RICE UNIVERSITY

DEAD-END AT THE CROSSROADS:

THE BATTLES OF MANSFIELD (SABINE CROSSROADS)

AND PLEASANT HILL, LOUISIANA, 8 AND 9 APRIL 1864

by

Richard Leslie Riper, Jr.

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

Thesis Director's Signature

Houston, Texas

May, 1976 Abstract

Dead-End at the Crossroads: The Battles of Mansfield (Sabine Cross¬ roads) and Pleasant Hill, Louisiana, 8 and 9 April 1864

Richard Leslie Riper, Jr.

On 8 April 1864 a Union army commanded by Major General Nathaniel

P. Banks was defeated by a Confederate army commanded by Major General

Richard Taylor at the small town of Mansfield, Louisiana. In Union records the engagement was recorded as the battle of Sabine Crossroads,

and the defeat signaled the "high-water mark" for the Union advance

toward Shreveport.

General Banks, after repeated urging by Major General Henry Hal-

leck, General-in-Chief of the Union Army, had launched a drive up the

Red River through Alexandria and Natchitoches to capture Shreveport,

the industrial hub of the Trans-Mississippi Department. From New Or¬

leans and Berwick, Louisiana, and from Vicksburg, Mississippi, the

Fédérais converged on Alexandria. From Little Rock, Arkansas, a Union

column under Major General Frederick Steele was to join Banks at Shreve¬

port. Three major infantry forces and the Union Navy under Admiral

David D. Porter were to participate in the campaign, yet no one was

given supreme authority to coordinate the forces. Halleck's orders were

for the separate commands only to co-operate with Banks--a clear viola¬

tion of the principle of unity of command.

Delays because of low water at Alexandria and Grand Ecore allowed

General Taylor to concentrate his Confederates at Mansfield where he

engaged the head of the Union column. A faulty march formation placed

the separate infantry units where they could not adequately support each other. The result was that those units were defeated in detail before reinforcements could be brought forward to assist them. An excessively

long wagon train, placed between the cavalry advance and the main body

of infantry, effectively blocked both the advance guard from retreating

and other infantry units from reinforcing. Because of a series of

tactical mistakes, therefore, the Union forces were defeated.

Banks withdrew his army to Pleasant Hill and established a defen¬

sive position, while sending those portions of his force which had been

routed during the battle back to Grand Ecore. The Union position at

Pleasant Hill was faulty. Several regiments were unsupported and the

flanks of brigades were "in the air." Taylor's plan was to envelop the

Union left with two fresh divisions while launching supporting attacks

to fix the Federal front line in position.

Taylor's flanking force destroyed one Federal brigade and a portion

of another, but, having failed to reach the Union rear prior to the

assault, soon found its own right flank exposed to attack. The Fédérais

took advantage of the opportunity and drove the Confederates back. Tay¬

lor's army, however, camped near the battlefield, while Banks withdrew

the remainder of his army to Grand Ecore about 2a.m.

General Ulysses Grant, appointed as General-in-Chief on 11 March

1864, ordered the expedition terminated so that Banks could prepare his

army for an attack on Mobile. Delays again plagued the Union force,

and the campaign was not concluded until 17 May. The attack on Mobile

had to be postponed, and 10,000 troops who were to accompany General

Sherman on his march through Georgia arrived at Vicksburg too late to

join that advance. General E.R.S. Canby superseded Banks who returned to Washington. The Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department continued as a minor thorn in the Union flank and was the last Confederate depart¬ ment to surrender. Acknowledgements

To the following people I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the assistance which they provided in the preparation of this thesis:

Mr. C.B. Edge and staff of the Mansfield Battle Park

Mr. Raymond E. Powell, past President of the DeSoto Parish Historical Society

Mr. Tommy Calhoun, long-time resident of Mansfield

Dr. C.E. Poimboeuf, resident of Pleasant Hill and student of the battle

Mr. Alonzo Plummer, author and former curator of Mansfield Battle Park Museum

To my wife, Diane, and children I owe more than appreciation. To them I owe apologies for the constant disarray of the dining room table and the living room floor; for the "raised voice" when disturbed; for the words "not now, kids, I'm too busy to play;" and for the many times when my tension displaced the usual serenity in our home. For their encouragement, understanding, and patience I give my thanks. To the centurion. Matthew 8:5-10 Table of Contents

Chapter Page

I. LURE OF THE RED RIVER 1

II. ON TO NATCHITOCHES ! 16

Part 1. Shall We Gather at the River 16

Part 2. Over the Rapids and through the Mud 35 to Natchitoches Town We Go

III. SEVEN DAYS IN APRIL 48

IV. COLLISION AT THE CROSSROADS 71

Part 1. Preparation: 3 a.m. until 4 p.m. 71

Part 2. First Phase: 4 p.m. until 5 p.m. 80

Part 3. Second Phase: 5 p.m. until 6 p.m. 93

Part 4. Third Phase: 6 p.m. until midnight 101

V. NOT SO PLEASANT PLEASANT HILL 119

Part 1. Preparation for battle 119

Part 2. Charge!! 133

VI. FAREWELL TO WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN 156

VII. END OF THE ROAD 168

Appendix A# Confederate Units Engaged at Mansfield and 179 Pleasant Hill

Appendix B. Union Units Engaged in the Red River Campaign 182

Bibliography 187 CHAPTER I: LUKE OF THE RED RIVER

"Authority without wisdom is like a heavy ax without an edge, fitter to bruise than polish," Anne Bradstreet: Meditations Divine and Moral, c. 1760

It is quiet there now. A spring day finds gayly-colored butter¬ flies dancing through the green fields of the old Moss Plantation, dandelions observing the surroundings from Honeycutt Hill, and only a rabbit sometimes rustling the leaf-covered floor of the neighboring woods. Occasionally the warm stillness is broken by a slight breeze or by a passing farm truck on the old stage road, now highway 175. But it was not always so. For on a spring day in 1864 the red of fresh blood stained those same green fields; black-mouthed Napolean cannon belched forth fire and destruction from Honeycutt, and thousands of running feet and pounding horses' hooves trampled the underbrush. It is the site of the battle of Mansfield (or Sabine Cross-roads as it is known in the

Union records), Louisiana, fought 8 April 1864—the site at which a powerful Union army was routed and the Red River campaign reached its own "high-water mark." It is the site at which an out-numbered Con¬ federate army ceased its retreat, coiled, and struck the blue-clad in¬ vaders a decisive blow. A follow-up strike launched at this same Union any the next day at the village of Pleasant Hill brought a tactical defeat to the Johnny Rebs, but a strategic defeat to Billy Yank, who began retracing his steps, no more to threaten northwestern or central

Louisiana.

What about this Louisiana wilderness was so important that a Union army was diverted from General Ulysses S. Grant's proposed campaign 2 against Atlanta and Mobile? What, about the region was so important that Major General Henry Halleck, President Lincoln's military advisor and general-in-chief, wanted to send all troops not required to hold the

Union positions in Virginia and the Atlantic coastal area to participate in the campaign?^ As early as 1861 Major General George Brinton

McClellan, Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, and Governor John A,

Andrews of Massachusetts championed an expedition into Texas and the Red

River area to forestall Confederate attempts to gain Mexican support, 9 and also to annex the cotton-producing lands of Louisiana and Texas,

In 1861 Spain, France, and Great Britain intervened militarily in Mexico to force payment of debts owed European creditors. Suspicion of French intentions brought the removal of the other European powers from Mexican soil. These suspicions proved to be well-founded, for in June 1863 the soldiers of Napolean III seized Mexico City, drove out President Juarez, and installed Prince Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria as emperor. Despite vigorous protests from the United States Government, fearful of a demand for the return of Texas to Mexico, French troops remained, well-aware that the United States was hardly in a position to intervene with other than words. Recognizing the possibility of assistance from south of the border, the Confederate Government was much more tolerant toward the new regime, although border incidents threatened the generally harmonious relationship. William Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State, became increasingly anxious over this flagrant French violation of the Monroe

Doctrine. His anxieties resulted in a proposal to Halleck and Lincoln that a United States presence in Texas be firmly established and that trade across the Confederate-Mexican border be interrupted.^ 3

Cotton--that fiber so key to the southern economy and so essential to the textile mills of the north and of England—played no small role in the decision to move up the Red. As early as November 1862 Halleck had recognized the potential of an expedition to open the cotton- producing region of north-western Louisiana. Cotton had risen in price in New York from about 43

In his campaign of April 1863 up Bayou Teche, Major General Nathaniel

Prentiss Banks, commander of the United States Department of the Gulf, had seized 5,000 bales. Rumor had it that 100,000 bales were stored in warehouses along the Red, with possibly another 100,000 bales in the

Texas hinterland ready to be seized by any taker. If this cotton could be seized, shipped to New Orleans, and sold, with the proceeds going to the U.S. Treasury, it could make the expedition cost-free while also financing campaigns in the less-profitable devastated areas of Virginia.

The cotton would be sent north and mills would open, cotton products would become.more available, and the credit and resulting publicity would

/t go to Banks.

Banks was not a professional soldier, but a politician, and as such he understood the political significance of Louisiana. He had served in the Massachusetts legislature, the U.S. Congress, and then as Governor of Massachusetts.** Having no military training, Banks had been bested by "Stonewall'1 Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley and at Cedar Mountain.

He had captured Port Hudson, Louisiana, but had only demonstrated mini¬ mum tactical ability. Lincoln was concerned about the political situation in Arkansas and Louisiana. An election was forthcoming, and the President was seeking potential pro-Republican electoral votes.

Through his "Ten-Percent Plan"^ Lincoln foresaw gaining the electoral votes of both states if their governments could be reconstructed quickly under Union loyalists. To achieve this goal, however, the Union com¬ manders in those two areas would have to end the menace which the Trans-

Mississippi Confederate army under General Edmund Kirby Smith posed to the stability of such governments and to citizens who might otherwise support the new regimes. To Banks, Lincoln assigned the mission of bringing Louisiana into the Republican camp. A drive up the Red River would fit into this plan perfectly, for voters in the population centers of Alexandria, Natchitoches, and Shreveport could then be administered the oath of allegiance and a new state government established. As a politician, and a Republican at that, Banks was only too eager to in¬ gratiate himself with the man who would have much to say as to his successor four years later. Of course, the possibility of military

Nathaniel P. Banks Henry W. Halleek failure existed and Lincoln might remove him, thereby conceivably destroying any Presidential aspirations.7

Shreveport and the neighboring Texas cities of Jefferson, Tyler, and Marshall were the hub of industrial activity for the Trans-

Mississippi Department. Arsenals which had been located at Camden and

Arkadelphia, Arkansas, were removed to the Shreveport and east Texas region following the Union invasion of central Arkansas and were pro¬ ducing up to 10,000 small arms rounds each day and smaller amounts of artillery ammunition. In Shreveport were boat yards for the construction of river steamers and industries for producing cotton gins, carriages, lumber, bricks, saddles, harnesses, boots, tin and copper ware, and the essential commodity of malt liquor. Factories in the area supplied

10,000 pairs of shoes a month to Kirby Smith's soldiers. The Edmund Key home in Marshall was one of several hat factories from which 20 to 30 employees turned out up to 13,000 hats and caps a month as well as blankets for troops and horses. From the penitentiary in Huntsville,

Texas, came monthly over one million yards of cotton and woolen cloth to be made into uniforms for Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas Confederates.

Pig iron and castings were being produced at a Marion County, Texas, furnace operated by the Niter and Mining Corporation. Although the

Fédérais had captured the mammoth salt mine at Avery Island near New

Iberia, Louisiana, in April 1863, that vital white substance was still available to the Confederates from resources at Lake Bisteneau and

Saline and Dugdemona Bayous in Bossier, Bienville, Webster, and Winn

Parishes east and southeast of Shreveport and from Van Zandt County,

Texas, north of Marshall. From Shreveport originated the Confederate- 6 cotton-for-Mexican-gold exchange which brought that desperately-needed metal into the southern states.** Major General William Sherman, com¬ mander of the Department of the Tennessee, said that Shreveport "should be held at any cost, as it is the very key of all Texas."9 Indeed the facilities of the region posed a tempting target to the Fédérais gathered at New Orleans and at Berwick Bay, Louisiana; a target, which, if destroyed, should cause the downfall of the entire Trans-Mississippi

Department.

