Hope and Humiliation: Humphrey Marshall and the Confederacy's Last Chance in Eastern Kentucky

BRIAN D. MCKNIGHT

he summer of 1862 found the Confederate army preparing for its only comprehensive invasion of the Civil War. In the east, Robert E. TLee's Army of Northern Virginia would take the war to the enemy by invading Maryland. West of the Appalachian Mountains, the invasion would be broader. Braxton Bragg would lead his Army of Tennessee into Kentucky by way of Nashville, augmented by Edmund Kirby Smith's force that would drive through the Cumberland Gap. A third column, albeit an afterthought to both Bragg and Smith, would be led out of southwestern Virginia into the mountains of eastern Kentucky by Humphrey Marshall. Although the failures of the Kentucky Campaign have become legend, perhaps the most important result of the invasion was the Confederacy's realization that the east- ern Kentucky mountaineers, a population long thought friendly to the southern cause, had chosen to remain loyal to the Union. The complex nature of the Civil War in the Appalachian region, combined with Humphrey Marshall's flaws as both man and commander, would have a signifi- cant impact on the failure of the Confederate cause in the eastern Kentucky mountains.1 Loyalty studies are hardly new to Civil War scholar- ship. One of the most important, Carl Degler's The Other South, sought to explain the South's intellectual and cultural diversity more fully than any other existing work. In it, Degler found the same complex loyalties that dogged Marshall during his invasion of eastern Kentucky. Although many of the mountaineers with whom Marshall and his men came Humphrey Marshall. The into contact on their journey likely fell into Degler's orderly and thoughtful Ftlson Historical Society categories, the lion's share likely viewed the Civil War as a family's personal struggle for self-preservation while caught between two, equally dangerous, en- emies.2 William Freehling, in his recent study of disloyalty to the Confederacy within the South, bolsters the argument that Kentuckians largely approached the war from a pragmatic angle. While he notes that approximately twenty- five thousand of the state's native sons fought for the Confederacy and twice

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that number fought for the Union, Freehling acknowledges that nearly 200,000 avoided military service, a conclusion that altogether minimizes the importance of patriotism and suggests that self-interest was the primary motivator for the Kentucky mountaineers in the war.3 Other recent scholarship has sought to answer the myriad questions re- garding the complex loyal- ties along the Civil War's borderland. Works such as John Inscoe's and Gordon McKinney's The Heart of Confederate Appalachia, Todd Groce's Mountain Rebels, Victoria Bynum's The Free State of Jones, and Martin Crawford's Ashe Humphrey Marshall to County's Civil War have turned under the old myths that suggested that loyalty Alexander Stephens, 22-23 and support were predictable and static within geographic regions.4 Particularly February 1862, Humphrey important are the findings of Inscoe, McKinney, and Groce who all focus on Marshall Papers in Edward Owings Guerrant Papers the pro-Confederate sentiment within regions that were, until recently, often The Filson Historical mistakenly viewed as homogenously unionist. Within this complex fabric, the Society leaders of the Confederate army that operated in eastern Kentucky's mountains often misunderstood those people whom they promised to protect.

ne of these commanders, Humphrey Marshall, had a military edu- cation that belied his lack of martial skill. A member of one of OKentucky's most renowned families, young Humphrey was raised in Frankfort before winning an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, in 1832. At age twenty, he graduated the Academy forty-second of forty-five cadets in his class. Just as he had not thrived in his military education, Marshall quickly grew tired of armed service and left the army in 1833, only one year after graduating from West Point. From 1833 to 1846, he spent his time practicing law in Frankfort and later in Louisville, where he supported the cause of the Whig party. After serving in Mexico, where he was a colonel of Kentucky volunteers, Marshall returned home, farming briefly in Henry County before winning a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1848. He resigned his seat in 1852 to serve as U.S. minister to China until 1854, when he won election again to the U.S. House, this time as an American Party, or "Know-Nothing." Renominated by acclamation in 1858, he declined to run and later supported fellow Kentuckian John C. Breckinridge's Southern Democratic presidential candidacy.5 By 1862, Humphrey Marshall was back in the military fold as brigadier general in charge of southwestern Virginia and eastern Kentucky. On August 8, 1862, Marshall returned to Abingdon, Virginia, from Knoxville, where he

4 OHIO VALLEY HISTORY had met with Edmund Kirby Smith and been told of the proposed invasion of Kentucky. An ambitious and self-confident man whose brusque mannerisms often put off those around him, Marshall's mind whirred with the possibilities. The sight of forty new Kentuckians in camp doubtlessly stoked his imagination. These men were only a handful of the estimated four hundred who had flocked to John Hunt Morgan's party during his recent incursion deep into the state. Indeed, the Confederate raider had entered Kentucky with eight hundred men and departed with some 1,200. Marshall was sure he could meet or exceed the success of the relatively unknown Morgan.6 Marshall was confident that Kentuckians would rally to his cause for both personal and political reasons. As early as 1861, Marshall, displaying his trademark confidence, informed Confederate Vice President Alexander Ste- phens that "One of my old soldiers of Mexico has just come into my camp here to offer me 100 men to serve under me but unwilling to go under any body else."7 In an August 1862 letter to Secretary of War George Randolph, Marshall relayed further information with growing assurance. "The news I have," he wrote optimistically, "is that the people of the mountains in Ken- tucky, where I was last fall and winter, are excited and can be induced now to come into the contest, but we must have arms." To outfit the numerous recruits behind enemy lines, he requested "5,000 stand of arms (Enfield rifles and muskets) to be sent to me here at once."8 Again, this time in a letter to Stephens, Marshall reiterated his confidence that he could draw soldiers out of Kentucky. His February 1862, letter described Kentucky as "the region inhabited by my friends" and suggested, "the people will flock around my banner as the Italians did to that of Garibaldi." He further strengthened his case to Stephens by reassuring him that "they have sent me word and they have been looking for me as their deliverer from accursed bondage."9

owever grandiose and optimistic were Marshall's expectations, the merits of a Kentuckian delivering on the promises of the Confed- Heracy was an attractive proposition. Even Edmund Kirby Smith felt that the Confederate invasion might fail if no Kentuckians played the role of liberators. Kirby Smith wrote Jefferson Davis, "I regret extremely, however, that I have no prominent Kentuckian with me, whose name can influence the wavering in this state." To remedy this, he suggested the President "order General Marshall to advance at once through Pound Gap."10 Without doubt, the Confederate high command, along with Humphrey Marshall, expected that any attempt to align Kentucky with the Confederacy would benefit from the petulant and proud general's help. Marshall's belief that Kentuckians would gravitate to his command bolstered one of the central issues encumbering his command. Since his initial commis- sion in the Confederate army, Marshall contended that the command be an independent one, like many others throughout the southern army. From the

