VI 16 82% 3 39 % 02 % % No Nie Nie V V 11% 21% 37% 50 61% VI VI 17 80% 05 4 % % 03 % 34 %

VII VI 04 VI 15 83 28% 32% 35% 53 2% 9% % % % 06 22% Don’t know, refuse toanswer Trudno powiedzieć i odmowa odpowiedzi odmowa i powiedzieć Trudno 15 83 V 05 State-owned enterprises Municipal, country, provincial offices Health service służba służba zdrowia firmy, firmy, przedsiębiorstwa państwowe urzędy gminne, powiatowe, wojewódzkie 2% XII 15% 25% 30% 44% 58% % % 07 32% VII VII 90 1% 9% 06 % IV 09 IV

54% 55% 14 28% 29% % 27% XII XII 89 2 9% % 07 % IV 10 IV 13 31% 29 58% 60% % % IV 09 IV 89 26% 9 2 % % %

VI 13 VI 13 27% 31 53% 62% VI VI % % 89% 9 2 % 18% 13 % V 17 V 48% 17% 30% 32 38% 93% V 6% 1 % 17 % 21% 15 Stefan Batory Foundation Bureau, Dz.U. [Journal ofLaws]2018,item2104,2399,2019, item 53,125,1091. Bureau, Dz.U. [Journal someone whoacceptsbribes? Chart 6.Knowing people who acceptbribes(in2000–2017). Do youpersonallyknowQuestion: one whohas;18yearsago,itwas29%. indicator: knowing people who have accepted a bribe. Today, just oneinten Poles knows some- said thatthey hadtopay a bribe in thepastthreeyears. Thisissimilarforanother or four respondents of 6% Only low. so been had indicator this that years 26 in time first the was This most commonformofcorruption,inthepastthree orfouryears. number ofpeople who saythatthey havebeen forced togive a bribe,i.e.toparticipateinthe been asking with certain modifications since 1993. In the 2017 poll, we see a marked drop in the In termsofPoles’own experiences,a questionwhichCBOShas itisworthnotingoneindicator: “In thepastthree orfouryears,were youever inasituationwhere youwere forced togiveabribe?” when you’vegivenabribeinthepastthree orfouryears?”Laterthequestionwasasked intheform: 20 recorded corruptioncrimesincreased significantly. of number the rule, government’s right-wing the of years three first the over that, is finding most recent map,publishedinearly2019, the endof2017. encompasses datauntil Its main crimes. TheCentral Bureau Anti-Corruption issues analyses of thisissuesystematically. The it istheonlysource that compilesrelatively currenton themaintypesofcorruption statistics reportmap. This data istheso-calledcorruption this collecting but hasgapsand shortcomings, We canconclude by referringUnfortunately,statistics. tocriminal theonlyavailablestudyfor Source: prepared by theauthorbasedon:https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_072_17.PDF, accessed:23September2019. 100 A definitionofcorruptionandalist ofcrimesiscontainedinArt.1.sec.3athe2006ActonCentr 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 0% % % % % % % % % % % XI XI 29 68 3 % 00 % % 26% 71 X 01 3 % % Yes Tak VI 02 VI 21 79% 0 % % VI 03 VI 22 78% 0 % % VI VI 76% 23 1 % 04 % Nie No 76 21 V 05 3 % % % 20 VII VII 79% 18 3 % 06 % XII XII 83 15 2% 07 Refuse toanswer Odmowa odpowiedzi Odmowa % % IV IV 83 15 2% 09 % % al Anti-Corruption VI VI 81 16 3% 13 % % 87 10 V 3 17 % % % 16 Stefan Batory Foundation ci, w:Korupcjaiantykorupcja –wybranezagadnienia 21 23 września2019. 20 HertieSchoolofGovernance Project, -korupcji, dostęp:23września2019oraz paperfortheAntiCorrp G.Makowski, DiagnosisofGoverningRegimeinPoland,Background Źródło: opracowanie własnenapodstawie,http://www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ak/wydawnictwa-cba/publikacje-w-jezyku-pol/mapa- rejestrowanych przestępstw korupcyjnych wzrosła o 67% cyjnych uwzględnianych na mapie. Na przykład w 2016 roku tylko dzięki temu zabiegowi ogólna liczba korup przestępstw liczby ogólnej podniesienia chęcią wszystkim przede podyktowana była dodaniu opisywany w raporcie. Trudno powiedzieć, dlaczego go pomijano. Wydaje się jednak, był że decyzja nie o korupcji, definicji prawnej się mieści ten czyn choć Wcześniej, roku. 2016 w dopiero korupcji mapie na uwzględniać zaczęto kk 3 § 271 art. z przestępstwo że podkreślić, jednak Trzeba osobistej. lub majątkowej korzyści uzyskania do dążeniem z związane kk) 2 § 231 (art. publicznych cjonariuszy funk przez obowiązków niedopełnienie lub uprawnień nadużycia i kk) 229 i 228 (art. czynne i bierne przekupstwo potem kk), 3 § 271 (art. osobistej majątkowejlub korzyści osiągnięcia do dążeniem z ne związa- nieprawdy poświadczenia są korupcyjnych przestępstw rejestrowanych typem Najczęstszym wyroków skazującychw latach 2007–2019 Wykres 7.Liczbarejestracji głównych typówprzestępstwkorupcyjnych oraz prawomocnych się art. 271 § 3 kk). Oczywiście zrozumienie różnicy międzyliczbąprzestępstwrejestrowanych aliczbą (dodatkowo liczba wyroków skazujących nie zmienia się od lat prawie w ogóle, zwłaszcza jeśli pominie przygotowawczych, których w 2017 roku było niespełna 2 tysiące – podobnie jak w poprzednich latach postępowań wszczętych liczbą z kontrastuje drastycznie przestępstw zarejestrowanych liczba Jednak wane sądanezarówno zuwzględnieniem art.271§3kk,jakibez tychdanych. prezento- czasie, w porównań dokonywania możliwość podstawową choćby zachować aby powyżej, wykresie na też Stąd kryminalnej. statystyki „kreatywnej” przykład typowy To zjawiska. skalę ono sza skokowozwięk- ponieważ przestępstwo, to właśnie statystyk do włączyć natomiast się Zdecydowano nie są uwzględniane na mapie (zapewne z powodów związanych z trudnością w pozyskaniu danych czynów, które innych wiele wymienia Antykorupcyjnym Biurze Centralnym o ustawy z korupcji finicja 2019 Chart 7. Number of records of the main types of corruption crimes and final convictions in 2007– estępczości”, in: 22 23 September2019. 21 67%. by crimes recordedcorruption of number total the creased in- alone amendment this example, for 2016, In map. the in included crimes corruption of number overlooked, butit seems thatthedecisiontoaddit was dictatedby adesire toincrease theoverall was it why unclear is It report. the in described not was it corruption, of definition legal the within is the penal code only began to be included in the corruption map in 2016. Previously, although this act of §3 271 Art. in to referred crime the that note to important is It gain. personal or financial seeking code) penal the of §2 231 (Art. officials public by negligence or power of abuses and code), penal the of 229 and 228 (Art. bribery active and passive byfollowed code), penal the of §3 271 (Art. gain sonal The most common types of corruption crimes recorded are false attestations seeking financial or per- , HertieSchoolofGovernance, Berlin2014. AntiCorrp Project pa-korupcji, paperforthe accessed:23September2019andG.Makowski, DiagnosisofGoverningRegimeinPoland,Background Source: prepared by theauthorbasedon:http://www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ak/wydawnictwa-cba/publikacje-w-jezyku-pol/ma- Of course, understanding the differenceOf course,understanding of crimesrecorded betweenthenumber of andthenumber §3). disregard271 we Art. if especially years, for remainedunchanged has convictions of number the addition, (in years previous to similarly 2017, in 2,000 than fewer were there which of initiated, ings However, thenumberofrecorded crimescontrasts radically with the numberofpreparatory proceed- and withoutit. §3 271 Art. with both presented is data the time, over comparison of possibility rudimentary a least This is a typical phenomenon. example of “creative” crimestatistics. In thechartabove, to preserve at mentions many other actions that are not included in the map (probably because of the difficulty the of data), with acquiring because (probably map the in included not are that actions other many mentions by the fact that, although the definition of corruption in the Act on the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 5000 M. Dudkiewicz, G.Makowski, https://cba.gov.pl/ftp/pdf/Mapa_korupcji._Zwalczanie_przestepczosci_korupcyjnej_w_2016_r._(pdf_1_427_KB).pdf, dostęp: M. Dudkiewicz, G.Makowski, “Możliwości oszacowania iprezentacji skalizagrożenia korupcją napodstawiestatystykprz- https://cba.gov.pl/ftp/pdf/Mapa_korupcji._Zwalczanie_przestepczosci_korupcyjnej_w_2016_r._(pdf_1_427_KB).pdf, accessed: 0 2007 11145 2641 Korupcja iantykorupcja –wybranezagadnienia 2008 8824 3086 8824 22 thiscrimewasincludedbecauseitwouldabruptlyincrease thescaleof Możliwości oszacowania i prezentacji skali zagrożenia korupcją napodstawiestatystykprzestępczoś skalizagrożenia Możliwości oszacowaniaiprezentacji , Berlin2014. 2009 11726 3036 Number offinalconvictions(notincludingArt.271§3thepenalcode) Number offinalconvictions Number ofrecorded coruptioncrimes(notincludingArt.271§3ofthepenalcode) Number ofrecorded corruptioncrimes Liczba prawomocnychwyrokówsazujących(bezart. Liczba prawomocnych wyroków skazujących wyroków prawomocnych Liczba Liczba zarejestrowanych przestępstw korupcyjnych (bez art. Liczba zarejestrowanych przestępstw korupcyjnych 2010 13938 2839 , red. J.Kosiński,K.Krak, A.Koman,cz.II,Szczytno 2011,s.12–63. 2011 9703 2937 7 , edsJ.Kosiński,K.Krak, A.Koman,partII,Szczytno2011,pp.12–63.

2012 10972 249 4 20 . Tezę tę uprawdopodabnia fakt, że choć de- 2013 15405 2376 § 21 3 kk) Thistheoryismademore credible 2014 9354 2261 271 § 3 kk) 2015 17790 1927 2405 8893 2016 25968 2005 2623 8473

2017 11418 36247 1656 2161 jego 21 ). - - - 18 17 FundacjaStefan Batory im. Stefana Foundation Batorego initiatives. did nothavetangibleresults.at someofthemostimportant it isworthlooking Nonetheless, scattereda setofinitiatives between (or evenindividual ministries ministers), mostofwhich the ruling coalition’s during the 2015–2019 parliamentary term was “policy” just anti-corruption vention Programme for 2014–2019. Programmefor vention a programmethe previousduring adopted PO–PSLgovernment, theGovernmental CorruptionPre- state of manifestation serious policy. Furthermore,themselves admit,itisapared-down astheauthorsofdocument versionof a be cannot it that shows 2017) late (in period implementation the timeline for implementingtheprogramme islessthantwoyearsandthatit was adoptedjustbefore gramme” inits title to present abroader vision for solvingtheproblem. Yet thevery fact thatthe final convictions would require in-depth sociological-legal research. 28 ta-20182020.html, accessed:23September 2019. 27 26 25 24 wlatach2001–2011 antykorupcyjnej polskichrządówprowadzonej 1998–2010 wświetledanychurzędowych. Analizasocjologicznoprawna”, in: 23 2017. December 19 on ed adopt- 2018–2020, for Programme Prevention Corruption Government the was initiative main The Corruption PreventionProgramme for2018–2020 the rulingcamp). ly any mention of corruption, in the 2015 election programme of Law and Justice (the main party in selecting the meansforrealising them. There are nopromises ofanti-corruptionmeasures, andhard- meanssettingfar-reaching –ifweassumethat “policy” objectives and rationally ti-corruption policy” “an- specific no has it ishardlycorruption, surprisingthattheUnitedRightgovernment defacto encourageSince thedataavailabledoesnot more large-scale andcoherentagainst actions The government’s (anti-)policytowardcorruptionin2015–2019 common crime,butasaformofparticularism,isgrowing threat, asweshallsee. in termsofcrimestatistics. From asystemicpointofview, however,not asa corruptionunderstood the total number of convictions), we must conclude that corruption is not a significant problem – also fact that2000 to 3000 people are convictedforcorruptionevery year(whichisjustatiny fraction of Even taking into account the problem of so-called “dark figures”, and notwithstanding the regrettable that themapshows thatthere were only2,161finalconvictionsin2017–thefewest since2015. adding worth also is It indictment. in ended proceedings 1,873 just 2017, In cases. these in enough cient evidence to press charges againstanyone.Finally, the public prosecutor is clearly not engaged suffi- amass to inability authorities’ enforcement law see we Secondly, place. take not did they when First, there iscitizens’growing inclination to report corruptioncrimes“just in case”, even insituations tainly suggestthatitshows theconvergenceof three factors(leavingasidecreative crimestatistics). government’s programme (implementationofwhichreceived a critical evaluation from theSupreme previous the of actions and priorities the reduced which modification, the expect, also might one As document prepared by itspredecessors, whenitcouldhaveproposed itsown new, betterstrategy. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WMP20140000299, accessed:23September 2019. http://www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ak/aktualnosci/12900,Nowy-Rzadowy-Program-Przeciwdzialania-Korupcji-RPPK-na-la- http://pis.org.pl/media/download/962a6041c364e939903caa9f7e9e54ea9f13c248.pdf, accessed:23September2019. http://pis.org.pl/document/archive/download/128, accessed:23September 2019. State ofaffairsattheendFebruary2020. Some clarificationonthisissueisprovided by JanWinczorek’s article“Ściganieprzestępczości korupcyjnej wlatach 25 The same is true of its programme in 2019. in programme its of true is same The 27 Onemightexpect agovernment documentcontainingtheword “pro- 28 It therefore tooktheUnitedRightalmost two yearstomodify a , Warszawa 2011. Polityka antykorupcyjna. Ocenaskutecznościpolityki 26