There were several other reasons for an expedition up the Red River, but none of the magnitude of those already mentioned. One of Sherman's reasons was simply revenge, to "make that rich country pay in gold or cotton for all depredations on our river commerce."*-® Confederate gun¬ boats had been known to slip into the Mississippi River from the Red for a quick strike at Federal shipping and then disappear into the rivers and bayous of central Louisiana. As Admiral David Dixon Porter, com¬ mander of the Mississippi River Squadron, said: "The rebel rams kept the Mississippi River in a fever all the time."*-*- Halleck reminded

Banks that a thrust would bring the Negroes of the region back under

Union control. Banks even saw the area as a source of additional troops—

Negro troops—who could only be obtained by penetrating the enemy's 12 territory where the Negroes were.

Consequently, on 6 August 1863, after the line of the Mississippi

River had been secured by the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Halleck wired General Banks:

There are important reasons why our flag should be hoisted in some point of Texas with the least possible delay. Do this by‘land, at Galveston, at Indianola, or at any other point you may deem preferable. There are reasons why the movement should be as prompt as possible.*-^ Four days later Halleck followed with another message to Banks—a message which set in motion the events that culminated in the defeat at Mansfield: .

In my opinion neither Indianola nor Galveston is the proper point of attack. If it is necessary...that the flag be restored to some one point in Texas, that can be best and most safely effected by a combined military and naval move¬ ment up the Red River to Alexandria, Natchitoches, or Shreveport, and the military occupation of northern Texas. Nevertheless, your choice is left unrestricted. I write ^ this simply as a suggestion and not as a military instruction.

And so was clearly stated a problem which was to plague Banks from that time on. Halleck's fondness for suggestions rather than orders, thereby allowing him to disclaim responsibility for failures, placed Banks in the awkward position of conducting a major land-naval expedition in¬ volving troops from three departments without definite orders and only minimum assistance from his superiors.

In November 1863 Banks and Major General Frederick Steele, commander of the Army of Arkansas, were directed by Halleck to open communications to determine the feasibility of a combined operation. 15 On 4 January

1864 Halleck again sent a message to Banks in regard to a combined move on Shreveport involving Banks, Steele, and also Sherman:

If. as soon as you have sufficient water in the Atchafalaya and Red Rivers, you operate in that direction, Steele's army and such forces as Sherman can detach should be directed to the same object. Hie gunboats should also co-operate. The best thing, it would seem, to be done, under the circum¬ stances, is for you to communicate with them, and also with Admiral Porter, in regard to some general co-operation. (emphasis added)

In a military organization, headquarters are established for several reasons, but primary among those reasons is to coordinate the efforts of subordinate commands toward achieving a common objective, not only 8 a tactical objective, but also the overall strategic objective. For any operation to succeed, the headquarters staff must provide definite guidance and definite orders to the subordinates and must direct what support is essential from other units under the control of that head¬ quarters, After all recommendations have been made and objections weighed, there must be a firm decision made and orders issued a$ to what that headquarters wants what subordinates to do and what support is to be provided by whom. To place a subordinate commander in the position of having to solicit co-operation from other co-equal commanders who are allowed to decide whether the operation is worth pursuing is a decidedly risky procedure, fraught with difficulty, and presenting exceptional opportunities for disaster. Yet this is precisely the position in which

Banks was placed by Henry Halleck.

Banks protested the Red River route because it would expose his

forces in a hostile country with transportation restricted to wagon

train and with little prospect for subsisting off the country-side.

There were few railroads in the Trans-Mississippi and none which could

support an army moving south to north. The only possibility for util¬

izing existing railroad facilities would involve extending the tracks

the 100 miles from Monroe to Shreveport, and then ship the supplies from

the Mississippi River at Vicksburg, Halleck1s repetitive suggestions

for the campaign, however, particularly after the failure at Sabine Pass

and the moderately successful landing near the mouth of the Rio Grande,

finally convinced Banks that these recommendations from his superior were equivalent to an order, He wired Halleck: 9

With the forces you propose, I concur in your opinion, and with Generals Sherman and Steele, 'that the Red River is the shortest and best line of defense for Louisiana and Arkansas, and as a base of operations against Texas,' but it would be too much for General Steele or myself to undertake separately. With our united forces and the assistance of General Sherman the success of 1Amovements on that line will be certain and important.

On 25 January Banks dispatched Captain Robert T. Dunham with letters to both Steele and Sherman in which he stated the need for co-operation and inquired as to what concentration of forces could be effected.^ On the 29th Banks informed Halleck of these actions and also told his superior that he was "anxiously awaiting information and instructions in regard to operations on Red fiver [sic]...."20 Halleck again totally abrogated his responsibilities:

You speak of awaiting 'orders' and 'instructions' in regard, to operations on Red river [sic]. If by this is meant that you are waiting for orders from Washington, there must be some misapprehension. The substance of my despatches to you on this subject was communicated to the President and Secretary of War, and it was under¬ stood that, while stating my own views in regard to operations, I should leave you free to adopt such lines and plans of campaign as you might, after a full consid¬ eration of the subject, deem best. Such, I am confident, is the purport of my despatches, and it certainly was not intended that any of your movements should be delayed to await instructions from here. It was to avoid any delay of this kind that you were requested to communicate directly with Generals Sherman and Steele, and concert with them such plans of co-operation as you might deem best under all the circumstances of the case. *

After the campaign Banks remarked to the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "The difficulty in regard to this expedition was that nobody presumed to give orders.

During February Steele and Sherman agreed to co-operate with Banks in a pincers movement west of the Mississippi River. Steele was to 10 secure Little Rock and the line of the Arkansas River and then move toward Shreveport while Banks, reinforced by Sherman's forces and accompanied by Porter's gunboats, moved up the Red River toward the same objective. Grant wanted Sherman to command the expedition, but, as Banks ranked Sherman, that was impossible, and there were too many political objections to removing Banks. Banks stated his intention to move by the 5th of March.23

In spite of all the reasons for launching the Red River campaign, was such an expedition really necessary? Did it really have the poten¬ tial for making a significant contribution to the overall war effort?

Halleck was convinced that the movement, if successful, would return all of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi area to the Union and eliminate the southwest as a thorn in the Union flank. What remnants of any Con¬ federate forces then left west of the Mississippi would thus be separated from their comrades on the eastern bank by a wide belt of Union ground.24

But Ulysses S. Grant did not agree. His belief was that the Union troops should be massed against those objectives, namely Confederate armies and manufacturing centers, the destruction of which would lead to total Con¬ federate defeat. He preferred an economy of force measure by Steele to prevent Kirby Smith from causing much trouble, while sending Banks against Mobile and Sherman against Atlanta to further split the south, destroy that port and trade centers, and eliminate the Confederate armies in the southeast as viable forces. As far as Grant was concerned, there was nothing in the entire Trans-Mississippi Department to justify the expenditure of funds, troops, or time which Banks' expedition would require. With Union control of the Mississippi River assured, the 11

Confederate west could not aid effectively the Confederate east. In essence, they were cut off and no longer posed a serious military threat to the Union.2^ Grant was a man of principles--the principles of war, and an expedition up the Red simply did not fit into the principles.

Each reason for such a campaign was important, but neither the reasons nor the campaign were of real significance to the overall war effort.

By the time Grant was appointed general-in-chief on 12 March 1864, how¬ ever, the operation had been "ordered" and preparations had progressed to the point where he allowed the campaign to begin. He, therefore, yielded to the circumstances, but he told Banks to move quickly and to remember that the upcoming Mobile campaign was to be his primary con¬ cern.2^

So in March 1864 the drive up the Red River toward Shreveport began. The towns of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill were nothing more than dots on the maps of the Union commanders. Their significance was yet to be told 12

V 13

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

^Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eda., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Inc., 1956), IV:99; War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols; in 128 (Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. I, XXXII, Part ii, 122-23. All references are to Series I. Hereafter cited as O.R.

^Ludwell H. Johnson, Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 8-9.

^Vincent H. Cassidy and Amos E. Simpson, Henry Watkins Allen of Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 196,4), pp. 120-21; Richard S. West, Mr. Lincoln's Navy (New York: Longman's, Green and Company, 1957), p. 242; John D. Winters, The Civil War in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 325; H.L. Landers, "Wet Sand and Cotton--Banks' Red River Campaign," Louisiana Historical Quarterly XIX (January 1936): 154; Joseph Howard Parks, General Edmund Kirby Smith, C.S.A. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954), pp. 283-84; Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, vol. 3: The War Years (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1939), pp. 12-13.

^Edwin Adams Davis, Heroic Years : Louisiana in the War for Southern Independence (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), p. 53; John Christopher Schwab, The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865: A Financial and Industrial History of the South During the Civil War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901), p. 175; Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, vol. 3: Red River to Appomattax (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 27-28; Philip Van Doren Stern, The Confederate Navy: A Pictorial History (New York: Bonanza Books, 1962), p. 184; Winters, pp. 325-26; U.S. Congress, Joint Committee, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. "Red River Expedition," 38th Congress, 2d Session, vol. II, iii-iv. Hereafter cited as CCW.

•’Sarah F. Ware, "General Banks's Red River Campaign of 1864" (Master's thesis, University of Texas, 1931), p. 1; Fred Harvey Harrington, Fighting Politician: Major General N.P. Banks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948), p. 55.

£ °A state, with its electoral votes, could return to the Union if ten percent of the registered voters of 1860 reaffirmed their loyalty to the United States. 14

^Foote, p. 27; Johnson, pp. 45-46; Winters, p. 325; West, Mr. Lincoln's Navy, p. 245; Donald Bridgman Sanger, "Red River - A Mercan¬ tile Expedition," Tyler's Quarterly Magazine XVII (October 1935): 74.

^Winters, pp. 21, 321; Foote, p. 27; Parks, pp. 350-51; Alwyn Barr, "Confederate Artillery in the Trans-Mississippi," Military Affairs XXVII (September 1963): 78; Waldo W. Moore, "The Defense of Shreveport - The Confederacy's Last Redoubt," Military Affairs XVII (August 1953): 74; Perry A. Snyder, "Shreveport, Louisiana: 1861-1865; from Secession to Surrender," Louisiana Studies XI (Spring 1972): 53; Ella Lonn, Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy (New York: Walter Neale, 1933), pp. 22, 29, 193; "Confederate Hat Factory Unearthed," Shreveport Journal, 25 June 1975, sec. D, p. 1.

9O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 86.

10O.R. XXXI, Part iii, 460-61.

11CCW. p. 273.

•^CCW, pp. xxvi, 24.

13O.R. XXVI, Part i, 672; CCW. p. iv.

14O.R. XXVI, Part i, 673; CCW, pp. iv-v.

15O.R. XXII, Part ii, 709-12.

16O.R. XXXIV, Part ii, 15-16.

^Robert L. Kerby, Kirby Smith's Confederacy: The Trans-Mississippi South. 1863-1865 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 7; John F. Stover, The Railroads of the South : A Study in Finance and Control (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1955), pp. 5, 25; Adam Badeau, Military History of Ulysses Grant, from April. 1861, to April, 1865. 3 vols. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1885), 11:59-60; CCW, p. xxi.

18O.R. XXXIV, Part ii, 133.

19O.R. XXXIV, Part ii, 144-45, 149.

2Qçcw. p. xxvii.

21 CCW, pp. xxvii-xxviii 15

22CCW, p. 19.

23Q.R, XXXII, Part iii, 289; XXXIV, Part ii, 267, 305, 368, 372, 431; M.A. DeWolfe Howe, ed., Home Letters of General Sherman (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), p. 286; Harrington, p. 151.

2^O.R. XXX, Part iii, 474-75; West, Mr. Lincoln's Navy, p. 246.

25 Foote, pp. 15-16; H. Allen Gosnell, Guns on the Western Waters : The Story of River Gunboats in the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949), p. 246.

2^Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. 2 vols. (New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1886), 11:139-40; Mark M. Boatner, The Civil War Dictionary (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1959), p. 367. CHAPTER II: ON TO NATCHITOCHES*

PART 1 - SHALL WE GATHER AT THE RIVER

When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement; the want of artillery by the nature of the maneuvers; and the inferiority in cavalry by the choice of positions, Napolean I

In late August 1863 various sources of intelligence alerted Major

General Richard Taylor, commander of the District of West Louisiana, to the strong possibility of a Union advance up the Red River, This ad¬ vance of perhaps 50,000 men from Helena, Arkansas, Vicksburg, Missis¬ sippi, and New Orleans and Berwick Bay, Louisiana, was to commence as % soon as the water level in that stream would allow Federal gunboats to navigate, Taylor immediately began preparations to meet such a threat to his adopted state. The fortifications at Fort DeRussy, 30 miles below

Alexandria, were strengthened and new works were constructed at Shreve¬ port and Camden. As the country between Bayou Boeuf (near Alexandria) and Pleasant Hill was, in Taylor's words, a barren "pine desert, furnishing no supplies whatever," he began establishing depots in this wilderness to supply forage, salt, and breadstuffs to marching troops.^-

Events were to prove his wisdom.