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time of his commission in early November 1861, Marshall fought with both the then-secretary of war, Judah P. Benjamin, and Confederate President Jef- ferson Davis over the nature of his command, with Vice President Stephens often acting as intermediary. Citing one of the South's major concerns of the early war, Marshall claimed that his independence was important to the Con- federate effort in Kentucky. Because he reportedly had been "fully authorized to take into the service such number of armed men as you may be enabled to raise," his enlisting large numbers of Kentuckians would strengthen the cause of the South while personally empowering Marshall. Building his small force into a much larger organization would likely give him added leverage in his fight with the Confederate government. Although he denied per- sonal gain as a motive, a promotion would surely fol- low his success. He reminded the Vice President, "you had told me Davis said to you about his willingness to make me a Major General—you will remember that yourself."11 Whatever his motives, Marshall would be disappointed in his quest. Davis never relented nor acknowledged the alleged promises and soon subordi- nated Marshall to an old Kentucky political nemesis, George B. Crittenden,who in late 1861 Davis named to command an army of invasion into Kentucky that was defeated at Mill Springs.12

y August 1862, Marshall's incessant claims for an independent command had not yet met B a highly placed and sympathetic ear. When Bragg's Kentucky Campaign began, Marshall saw an excellent opportunity to return to his home state. Since Bragg's invasion of Kentucky would coincide with Lee's thrust northward into Maryland, the Confederacy's first attempt at a concerted offensive Alexander Stephens. The provided Marshall with a chance to prove his worth to Jefferson Davis. If he Filson Historical Society could mobilize, recruit, and thus cultivate his army effectively, Confederate authorities would be forced to address his requests. Yet Marshall's self-interest conflicted with the military mission in Kentucky. Although his force entered the state as one of Bragg's detached columns and was expected to move to central Kentucky to link with Kirby Smith's, the Kentuckian focused his attention solely on recruitment and virtually ignored the responsibilities of his supporting role. As long as he had authorization to enlist men and expand his force, Marshall's hopes for an independent command remained alive. Believing that if he took a large force into Kentucky it would impress the largely neutral populace and motivate men to join him, he readied his command to move.13

6 OHIO VALLEY HISTORY The preparations for a major military campaign were innumerable, but Marshall's first priority was to prod the War Department to shift as many resources as possible to his command for the upcoming invasion. Like all things coming from Richmond, this effort provided the general with end- less frustrations. On August 9, one of Marshall's friends in the Confederate capital went to work on the secretary of war to secure additional troops for Marshall's movement across the Cumberland Mountains. Henry E. Read, a Kentuckian serving in the Confederate Congress, met with Secretary Randolph and "reminded him ... of his promise" to supply Marshall with more men who could aid in the invasion and recruitment. Unfortunately for Marshall, Randolph had already sent to other theaters of the war those men who had been earmarked for Marshall's campaign. In order to pacify the general, Ran- dolph offered "to furnish any ammount [sic] of Artillery that you may want." To prevent further disappointments, Read advised his friend to "make your requisition immediately, for in this, his mind may change and his promise be broken, as in the furnishing of troops to reinforce you."14

espite his disappointments in the Confederacy's political leadership, Marshall's men were ready. Edward O. "Ned" Guerrant, a native DKentuckian who served as an aide under Marshall, wrote on August 11, as if on cue, "I am tired! tired! tired! Tired of waiting on the slow motion of our army in going to the land and people that I love."15 Four days later, on a day in which he described in his diary as "500,000 degrees Fahrenheit!," Guerrant recorded the "Great expectation and suspense" that surrounded Abingdon, Virginia, while awaiting orders from the War Department.16 The expectations proved premature. The general and his force waited for nearly a month before Edmund Kirby Smith called Marshall into Kentucky.17 By that time, Bragg was already in central Kentucky while Kirby Smith stood outside of Lexington. During that month of waiting at Abingdon, Marshall continued, with renewed vigor, his hounding of whomever would listen in Richmond. In his August 28 letter, whose likely recipient was Alexander Stephens, Marshall ad- dressed several points not only necessary to the success of his operations, but proposed several radical suggestions regarding the prosecution of the entire war. Marshall desperately wanted the additional manpower he believed he had been promised and acted officiously in order to get it. He outlined his objects to the Vice President with the first being "to let you see the mistake which is being committed." As far as Marshall was concerned, his force should be strengthened and take precedence over that of Edmund Kirby Smith. He informed Stephens that he had been limited "to 2[,]000 while 8[,]000 are sent to Kirby Smith."18 He based his argument on dual claims of the allegiance of Kentuckians to him and him alone, and the large amounts of provisions that could be extracted from the mountain counties of eastern Kentucky.

