Bachelor’s thesis

Did the fascists get you?

The New Right’s influence on right-wing populism

Author: Jonathan Madeland Supervisor: Dino Viscovi

Examiner: Gergei Farkas Term: VT20 Subject: Sociology Level: Bachelor Course code: 2SO31E

Abstract:

An experimental survey (N = 415) is used to evaluate fascist qualifications within party preference groups, regarding susceptibility to a neofascist communication style and gravitation toward fascist ideas. Testing the notion by fascism expert Roger Griffin, that the influence of the neofascist intellectual movement the New Right (la Nouvelle Droite) is successfully shaping the 21st century wave of right-wing populism, it is hypothesized that sympathizers of the Swedish right-wing populism equivalent (the Sweden Democrats) are more susceptible to a neofascist communication style and more preconditioned to agree with covertly fascist ideas (as based on the writings of the Nouvelle Droite). The results strongly support this hypothesis, although the potential for generalizability beyond the collected sample is limited. Using a causal networks approach, the failure to falsify the hypothesis is however considered a small but valid observation that bolsters its probability. The study contributes to the current research by further strengthening the bridge between the fields of populism and fascism.

Key words: fascism, survey experiment, causal networks, New Right, Nouvelle Droite, right- wing populism, the Sweden Democrats

Thank you!

I would like to thank the members of the Kantian Dinner Party for critiquing this text. Valuable feedback has also been given by my fellow sociology students: Elin Gunnarsson, Olivia Jakobsson, Hanna Nir and Julia Yunusova. I will also, contradicting all the conventions because I don’t care about them right now, thank my supervisor Dino Viscovi for having enough confidence in me to let me try several unusual approaches.

I would especially like to thank everyone who has participated in the study, a considerable amount of whom via the facebook group “Växjö”. You are by far the most helpful town-based facebook group; the stockholmare and the göteborgare only contributed with about five cases total (although I am of course incredibly grateful for those!). I am very sorry that I deceived you regarding the true purpose of the study. Unfortunately, it is a necessity in experimental effect studies that participants are unaware of what is being tested. I hope that you will nevertheless find the study interesting.

It is my sincere hope that no one will feel accused of being “a fascist” by the results or conclusions in the study. This is far from the point. It is only that I measure the susceptibility to a neofascist communication style and the presence of certain ideas that would make actual neofascists regard themselves successful in their online propagating. I in no way make any conclusions regarding the political intentions of the participants. I hope that what will be communicated in the study is a demonstration that neofascist propaganda has an observable, very real effect, and that fascist conceptions seem to be concentrated in groups that are especially susceptible to neofascist propaganda; that it is not an accusation of fascism but a heads up regarding an empirically potent threat of far-right manipulation that is ongoing in our current world.

Jonathan Madeland

Table of contents

1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Expanding the field of populism ...... 1 1.2 Why study fascism? ...... 2 1.3 An experimental approach ...... 4 1.4 Purpose statement ...... 6 2 A deductive excursion ...... 7 2.1 Defining fascism ...... 7 2.2 A neofascist communication style ...... 10 2.3 Exploring causal networks ...... 11 3 Methods and materials ...... 15 3.1 Forging a fascist-o-meter ...... 15 3.1.1 Susceptibility to a neofascist communication style ...... 15 3.1.2 Gravitation toward fascist ideas ...... 16 3.1.3 Party preferences ...... 18 3.2 Notes on validity ...... 18 3.3 A theoretical generalization ...... 19 3.4 Collected materials ...... 20 3.5 Ethical considerations ...... 21 4 Results ...... 23 4.1 Susceptibility: Variation A vs Variation B ...... 23 4.2 Gravitation toward fascist ideas ...... 25 5 Discussion and conclusions ...... 27 5.1 Exploring causal networks (post experiment) ...... 27 5.2 So what? ...... 29 References ...... 31

Appendix A – Complete references in literature map ...... 35 Appendix B – Crime descriptions ...... 40 Appendix C – Screenshots of facebook comments ...... 43

1 Introduction

1.1 Expanding the field of populism

A salient political trend during the last decades is the global rise of populism (Elgenius & Rydgren 2017; Hameleers & Schmuck 2017; Sheets et al 2016). According to Roodujin (2019), research on populism has since the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit referendum become an entire industry of its own. Even so, a major gap in this research field is that populism remains rather detached from adjacent fields. Also, being consensually defined as “a set of ideas that concerns the antagonistic relationship between the corrupt elite and the virtuous people” (ibid, pp. 365-6), populism as a concept can be applied on a wide range of phenomena. Because of this, Roodujin continues, there is a risk that important distinctions between populist movements might get overlooked. For example, we can immediately and meaningfully differentiate between “left-wing” and “right-wing” populists – the former basing their societal critique on the concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands, the latter on the impact of immigration (see also Caiani 2019); i.e. different demographics voicing different concerns but having in common that they are against the status quo. Failing to make this distinction, researchers have in the past wrongfully claimed that nativist conceptions and a lack of education make people susceptible to “populism” – when a well-educated non-nativist might as well be a populist (but not of the same kind).

The general increase of populism worldwide suggests that there is more than one single cause or issue at hand; the current state of the world itself seems to be fertile ground for populist movements. There are many theories to why this is. One supporting reason, according to Mudde (2004), could be the ‘demystification of the political office’ which means that citizens in post- industrial societies more so than before consider themselves to have a good understanding of what politicians do – and think that they can do it better. This belief undermines the legal authority (in a Weberian sense) of politicians and instead opens the door for charismatic leadership (ibid). Many researchers point to a lack of trust rooted in the material implications of global capitalism (or neoliberalism) which is then associated with widening class divides, economic instability and international flow of capital disrupting the balance between the state and the private sector (see for instance Balorda 2019; Hameleers et al 2018; Thesen 2018; Hobsbawm 2011; Gupta 2010). There is also an increase of populism associated with the level of immigration (Caiani 2019). Working in tandem, these broad social forces could be creating an environment fit for populist movements of all kinds.

Now, in this world-encompassing and diverse populist uprising, there is a possibility, and this is the central idea in this study, that fringe ideologies (like fascism) will successfully “hijack” or “shape” the waves of political distrust, with ideologues spreading sophisticated, thought-out narratives that make the situation comprehensible to a frustrated populace, pointing to a culprit – and to a savior. In other words, radical actors might succeed in capitalizing on this non- integrated societal condition; thereby shaping populist movements in a way that benefits them. 1

Indeed, Schultz et al (2018) points out that populist movements can transform into thicker ideologies when, for instance, socialism or fascism are added to it.

Answering both of Roodujin’s (2019) pleas for on the one hand an expansion of the study of populism to adjacent fields, and on the other the use of a sharper analytical focus to better elucidate the lines between pure populism and other ideologies – thereby reducing the risk of drawing invalid conclusions – this study will test the claim that the right-wing populist movement supporting the Swedish “Trump-equivalent” (Kroes 2017), the Sweden Democrats (SD), is indeed, as the movement has sometimes been accused, unknowingly informed by fascist ideology.

1.2 Why study fascism?

In parallel with populism, a growing number of researchers are taking an interest in 21st century fascism (e.g. Traverso 2019; Christopher et al 2019; Balorda 2019; Kroes 2017). This is interesting because the basic phenomenon of these fields (the sudden domination of right-wing populist parties) overlap with each other. To further unite the fields this study asks the question if fascist remobilization, from the position of having been declared dead1, utilizing the internet and the neofascist strategies developed by the Nouvelle Droite (see Elgenius & Rydgren 2018; Griffin 2000), can help explain the specific shape of right-wing populism in Sweden.

Several prominent experts on fascism point out fascistic aspects of the wave of right-wing populists in the world today, although they refer to varying subsets of them. While there is no final definition of fascism upon which everyone agrees, Robert O. Paxton (2009) writes that he has no problem calling many of these new parties neofascistic – in that they share the same position on the political spectrum and attack the same enemies as explicit neofascists do. He says that the denial of fascism, regardless, is a pragmatic necessity for these kinds of parties to gain entrance to important political spaces, but that fascist ideas can often be welcomed behind closed doors (Paxton 2004). Roger Griffin says in an interview (Arnstad 2019) that what we are seeing is indeed a form of fascism given its central conception: that the nation is degenerating and that it needs to be “reborn”. Direct parallels with classic (interwar) fascism are however completely fallacious, Griffin says; what happened in Italy, Germany and in other places during this period was generic fascism at work given the specific historical contexts (as per the “new consensus”, described later). This means that generic fascism operating today will do so in relation to new contexts but will work toward the same vision – a cleansed and reborn nation.

1 One of the current leading experts on fascism, Roger Griffin, claimed in 1990 that “[Fascism as] an active factor in the transformation of history […] is a spent force” (Griffin 1990, p. 45). A decade later he wrote about the effective remobilization of fascist ideology via the French think-tank la Nouvelle Droite but concluded that the western world was too stable for fascist ideas to really take root (Griffin 2000). This was of course the year before 9/11. Since then, talk of white nationalism, right-wing populism and the far right has been extensive in both academia and mainstream media, a large proportion of which linking the phenomena to fascism in “an explosion of historical analogizing” (el-Ojeili 2019; citation by Dylan Riley ibid, p. 102). 2

Griffin says in another interview (Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung 2019) that fascism poses two threats today. First, individuals are getting radicalized online which can drive them to commit acts of terrorism. Second, the influence of the New Right (la Nouvelle Droite) could successfully enter populist movements and dye them with neofascist ideas presented as “common sense” (in other words, precisely what is here going to be tested in the case of the Sweden Democrat sympathizers). In this manner, fascist actors could mobilize populist movements and use them as tools to pressure established non-fascist parties to introduce policies in concession with the manipulated populists.

The Nouvelle Droite (ND) is one of the most significant rightist intellectual currents today and has had a large impact well beyond Europe, forming a transnational network of neofascist actors (Bar-On 2012; Mammone 2008). It emerged in the 1960s as an attempt to answer the calls of fascist intellectuals, like Maurice Bardèche and Dominique Venner, who realized that their ideas would not be able to survive in the post-WW2 environment without a reorientation (Griffin 2000). The ND would go on to be known as “fascism with a human face” by other intellectuals due to its alarmingly successful attempt of a reconstruction of fascist ideology without Nazi- or other fascist connotations (Bar-On 2012; McCulloch 2006; Griffin 2000). It was closely connected to and effectively transformed the French Front National (FN) in the 1980s, from a marginal fascist constellation to what it is today2 (McCulloch 2006). There have been schisms between the ND and the FN (see Griffin 2000), but the ND strategy of denouncing fascism and using a more politically correct language (though covertly analogous with fascist ideology) worked efficiently and was copied by other nationalist parties throughout Europe, like the Italian Lega Nord and the British National Party (Bar-On 2011).