By March 1864 it became obvious to Taylor that the Union expedition would soon begin. Banks was moving troops from the Texas coast, and there was a quickening of activity in the Union camps of south Louisiana.

Taylor realized that his Confederate forces scattered across Arkansas,

Louisiana, and Texas must be concentrated if he were to have any chance of defeating the Union masses. Consequently he made plans to attach 17

Issac Harrison's partisans at Monroe to Brigadier General St. John R.

Liddell, commanding the sub-district of North Louisiana, with instruc¬ tions to hold the north shore of the Red and harass Union riverine forces. The 6,000 men of Brigadier General Alfred Mouton's infantry brigade operating between Black Bayou (near Minden) and the Ouachita

River were ordered to concentrate and prepare to move south. Prince

Camille de Polignac was directed to move his brigade from Harrisonburg

(south of Monroe) to Alexandria. Major General John G. Walker received instructions to hold the area bounded by the Atchafalaya River, Fort

DeRussy, and Opelousas with his 7,000 men, but to fall back to Alexandria o if pressed by the 13,000 Fédérais in lower Louisiana.

Alfred Mouton Richard Taylor

Taylor did not put all his eggs in the Red River basket. Major

General Sterling Price, with a combined infantry-cavalry force of approximately 13,000 men, held a line Monroe-Camden-Arkadelphia where he was in a position either to oppose Steele or join Taylor. Major 18

General John Bankhead Magruder, commanding in the Galveston-Houston area, was reinforced with a division under Brigadier General Tom Green and a brigade commanded by Colonel William H. Parsons, for a total force of about 15,000 soldiers. With these he could oppose an attack from 3 the Federal base at Matagorda Bay.

Edmund Kirby Smith Prince Camille de Polignac

Banks estimated that Taylor could gather 25,000 to 30,000 Confed¬

erate troops against his advance. To eliminate such an army, Banks planned to concentrate 17,000 of his own troops, 10,000 of Sherman's, and 15,000 of Steele's, plus whatever gunboats he could obtain. To accumulate the necessary forces, operations in Texas were suspended, with only small detachments left to hold the Federal positions along

the coast. Garrisons at other locations under Banks' immediate command were likewise reduced.^ Sherman traveled to Banks' headquarters at New

Orleans and there discussed reinforcements for Banks' pending expedition.

On 2 March Banks formally requested that Sherman furnish 10,000 men "to 19 reach Alexandria, La., on about the 17th instant, with supplies for

thirty days."“* Two days later Sherman gave his formal consent to attaching 10,000 men to Banks, but with two strings attached—"that I

calculate, and so report to General Grant, that this detachment of his >•

forces in no event go beyond Shreveport, and that you spare them the moment you can, trying to get them back to the Mississippi in thirty days from the time they actually enter Red River.Grant had earlier been informed by Halleck that Sherman's troops would be involved, but he was less than enthusiastic, fearing that the men "will be permanently

lost from this command."^ Brigadier General Andrew Jackson èmith was

chosen by Sherman to march at the head of the 10,000 and to meet Banks

O at Alexandria.

Securing Steele's co-operation was another matter. Although he had agreed to a junction of his force with that of Banks on the Red

River, Steele apparently had second thoughts as to how much co-operation

should be expected from him. By 6 March he had decided merely to create

a diversion, a feint, and not to unite with Banks. He informed Banks of

his change of plan and also declared that only 7,000 men would be avail- 9 able. Banks dutifully informed Halleck of the problem, and Halleck

dutifully "advised" Steele that he "proceed to co-operate in the move¬

ment of Banks and Sherman on Shreveport."^-® Grant, however, then issued

a positive order to the Arkansas commander: "Move your force in full

co-operation with General N.P. Banks' attack on Shreveport. A mere

demonstration will not be sufficient."*-* 20

For a change, a directive had been issued from Washington, but even

this order of Grant's was not sufficient. The implication was that

Banks was superior to Steele for operational aspects of the campaign, but the command relationship was not explicitly stated. In January 1864

Banks had Major D.C. Houston, chief engineer of the department, prepare

a memorial on conditions which should be met prior to initiating field

operations. One recommendation was "that the entire force should be

placed under the command of a single general.There is a Dutch

proverb which says "little is done where many command," but, unfor¬

tunately, the Union leaders seemed unfamiliar with the concept. Not

only was Steele never directly subjugated to Banks, but also the Navy

under Porter was practically independent of Banks' authority.^ The

result was that the principle of unity of command, recognized by

military men as essential to martial success, was violated in the Red

River campaign. Whether Grant was aware of the lack of a firm command

relationship or whether he assumed such a basic detail had been arranged

by Halleck is not known, but as general-in-chief, the responsibility

must be laid at his door. Banks himself, however, is not entirely free

from guilt. Although he knew that there must be a designated commander

for the overall expedition, at no time did he insist that one be clearly

appointed.

Meanwhile, back at New Orleans, preparations for the upcoming cam¬

paign were proceeding at a rapid pace. The 5,000 to 6,000 men of the

Third and Fourth Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, returned from Texas

and proceeded to lower Teche Bayou near Berwick Bay. Seven new cavalry

regiments were sent south to join the expedition, while seven others 21 were formed by mounting infantry regiments. ^ Among the latter was the

8th New Hampshire Infantry which was redesignated the 2d New Hampshire

Cavalry. Upon receiving their mounts, training began under the watch¬

ful eye of a West Point cavalry instructor. Those soldiers who knew horses had reservations about the change. "I don't know how I shall

like it," wrote former farm boy Sergeant Claude Goings, "but I am not very much pleased with the idea. It is true we shall not have to walk

so much but will have to take so much care of our horses that it cannot be much easier for us." The 600 troopers were then issued Remington

revolvers, sabers, and the Sharp breech-loading carbine—all weapons

they had not known as infantrymen. The New Hampshire men, along with

the 3d Massachusetts Cavalry, left New Orleans on 2 March for Donaldson- ville, where they joined the 4th Brigade of the cavalry division. The

56th and 83d Ohio Infantry, 46th Indiana Infantry, and 23d and 29th

Wisconsin Infantry marched from Algiers, across the river from New

Orleans, on 5 and 6 March for Brashear City (now Morgan City) to join

the other Union forces gathering in the vicinity. Many of the regiments

of the Nineteenth Corps were nearing the end of their enlistments, with

the possibility looming of a disintegration of the Corps. As an induce¬

ment to reenlist, the men were offèred a thirty-day furlough and a

bounty, which most accepted, thereby ending this threat. Major General

William Franklin, Corps commander, received the 29th and 30th Maine,

153d New York, and 14th New Hampshire Infantry regiments, along with the

1st Deleware and 7th Massachusetts Batteries, as reinforcements.^ 22

Within the next few days soldiers of Banks' huge army began pouring into the camps around Franklin, Louisiana, until their number was about

15,000. The Maine 13th and 15th Infantry arrived on the 8th from

Matagorda Bay. "Gold Lace" Dudley's cavalry brigade arrived from Donald- sonville and joined the other "pony soldiers" of Brigadier General Albert

F. Lee's cavalry division on the 10th. The engineer troops of the Corps de Afrique, 721 Negro soldiers, arrived. Their skills in road repair and bridge building would be extensively utilized in the weeks ahead.^

Albert Findley Lee Nathan Augustus Monroe Dudley

Taylor and Kirby Smith closely watched these storm clouds brewing near the Gulf coast. Agents reported the tempest, of hurricane strength, would blow north between the 15th and 20th of March. Having determined that the Federal advance would be in Louisiana, Taylor ordered Magruder on 8 March to send General Tom Green's division to Alexandria immediately and to prepare to move the remainder of his command to reinforce. On 7

March Polignac was directed to march to Alexandria and to join Colonel 23

Henry Gray, commanding Mouton's brigade, to form a division under Mouton. 18 This left Liddell to watch the approaches from Natchez and Vicksburg.

William Buel Franklin Henry Gray

Up the Mississippi at Vicksburg the troops of A.J. Smith embarked

on such transports as the South Webster containing the 864 men of the

32d Iowa, the Mars with the 47th Illinois, and the Diana, holding the

81st Illinois. All together, one artillery battery and six infantry

regiments from the Seventeenth Corps, two batteries and fifteen regi¬ ments of the Sixteenth Corps, and the Mississippi Marine Brigade, a

total of about 12,000 men on twenty-seven transports, sailed for the 19 mouth of Red River on Thursday, 10 March.

Smith's orders were to join Admiral Porter near Simmesport and,

with a portion of the Mississippi Squadron as an escort, proceed to

Alexandria and unite with Banks and Franklin on the 17th. Upon arriving

at the mouth of the river about noon on the 11th, however, Smith re¬

ceived a dispatch from Banks stating that he would not be at Alexandria 24 before 21 March due to a delay caused by heavy rain. Not given to sitting around, Smith disembarked and marched his forces overland the

28 miles to Fort DeRussy, which he captured on the 13th with a Union loss of three killed and 35 wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Bird, fort commander, lost five killed, four wounded, 250 captured, 10 cannon, an average of 100 rounds per gun, and 60,000 rifle cartridges--losses which

Taylor's small force could ill afford.^® Smith's men were tough—

"gorillas" they came to be called—from hardy stock; men from the Western states of Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Indiana, and Missouri; frontier states where men had to be tough to survive. And Smith saw to it that they remained tough. Porter described them:

The clothes of the men were worn and faded, their shoes were patched, they had no tents to sle*ep under....Their tents were on the transports, and the general forbade their being used without his orders. I recollect hearing him denounce some officer as a 'Miss Nancy kind of fellow' because he slept under a shelter-tent, which is a thin piece of canvas about the size of a bandana handkerchief. Smith thought it a luxury that no one under his command should indulge in. He said wagons demoralized an army more than tents did, and if he had soldiers that couldn't find a restaurant in the Desert of Sahara, and a comfort¬ able bed in the swamps of Louisiana, he wanted to swap them off for those who could.

Men such as these took few casualties and achieved great results.

Leaving part of his forces to destroy DeRussy's fortifications,

Smith reembarked the 1st and 3d Divisions, Sixteenth Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Joseph Mower, and sent them to Alexandria, which they occupied on the 15th.^2 <

Pickets from Brigadier General William Scurry's brigade of Major

General John Walker's Texas infantry division reported, on 12 March, the arrival of A.J. Smith and Porter at Simmesport, but estimated their 25

number of troops at 15,000 to 17,000 infantry plus 300 cavalry. As

Walker had only 3,828 men, he decided to concentrate his three brigades

and find a strong defensive position. Walker was joined on the 14th by

one company of the 2d Louisiana Cavalry and the next day by Gray's brigade, but, even with the additional men, to attack the Union forces

would invite disaster. As his cavalry had been cut off east of the

Atchafalaya River by the Federal landing, he had no reconnaissance arm

to advise him of Union strength or movements. Employing his one cavalry

company as scouts, he prudently retired towards Alexandria, meeting the

remainder of Mouton's division along the way.^3

Andrew Jackson Smith Joseph Anthony Mower

When Kirby Smith learned of Union forces entering the Red, he

ordered Magruder at Galveston to put his soldiers in motion for Alex¬

andria. Brigadier General Hamilton P. Bee left Columbus, Texas, with

six regiments of cavalry--Debray's, Buchel's, Terrell's, Woods', Gould's,

and Likens'. Three regiments of Green's division left Hempstead on the

13th, 14th, and 15th, while the fourth, along with part of James P. 26

.i O 27

Major's division, left on the 16th and 17th. The remainder of Major's division departed Hempstead on the 22d. These regiments would each add

two to five hundred men to Taylor's diminutive army of 5,300 infantry,

500 cavalry, and 300 artillerymen. On 18 March Price was ordered to

send his reinforcements to Taylor, and 4,000 more Confederates reached

Shreveport, a two-day march from Taylor, on the 24th.^

Hamilton Prioleau Bee James Patrick Major

Things were not going well for Franklin at Franklin. Rain and a

breakdown in communications combined to delay his start from that place.