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Within this lengthy letter, Marshall slipped into a brand of military pragma- tism later attributable to federal commander William T. Sherman. Focusing on the end result without regard to the competition for local loyalties, Marshall proposed strong-arm tactics to provision his army. He suggested that partisan rangers should guard "the one line of communications" into the mountains. Once under control, his quartermaster could negotiate prices without the inter- ference of outside market conditions or political influence. In sum, Marshall proposed to "beat them [the mountaineers] as we do Indians, kindly if they are faithful; but with terrible energy if they are false or hostile."18a In regard to the most effective strategy for prosecuting the war, he proposed direct conflict with Union armies in the hopes that the Confederate forces could drive their adversaries back across the Ohio River. "If nothing else will do, we must send our people across the river, break up his communications—fire his cities—shoot upon the roads—and make them feel that it is a war of extermination which has no particular location." On the subject of African Americans both free and enslaved, Marshall promised renewed hostilities if Union commanders decided to "arm our blacks."19

s if his proposed war on the North and its people were not enough, Marshall continued on with what he considered a more pressing Aproblem. He had, for some time, been troubled by Kentuckians who traveled through his lines to the South to collect debts and then return with that money to their home state. As he saw it, these were men who called themselves southerners but lived under the protection of the federal banner. Furthermore, they took considerable amounts of currency out of the southern economy and transferred it northward to where they could exchange it for United States's legal tender. Frustrated, he lamented these "psalm-singers to the union.... They should be driven out of our country or disposed of so they can do no harm." He suggested dealing with these men he considered traitors by "arresting] suspected persons and compel [ling] them to move into stipulated or stated sections or to go into the army." He specifically wanted "power to press Kentucky emigres into service." For his part, Marshall had closed all the major gaps connecting Kentucky with Virginia and did not allow passage into the latter state unless that person came to join his army. He estimated that he had "turned two hundred back" to Kentucky who had traveled south to collect monetary debts, instructing them to "go back and submit to Lincolnism." To drive his point home, Marshall swore that there were "scores of them I would rather hang than to spend an hour in Paradise."20 Marshall then turned to military exigencies. He had always felt that his task was more formidable and important than that of Smith's; now he wished to impress that view on the Vice President, even if the moment of decision had already passed. Marshall lamented the fact that "Mr. Benjamin" paid him "no more attention . . . than if I was an old dog baying the moon." 2I

8 OHIO VALLEY HISTORY The general went on to relay that he had requested additional manpower sufficient to "have the force to go to the Ohio River." Ever confident of his appeal to Kentuckians, he added, "Ten thousand men would do it, and in six weeks it would be 20,000 or lost."22 Marshall's plea for more troops signaled an emergency. Time was passing and if Kentucky was to be rescued for the Confederacy, more men were necessary. Although his original plan had been to invade Kentucky with his Virginia regiments, out of fear that Kentuckians would not embrace "foreign" troops the Confederate high command ordered Marshall to leave all Virginia troops behind.23

n early September, Smith's orders finally arrived at Marshall's headquarters. Understanding that the IKentuckian's unflagging claims of independence might slow his proposed movement, Smith enclosed a "proclamation to the people of Kentucky in order that you may fully understand the policy I have in- augurated and which I intend to pursue." Edmund Kirby Smith did not trust Marshall and cautioned the Kentuckian as to the expected behavior of his men: "I urge upon you to enforce upon the troops under your command the necessity of the most scrupulous respect for the rights of persons and of property." Fearful that Marshall might use any means neces- sary to entice recruits and compel loyalty, he called the general's attention "to the order relative to horse thieving, and ask that you will use every exertion to prevent a species of rascality."24 Smith feared that Marshall would take advantage of any opportunity to aggrandize himself and his command without respect to the overall mission Edmund Kirby Smith. The of the campaign. Filson Historical Society Beginning on September 4, Humphrey Marshall started his men on their march into Kentucky. Because of the difficult terrain and narrow roads, he had to be particularly creative in dispatching his men. Sending small regiments forward at intervals created a long, snaking column consisting of relatively small and geographically distant regiments. Indeed, Ned Guerrant described Marshall's army of 4,600 as extending "from Abingdon, Va. to Mt. Sterling, K'y, 200 miles."25 By then, both Smith and Bragg were firmly emplaced within the state, thus accomplishing the dual objectives of forcing the Union army to withdraw from Tennessee in pursuit of the Confederates and instilling in Kentuckians the idea of a real and forceful Confederate presence. Marshall's army was to move through the mountains and unite with the other command- ers in time for the inevitable decisive battle of the campaign. Owing to the disruption already caused throughout the state by Bragg's and

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Smith's invasions, Marshall met little resistance on his route into the region Guerrant termed "God's Country."26 The fact that small partisan units like those of Col. Andrew Jackson May had begun new operations in Kentucky in the weeks preceding the formal invasion contributed to this relative security. May was representative of many of the men who operated in these borderland areas. Originally from Pike County in eastern Kentucky but now in exile in Virginia with his regiment, May prosecuted the war with a special skill and verve that his physical and emotional proximity to the conflict only fostered. Many of these partisans found significant success in the mountain war, largely because they knew the terrain, the people, and their habits better than any outsider. The support that local partisans could count on made all the differ- ence in their operations. In May's case, he had so many friends in Pike County that misinformation clouded Union knowledge of his whereabouts and forced federal commanders in the region to act on any report that May had returned home. Col. Jonathan Cranor, commanding the 40th Ohio, stationed at Louisa, Kentucky, reported to his commander, Brig. Gen. Jeremiah Boyle, that "Jack May has never been at home to my knowledge since I have had command in this valley." He added, "I was informed that he had come home or to his mother-in-law's near Prestonsburg while we were stationed there." To inves- tigate the rumor, Cranor "sent out a scouting party in the night to effect his arrest but was disappointed as my informant was mistaken."27 Countering their efforts were the pro-Confederate Home Guards who sought to provide some oversight of civilians with questionable loyalties in this divided region. Significantly, Marshall ordered May into eastern Kentucky with orders to re- cruit in the region, clear it of anti-Union guerrillas, and inform the populace of the general's impending movement.28

hile the partisan support of men like Jack May could have been ben- eficial, it frequently proved troublesome. These men often fought Wtheir own small guerrilla wars in an effort to save their hometowns or counties for the Confederacy. For Humphrey Marshall to give them orders, and for them to obey them, was simply unfeasible. Even if Marshall wished to limit the activities of the partisan guerrillas, he likely could not have done so. In one case, he confided in Secretary Randolph: "A man by the name of Menefee is in Kentucky recruiting for General Floyd's Virginia State Line, and has gathered some 300 men in the mountains."29 Menefee, he continued, "has committed violence on private property, taking all the property, for instance, from the store of a citizen of Kentucky." While Marshall's opposition to Menefee smacks of hypocrisy (the general himself having suggested similar tactics), he voiced his reservations because of the trouble such activities might stir in the proposed path of his invasion. Complaining about Menefee's hav- ing pushed deep into Kentucky "on the line of my contemplated movement," Marshall lamented that the guerrillas were "no doubt plundering and exciting

