Stephen R. Taafe. MacArthur's Generals. Lincoln: University Press of Kansas, 2016. 278 pp. $34.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-2221-4.

Reviewed by James Matray

Published on H-FedHist (August, 2017)

Commissioned by Caryn E. Neumann (Miami University of Ohio Regionals)

Well-regarded military historian Stephen R. excel in peacetime do not always possess the nec‐ Taafe, author of Marshall and his Generals: U.S. essary attributes to deliver victory on the battle‐ Army Commanders in World War II (2011), con‐ feld in wartime” (p. 4). tinues his analysis of top US combat ofcers in In his opening chapter, Taafe describes the this excellent study examining the performance “deplorable shape” (p. 15) of the Eighth Army in of the feld army, corps, and division commanders Japan when the Korean War began. His next three who served under generals Douglas MacArthur assess the performance of US commanders during and Matthew B. Ridgway during the frst year of the frst six months of the confict. Taafe’s treat‐ the Korean War. T. R. Fehrenbach subtitled his ment of MacArthur covers familiar ground, but 1963 history of the confict A Study in Unpre‐ nicely traces how his twisting of orders led to tri‐ paredness. Taafe shows that this characterization umph at Inchon and tragedy against the Chinese. “was especially true of [US] senior combat leader‐ Like other scholars, he assigns Lieutenant ship” (p. 204), explaining how few of these gener‐ Walton H. Walker, the Eighth Army commander, als had led large units in combat and most had re‐ good grades for defending the Pusan Perimeter, ceived appointment to infate their records before but poor ones in combating the North Korean and retirement. His detailed coverage of battlefeld later Chinese ofensives. Because MacArthur did events demonstrates that “the Eighth Army’s lead‐ not have confdence in Walker, Taafe argues, his ership ran the gamut from impressive to lacklus‐ failure to relieve him “did a disservice to himself, ter” (p. 4). This did not bother MacArthur, who Walker, and the war efort” (p. 55). But he also “paid less attention to his division and regimental condemns Walker for not “honestly voicing his commanders and was content to accept the ones opinions to MacArthur” because he feared being the army sent him” (p. 13). Taafe’s main thesis fred, embracing “Kabuki tactics” that “put his ca‐ holds that while the Eighth Army was not totally reer above the welfare of the army in his charge” unprepared, two factors led to substandard per‐ (p. 209). As for Walker’s subordinates, Major Gen‐ formance. First, MacArthur’s manipulation of his eral William Dean, the 24th Division commander, generals and pitting them against each other dis‐ “never controlled and maneuvered his units the couraged teamwork. Second, Taafe blames “a way a successful ofcer should” (p. 24), and his re‐ leadership dilemma that had plagued all armed placement after capture at Taejon, Brigadier Gen‐ forces since time immemorial: those leaders who eral John H. Church, was old and arthritic. Major H-Net Reviews

General William Kean, commander of the 25yh however, an overlooked reason for his success. Division, “never shook the aura of a staf ofcer” Ridgway was disappointed with the commanders (p. 31), but regimental colonels Henry Fisher and he inherited because they lacked aggressiveness “hard-driving” (p. 41) John “Mike” Michaelis made and moved deliberately “to supplant them with him efective. tough, dynamic, energetic men” (p. 153). But he Stopping North Korea’s ofensive required de‐ wisely followed the advice of US Army Chief of ployment of two more US divisions with similarly Staf General J. Lawton Collins, doing so gradually fawed leaders. Major General Hobart “Hap” Gay, and in the context of a new rotation system that commander of the First Cavalry, “performed cred‐ averted a loss of public confdence in the army. ibly enough” (p. 33), while Major General Lau‐ Ridgway chose “the dignifed, imperturbable, and rence “Dutch” Keiser, “an unlikely choice” (p. 47) thoughtful” (p. 154) Major General Bryant Moore to lead the Second Division, presided over a near to replace Coulter, but kept the widely popular disaster at the Naktong Bulge. In his glowing de‐ Milburn because relieving him would undermine scription of the Inchon-Seoul campaign, Taafe re‐ already low morale. In addition to Almond, he re‐ iterates prior negative descriptions of Major Gen‐ tained Smith to preserve “interservice harmony at eral Edward “Ned” Almond, head of the X Corps, this crucial time” (p. 159) and Major General and positive assessments of Major General Oliver Robert “Shorty” Soule, head of the last-to-deploy P. Smith, the First Marine Division commander. Third Division that “had done yeoman’s service Meanwhile, division of Walker’s command had guarding the beachhead” (p. 136) at Hungnam. brought Major General Frank “Shrimp” Milburn Brigadier generals Blackshear “Babe” Bryan, to Korea. The new First Corps commander “lacked Claude “Buddy” Ferenbaugh, Charles “Charlie that little extra centimeter of gray matter, that lit‐ Dog” Palmer, and Joseph Sladen Bradley replaced tle extra spark, that separated competent generals Church, Barr, Gay, and Kean respectively. Major from the great ones” (p. 82), while John B. Coulter, General Clark “Nick” Rufner took over the Sec‐ head of the Ninth, lacked the “operational aware‐ ond Division from Major General Robert B. Mc‐ ness and sure-footedness … to control events” (p. Clure, who had assumed command after Keiser’s 141). Taafe targets two generals for his harshest fring, and transformed “an outft full of dissen‐ criticism. Failing to understand the magnitude of sion” (p. 168) into one able to fght. China’s entry, Keiser invited the demolition of the Ridgway’s new generals were far more efec‐ Second Division in the west and, in the east, a tive than MacArthur’s “second stringers” (p. 59) shocked Major General David G. “Barr felt help‐ because they had the experience and mentality to less, bitter, exhausted, and distraught” (p. 220) execute his “meat-grinder strategy” (p. 164) fo‐ while watching as the Chinese battered his Sev‐ cused on killing communist soldiers rather than enth Division. Taafe, in his summary judgment, seizing territory. When Ridgway replaced concludes that most of the US feld army, corps, MacArthur, Collins already had selected Lieu‐ and division commanders “fought competently tenant James A. Van Fleet as his successor, who enough under trying and confusing circum‐ immediately won the respect of his subordinates stances” (p. 144). with his “bluf, easygoing, and unpretentious Taafe’s ffth and last chapter fortifes the con‐ manner” (p. 189). But Ridgway “did not have com‐ sensus opinion that credits Ridgway with averting plete confdence in Van Fleet” and “meddled in a US defeat in Korea, relying on “his forcefulness, Eighth Army operations in ways MacArthur never aggressiveness, and energy” (p. 147) to restore the would have contemplated and that Ridgway him‐ Eighth Army’s fghting spirit. Taafe emphasizes, self would not have tolerated” (p. 188). However, the two collaborated well in provoking the Chi‐