A terrific storm on the 9th turned the roads of south Louisiana into

impassable quagmires, indistinguishable from the swamps they were built

to traverse. By the 11th the road in high places had drained, but that

in low places was still poor. Finally on the 13th road conditions im¬

proved so that the army could set out. Banks had intended to move his

forces from Franklin on the 7th to meet A.J. Smith and Porter at Alexan¬

dria on the 17th; yet, General Franklin was not informed of this inten¬

tion until the 10th. As it was impossible to prepare the expedition and 28 march 175 miles in seven days, the timetable had to be adjusted by one

2S week. J

Lee's cavalry trotted out of the Union camp the evening of the

13th, with the rear guard following on the 14th. That day and the next,

regiments of Franklin's Nineteenth Corps (1st and 2d Divisions) and

Brigadier General Thomas E.G. Ransom's Biirteenth Corps (3d and 4th

Divisions) filed northward. More than 15,000 men were launched like a

blue arrow into the heart of Louisiana.^

Of the territory they passed, soldiers said: "Louisiana is the

Prettiest State that ever I Saw flowers of all kinds are out everything

are green and nice [sic].."^ "There is a good deal of this part of

the world that the Lord has not finished yet. He meant the snakes and

alligators to hold possession for a thousand or two years more before

OQ man [was allowed] to occupy it. It is half land and half water." °

The sight of blue columns and the red and white stripes of Union battle

flags greeted the residents of every village along the route. Martial

music added to the expectantly victorious air surrounding the pro¬

cession.^

In the face of the converging columns of A.J. Smith and Franklin,

Taylor had no choice but to order his Confederate forces to fall back.

Between 16 and 18 March Walker, near Cheneyville, and Polignac, at

Lecompte, marched to Carroll Jones', a forage depot which Taylor had

previously established at this free Negro's plantation. Only 12 miles

from Monett's Ferry on Cane River as well as from Bayou Rapides and

located on the Natchitoches road, Carroll Jones' was an excellent base

from which Taylor could scour the countryside for supplies and also 29 concentrate his forces. Taylor himself left Alexandria just prior to

Of) the arrival of Mower.

Colonel William G. Vincent's 2d Louisiana Cavalry was ordered to join Taylor but to leave scouts to watch the Union forces. As they withdrew, the cavalry set fire to all the cotton along the route of the

Union army to prevent it from falling into Federal hands. Unfortunately, the flames often spread to sheds and dwellings. The fires prompted one

Union soldier to observe: "From the day we started on the Red River expedition, we were like the Israelites of old, accompanied by a cloud

(of smoke) by day, and a pillar of fire by night. This was one of the curious phases of the war—to see the rebels bent on the destruction of their own property." Upon arrival at the plantation, Vincent reported that 10,000 men under the command of A.J. Smith were in Alexandria.^2

Completing the demolition work at Fort DeRussy, A.J. Smith and the

1,800 men of Kirby Smith's detachment of the Seventeenth Corps arrived in Alexandria about 5 p.m., 18 March.^ Newspaper correspondents accom¬ panying these forces reported serious crimes against the local populace, writing that "a spirit of destruction and wanton ferocity seems to have seized upon many of them," and fearing "there is a danger of our whole hoble army degenerating into a band of cut-throats and robbers."^ Such were Smith's "gorillas."

Lee's cavalry advance arrived at Alexandria the following day, 19

March, with the remainder of his division coming up on the 20th.^

Observing that Vincent's cavalry was observing him from the vicin¬ ity of Henderson's Hill, A.J. Smith determined such a situation was intolerable. In the midst of a violent rain and hail storm, Mower led 30 portions of the 1st and 4th cavalry brigades, the 2d and 3d brigades

Sixteenth Corps, the 89th Indiana, and 9th Indiana Battery out to elim¬ inate the source of irritation. The result was a complete surprise of the Confederate force and the capture of Captain William Edgar's 4-gun battery, about 200 horses, and 261 prisoners. The victors feasted on sweet potatoes, fresh pork, beef, and spring chicken—contraband of war.36

After passing through picturesque south Louisiana towns and villages with such names as New Iberia, Vermillionville, Carrion Crow, and Ope¬ lousas, the 1st Division, Nineteenth Corps, commanded by Brigadier

General William H, Emory, marched into Alexandria on the 25th. The 2d

Division, under Brigadier General Cuvier Grover, arrived on the 26th and

28th of March. The engineers of the Corps de Afrique had done excellent work in repairing bridges and laying a corduroy road in places where the deep mud caused by the severe rain had threatened to further delay the Union advance. Marching 14 to 20 miles a day, with only one day of rest, Thomas Ransom's Thirteenth Corps arrived on the 26th. In addition to the much-needed rest, the Chicago Mercantile Battery had a special reason to celebrate, for there they received four months' back pay—

$52.00 each. Finally the Red River expeditionary force was assembled in one location. On the 22d Banks left New Orleans, reached Alexandria on the 24th, opened his headquarters on the 25th, and took command of

32,768 officers and men—a force almost five times as large as that 37 which Taylor had gathered 35 miles away.

Banks was greeted at Alexandria by problems. Word arrived from

Vicksburg that Major General James McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth 31

Army Corps, wanted Brigadier General Charles Ellet's Marine Brigade returned immediately. Banks could consider their loss a mixed blessing.

These troops were suffering from a smallpox outbreak, and their ships had too deep a draught to cross the rapids north of the city. The marines had no organic land transportation, and additional wagons were not available to furnish their needs. Consequently, these 3,000 men were released from duty with the Department of the Gulf on 26 March and departed for Vicksburg on the 27th, stopping to pillage and destroy at

every opportunity on their way back to the Mississippi. The impact of

their departure was partly eased by the arrival of a 1,535-man brigade

OQ of the Corps de Afrique.

William Hemsley Emory Thomas E.G. Ransom

Smith's veterans, in particular, had not entered upon the expedi¬

tion happily, for they viewed it as nothing more than a cotton raid to 39 enhance the fortunes of speculators and navy prize-seekers. The Joint

Committee on the Conduct of the War investigated the cotton-seizing 32 activities of the Union forces and heard charges, counter-charges, and a great deal of conflicting testimony. At Alexandria, the navy, using army wagons obtained through "midnight requisitions," ranged up to 10 miles from the river seizing bales upon which sailors quickly painted

"C.S.A." (to disallow claims that the bales were privately owned) and

"U.S.N." This combination of letters was dubbed "Cotton Stealing.Asso-... dation of the United States Navy" by their army comrades.^® Admiral

Porter charged that Banks' headquarters steamer was "loaded with cotton

41 speculators" —"an army of cotton speculators commanded by General

Greed, General Avarice, General Speculation, and General Breach of

Trust," and he implied that Banks' mission was one of personal enrich- 42 ment. Banks charged that Porter ignored his instructions that all government-owned cotton was to be sent to New Orleans to benefit the

United States Treasury and continued to seize cotton for prize money.

Lieutenant Frank L. Church was able to obtain $259.70 as his share of the prize. Porter stated, "When the army came here [Alexandria] I gave an order to touch no more cotton."^ If such an order were given, it was totally unenforced.

Banks requested that Porter station a boat at the mouth of Red

River to prevent any speculators from sailing to Alexandria. Several speculators did accompany the expedition, however, and these few were much to the detriment of Banks' reputation. One, William Halliday, had no pass, but traveled on a gunboat under Porter's protection. Two others, William Butler and Samuel L. Casey, had cotton-trading permits issued by President Lincoln in his own handwriting.^ Banks admitted that he gave "about ten or twelve [passes] to men connected with the 33 press, officers representing the Treasury Department, and officers of 46 the western States, whose troops were in service in this campaign."

Two of these "ten or twelve," however, were issued to Charles K. Hawkes

and a Mr. Miltenberger. That to Hawkes was an unconditional permit to

obtain 4,800 bales of cotton, while that to Miltenberger was restricted

to 3,000 bales belonging to the Louisiana State Bank. J.H. McKee ob¬

tained a pass by convincing Banks that he was a Unionist who could

restore sympathy for the Union in the Red River area. Other speculators bribed captains of army-chartered transports or bought journalist passes 47 for up to $2,500. But as Department Commander Banks must bear respon¬

sibility for failure to weed-out these irregularities.

Despite his detailed orders to prevent unauthorized shipment of

cotton and his attempts to account for all property seized, Banks became

the victim of much criticism. Major General David Hunter, Grant's

personal emissary, wrote the general-in-chief:

The vital interests of the contest are laid aside, and we are amused with sham State governments, which are a complete laughing-stock to the people, and the lives of our men are sacrificed in the interests of cotton speculators.48 49 "Cotton killed that expedition, in my opinion," Porter said later.

"The army...should have pushed on at once. General Banks ordered an

election at Alexandria, and some days were lost in that election. The

army should have moved the day after it arrived there."^0 But neither

was there evidence that Banks placed personal considerations ahead of

the best interests of the government, nor did the Joint Committee estab¬

lish that property under Banks' control was improperly accounted for.

Banks had used the time at Alexandria to hold an election on 1 April,

but he believed that he was following the desires of the President by 34 doing so. There had been 1,500 voters in the parish before the war, and

300 turned out for this election. Several hundred others took the oath of allegiance. True, the army could have left Alexandria soon after its arrival there, but Banks needed the fleet for supplies and Porter would never have allowed his ships to be left unprotected. The Admiral dis¬ liked Banks because he was a politician and because he had interfered with the navy's seizure of cotton.Porter's charges appear to be nothing more than a querulous attempt to castigate Banks while relieving himself of any responsibility in the episode.

That Casey had a brother-in-law serving as a colonel under Kirby

Smith led to a rumor that Smith had made a deal that, in turn for dis¬ bandment of his army, the Fédérais would sell the cotton of the region and establish a fund for Confederates who would leave the country. This rumor was absurd in light of the fact that the Confederate army resisted the Union advance; but so prevalent was the idea that Smith felt obliged to respond:

My power in the Trans-Mississippi was almost absolute. It would have been absurd in me to have called in the devious and uncertain agency of a Federal army, and of cotton speculators within the Union lines, when I could at any time have safely exported and placed to my credit abroad thousands of bales of cotton. ^

Less than one week after his appointment as general-in-chief, Grant determined that the Union armies would act as a single co-ordinated force to get on with "conquering of the organized armies of the enemy."53

While recognizing the importance of the objectives of taking Shreveport and of protecting the route of the Mississippi, Grant informed Banks, in no uncertain terms, that the return of the army to New Orleans was of 35 even greater importance. Grant was willing to extend the time limit of

A.J. Smith's retention by ten or fifteen days (26 April at the latest), but only on the proviso that Shreveport could be taken by that date; if not, the 30-day limit was to apply (11 April). Upon capturing Shreve¬ port, Banks was to abandon plans for moving into Texas, garrison the

town, leave the navy to secure his river communications, and get to 54 New Orleans. While providing an opportunity for tactical success,

the expedition was of minimum strategic value, and Grant was determined

this side-show would not be to the detriment of the main event east of

the Mississippi River. As Banks sat in his headquarters on 25 March, he realized he had just 32 days to take Shreveport. What would Taylor

and Kirby Smith do? Abandon the city? Simply disperse in the face of

overwhelming odds? Or would Steele join him in time to swat the Confed¬

erates aside like bothersome gnats? But no matter what the rebels did, he knew he had to move, and move quickly.

PART 2 - OVER THE RAPIDS AND THROUGH THE MUD TO NATCHITOCHES TOWN WE GO

No great success can be hoped for in war in which rapid movements do not enter as an element. Even the very elements of Nature seem to array themselves against the slow and over-prudent general. Dennis Hart Mahan

Through poor co-ordination, Franklin and the Nineteenth Corps had

been slow to leave his base in south Louisiana, and now "the very

elements of Nature," who seemed to wear Confederate gray, aligned them¬

selves to slow Banks' progress even more. The navy was to accompany the

expedition to insure communications were kept open to the Mississippi,

to carry provisions for the army to draw upon during their march to 36

Shreveport, and to protect the right flank of the marching invaders.55

Despite Porter's boast that "I can run my boats wherever the sand is damp," the gunboats in fact had to have 7% to 10 feet of water in the channel to cross the rapids north of Alexandria. But the Naiads of the Red apparently had conspired to provide no spring rise in the river this year. Not since 1855 had thé water level failed to rise, but now there was only six feet of water on the rapids.56 For 11 days the fleet and the army sat and watched and waited and measured. Not until the 26th was the first gunboat able to cross. Others, and some transports, were able to cross on the 28th.. The last of the shallow-draught vessels crossed on the 2d and 3d of April—19 days after the arrival of the fleet. But only 13 of Porter's 19 gunboats and 30 of the transports were able to traverse those falls. The low water necessitated a supply depot at Alexandria to transfer supplies overland from the steamers below the rapids to those above. The 3,700-man 2d Division, Brigadier General

Cuvier Grover commanding, Nineteenth Corps, was detailed to remain be¬ hind to protect the facility.^

Anticipating that the gunboats would soon be able to navigate,

Lee's cavalry began moving north on 26 March. Two divisions of the

Thirteenth Corps, the ammunition train, Emory's division, the wagons of the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Corps (loaded with supplies for 10 days), and a rear guard of cavalry followed on the 28th. A.J. Smith, on the

26th, was directed by Banks to march his command to Cotile Landing, 20 miles upriver, there to board transports, and proceed to Grand Ecore.