10 OHIO VALLEY HISTORY the whole country."30 Marshall wrote his letter as if he had little knowledge of the man; indeed, he referred to him distantly as "Menefee." Union com- mander James A. Garfield, however, believed Menefee and Marshall to have had at least a command relationship. In March 1862, Garfield sent Capt. Daniel Garrard of the 22nd Kentucky Volunteers out "to capture or drive out a predatory band of rebels under the command of Captain Menifee, who is also acting as a scout for Marshall."31

ndeed, Menefee's activities acted as a catalyst to pro-Union sentiment in the upper Sandy River valley. In the wake of Garfield's victory there and Ithe expected increase in social stability, a large segment of the populace of eastern Kentucky had begun to develop into ardent unionists. Nathaniel Menefee's raid on unionist John Dils's store in Piketon, Kentucky, helped crystallize regional loyalties. A veteran of the Mexican War, the one-legged Menefee came to eastern Kentucky and raised a guerrilla company early in the war. In August 1862, Menefee and his band launched one of their frequent raids into Pike County, Kentucky, with the private property of Dils, one of the county's most outspoken unionists, in mind. Stealing thousands of dollars in goods and stock, the activity brought about unintended results. Remembering the progress of the war in the region during the summer and fall of 1862, Ephriam Dunbar noted, "Menifee's rob[b]ery over in Ky was like stirring up a hornet's nest."32 With the southern army's reappearance in heavily divided Kentucky, sympathetic, and pragmatic, men and women found it a good time to confirm their loyalties. In such places under similar conditions, sympathies frequently vacillated depending on which side held the ground. Ned Guerrant recorded in Floyd County, Ken- tucky, how a Mrs. Vance "wished all the Union men in HELL" and remembered that Kentucky had offered "a warm reception,"33 an anomalous stance in light of the strong Union support the region had recently given James Garfield's federal army. Edmund Kirby Smith noted the sympathies when he wrote General Bragg, "Thus far the people are universally Judah Benjamin. The hostile to our cause. This sentiment extends through the mountain region of Filson Historical Society Eastern Kentucky."34 As Marshall's force moved out of the mountains and into the rolling hills of northeast Kentucky, they entered strongly unionist territory, some of whose population, Guerrant noted, were even glad to see the Confederates.35 Aside from being a man of military training, Humphrey Marshall was also an astute politician. He had the ability to either convince men like Guerrant

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to follow, and nearly worship, him, or to stoke the ever-present debate among the Confederate high command in Richmond over his claimed independent command. While stopped in a small mountain village, Guerrant observed Marshall as "the most incorrigible democrat I ever saw." He "'jawed' with the old women," ate "'bacon and beans' with 'the old man,'" and "'proposed to dance with [the] girls.'"36

t first glance, Guerrant's observations of the general's gracious be- havior toward the Kentucky mountaineers appear innocuous. But, Awhen transposed against the official correspondence coming from Kirby Smith's army, it becomes clear that Marshall did not give up his own designs. Having received orders to move into Kentucky in a supporting role, he remained fully committed to his own motives of recruiting soldiers and building a positive relationship with the populace. As Marshall focused his attention selfishly, Kirby Smith found himself deep inside the state with little expected support, whether from Mar- shall or Kentuckians. Over the coming weeks, Smith repeatedly prodded the tardy Marshall to "hasten as rapidly as you can your march toward Cynthi- ana"37 and to "again urge upon you to come to Paris as rapidly as possible."38 Smith's frustration with Marshall's ap- parent disinterest even compelled him Map of the Theater of the to write Braxton Bragg about the increasingly disturbing situation. In his Rebellion in the United letter of September 18, Kirby Smith updated Bragg as to his army's progress States, 1861. Gibson in central Kentucky. He notified Bragg that "Marshall should advance to & Co., Cincinnati. 39 Cincinnati Museum Center, Mount Sterling" but added, "I fear he will not come." Finally, on September Cincinnati Historical 19, President Jefferson Davis became personally involved and sent a tersely Society Library worded letter to Marshall in the hopes of settling, once and for all, the ques- tion of independent commands. Davis, an old soldier himself now charged with holding together a rebellion based on state rights within a federal type of government, wrote directly: No one can have an independent command. Co-operation is necessary to success, and the senior officer present for duty must command the whole. It was expected that you would have moved with General Smith into Kentucky.40 As badly as Humphrey Marshall wanted the president to make a decision on his matter, he did not appreciate Davis's answer. As if the weight of the world had been removed from his shoulders, Secretary Randolph notified President Davis that he had received "The telegram from General H. Marshall,

12 OHIO VALLEY HISTORY stating that he had made an arrangement for acting in concert with General E. Kirby Smith."41 Now with the question of an independent command now officially, albeit negatively, decided, Marshall found no reason to speed his movements.42 Throughout his correspondence with Confederate civil and military leaders, Marshall stood firm on his claims that he should operate unfettered. His August 28,1862, letter to Alexander Stephens serves as a fine illustration of Marshall's character and the extent to which he felt the war should be prosecuted. Without doubt, George W. Randolph's letter, written three days before, spurred Marshall to write to one of the seemingly few Confederate administrators who would acknowledge the Kentuckian's perspectives. In that earlier note, Randolph laid down firm guidelines regarding the recruitment of Kentuckians into the Confederate army, cautioning Marshall that a recent act of the Virginia state legislature "does not and cannot permit the enlistment of men in Kentucky, nor can the Department allow such enlistment."43 Virtually everyone in the War Department had correctly guessed that Marshall planned to use the Virginia regiments he commanded to enlist and build his personal army. Confederate Major General W. W. Loring, who was operating on the east side of the Sandy River in the westernmost region of Virginia, told the secretary of war "it seems to me ill-judged for him to take Virginia regiments into Kentucky in search of other enemies."44 Randolph reminded the general, "If we get possession of that state, the Conscript Act will be enforced."45 Humphrey Marshall could not help but recognize that his hopes for governmental approval for raising his own army of Kentuckians had suffered a considerable blow.