This could also bethereasoncould This why 23 If we compare them, we cancer- 24 18 Stefan Batory Foundation has significantly worsened during the current government, current the during worsened significantly has risk of corruption.From the point of view of the generally opaque legislative process in Poland, which Another interesting direction is theintroduction ofanevaluation system for legal acts intermsofthe transparency ofpolitical and creatingparty andcampaignfunding, lawsto protect whistle-blowers. finan- the of cial disclosure system, reinforcing regulations ontheliability of collective identities, increasing the reform are: They document. the in kind this of initiatives four only are There started. should setnew objectives and propose actionsthatare yet to betaken, oratleast that havenotyet more general and softer – mostly educational and information initiatives. An effective programme the programme wasadopted(e.g.workonthepublicprocurement bill). Some ofthesetaskswere For each of these priorities, tasks were identified that were mostly already at an advanced stage when general declarations, whichundertake to: Audit Office (NIK)), Office Audit accessed: 23September2019. ichdziałalności cim roku orazpodsumowującyaktywnośćlegislacyjnąrząduiparlamentuwtrze od16maja do15listopada2018roku wokresie prowadzonej 30 29 title seemedtosuggestthatitwouldencompassanti-corruption policyatthegovernment level. arately from the programme andwere announced by different ministers – although the document’s Moreover, anti-corruptioninitiatives significant other government Right United by the appeared sep- the funds assignedto it and the management structure rendered its implementation impossible. paring bills, educational materials, studies, andso on. In short, the way the programme wasprepared, bureau is a typical law enforcement agency, an intelligence service, not an institution capable ofpre- the personnelnoreven thecompetencesincoordination andimplementation of publicpolicy. The implementing theprogramme washandedto the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, whichhasneither allocated to theprogramme, whichisentirely inadequate fortheplannedinitiatives. Responsibility for was million 3 PLN of budget A coalition. PO–PSL the by adopted programme the of errors main the reproduced it all, above prosaic: are reasons The term. parliamentary 2015–2019 the of end the fore be- materialised programme government the in proposed solutions anti-corruption key the of None curiosity. • • • • • • • • Skrywane projekty ustaw. XII Komunikat Obywatelskiego Forum Legislacji o jakości procesu legislacyjnegonapodstawieobserwacji ustaw.XIIKomunikat ObywatelskiegoForumLegislacjiojakości procesu Skrywane projekty https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,11324,vp,13673.pdf, accessed:23September2019. Strengthen internationalcooperation onpreventing andcombatingcorruption. combating corruption Implement solutionsforthecollaborationcoordination and oflawenforcement authoritiesin Shape publicawareness through anti-corruptioneducation cials andpeopleholdingpublicoffice offi- public for programmes education and training into education anti-corruption Implement Strengthen solutionslimitingthepossibilityofcorruptioninpublicandprivatesector Strengthen thetransparency andobjectivityofthepublicprocurement process. of economicsignificance monitor theexecution oflawsoncommercialisation and consolidation of property by companies Develop rulestoprotect thecivil law systemaswellthemajorpublicprocurements andto Strengthen theopennessandtransparency ofpubliclife , http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/XII_Komunikat_OFL.pdf, 29 couldnotbeawayofimprovingThe programme thedocument. isalistofeight 30 this point can be treated purely as a - 19 Stefan Batory Foundation introduce. legislative practice. Much more damaging, however, were the solutions that the act was supposedto ulations concerningdifferent issuesinoneact–wasstrongly criticisedasanexample ofcalamitous largely copiedthetexts oftheseacts,modifyingcertainaspects.Thisprocessreg alone–combining - bill Kamiński’s however, practice, In posts. public in individuals by activity economic on restrictions to repealThe actwassupposed three lawsregulating lobbying, accesstopublicinformationand enterprises andpublicinstitutions)intermsofproducing internalethicalmanagementrules. whistle-blowers, andalso,toacertainextent, the responsibility of collective entities (especially private the financial disclosure system, the conditions of access to public information, lobbying, the status of public lifebill,asitwasanambitiousandcontroversial idea forregulating fourareas inonelegalact: the foundationofstatepolicy was minimal.Itisworthpayingsomeattentiontothetransparency in govern- the before long ment’s anti-corruption programme was adopted, whichshows on again that the programme’s value as worked being therefore was bill The October. that unveiled and 2017 January in services, secret the of coordinator and portfolio without minister a Kamiński, Mariusz by Perhaps themost radical anti-corruption initiative was the transparency in publiclife bill Transparency inpubliclifebill 33 pl/docs//2/12304351/12465407/12465410/dokument315048.pdf, accessed:23September2019. 32 31 constitutional right to petition by giving citizens a dilemma: to use their right to petition and take part envisaged far-reaching interference in the right to privacy. These solutions also Once again, abill, under the pretext of battling corruption andseekingtransparency in public life, declarations from the two years preceding their desire to participate in a decision-making process. tax publish to supposed were meanwhile, persons, Natural donors. individual of data the provide to sations, apartfrom declaringsources ofincomefrom legalentities (e.g. grants), were alsosupposed natural persons(interestingly, privatecompanieswereto beexempt). supposed Civil society organi- their sources of income. These regulations were supposed to apply to civil society organisations and administrative decisions, including draft ontheinterested legalacts,dependent partiesdeclaring Another controversial proposal wastheonetomake participationintheconsultationofanydraft checking 69casesperyear? 600,000 people to submit declarations and the CBA, responsible for verifying them, is only capable of regularity of sucha high numberofdeclarations, since the current legal conditions require almost the monitor to able be would Who view. of point technical a from sense no made also It life). public the righttoprivacy (critics soon begantodubit the “transparency inprivatelife” bill, as opposedto After all, it was hard toarguesuch heavy thatthebattle restrictionswith corruptiondemanded on rations. This idea was controversial not only in terms of the constitutional principle ofproportionality. decla- financial publish to people million two as many as oblige would this that estimated was It too. spouses, their the bill, of versions first in the and, officers police municipal and soldiers rank-and-file pand the list of people obliged to submit and publish financial statements. It was supposed to include Using the attractive-sounding catchphrase “transparency”, the sponsors of the bill proposed to ex- few ofthemostserioussolutionsthatbillforesaw. a mention only will I point, this At reported. were comments various with positions 265 some stage, roku.pdf, accessed:23September2019. http://cba.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty_pdf/Informacja%20%20Centralnego%20Biura%20Antykorupcyjnego%20w%202018%20 Opinion oftheStefanBatoryFoundation onthetransparency inpubliclifebillof23October2017, https://legislacja.rcl.gov. https://legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/projekt/12304351/katalog/12465407#12465407, accessed:23September2019. 32 Thescale of thecontroversy is demonstrated by the factthat,atpublicconsultation 33 de facto restricted the 31 announced