Reaching the landing on the 28th, Smith sailed for Grand Ecore on 2

April, arriving there the following day. 37

Despite more rain and almost constant skirmishes with the Con¬ federates, particularly at Monett's Ferry and Cloutierville, the Union cavalry occupied Natchitoches on the 30th. The Union infantry advanced

5 to 25 miles a day, enduring first mud and then dust, along a single road through the pine woods until the head of the column reached Natchi- 59 toches on 1 April.

Dissension was in those Union ranks. The veteran cavalrymen were constantly finding fault with the mounted infantry. Smith's Westerners criticized the other Corps as "holiday soldiers, paper collar and white glove gents," incapable of fighting or foraging.^ The Easterners, in turn, referred to the "gorillas" as crude, loud-mouïhed chicken thieves.As Private Henry Whipple said, "They and the Western boys fight every time we meet. I think either side would rather shoot at 62 each other than the Johnnies."0

Taylor's Johnnies knew at whom they wanted to shoot, and it cer¬ tainly was not each other. But in the face of overwhelming forces,

Taylor had to choose his time and his battlefield very carefully. Fear¬ ful of a Union advance after the debacle at Henderson's Hill, Taylor formed line of battle pn 22 March with Mouton's division and sent his wagon train the 12 miles to Beasley's plantation, another forage depot at the intersection of the roads to Fort Jesup and Natchitoches. No

Fédérais showed, so the following day the army followed the wagons.

As the Confederate field commander, Taylor was becoming exceedingly anxious over the size of his army. Learning that the troops from Price's army had reached Shreveport but that Kirby Smith would not send them forward, Taylor became infuriated. Zachary Taylor had described his son 38 as being "a little hasty as to temper" and "rather wild."^ A friend said that Taylor had "a total irreverance for any man's opinion," and

Dick did not fail to live up to such characterizations. D Smith ex¬ plained that the troops had been held to replace their defective ammu¬ nition and to reorganize them into two divisions.66 But Taylor was furious. He wrote Smith: "Price's command could have been here on the 28th, and I could have fought a battle for the department today

[30th], To decline concentration when we have the means, and when the enemy is already in the vitals of the department, is a policy I am too obtuse to understand."^ This was only the opening salvo in a struggle between the two which was to last throughout the Red River campaign.

Taylor had neither a view of nor responsibility for the entire situation. Even with Price's 4,000 men, the odds were still greater than three to one in favor of Banks' blue army, and Steele was still moving southward towards Camden. Kirby Smith had to make a major deci¬ sion. He knew the only formula for Confederate success was to defeat the separate columns of Steele and Banks before their juncture. 'Napolean had cautioned against concentrating forces with separate lines of opera¬ tion near the enemy; but the Union forces, lacking an overall commander and detailed plan, had ignored Napolean's warning.68 Smith was aided in his plan by the terrain. Not only did the Red River limit the ability of the two forces to unite, but also the many lakes and bayous compounded the difficulty. Still, it was not an insurmountable problem--had the

Union commanders planned ahead. Smith had wanted to fight Banks first, but when he learned of the small size of Steele's column, he vacillated, even though Banks was nearer Shreveport. He urged Taylor to continue 39 his defensive policy and Price to "retard the enemy's advance" until a

course of action could be determined

To pursue any course Taylor needed more men. He dispatched mes¬

sengers to the vicinity of San Augustine, Texas, to meet the Confederate

cavalry from Magruder's command and direct them to Beasley's. Brigadier

General Elkanah Greer, chief of conscription and commander of reserves

in the Trans-Mississippi Department, ordered the W.P. Lane Rangers,

guarding prisoners at Camp Ford, Texas, to join Taylor's army. The

Rangers, named after a distinguished citizen of Marshall, numbered only

129, but every man was vital now.^® Governor Henry Watkins Allen di¬

rected the Louisiana militia to assemble, revoked all furloughs, and

ordered every available man into the army. To the enrolling officers

he gave very specific instructions: "If any man resists you with deadly weapons, you will cause him to be shot dead on the spot."71 The situa-

/ tion in Louisiana was becoming serious.

Taylor and his army stayed at Beasley's until the 29th when the

army was sent toward Pleasant Hill where a depot also had been estab¬

lished. The following day Taylor went to Natchitoches. Colonel Henry

McNeill's 5th Texas Cavalry, 250 men, joined him there on the 30th, and

the 7th Texas Cavalry, 350 men commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Philemon

Herbert, arrived on the 31st. These men were a welcome sight to Taylor,

but, unfortunately, 175 members of these regiments were unarmed. They

were ordered to fall back, toward Pleasant Hill. Taylor himself left

Natchitoches on the steamboat Frolic just ahead of the Union cavalry's

entrance into the town 72 40

Other cavalry units from Texas were nearing the Louisiana border.

Major's division moved 50 miles to Nacogdoches on the 30th and some of his units crossed into Louisiana on 1 April. Walter Lane's brigade crossed the Sabine River on the 2d. Xavier Debray's brigade, with the batteries of Captains William Moseley and M.V. McMahan, crossed the

31st, and the men of Augustus Buchel's brigade found Louisiana soil on the 1st. Bee reported that Woods and Likens would be up on the 3d. On the 31st, Colonel A.W. Terrell was ordered to march quickly from Rusk,

Texas, to Pleasant Hill to add his weight to the slim Confederate

70 ranks.

Slowly the depleted ranks of Taylor's army were being filled. But it was just too slow for the fiery general, and he knew upon whose shoulders blame for the delay rested. As he left Natchitoches, he sent another message to Kirby Smith:

Had I conceived for an instant that such astonishing delay would ensue before re-enforcements reached me I would have fought a battle even against the heavy odds. It would have been better to lose the State after a defeat than surrender it without a fight. The fairest and richest portion of the Confederacy is now a waste. Expecting every hour to receive the promised re-enforcements, I did not feel justified in hazarding a general engagement with my little army. I shall never cease to regret the error.^

On another continent after another war Ferdinand Foch would say: "To be disciplined.. .means that one frankly adopts the thoughts and views of the superior in command... Kirby Smith was a West Point gradu¬ ate and he, too, knew about discipline. He knew that perfect disci¬ pline was the heart, soul, and strength of an army, and Taylor now had committed two breaches. To ignore them could only lead to others. But

Taylor was the best Smith had. Taylor knew the business of war and in 41 this period of crisis Smith could not relieve him. So Smith decided to ignore the comments and tone of his subordinate's messages. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to argue with that decision.

On 31 March the transport James Battle, captained by James D.

Phillips, arrived at New Orleans and reported that Shreveport had been taken.^ 42

NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

lp.R. XXXIV, Part i, 478-80, 561; Part ii, 930.

2parks, pp. 365-66; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 196; Jefferson Davis Bragg, Louisiana in the Confederacy (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1941), p. 165; Irion Valentine, "The Battle of Mansfield, April 8, 1864," address given to the United Daughters of the Confederacy Convention held at Mansfield Battle Park, 1951. Jean Jacques Alexander Alfred Mouton was graduated from West Point on 18 June 1850. He resigned his commission and became an engineer until war broke out when he was commissioned colonel of the 18th Louisiana. See William Arceneaux, Acadian General; Alfred Mouton and the Civil War (Lafayette: University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1972), pp. 1-113 passim. Camille Armand Jules Marie de Polignac was a French Count who had served in the Crimean War but had come to America to join the Confederates. As he spoke little English, he was assigned to serve with Mouton who was fluent in English and French. See Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Confederacy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), pp. 167-70.

3O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 196; Parks, pp. 365-66.

4O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 196; Winters, p 326.

5O.R. XXXIV, Part ii, 481.

6Ibid.. 494.

7O.R. XXXII, Part ii, 224-25.

8O.R. XXXIV, Part ii, 515.

9Ibid.. 512, 576; CCW. pp. 338-39.

10 O.R. XXXIV, Part ii, 587.

11Ibid.. 616.

12Ibid.. 125-28.

^3West, Mr. Lincoln's Navy, p. 246.

14O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 573; Winters, p. 326.

l^Mather Cleveland, New Hampshire Fights the Civil War (New London, New Hampshire: Mather Cleveland, 1969), p. 87. 43

l^Ibid.. p. 88; James K. Ewer, The Third Massachusetts Cavalry in the War for the Union ([Maplewood, Massachusetts: Hie William G.J. Perry Press], 1903), p. 133; John M, Stanyan, A History of the Eighth Regiment of New Hampshire Volunteers (Concord: Ira C, Evans, printer, 1892), p. 374; Winters, p, 326; Forty-sixth Indiana Regimental Associ¬ ation, History of the Forty-sixth Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry (Logansport, Indiana: Wilson, Humphreys & Co,, 1888), p. 85; William DeLoss Love, Wisconsin in the War of the Rebellion: A History of All Regiments and Batteries the State has Sent to the Field (Chicago: Church and Goodman, 1866), pp. 752-53; T.B. Marshall, History of the Eighty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry (Cincinnati: The Eighty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry Association, 1912), p, 122; Thomas J. Williams, An Historical Sketch of the 56th Ohio Volunteer Infantry (Columbus, Ohio: The Lawrence Press, Co., n.d.), p. 65.

l^Edwin B. Lufkin, History of the Thirteenth Maine Regiment (Bridge- ton, Maine: H.A. Shorey & Son, 1898), p. 69; Henry A. Shorey, Hie Story of the Maine Fifteenth; Being a Brief Narrative of the More Im¬ portant Events in the His tory of the Fifteenth Maine Regiment (Bridgeton Maine: Press of the Bridgeton News, 1890), p. 72; Richard B. Irwin, History of the Nineteenth Army Corps (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1892), pp. 288-89; Solon F. Benson, "Hie Battle of Pleasant Hill, Louisiana," Annals of Iowa VII (October 1906): 483; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 167.

18O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 551, 573-74; Part ii, 1027, 1029; Roy 0. Hatton "Prince de Polignac and the American Civil War," (Master's thesis, North western State College, Natchitoches, Louisiana, 1963), p. 16.

^Cloyd Bryner, Bugle Echoes : The His tory of the Illinois 47 th Springfield, Illinois: Phillips Brothers, 1905), p. 98; Edmond Newsome, Experience in the War of the Great Rebellion (Carbondale, Illinois: E. Newsome, 1879), p, 65; John Scott, Story of the Thirty-Second Iowa Infan try Volunteers (Nevada, Iowa: By the author, 1896), pp. 127, 130; Winters, p. 327; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 168, 203, 304; J.P. Blessington, The Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division (New York: Lange, Little & Co. 1875; reprinted Austin: The Pemberton Press, 1968), p. 169.

20Q.R. XXXIV, Part i, 304, 578-79; Winters, p. 328; Thomas R. Bonner, "Sketches of the Campaign of 1864: Battle of Mansfield," The Land We Love V (August 1868): 460.

21 David D, Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1885), pp. 217-18.

22O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 306. 44 23Ibid., 599; Johnson, p. 92; Blessington, pp. 173-75; Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, 30 volumes and index (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894- 1922), Series I, Volume XXVI:163-64. Hereafter cited as O.R.N. All references are to Series I unless otherwise stated.

240.R. XXXIV, Part i, 494, 513, 606; Part ii, 1056; Rebecca W. Smith and Marion Mullins, eds., "The Diary of H.C. Medford, Confederate Soldier, 1864," Southwestern Historical Quarterly XXXIV (January 1931): 126; Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experi¬ ences of the Late War, edited by Charles P. Roland (Waltham, Massachu¬ setts: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1968), p. 153.