espite Marshall's overwhelming confidence in the loyalty of Kentuck- ians to him and to the Confederacy, the expected deluge of recruits Dnever came. Very early in the campaign, most of Marshall's contem- poraries and superiors doubted the receptiveness of Kentuckians, mountaineers and not, to his efforts. General Loring, in complaining about his colleague's lack of cooperation with his own movement to the Ohio River, criticized Marshall's promised army as the "recruits which he has not yet found of the patriotic Kentuckians." Loring continued on to remind Secretary of War Randolph that "the advantage of the public service lies in restoring between General Marshall's command and my own the usual military relations." Even Loring, who had a limited knowledge of the situation in Kentucky, surmised the situation in the state correctly when he wrote, "the condition of things in Kentucky so little invites invasion."46 In Marshall's defense, Loring knew few details of his colleague's situation but believed Marshall was acting selfishly, even petulantly, by refusing to assist in Loring's mission to save the dissent- ing section of Virginia. In his reply, Secretary Randolph informed Loring of Marshall's larger role in the campaigns of Bragg and Smith. Fully expecting the mountains to empty with recruits for the southern

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army, all were surprised by the mountain populace's tepid interest. Very early in the Confederate invasion, stories abounded of the deluge of new recruits from the mountains, stretching existing supplies and arms in their new regi- ments to the point of collapse. Andrew Jackson May reported to Marshall in late August that recruits were coming into his camp at a rate of fifteen to twenty per day "at Piketon alone."47 Edward Guerrant took advantage of a stall in the advance and secured a ten-day furlough and visited friends, during which Guerrant, one of Marshall's staunchest supporters, began to question the general's estimation of popular support among the mountaineers. In an entry that very much defines the complex nature of the Appalachian Civil War, the Confederate writes, "Went to see many of my old friends in Sharpsburg. Union people glad to see me. Volunteering going on peacefully." In few places outside Kentucky could a Confederate officer be so unreservedly accepted into enemy circles. He went on to note that although the recruiting process was peaceful, men were "Not turning out as they ought."48

erhaps Humphrey Marshall's greatest military weakness was his pro- pensity to view Kentuckians monolithically. As a longtime politician, Phe prided himself on his ability to speak to local constituents, but his Bluegrass roots did not translate to an understanding of the complexity of the mountain population. Because an overwhelming portion of Marshall's politi- cal experience and social contacts came from outside the mountain region, he failed to comprehend the profound differences between the mountain residents and those from the Bluegrass and beyond. Unfortunately for Marshall, the logic and arguments that brought results in the central and northern parts of the state held little sway over residents of the mountainous east. Despite Marshall's inflated expectation of local support for his campaign, most Ken- tuckians were decidedly dispassionate toward both causes, especially in the war's early years. In addition to Marshall's commitment to looking after the friendly and undecided of eastern Kentucky, his actions toward Unionist citizens exhibited an unexpected level of patience, given his recent suggestion of the employ- ment of "hard war" tactics against them. While at Mount Sterling, Marshall commanded from the residence of Alexander Barnes. On the return trip to Virginia, Ned Guerrant recalled the general regaling a small group of his of- ficers of how he commandeered the Barnes house over the protests of a woman identified only as Mrs. French: Mrs[.] French. "Whom Have I the h-o-n-o-r to address"? Gen[.] Marshall. "Genl. Marshall Madam". Mrs[.] French. "I suppose Genl. Marshall thinks he can do here as he pleases"? Genl. Marshall. "He does Madam"!

14 OHIO VALLEY HISTORY Mrs[.] French (cooling down from blood heat,) Federal Generals would not thus take possession of private property".! Genl[.] Marshall. "Union Genls. are immaculate Madame"! We rebels claim no angelic virtues. It could not be expected of rebels. Therefore we must be excused if we shelter ourselves beneath our enemies' roof!! Union Generals never do such things! With extreme regret we rebels are compelled to do it!! Mrs[.] French exit!!49

Although Marshall never lost his optimism regarding the possibility of Ken- tucky and Kentuckians joining the Confederacy, such exchanges provide stark illumination of the palpable hostility of the populace to the Confederates and their cause. Marshall's dilatory pace following his arrival in the vi- cinity of Mount Sterling troubled both Bragg and Smith, who, by late September, were massing near Harrodsburg to resist Don Carlos BuelPs approaching federal army. By October 5, officially rebuffed, Marshall had girded himself and gotten his army moving toward Harrods- burg. Making excellent progress, the men were deflated when, only fifteen miles from their objective, they were ordered back to Lexington. Camping at the local fair- grounds, Marshall's men inexplicably sat out the battle at Perryville, which turned back the Kentucky Campaign, perhaps owing to Bragg's and Smith's respectively low expectations of Marshall's motives and the small size of his force.50

or Humphrey Marshall and his men, the Kentucky Campaign had been a long series of disappoint- Fments. On October 12, Guerrant expressed his frustration about the recent campaign and his impend- ing return to Virginia. He noted that "Genl. Wm. C. Preston defined the position of K'y as one of 'General Sympathy and Feeble Edward Guerrant. The Resistance!'" Another soldier lamented, "'did ye never call the spirits from the Filson Historical Society vastly deep, and they didn't come'!" Guerrant added, "So of K'ys volunteers! . . . God save our native State. We came and offered her help! She refused and we go away!"51 The day before the retreat began, one he referred to as the "Day of blasted hope and ruined fortunes!! Day of evil. Dark Day!," he described the retreating force as "unaided and unassisted by the people of the state they came to deliver." Clearly wounded by Kentucky's spurning of south- ern protection, Guerrant saw Marshall's tired army as "standing] now like a lion at bay, surrounded by 100[,]000 hungry minions of a ruthless despot."52