A prominent slogan of the ND, to give an example, is the “right to difference” (see Mammone 2008) – meaning that people within a nation have the right not to be blended with people from other cultures, since this would lead to the death of their own culture. With this as an ideological starting point, immigrants become analogous with “foreign elements” that threaten the cultural integrity of the nation; the immigrants being one step away from being interpreted as “invaders”, which in turn would mean that the nation is under attack – demanding a response that the establishment, treacherously, won’t recognize. Spreading ideas or conceptions like the “right to difference” (also referred to as ethnopluralism, see Wåg 2010), rather than focusing on concrete, short-term political goals, is part of an explicit right-wing Gramscian meta-political strategy – meaning that the ND believes that the proper ideas must be put in place within a nation before material change can happen (Bar-On 2012; Mammone 2008; Griffin 2000). In line with this, a network of far-right “alternative” online media has emerged globally during the last decade, often with direct ties to fascist organizations, mobilizing supporters and mainstream voters by spreading fear of immigrants (Figenschou & Ihlebaek 2019; Doerr 2017).

The Sweden Democrats’ roots in neofascism is a well-established fact (Robsahm 2020; Elgenius & Rydgren 2019; Mulinari & Neergaard 2015; Deland et al 2010; Ekman & Poohl

2 In 2018 Front National rebranded itself as Rassemblement National. 3

2010). To what extent these ideas are still present in the party is unclear; the SD themselves claim that the party has renewed itself completely since the early 90s, but a steady stream of racist scandals that has not ceased to this day tells a different story. It is also easy to hesitate in giving the claim of renewal the benefit of the doubt considering the winning strategy of the Front National that made the nationalist wave take off in the first place – the denunciation of fascism and the use of a more politically correct discourse. In 2004, for example, this strategy is evident in a strategic discussion within the SD, stated by the former party secretary Torbjörn Kastell, that they were not supposed to publicly say things like ‘kick out the black people’, but instead ‘work toward the repatriation of non-assimilable elements’; not ‘hang the traitors to the nation’, but ‘demand responsibility from the politicians that have acted against the interests of their country’ (Ekman & Poohl 2010, p. 218, my translations). However, instead of trying to make the judgement of whether the SD definitely lies about their true ideology or not, which is probably a hopeless pursuit, a more fruitful way of going about this question is to look at how the social movement that makes the SD possible, i.e. their sympathizers, respond to neofascist stimuli and to what extent fascist ideas are concentrated in this group compared to others. That way the SD’s intentions become irrelevant to the de facto mobilization of fascist ideas that may or may not be present in their movement. This is after all what is truly relevant; fascism happens, Griffin says, when enough people feel that something radical must happen to prevent the nation or the race from dying (Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung 2019).

1.3 An experimental approach

To measure SD sympathizers’ relative responsiveness to a neofascist stimulus, a strong causal test is required. Experiments are rarely used in sociological studies for practical and/or ethical reasons but, given the opportunity, it is a valuable thing in and of itself to further explore its possibilities within the social sciences. Details of the design will be provided in a later chapter.

The author has not been able to find a single prior experiment with the aim of evaluating fascist qualifications within 21st century populist movements. Bos et al (2013) writes that they are the first to use an experimental approach in the study of populism, exploring which social groups that are preconditioned to respond to different combinations of populist style and rhetoric in news articles. This was seven years ago. The author has tracked the development of this study by using the “cited by”-search function in the Linnaeus University database (finding subsequent articles that refer to it), and then by repeating the process for each new article also describing an experiment. Hits that do not describe experiments but still deal with the topic of populism have been marked and skimmed through, but not researched in turn. See a literature map of the result below.

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Figure 1. Genesis and development of experimental studies in populism. The upper section considers conducted experiments, the lower section subsequent but non-experimental studies in populism. See complete references in Appendix A.

MIND THE GAP: this literature sometimes makes subtle or direct passes to the far right discussion, drawing relationships between the rise of right-wing populism and more extreme movements (e.g. Krämer 2017; Sheets 2016; Stockemer 2014), but mainly it is interested in media strategies and how the framing of messages affect readers in more of a psychological or socio-psychological context (far from a specific ideology-diagnostical one). Regarding the experimental studies, all of which are using factorial designs to compare individual effects of variations in news articles, they explore things like perceived legitimacy (Bos et al 2013), party preferences (Matthes et al 2019; Hameleers et al 2018c; Sheets et al 2016), exclusionist or anti- establishment attitudes (Matthes & Schmuck 2019; Hameleers & Schmuck 2017; Hameleers et al 2017a; Schmuck & Matthes 2017), mobilizing effects (Bos et al 2020; Hameleers et al 2018a), self-selection of populist messages (Hameleers et al 2018b), and sender recognition (Heiss et al 2019). The experiments are made within micro or meso theoretical frameworks, i.e. contributing to explanations that regard psychological mechanisms or actor agency within a given structure, as opposed to a top-down macro framework involving broader socio-political contexts and discursive opportunities (see Gattinara & Pirro 2018 for a discussion of different approaches to the study of the far right as a social movement).

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Two of the non-experimental studies do mention the Nouvelle Droite in passing. Stockemer (2014) has interviewed activists from the Front National, one of them describing his initial interest from reading ND literature. Krämer (2017) mentions that the few scholarly developments of populism as a full ideology that exist have been made by writers of the ND (or by writers of the Conservative Revolution).

These things considered, fascism, or the far right, can be considered an adjacent topic to populism. Further, experimental approaches exploring right-wing populist social movements’ relation to fascist ideology within a macro theoretical framework are, if at all existing, very rare. While the connection between right-wing populism and fascism has often been explored using other methodological approaches, empirical evidence of the responsiveness to a neofascist communication style, and the gravitation toward fascist ideas within populist movements, is lacking.

1.4 Purpose statement

As motivated by the sections above, this study’s purpose is to, within a macro theoretical framework, explore the relationship between general populism, neofascist meta-politics, and 21st century right-wing populism. It is limited to a Swedish context, using an experiment to measure the relative responsiveness of party sympathizers to a neofascist communication style, as well as measuring the degree of which sympathizers of the right-wing populist party in Sweden (the Sweden Democrats, SD) will agree with covertly fascist ideas, as based on the writings of the Nouvelle Droite, compared to non-SD sympathizers.

The overarching theory being that the influence of the Nouvelle Droite is successfully shaping the right-wing populist movement in Sweden, the following hypotheses will be tested:

➢ A neofascist communication style will cause SD sympathizers to respond significantly stronger than non-SD sympathizers.

➢ There is a significant positive correlation between agreeing with covertly fascist ideas and sympathizing with the SD.

The study aims to guide the question of whether it is worthwhile to further strengthen the bridge between the fields of populism and fascism by extracting empirical evidence of their positive or null association.

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2 A deductive excursion

2.1 Defining fascism

In order to measure and analyze fascist ideology it must be made perfectly clear what is meant by it, i.e., what definition of fascism that will be used. The reader will understand that the definition stated in this section is a theoretical construct made by the author and that a “true” definition of fascism (that is, one that all experts agree on) does not exist. Other definitions can be true or valid in other contexts; fascism is for instance used by some historians to exclusively refer to the political developments in Italy between 1919 and 1945 (when fascism, viewed this way, ended). What fascism is that is being referred to in this study is not a historic period, not even specific acts committed by fascists, but fascism as an idea, a worldview, a driving force and a societal vision. This way of viewing fascism is what is meant by “the new consensus” among fascism experts (Griffin 2000); it is considered by many to be the most useful way of studying the subject. Fascism in this regard is sometimes referred to as “generic fascism”.

Now then, how should generic fascism be defined? What ideas would drive Mussolini to do what he did, given the specific context of interwar Italy; Hitler during the same period in Germany; Breivik in 2011; Tarrant in 2019; and current American, French or Swedish neo- Nazis? What unites them is – and this is said to be the mandatory starting point in the difficult task of defining fascism (Passmore 2006) – first, an extreme devotion to a people, nation or culture (or “ethnos”, see Bar-On 2012), the survival of which is what all political action is centered around. Second, it is a conception that this ethnos has a pure essence with one history and a future in which it is either victorious or defeated by other ethnies. When fascists demand change, it is because they believe that the destiny of their ethnos is threatened by other ethnies or that it is itself turning away from its essence; from its excellence; and therefore, from future glory. Fascists are often radical, not because it is an inherent part of their ideology, but because they seldom believe that the establishment first and foremost serves the survival of the ethnos. To the fascist, the struggle for survival is therefore often also one between the pure people of the ethnos versus the corrupt elite. The famous definition by Roger Griffin captures all these properties:

Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism.

Griffin cited in Feldman 2008, p. xii.

Fascist movements are here described as permutations of a common ideological core; this core is what unites all fascisms even if they do not have direct bonds to each other. The core is that of palingenesis, meaning “rebirth”, which is the critical need to “get back in shape” from a degenerated state. This palingenesis comes in the form of populist ultra-nationalism (people with an extreme devotion to their ethnos versus the elite), that is, what is to be reborn, cleansed, purified, reinstated, is the essence of the ethnos itself.

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What makes Breivik’s actions coherent with fascist ideology, then, is that he, in his mind, attacked a sickness within his ethnos (social democracy) that has allowed foreign elements (other ethnies, specifically “Muslims”) to corrupt the purity of the Norwegian, Scandinavian, or European essence. Tarrant’s actions in Christchurch become coherent with fascism when he considers them a justified revenge for acts of terrorism committed by other Muslim individuals. Any Muslim, being part of the Muslim ethnos, is, in Tarrant’s mind, a valid target in the war between ethnies; it is he, representing one ethnos, attacking another. The point that is being made is that it is the conceptions behind these acts of terror that are fascist; terrorism is an extreme strategy by fascist fanatics, but strategies need not be extreme in this sense to be fascist. In the same way, rationales for the separation of ethnies are historically contingent. Biological racism, for instance, has in the past worked as a convenient scientific rationale for fascist ideas. When the concept of distinct biological races is proven unfeasible, fascism finds another rationale for the separation of the perceived ethnies (for instance supposed deep-rooted and incompatible cultural differences). It is therefore clear that specific political actions and/or rationales cannot be used to define generic fascism.