25O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 544-45, 561; CCW. pp. 28-29.

26irwin, p. 289.

27gell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1951), p. 105.

28Ibld.. p. 97.

2^Lufkin, p. 76.

30O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 561-62; Part ii, 1052; Johnson, p. 96; Winters, p. 329; Alwyn Barr, "William T. Mechling's Journal of the Red River Cam¬ paign, April 7 - May 10, 1864," Texana I (Fall 1963):375n.

3^0.R. XXXIV, Part i, 508, 561; John A. Bering and Thomas Montgomery, History of the Forty-Eighth Ohio Vet. Vol, Inf, (Hillsboro, Ohio: High¬ land News Office, 1880), p. 129; Orten S. Clark, The One Hundred and Sixteenth Regiment of New York State Volunteers (Buffalo: Printing House of Matthews & Warren, 1868), p. 150.

32O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 498.

33Ibid.. 306.

34Frank Moore, The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events 20 vols. (New York: D. Van Nostrand, Publisher, 1865), VIII:430.

35O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 35.

38O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 314-15; Harry McCorry Henderson, Texas in the Confederacy (San Antonio: The Naylor Company, 1955), p. 59; J.M. Williams, The Eagle Regiment. 8th Wis. Inf1ty Vols. (Belleville, Wis¬ consin: Recorder Print, 1890), p. 23. 45

37Q.R. XXXIV, Part i, 167-68, 178, 181, 248-49, 500; Part iii, 35; Lufkin, pp. 71-74; Irwin, p. 289; Harris H. Beecher, Record of the 114th Regiment, N.Y.S.V. (Norwich, N.Y.: J.F. Hubbard, Jr., 1866), pp. 292-98; Leo M. Kaiser, ed., "The Civil War Diary of Florison D. Pitts," Mid- America: An Historical Review XL (January 1958):56.

38O.R. XXXIV. Part i, 167; Part ii, 735, 768; Winters, p. 331; CCW, p. 7.

3^Bryner, p. 99.

40O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 18; West, Mr^ Lincoln's Navy, pp. 248-49.

41CCW. p. 271.

^2porter, pp. 227-29.

43Johnson, p. 103; Frank L. Church, Civil War Marine: A Diary of the Red River Expedition, 1864. edited by James P. Jones and Edward F. Keuchel (Washington: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1975), p. 23.

44CCW. pp. 262-63.

43CCW. pp. xlix, 81-82; Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, vol. 3: The War Years (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1939), pp. 15-16.

46CCW. p. 81. I

47OJL XXXIV, Part iii, 140-41, 514-15; CCW. pp. 71-73, 80-82; Harrington, p. 161.

48O.R. XXXIV, Part ii, 796-97, Part iii, 390; CCW. p. 336.

49 CCW, p. 277.

50Ibid.

51Q.R, XXXIV, Part i, 212; Harrington, p. 153; CCW. reports of findings, passim.

3^West, Mr. Lincoln1s Navy, p. 247; Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Inc., 1956), IV:373-74. Hereafter cited as B&L. 46

53O.R. XXXIV, Part ii, 611.

54Ibid., 610-11.

33Comte de Paris [Louis Philippe Albert d'Orleans], History of the Civil War in America. 4 vols. (Philadelphia: Porter & Coates, 1888), 4:510.

56O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 197, 508-509; H.W. Landers, "Wet Sand and Cotton--Banks' Red River Campaign," Louisiana Historical Quarterly XIX (January 1936):176.

57O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 197; Irwin, pp. 291-92; O.R.N. XXVI, 50. The fleet below the falls numbered about 60 vessels. See B&L, IV:366.

33Ewer, p. 140; Stanyan, p. 379; Bering, p. 128; Shorey, p.. 76; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 284, 307, 322, 331, 343, 358, 426-27; P.C. Headley, Massachusetts in the Rebellion (Boston: Walker, Fuller, and Company, 1866), pp. 344-45; Théo. T. Scribner, Indiana's Roll of Honor. 2 vols. (Indianapolis: A.D. Streight, 1866), 11:186.

-^Ewer, p. 141; Winters, p. 335; Lufkin, pp. 74-75; Williams, 56th Ohio Infantry, pp. 65-67.

^^Beecher, p. 114; J.T. Woods, Services of the Ninety-Sixth Ohio Volunteers (Toledo: Blade Printing and Paper Co., 1874), p. 78.

^Clark, pp. 128-29; Frank M. Flinn, Campaigning with Banks in Louisi¬ ana. '63 and '64. and with Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley in '64 and *65 (Lynn, Massachusetts: Press of Thomas P. Nichols, 1887), pp. 156-57; Wickham Hoffman, Camp. Court. and Siege (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1887), pp. 94-95.

^Henry P. Whipple, The Diary of a Private Soldier, quoted in Wiley, p. 323.

^3O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 561-62; Taylor, pp. 154-55; Alwyn Barr, Polig- nac's Texas Brigade (Houston: Texas Gulf Coast Historical Association, 1964), p. 38.

^4Holman Hamilton, Zachary Taylor : Soldier in the White House (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1951), p. 27.

^3Dabney H. Maury, "Sketch of General Richard Taylor," Southern Historical Society Papers VII (1879):343-45. 47

660.R. XXXIV, Part i, 513,

67Ibid., 514-15.

^^Napolean I, Napolean's Maxims of War, notes by General Bournod, translated by Lieut.-Gen. Sir G.C. D'Agilar (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1917), p. 11; B&L IV:370.

69 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 516, 521-22; Part ii, 1062-63, 1095; Sarah A. Dorsey, Recollections of Henry Watkins Allen (New York: M. Doolady, 1866), p. 271.

700.R. XXXIV. Part i, 561-62; W.W. Heartsill, Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days in the Confederate Army, edited by Bell Wiley (Jackson: Tennes¬ see: McCowart Mercer Press, 1954), pp. 2-3, 198-99; Theo. Noel, A Campaign from Santa Fe to the Mississippi. Being a History of the Old Sibley Brigade, edited by Martin Hardwick Hall and Edwin Adams Davis (Houston: Stagecoach Press, 1961), pp. 115-17.

7^Luther Edward Chandler, "The Career of Henry Watkins Allen" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1940), quoted in Vincent H. Cassidy and Amos E. Simpson, Henry Watkins Allen of Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), p. 123.

72O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 561-62; Taylor, pp. 154-55; Alonzo H. Plummer, Confederate Victory at Mansfield (Mansfield, Louisiana: Kate Beard Chapter No. 397, United Daughters of the Confederacy, 1969), p. 8.

73O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 722; Part ii, 1102; Smith and Mullins, "The Diary of H.C. Medford," p. 130.

74Q.R. XXXIV, Part i, 515.

7 ■’Ferdinand Foch, Precepts and Judgments. translated by Hilaire Belloc (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1919), p. 149.

76 "Shreveport in Our Possession," New York Tribune. 11 April 1864, p. 1. CHAPTER III: SEVEN DAYS IN APRIL

Those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him. Sun Tzu

On 31 March the Union army was not at Shreveport but 73 miles away with the Confederate army in between. On 1 April the Union cavalry pushed through Natchitoches to the vicinity of White's Store, 12 miles

to the west^ as the infantry continued to file into the town. During

that day and the next two, 27,457 blue-clad soldiers congregated in the

area. Banks arrived at Grand Ecore on board the steamer Black Hawk on

3 April.'*' A member of the 29th Maine reported that when the Union

general rode through the camps "his presence was indicated by cheers,

for wherever he went, in our hearing, the regiments greeted him with

an enthusiasm that must have cheered his heart."2

While resting at Natchitoches, two men from the 48th Ohio and one

from the 24th Iowa were captured while foraging nearby. One was killed

and reprisals swiftly followed. Ransom ordered everything burned on

the plantation where the man had been killed, "which orders were carried

out with exceeding cheerfulness."3 Throughout their march the Union men

had been annoyed by bushwhackers--"cowardly sneaks" they were called--

guerrillas for whom the invaders had nothing but scorn. Signs on houses

read "Neutrality - French protection here," but these attempts by the

local people to save their belongings were to no avail. These claims

meant nothing to Union men whose friends were being shot from unseen

quarters, and they showed their contempt "by acts of wholesale destruc¬

tion as they passed along. 49

After disembarking at Blair's Landing, Taylor proceeded overland to Pleasant Hill, arriving there on 1 April. Walker's division arrived that day, as did a portion of Bagby's brigade and Tom Green with his staff. Polignac's brigade halted six miles south of the town and formed a line of battle on the Natchitoches road, while the remainder of

Mouton's division joined the main body of Confederates.^

Learning from Green that Debray and 510 well-armed cavalrymen along with two batteries were near Many and heading for Pleasant Hill by way of Fort Jesup, Taylor sent a message to push forward rapidly but g to watch the right flank for Union cavalry.0 As the troopers left camp the morning of 2 April, a major on Taylor's staff approached and asked

Debray where his men were from. "They are Texians," was the reply.

"TexiansJ" said the major. "I never saw the like; I saw no stragglers, they march in a solid column, the officers saluted me, and I was not once requested to get out of my boots or from under my hat."^ These disciplined troops would be put to good use by Taylor.

At 2 p.m. that day the First, Third, and Fourth Brigades of Lee's division, with the 14th New York Cavalry in advance, found Debray's right flank at Crump's Corners and a sharp fight ensued. Bagby's men and a section of the Valverde battery joined this running fight, and

Taylor, about 6 p.m., pushed forward Walker's division to form a line of battle on the road between Pleasant Hill and Crump's Corners.

Rawles' battery of the Fifth United States Artillery was brought up and the action became general. The Confederates finally extricated themselves and reached Pleasant Hill, suffering a loss of 25 to 30 killed and wounded, and 29 captured. The Union cavalry reported 50 casualties of seven wounded men and 30 horses killed and wounded. Con¬ federate cavalry units west of Many were then ordered to rendezvous at

Logansport and from there march to Mansfield as the Sabinetown route was now blocked.**

Lee's cavalry pressed on toward Pleasant Hill, but soon retired to

Crump's Corners and White's Store where they camped the night of 3

April. The Third Massachusetts Cavalry was sent to guard a bridge near¬ by, where they remained until the 7th. Lee reported to Banks that information obtained from prisoners indicated that two brigades of

Mouton's division and four brigades of Walker's division, each brigade having four regiments with about 300 men each, were now facing the Union army. Banks estimated from all intelligence sources that 25,000 Confed¬ erates and 76 guns were arrayed against him. At no time during the campaign, however, \did Taylor's force ever amount to more than 13,200

9 men.

Dawn of 3 April 1864 found the trains of the Confederate army de¬ parting Pleasant Hill for Mansfield and the army preparing to receive a Union attack. Taylor sent troops to establish depots at Mansfield and Keatchie to provision his retreating army. Leaving Debray, Bagby,

Vincent, and the Valverde battery at Pleasant Hill, Taylor led the remainder of his army north at about 10 a.m. Having estimated the Union force at 25,000, a remarkably accurate figure, retreat seemed the prudent course to' take.^®

Again at Grand Ecore and Natchitoches the Federal infantry and fleet developed a case of the "slows." Time was spent in foraging, replenishing supply wagons, distributing rations, and holding a parade. 51

There was little sense of urgency even though the time remaining as specified by Grant for the return of A.J. Smith's forces was steadily slipping away. Not until 7 April was the fleet able to navigate above

Grand Ecore, and then it had to be reduced to six gunboats and 20 trans¬ ports. Fourteen of the transports were assigned to carry the 1,721 men of Kilby Smith's detachment of the Seventeenth Corps. These troops were not only to guard the fleet, but also were to disembark at Loggy Bayou and open the road from Springfield to Mansfield.L This plan had con¬ siderable merit since it placed a sizeable enemy force in the Confed¬ erate rear while the Union main body marched on Taylor's front. Taylor would be forced either to withdraw or face a fight on two fronts. Pros¬ pects for a Confederate victory in such a fight were less than bright.

Although Banks cannot be chastised for acts of nature, he could have left the fleet at Grand Ecore under the protection of Kilby Smith and marched rapidly toward Shreveport. This would mean a fight on only one front, but with an army much greater than that of the Confederates.

Every day he delayed allowed the further reinforcement of the Confederate army.