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"We came into the state to meet and deliver friends," he lamented. "We met rather the scowl of enemies!" Where Marshall's army came to "meet Kentuck- ians with arms and doors open and welcome," what they found instead were "clenched teeth, and closed doors." In return for southern charity, Guerrant observed, "provisions were driven and carried away. . . . The mills stopped or burnt. Storehouses closed or emptied." Despite his anger over the failure of his fellow Kentuckians to appreciate his cause, Guerrant was careful not to cast all of the same mold. He recognized that "a glorious self sacrificing few—are excepted honorably!"53 As for those ungrateful souls who had rejected the southern charity, he wrote: •

o those others who prefer the Northern despo- tism, and association with abolitionists, fanat- Tics and Infidels—we leave behind us our "God speed" in their new alliance and the recollection of our generous conduct towards them while they were in our power. But those we love shall never breathe the same air nor drink of the same streams that gives vitality to such Kentuckians. They will bid farewell to the skies and fields and rivers that were once beautiful in the sunlight of liberty—and glorious in the consciousness of an untarnished fame! To a sunnier—a freer and happier clime we will remove them—and live or die free,—if nothing more!54 The disappointment of the Confederacy's Kentucky Campaign overwhelmed Ned Guerrant. The moun- tains of eastern Kentucky did not spill forth the men the Confederate army so desperately needed to survive, nor did they rise to Marshall's private call. It seemed B rax ton Bragg. The that the people of eastern Kentucky were content living within the Union. Filson Historical Society The normally perceptive Guerrant clearly missed obvious signs of Kentuck- ians' tepid interest in joining the Confederacy. Upon arriving home, the young officer noticed that the people "are afraid even yet to speak out of a whisper. So thoroughly were they subjugated!" Days later, on Sunday morning, Oc- tober 5, Marshall's army entered Lexington "when people were crowding the way to the churches." Guerrant, picking up on the situation better than he even realized, described the scene, "Demonstrations of joy were curbed by the sacredness of the day and the fear here entertained by all our friends that we were 'evacuating the city—as Frankfort had been yesterday.'"''55 Rather than seeing scarred suppression or sacred restraint, Guerrant likely witnessed sincere solemnity, not from respect for the Sabbath or fear of Union repression, but out of fear that an opposing force was threatening the federal army with which they had become accustomed to living and conducting business.

16 OHIO VALLEY HISTORY During the trip to Virginia, Marshall's force clearly lacked the optimistic enthusiasm that had been present a little more than a month before. "As starvation stared so large an army in the face on the Cumberland Gap road," Marshall had requested and received permission from Kirby Smith to choose his own route out of Kentucky, spurring Guerrant to view the delegated power as "simply placing him in his former and proper position of an independent commander." More than a month after Jefferson Davis abruptly settled the issue, the idea of Marshall's independence still floated through his command.56 On the retreat, Guerrant and others had an opportunity to appraise their efforts over past two months. "Since the confederate armies entered the state of Kentucky, the recruits to our army has not exceeded 40 p'r c't of the losses sustained by sickness—death—desertion, stragglers, wounded, &c. Lost more than twice as much as we gained. Oh Kentucky!"57

ndeed, Marshall had accomplished little aside from weakening his own force and destroying his reputation within the Confederate State's military and Ipolitical arenas. The march back to the "Old Dominion" proved torturous. As the army returned to Virginia, Marshall's prophecy that "many of us will never see its end; for it will be dreadful!!!" held considerable truth. When Kirby Smith reported his arrival at Cumberland Gap to Braxton Bragg, he opened his letter with "My men have suffered on this march everything excepting actual starvation." He added, "There must be not less than 10,000 of them scattered through the country trying to find something upon which to live."58 The Abingdon Virginian noted that Marshall "can't remain in these parts long unless he brings his 'grubb' with him, for both man and beast."59 Expecting Marshall's return, the newspaper wondered, "How they are to be subsisted the Lord only knows as there is scarcely a sufficiency in this part of the country to keep the souls and bodies of the permanent population together."60 Throughout the return trip to Virginia, Marshall's command suffered deser- tion, disease, and starvation. Ned Guerrant described the trek ahead of him as "105 miles through a wild, poor, hostile, mountainous country. God grant we survive it!"61 Along the way, the already suffering morale of the army de- teriorated further. As Guerrant noted on October 15, "Most of Peyt Miller's Company resigning." Indeed, many of the men of 5th Kentucky Volunteers reenlisted only to become famous as part of the Orphan Brigade, suggesting the soldiers' referendum on their leader more than on the southern cause. Guerrant, however, did get the opportunity to have breakfast at "Mr. Shaw's—a Seces- sionist! Few of the genus found in this soil." On October 17, "the sick (ahead of the trains) and stragglers by hundreds committed very many depredations." Humphrey Marshall reacted with anger at his men's emptying "a barrel of whiskey at 'Ticktown'." Guerrant noted the command was "more demoral- ized than ever I knew before. Result of evacuation and cowardly 'skedaddling'

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Kentuckians—following the army for protection! Glorious Kentuckians!!"62 Ironically, once out of the Bluegrass and back in the mountains, Confederate soldiers began to see more sympathy among the populace. Guerrant noted new- found support in the region near Hazel Green and once again noted Marshall's idealism "as he stopped to talk to every Clodhopper about 'Constitutional Liberty', &c." After lamenting that he had worn a single pair of pants since April, Guerrant was given a new suit of clothes sewn by a Mrs. Ellen Hamilton with a "Patriotic, sensible, hopeful note." Guerrant added, "The women of Ky—are the only remaining diadem in the once illustrious Crown of old Kentucky. May Heaven preserve it with care. They deserve anything and everything. Hurrah for the women—the rebel women of my native state!!"63