2 H-Net Reviews nese April-May ofensives that created the oppor‐ that made the soldiers nervous” (p. 110) during tunity for the Eighth Army to infict enormous the Eighth Army’s retreat from the Yalu. Walker’s losses on the enemy. Taafe labels as “debatable” death in a freak jeep accident, Taafe notes per‐ Ridgway’s claim that his forces could have driven ceptively, “seemed to epitomize the irony and to the Yalu, yet contradicts himself when he as‐ frustration of the confict” (p. 122). He also re‐ serts that “stopping the Eighth Army’s northward minds readers that the US “military had waged so push cost the its most efective many low-intensity wars … that it was actually means of pressuring the enemy to bargain seri‐ the world wars that were incongruous” (p. 181). ously” (p. 198). Ironically, Almond, he argues con‐ A few simple factual errors diminish the qual‐ vincingly, after January 1951 emerged as the real ity of this study. Korea has a width not of “90 to star among US commanders, displaying the “ener‐ 120 miles” (p. 5), but over 300 miles at its widest. gy, aggressiveness, and determination that Ridg‐ The ofcial name of North Korea is not the way looked for in his combat leaders” (p. 200). “Democratic Republic of Korea” (p. 5). Taafe con‐ Paralleling the analytically rich “Conclusions” sec‐ sistently misspells the city of Kunsan as “Kusan.” tions ending each chapter, Taafe’s conclusion to “For Truman,” he writes, “MacArthur’s letter to the study revisits his main arguments under three [Congressman Joseph] Martin was the fnal straw” subheadings titled “Transforming the Eighth (p. 183), when the president later specifed the Army,” “Command Relationships,” and “Evaluat‐ general’s issuance to the enemy of an unautho‐ ing Commanders.” rized surrender ultimatum. Among his interpre‐ A great strength of this study is extensive re‐ tive missteps, Taafe wrongly claims that seeking search at the National Archives, presidential li‐ Korea’s “unifcation came into the picture [for the braries, and private manuscript collections, with Truman administration] only in the euphoric af‐ references to information in oral history inter‐ terglow of Inchon” (p. 182), when in fact a month views, newspapers, journals, and numerous sec‐ earlier it publicly stated its goal was to destroy ondary sources. Taafe writes with smoothness, North Korea and started planning to do so. He clarity, and verve, using frequently vernacular then contends that “the basic American objective phrases such as “on the fy” (p. 60), “counted [to save ] remained remarkably con‐ noses” (p. 135), and “duke it out” (p. 191). Personal sistent … and from this perspective [the United profles extend beyond background and training States] ‘won’ the war” (p. 203). Taafe comes clos‐ to personality traits and idiosyncrasies, including er to the truth when he concludes more modestly thoughtful and balanced assessments of individu‐ that improved leadership enabled the Eighth al strengths and weaknesses. Taafe skillfully uses Army “to defeat the Chinese and North Koreans anecdotes not only to evoke humor, but also on the battlefeld, thus laying the groundwork for poignancy, such as Ridgway taking care of person‐ a negotiated settlement that preserved South Ko‐ al efects before leaving for Korea. There are six rean independence” (p. 220). good maps, one of Korea and the others zooming in on regional areas. Among new insights, Taafe reports how US intelligence provided “Walker with astonishingly accurate information about North Korean intentions and movements through intercepted and decoded radio messages” (p. 38). During a meeting in Tokyo, he suggests, critics of the plan to land at Inchon “may have overplayed their hand” (p. 63). “It was the absence of refugees

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Citation: James Matray. Review of Taafe, Stephen R. MacArthur's Korean War Generals. H-FedHist, H- Net Reviews. August, 2017.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=49575

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