Because fascists have historically been hostile toward both liberals and socialists (claiming a “third position” on the left-right axis), fascism has been called “anti-modern”. Yet, fascism is not conservative (although conservatives can be useful allies against liberals and socialists). A better way to understand the fascist ideology is that it is yet another child of modernity – not adoring a vision of a self-regulating market system or the vision of an egalitarian society, but a vision of pure ethnies becoming more of themselves. The Nouvelle Droite appreciates technological progress and new scientific modes of analysis, for instance, but wants to abolish things like egalitarianism and excessive individualism (Bar-On 2012). The Venn-diagram below is an attempt to compare some antithetical as well as shared properties between the modern ideologies of liberalism, socialism and fascism to better understand how they relate to each other. It is crude but useful.

Figure 2. Venn-diagram of three ideologies: fascism, liberalism and socialism. 8

To begin with fascism’s unique trait in this comparison, it is nativist, here meaning exclusionist toward anyone considered not belonging to the ethnos. Fascism is also essentialist in that an individual is considered to inherently belong to either the same ethnos or to another ethnos. Non-European immigrants gaining citizenship, for instance, are only technically, not truly, part of the nation; their future children also carrying an alien essence within them, corrupting the ethnos. Fascism is collectivist in that it propagates for the health of the ethnos as a whole so that it may compete with other ethnies; men should for example be raised to be masculine and brave, and women should give birth to many pure babies. Socialism is collectivist too, but within a different paradigm (while immigration hurts the collective in an ethno-essentialist sense, the exploitation by the rich hurts the collective in an egalitarian sense). They find, although for different reasons, a common enemy in global market capitalism (emphasis on “global”) because it disrupts the integrity of both ethnies and geographically limited labor unions and states. Liberalism shares the property with fascism of being essentialist, but again, a different shade of it. Here it is the notion of individuals being where they are because of inherent traits; if an individual is inherently hard-working and intelligent it will find its way to the top, given a free market system, which then automatically produces just social hierarchies. Liberalism and fascism thus find a common enemy in the constructionism that exists within the socialist sphere, here referring to the ontological claim that human qualities are not independently existing but are contingent on material and/or discursive circumstances. This challenges the notion of distinct ethnies, rendering them a fantasy, as well as the reliability of righteously produced social hierarchies. Liberalism and socialism do, however, find common ground in multiculturalism (antithetical to nativism), either in a meritocratic sense – only regarding performance within the system – or in an egalitarian sense – interpreting low- empowered social groups as less privileged by the system and therefore in need of empowerment. Finally, the diagram shows liberalism as currently being the dominant ideology, explaining why socialism and fascism would manifest in populist movements since they would both be unhappy with the status quo.

In line with all of this, generic fascism will be defined as follows:

1. An ideology striving toward the purification of the collective (the ethnos); therefore, principally against the mixing of perceived ethnies in order to protect purity. 2. An ideology prescribing an identification with the ethnos, honoring its past and guiding it toward a glorious future. The needs of the collective come before the needs of individuals. 3. An ideology strictly prioritizing the well-being of the own ethnos before other ethnies.

Given this ideological core, fascist actors can then utilize whatever strategy that seem appropriate depending on the circumstances of the surrounding world. It could mean cooperating with liberals against socialists on a democratic arena, or to cooperate with conservatives against liberals, and so on. Temporary alliances can affect fascists’ stances in specific political issues (thereby making it hard to pin down what fascists consistently do), but the core ideas listed above always operate in the background, regardless if the actor in question

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is a political party or a lone fanatic. A fascist mobilization would also be expected to be mirrored by a growing belief that the ethnos is threatened and/or degenerating, spurring action.

Griffin has analyzed the writings of the Nouvelle Droite and has summarized the ideas that are intended to be sown via their meta-politics (an attempt to “take over the laboratories of thinking”), making voters more inclined to listen to covertly fascist proposals (Griffin 2000, pp. 222–4). Arnstad (2019) has summarized these ideas even further, cited below. The reader should find them coherent with the definition of fascism above.

1. The pluralistic and multicultural society must be abolished in favor of an ethnically homogeneous society. 2. Western democracy – as based on universal human rights and the freedom of the individual – is to be replaced by a democracy based on the idea of an “organic society”. 3. The cosmopolitanism of modern times, rootlessness and atomization must be defeated through a tribute to authentic national culture. 4. Insight must be gained that European cultures are facing an acute threat; they have almost been lost. Multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity undermine the homogeneous cultural and ethnic identities in Europe. 5. The “New Right” should be presented as an innovative third way, between traditional left and right.

Arnstad 2019, p. 357, my translation.

Because the success of the Nouvelle Droite’s neofascist project is equivalent to the extension of these ideas in the public mind, the gravitation toward fascist ideas will be operationalized using these points, described in a later chapter.

2.2 A neofascist communication style

The methods fascists use to put out their message have transformed since the creation of the internet. Wåg (2010) writes that far-right propaganda used to come in the format of flyers, paper magazines and music, but is now spread through national and international online forums (see also Figenschou & Ihlebaek 2019; Doerr 2017). In these forums you can find autonomous nationalists as well as Sweden Democrats (Deland et al 2010). Articles spread in these forums focus on crimes committed by immigrants, the intention being to enforce the idea of immigrants as a destructive element within nations. According to the Swedish Media Council, in 2013, seven out of ten articles shared on these far-right online media platforms concerned immigration and crime (Statens medieråd 2013).

Of interest to the methodological purposes of this study, Wåg (2010) presents an email containing a media strategy formulated by Lennart Berg, directed to the writers of Folktribunen (the most important magazine within the Swedish far right between 1999-2001). Here it is made clear that the writers should not be untruthful in their news reporting – but selective; only reporting incidents that put immigrants in bad light. Texts should be biased just below the point

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of being recognized as propaganda by an untrained eye. Also, it should over time build a meta- narrative of the establishment selling out their nation and people, and that the supporters of the nationalist movement are the liberators of the people. An excerpt of Lennart Berg’s email is presented below.

The goal is for the reader to get the impression that we simply communicate the unadulterated truth about what is happening in the world, completely without bias. That does not mean that we should not distort the news at all, just that the distortion should be so sophisticated that it is not visible to an untrained eye. The distortion deals most of all with the selection of news we convey, which should happen more or less automatically, since we write about what interests us and consider important, and that could get the reader to support our cause. The distortion also applies in the words we use, which in short means that we should always use words with positive connotations when we write about ourselves, or about our enemies’ enemies, and words with negative connotations when we signify our enemies. This does not mean that the designations shouldn’t be consistent with the truth. For example, our enemies can be denoted by words like “anti-Swedish”, “stooge of the regime”, “politically correct”, or in particularly serious cases, “traitor to the people” or “collaborator”; while our own can be denoted by, for example, “patriot”, “regime critical”, “politically incorrect”, “dissident” or “oppositional”. In the same way, our struggle is not one of “throwing out immigrants”, but a struggle of national liberation, a struggle against foreign exploitation, and of the Swedish people’s right to their own country.

Lennart Berg cited in Wåg 2010, p. 103, my translation.

It is worth pointing out that Lennart Berg was part of Nordiska Förbundet (freely translated: the Nordic League) who founded Metapedia, which functions like a “far-right encyclopedia” (Expo 2018). Metapedia, Bar-On writes, “was created by [Nouvelle Droite] supporters in Sweden to disseminate ND ideas worldwide” (Bar-On 2012, p. 22).

Current far right online media sites are an evolution of fascist paper magazines (Wåg 2010). Browsing these sites, the one-sided reporting of immigrants, the story of the corrupt and politically correct establishment, as well as the appearance of objectivity, is easy to recognize (see also Nygaard 2019). The insights provided by Lennart Berg, into at least some aspects of the far right’s media strategy, will be important in the construction of a neofascist stimulus.

2.3 Exploring causal networks

The study sets out to, within a macro theoretical framework, explore the relationship between general populism, neofascist meta-politics, and 21st century right-wing populism (in the Swedish case the sympathizers of the Sweden Democrats). In this section, a chart of all causal possibilities between these elements is provided. The current study will then make a modal evaluation of as many possibilities as possible to make the more probable scenarios stand out.

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A more comprehensive project might have aimed to falsify all possibilities but the one that cannot be falsified, thereby deriving its truth, but it will be considered enough within the scope of this project to at least make some valid progress in solving this problem.

General populism, i.e. populism of any kind, will be assumed to be a reaction against the political status quo, since populism is used to signify people versus the elite. The dominant political ideology has been assumed to be something in the lines of “liberalism”, here specifically signifying a combination of meritocratic multiculturalism, individualistic essentialism and global market capitalism – causing resistance of various forms due to economic and cultural impacts. However, it is enough to feel that something is wrong to be open to populist explanations of these feelings, meaning that there is room for negotiations regarding who or what is to blame. People with decreasing trust in the establishment would then gravitate toward one of several independently coherent narratives, mobilizing these people into focused populist movements. One such narrative that is being strongly communicated is the one directed by the international network of far-right online media as per the meta-political strategy of the Nouvelle Droite, consistently portraying immigration as the main reason for society’s problems (and sustained by both the establishment and the rival “left”). Has this narrative influenced the support of the right-wing populist movements in a considerable way? Every logical possibility is presented below. As much progress as possible will be made deductively before new empirical evidence is needed.

Figure 3. Overview of causal networks 1: 27 logical possibilities. First, since two phenomena, B and C, has a fixed starting point in time (1968 and post 1990, respectively), the circular hypotheses (H25 and H26) are impossible. Those can confidently be falsified.

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Second, since B occurs before 1990, it could never have been caused by C. Any hypothesis proposing B as dependent on C (H5, H8, H11, H12, H15, H17, H20, H23, H24) can therefore also be falsified.

Third, it will be considered unlikely that the Nouvelle Droite, it being an intellectual movement with a specific agenda independent of outside dominant views or feelings, was formed due to a general lack of trust in the world. Any unfalsified hypothesis proposing B as dependent on A (H1, H7, H13, H19) will be marked “unlikely”.

Fourth, it will, in the opposite direction, be considered improbable that the ND has had a significant influence on the general lack of trust in the world. This would surely be an overestimation of the ND’s influence. It will, if anything, be considered more likely that the ND has been able to mobilize an already existing populist energy. Any unfalsified hypothesis proposing A as dependent on B (H4, H10, H14, H18, H21, H22) will be marked “unlikely”.