At Natchitoches Banks made another major mistake. The problem he faced was how to get to Shreveport—what route to follow? Rather than use his available time for reconnaissance or extensive questioning of the local populace, Banks relied upon information supplied by a river pilot, W.W. Withenbury, and his own map. The main stage road led west, away from the river, and passed through Pleasant Hill and Mansfield before curving back toward Shreveport. This narrow road ran through hilly terrain covered with dense pine forests and crossed few streams 52 capable of furnishing water for such a large army. Nor were there many farms in the area from which forage could be obtained for men or ani- mais. Banks and his chief-of-staff, Brigadier General Charles P.

Stone, asked Withenbury about crossing to the east bank, but the reply was that that route would take about three days longer. Withenbury

showed them the road from Campti to Fort Towson (probably the road to

Minden) which was by far the longest road and effectively prevented 14 co-operation between the army and navy. A third road ran along the

east bank of Red River from Campti, through Coushatta Chute, and followed

the river until recrossing to the west bank near Red Shoot Lake, Whether

Banks knew of this road cannot be determined. There was also another

road which ran along the west bank of the river, but crossed many streams.

This was the most advantageous route. No river-crossing operations were

required, the fleet and army would be in constant contact, the road was

good with wide fields for observation and deployment, and plenty of water,

corn and cattle were to be had.^ But none of this was known to Banks,

and Withenbury did not mention it. Only after Porter steamed up the

river was it learned and by then the army was in the heart of a Louisiana wilderness. Perhaps Banks believed he could make better progress in the

hill country than along the river bottom, assuming he knew of that fourth

road. Banks was so sure that Taylor would not fight that perhaps he saw

no necessity either for co-operating with the fleet or reconnoitering to 16 find a different road. A comparison of the maps which Banks and Kirby

Smith submitted with their official reports of the campaign shows that

routes found on the Confederate map, specifically the roads lying near

the river, are not drawn on the Union map. From the Union standpoint, 53 the discrepancy was most unfortunate. (See Maps III-l and III-2) Banks wrote of his optimism to John Hay, Lincoln's private secretary, who showed the letter to the President. The prophetic comment was, "I am sorry to see this tone of confidence; the next news we shall hear from there will be of a defeat.”^

From his headquarters at Shreveport, Kirby Smith watched the columns of Banks and Steele slowly plodding toward him. A decision now had to be made. Operating on interior lines, the Confederates were in a favor¬ able position to strike either opponent, but the Southern army had to be kept from suffering a defeat. Said Smith, "Defeat not only loses

the department, but releases the armies employed against us here for 18 operations beyond the Mississippi." To insure no such defeat occurred,

Smith even considered withdrawing his forces into Shreveport until a

relief force could be raised. Another possibility was to withdraw into

Texas and induce the Union army to follow. Neither of these alternatives, however, were viable. In the former case, the only conceivable outcome would be another Vicksburg, for there was simply no possibility of find¬

ing men for a relief force. The latter alternative would lead to aban¬

donment of Arkansas and Louisiana. Taylor believed that such a course would lead, in turn, to the abandonment of the Confederate army by men

from those states. Taylor and Smith believed the Trans-Mississippi army

still had a major role in Confederate strategy, but to withdraw further

west would diminish that role. From Texas the army simply could not

affect operations in the main theatre east of the Mississippi. These

two alternatives, therefore, were dropped. On 3 April Smith wrote Price

that he expected to concentrate against Steele first and that Price 54 MA.P III - 1

-

Map accompanying Kirby Smith's official report of campaign ‘ v ' '*■

Map accompanying Banks' official report of campaign 56

should insure the Union force facing him stayed east of the Red River

to prevent their marching on Jefferson and Marshall. On the 5th he 19 notified Taylor he would meet him at Mansfield to discuss the situation.

Sundown, April 4, 1864, found the Confederate army near Mansfield.

Walker's division passed through the town and camped four miles north on the road to Kingston and Shreveport. Mouton's men stopped one mile 20 further toward Kingston. Learning that Steele had slowed his march

even more, Smith sent the 4,400 infantrymen which he had held at Shreve¬ port to Keatchie, 20 miles from Mansfield. Taylor received word of

their arrival on the 6th, but ordered them to remain where they were as 21 "supplies were far from abundant in the vicinity of Mansfield." Texas 22 Confederates, crossing at Logansport, galloped toward Mansfield.

A force of 1,500 Union cavalry broke camp at 3 a.m. and crossed

the Red near Campti. An indecisive clash with Liddell followed, but 23 Confederate fears of an advance east of the river were heightened.

Confederate infantrymen rested in their camps on the 5th, 6th, and

7th, and held religious meetings. Revivals were occurring all over

northern Louisiana--revivals in which people were praying that the hand

of God would smite the invaders and send them reeling into the Gulf of

Mexico. Hie Confederate Congress designated 8 April as a day of fasting

and prayer during which soldiers and civilians were to pray for their

homeland. The war was not simply a fight over states' rights; it was 24 a holy crusade for survival.

More Confederate cavalry joined Taylor's army at Mansfield on the

5th and 6th. James P. Major reported with his brigade (730 men) as did

Hardeman and Waller with their regiments. Hamilton Bee arrived with 57

Augustus Buchel's regiment of 500 Texas Germans along with Alexander

Terrell's 360 men. Bee was ordered to return to Logansport to find the 25 regiments of Woods, Likens, and Gould.

Banks, on the 5th, placed Franklin in charge of the Union march and ordered him to advance the next day. He wanted the army to move rapidly "and in such order as to be able to throw as much as possible 26 of your force into battle at any time...." Finally the army was again in motion, but in motion inland toward Pleasant Hill. Lee's cavalry division led off—three brigades, three artillery batteries, and 320 to

350 wagons—and marched to Crump’s Corners. This immense train, in ad¬ vance of the main body of infantry, carried ten days' rations for men, three days' forage for the horses, ammunition, and camp equipage.

Forage was scarce in northwestern Louisiana and, if the Union army pushed into Texas, a large forage train would be essential. But Lee was worried that the placement of his trains would prove to be a great dis¬ advantage in the event of a battle, and he requested that Franklin allow him to place the wagons in the rear with those of the infantry. Franklin refused on grounds that "If £l] had taken the 250 which the cavalry had and put them in front of my infantry train, my infantry wagons would never have got into camp the day of the march. The consequence would have been that the cavalry would have had their wagons up, but at the 27 expense of the infantry."

This was a lame excuse indeed. With a little forethought, Franklin could have devised a plan which would allow both infantry and cavalry to be supplied without placing 250 wagons between the two bodies. Just as in today's army the supply trains are divided into combat trains and 58 field trains, so, too, could the Union leaders have divided their wagons. The infantrymen and cavalrymen could carry three or four days' rations in their haversacks and the cavalry could carry one day's for¬ age in their horses' nose bags.A few wagons could be loaded with

forage and placed either with the cavalry or at the head of the infan¬

try wagons. When these wagons were emptied, a shuttle-system could have been devised to get the forage to the horses. The same could have been done with the infantry wagons. That equipment needed for each night's camp could have been loaded on wagons and placed in a group in

column while the remaining wagons were placed farther to the rear. In

such a configuration, the Union column would have been better organized

for a meeting engagement with Confederate forces.

On a rainy 6 April Ransom's and Emory's men followed the cavalry

and marched 15 to 18 miles before stopping for the night. The road

being narrow and the underbrush thick, the wagons remained strung out

along the trail. Dickey's brigade was detailed to guard the infantry

wagons, and Colonel O.P. Gooding's cavalry brigade guarded the rear and 29 left flank of the march.

Again on the 7th Lee's cavalry and wagons led, followed by Ransom's

division and the reserve artillery, the ammunition train, Emory's divi¬

sion, the trains of the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Corps, Robinson's engi 30 neers, Dickey's men, and Gooding's brigade in the rear. Porter's

fleet, along with Kilby Smith's division, departed Grand Ecore for the

110 mile trip to Springfield Landing. Because of a lack of coal, it

was often necessary to land men to tear down rail fences for boiler fuel

Commander Thomas 0. Selfridge, of the ironclad Osage, remarked that 59

"If the rebels had been clever enough to burn rails instead of cotton, the naval participation in the expedition would have been greatly hin- 31 dered above Alexandria." A.J. Smith and his two divisions followed the main body of Union troops, catching them after seven or eight miles where they went into camp. Rain again turned the clay road to mud, making the march miserable for the infantry.^

Reveille for the Union forces sounded at 4 a.m. on the 7th and by

5:30 a.m. the lead units were stepping onto the road under cloudy, rainy skies.33 Men soon noticed a change in the countryside. The rich plains of south Louisiana gave way to clay and sand hills covered with towering pines darkening the trail beyond. Thick undergrowth made going difficult for the flank guards. The narrow road was in poor condition and often the column had to halt to repair bridges or widen the path. Traces of agriculture were rare and the few buildings they passed were nothing more than mud-plastered log huts. Through this wilderness the Union army marched "in cheerless isolation."^ The 20 miles to Pleasant Hill were covered without incident and the troops began arriving there about

1 p.m. There they found Dudley's cavalry brigade and the cavalry train.

The wagons soon began departing, but it took most of the afternoon for all to get away. Emory began arriving about 6 p.m., but his trains were so delayed by the rain that they did not close until the following 35 morning.

Tom Green’s cavalry had been harassing the Union advance for several days and had been driven back through Pleasant Hill. But at

Wilson's Farm, three miles beyond the town, resistance stiffened. Bagby, who had been impeding the Union column, sent a courier to Lane and Major 60 informing them that the enemy was advancing in force. Major quickly arrived, dismounted his force, about 2,500 men, and deployed them on the crest of a hill in the edge of the woods--the 2d Arizona Cavalry on the left, then the 3d Arizona Cavalry, the 1st Texas Partisan Cav¬ alry, and the 2d Texas Partisan Cavalry on the right. From the protec¬ tion of a fence, the Confederates poured a steady stream of bullets into the 87th Illinois and 1st Louisiana (Union) Cavalry, which had also dismounted. Guns from the howitzer battery of the Sixth Missouri

Cavalry and a section of Lt. Rawles' Battery G added their reports to the struggle. Confederate superiority was soon established and the

Union men were forced back. Colonel Thomas Lucas then threw his First

Brigade into the fray, dismounted them, and began to flank the Con¬ federate position. Captain Ormand Nims' 2d Massachusetts Battery arrived on the scene but could not go into action because of the dense woods.

Nims then put his battery into the line with Dudley's men in the rear.

Having expended most of their ammunition, the Confederates began with¬ drawing, but left three companies behind the brow of a hill. As the

Union cavalry, mounted now, crested the ridge, they received a volley, from 30 yards which emptied many saddles and allowed the Confederates 36 to retire in order.

Union losses at Dr. Wilson's farm were 14 killed, 39 wounded, and

9 missing. The wounded were returned to Pleasant Hill where several houses were converted into hospitals. Confederate losses were heavy—

150 killed and wounded, and 23 captured. Among the wounded was Captain

Stephen Webb, a company commander in Lane's Brigade, who, in truly ro¬ mantic fashion, was later to marry his nurse. At Brushy Bayou the 61

Confederates took the wounded into William Robertson's house, laid them 37 on the dining table, and surgeons began to operate.

Area of Confederate Deployment at Wilson's Farm

At Carroll's Mill on Ten Mile Bayou the Confederates halted in a strong position and opened on the Union advance with the four pieces of the Valverde Battery. Earlier in the day, Bee had received orders from

Green to move with Debray's, Buchel's, and Terrell's regiments to Chat¬ man's Bayou, 6 miles south of Mansfield. About 5 p.m. Bee joined Lane and Major at Ten Mile Bayou and prepared to receive the Federal advance.