20 Stefan Batory Foundation government in 2005–2007. in government directly to corruption in the form of abuse of power, as demonstrated during the first Law and Justice balances on the acts of a politicised public prosecutor’s office and law enforcement agencies can lead as theaforementionedsuch zens, regulations onwhistle-blowers. Discretionlack ofchecksand and various solutionsthatcouldbeusedatthediscretion oflawenforcement authorities to provoke citi reducedthe transparency by ofdecisionmaking limitingcitizens’accesstoit.Thebillalsocreated tice, ifthisacthadentered intoforce,as itwouldhaveradically itwouldalsohavebeencorruptogenic, example ofexploitingcivil rights. Inpracand theostensiblebattleagainstcorruptiontolimit human - to local government officials, via trade unions and employers’ organisations. It was almost a textbook The transparency inpubliclifebillprompted indignationinvariouscircles, from socialorganisations torial confidants. freedom ofspeech,oughttobeguaranteed thepossibility to report abuses–totherole of prosecu- activities. For example, both thetransparency in publiclife bill and theliability of collective entities anti-corruption of leader the of status the for minister, justice the Ziobro, Zbigniew with competing was Kamiński that suspect to reasons many also are There respect. this in policy state coherent a on tion programmethis showsAgain, wasadopted. that there wasnoagreement withinthegovernment the transparency inpubliclifebill,workon thisbillstartedlongbefore thegovernment’s anti-corrup- yet tobeacceptedby thecabinetanditwasnever senttotheSejm. ernment. Despite promises that the act would come into force at express speed, in January 2018 it had was thepublicprosecutor. like a witness, and the only authority entitled to freely accord whistle-blower status without any cause international standards. In short, the definition the bill assigned was to something a “whistle-blower” pose improprieties intheirworkplaceortheriskthatthey mightoccurhadnothingincommonwith tle-blowers. Apart from using the name, the proposed format of legal protection of peoplewhoex- Finally, thethird controversial proposal inthetransparency inpubliclifebill was its articles on whis- public decisions. in consultations, atthecostofgivinguptheirrighttoprivacy, ortogiveuptherightparticipatein 37 and SocialChange 36 vised, accessed:23September2019. https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/proposed_transparency_legislation_in_poland_must_be_rethought_and_re- 35 2019. pisane---Grzegorz-Makowski-i-Marcin-Waszak-o-projekcie-ustawy-o-jawnosci-zycia-publicznego.html, accessed:23September 34 collective entities for prohibited acts under penalty of law of liability on bill the – fate similar a met initiative anti-corruption significant third government’s The other anti-corruptioninitiatives Bill onliabilityofcollectiveentitiesforprohibitedactsunderpenaltylawand international organisations. tions, businesses andtrade unionsprotested against this regulation ofwhistle-blower status,butalso organisa - social Polish only Not protection. any person a such denying moment, any at away it take duration of the proceedings. Yet the public prosecutor could both award whistle-blower status and tection, such as making it impossible to dismiss them from work or access to free legal aid for the http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/dok?OpenAgent&8-020-1211-2019, accessed:23September2019. A. Krajewska, G.Makowski, “Corruption,anti-corruption andhumanrights:thecaseofPoland’s integritysystem”, Crime, Law https://legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/docs//2/12304351/12465407/12465410/dokument319949.pdf, accessed:23September2019; G. Makowski, M.Waszak, Przepisycyrylicąprzez PiSpisane,https://www.rp.pl/Opinie/304069992-Przepisy-cyrylica-przez-PiS- 2017, no.68(3),pp.325–339. 36 34 35 In the end, Kamiński did not find allies for his bill – not even in the gov- the in even not – bill his for allies find not did Kamiński end, the In Thebillenvisagedproviding whistle-blowers withcertainformsofpro- Inpractice, it reduced whistle-blowers –individualswho,onthebasisof 37 prepared by the Ministry of Justice. As with - 21 Stefan Batory Foundation human rightsandtheruleoflaware threatened underthepretext of combatingabuses. fore havebeenexamples ofanincreasingly present trend inglobalanti-corruptionpolicy, inwhich as therighttoprivacy, petition,ownershipor freedom ofeconomicactivity. These billswouldthere- radical. Theiradoptionwouldhavemeantfar-reaching interferencecivil infundamentalrights,such anti-corruption initiatives – the transparency and liability of collective entities bills – proved to be too their own ideas,mostofwhichdidnotcometofruition.It is alsoimportantto note thatthemain several ministers attempted,without really working togetherorwith the prime minister, to introduce policy. Its actions in this area were incoherent, unplanned andencumbered by departmentalism – In general, though, it is difficult to argue that the 2015–2019 government pursued any anti-corruption tree” (evidence obtainedillegally),ormakingiteasiertoconfiscateproperty obtainedthrough crime. ruption crime–abroader range ofinvigilation powers, thepossibility of using“fruitthepoisonous authorities also received new instruments for uncovering and combatingcorruption,includingcor- other things.Thelawenforcementtightening penaltiesforcertaincorruptioncrimes,among passed nated at the government level in any way. For example, in 2017 an amendment to the penal code was smaller and indirect activities that could bepartofanti-corruption policy, if only they had beencoordi- initiatives, which wereIn additionto these “major” notimplemented,weshouldat least mention be fullywithdrawn forpoliticalandPRreasons. legal solution is notfully accepted withinthe government andtheparliamentary majority, butcannot that forpolitical reasons Thisisatypicalsituationwhen to theso-called“freezer”. itwasconsigned meaning number, paper Sejm evenreceivea not did It motion. in set not was but 2019, early in Sejm property and freedom of economic activity. In the end, after several years of work, the bill reached the taking control ofthecompanyororganisation. control, toprohibit acollective entity fromany contracts concluding its board, ortosuspend thereby court without even prosecutor, the authorising envisaged bill the versions, first the In proceedings. well asthefar-reaching preventative measures thatthepublicprosecutor couldinvoke withinthe against alegal entity (a company, social organisation, political party oreven church legal entity), as proceedings commence to office prosecutor’s public the allowing premises vague the by prompted but it proved no less controversial than the transparency in public life bill. The most concerns were tion) and the demands ofthe EU. Inresponse to this problem, the Ministry of Justice prepared the bill, Corrup- against Convention UN the particular, (in Poland by signed conventions international from seldom usesthis measure. At the same time, the obligation to produce laws on this matter results culties with conducting proceedings in the way foreseen by the act, the public prosecutor’s office very for crimes,particularlycorruptionisuseless. to bepunished since 2002, which are in practice dead. in legislative terms and, furthermore, addressed a genuine needto change the regulations in place tection for whistle-blowers. However, theliability of collective entities bill was muchbetterprepared bill containedrivalregulationsand prothe obligationtoimplementethicalmanagement concerning - and SocialChange 41 operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Odpowiedzialnosc%20karna%20podmiotow%20zbiorowych.pdf, accessed:23September2019. 40 Zjednoczonych przeciwko korupcji wPolsce,WarszawaNarodów 2015,pp.17–35. izacji zachowań korupcyjnych”, in:G.Makowski, C.Nowak, C.Wojciechowska-Nowak, RealizacjawybranychpostanowieńKonwencji 39 38 therefore, thebillswere notpassed–ablessingindisguise. A. Krajewska, G.Makowski, “Corruption,anti-corruption andhumanrights:thecaseofPoland’s integritysystem”, Crime, Law wedługPiS,http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20G. Makowski, Odpowiedzialnośćkarnapodmiotówzbiorowych C. Nowak, “Implementacjaprzepisów konwencji. Ocenaimplementacjiwybranych artykułów konwencji dotyczącychpenal- ofLaws]2019,items628,1214. Dz.U. [Journal 2017, no.68(3),pp.325–339. 38 Forvarious reasons, the 2002 law, whichallows legal entities 40 Thebilltherefore contravened therighttoprivate 39 Owing to the enormous diffi- enormous the to Owing 41 Ultimately, 22 Stefan Batory Foundation ing the number ofthis typeofentity ing thenumber to aminimum. combined influence with lesscontrol. Thisproblem isdescribedinmanybooksoncorruption,whichrecommend reduc party - excessive from resulting abuses of source typical a are structures state ministrative bodies. Special agenciesandvarious entities funds, deliberately set up outsidethestrict public moneybut are tospend, notsubjecttothesamestrictstate orpubliccontrol facedbyof publicad- złoty of millions of hundreds have entities These established. were Development Society National Water Holding, Future WatersIndustry Platform Foundation and National Freedom Polish Institute – Centre for Civil vast the example, for 2015–2019, In structures. administration’s public the the creation of varioustypes of funds,agenciesandfoundations dependentonthestate, but outside Another example ofthis“systemic clientelism”,appropriation particularismand ofpublicresources is people inonefellswoop. out mass layoffs at these institutions and staffthem with hundreds or even thousands of their own public television broadcaster, whenthe government simply adopted resolutions allowing it to carry This was the case for the civil service, presiding judgesand the court administration as well as the of anovelty was theappropriation ofentire institutions in asystemic manner, by a changeinthelaw. but even the families of politicians or officials with ties to the ruling parties that filled posts. Something the quality of the“new elites” were unprecedented. vious governmentsalso inserted“theirown had people”,and decrease inthiscasethescale,speed in the civil service), the administration of courts, the public prosecutor’s office, and so on. Although pre - party nominees–atstate-owned enterprises,inthecentral andlocaladministration (andespecially filled be could by that posts public the all thereof elections, invasion 2015 instant the was after Right to anygovernment before it. fairs. Thedifference is that it represents an incomparable more aggressive and radical type compared similarly to all its predecessors by taking over public institutions and generating asuccessionofaf- have been victims ofcorruption. Poles are increasingly less likely to see it as a significant problem and less likely to say that they As opinionpollsshow, theoverall publicsenseofthethreatis steadilydecreasing. ofcorruption with thegovernment’s (anti-)corruptionpolicy(orlackthereof) in2015–2019. the aforementioned dataonthethreat ofcorruption(perceptions, experiences andcrimestatistics) In thissection, I will address several fundamentalquestionsthatbecomevery visible if wecompare less)? Perception andreality.in theUnited Why Right governmentis corruption soharmful(orharm- 2009. 43 podstawy, Warszawa 2018. , Warszawa 2018;J.Paczocha, 2017 roku 42 very soon prompted justified criticism and accusations of partisan influence; for example, for funding enterprises state-controlled largest (such as Orlen and PGE). The the PNF’s aims and operations from are extremely untransparent. donations The foundation of basis the on and Szydło Beata Minister established inlinewiththegeneral regulationson theinitiative of Prime ofthelawonfoundations, for instance), in which at least tighter control and greater transparency could be guaranteed. It was was notestablishedonthebasisofanyspecialact(unlike the Future IndustryPlatformFoundation, it formation: unprecedented an is This (PNF). Foundation National Polish the is problems causes that J. Wedel, od16listopada2015do31października See G.Kopińska,Stanowiskapublicznejako łuppolityczny.Politykapersonalnawokresie Shadow Elite: How the World’s New Power Brokers Undermine Democracy, Government, and the Free Market, Basic Books, UndermineDemocracy,Government,andtheFree Shadow Elite:HowtheWorld’sNewPower Brokers Partia w państwie. Bezprecedensowa wymianakadrwadministracjirządowejijejlegislacyjne Partia wpaństwie. Bezprecedensowa At the same time, the 2015–2019 coalition government behaved government coalition 2015–2019 the time, same the At 42 43 Inmanyplaces,itwasnotjustpartynominees, One particularly flagrant example of an entity an of example flagrant particularly One 23 Stefan Batory Foundation community. a political campaign supportingthecontroversial changes tothejudiciary and affectingthejudicial 23 September 2019. 47 iedliwe-Sady---postanowienie-sadu.html, accessed:23September2019. 46 to/9mnqpcy, accessed:23September2019. 45 utem-orzekl-sad, accessed:23September2019. 44 of millions of złoty into a dubious campaign to improveto States. United campaign the Poland’sdubious in a image into złoty of millions of concluding thatthere hadbeennoevidence ofacrime. Thisdecisionisspicedupalittle by thefact called in to provide an explanation. Thereafter, the prosecutor finally decided not to open an enquiry, was Srebrna from anyone nor Kaczyński Neither hours. 40 than more devoted prosecutor the whom prosecutorthe public tookover this affair,theonlypersoninterviewed wasoneAustriancitizen,to the state and, in practice, nominees ofthe ruling party, hadjust taken control. For ninemonthsafter 300 million loan for investment in the skyscrapers. Theloan was to be paidby Pekao BankSA, of which PLN a secure to needed Srebrna that attorney of power the signing for return in company), Srebrna the of owner formal the is foundation the brother, twin deceased Kaczyński’s Jarosław after (named Institute Kaczyński Lech the of council foundation the in priest a to paid allegedly was 50,000 PLN of systemic political corruption. TheSrebrna affairalsocontainsadirect corruptioncomponent.Abribe ties that was demonstrated in this affair is a textbook example of a situation planting the roots of and associated groups. Theconvergence ofmurkypersonal(including familial), political and business Kaczyński’sparty for fund endowmentprovide an to supposed wereWarsaw. buildings of centreThe with close ties to PiS, Birgfellner had prepared designsforthe construction of two skyscrapers in the Gerald Birgfellner. Commissioned by the Srebrna company, set up some time earlier by Kaczyński and headquarters negotiating a solution to the problem of the payment of a fee to Austrian businessman party the at recorded was government, the of head facto de and chairman party PiS the Kaczyński, At this point, we cannot avoid mentioning the “Srebrna affair” of early 2019. On this occasion, Jarosław since then. ki was arrested on misconduct charges in late 2018, there has been no significant progress in the case over by thestatetreasury inreturn forafavourable contractAlthough Chrzanows fora lawyerfriend. - was recorded by the owner of a Polish bank suggestingthat he could help avoid the bank beingtaken vision Commission affair”. The government-appointed headof the commission, Marekvision Commission affair”. Chrzanowski, with corruption, tinged involving leading politicians and unequivocally officials. One worth mentioning scandals was the “Financial Super- of series a featured also term firm government’s coalition The transparency andtheaccountabilityofpeopleresponsible foritsoperation. on thefringesofstate’s structures, where it is impossibletoimplementhighenoughstandards of sies associatedwithitare anexample ofthetypical problems withentities set uponpolitical orders been deemedunlawfulby courts, withnolegalconsequences). have actions its of some (although legal is formula PNF’s the because corruption” “legal of example political parties. Itdefactousesmoney frompolitical activity. statecompaniestofund Thisisasubtle ties to the government in key posts, is nothing other than sly circumvention of the rules on funding tivity, focused solely the ruling coalition’son pursuing political goals while putting activists with close ac- one-sided entirely PNF’s the practice, In camp. ruling the with friendly family diaspora Polish a of ington-based lobbying companies that it hired showed that most of the money had goneto members known about the effects of the campaign, but publicly available reports submitted by one of the Wash- https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1354154,afera-w-knf-czarnecki-obawial-sie-o-niezaleznosc-audytora.html, accessed: https://www.rp.pl/Fundacje-i-stowarzyszenia/181129432-Polska-Fundacja-Narodowa-naruszyla-swoj-statut-finansujac-Spraw- https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/jak-polska-fundacja-narodowa-wyrzuca-miliony-dolarow-w-amerykanskie-blo- https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/polska-fundacja-narodowa-kampania-sprawiedliwe-sady-niezgodna-ze-stat- 44 Later, journalists from the Onet news website discovered that the PNF had pumped tens 46 The PNF’s activity and the controver- 45 Little is 47

24 Stefan Batory Foundation Srebrna affair,informationaboutthiscametopublicattentionaftertheelectionsinOctober2019. the same tax. In 2019, they were detained and then arrested on charges such as VAT fraud. defraud As to with the helping were colleagues closest his abuses, VAT combating and Administration Revenue National the building for responsible minister finance deputy the was Banaś when that out turned estimated value. its giving as well as statement, her in barn the declared official, public a also wife, minister’s the that converted into a luxuryloftapartment.Thepublicwouldnothavefoundoutaboutit if notforthefact was thatofthelate environment minister Jan Szyszko, whosedeclaration failedtodiscloseabarn owned by Banaś was rented “by the hour” by representatives of the Krakowunderworld. the representatives of by hour” the “byrented was Banaś byowned metres square 400 of townhouse a revealed, channel television TVN24 the for working journalists by he admitted in an interview) his income from renting out property. Furthermore, as an investigation (as understated also He finance. of minister later and minister deputy as submitted he statements post with the ruling camp’s votes, Banaś was selected for the post despite ambiguities in the financial the to Appointed Banaś. Marian Office, Audit Supreme the of president the involved It end. an to ing Finally, onemorenot beoverlookedthat should affair on thisanalysiswascom- as work washatching interest. Kaczyński’s by dictated was enquiry an open to not decision the that suspicions (justified) prompted the election campaign, whichcouldhave lowered supportforthe party. Announcingit would have obvious that thiswasdoneto protect Law andJustice from adebateonthecontroversial case during is It them. after until announced not and 2019 October 13 on elections the before made was it that tember 2019. 55 ktore-wcale-sie-nam-nie-konczy-6183812642347137a, accessed:23September2019. 54 tember 2019. 53 html, accessed:23September2019. 52 go, accessed:23September2019. 51 fia-vat--owska-giertych-uderza-6438823462282881a.html, accessed:23September2019. 50 nien--6317578478134913a, accessed:23September2019. 49 tvn24,971093.html, accessed:23September2019. 48 publication. its delaying minister, finance was he when statement his problemwith a governmentinnocent. PrimeMinisterMateuszMorawiecki campappear wasamongthosewhohad the of members leading other of statements financial the with problems the backdrop, this Against a person supported bya person supported the ruling party and “sweeping the matter under the carpet”. before hewasappointedto the post.Certainly, this seemed like acaseofthestate authorities “hiding” Despite this, the CBA, whichwasresponsible forverifying statements, did not complete checks onhim been doubts about the holdings of the minister and later head of the Supreme Audit Office since 2016. take ineachcase. incomplete information. Defendinghimselfinthemedia,heclaimedthat this had beenasimple mis- or incorrect with declarations financial 12 as many as gave who Dworczyk, Michał Minister of case over to his wife, with whom he has separate property status – out of the public eye. out that Morawiecki’s declarations contained inconsistencies and that he kept certain asserts – signed that ithadgreatwas therefore sentimentalvalueand pricelessforhim. https://www.rp.pl/Rzad-PiS/190529630-Oswiadczenia-majatkowe-Dworczyk-zatail-udzialy-w-spolce.html, accessed:23Sep https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/szyszko-pokazal-co-znajduje-sie-w-slynnej-stodole-i-przeprowadzil-dowod-logiczny-ws-drewna- https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/polityka/stodola-ministra-jana-szyszko-zdjecia-wnetrza-stodoly/r2y7k2j, accessed:23 Sep http://wroclaw.wyborcza.pl/wroclaw/7,35771,24804530,morawiecki-uwlaszczyl-sie-na-gruntach-koscielnych-jest-odpowiedz. https://natemat.pl/167021,wicepremier-mateusz-morawiecki-jako-jedyny-czlonek-rzadu-nie-zlozyl-sprawozdania-majatkowe- https://www.money.pl/podatki/afera-z-otoczenia-banasia-jeden-z-jego-najblizszych-wspolpracownikow-kierowal-ma- https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/wkurzeni-pracownicy-fiskusa-zrobili-kontrole-majatku-wiceministra-finansow-zadaja-wyjas- https://www.tvn24.pl/superwizjer-w-tvn24,149,m/pancerny-marian-i-pokoje-na-godziny-reportaz-superwizjera-w-- 53 55 Yet, foralongtime,theministerrefusedto declare theproperty’s value,claiming These people all went unpunished. Innoneofthecasesdidpublicprosecutor’s Thesepeopleallwentunpunished. 54 We could also mention the mention also could We 51 49 52 Itlaterturned In addition,it Another case 48 There had - 50 - 25 Stefan Batory Foundation ki, and his family and party colleagues for private purposes. Bank of Poland and the repeated use of state aeroplanes by the marshal of the Sejm, Marek Kuchcińs- competences and experience) of the female assistants of the PiS-nominated president of the National given to members of Prime Minister Beata Szydło’s cabinet, the gigantic salaries (far outweighing their office even initiate a preliminary investigation. There are many similar cases, such as the pay bonuses 59 58 57 accessed: 23September2019. 56 years. Thenext isthegenerallyavailability betterqualityand of variousservices(for whichonemight several objective factors. One is the economic situation of society, which hasbeenimproving for many I wouldlike topropose thehypothesisthatthis “desensitisation” tocorruptionresults above allfrom institutions. demns individual and personalcorruption,butlimits criticism when thecorruptionconcernsentire unique mentality, which, according to research by Przemysław Sadura and Sławomir Sierakowski, con- and further back than the 2015–2019 term of government. Another factor, certainly, is Polish society’s government corruptionare thereforealso godeeper smaller.Butthecausesofthis phenomenon this one at least gives something back to others – it divides its spoils. Criticism and concernsabout indeed beaware oftheaffairsandscandals,butisconvincedthatevery governmentthat stealsand (although there are no polls to confirm this, just qualitative research) qualitative just this, confirm to polls no are there (although cess with its social programmes, temperingcitizens’ criticism of the state. It is also no doubt the case Perhaps this tolerance of corruption results partly from the fact that the government has enjoyed suc- majorities inthepast. of thegovernment –muchmore sothanthey were towards othergovernments andparliamentary simply impervious to cases ofthis kind andare very tolerant ofcorruptconductby representatives lites remained atahighandstable level despitetheseriesofaffairsandabusespower. Peopleare satel- its and Justice and Law for support why explains this extent, certain a one. To significant a not ple have many diverse reasons for giving a negative assessment of the government, but corruption is just 1%,selected “scandals: Credit Unions,FinancialSupervisionCommission,etc.,corruption”. ple stated“nepotism, puttingtheirown peopleinpositions,appropriating thestate”,even and fewer, 40% of respondents. Answeringanopenquestion aboutthe reasons forthis opinion, only 4% of peo- United Rightgovernment aftermore thanthree years inpower. Anegative view wasexpressed by the of evaluation overall the on poll a out carried CBOS 2019, February In corruption. of reports on outlined above. Interestingly, even the government’s opponents donot base their negative opinions At the same time, public opinionseems unmoved by both these affairs andcorruptionin general, as opponents are even worse. instrumentalised thegovernment’s is,asitseeksatallcoststoprove anti-corruption“policy” thatits ly launching proceedings againstpeopleassociated with the opposition. Thisshows how extremely immediate- by circles own its in scandal every to responds camp ruling the Additionally, office. tor’s these matters are systematically drawn out and “buried”by law enforcement and the public prosecu- a strongthat demand response from thelawenforcementas authorities.Butnoneisforthcoming, The rulingcoalition’s time in government has therefore been characterised by many shocking affairs problem compared tothethree affairsmentionedabove. P. Sadura, S.Sierakowski, PolitycznycynizmPolaków. Raportzbadańsocjologicznych Internal report oftheStefanBatoryFoundationonresearch onLawandJusticepartyvoters (manuscript). https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2019/K_018_19.PDF, accessed:23September 2019. https://oko.press/kuchcinski-tlumaczy-swe-loty-sluzba-publiczna-ale-84-proc-z-nich-bylo-z-do-domu-liczby-go-demaskuja/, 59