Fifth, it will also be considered unlikely that the wave of right-wing populism first became the shape it is, and then caused a general lack of trust in the world. Although a feedback effect could be feasible, it will be considered more likely that the formation of any populist movement is a consequence of a potent populist energy, emanating from other sources (for instance economic instability or immigration). Any unfalsified hypothesis proposing A as dependent on C (H6, H9, H18, H22) will be marked “unlikely”.

Sixth, it will, in line with the last paragraph, be considered improbable that the world-spanning right-wing populist wave formed without a general lack of trust behind it. Any unfalsified hypotheses proposing C not dependent on A (H1, H3, H4, H6, H7, H9, H14, H18, H22, H27) will be marked “unlikely”. The causal networks chart will now look like this:

Figure 4. Overview of causal networks 2: pre experiment modal judgements. 13

As can be seen, the most likely scenarios, given the reasoning above, comes down to two possibilities. Either the Nouvelle Droite has had a significant influence on the forming of the right-wing populist wave (H16), or it has not (H2). An experiment must now be conducted to make this judgement in the Swedish case of the Sweden Democrat sympathizers. If the ND has had an influence, it is expected that SD sympathizers will, first, prove to be especially susceptible to the style of far-right communication, and, second, conditioned to agree with the ND’s ideas.

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3 Methods and materials

3.1 Forging a fascist-o-meter

Three things needed to explore the causal networks described above has been measured using an experimental online survey. First, “susceptibility to a neofascist communication style” was measured by comparing reactions to a, in Variation A, description of a man assaulting his wife, the intention of the text being to convey the story without bias; and in Variation B, a description of the same event, but this time intended to stir up emotions of hate against the man. Second, “gravitation toward fascist ideas” was measured by letting the respondents take a stance on different raised opinions about the event, some of them communicated through a fascist rant on facebook, and some of them through an antithetical response to it (this stage was identical for Variation A and B). Third, “party preferences” was measured conventionally in a final stage.

3.1.1 Susceptibility to a neofascist communication style

Using the service Soscisurvey (www.soscisurvey.de), an online survey was programmed to randomly generate the number “1” or “2” for every respondent clicking the survey link. The survey was then programmed to unlock different elements for the respondents, depending on their secret number. This way, respondents were randomly assigned into two experimental groups (in a way statistical copies), enabling a strong causal test by then exposing the groups to different treatments (see Creswell & Creswell 2018, chapter 8 on true experiments, and a strong causal test applied in Bos et al 2013). Any significant difference between the groups must then be interpreted as a direct result of the different treatments as the three conditions for causality are achieved, i.e. temporal order, evidence of association and the ruling out of alternative causes (see Neuman 2014, p. 282).

In Variation A, the respondents were instructed to read a short text (approximately 300 words) describing a criminal case regarding a man (Ahmed) assaulting his wife (Elin). The text used is borrowed from another study by Jerre & Tham (2010, pp. 30–31), but more summarized and with some minor changes of details. The text provides some background information and focuses on the facts, for instance the number of punches and kicks Elin received. It also describes the events leading up to the assault, both Ahmed and Elin having active roles. In Variation B, the intent was to distort the event as per the journalistic directions of Lennart Berg to the writers of the far-right magazine Folktribunen (Wåg 2010, p. 103). There are thus no technical falsehoods, but all details and circumstances not portraying Ahmed as a monster is cut out – and everything that does is highlighted. The text focuses on Ahmed’s bad mood and actions, not really placing them in an interplay with Elin. Her passive role in the text is simply to, for no apparent reason, be assaulted by Ahmed, whose Muslim heritage is emphasized, and who “got away” with only 24 months in jail (implying a weak justice system). Quantitative statements are made suggestive; for instance, instead of “two kicks” Elin gets “several kicks”, leaving the reader to guess how many. Placing of information is used to imply more extreme violence; in Variation A the reader immediately learns that Ahmed has given Elin “a slap one

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time in the past”, but in Variation B the reader learns, after the assault has taken place, that Ahmed has “mistreated Elin before” (implying more than a slap). See the full texts in Swedish and translated to English in Appendix B. The name “Ahmed” appears in both variations and is meant to imply a Muslim heritage (though made explicit in Variation B). This was to make sure that it was the style of the text that caused the effect, not the fact that it was a Muslim committing the crime.

After reading the texts, the respondents learned that Ahmed was sentenced to 24 months in jail for the assault and were then instructed to submit what jail sentence they themselves felt was most reasonable (expressed in months). Sentences were limited to a maximum of 240 months. Anything above this, for instance “99999”, was altered to 240 (applied in five cases). The answer “life imprisonment” was also altered to 240 months. It is assumed that a higher sentence in Variation B signifies that the fascist communication style was effective, hence revealing which social groups that were most susceptible to it in the sample. Susceptibility was calculated by a mean analysis of the jail sentence as dependent on Variation A/B, layered by social group; each individual social group’s ascribed susceptibility being the percentual increase from Variation A to Variation B. The significance level was calculated by first splitting the data set so that only the social group in question was present, and then performing a mean analysis of the jail sentence as dependent on Variation A/B and applying an ANOVA.

3.1.2 Gravitation toward fascist ideas

The aim of the Nouvelle Droite is to make people agree to fascist ideas without recognizing them as fascist. Therefore, it is not possible to evaluate the success of the ND by asking respondents if they agree with fascist ideas or not. The answer would be “no” either way, and even still, the question would surely confuse the respondents since there is no common understanding of what fascism is supposed to signify. Instead, the ideas (and antithetical ideas), as per the definition of fascism in the previous chapter, was disguised in a fictitious exchange of anonymous facebook comments regarding the assault case.

First, the respondents saw a screenshot of a facebook comment saying that it is obvious that the multicultural society must be abolished in favor of an ethnically homogenous society, that he/she doesn’t give a damn about universal human rights, etc., basically integrating the five bullet points of the ND into a 164-word rant. The respondents were instructed to take a stance on the following opinions (variable name in brackets):

• Our multicultural society should be abolished in favor of an ethnically homogenous society. [Ethnic homogeneity] • There is a great need for innovative thinking since neither traditional left- or right-wing politics will be able to solve society’s problems. [Neither left nor right] • We should not worry about universal human rights but instead prioritize “our own”. [No universal human rights] • People from different cultures should, by principle, not mix since they will then lose their unique qualities. [No mixing of cultures]

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• Sweden is degenerating. [Sweden is degenerating] • It is important that Sweden begins to tone up its own traditions. [Revitalize Swedish traditions]

A slider was used here so that the respondents could agree with the statements from 0 to 100 percent. The respondents were also instructed to take a stance on whether they felt good about the comment being posted, as well as some other questions about the comment that only served to disguise the study’s true purpose, for instance if the comment was well structured or clear in its message.

Second, the respondents saw a screenshot of another comment, responding to the first, accusing the first author of thinking like a fascist and that feminism is the answer to spouse abuse; integrating several to fascism antithetical ideas. The respondents then took a stance on the following opinions, in the same manner as before:

• The last author, to whom the comment is directed, displayed a clearly fascist way of thinking. [Recognition of fascism] • Feminist theories are important elements in solving society’s problems. [Feminism] • “Swedish-ness” is a conception that changes over time; there is no “true Swedish-ness” that can be destroyed or restored. [NOT true Swedish essence]

Feminism was chosen as an antithetical idea because it reasonably well encapsulates anti- nativism, anti-essentialism, multiculturalism and egalitarianism, as well as often being an eye- soar to fascists since the disintegration of traditional gender roles is perceived to disrupt the viability of the ethnos (el-Ojeili 2019), and critical theory in general to have a profane effect on national myths. See screenshots and English translations of the facebook posts in Appendix C.

Now, before an index of the gravitation toward fascist ideas can be constructed, there is a logical problem that must be resolved. While all the variables above can have something to do with fascism, not all of them necessarily do. For instance, it is reasonable that one could dismiss feminist ideas and still dismiss fascist ideas. It is rather so that feminist ideas implicate the negation of fascist ideas; but they are not equivalent. Not believing in universal human rights is, on the other hand, considered a key part of the fascist ideology; so that it is impossible to agree with this and simultaneously completely dismiss fascist ideas, and vice versa. The logical relationships are formulized below.

A: Fascism  Ethnic homogeneity B: Fascism  No mixing of cultures C: Fascism  True Swedish essence

D: Fascism  NOT universal human rights

E1: Fascism → Neither left nor right E2: NOT neither left nor right → NOT fascism F1: Fascism → revitalize Swedish traditions F2: NOT revitalize Swedish traditions → NOT fascism G1: Fascism → Sweden is degenerating G2: NOT Sweden is degenerating → NOT fascism H1: Fascism → NOT recognition of fascism H2: Recognition of fascism → NOT fascism I1: Fascism → NOT feminism I2: Feminism → NOT fascism

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Propositions A–D have sub-propositions that are equivalent, meaning that the truth values of the corresponding sub-propositions are always the same; if “Fascism” is true, then “NOT universal human rights” is also true, and vice versa (the same goes for negative truth values).

Propositions E–I have one sub-proposition implicating another, meaning that it is possible to derive the later sub-proposition from the first, but not the other way around; if “Fascism” is true, then “Sweden is degenerating” is true, but if “Sweden is degenerating” is true, the truth value of “Fascism” is still problematic. To clarify: a neofascist would say that Sweden is degenerating (proposition G1), but it would be possible for a non-neofascist to believe that Sweden is degenerating too (for another reason; perhaps because of all the neofascists). Therefore, fascism is not equivalent to the belief that Sweden is degenerating. However, not believing that Sweden is degenerating is an indication of non-fascism (proposition G2).

Hence, the propositions A, B, C and D was used to construct a fascism index (ranging from 0 to 100), which was subtracted by an anti-fascism index formed by the propositions E2, F2, G2, H2 and I2 (0–100). This results in a final value ranging from -100 to 100; dismissing all ideas, or agreeing with all ideas, equals 0; dismissing all fascist ideas while agreeing with all anti- fascist ideas equals -100; and agreeing with all fascist ideas while dismissing all anti-fascist ideas equals 100. Gravitation toward fascist ideas was calculated by a mean analysis of this final value as dependent on social group. Significance level was calculated for each individual social group with an ANOVA.