uch buoyed hopes were only temporary. In Guerrant's mind, his fellow Kentuckians had abandoned the Confederacy. By the end of the Kentucky SCampaign, he had been away from home for only seven months, but during that time, much had changed. The Union army had moved throughout Kentucky and brought a significant amount of economic prosperity and social order with it, particularly along the railroads and turnpikes. Indeed, the loyal- ties of those in the more isolated region of eastern Kentucky had been secured for the federals in January 1862, when Marshall's Confederates lost at Middle Creek to troops under James Garfield, the future president. When Garfield pushed Marshall's men through Pound Gap and back into Virginia, only iso- lated pockets of pro-Confederate sentiment could be found. The failure of the Confederates at Middle Creek had convinced the vacillating populace that the South could not win against the larger, better trained, and better equipped northern armies-at least not in their section. Sidney Barnes, a native of eastern Kentucky and a Union colonel, suggested the pragmatic nature of eastern Kentucky's mountaineers when, during the pre- vious year, he wrote to Gen. George H. Thomas, encouraging him to establish a camp in the region. He reasoned that if Thomas could supply "Blankets, tents, guns, andc," the move "will help us and give our people confidence." He went further to explain, "More depends on this than men ordinarily imagine. The mountain people are peculiar, and I know them."64 The mountaineers, being small farmers living in near perpetual poverty, likely wished to side with whichever side they believed would ultimately carry their region. By aligning themselves with the potential victor, these Kentuckians could ensure themselves good treatment and security from, as they judged correctly, the union rather than the Confederate army. On October 30, 1862, Ned Guerrant passed yet again through Pound Gap into Virginia. Behind him lay months of disappointment. Kentuckians, upon whom he and Humphrey Marshall believed fervently they could count, had given just enough support early in the campaign to whet the army's appetite-

18 OHIO VALLEY HISTORY before wholly abandoning their "liberators." Obviously, their suffering had been slight and their allegiance to the Union cause great. The coming months in southwestern Virginia would prove torturous as little fighting took place and the men had ample time to reflect on their disappointments in Kentucky. Marshall continued his harassment of the Confederate high command, using the shortcomings in Kentucky as evidence that his force should be strength- ened and allowed to act independently. He did so even more sharply, and publicly, in 1863, after he resigned his commission and was he was elected to the Second Confederate Congress from Kentucky. When Ned Guerrant returned to Castle's Woods, Virginia, on November 2, 1862, he summed up the feelings of most of his Kentucky comrades, and likely his own commander. In Virginia, and not in the mountains of eastern Kentucky, Guerrant "Felt like I was getting home."65

The author wishes to thank Christopher Phillips, Wayne but the lack of widespread education and literacy likely Durrill and the journal's anonymous reviewer for their support, combined with the immediacy of the conflict in hotly encouragement and thoughtful critique of this article. Special contested areas like the mountains of eastern Kentucky to thanks should also be extended to Brian S. Wills of The preclude the development of well-thought-out philosophies University of Virginia's College at Wise. of loyalty among most of the population. 3. For more on Confederate failures within the South, 1. The historiography of the complex nature of loyalty particularly in Kentucky, see Freehling, The South vs. The along the borderland during the Civil War has grown South, 68-69, 72-73. See also Richard Nelson Current, exponentially during the past decade. Regional studies such Lincoln's Loyalists: Union Soldiers from the Confederacy as Martin Crawford, Ashe County's Civil War: Community (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992; reprint New and Society in the Appalachian South (Charlottesville: York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Although Current University Press of Virginia, 2001); Noel C. Fisher, War studies only those states that seceded from the Union, he at Every Door: Partisan Politics and Guerrilla Violence deals with Kentucky tangentially by way of his evaluation of in East Tennessee, 1860-1869 (Chapel Hill: University of Tennesseans who joined the federal armies. North Carolina Press, 1997); W. Todd Groce, Mountain 4. Inscoe and McKinney, The Heart of Confederate Rebels: East Tennessee Confederates and the Civil War, Appalachia; Groce, Mountain Rebels; Victoria E. Bynum, 1860-1870 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, The Free State of Jones: Mississippi's Longest Civil War 1999); and John C. Inscoe and Gordon B. McKinney, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); and The Heart of Confederate Appalachia: Western North Crawford, Ashe County's Civil War. Carolina in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North 5. Mark M. Boatner, III, The Civil War Dictionary (New York: Carolina Press, 2000), are among the best outgrowths of David McKay Co., Inc., 1959), 513-14; David S. Heidler earlier and more geographically and intellectually broad and Jeanne T. Heidler, eds., Encyclopedia of the American studies. See also Carl N. Degler, The Other South: Southern Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History (Santa Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Harper Barbara, Cal.: ABC-CLIO, 2000), 1255; John E. Kleber, and Row, Publishers, 1974); Mark Grimsley, The Hard ed., The Kentucky Encyclopedia (Lexington: University Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Press of Kentucky, 1992), 610-11; James L. Harrison, ed., Civilians, 1861-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress, 1774- Press, 1995); Michael Fellman, Inside War: The Guerrilla 1949 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Conflict in Missouri During the Civil War (New York: Office, 1950), 1503; Humphrey Marshall autobiographical Oxford University Press, 1989); Stephen V. Ash, When the sketch, undated [ca. 1858], Charles Lanman Collection, The Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South Filson Historical Society, Louisville, KY. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); and Daniel W. Crofts, Reluctant Confederates: Upper South 6. William C. Davis and Meredith L. Swentor, eds., Bluegrass Unionists in the Secession Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of Confederate: The Headquarters Diary of Edward O. North Carolina Press, 1989). More recently, William W. Guerrant (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, Freehling, The South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate 1999), 126. Southerners Shaped the Course of the Civil War (New York: 7. Typescript of Humphrey Marshall to Alexander Stephens, 30 Oxford University Press, 2001), has returned broad issues November 1861, Humphrey Marshall Miscellaneous Papers, to the forefront of the study of the divided South. The Filson Historical Society, Louisville, KY, hereinafter 2. With regard to the Appalachian region of Kentucky, cited as TFHS-Marshall. Degler's The Other South deals largely with the antislavery 8. Marshall to George W. Randolph, August 19, 1862, The current running through the area in the middle decades of War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records the nineteenth century, largely because of the activities of of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, D.C.: noted abolitionist, Cassius M. Clay. Degler outlines several Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), ser. I, vol. 16, schools of thought popular among southern unionists, pt. 2, 765-67, hereinafter cited as OR (unless otherwise indicated, all citations are to series I).