56 Yet these examples seem to be a minor , Warszawa 2019,pp.14–16. 58 thattheaverage citizenmay 57 Peo- 26 Stefan Batory Foundation several extreme cases,havetaken placewithinthelaw. for except nominees, party with boards company of filling the even and purges mass allowing laws a crime.Afterall,thestatutory“appropriation” ofthecivil service orjudicial administration by passing systemic responses.It frequently cannotbe eludesdefinitions in criminallegislationand regarded as Today, therefore, wehaveaproblem with political, systemic, “grand corruption”, and this demands able itbecomestotheaverage person. a political a component at political its core. fact thatPoland has aproblemand, more with corruption precisely, withgrandwith corruption, doesn’t affect me personally, I’ll turn off the TV and don’t need to watch it. a crimeseries.Evenifit is based onatruestory, peopleseemto think: it’s still just a programme, it watching were they if as almost offices) and companies state in nominees party putting as (such dia affairs inthe top echelonsofpower – or, more generally, in the publicsphere – presented in the me- At present, corruption seems more distant from Poles’ everyday experiences. People tend to view the longer playsthesamerole. involved in corruptionaffairstotheirrivals than they are today. Thepersonalexperience factorno – or even decades – ago, Poles were more likely to transfer their support forpoliticians and groupings years few a why is This experiences. own their through government the of appraisals their filter rally echelons ofpowercorruption intheupper tendency tocondemn to begreater. alsohad Peoplenatu- When corruption was more palpable to the average person, and therefore a more acute problem, the person whohasgivenabribe. drop percentagesignificant the the in of knowor service who health respondents a the in corruption can Echoes also be seenin the polls cited above; a strong example is the aforementioned improved opinionon larger. much was corruption “everyday” of kind this of scale the when 2000s, or 1990s the longer no is this – but police the with contact in and universities schools, offices, administration present ineveryday experience. There are certainly still cases ofcommoncorruption–athospitals, deficiencies), the state seems to be generally functioning better and thus corruption has become less have topay, butrarelyA third offer abackhander). factoristhat,fortheordinary citizen(despitemany 62 tions. the participationofhigh-ranking publicofficialsandcostsintheformoflosssignificant publicfundsandhumanrightsviola 61 cessed: 23September2019. 60 veloped country, elites. Perhaps perversely, we could even say that just as Poland hascome to be seen as a highly de- show whendiscussingthe main areas of threats) and involves political, administrative and economic developed variety. to government-friendly mediaafterthe right-wing coalition came topower; atthesametime,little rial subsidiesorstate-owned averylarge companies’advertisingbudgets, proportion ofwhich went amine where variousstreams ofpublicmoney have beendiverted. Anexample mightbetheministe- Incidentally, there are manymore manifestationsofthispartisanparticularism, especially if weex- ed ascorruption. access to public resources – much of the government’s conduct in 2015–2019 should indeed be treat- understanding employed in this article, which views corruption as a form ofparticularism – limiting https://natemat.pl/262257,byly-rzecznik-mon-bartlomiej-m-zatrzymany-przez-cba, accessed:23September2019. Transparency International isseekingforinternationalorganisations toadoptalegaldefinitionofcorruption to emphasise https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/dolaczylismy-do-elitarnego-grona- polska,23,0,2416663.html,ac 60 ourcorruptionhasalsotransitioned from “street” corruptiontothe “grand”, highly 61 Itisaparadox thatthe“grander” contemporary corruptiongets,thelessnotice- This kind ofcorruptionis systemic (intrinsic to institutions, as I will 62 Butfrom theperspectiveofsociological This does not change the does not This - - 27 Stefan Batory Foundation concrete helpfrom thestate budget, forinstance. werefor thestategovernment compliantpartners could expect bettercooperationas aresult, and, election campaign in 2018, the United Right government openly declared that local governments that justice system or in relations between local and central government. Duringthe local government observe symptoms of inequalities resulting from systemic corruption; forexample, in access to the economic stability,to have an impact on the country’s this effect will ensue. However, we canalready average citizen) the by felt immediately almost is corruption grand where situation, economic difficult a in countries on thestate’s economicsituation,wewillnotobservethiseffect(unlike, forexample, indeveloping within theaverage citizen’s experience. Until the consequencesofthiscorruptionhaveanimpact larism –will not automatically lead toincreased social inequalities when it remains atalevel scarcely To concludethissection,Iwouldlike toemphasisethatsystemic corruption–althoughitisparticu- systemic solutionsinthenext section. again toRobertKlitgaard’s model).Iwill focus onthesesystemic concentrations ofcorruptionand lic decisionsandguarantee thetransparencyof government andaccountability (to refer once to counteract demandssystemicsolutions Systemic corruption thediscretionary nature ofpub- nominees, partisancourtsandeven politicallyinfluencedmediaand “desensitised” citizens. party by staffed institutions control and office prosecutor’s public the agencies, enforcement law by is increasingly becomingpartofthesystem of exercising power. Thisisbecausethey will not beused exposeistic investigationand abuses.Yet thesemeasures willnotbearemedy forcorruption,which journal- a decent conduct to possible is it system, disclosure financial deficient a using even shown, have Dworczyk Michał Minister and Banaś Marian chief Office Audit Supreme of cases the As them. helpful either.Ofcourse,itisworthpreparingthese kindsofsolutions,havingthemready andusing not are system, disclosure financial the of reform even or legislation criminal tighter including form, ensure thatthere isnone.Thevarious“technical” measures designedtocounteract corruptioninthis sive. Sometimes there isnotevento investigate,asstepshavebeentaken anylegalfoundation to pas- remain authorities enforcement law and services secret office, prosecutor’s public partisan the There is no investigation of these signs of corruptionin the sense of particularism – not only because have limitedviewership andreadership. outlets media these as justification, economic no have actions these that fact the to paid is regard samorządu terytorialnegoWspólnota 66 frontacje-to-wspolpraca-z-rzadem-jest-latwiejsza,112947.html, accessed: 23September2019 65 2015. 64 wydatki-w-gazecie-polskiej-zwiekszyly-o-ponad-120-proc, accessed:23September2019. 63 development.should bebasedonthemostobjective, Accesstothesefunds merit-based criteria pos- projects support building localroad infrastructure. Itgoeswithoutsayingthatroads are acrucialelementoflocal to aims 2018, in established fund, grants government this suggests, name its As whose reportas thisanalysiswasbeingcompleted. was published ontheMunicipalRoadsFund A good illustration of how this type of mechanism might work is provided by Prof. Paweł Swianiewicz, mass scale. quality of life in particular local communities and is a short step away from political clientelism on a P. Swianiewicz, politykipartyjnej narozdział “Wpływ dotacjicelowych naprzykładzie FunduszuDróg Samorządowych”, Pismo https://www.portalsamorzadowy.pl/polityka-i-spoleczenstwo/michal-dworczyk-jezeli-samorzad-nie-jest-nastawiony-na-kon- them.Evidencepaperoncorruption Why corruptionmatters:understandingcauses,effectsandhowtoaddress https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/panstwowe-spolki-najwiecej-na-reklamy-wydaja-w-sieci-prawdy-wprost-i-do-rzeczy-- 64 . Thisisnottosaythatifthedeterioration ofpublicinstitutionsprogressesstarts and 2020,no.1/2020. 63 65 Thiscouldhavenegativeconsequencesforthe , DIFID, London 66