3.1.3 Party preferences

The last stage of the survey was also identical for Variation A and B. The respondents were instructed to answer a few standard questions (age, gender and education level), and finally, state their degree of trust in each individual parliament party leader in Sweden on a 1–5 point scale. Operationalizing party preferences this way was considered less intruding than asking the respondents to rank each party directly. This was the case in a pilot study which had revealed a great drop-out rate on this final page in the survey, which now seems to have been avoided. The respondents’ level of trust was coded into binary categories for each individual party leader (4–5 = “high trust”; 1–3 = “not high trust”).

3.2 Notes on validity

Two things must be addressed concerning the validity of this approach. First, by clicking the survey link and reading the cover letter, the respondents were made aware of their data input being recorded for some purpose. They were, therefore, more self-conscious of their feelings than they would have been in a natural situation. This is true even though the respondents were unaware of the experimental aspect of the situation, the study’s true purpose, and of the crime descriptions and facebook comments being fabricated. It is possible that some would have reacted differently to the treatment if it were not for this self-awareness. Also, agreeing with

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frowned upon statements, like that of disregarding universal human rights or being principally against the mixing of cultures, might be harder for some, given the pressure of, in a way, being watched. Second, a respondent agreeing with single statements like these is most likely insufficient to reliably pin down some specific label on that respondent. Must one really be a “fascist” to agree with these statements, or can one simply be a “racist”, or a “xenophobe”, or a “nationalist”, or something else?

Now, because of the way the hypotheses that have been tested are framed, these validity problems have limited implications. Because it was not asked exactly how susceptible the party preference groups were to a neofascist communication style, but instead if the SD sympathizers were significantly more susceptible than the non-SD sympathizers, the final scores may have been somewhat distorted by self-awareness without this having significantly altered the groups’ relative positions. Everything regarding the artificial situation was, after all, equally true for all experimental- and social groups in the sample. Similarly, it was not asked whether SD sympathizers would be fascists, but if SD sympathizers would agree with fascist ideas to a significantly greater extent than non-SD sympathizers. There is an important distinction between, on the one hand, deriving a specific political label from a respondent agreeing with some statement, and on the other, deriving a level of gravitation toward a statement from a respondent agreeing with that statement (while simultaneously making the analytical judgement that the statement fits within some broader ideological construction). To clarify: a statement can be fascist without one having to be “a fascist” to agree with it. For the purposes of the study, it was the compared levels of gravitation toward fascist ideas that was interesting, not deciding who was “a fascist” and who was not.

3.3 A theoretical generalization

It is important to note, that while a strong causal test has been carried out regarding susceptibility to a fascist communication style, the modus of the causal relation, as well as any other statistical correlation, can only be statistically verified within the collected sample at the time of the measurement. To generalize the results to a broader public, the sample would have to reflect that broader public. Collecting a sample like that has been far beyond the author’s means. There are, however, other ways to generalize results apart from a population generalization, one other way being a theoretical generalization (Neuman 2014 pp. 306–8). This kind is not so much making a generalization as it is testing one (Mook 1983, p. 380). The reason for believing something, in this case that the influence of the Nouvelle Droite is shaping the right-wing populist movement in Sweden, is not because of the experiment, but because of synthesized prior research; the experiment is an attempt to falsify that hypothesis – not prove it. In other words, the experiment will provide empirical evidence for or against a theory that is already feasible on its own terms. If the hypothesis in question is false, it would be more likely to find contradictory results than not.

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3.4 Collected materials

The survey was shared on facebook as well as other online forums3. The link was in turn shared by at least 17 people. The aim was to semi-randomly collect as many responses as possible, not mirroring any specific population but achieving statistical significance within the sample (in accordance with the reasoning in the last section). The largest single population that contributed to the sample was however the town-based facebook group “Växjö”, which generated an estimated 60 percent of the sample. The survey was shared there three times over the three- week collection period. The survey was in total started 702 times, ultimately resulting in 415 respondents reaching the final page. This means that the drop-out rate was 41 percent; most frequent during the first stage, specifically during the jail sentence section.

The sample is, compared to the broader population, relatively educated, female, and young. 20 percent lack any higher education (0 credits); 61 percent of the sample is female; and 50 percent is below 31 years of age. 12 percent have high trust in the SD leader Jimmie Åkesson, which is few relative to the broader population. To get a better feel for the complexity of the sample, a table layered by education level (0 / at least one credit), gender, and age (up to 30 years / 30+ years) is provided below. The proportion of SD sympathizers are indicated within each category.

Figure 5. Sample overview. There are also 5 respondents of non-binary gender; 3 of them are young with higher education; 1 is young without higher education; and 1 is of mature age with higher education. None of them sympathize with the SD. N = 415.

The fascism-, anti-fascism- and final index have shown coherence within the sample. All the ND ideas correlate significantly, as do the antithetical ideas, except for the variables [NOT neither right nor left] and [Recognition of fascism]. Cronbach’s alpha shows .752 and .717, respectively. The fascism- and anti-fascism indexes, as expected, show a strong negative correlation (Pearson’s R: -.705).

3 98 percent of the sample was collected from facebook; 6 cases were collected from familjeliv.se; and 1 case from flashback.se (the author accidentally violated flashback’s terms of use by sharing the survey link there, and was banned off the site after a few minutes). 20

Figure 6. Internal coherence in the collected sample: fascism- and anti-fascism index. ** Correlation (Pearson’s R) is significant at the 0.01 level.

The ideological indexes have not been affected by the variation in the survey’s first stage; Variation B only has a final index value of 0,64 points less than Variation A (p=.868). The SD sympathies are on the exact same level in both Variation A and B (p=.986).

3.5 Ethical considerations

While the participants were guaranteed confidentiality, informed of the scope and intended use of the study (a bachelor’s thesis in sociology), and made conscious of the content of the survey (most importantly that they were going to read a text about spouse abuse), there are three ethical issues that must be addressed. The first issue is the deception regarding the study’s true purpose. Because the study would have been useless if the participants had been informed of the multiple versions of the survey, one trying to manipulate their feelings, this was a necessity. Cover stories are often used in experimental approaches for reasons like this (Neuman 2014, p. 292). In this case the respondents were led to believe that it was attitudes regarding “manners on the internet” that was being studied. Several questions were posed on the style of the facebook interaction, which were not relevant to the study at all. Oftentimes there is no harm in this approach, but what makes this case problematic is the second ethical issue: the sensitive subject of fascism. The author realizes that several participants may not have wanted to take part in and/or share the survey had they known that it was susceptibility to a neofascist communication style and the gravitation toward fascist ideas that were being measured – and on top of that, that they were going to be representatives of political party supporters in this regard. Few people want to be associated with fascism, and it would only be natural to be offended by such an insinuation.

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In defense of the study so far, two points will be made. First, the study had the potential to find empirical evidence against the popular claim of a fascist mobilization. The study is, after all, an attempt to falsify just that, which, it is not unreasonable to suggest, should be welcomed by anyone sincerely denying a potent regrouping of fascism. Second, if a study is considered valuable in relation to current research fields, then there is, according to the Swedish Research Council, an ethical imperative to conduct that study – even if there is some, non-significative harm to the integrity of participants (Vetenskapsrådet 2017, p. 13). The value of the information provided by the study must in other words be weighed against the potential insulting of some participants’ integrity. It is the author’s belief that, first, studying susceptibility to a neofascist communication style and the gravitation toward fascist ideas among right-wing populist supporters is a logical extension of the current research fields of populism and fascism, and second, that the only possible way of conducting the study has been by deceiving participants to draw their attention away from the true subject of the study, its attempts of manipulation, and its measuring of fascist qualifications.

The final ethical issue considers the potential harm in strengthening the neofascist meta- narrative by spreading a text designed to provoke hate toward Muslims. 702 people have clicked the survey link, meaning that 351 people have read the biased version of the article. No respondents were debriefed of the study’s true purpose because of contamination risks, and therefore they left the survey believing that the incident with Ahmed and Elin had actually taken place. It is the author’s hope that by exposing how a neofascist communication style can cause irrational anger, this project will be an anti-fascist act rather than a fascism-promoting one. The author will do his best to communicate the results of the study to as many people as possible by sharing the thesis, and also by making it more accessible by summarizing it in text or video.

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4 Results

4.1 Susceptibility: Variation A vs Variation B

Regardless of education level, gender, age and Sweden Democrat sympathies, the mean jail sentence did not stray off far from 42 months in Variation A. In Variation B, however, the mean jail sentence differed greatly between the social groups. The mean jail sentence in Variation B was 61 months, meaning that the sentence on average increased by 45 percent (p=.000). No matter which social group, a significant increase between Variation A and B was observed, ranging from the lowest observed increase of 37 percent in the case of the mature respondents (p=.028) to a 91 percent increase in the case of the SD sympathizers (p=.019). Non-SD sympathizers had an increase of 39 percent (p=.001). See all results in the table below.

Table 1. Mean jail sentences: Variation A vs Variation B, layered by social groups.

Respondents with no higher education were more susceptible to a neofascist communication style than their educated counterparts; a 41 percent increase vs a 61 percent increase, meaning that those without higher education were 49 percent more susceptible than those in the sample with at least 1 credit. Young respondents were more susceptible than mature respondents; a 55 percent increase vs a 37 percent increase, meaning that those below 31 years of age were 49 percent more susceptible than those 30+ years of age. Males were more susceptible than females; a 54 percent increase vs a 40 percent increase, meaning that males were 35 percent more susceptible than females. The greatest increase was observed between SD sympathizers and non-SD sympathizers; a 91 percent increase vs a 39 percent increase, meaning that SD sympathizers were 133 percent more susceptible to a neofascist communication style than their non-SD sympathizer counterparts.

Presented below is the sentence distribution within the non-SD sympathizers and the SD sympathizers, Variation A vs Variation B, expressed in percentage points for easier visual comparison.

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Figure 7. Sentence distribution within non-SD sympathizers, Variation A vs Variation B.

Figure 8. Sentence distribution within SD sympathizers, Variation A vs Variation B.

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In the case of the non-SD sympathizers, 47 percent in Variation A did not go above the sentence they had learned was given to the culprit in the text (24 months). This alternative remained the mode alternative in Variation B, though it fell to 36 percent. In the case of the SD sympathizers, 24 months or less was also the mode alternative in Variation A, but rather drastically moved to 49-60 months in Variation B. The proportion to not go above the original sentence, given that SD sympathizers were unaffected by the neofascist communication style, was 58 percent less than expected.