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9. Humphrey Marshall to Alexander Stephens, 22-23 February 35. Davis and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 148, 150. 1862, Humphrey Marshall Papers in Edward Owings 36. Ibid., 145. Guerrant Papers, The Filson Historical Society, Louisville, KY, hereinafter cited as TFHS-Guerrant. 37. E. Kirby Smith to Marshall, September 10, 1862, OR, vol. 16, pt. 2, p. 807. 10. E. Kirby Smith to Jefferson Davis, August 21, 1862, OR, vol. 16, pt. 2, p. 768-9. 38. E. Kirby Smith to Marshall, September 12, 1862, OR, vol. 16, pt. 2, p. 814-15. 11. Typescript of Humphrey Marshall to Alexander Stephens, 30 November 1861, TFHS-Marshall. 39. E. Kirby Smith to Braxton Bragg, September 18, 1862, OR, vol. 16, pt. 2, p. 845-6. 12. Charles M. Spearman, "Crittenden, George B.," in Richard N. Current et al; Encyclopedia of the Confederacy (New 40. Jefferson Davis to Marshall, September 19, 1862, OR, vol. York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), vol. 1, 428. 16, pt. 2, p. 851. 13. Earl J. Hess, Banners to the Breeze: The Kentucky 41. G. W. Randolph to Jefferson Davis, September 23, 1862, Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River (Lincoln: University OR, vol. 16, pt. 2, p. 867. of Nebraska Press, 2000), 80. 42. E. Kirby Smith to Marshall, September 21, 1862, OR, vol. 14. Henry E. Read to Marshall, August 10, 1862 (copy), 16, pt. 2, p. 859. Edward O. Guerrant Papers, Private Collection of Wallace 43. George W. Randolph to Marshall, August 25, 1862, WG- Guerrant, Winchester, Ky., hereinafter cited as WG- Guerrant. Guerrant. 44. W. W. Loring to George W. Randolph, August 11, 1862, 15. Davis and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 127. OR, vol. 12, pt. 3, 928. 16. Ibid., 129. 45. George W. Randolph to Marshall, August 25, 1862, WG- 17. G. W. Randolph to W. W. Loring, August 21, 1862, OR, Guerrant. vol. 12, pt. 3, 938. 46. W. W. Loring to George W. Randolph, August 11, 1862, 18. Humphrey Marshall to [Alexander Stephens?], 28 August OR, vol. 12, pt. 3, 928. 1862, TFHS-Guerrant 47. Davis and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 137. 18a.Ibid. 48. Ibid., 150. 19. Humphrey Marshall to Alexander Stephens, 22-23 February 49. Ibid., 169. 1862, TFHS-Guerrant. 50. Ibid., 154-58. 20. Ibid. 51. Ibid., 157. 21. Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin. 52. Guerrant's estimate of 33,000 men under Marshall appears 22. Humphrey Marshall to Alexander Stephens, 22-23 February unfounded. Estimates hold that Marshall entered Kentucky 1862, TFHS-Guerrant. with about three thousand men. 23. Marshall to George W. Randolph, August 28, 1862, OR, 53. Davis and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 158. vol. 16, pt. 2, 786. 54. Ibid. 24. E. Kirby Smith to Marshall, September 7, 1862, OR, vol. 55. Ibid., 150, 54. 16, pt. 2, 801. 56. E. Kirby Smith to Braxton Bragg, October 15, 1862, 25. Davis and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 143. Guerrant OR, vol. 16, pt. 2, p. 949; Unpublished manuscript on counts Marshall's forces as "Consisting of 5h. Ky. (700) the Kentucky Campaign, 9, Edward O. Guerrant Papers, 43d. Tenn (750) 29h. Va. (700) 21st. Va. Battn. (350) M'td Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University Rifles (350), Shawhan's Cavalry (150) Georgia Battn. (500) of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, and 12 cannon, Jeffress Battery (6 pieces), Davidson's hereinafter cited as UNC-SHC-Guerrant Manuscript; Davis battery (4 pieces) besides the Va. cavalry (400)." and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 160. 26. Davis and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 141. 57. Davis and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 159. 27. J. Cranor to J. T. Boyle, August 13, 1862, OR, ser. II, vol. 4, 58. E. Kirby Smith to Braxton Bragg, October 22, 1862, OR, (only 1 part in series 2), 384. vol. 16, pt. 2, 975. 28. Davis and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 143, 146. 59. Abingdon Virginian, October 24, 1862. 29. Nathaniel M. Menefee, a former soldier in the Mexican 60. Ibid., October 31, 1862. War, employed his talents as a recruiter, trainer, or scout to various Confederate commanders. With a band of around 61. Davis and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 159. twenty-five Virginians, Menefee terrorized Pike County, 62. Ibid., 161-63, 166. Kentucky, for a time in 1862. He spent considerable time 63. Ibid., 164. working on the behalf of John B. Floyd as well as Marshall. 64. Sidney M. Barnes to George H. Thomas, September 23, 30. Marshall to George W. Randolph, August 19, 1862, OR, 1861, OR, vol. 4 (only one part in ser 1, vol 4), p. 269-70. vol. 16, pt. 2, 765. 65. Davis and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 172, 173; Ezra 31. f. A. Garfield to Daniel Garrard, March 5, 1862, OR, vol. J. Warner, Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate 10, pt. 2, 9. Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 32. Your uncle E. A. D. to Dear Nephew, May 20, 1923, in Press, 1959), 212-13. Elihu Jasper Sutherland, Pioneer Recollections of Southwest Virginia (Clintwood, VA. H. S. Sutherland, 1984), 117. 33. Davis and Swentor, Bluegrass Confederate, 146. 34. E. Kirby Smith to Braxton Bragg, August 24, 1862, OR, vol. 16, pt. 2, 775-6.

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