28 Stefan Batory Foundation and tiesconducivetocorruptpractices betweenpoliticiansandofficialsatthelocalcentral level. on party them dependent concerns, contributesdirectly to the development of clientelistic networks to concludethatincreasing theproportion ofmoney comingfrom centralwhile alsomaking funds, partisan influence and therefore also to particularisation and all the ensuing consequences. It is easy to susceptible are They influence. little have authorities local while subsidies, specific of distribution the in role major a plays government the course, Of one-third. over for accounted it 2018 of end the by 16%, than higher no was it 2013 in Whereas sharply. increased budgets municipality in subsidies specific of share the term, government’s Right United the during that, shows Swianiewicz thermore, municipalities where thelocal leaders andcouncilmajority have ties to theLawandJusticeparty. Fur- 2019, in fund encompassing ten provinces. This makes it clear that the distribution of these funds distinctly favours the from subsidies of waves two of analysis precise rather a conducted Swianiewicz sible, guaranteeingfor thistypeofinfrastructure. equalityandtakingintoaccountthetruedemand on holding office as a deputy and senator. The objective was not only to give the opposition less room Above all,theSejm,dominatedbyregulationsthe working asinglepolitical opinion, changed andact of thisare diverse. balances between the branches ofpower are diminished inanobvious way. Theconsequences and checks as mutual the riskofcorruption, affecting is anobjective andsystemicfactor This idential level, as well as in parliament,the hands ofone political alliance is therefore huge. the United Right’s candidate.Theconcentration ofexecutive power at thegovernment andpres- centres, to the detriment of the former. On top of this, the presidential election in 2015 was won by turned out to be in practice in terms of the separation of powers between the legislative and executive ruling camp.This homogeneity of the parliamentary majority need not have been dysfunctional, but it pared to the minor partners, which results in a limited pluralism of views and homogeneity in the main characteristic of this quasi-coalition is thehegemonic positionofthestrongest party(PiS) com- and PSL or Solidarity Electoral Action and the Freedom Union (more on this in the next section). The byformed Civicthe PolishPeople’s Platformand earlier, theDemocratic Party(PSL) and, LeftAlliance not a coalition of entities of equalstatus, as was the case in the previous parliamentary majorities is this but Agreement,Gowin’s Jarosław and Poland Solidary Ziobro’sZbigniew of consists also camp having to form acoalition with anotherparty. Granted, inaddition to Law andJustice, the UnitedRight communism, onegrouping managedtowinamajority that enabledit to formagovernment without from transition Poland’s since time first the for elections, 2015 the In 1989. since camp political one and factors has led to the greatest concentration of executive and legislative power in the hands of the problem ofinterference intheseparation ofpowers isobvious. Aconvergence ofcircumstances In thecontext of the threat of corruptionthat we are experiencing duringthe United Rightgovernment, The problem Interference intheseparation ofthelegislatureandexecutive can beremoved The mainconcentrations ofgrand corruptionandhow they 29 Stefan Batory Foundation Act on the Institute of National Remembrance in 2019. in Remembrance National of Institute the on Act could be passed very quickly – within a few days or even a matter of hours, like an amendment to the well asagainstthelimited access ofthemediaandcitizenstoparliament. among otherthings,againsthow lawswere passed,whichwentagainstbasiclegislative standards, as on the executive was the major protest mounted by the opposition in the Sejm in late 2015 and 2016, function. Thepretext for this and manyotherchangeslimiting the possibility of parliamentary checks importantly from the point of view– most of this study – to carry out the parliament’s checks andbalances also but debate public hold to only not senators and deputies for difficult it making duced, parliamentarydebateslimited. Manyproceduralsubmit formalmotionsduring changeswere intro- their ability Deputies found to ask government representatives questions aboutcurrent issuesand terpreted couldbedockedfor whichadeputy and asmuchhalfhisorhersalaryforthree months). which they couldbeapplied(forexample, anew premise –insultingtheSejmthatcouldbefreely in- opposition. Draconian penaltiesfordeputieswere introduced, while increasing thelist of reasons for ruptogenic, inthesensethatit constitutes another violation ofthestandards ofmutualchecksand for manoeuvre, butalsotoreduce opportunitiesforcontrol. 70 2019. 69 68 ties forcontrol notonlyoftheopposition,butalldeputies. functions. Thepackagewasnever debatedinparliamentandthechangesadoptedby themajorityseverely limitedthepossibili antee theparliamentaryoppositionadecentplaceindemocratic process andprovide itwithgenuinechecksandbalances contrary toitselectoral promises from 2015,whenithadpledgedtointroduce aso-called“democratic package” thatwouldguar- rac-naruszenie-powagi/, accessed:23September2019.Itisalsoworthnotingthattheright-wing coalitionmadethesechanges 67 consultations, reviews or interministerial agreements couldbebypassed. in theformofbills submitted by agroup ofdeputies.Thismeantthattheneedtocarryoutpublic became standard practice to bypass bills. Bills that were drafted inthe government reached theSejm ers) have been processed. During the United Right government, and especially in the first two years, it Furthermore, itisimportanttoaddress thewayinwhich mostofthecontroversial acts (andoth- public prosecutor’s officeandthecivilservice(more ontheselater). act on theConstitutional Tribunal andthejudicial system, as well as changesto regulations onthe constitutional, and thus corruptogenic, changes to the law. The most significant examples include the out any particular obstacles, the ruling majority could vote through many controversial or even un- By reducing theparliament’s competencesindebatesandcontrol, aspacewascreated where, with- been considered goodformforeachparliamentarycaucustohaveoneplaceinthepresidium. Party caucus from thePresidium oftheSejm. Although thelawdoesnotspecifythis,it had previously the pointofview ofpolitical custom, suchastheremoval ofarepresentative of thePolishPeople’s changes were alsoaccompaniedby concrete decisionsthatwere notunlawful,butcontroversial from by participants in a committee debate onkey changes to the judiciary to just 30 seconds). sition from debate(awidelydescribedcase,butnottheonlyone,wasdecisiontolimit statements er, the ruling majority had plannedto curb parliamentary activity and managedto eliminate the oppo- untransparent, closing it to citizens and resulting in numerous major legislative errors. that it contravenes theprinciplesof proper legislation and renders theentire law-makingprocess wiadomosc/5-tys-zl-mandatu-za-spacer-z-dzieckiem-po-chodniku-7735301.html, accessed:23September2019 to-wcale-nie-jest-niewinna-ustawa/6yryt3s; 5tys.mandatuzaspacer zdzieckiempościeżce rowerowej, https://www.bankier.pl/ 72 org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Grzechy_PiS_nowelizacje_IPN.pdf, accessed: 23September2019. 71 See http://300polityka.pl/live/2018/07/19/piotrowicz-na-spc-ogranicza-czas-wypowiedzi-do-30-sekund/, accessed:23September https://wiadomo.co/sejm-nie-dla-dziennikarzy/, accessed:23September 2019. https://oko.press/zeby-opozycja-gardlowala-zadawala-tych-pytan-przerywala-pis-zmienia-regulamin-sejmu-chce-ka- G. Makowski, Wolne12listopada?Towcaleniejest niewinna ustawa G. Makowski, isiedemgrzechówgłównych państwaPiS NowelizacjeustawyoInstytuciePamięci Narodowej Skrywane projekty ustaw...Skrywane projekty , https://www.newsweek.pl/opinie/wolne-12-listopada- 71 Theproblem withthis practice is not only 67 These changes were Thesechanges targeted atthe 70 68 Actsprocessed inthisway Evenwithoutthis,howev- , http://www.batory. 72 It is also cor- 69 The legal - 30 Stefan Batory Foundation and making it clear that this could have negative effects on the economy and labour market.it clearthatthiscouldhavenegative effectsontheeconomyand making and the minister of enterpriseandtechnology, couldnotcontainhersurprise,distancingherselfpublicly including a sharp rise in the monthly minimum wage to PLN 4,000 gross. This time, Jadwiga Emilewicz, electoralpromises,main the announced Kaczyński Again, year. that later campaign election mentary child andanadditional(“13th”) monthlypensionpayment.Thesituation was repeated intheparlia- responsibility for expensive social programmes suchastheextension ofthe500+ scheme toevery the government cedessomeofitscontrol over publicpoliciestoparliament. that means course of which bills, to modifications far-reaching make to deputies allows therefore It quire aregulatory impactanalysis(RIA),thegovernment essentially sends ahalf-product totheSejm. processthe standards andignoring ofcorrect legislation,which,apartfrom consultations,alsore- It is a similar story for thegovernment, themaincentre ofexecutive power. By bypassing thenormal monitor theactionsofexecutive. balances, asdeputies,by takingpartinbypassing government projects, relinquish theopportunityto ze-emilewicz,nId,3195755, accessed:23September2019. 76 accessed: 23September2019. 75 cessed: 23September2019. 74 html, accessed:23September2019. changes initscontent.http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,22088949,ustawa-o-sadzie-najwyzszym-w-sejmie-kim-jest-andrzej matusiewicz. is formallyadeputies’bill,therepresentative ofgovernment hasamuchweaker position,andtherefore lesscontrol over the question wasnoteven familiarwiththebillheorshewassponsoring.Onotherhand,thismeantthatinadebateonwhat 73 and largeareathis in informality scaleof isanevidentproblemscausing factor inthestate Yetwings. mistakesliable for be heldformally hecannot of clarity The lack andbaddecisions. mally, the government isresponsible forit,but in practice itistheparty leader, sitting inthe This therefore begs the question about actual accountabilityand liability forpublicpolicy. For- of theSejm. deputy normal a only formally was who Kaczyński, again but reservations, her to media) the in (also estingly, itwasnotEmilewicz’s theoretical boss, PrimeMinisterMateuszMorawiecki, whoresponded Teresa Czerwińska, who resigned after the election. cluded promises that came as a surprise to government ministers. Among them was finance minister in- it that fact the for not if this about strange nothing be would There Kaczyński. Jarosław chairman party by announced was programme electoral The 2019. spring in campaign election Parliament an The workingsofthismechanismcanbeobserved,forexample, duringthecourseofEurope- transparently andinvisiblytocitizens. arepublic decisions made outside formalstructures, ignoringprocedures regulated by law, un- with aclosecirclearrangement,is acorruptogenic ofpeopleinthepartyauthorities.This since JarosławKaczyński, Justice, and Law of leader the but ter, the view that the actual centre ofexecutive power wasnot the government oreven the prime minis- mentary termwere nottheleadersofparliamentarymajority. There ismuchevidence tosupport The problem, whichmainlyappliestothegovernment,the parlia- isthattheprimeministersduring On thesideofexecutive,of competences,liability wealsoobserveablurring and accountability. checks andbalances. balances between the legislature and the executive, we therefore have the relinquishing of https://fakty.interia.pl/raporty/raport-wybory-parlamentarne-2019/aktualnosci/news-jaroslaw-kaczynski-odpowiada-jadwid- https://gospodarka.dziennik.pl/praca/artykuly/607291,placa-minimalna-jadwiga-emilewicz-minister-przedsiebiorczosci.html, https://gospodarka.dziennik.pl/news/artykuly/592900,piatka-kaczynskiego-resort-finansow-teresa-czerwinska.html, ac- During debatesonbypassing bills,thedeputyacting asrapporteur ofabillwasoftenreplaced by aminister. TheMPin 76 74 It is an opensecret thatshedidnotwanttotake formally a rank-and-file deputy,together a formally 73 Instead of checks and Insteadofchecks 75 Inter- 31 Stefan Batory Foundation as theirpurposewasthefurthersubordination ofthejudiciarytoexecutive. seen as a manifestation of corruption. The laws made in this way, incidentally, are also corruptogenic, be itself can which procedures, official of outside law-making untransparent absolutely of example the drastic deteriorationbalances between the executive ofchecksand parliament, butisalsoan and immediately voted through using the“bypass” principledescribedabove. Thiscasenotonlyillustrates made” versionsofthebillsagreed oninthisinformalwaywere senttotheSejm,where they were between thePiS chairman, thepresident andenvoys of thejustice minister, outofpublicview. “Ready- the distribution ofthis power wasmadenotin an opendebate in parliament,but covert discussions sented hisown, restoring hispowers ofcontrol regarding judges. Ultimately, however, thedecisionon a vociferous reaction from thepresident. Dudavetoed the law prepared by the government andpre- (and, specifically, the justice minister) at the cost of the head of state, prompted not only protests, but the Supremeand which shiftedcompetencestothegovernment Court.Theattemptedamendments, tests, President Duda decided to veto some of the acts concerning the National Council of the Judiciary pro- street Following 2017. in situation the was corruption of threat the creates balances and checks A drastic example of how the excessive concentration of power and accompanyingdissipation of whose effectssoonbecamevisible,asweshallseelater). fice, which in practice ended its autonomy from political power (this is another corruptogenic change of- prosecutor’s public the to changes the for approval absolute president’s the note also should We implement thelaw–includinginbattle against corruption(more onthisinthenext subsection). extent, large these acts brought thejudiciary under thecontrol of the executive, thereby a reducing its capacity to To courts. common and Court Supreme Judiciary, the of Council National Tribunal, corruptogenic, laws. In particular, this meant judicial acts regulating the status of the Constitutional this is the factthatDudahardly used hisrightto veto any of theevidently unconstitutional, as well as Duda, from the same political camp, turnedout to be entirely subordinate to it. The best evidence of The balancebetweenthepresidential and parliamentary centres wasdisrupted.President Andrzej new mechanisms were created to “discipline” opposition deputies whenthey became too inquisitive. more precise, left inthehandsofopposition,althoughwithreduced scopeforaction.Inaddition, Checks andbalancesbetweenthe government andparliamentwere therefore disabled–or,to be are welldocumentedinalarge amountofresearch andliterature. while thegovernment andparliamentwere amere façade.Theconsequencesintermsof corruption buro of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, with the first secretary at the helm, the situation during the communist era, whenactual power in the state was inthe hands ofthe Polit corruption. and wrongdoing systemic for field a also but administration, siątych, Warszawa 1995;R.Karklins, 77 is thenature ofPolishpoliticalpartiesandthesecondiselectoral system. levelpossible pluralism.ideological and political of Two arefactors systemic here:significant first the be to create a framework forthe operation of the parliament and government permitting the highest balances at the level of relations between thelegislature and the executive, the best solution would In searching formeasures toprevent suchextensive disintegration oftheprinciplechecksand Proposals See J.Kurczewski, Umowaokartki The SystemMadeMeDoit... Władza i interesy w gospodarce polskiej u progu latosiemdzie polskiejuprogu wgospodarce , Warszawa 2004;A.Rychard, Władzaiinteresy 77 This is reminiscent of - - 32 Stefan Batory Foundation sions handingthepartychairmanalmost unlimited power withintheorganisation. that has managed to stay in power for so long. Furthermore, PiS’s statute contains numerous provi- centralisedleadership and uniform a such groupinghas other No scene. political Polish the on tional that since its inception the party has been led by the same person, Jarosław Kaczyński, makes it excep- party. “totalitarian” fact very such The one is particular in PiS ironfist. leader’s party bythe command leader andhisteam.They are built not oninternal,pluralistic dialogue,butontheruleofloyalty and Law and Justice is the prime example ofthis model. exceptions (PSL and partofthe left), Polish political parties tend to be leader-focusedorganisations – few a With level. legal the and cultural the between distinguish can we parties, political of terms In 78 atively low(just 38.3%), with arelatively support lowmajor fragmentation turnoutand ofthepolitical Regardingthe electoral system,asthe2015 election results showed,it ispossiblethatapartywithrel - issues. the transparency and operation ofpoliticalparties,before the ruling camp can dominate these opposition’s hands.Itwouldbe desirable for theoppositiontopropose itsown billtoimprove of combating abusesin politics, which always sounds good,the bill would be similarly controversial to the transparency in public life bill. With the ostensible objective no concrete plans have been suggestedin the public debate,butit is easy to imagine that a potential promised tomake new proposals forcontrolsactivity and of politicalparties.To onthefunding date, 2018–2020 for programme prevention corruption government aforementioned The opponents. its As therulingcoalition has theinstrumentsofpowerit caneasily initshands,exploit thistoattack position exposes it to an attackfrom therulingparty, whichisnodifferent from thesebadstandards. op- the from problem on this reflection insufficient Moreover, practices. corrupt of threat a is there or to find out exactly how money is spent during election campaigns. election during spent is money how exactly out find to or sible to extract precise information from parties on what money from their expertise fund is spent on election campaigns, which make public checks of party activity more difficult. For example, it is impos- On top of this, there are also defective regulations concerning the funding of political parties and to theconcentration ofpower –withallthenegativeconsequencesthatthisentails. government. Inshort,theauthoritarianculture ofPolish political parties, especially PiS, is conducive is a factor causing corruption, reducing the transparency of public life and the accountability of the Suppressingits control discussionwithinthepartyaswelloutsideit–instatebodiesunder – although hehasnoofficialfunction. losing deputies. The government also evidently operates according to the dictate of the party head, out due consideration and almost unanimously even the most controversial changes, almost without bythis: themajorityformed Justice showed Lawand unprecedented discipline,votingthroughwith- of example best the is term parliamentary 2015–2019 The ocraticstate whenitcomestopower. culturetional ofagivenpartyisevidently transferredof theorgans totheworkings ofadem- In termsofthesubjectthisstudy, thisisimportantbecausetheleader-focusedorganisa- other mainparties,despitechangesinleadership,alsohavestrong leadershipcharacteristics. 80 79 Uprawnienia%20opozycji%20parlamentarnej(1).pdf, accessed:23September 2019. pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Masz%20Glos/Co%20wolno%20opozycji%20i%20dlaczego%20jest%20potrzebna%20 Sześciło, O demokracjiwpolskichpartiachpolitycznych A. Gendźwiłł,G.Bukowska, J.Haman,A.Sawicki,Zbieranek, Finansepolskichpartii P. Marczewski, Partie polityczneajakość polskiejdemokracji Co wolnoopozycjiidlaczegojestpotrzebna? Uprawnieniaopozycjiparlamentarnej , edsM.Chmaj,Waszak, J.Zbieranek, Warszawa 2011;P. Marczewski, D. , Warszawa 2017. 78 These parties are based on the principle of the de facto , Warszawa 2017. , Warszawa 2017,http://www.batory.org. 80 Thisis another factorwhere purpose wouldbe to tie the 79 Nevertheless, the 33 Stefan Batory Foundation elections. 2019 the before “stakeholders” Confederation’s among subsidies party’s KORWiN the of distribution partners, andwhatkind.Thebest example ofproblems inthisrespect wasthecontroversies over the quasi-coalition the between transactions financial are there whether know not do We area. grey the generally deficient legal solutions for funding political parties and election campaigns, it also expands in itselfisacorruptogenicfactorasitweakens political control ofthegovernment. Moreover, withthe tively decides onitsdistribution.Thiskindofconsolidationisnotconducivetopartypluralism, which because thestrongest componentofthealliancetakes theentire partysubsidy, oratleastauthorita- sages. On the other hand, the practice weakens the smaller entities within the quasi-coalition, if only terms of political communication; quasi-coalitions of this type simply produce more coherent mes- in significant also is It support. lower with committees for important especially is which committees, partners”. Ontheonehand,this makes it possible to avoid ahigherthreshold forcoalition electoral electoral listsandessential resourcesavailable toits“coalitionan electioncampaign forconducting In thistypeofconstruction,thedominantentity makesa similarform. itslocalstructures, placeson Togetherand on Confederation(Wiosna) took Kukiz’15. Spring also with the PSL and parties, (Razem) form formed a similar alliance with Modern (Nowoczesna), the Democratic Left Alliance together with land and Jarosław Gowin’s Agreement together with Law and Justice. In 2019, the opposition Civic Plat- Po- Solidary Ziobro’s Zbigniew bringing camp, Right United the been has 2015 since “coalition” such This construction of the electoral system also encourages the formation of“quasi-coalitions”. a consolidatedpartywithstrong leadershipculture wins. democratic institutions can be (the Constitutional Tribunal, judiciary, public prosecutor’s office, etc.), if old, PiS would not have had a chance ofanabsolute majority. The 2015 elections showed how weak parliament, with 0.3% less than the 5% party threshold. If at least the coalition had crossed the thresh- in seats gaining of short just KORWiNfell fromthe also apart parties, party 2015, left-wing In winner. tions –thesmallerdifference by whichapartyfailstogetintoparliament,themore it helps the parties below the threshold increases the number of seats obtained by the party that wins the elec- for support that means method D’Hondt the of use the Meanwhile, 8%). is coalition a for threshold (the 0.6% breadth– representation byhair’s win Sejm a to the failed in coalition Left United the 2015, committees. Thethresholds donotencourage groupingswith lower together. In to work support elections. Second,therelatively electoralhigh thresholds,coalition especiallyforsmallerpartiesand this istheresult oftwofactors.First,thewayvotesare counted,whichrewards thewinnerof centrate more and more power inits hands withoutunduecare even fortheconstitution. To simplify, scene, couldgainamajority largeto govern enough onits own. It can thenusethisruthlessly to con- 81 judiciary – to use this as apretext to strengthen their own position and restrict opposition parties’ is that they could result in a temptation – especially among the ruling camp,as was the case with the parties’ activity as welltheelectoraland funding, system,mustbemadevery cautiously. Therisk reinforce checksandbalances.Yet wemustalsobearinmindthatanychangesconcerningpolitical A changeintheseconditionscouldlimit the riskofconcentration of power, increase pluralism and tices reducing thetransparency ofpoliticalfunding. genic concentrationof power, aswellanarrow one–becausethey createdprac aspacefor - provedelections in abroad tobecorruptogenic sense,becausethey permittedthecorrupto 82 tyczna.pdf, accessed:23September 2019. http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/System%20wyborczy%20a%20integracja%20poli html, accessed:23September2019 See J.Flis, http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114884,25249831,przychodzi-winnicki-do-k 82