In Variation B, the proportion of extreme sentences (229-240 months) was more than triple the size for the SD sympathizers compared to the non-SD sympathizers.

4.2 Gravitation toward fascist ideas

For each idea indicating generic fascism (i.e. the ideas within the fascism index), the SD sympathizers on average scored more than twice that of the non-SD sympathizers. Most saliently regarding the idea that Sweden should abolish the multicultural society in favor of an ethnically homogenous society, which was 208 percent more dominant within the SD sympathizers. Not recognizing universal human rights was 176 percent more dominant; believing that different cultures should not mix by principle was 173 percent more dominant; and believing in a true Swedish essence was 137 percent more dominant.

Also, regarding each of the ideas antithetical to generic fascism (the anti-fascism index), the SD sympathizers on average scored consistently lower than the non-SD sympathizers, but not extremely so in every case. The idea that Sweden should not revitalize its traditions was 159 percent more dominant within the non-SD sympathizers; not believing that Sweden is degenerating was 122 percent more dominant; and believing that feminism is important was 120 percent more dominant. Two ideas had less discrepancy: the recognition of fascism was 53 percent higher within the non-SD sympathizers (a mean score of 69 vs 45), and subscribing to traditional left- or right-wing politics was 49 percent higher (a mean score of 61 vs 41).

Figure 9. Ideological comparisons: the fascism index and the anti-fascism index. Maximum score: 100. 25

By subtracting the fascism index with the anti-fascism index, the final index was calculated. Below is a comparison between the party preference groups.

Table 2. Party preference groups: index overview. Rounded numbers. The MP has two party leaders (språkrör) who have been weighed together in this table.

All party preference groups deviated significantly from the mean value, except for the Liberals (L) (p=.126). The greater the preference for either the Sweden Democrats (SD), the Christian Democrats (KD) and the Moderate Coalition Party (M), the higher the final index value, and vice versa for the other party preference groups (except for the L sympathizers whose results remain uncertain). As is clear, the only party preference group whose final index value came out positive was the SD sympathizers. They, on average, deviated positively by 55 points from the mean value (-45; see the graph below).

Figure 10. Final index: comparison between party preference groups (trust in party leader). 28 of the SD sympathizers had a positive final value; 20 did not. 26

5 Discussion and conclusions

5.1 Exploring causal networks (post experiment)

The purpose of the study was to explore the relationship between general populism, neofascist meta-politics, and 21st century right-wing populism. A causal networks chart has been used to systematically deduce what relationships, out of 27 logical possibilities, are the most feasible considering prior research. Two of those possibilities stood out in that the author were unable to find good enough reasons to doubt them; either the neofascist Nouvelle Droite has had a significant influence on the current right-wing populist wave over the last decades, or it has not. To help make this judgement, an experiment was set up to test whether the supporters of the Sweden Democrats (the Swedish right-wing populist party equivalent) are at all susceptible to a neofascist style of communication, and then, if their ideology correspond with the Nouvelle Droite. If these hypotheses were to be falsified, the suggestion that the Nouvelle Droite, first, are able to effectively influence voters via far-right online media, and second, have been successful in mobilizing a political force pulling towards a fascist societal vision, would be doubted. This would strengthen the belief that the shape of 21st century right-wing populism is independent from neofascist meta-politics.

Formally, the first hypothesis (not to be confused with the hypotheses in the causal networks chart) was:

➢ A neofascist communication style will cause SD sympathizers to respond significantly stronger than non-SD sympathizers.

The results verify this hypothesis. SD sympathizers reacted 133 percent stronger than non-SD sympathizers in a strong causal test (p=.019). SD sympathies were a better predictor for susceptibility to a neofascist communication style than both education level, gender and age.

The second hypothesis was:

➢ There is a significant positive correlation between agreeing with covertly fascist ideas and sympathizing with the SD.

The results verify this hypothesis as well. SD sympathizers scored the highest on the fascism index and the lowest on the anti-fascism index, resulting in a final value that deviated the strongest from the total mean (55 points on a 201-point scale). The correlation between sympathizing with the SD and agreeing with covertly fascist ideas was highly significant (p=.000). The SD sympathizers were also the only group with a positive final index value.

These results are consistent with H16 in the causal networks chart, i.e. that the Nouvelle Droite has had a significant influence on the shape of the right-wing populist wave. It does not, however, falsify the claim that this shape would basically look the same without neofascist

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meta-politics (H2). The experiment has rather been designed as an attempt to falsify H16, which it has failed to do. There is still an argument to be made that H16 should now be considered slightly more probable than H2, in that the results line up surprisingly well with H16, given the assumption that it is false. Random chance would have had many opportunities to create contradicting evidence. At least one fascist idea, for instance, should have been the most dominant within the non-SD sympathizers; some anti-fascist idea should have been the most dominant within the SD-sympathizers; some other social factor than SD sympathies should have been the best predictor of susceptibility to neofascist propaganda. In other words: it would have been a long shot to come across such noticeably clear-cut results as this study have if H16 is indeed false.

Even if the results are not conclusive, and even if they cannot, due to the sample collection process, be generalized to a national-, let alone an international level, this study is a small but valid observation that speaks for, rather than against, H16. This hypothesis will therefore, for the time being, be framed in green to signify that it has survived a falsification test, while more research is awaited.

Figure 11. Overview of causal networks 3: post experiment modal judgements.

The study set out, as pleaded by Roodujin (2019), to expand the field of populism research to adjacent topics. Fascism was chosen because both these fields currently share one core phenomenon (the domination of right-wing populist parties). One aim has been to guide the question of whether it is worthwhile to further strengthen this bridge. Because the study has found some empirical evidence of their association, it should now be considered more worthwhile to do so. A similar study on a larger scale could yield more conclusive evidence regarding SD sympathizers’ susceptibility to neofascist propaganda and gravitation toward fascist ideas. That study should also try to establish patterns of media consumption to see if

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participants who regularly visit far-right online media sites hold even more fascist views as well as higher trust in the SD, and vice versa. This would further strengthen the theory that there is a considerable causal relationship between neofascist meta-politics and the shape of the global right-wing populist wave.

5.2 So what?

It must be reminded that the stimulus, the definition of fascism and the indicators of it used in the measurements are not based on any SD sources. The stimulus is based on Nazi media strategies; the definition is based on expert texts on generic fascism outside of the Swedish context, not addressing the SD; and the indicators of fascism are based on the writings of the neofascist Nouvelle Droite. Therefore, any results associating the SD with fascism is not a matter of the author begging the question. If the reader finds that there are obvious similarities between the SD and fascism as defined here, it is because they have obvious similarities; not because the definition of fascism is based on SD characteristics. If the SD is indeed not associated with fascism any more than other parties, it should be expected that party sympathizers of all kinds have an equally distributed gravitation toward Nouvelle Droite ideas.

A case of begging the question would basically look like this:

Fascism  SD SD → Fascism

It would have been claimed that fascism is equivalent to the SD, and then when it unsurprisingly turned out that SD sympathizers agree with SD politics, derived that the SD is a movement colored by fascism. Instead, this case is made:

Fascism  ND ideas SD → ND ideas o SD → Fascism

Here the SD’s characteristics are not said to be equivalent to fascism, but that the SD is (empirically) associated with the ideas of the ND, which are, in fact, fascistic, making the SD (nevertheless in a practical sense) a movement colored by fascism.

But, now, if generic fascism, as defined in this study, is not necessarily violent (i.e. if the terrible connotations that usually come to mind when we think of fascism are not actually essential to fascism), what is the big deal if people would develop a fascist worldview? It is true that the nicest behaving person on earth could hold fascist views, be them deranged and anthropologically absurd, but consider if that person (I am lending this line of thought from Griffin 2000) would vote for a party that is determined to realize these visions. Suppose that this party becomes popular and confident, and that the word “meta” stops being necessary in fascist meta-politics. People that are deemed antithetical to the essence of the ethnos would

29

have to go away somehow to purify it. Outsiders wanting to settle in the nation would have to be stopped somehow to keep the ethnos pure. If minorities in a fascist nation would not move by themselves, and if refugees kept trying to enter that nation, state violence based on ethnicity would have to be used (be it as a last, regrettable resort). Further, to bring the ethnos back in harmony with its essence, toxic influences would have to be avoided. The media and the arts as well as academia could not then be allowed to operate freely, potentially degenerating the nation instead of working toward the reinstitution of its glorious destiny. In this way, fascism, in a practical sense rather than an ideological, is bound to exercise violence and anti-democratic means to realize its visions. Generic fascism may be the vision of a happy, pure people where everyone proudly puts the greatness of their common legacy first, but fascism in practice might so often be authoritarian and censuring because violence proves necessary to hold this unnatural and made-up world together.

As a closing paragraph, attention will be drawn to the phenomenon “A” in the causal networks chart (a general lack of trust), here treated as the non-integrated state of the world that makes populist uprisings possible, which are then assumed to be influenced and shaped by competing ideologues. This non-integrated state itself is assumed to be the root of the populist energy which makes people inclined to listen to neofascist propaganda in the first place. Griffin says that fascism is like a seed in a desert; it needs rain to grow, and crisis is that rain (Rosa- Luxemburg-Stiftung 2019). To combat fascism, it is perhaps futile to do anything but target that which in turn causes this non-integrated state, that is, some underlaying crisis. Considering the economic aspect, the renowned economist Thomas Piketty says in an interview with Fast Company (2020) that rising nationalism is a main risk of rising inequality, because nationalists can easily exploit people’s frustrations. Border control and national identity is a relatively easy message to understand and adopt, but basically, Piketty says, it is a wrong response to a real problem (ibid). This discussion must for now, however, be continued in a future project.

30

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Appendix A Complete references in literature map

This is research connected to the first experimental study of populism by Bos et al (2013). The references are separated based on their experimental- or non-experimental approach. This overview was made by the author in the first quarter of 2020.

Experimental studies

Bos, Linda., Brug, Wouter van der & Vreese, Claes H. de. (2013). An experimental test of the impact of style and rhetoric on the perception of right-wing populists and mainstream party leaders, Acta Politica, 48(2), 192–208.

Bos, Linda., Schemer, Christian., Corbu, Nicoleta., Hameleers, Michael., Andreadis, Ioannis., Schulz, Anne., Schmuck, Desirée., Reinemann, Carsten & Fawszi, Nayla. (2020). The effects of populism as a social identity frame on persuasion and mobilization: Evidence from a 15-country experiment, European Journal of Political Research, 59(1), 3–24.

