Matray on Stephen R. Taaffe's Macarthur's Korean War Gene

Stephen R. Taaffe. MacArthur's Korean War Generals. Lincoln: University Press of Kansas, 2016. 278 pp. $34.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-2221-4. Reviewed by James Matray Published on H-FedHist (August, 2017) Commissioned by Caryn E. Neumann (Miami University of Ohio Regionals) Well-regarded military historian Stephen R. excel in peacetime do not always possess the nec‐ Taaffe, author of Marshall and his Generals: U.S. essary attributes to deliver victory on the battle‐ Army Commanders in World War II (2011), con‐ field in wartime” (p. 4). tinues his analysis of top US combat officers in In his opening chapter, Taaffe describes the this excellent study examining the performance “deplorable shape” (p. 15) of the Eighth Army in of the feld army, corps, and division commanders Japan when the Korean War began. His next three who served under generals Douglas MacArthur assess the performance of US commanders during and Matthew B. Ridgway during the frst year of the frst six months of the conflict. Taaffe’s treat‐ the Korean War. T. R. Fehrenbach subtitled his ment of MacArthur covers familiar ground, but 1963 history of the conflict A Study in Unpre‐ nicely traces how his twisting of orders led to tri‐ paredness. Taaffe shows that this characterization umph at Inchon and tragedy against the Chinese. “was especially true of [US] senior combat leader‐ Like other scholars, he assigns Lieutenant General ship” (p. 204), explaining how few of these gener‐ Walton H. Walker, the Eighth Army commander, als had led large units in combat and most had re‐ good grades for defending the Pusan Perimeter, ceived appointment to inflate their records before but poor ones in combating the North Korean and retirement. His detailed coverage of battlefield later Chinese offensives. Because MacArthur did events demonstrates that “the Eighth Army’s lead‐ not have confidence in Walker, Taaffe argues, his ership ran the gamut from impressive to lacklus‐ failure to relieve him “did a disservice to himself, ter” (p. 4). This did not bother MacArthur, who Walker, and the war effort” (p. 55). But he also “paid less attention to his division and regimental condemns Walker for not “honestly voicing his commanders and was content to accept the ones opinions to MacArthur” because he feared being the army sent him” (p. 13). Taaffe’s main thesis fired, embracing “Kabuki tactics” that “put his ca‐ holds that while the Eighth Army was not totally reer above the welfare of the army in his charge” unprepared, two factors led to substandard per‐ (p. 209). As for Walker’s subordinates, Major Gen‐ formance. First, MacArthur’s manipulation of his eral William Dean, the 24th Division commander, generals and pitting them against each other dis‐ “never controlled and maneuvered his units the couraged teamwork. Second, Taaffe blames “a way a successful officer should” (p. 24), and his re‐ leadership dilemma that had plagued all armed placement after capture at Taejon, Brigadier Gen‐ forces since time immemorial: those leaders who eral John H. Church, was old and arthritic. Major H-Net Reviews General William Kean, commander of the 25yh however, an overlooked reason for his success. Division, “never shook the aura of a staff officer” Ridgway was disappointed with the commanders (p. 31), but regimental colonels Henry Fisher and he inherited because they lacked aggressiveness “hard-driving” (p. 41) John “Mike” Michaelis made and moved deliberately “to supplant them with him effective. tough, dynamic, energetic men” (p. 153). But he Stopping North Korea’s offensive required de‐ wisely followed the advice of US Army Chief of ployment of two more US divisions with similarly Staff General J. Lawton Collins, doing so gradually flawed leaders. Major General Hobart “Hap” Gay, and in the context of a new rotation system that commander of the First Cavalry, “performed cred‐ averted a loss of public confidence in the army. ibly enough” (p. 33), while Major General Lau‐ Ridgway chose “the dignified, imperturbable, and rence “Dutch” Keiser, “an unlikely choice” (p. 47) thoughtful” (p. 154) Major General Bryant Moore to lead the Second Division, presided over a near to replace Coulter, but kept the widely popular disaster at the Naktong Bulge. In his glowing de‐ Milburn because relieving him would undermine scription of the Inchon-Seoul campaign, Taaffe re‐ already low morale. In addition to Almond, he re‐ iterates prior negative descriptions of Major Gen‐ tained Smith to preserve “interservice harmony at eral Edward “Ned” Almond, head of the X Corps, this crucial time” (p. 159) and Major General and positive assessments of Major General Oliver Robert “Shorty” Soule, head of the last-to-deploy P. Smith, the First Marine Division commander. Third Division that “had done yeoman’s service Meanwhile, division of Walker’s command had guarding the beachhead” (p. 136) at Hungnam. brought Major General Frank “Shrimp” Milburn Brigadier generals Blackshear “Babe” Bryan, to