Jak bardzo sejmowa ordynacja zachęcadobudowaniasojuszyijakie stwarzadlanichprzeszkody?, Warszawa 2019, sejmowaordynacja Jak bardzo Briefly, certain features of the electoral system in the context of the 2015 and 2019 and 2015 the of context the in system electoral the of features certain Briefly, orwina-wyciekly-nagrania-na-ktorych. 81 One - - 34 Stefan Batory Foundation system ofcontrol oftheelectoral processof political parties. andthefunding a major breach has already been madein the autonomy that until recently characterised the Polish seeing thatthecurrent arrangements are enoughto hold ontopower. Yet it is important to note that For the time being, the ruling coalition is not trying to change the system for the allocation of seats, without tougheningregulations. Itisasimilarcasewiththeelectoral system. not be possible without the earlier takeover of the institutions checking political parties’ finances and imposing draconian penalties for transgressions in the funding ofelection campaigns. opportunity to act. The Fidesz party in Hungary did this, causing a financial crisis for its rival Jobbik by 84 83 more desirable forthegovernment tobeformed by coalitions of parties(butnotquasi-coalitions, immature Polish political scene and leader-focusedmodel of political party organisation, it would be sult, beingabletogainanabsolutemajority of seatsallowing it to govern onits own. Giventhestill method. Thiswouldminimise the chancesofoneparty, witharelatively low turnoutandelection re- returnthe D’Hondt methodfortheallocationofseatsinSejmand to abandon totheSainte-Laguë elements. onthese Above all,theelectoral codeneedstobeconsideredOne short-termmeasure andamended. couldbe foremost and first concentrate should corruption of risk the reduce to Efforts political sceneisfragmented andthere isalackoftransparency intheoperation ofpoliticalparties. emphasise therole of the leader inpolitics, while the winningpartyis excessively rewarded whenthe arrangement emerged is closely linked to the characteristics of the party and electoral system, which the of office president, that the most important decisions affecting state policy are made. Yet the very fact that this the in or government the in than rather there, is It party. ruling the of leadership the At the same time, the actual centre of power was transferred outside the formal structures, to within pression of parliament’s control function anda reduction in the position and powers of the opposition. the within both parliament (single-party majority) and on the side of the executive. This is accompanied by the sup- power of concentration huge a observed have We judiciary. the of weakening ing ing further circumstances conducive to corruption – a departure from the rule of law or the far-reach- creat- first “domino” the was This developed. corruption which on foundation a itself was 2015–2019 because, inmyview, thedisruptionofchecksandbalancesbetweenlegislature andexecutive in I have concentrated in this section largely on the legislature, theexecutive and political parties. Thisis therefore seemslike abetter strategy thanreacting tochangesgoingintheoppositedirection. ward” and proposing reforms to the party and electoral system to reinforce checks andbalances for- a“leap Taking identified. be can moves such for pretexts Numerous act. to it for difficult more changes strengthening thegovernment camp,whilealso disciplining theoppositionandmakingit further out rule cannot we but completed, was report this before emerged had proposals new No could alsointroduce changesinthisarea. it that showed therefore Right United The organ. electoral key this of operation the over influence from currentIn itsplace,solutionswere politics,wasabandoned. introducedto givepoliticians direct National Electoral Commission model, based on judges and thus guaranteeing greater independence changing theelectoral administration operation model were passed.Inoneofthemainchanges, Masz%20Glos/O%20co%20chodzi%20w%20nowelizacji%20kodeksu%20wyborczego.pdf, accessed:23September2019. 2019; A.Gęndźwił, kodeksie%20wyborczym%20wprowadzanych%20ustawa%20z%20dnia%2014%20grudnia%202017r.pdf, accessed: 23September www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Masz%20Glos/Opinia%20prawna%20w%20sprawie%20zmian%20w%20 See P. ustawązdnia14grudnia2017r. wprowadzanych Uziębło,Opiniaprawnawsprawiezmiankodeksie wyborczym https://www.ft.com/content/9a2cbc36-199b-11ea-97df-cc63de1d73f4, accessed:20January2020. , http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/O cochodziwnowelizacjiKodeksu wyborczego? 84 In 2017, regulations 2017, In 83 This would , http:// 35 Stefan Batory Foundation particularism entailing a specific party seeking to gain control over an institution that inprinciple aninstitution over control togain seeking party specific a entailing particularism of manifestation a is This system. justice the into influence party bring to aim and executive the on over the judiciary. The so-called reforms implementedsince 2015 make judges extremely dependent executiveand authoritiesdiscussed earlier provided anunprecedented opportunitytogain control byduced thegovernment areThe excessive corruptogenic. concentration ofpower inthelegislative The mainproblem, therefore, isnotcorruptionwithinthejudiciary,intro butthefactthatchanges - age ofPolishjudgesisaround 46. full ofjudgeswho had worked inthe previous system. This is also untrue, consideringthat the average emphasise that the judiciary in Polandhadremained sincethecommunistperiodandwas unchanged to partymembers,butalsopublicopinion. Greaterfunding. opennessin this respect would force political parties’ leadership to answer not only would be to increase the requirements for the transparency of party finances and electoral campaign Last butnotleast,greater democratisation ofintra-party lifeshouldbeenforced. Onewaytodothis punish theirpoliticalopponents. greater freedom to conduct debatesandparliamentary majorities less opportunity to discipline and deputies give to senator, and a deputy as office holding on act the as well as Senate, and Sejm the of In addition,therole of theparliamentary opposition shouldbestrengthened, shapingtheregulations between thepoliticalforces andwithexperts’ participation. mixed system,whichwouldnotrequire achangetotheconstitution), ideally based onanagreement most desirable solution, however, would be the reconstruction of the entire electoral system (into a and executive, which –asweare witnessing–favoursthedevelopment of systemic corruption. The teeing pluralismpreventing and theexcessive concentration ofpowerof thelegislature inthehands of overall political stability. Thiswouldbeanothersafeguard protecting liberal democracy, guaran- where onelarge grouping is the hegemon)thatare ableto keep eachotherincheck,even atacost 87 cessed: 23September2019. 86 2019. org.pl/ upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Masz%20Glos/Policy%20Paper%20Dawida%20Szescilo.pdf, accessed:23 September cessed: 23September2019;D. Sześciło, gramy%20operacyjne/Masz%20Glos/Jak%20zmieniac%20prawo%20wyborcze_%20Doswiadczenia%20porownawcze%20.pdf, ac 85 that the judiciary is corrupt cannot be defended. trary to the government’s claims. As inevery area ofthestate’s operation, abuses exist. But theview There is no datashowing that the judiciary itself has beenparticularly affected by corruption – con- branches ofpower. analysing the corruption threat is the interference in the systemic separation between the main As in the case of the legislature and executive, the main source of the problem in the judiciary when The problem The judiciary introduced by his government and that of his predecessor, Beata Szydło, in front of the European Commission andinternationalmedia. the of front in Szydło, Beata predecessor, his of that and government his by introduced ment on numerous occasions are Prime Minister Morawiecki, defending the changes to the judiciary https://www.premier.gov.pl/static/files/files/biala_ksiega_pl_full.pdf, accessed:23September2019. https://oko.press/sedziowie-z-krakowa-wygrali-z-gazeta-polska-bedzie-sprostowanie-slow-premiera-morawieckiego/, ac- , http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/ProSee B. Doświadczeniaporównawcze Michalak,Jakzmieniaćprawowyborcze. - Mieszany system wyborczy w państwach Europy Środkowej iWschodniej Środkowej w państwachEuropy Mieszany systemwyborczy 87 Interestingly, thenarrativetack, attemptingto later changed 86 Among those to have repeated this false argu- 85 , http://www.batory. - 36 Stefan Batory Foundation well as to put pressure on individual judges in specific cases. specific in judges individual on pressure put to as well legal instruments,however,the power thejusticeministergained todismisspresidingas judges, when it comes to checks and balances oftheexecutiveit comestochecksand when legislative branches. and es (aswell as otherlegalprofessions). powers Ofcourse,thesechangesalsoall limit the judiciary’s the partisan National Council of the Judiciary to it, is one more means of exerting influence over judg- Court, whichwasgivenspecialcompetences,andappointingexclusively party nomineesacceptedby legislature and executive incheck. the severe distortiontotheseparation ofpowers diminishedability to keep andthejudiciary’s the symptoms, alongwithall the changes to the judiciary since the 2015 elections, unequivocally prove arch 18(01),2018,https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3103491, accessed:23September 2019. arch 95 23 September 2019. 94 hoc-report-on-poland-rule-34-adopted-by-greco-at-its-79th-plenary-m/168079c83c, accessed:13January2020. party influence. As critics note, these changes did not improve the functioning of courts. under come to Court Supreme the and Judiciary the of Council National the for way the paving and my ofthejudiciary. This wasfollowed by lawsenablingthejusticeministertoreplace presiding judges minister almosttotal control over thejudicialadministration –amove thatclearly reduced theautono- justice the giving regulations introduced camp Right United the power, to coming of months Within fundamental publicgoodoftherighttoafairtrial. should act in the public, rather thanparty, interest. If this process continues, it will limit access to the 89 23 September2019. 88 ed againstjudgeswhoissueverdicts thatdonotfollow thepolitical line ofthegovernment. actions aimtointimidatejudges.There havealsobeeninstancesofdisciplinarycasesbeinginitiat judges critical of the overhaul or whosent prejudicial questions to the EU Court of Justice. These state of thejudiciary, is demonstrated by the numerous disciplinary proceedings launchedagainst The government’s actual intention to create ways of leaning on judges,rather thanto improve the even greater control ofthegovernment, parliamentandtherefore alsotherulingparty. however,the rulingcamphaspromised and tocontinueits“reforms”,the judiciaryunder whichbring judges and the first president of the Supreme Court impossible. Most of the changes remain in force, Among other things, the CJEU verdict made the replacement of a large numberofSupreme Court partially blocked by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgment on 24 June 2019. June 24 on judgment (CJEU) Union European the of Justice of Court the by blocked partially appointments andpromotions. judicial influence to majority parliamentary the and government the allowed Judiciary the of Council hoc ReportonPoland(Rule34).AdoptedbyGRECOatits79thPlenaryMeeting (Strasbourg,19–23Mar changes isareport by GRECO (Group ofStatesAgainst Corruption,operating withintheCouncilofEurope) from March 2018: violations oftherulelaw. The maindocumentthatsyntheticallydescribesthecorruption-related threats resulting from these ature wasproduced onthechangestojudiciaryby therulingcamp.Yet few authorsoutlinethelinkbetweencorruptionand 93 92 91 the%20Rule%20of%20Law.pdf, accessed: 23 September2019. upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/ESI-ideaForum_Batory%20-%20Poland%20and%20the%20end%20of%20 90 batory.org.pl/upload/files/pdf/Stanowisko_Ustawa%20o%20usp.pdf, accessed:23September2019. org.pl/upload/files/pdf/Stanowisko%20ZEP%20ws_%20sadow%20powszechnych.pdf W. Sadurski,“How Democracy Dies(inPoland):ACaseStudyofAnti-Constitutional PopulistBacksliding”, https://oko.press/sad-odsuwa-sedziego-bilinskiego-ktory-uniewinnial-za-udzial-w-protestach-antyrzadowych/, accessed: http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/pdf/Apel%20do%20Prezydenta.pdf, accessed:23September2019; https://www.rp.pl/Sedziowie-i-sady/308239912-Sady-dzialaja-wolniej-Ministerstwo-Sprawiedliwosci-uspokaja.html, accessed: During thefirsttermofUnitedRightgovernment, notonlynumerous expert studiesbutalsosubstantialacademicliter https://www.euractiv.pl/section/demokracja/news/polskie-wladze-bagatelizuja-wyrok-tsue/, accessed:23September2019. https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-4189_pl.htm, accessed:23September2019. P. thelawends.ThecollapseofruleinPoland–andwhattodo Buras, G.Knaus,Where 90 Furthermore, establishing the Disciplinary Chamber ofthe Supreme 95 89 Establishing control over the National the over control Establishing , accessed:23September2019;http://www. ch 2018) , http://www.batory.org.pl/ 91 The“reforms” were , https://rm.coe.int/ad- Legal StudiesRese- http://www.batory. 93 88 Bycreating 94 These Ad - 92 -