Hameleers, Michael., Bos, Linda., Fawzi, Nayla., Reinmann, Carsten., Andreadis, Ioannis., Corbu, Nicoleta., Schemer, Christian., Schultz, Anne., Shaefer, Tamir., Aalberg, Toril., Axelsson, Sofia., Berganza, Rosa., Cremonesi, Christina., Dahlberg, Stefan., Vreese, Claes H. de., Hess, Agnieszka., Kartsounidou, Evangelia., Kasprowicz, Dominika., Matthes, Joerg., Negrea-Busuioc, Elena., Ringdal, Signe., Salgado, Susana., Sanders, karen., Schuck, Desirée., Stromback, Jesper., Suiter, Jane., Boomgaarden, Hajo., Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Keren., Weiss-Yaniv, Naama. (2018a). Start spreading the news: A comparative experiment on the effects of populist communication on political engagement in sixteen European countries, The International Journal of Press/Politics, 23(4), 517–538.

Hameleers, Michael., Bos, Linda & Vreese, Claes H. de. (2018b). Selective exposure to populist communication: How attitudinal congruence drives the effects of populist attributions of blame, Journal of Communication, 68(1), 51–74.

Hameleers, Michael., Bos, Linda & Vreese, Claes H. de. (2018c). Framing blame: Toward a better understanding of the effects of populist communication on populist party preferences, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 28(3), 380–398.

Hameleers, Michael., Bos, Linda & Vreese, Claes H. de. (2017a). “They did it”: The effects of emotionalized blame attribution in populist communication, Communication Research, 44(6), 870–900.

Hameleers, Michael & Schmuck, Desirée. (2017). It’s us against them: a comparative experiment on the effects of populist messages communicated via social media, Information, communication & society, 20(9), 1425–1444.

Heiss, Raffael., Sikorski, Christian von & Matthes, Jörg. (2019). Populist Twitter posts in news stories: Statement recognition and the polarizing effects on candidate evaluation and anti-immigrant attitudes, Journalism Practice, 13(6), 742–758.

35

Matthes, Jörg & Schmuck, Desirée. (2019). Voting “against Islamization”? How anti-Islamic right- wing, populist political campaign ads influence explicit and implicit attitudes toward Muslim as well as voting preferences, Political Psychology, 40(4), 739–757.

Matthes, Jörg., Schmuck, Desirée & Sikorski, Christian von. (2019). Terror, terror everywhere? How terrorism news shape support for anti-muslim policies as a function of perceived threat severity and controllability, Political Psychology, 40(5), 935–951.

Schmuck, Desirée & Matthes, Jörg. (2017). Effects of economic and symbolic threat appeals in right- wing populist advertising in anti-Immigrant attitudes: The impact of textual and visual appeals, Political Communication, 34(4), 607–626.

Sheets, Penelope., Bos Linda & Boomgaarden, Hajo. (2016). Media cues and citizen support for right- wing populist parties, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 28(3), 307–330.

Non-experimental studies

Aguilar, Rosario & Carlin, Ryan E. (2017). Ideational populism in Chile? A case study, Swiss Political Science Review, 23(4), 404–422.

Baldwin-Philippi, Jessica. (2019). The technological performance of populism, New Media & Society, 21(2), 376–397.

Berning, Carl C., Lubbers, Marcel & Schlueter, Elmar. (2018). Media attention and radical right-wing populist party sympathy: longitudinal evidence from the Nederlands, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 31(1), 93–120.

Blassnig, Sina., Engesser, Sven., Ernst, Nicole & Esser, Frank. (2019). Hitting a nerve: Populist news articles lead to more frequent and more populist reader comments, Political Communication, 36(4), 629–651.

Bloomgaarden, Hajo G & Song, Hyunjin. (2019). Media use and its effects in a cross-national perspective, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, doi:10.1007/s11577-019-00596-9.

Bobba, Giuliano. (2018). Social media populism: Features and ‘likeability’ of Lega Nord communication on Facebook, European Political Science, doi:10.1057/s41304-017-0141-8.

Bobba, Giuliano., Cremonesi, Cristina., Mancosu, Moreno & Seddone, Antonella. (2018). Populism and the gender gap: Comparing digital engagement with populist and non-populist Facebook pages in France, Italy, and Spain, The International Journal of Press/Politics, 23(4), 458–475.

Bracciale, Roberta & Martella, Antonio. (2017). Define the populist political communication style: The case of Italian political leaders on Twitter, Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1310–1329.

Castelli Gattinara, Pietro & Froio, Caterina. (2018). Getting ‘right’ into the news: Grassroots far-right mobilization and media coverage in Italy and France, Comparative European Politics, 17, 738–758.

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Doroshenko, Larisa. (2018). Far-right parties in the European Union and media populism: A comparative analysis of 10 countries during European parliament elections, International Journal of Communication, 12, 3186–3206.

Engesser, Sven., Fawzi, Nayla & Larsson, Anders O. (2017). Populist online communication: Introduction to the special issue, Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1279–1292.

Ernst, Nicole., Blassnig, Sina., Engesser, Sven., Büchel Florin & Esser, Frank. (2019). Populists prefer social media over talk shows: An analysis of populist messages and stylistic elements across six countries, Social Media + Society, doi:10.1177/2056305118823358.

Gonawela, A’ndre., Pal, Joyojeet., Thawani, Udit., Vlugt, Elmer van der., Out, Wim & Chandra, Priyank. (2018). Speaking their mind: Populist style and antagonistic messaging in the Tweets of Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, Nigel Farage, and Geert Wilders, Computer Supported Cooperative Work, doi:10.1007/s10606-018-9316-2.

Hameleers, Michael. (2019). Partisan media, polarized audiences? A qualitative analysis of online political news and responses in the United States, U.K., and the Netherlands, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 31(3), 485–505.

Hameleers, Michael. (2018). Augmenting polarization via social media? A comparative analysis of Trump’s and Wilders’ online populist communication and the electorate’s interpretations surrounding the elections, Acta Politica, doi:10.1057/s41269-018-0119-8.

Hameleers, Michael & Vliegenhart, Rens. (2020). The rise of a populist zeitgeist? A content analysis of populist media coverage in newspapers published between 1990 and 2017, Journalism Studies, 21(1), 19–36.

Hameleers, Michael., Bos, Linda & Vreese, Claes H. de. (2019). Shoot the messenger? The media’s role in framing populist attributions of blame, Journalism, 20(9), 1145–1164.

Hameleers, Michael., Bos, Linda & Vreese, Claes H. de. (2017b). The appeal of media populism: The media preferences of citizens with populist attitudes, Mass Communication and Society, 20(4), 481– 504.

Hawkins, Kirk A., Kaltwasser, Cristóbal R & Andreadis, Ioannis. (2018). The activation of populist attitudes, Government & Opposition, doi:10.1017/gov.2018.23.

Heiss, Raffael & Matthes, Jörg. (2017). Who ‘likes’ populists? Characteristics of adolescents following right-wing populist actors on Facebook, Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1408–1424.

Homolar, Alexandra & Scholz, Ronny. (2019). The power of Trump-speak: Populist crisis narratives and ontological security, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32(3), 344–364.

Krämer, Benjamin. (2017). Populist online practices: The function of the internet in right-wing populism, Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1293–1309.

Larsson, Anders O. (2019). Right-wingers on the rise online: Insights from the 2018 Swedish elections, New Media & Society, doi:10.1177/1461444819887700.

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Lueg, Klarissa & Jakobsen, Andreas. (2016). The Construction of a Class with a Sense of Entitlement: A Case Study on Political Rhetoric as Symbolic Violence in Denmark, The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, 43(2), 111–133.

Mancosu, Moreno., Vassallo, Salvatore & Vezzoni, Christiano. (2017). Believing in conspiracy theories: Evidence from an exploratory analysis of Italian survey data, South European Society and Politics, 22(3), 327–344.

Mazzoleni, Gianpietro & Bracciale, Roberto. (2018). Socially mediated populism: the communicative strategies of political leaders on Facebook, Palgrave Communications, doi:10.1057/s41599-018-0104- x.

Müller, Philipp, Schemer, Christian., Wettstein, Martin., Schulz, Anne., Wirz, Dominique S., Engesser, Sven & Wirth, Werner. (2017). The polarizing impact of news coverage on populist attitudes in the public: Evidence from a panel study in four European democracies, Journal of Communication, 67(6), 968–992.

Norocel, Ov C & Szabó, Gabriella. (2019). Special issue: Mapping the discursive opportunities for radical-right populist politics across eastern Europe, Problems of Post-Communism, 66(1), 1–7.

Nygaard, Silje. (2019). The appearance of objectivity: How immigration-critical alternative media report the news, Journalism Practice, 13(10), 1147–1163.

Örmen, Jacob. (2019). From consumer demand to user engagement: Comparing the popularity and virility of election coverage on the internet, The International Journal of Press/Politics, 24(1), 49–68.

Roodujin, Matthijs. (2019). State of the field: How to study populism and adjacent topics? A plea for both more and less focus, European Journal of Political Research, 58(1), 362–372.

Schmuck, Desirée & Hameleers, Michael. (2019). Closer to the people: A comparative content analysis of populist communication on social networking sites in pre- and post-election periods, Information, Communication & Society, doi:10.1080/1369118X.2019.1588909.

Schulz, Anne. (2019). Where populist citizens get the news: An investigation of news audience polarization along populist attitudes in 11 countries, Communication Monographs, 86(1), 88–111.

Schulz, Anne., Wirth, Werner & Müller, Philipp. (2018). We are the people and you are fake news: A social identity approach to populist citizens’ false consensus and hostile media perceptions, Communication Research, doi:10.1177/0093650218794854.

Sikorski, Christian von., Schmuck, Desirée., Matthes, Jörg & Binder, Alice. (2017). ”Muslims are not terrorists”: Islamic State coverage, journalistic differentiation between terrorism and Islam, fear reactions, and attitudes toward Muslims, Mass Communication and Society, 20(6), 825–848.

Silva, Rodrigo Quintas da. (2018). A Portuguese exception to right-wing populism, doi: 10.1057/s41599-017-0062-8.

Stockemer, Daniel. (2014). Who are the members of the French National Front? Evidence from interview research, French Politics, 12(1), 36–58.

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Szabo, Gabriella., Norocel, Ov C & Bene, Márton. (2018). Media visibility and inclusion of radical right populism in Hungary and Romania, Problems of Post-Communism, 66(1), 33–46.