Korea. The new First Corps commander “lacked Claude “Buddy” Ferenbaugh, Charles “Charlie that little extra centimeter of gray matter, that lit‐ Dog” Palmer, and Joseph Sladen Bradley replaced tle extra spark, that separated competent generals Church, Barr, Gay, and Kean respectively. Major from the great ones” (p. 82), while John B. Coulter, General Clark “Nick” Ruffner took over the Sec‐ head of the Ninth, lacked the “operational aware‐ ond Division from Major General Robert B. Mc‐ ness and sure-footedness … to control events” (p. Clure, who had assumed command after Keiser’s 141). Taaffe targets two generals for his harshest firing, and transformed “an outfit full of dissen‐ criticism. Failing to understand the magnitude of sion” (p. 168) into one able to fight. China’s entry, Keiser invited the demolition of the Ridgway’s new generals were far more effec‐ Second Division in the west and, in the east, a tive than MacArthur’s “second stringers” (p. 59) shocked Major General David G. “Barr felt help‐ because they had the experience and mentality to less, bitter, exhausted, and distraught” (p. 220) execute his “meat-grinder strategy” (p. 164) fo‐ while watching as the Chinese battered his Sev‐ cused on killing communist soldiers rather than enth Division. Taaffe, in his summary judgment, seizing territory. When Ridgway replaced concludes that most of the US feld army, corps, MacArthur, Collins already had selected Lieu‐ and division commanders “fought competently tenant James A. Van Fleet as his successor, who enough under trying and confusing circum‐ immediately won the respect of his subordinates stances” (p. 144). with his “bluff, easygoing, and unpretentious Taaffe’s ffth and last chapter fortifies the con‐ manner” (p. 189). But Ridgway “did not have com‐ sensus opinion that credits Ridgway with averting plete confidence in Van Fleet” and “meddled in a US defeat in Korea, relying on “his forcefulness, Eighth Army operations in ways MacArthur never aggressiveness, and energy” (p. 147) to restore the would have contemplated and that Ridgway him‐ Eighth Army’s fghting spirit. Taaffe emphasizes, self would not have tolerated” (p. 188). However, the two collaborated well in provoking the Chi‐ 2 H-Net Reviews nese April-May offensives that created the oppor‐ that made the soldiers nervous” (p. 110) during tunity for the Eighth Army to inflict enormous the Eighth Army’s retreat from the Yalu. Walker’s losses on the enemy. Taaffe labels as “debatable” death in a freak jeep accident, Taaffe notes per‐ Ridgway’s claim that his forces could have driven ceptively, “seemed to epitomize the irony and to the Yalu, yet contradicts himself when he as‐ frustration of the conflict” (p. 122). He also re‐ serts that “stopping the Eighth Army’s northward minds readers that the US “military had waged so push cost the United States its most effective many low-intensity wars … that it was actually means of pressuring the enemy to bargain seri‐ the world wars that were incongruous” (p. 181). ously” (p. 198). Ironically, Almond, he argues con‐ A few simple factual errors diminish the qual‐ vincingly, after January 1951 emerged as the real ity of this study. Korea has a width not of “90 to star among US commanders, displaying the “ener‐ 120 miles” (p. 5), but over 300 miles at its widest. gy, aggressiveness, and determination that Ridg‐ The official name of North Korea is not the way looked for in his combat leaders” (p. 200). “Democratic Republic of Korea” (p. 5). Taaffe con‐ Paralleling the analytically rich “Conclusions” sec‐ sistently misspells the city of Kunsan as “Kusan.” tions ending each chapter, Taaffe’s conclusion to “For Truman,” he writes, “MacArthur’s letter to the study revisits his main arguments under three [Congressman Joseph] Martin was the fnal straw” subheadings titled “Transforming the Eighth (p. 183), when the president later specified the Army,” “Command Relationships,” and “Evaluat‐ general’s issuance to the enemy of an unautho‐ ing Commanders.” rized surrender ultimatum. Among his interpre‐ A great strength of this study is extensive re‐ tive missteps, Taaffe wrongly claims that seeking search at the National Archives, presidential li‐ Korea’s “unification came into the picture [for the braries, and private manuscript collections, with Truman administration] only in the euphoric af‐ references to information in oral history inter‐ terglow of Inchon” (p. 182), when in fact a month views, newspapers, journals, and numerous sec‐ earlier it publicly stated its goal was to destroy ondary sources. Taaffe writes with smoothness, North Korea and started planning to do so. He clarity, and verve, using frequently vernacular then contends that “the basic American objective phrases such as “on the fy” (p. 60), “counted [to save South Korea] remained remarkably con‐ noses” (p. 135), and “duke it out” (p. 191). Personal sistent … and from this perspective [the United profiles extend beyond background and training States] ‘won’ the war” (p.

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