37 Stefan Batory Foundation changes prepared by anotherLEGmember,JudgeJacekCzaja,canberecommended. strength compared totheexecutive and legislature. Inthiscase,too, thedetailedanalysis of possible in thiswaywillitbepossibletoguarantee thenecessarylevelincrease ofjudicialautonomyand its reduced andthejudges’governing control body’s mechanisms over the judiciary strengthened. Only political and expert community, oversightthe scope of the justice minister’s of the judiciary should be judicial, the of representatives comprising commission special a to entrusted be should which 2019, ated by Transparency International). prevention system (like intheaforementionedIntegrity System cre conceptoftheNational - a corruption of element a crucial are courts independent and efficient that doubt no is There 96 direct prosecution ofoffences. the ruleoflawandhasamorerole advanced thanthepoliceandotherauthoritiesresponsible forthe Although, according to Polish law, it is not aconstitutional organ, it plays a crucial role in enforcing Alongside commoncourtsandtheConstitutional Tribunal, it is aninstitution that upholdsthelaw. tigation of crimes, pursuing prosecutions, and prosecuting on behalf of the public before the court. including the public prosecutor’s office. After all, in principle it is responsible for supervising the inves- keyA preventioncorruption the of part byoutlined (as system approach) NIS the enforcement, law is The problem The publicprosecutor’s office this respect. in recommendations detailed presented Bojarski, Łukasz member, LEG One compliant. not are who rather thananinstrumentforpromoting judgesfavourable to the rulingcampanddiscipliningthose well as personnel changes. It must return to its role as an authority defending judges’ independence, established andbasedonregulations that go againstthe constitution, requires thorough reform, as as see Judiciary,lawyers the most of which Council introduced areNational been extensive. The have the Stefan Batory Foundation since 2016. The process will be a difficult one, because the changes that Recommendations in this area have been proposed by the Legal Experts Group (LEG) operating at Proposals tion. Onlyanindependentcourtcanholdacorruptpoliticianliableandaccountable. combating corruption,itistherefore essentialtorestoreimprove courts’autonomyand theiropera- from beingaccusedof–letalonesentencedforacrime,especially one ofcorruption.Interms authority tobe undermined. The simplest way to achieve this is to prevent any of its representatives is atstake. ofaccountability of theprinciple The abolition Thegovernmentallow cannot its that couldseriouslychallengeitslegitimacy. to giveverdictsjudges willnotbewilling againstthegovernment,cases especiallyincorruption are a corruptogenic factor. One consequence thatwe can therefore expect is thatsubordinate said to increase the state’s capacity to combat corruption.Quite the opposite, in fact – such changes politicians and government representatives, and reducingcourts’ autonomy, cantherefore hardly be 97 accessed: 23September2019. tember 2019. http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Bojarski_KRS.pdf?amp%3Bqid=391046 http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Sady%20powszechne.pdf, accessed:23 Sep 96 It is a similar story with common courts.Apartfrom revision of thechanges2015– Changes to the system bringing judgesunderthe power of 97 , - 38 Stefan Batory Foundation direction from that in Western countries and recommended by international institutions. As well as well As institutions. international by recommended and countries Western in the opposite that from directionin office prosecutor’s public the changing is however, government, Right United The effective toolinthebattleagainstcorruption upperechelonsofpower. – to avoid it beingpolitically instrumentalisedtocreate affairs andtomakecorruption it an to increaseis whycalls which against theopposition, used asatool are its autonomy important the political opposition. ruption crimes can also easily lead to the delegitimisation of power. Equally, though,they can harm have beendeveloping. in EU states, where mechanisms guaranteeing the independence of prosecutors from the executive EU. This model contravenes the recommendations ofthe Council of Europe, aswell as recent trends munist-era model of the public prosecutor’s office – a situation not encountered anywhere else in the of the separation of the offices of prosecutor general and justice minister, it thereby restored the com- direct Following the minister. control under justice office the the of bring severalto majority years its victim to the concentration of power at the legislative and executive level. The rulingcampexploited Unfortunately, as in the case of the judiciary, after the 2015 elections the public prosecutor’s office fell strument forcombatingcorruption. a in- key is office prosecutor’s public the and area this in policy state any of part integral an is crimes institutions, but alsoinbusinessesandthewholeeconomy. Theeffectiveinvestigation of corruption take place at the cusp ofthe public and private sectors. These kindsofactions undermine trust in state usually crimes Corruption dimension. societal the a of result as also a but role), playing officials state scope (corruption cases often mean huge losses of public money, with prominent politicians and top crime, thisremains animportantaspect.Corruptioncrimeisaseriousthreat, notonlybecauseofits Although, as we saw at the beginning of this article, corruption cannot be viewed solely in terms of 98 is increasinglyimportant, ascorruption concentrated at thehighestlevels ofpower. In terms of combating corruption, the autonomy of the public prosecutor’s office is particularly anti-corruption policy.anti-corruption Corruption is political by nature, as there is always power involved. However, a public prosecutor’s office dependent on political concerns serves to instrumentalise the rulinggrouping comeintoplay. affair”, a politicised public prosecutor’s office might be reluctant to pursue cases when the interests of observing typicalcasesthatare perfectexamples ofthisconcept.Like intheaforementioned “Srebrna dealing withthistypeofcrime).It makes sensetostartusingthisterm,however, asweare already lic policy (although thismightbeaneffectofadoptionapenalpolicythatisnotgeared towards In Poland,thequestionof“grand corruption” isnotpresent inthepublicdiscourseoreven inpub on politicalfactors(ofteninvolvedincrimes)willbemore difficult,or evenimpossible. organisedcrime. to connected Combating thesepractices whenthemainauthorityoverseeing investigations is directly dependent and isfrequently investments, for public tenders of fixing the and corruption oftentakes theformofnotonlypolitical corruption, butalsomoneytax fraud laundering, members ofthegovernmentelites) isregarded andeconomic asthemainthreat. Thisformof ern countries, this “grand corruption”, involving influential groups (leading politicians, officials, 99 accessed: 23November 2019. 100 http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Rola%20i%20miejsce%20prokuratury.pdf S. Rose-Ackerman, “Democracy andgrand corruption”, InternationalSocialScienceJournal G. Makowski, społeczny... Korupcjajako problem 98 A public prosecutor’s office dependent on the executive will therefore be 2008,no.48(149),pp.365–380. 99 InWest- 100 Cor- , - 39 Stefan Batory Foundation and a significant corruptogenic factor. Like in the previous cases, to reduce the systemic threat of corruption, itisnecessarytomake systemicchangestohow thepublicprosecutor’s office operates. threat systemic the reduce to cases, previous the in Like factor. corruptogenic significant a and one else who mightbe a threat to therulingparty. Thisis a furthermanifestationofparticularism under thecarpetandmakingitpossibletoengineerpenalcasesagainstoppositionorany- allowingsolutions legal and institutional casesthatmightaffectthegovernment tobe swept almost entirely dependent on apoliticalminister.Meanwhile, we have a separate system of are prosecutors Yet cases. corruption in effectively more working is office prosecutor’s public The ruling camp has therefore created a situation inwhichthere are that the no indications to create anappropriate imageofthegovernment inthemedia. not onlytoproveis beinglaunched, somethingorbeable topress charges, buttousethedetention it isnothard toimaginetheextendedagainst whomaninvestigation detention ofpolitical opponents and anexample of amethodthat can beusedto violate fundamental humanandcivil rights. Afterall, of view ofanti-corruptionpolicy, itisanothermeansofinstrumentalisingcorruptionasapolitical tool point the From trial. a fair to right civil fundamental the and decision) their ignore can office ecutor’s pros- public the (as courts of position constitutional the undermines This preventive measure. ficient the prosecutor general toextend thedetentionofasuspecteven whenthecourtdeemedbailasuf- accessed: 23November 2019. of interference intheseparation betweentheexecutive and thejudiciary. ecutor general’s extensive powers, provides room forabusesandcorruptionis a furtherexample prosecutors). In early 2019, another significant element was added, which, in the context of the pros- and demoteprosecutors (whichmakes it possible tomanipulateinvestigations and reward compliant promote to free is he Furthermore, supervision. his under is which office, prosecutor’s national the als from the investigation, at any stage, to anybody. The minister can also transfer investigations to ings andthecourt.Inaddition,prosecutor general hasacquired thepower todisclosemateri- methods (suchasprovocations). Hisinterventionsmightnotbevisible to thepartiesinproceed- give personal instructions to prosecutors (even without written form) ororder the use ofoperational the prosecutor general –hasgainedtherighttointerfere inanyinvestigation, including theability to it is worthnotingafew radical changesreducing prosecutors’ autonomy. Theminister – whoisalso the return tothecombinedfunctionofjustice minister andprosecutor general, mentioned above, 102 accessed: 23September2019. 101 Kwiatkowska. Detailed recommendations in this respect have been presented by Jarosław Onyszczuk and Katarzyna Proposals Onyszczuk andKwiatkowska’s study contains anumberofrecommendations that could make the the work of individual prosecutors. It is crucial to minimise the risk of manipulation of investigations. in interference excessive preclude to law the in precisely specified be should competences general’s prosecutor The model). a as serve could NIK (again, autonomy functional and budgetary of degree president of the Supreme Audit Office (NIK). The prosecutor general should also be assured a suitable candidates putforward by the prosecutorial governing body, for a statutory six-year term, like the general could be selected by the Sejm (perhaps with input from the president of Poland) from among es of power, as well as between the ruling parties and the opposition. For example, the prosecutor eral, whoseselectionmustbemorein termsoftherelations balanced betweenthevariousbranch - political minister. This should be replaced by a return to the model of an autonomous prosecutor gen- http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Rola%20i%20miejsce%20prokuratury.pdf https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-sad-nie-prokurator-ma-decydowac-czy-podejrzany-opusci-areszt-po-zaplacie-kaucji, 102 Their main proposal is to scrap the model where the prosecutor’s office is headed by a 101 Thiswasalawallowing , 40 Stefan Batory Foundation 106 105 accessed: 23September2019. https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/515983,panstwo-to-ja-jar 104 The amendment to the civil service act of January 2016 January of act service civil the to amendment The the rulingpartyline. distributing the good that isworkinthepublicservice,whichrestricted tothesupportersof re- – particularism of instance flagrant a is all onconsiderations ofmeritandcompetences.This ularistic) access tothepublicservice (Art. 60 of thePolishconstitution), which shouldbebasedabove hiring people for official posts, this created a problem with enforcing the rule of open (i.e. non-partic- to power. change to the 2008 civil service act was adopted immediately after the United Right government came changes to the law – several more acts and twice as many extensive amendments. The last significant theremany in 1998, been have passed was act service civil a first the As since offices. result, state est chinery, inpractice always weakened thecivil service by seeking to place their own peopleinthehigh- sive governments, despite declaring a desire to build a professional, neutral state administrative ma- Succes- obstacles. numerous encountered Poland in service civil the of development the 1989, After inary board). public services (the civil service corps includesbodiessuchaseducationdepartmentsandtheveter- The civil service is responsible for preparing andimplementingpublicpolicy, aswell as formanybasic administration. government the of units local and ministries at employed mainly officials, 120,000 tration, as well as the most important part ofthe government administration. It is made upofalmost in particular, the civil service. The Polish civil service is meant to be an elite part of the public adminis- and, administration public the is overlook not must we that flashpoint corruption potential final The The problem The publicadministration configuration ofthepoliticalscene. public prosecutor’s office an effective means of combating corruption crime, regardless of the current 103 plement thepartyvision. im- loyally would who officials needed he that media the in saying this, hide to attempt even not did JarosławKaczyński chairman PiS concerns. party to interest,but public the to or state the to loyalnot people with posts these fill to easier it make to was intention The nominees. party for jobs create to open recruitment forthehighestpostsincivil service. Theobvious objective of thismove was 2015 only theright-wingpartieshadgoneasfaranovert, radical departure from theprincipleof by 1989, after sides political all by service civil the appropriate to efforts traditional the despite Yet the Polish constitution; specifically, articles 153 and 60, which state that the civil service is an institu- an is service civil the that state which 60, and 153 articles specifically, constitution; Polish the employees inalmostone-third ofthetopadministrative posts were replaced. to nel be act” passed by the United Right camp. As a result, in the first year after the new regulations, near-automatic replacement of officials in more than 3000 posts, making it the first so-called “person- nomination, but also reduced the requirements for candidates’competences.It also permitted the ing topadministrative posts (from general directors directors) todepartment basedmainlyonparty G. Kopińska,Stanowiskapublicznejako łuppolityczny... ofLaws],item34. Dz.U. 2016 [Journal https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/928582,dobra-zmiana-kaczynski-nepotyzm.html, accessed:23September 2019, K. Gadowska, Dysfunkcje administracji.Służbacywilnawperspektywieneoinstytucjonalnej 103 104 Yet since partyloyalty to bethemainconsiderationwas supposed when 105 oslaw-kaczynski-pis-partia-rzad-wladza-analiza.html, not only established a procedure for fill- for procedure a established only not , Kraków 2015. 106 Theactalsoviolates 41 Stefan Batory Foundation after theSupreme Administrative Court judgmentwasissuedandinviolation of itsdecision. issued fact in was which Office, Protection Data Personal the of President the of directive a behind hiding comply, to refused Sejm the of Chancellery the of head the Judiciary, the of Council National Administrative Court ordering thedisclosure oftheletter of supportforcandidatesthepartisan to act in accordance with and within the law. Despite a legally binding judgmentoftheSupreme officials requiring legalism of principal constitutional the violates which Sejm, the of Chancellery the at working officials of position the is affairs of state this of consequences the of illustration good A by loyalty totherulingparty. Itistherefore naturally asignificantfactor resulting inabuses. This system does not encourage officials to be guided by the criterion of the public interest, but rather posts (suchasatthechancelleries of theSejm and Senate,aswell as manyothercentral institutions). of thecivil service act,resulting ineven more arbitrary andpartisanappointmentstoadministrative fices has been kept in force, while many central institutions have been excluded from the regulations administrations. service more reminiscent of the communist-era By contravening thelaw,for theoperationcamp hassetupconditions theruling of thecivil way, andthataccesstoitisopenbasedontheprincipleofequality. tion established to carry out the state’s obligations in an impartial, professional and politically neutral 109 23 September 2019. 108 Odpowiedzialne%20Panstwo/Opinia_Sluzba_cywilna_HIzdebski.pdf, accessed:23September2019. ofLaws]2016, item34),Warszawa 2016,http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/ustaw (Dz.U. [Journal 107 regulated sothatpartysympathiesare nolonger theonlycriterion.Agoodsolutionwouldbeastate political corps. First and foremost, the rulesofrecruitment for topadministrative posts needto be A new actshouldbeadoptedthatclearly between theadministrativemarks theboundary and the institutions from thestandards ofthecivil service. The civil service itself should bestrengthened. specific excluding acts other many as well as 1982, of act employees administration state the repeal to be would step main The institutions. government of types all to work officials’ of standards form changes will again beessential. Reform of the civil service is also necessary and shouldextend uni - systemic politicians, and officials between relations in and administration public the of level the at To avoidthedevelopment andconsolidationofanomenklaturasystem,whichfavourscorruption Proposals communist-era nomenklatura) nature (of the patron–client type, to refer to a category coined by Jacek Tarkowski to describe the The deep-rooted party influences on the administrative structure generates relations of a clientelistic to administrativecorruption. becoming anelementofsystemicpolitical butisitself corruption, by the criterionofparty loyalty, rather thanprofessionalism,will notonlybe more susceptible was createdA situation the government inwhich administration,aboveguided initsactions all data protection office. cians –formerPiS councillors – were appointedastheheadsofboth Chancellery of theSejm and examples ofcorruptionandotherabusespower. specific mask to also but above, cited example the in as law, the circumvent to only not exploited be J. Tarkowski, iklienci Socjologiaświatapolityki:Patroni https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/listy-poparcia-do-krs-uodo-zdecyduje-czy-mozna-ujawnic,452521.html, accessed: H. Izdebski,Opiniawprzedmiocieustawyzdnia30grudnia2015r.ozmianieUstawy służbiecywilnejorazniektórychinnych This assessment is all the more justified as the 1982 act on employees of state of- state of employees on act 1982 the as justified more the all is assessment This 109 between officials and politicians. These kinds of relations can easily can relations of kinds These politicians. and officials between , Warszawa 1994. nomenklaturamodern, Westernof than public 107 108 Politi - 42 Stefan Batory Foundation closures. First and foremost, the constitutional framework needed to counteract “grand corruption” dis- financial of reform the or regulations penal tighter – technicalities on solely concentrate cannot For this reason, as systemic factors conducive to corruption have emerged, anti-corruption policy growing impunityofpoliticians,administrative officialsand everyonedependentonthem. administration. These are conditions in which liability and accountability are disappearing, amid the – the separation of powers, judicial independence, and the integrity of law enforcement and public see the further disintegration of the most important institutions in a country bound by the rule of law one example. Similar, less momentous casesaboundandwill continue to multiply with every day ifwe just is This party. ruling the of head the Kaczyński, Jarosław was case the in figure main the that was na case, which wasdiscontinueddespite traces of political corruption andeven bribery. The reason symptoms of this. The bestexample is the partisan publicprosecutor’s office’s dropping ofthe Srebr- observe already can We government. the for impunity and corruption of forms criminal concrete, to In thelongterm,consolidationofthissituationwillleadnotonlytostatedysfunction,butalso public service,orthisaccessisbeingreduced. time, systemic inequalities are beingcreated; forexample, inaccesstothejusticesystemand the control oftherulingparty, givingit almost completediscretion indecisionmaking.Atthesame Yet they significantly expand particularism in public life, as they bring entire sectors of the state under crime. a as corruption of understanding narrow traditional, the within fit not do actions These tura. scrapped, pavingthewayto the transformation ofthegovernment administration into a nomenkla- justice minister the of (and thusthepolitical factor). Openandcompetitive recruitment fortoppostsin the civil service was control the direct itunder bringing office, prosecutor’s public the of model A far-reaching reduction of judicial independence ensued.There was a return to the communist-era It thensetaboutexploiting this situationtounderminethefoundationsofrulelawinPoland. 1989. since unprecedented was that power legislative and executive of concentration a camp ruling A remarkably favourable setofpresidential and parliamentaryelection results in 2015 the handed Right coalition,whichcametopower in2015,hasproved tobethiskindofgroup. actions that privilege a specific group over others in access to public resources. In Poland, the United as amanifestationofparticularisminpubliclife.Particularismissysteminstitutionsandconcrete sometimes even legalised.It is easiertoperceivethis typeofcorruptionifweseeit and understand istrative and economic elites, is rooted in the system, frequently not punishedby criminal laws, and rience oftheaverage citizen. This is paradoxical because “grand corruption” affectspolitical, admin- Paradoxically, thecorruptionweshouldbeworriedabouttodayis beyond theperception andexpe- Conclusion the countrycanthenconsiderfurther,detailedreforms. function withoutorders from therulingparty–but,instead,accordingto theethosofpublicservice– be open andcompetitive. By guaranteeing the core central administration stability and the chance to tutions. Recruitment for all posts below general directors of administrative offices, meanwhile, should power, political parties couldusethis resource to freely choose peopleforthetoppostsat state insti- include peoplewhohavedemonstrated highcompetencesandsuitableexperience. Aftercomingto personnel resource –akindofdatabasecandidatesfortopadministrative post, whichwouldonly Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Dla%20panstwa%20i%20obywateli_Makowski.pdf, accessed:23September 2019. 110 Dla państwa i obywateli. Diagnoza i propozycje reformy służbycywilnej reformy G. Makowski, Dlapaństwaiobywateli.Diagnozapropozycje 110 , http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/ 43 Stefan Batory Foundation must be reconstructed and reinforced. Consideration should be given to the possibility of creating new safeguards to prevent the excessive concentration of power; for example, by incorporating them in the electoral system and regulations concerning operation of political parties – strengthening their internal democracy, pluralism and accountability. The judiciary’s independence from the executive and legislature must be strengthened, since only balance between the main branches of public power guarantees them mutual responsibility. It is also essential to abandon the partisan model of the public prosecutor’s office; without this, it is impossible to hold those guilty of abuses of power to account, especially in cases of corruption crimes. Finally, there must be a return to the path of reforming and building a professional public administration, and especially civil service. Without this, the administra- tion will become even more characterised by party ties and nomenklatura concerns, resulting in even greater administrative corruption.