Thesen, Gunnar. (2018). News content and populist radical right party support. The case of Denmark, Electoral Studies, 56, 80–89.

Vreese, Claes H. de, Esser, Frank., Aalberg, Toril., Reinemann, Carsten & Stanyer, James. (2018). Populism as an expression of political communication content and style: A new perspective, The International journal of Press/Politics, 23(4), 423–438.

Whiteley, Paul., Larsen, Erik., Goodwin, Matthew & Clarke, Harold. (2019). Party activism in the populist radical right: The case of the UK Independence Party, Party Politics, doi:10.1177/1354068819880142.

Wirz, Dominique S., Wettstein, Martin., Schulz, Anne., Müller, Philipp., Schemer, Christian., Ernst, Nicole., Esser, Frank & Wirth, Werner. (2018). The effects of right-wing populist communication on emotions and cognitions toward immigrants, The International Journal of Press/Politics, 23(4), 496– 516.

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Appendix B Crime descriptions

The varying crime descriptions are presented below in original Swedish and translated into English. Note that the survey was only given in Swedish.

Variation A

Swedish:

Var god läs nedanstående brottsbeskrivning

Den beskrivna händelsen är en sammanfattning av ett rättsfall från 2017. Alla namn har bytts ut.

Ahmed och Elin är gifta och bor tillsammans sedan fyra år och har en dotter på fem år. Under det senaste året har de börjat gräla alltmer. Vid ett tidigare tillfälle har det lett till våldsamheter där Ahmed gett Elin en örfil, men det är inget som polisanmälts. En kväll bestämmer de sig för att tala ut om sina problem och lämnar dottern hos en barnvakt. Samtalet utvecklar sig snabbt till ett våldsamt gräl. Ahmed bestämmer sig för att lämna lägenheten och Elin gör sedan samma sak.

Efter ett par timmar börjar Ahmed ångra sig och ringer flera gånger hem till Elin, som inte är hemma. Han provar även att ringa Elins mobiltelefon men får inget svar. Klockan ett på natten återvänder Ahmed till lägenheten.

En timme senare återvänder också Elin och Ahmed undrar var hon varit. Elin säger att hon inte orkar prata för stunden. Ahmed insisterar på att få veta, men Elin svarar fortfarande inte och vill inte prata med honom alls. Ahmed börjar bli svartsjuk och irriterad på att Elin inte är villig att tala ut som de bestämt, och beskyller henne för otrohet. Elin blir förbannad och de börjar gräla högljutt och beskylla varandra för otrohet. Ahmed blir mer och mer uppretad. Vid ett tillfälle säger Elin att det vore bättre att skiljas. Ahmed blir nu så uppretad att han slår Elin hårt i bröstet så att hon ramlar till golvet. Elin får sedan två sparkar i ryggen. Elin försöker värja sig med händerna men Ahmed sparkar henne ännu en gång i sidan och ger henne ytterligare ett knytnävsslag i bakhuvudet. Elin lyckas ta sig upp och ropar att nu är det definitivt slut. Hon springer sedan ut ur lägenheten.

Elin blir undersökt och röntgad på sjukhuset. Hon har blåmärken på bröstet och ryggen och har smärtor i nacken, ryggen, revbenen och i njurarna i fem dagar. Elin har också brutit två fingrar på höger hand. Elin ansöker om skilsmässa och paret skiljer sig sedan.

Ahmed blev dömd till 24 månaders fängelse.

English:

Please read the criminal case below

The described event is a summary of a case from 2017. All names have been changed.

Ahmed and Elin are married and have lived together for four years and have a five-year-old daughter. During the last year they have argued more than they used to. One time this arguing led to violence when Ahmed gave Elin a slap, but this was never reported to the police. One night they decide to talk about their problems and left their daughter at a babysitter. The conversation quickly develops into an intense quarrel. Ahmed decides to leave the apartment and Elin later does the same.

After a few hours Ahmed feels remorse and tries to call Elin several times, but she is not home. He tries her cellphone as well but does not get an answer. At 1 am Ahmed returns to the apartment. 40

An hour later Elin too returns, and Ahmed asks her where she’s been. Elin says that she is too tired to talk for the moment. Ahmed insists on finding out, but Elin still doesn’t answer and does not want to talk to him at all. Ahmed starts to get jealous and irritated for Elin not being willing to talk about their problems, as they had agreed to do, and accuses her of cheating. Elin gets mad and they start to argue loudly, accusing each other of cheating. Ahmed becomes more and more exasperated. At one point Elin says that it would be better for them to get a divorce. Ahmed now becomes so enraged that he hits Elin hard in the chest so that she falls to the floor. Elin is then kicked two times in the back. Elin tries to protect herself with her arms, but Ahmed kicks her one more time in the side and hits her again in the back of the head with his fist. Elin manages to get up and shouts that their relationship is definitely over now. Then she runs out of the apartment.

Elin gets treated at the hospital. She has bruises on her chest and back, and feel pain in the neck, back, ribs and kidneys for five days. Elin has also broken two fingers on her right hand. Elin files for divorce and the couple go separate ways.

Ahmed was sentenced to 24 months in jail.

Variation B

Swedish:

Var god läs nedanstående artikel

Artikeln är skriven med anledning av ett rättsfall från 2017. Alla orter och namn har i denna version bytts ut.

Grov misshandel i Nässjö

Ahmed Abdi flyttade ihop med Elin Johansson strax efter att han gjort henne gravid. De blev så småningom gifta och har nu en liten dotter på fem år. Sedan de börjat leva tillsammans har konflikterna bara blivit värre. En kväll brister det och de börjar öppet tala ut om sina problem. Det övergår direkt till ett våldsamt gräl. Ahmed blir förbannad och lämnar lägenheten.

Efter ett par timmar börjar Ahmed telefontrakassera Elin, som vägrar svara. Mitt i natten återvänder Ahmed till lägenheten, men då är Elin inte längre där.

När Elin vågar sig tillbaka kräver Ahmed att få veta var hon varit. Elin ger honom inget svar varpå Ahmed börjar bli hotfull och anklagar henne flera gånger för att ha varit otrogen. Elin orkar nu inte längre och ber om att få skiljas. När Ahmed hör detta blir han vansinnig och ger Elin ett hårt knytnävsslag i bröstet så att hon faller till golvet. Han fortsätter sedan skonings- löst att sparka henne upprepade gånger i ryggen och i sidan och avslutar misshandeln med att ge Elin ytterligare ett hårt knyt- nävsslag i bakhuvudet. Som genom ett under lyckas Elin ta sig upp och skriker att deras förhållande definitivt är slut innan hon flyr från lägenheten. Ahmed har vid ännu ett tidigare tillfälle misshandlat Elin, men det är inget som polisanmälts.

Elin blir senare undersökt och röntgad på sjukhuset. Hon är totalt blåslagen, har två sönderbrutna fingrar och har grova smär- tor i nacken, ryggen, revbenen och i njurarna i nästan en vecka. Elin ansöker så fort hon kan om att få skilja sig från den mus- limske mannen, vilket hon till slut lyckas med.

Ahmed kom undan med 2 års fängelse.

English:

Please read the article below

The article is about a criminal case in 2017. All locations and names have been changed in this version.

Aggravated assault in Nässjö

Ahmed Abdi moved in with Elin Johansson after making her pregnant. Later they got married and they now have a little five- year-old daughter. Ever since they started living together their conflicts have only gotten worse. One night everything breaks

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apart and they start to have it out about their problems. It immediately escalates to a violent fight. Ahmed gets furious and leaves the apartment. After a few hours Ahmed starts to harass Elin by repeatedly calling her on the phone, but she refuses to answer. In the middle of the night Ahmed returns to the apartment, but Elin is not there anymore.

When Elin finds the courage to return, Ahmed demands to know where she’s been. Elin doesn’t say anything, and Ahmed then becomes threatful and starts to accuse her several times of being unfaithful. Elin doesn’t have any strength left and begs him for a divorce. When Ahmed hears this, he becomes completely mad and strikes Elin hard over the chest with a closed fist so that she falls to the floor. He then mercilessly kept kicking her in the back and in the side and ended the assault by once again punching Elin hard in the back of the head. As through a miracle, Elin manages to get up and screams that their relationship is over before escaping from the apartment. Ahmed has mistreated Elin before, but that was never reported to the police.

Elin is later treated at the hospital. She is totally wrecked with bruises all over, has two broken fingers and feels great pain in the neck, back, ribs and kidneys for almost a week. Elin, as quickly as she can, files to divorce the Muslim man, which she in the end is able to do.

Ahmed got away with 2 years in prison.

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Appendix C Screenshots of facebook comments

The facebook comments were identical in Variation A and B. Below the screenshots the texts have been translated into English. Grammatical errors are intended for authenticity.

Comment 1:

Translation:

No shit that it turned out to be a Muslim! yet another example that confirms that multiculturalism doesn’t work… We must, I am sorry to say, create a more ethnically homogenous society. Not least to protect our women. Both the pussy left and the greedy right have failed us with their PC crap about social justice and market globalism. Vi must think outside the box! i don’t give a damn about pointless hogwash like “all peoples’ equal rights”, close the borders, move production back to sweden and let our welfare benefit our own!!! People need to wake up and realize that we are going extinct all over Europe due to our beloved multiculturalism. Soon we’ll just be a gray mass, and tell me how is that “multiculturalism”!?? We cannot allow ourselves to become rootless. Sweden has degenerated long enough with lgbtq and gender bullshit. We must begin to honor our own culture and cling to the Swedishness before we forget what that is!!!

/A swedish viking

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Comment 2:

Translation:

Wow… I think you just checked off every single item on the fascism list! Surprised that you didn’t start your ramblings by saying “I’m not a racist, BUT”..!

For people like you everything seems to be like a war from morning to night. We don’t need your “protection” against some “invaders”. It doesn’t make any sense to generalize the way you do. Sure, the culprit MAN was in this case a bastard, does that mean that we should deport all men? Instead of attacking individuals as if there were some inherent fault in them we must ask ourselves what structures shape these behaviors. Why did the woman choose to stay with a man who hurt her before? Why did the man consider himself in the right to hurt her? The problem is spelled “patriarchy” and the solution is spelled “feminism”.

And hey, although this was off topic as hell, nothing is lost by “mixing cultures” – that might as well just be a good thing. Cultures are already mixed and have always been mixed. Your idea of “Swedish-ness” is a myth.

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