Without changes in the most important segments in the state system, particularism will increase, the field of corruption crime will expand and inequalities will grow, including in access to fundamental public goods. For instance, it is not hard to imagine EU funds being distributed on the basis not of merit or public needs, but of political clientelism. If this happens, the effects will also be felt by average citizens, the inhabitants of specific towns and regions. The reality of this scenario is made clear by the experiences not only of developing countries, but also of relatively well-developed EU member states – Czechia, Hungary and Greece. There, systemic grand corruption has managed to take root, bringing about a political and economic crisis and growing social inequalities. Finally, we should also stress that these institutional changes will not happen on their own. To implement them, people who believe in certain values and are capable of first initiating and then sustaining and upholding them are needed.

Grzegorz Makowski – PhD in sociology, expert at the Stefan Batory Foundation ideaForum, assistant professor at Collegium of Socio-Economics, Warsaw School of Economics (SGH). His interests include corruption and anti-corruption policy, the development of civil society and the situation of NGOs. Be- tween 2003 and 2012, he worked at the Institute of Public Affairs Institute Foundation as an analyst and then as director of the Civil Society Programme. Author of books, academic articles and press publications.

The translation of this report was supported by Transparency International e.V, Germany.

Stefan Batory Foundation Publication is licensed under Sapieżyńska 10a the Creative Commons 00-215 Warsaw Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 tel. (48-22) 536 02 00 Poland Unported Licence (cc BY-SA 3.0) fax (48-22) 536 02 20 [email protected] www.batory.org.pl Translated by Ben Koschalka Edited by Annabelle Chapman Warsaw 2020 ISBN 978-83-66543-54-6