Twice the blue-clad men tried to cross the stream and twice they were repulsed. Darkness finally ended the skirmishing. Horses remained saddled and both sides slept on their arms in the rain. A drunken

Yankee lieutenant, George Stone, stumbled into the Confederate lines

OO and was taken prisoner. 62

As he sat near the stream that night, Brigadier General Albert Lee, commander of the Union cavalry division, was worried. He judged that he was facing 5,000 enemy soldiers (actually it could not have been more than 3,000) with 3,300 Union troopers. Being eight miles from infantry support, with a large wagon train in between, he believed himself to be in a most disadvantageous position should the enemy attack. Twice during the fight at Wilson's Farm Lee had requested infantry support from Franklin. The 2d Brigade, Third Division, Thirteenth Corps had actually started from Pleasant Hill when Lee sent word that the Confed¬ erates were retreating. The Brigade then returned to camp. As he pon¬ dered, Lee again decided to request infantry support. He reasoned that the infantry could advance through the thickets easier than the cavalry, which had to be deployed dismounted. As soon as the enemy cavalry was found and began to retire, the men had to run back for their horses before they could pursue. The horses posed the additional problem of having to be led about while their riders advanced on foot.Franklin declined the request. Lee's instructions were "to attack the enemy... but not to bring on a general engagement,"^® and Franklin feared infan¬ try support would do just that by reducing the maneuverability of the advance. On the march the cavalry would either slow to the infantry rate-of-march or the infantry would march faster and negate its value by tiring quickly. When Colonel John S. Clark, an aide to Banks, joined

Lee to ascertain the situation, Lee then requested infantry support from him. Clark told Franklin of the new request; Franklin again refused, so Clark went to Banks. At 10 p.m. Franklin received a message from 63 4i Banks that a brigade was to be sent to Lee at daylight. Banks ex¬

plained:

I did it upon the idea that the advance guard should be composed of cavalry for celerity, artillery for force, and infantry for solidity; that General Lee could not safely inarch faster than the column, and therefore he might have -this infantry to support him, but not for a general battle; only that they might not be stopped by a slight force of the enemy. If the enemy was in full strength they were to halt, if only in small force it would be otherwise.^

Emerson's brigade of Landrum's division, Thirteenth Corps, was selected.^

Banks' army was conducting a movement to contact--an operation

designed to gain contact with an enemy force in order to destroy it. In

such an operation the purpose of the advance guard is to operate ahead

of the main body to insure an uninterrupted advance and to provide secu¬

rity and protection from surprise. The cavalry had a*simple route-recon¬

naissance mission to maintain contact with the enemy, determine the

situation (enemy strength, disposition, composition), and avoid a deci¬

sive engagement. On these points Franklin and Banks were in agreement.

But on the degree of security which the advance was to provide they

differed sharply. Franklin envisioned the advance acting as a screen

to provide warning and enable the main body to maneuver and deploy for

combat. Kilby Smith also agreed and stated later that the cavalry

should have been used for observation only. From Banks' statement above,

it must be inferred that he envisioned a covering mission. He wanted

a tactically self-contained force that could defeat an enemy force at

a considerable distance from the main body without becoming decisively

engaged. Operating eight miles in advance of the main body, support

could not reach them in less than one hour from initial contact. Even 64 at that, the infantry, running forward, would be fatigued and in poor condition to fight, Franklin feared that the attachment of infantry to the advance would cut down the cavalry's rapidity of movement, there¬ by subjecting the force to defeat in detail before help could arrive.^4

For his advance guard to be effective, Banks should have decided exactly what he expected from them and then disposed that force and the main body accordingly so they could be mutually supporting. As it was, the disposition of the forces was inconsistent with the mission he assigned his advance.

No conclusion as to whom to attack first was reached during the 6

April meeting between Taylor and Kirby Smith. To insure that his sub¬ ordinate did not act before the time was ripe to attack, Smith sent

Taylor a message from Shreveport on the 7th "not to fight, but to with¬ draw nearer Shreveport.Taylor, however, feared a further withdrawal.

Once past Mansfield three routes—one of which was near the river and the fleet—were open for Banks to take toward Shreveport. The Union army was marching in a defile and Taylor knew it was best for him to strike before the country opened up so that the full weight of the enemy could be disposed against his small force.

He began preparing for battle. Parsons' and Churchill's men at

Keatchie were ordered to march for Mansfield at dawn on the 8th. Mouton and Walker received instructions to cook one day’s rations and march at 4 a.m. for the Moss Plantation, three miles south of Mansfield, which

Taylor had selected as a suitable battlefield. Green's entire cavalry corps was to spend the night at Ten Mile Bayou (Carroll's Mill). Major's division was to march at dawn and take a position at the Moss Plantation 65 while Bee remained to harass and delay the Union advance. Chief Surgeon

P.B. McKelvey was ordered to prepare hospitals in Mansfield, while Major

A.H. Mason, chief commissary officer, and Major R.W. Sanders, chief

quartermaster, were to prepare supplies for the following day.^

As the men of the Union and Confederate armies lay that night in

the rain under whatever shelter they could improvise, they thought of many things—home, the girls they had left behind, good food, a com¬

fortable fire. Many tried not to think of the morrow. Those who did prayed for courage that they would not disgrace themselves before the

enemy and before their comrades and fervently hoped that when the battle was over, it would not be his broken lifeless body lying on the field. 66 MAP III - 3 67

NOTES FOR CHAPTER III

^•Q.R, XXXIV, Part i, 168-69, 445; Beecher, p. 306; Johnson, p. 112; Forty-sixth Indiana Regimental Association, p. 86; Williams, The Eagle Regiment, p, 23; Kaiser, "The Civil War Diary of Florison D, Pitts," p. 56.

^John M. Gould, History of the First - Tenth - Twenty-ninth Maine Regiment (Portland, Maine: Stephen Berry, 1871), pp. 410-11.

^Kaiser, "The Civil War Diary of Florison D. Pitts," p. 56; Marshall, History of the Eighty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry, pp. 124-25.

*W .H. Bentley, History of the 77th Illinois Volunteer Infantry. Sept. 2, 1862 - July 10, 1865 (Peoria: Edward Hines Printer, 1883), pp. 247- 48.

^Plummer, Confederate Victory at Mansfield, p. 8; Taylor, p. 155; Barr, Polignac's Texas Brigade, p. 38; Blessington, p. 179; Arceneaux, p. 127; Morning report of Company "F," 22d Texas Cavalry (dismounted), signed by W.J. Notley, unpublished.

6O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 518, 520-21; Taylor, p. 155.

^Xavier Blanchard Debray, A Sketch of the History of Debray's (26th) Regiment of Texas Cavalry (Austin: Eugene Von Boeckmann Book and Job Printer, 1884; reprint ed., Waco: Waco Village Press, 1956), pp. 14-16.

8O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 444-45, 518, 520-21; Taylor, p. 155; Stanyan, p. 383; Henderson, p. 109; Smith and Mullins, "The Diary of H.C. Medford," p. 209; Houston Daily Telegraph. 18 April 1864; Moore, VIII, 533. The guns of the Valverde Battery had been captured from the Fédérais at the battle of Val Verde, New Mexico, 21 February 1862. See Henderson, p. 146.

^O.R, XXXIV, Part, i, 198, 445, 447; Stanyan, p. 383; Ewer, p. 143; Taylor, pp. 161-62.

*QQ.R. XXXIV, Part i, 518; Debray, p. 16; Edwin C. Bearss, ed., A Louisiana Confederate: Diary of Felix Pierre Poche1. translated by Eugenie Watson Somdal (Natchitoches: Louisiana Studies Institute, Northwestern State University, 1972), p. 104; Diary of John Thomas Stark, Co. "H," 13th Texas Cavalry, Walker's Division, 25 September 1863- 13 October 1864, unpublished, p. 4. 68

^Williams, The Eagle Regiment. pp. 23-24; Ellas P. Pellet, History of the 114th Regiment New York State Volunteers (Norwich, New York: Telegraph & Chronicle Power Press Print, 1866), p. 191; Richard Hobson Williams, "General Banks' Red River Campaign," Louisiana Historical Quarterly XXXII (January 1949):115.

12O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 60; ÇÇW, p. 327; O.R.N. XXVI, 51; Winters, p. 337.

^Foote, III, 39; Plummer, Confederate Victory at Mansfield, p. 12.

14CCW, pp. 286-87.

15O.R.N. XXVI, 60.

16O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 179-80.

^John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History. 10 vols. (New York: The Century Co., 1890), VIII:29.

18O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 525-26.

19Taylor, p. 156; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 525-26; Part iii, 728.

2®Blessington, p. 180; Bearss, p. 104.

2^Taylor, p. 157; Johnson and Buel, IV, 370-71.

22Smith and Mullins, "The Diary of H.C. Medford," p. 37.

23 O.R, XXXIV, Part i, 445; Stanyan, p. 385; Plummer, Confederate Victory at Mansfield, pp. 10-11.

24 Ibid., p. 18; Barr, Polignac's Texas Brigade, p. 39; Morning report of Company "F," 22d Texas Cavalry; Bearss, pp. 104-105.

25 Johnson, p. 119; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 524, 563, 606.

26O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 46.

27O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 445, 458; CCW. pp. 32, 58; Irwin, p. 283.

28CCW. p. 55. 69

3^0.R. XXXIV, Part i, 264; Irwin, p. 296; Clark, p. 152; Lufkin, p. 77; Forty-sixth Indiana Regimental Association, p. 77. Legend has it that one of Taylor's officers, in talking with an old doctor at Grand Ecore, conceived a plan by which the Confederates could learn which route the Union army was taking. There was a boy living nearby whose father had taken his slaves to Mansfield where Captain John P. Young¬ blood, a maimed Confederate soldier, was looking after them. When the army left Grand Ecore, the doctor would send the boy to tell Youngblood to move the slaves to Texas. A plan was devised to preclude the boy from being taken as a spy. The doctor showed the officer several of the boy's nankeen (a cotton variety with dark brown or copper lint) shirts. "These are the boy's shirts," he said. "You will see that some are decorated with braid down the front, while others are plain—that is, without braid. Now, when I send the boy with the message to Captain Youngblood, I will see that he wears a shirt with braid on it if the Yankees are crossing to the north side of Red River, but if they are marching over the road to Mansfield, he will wear a shirt without braid, so by a glance at his shirt front you can tell which way the Yankee army is moving." The plan is alleged to have worked perfectly. See Plummer, Confederate Victory at Mansfield, pp. 50-51.

30O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 58.

3^Irwiri, p. 295; Thomas 0. Selfridge, Memoirs of Thomas 0. Selfridge. Jr.. Rear Admiral, U.S,N, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1924), p. 98.

3^0.R. XXXIV, Part i, 307; Scott, Story of the Thirty-Second Iowa, p. 135.

33O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 264; Kaiser, "The Civil War Diary of Florison D. Pitts," p. 56.

3^Flinn, pp. 98, 102; Woods, p. 53; Scott, Story of the Thirty-Second Iowa% pp. 135-36.

35O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 264; Part iii, 372.

3^Barr, Polignac's Texas Brigade, pp. 38-39; Debray, p. 16; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 462, 616-17; Moore, VIII, 560-61; Walter P. Lane, The Adventures and Recollections of General Walter P, Lane (Marshall, Texas: News Messenger Pub. Co., 1928), pp. 108-109; Caroline E. Whitcomb, History of the Second Massachusetts Battery (Nims' Battery) of Light Artillery 1861-1865 (Concord, New Hampshire: The Rumford Press, 1912), p. 65.

37O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 199; Lane, p. 109; Kaiser, "The Civil War Diary of Florison D. Pitts," p. 56; Benson, "The Battle of Pleasant Hill, Louisiana," pp. 483-84. 70

38O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 450, 606, 616-17; Barr, "William T. Mechling's Journal," pp. 365-66; Smith and Mullins, "The Diary of H.C. Medford," pp. 214-15.

39O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 285, 288; Part iii, 472; CCW. p. 59; Irwin, p. 98; Taylor, p. 162; Foote, III, 41.

40CCW. p. 58.

41CCW. p. 32, 194-95; O.R. XXXIV. Part iii, 372-7-3.

42ÇÇW, p. 11.

43O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 264; Kerby, p. 303.

44Hoffman, pp. 87-88; CCW. p. 211; U.S. Army Infantry School, Tactical Operations Handbook (Fort Benning, Georgia: U.S. Army Infantry School, 1970), pp. 10-1, 10-2.

43Clement A. Evans, gen. ed., Confederate Military History. 12 vols. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1962), vol. X, Part 1: Louisiana, by John Dimitry, p. 134; Johnson, p. 123.

46O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 563; Taylor, pp. 159, 161; Arceneaux, p. 129; Blessington, p. 181. CHAPTER IV: COLLISION AT THE CROSSROADS

Battle decides everything. Clausewitz

Part 1 - Preparation: 3 a.m. until 4 p.m.

Weigh the situation, then move. Sun Tzu

During the early darkness of 8 April the Union behemoth stirred, shook itself, and prepared for the coming dawn. At 3 a.m., after a hurried breakfast of coffee, hardtack, and salt pork, Colonel Frank

Emerson led the 1,400 men of the 19th Kentucky, 67th Indiana, 77th

Illinois, and 23d Wisconsin from their camp onto the road toward Car¬ roll's Mill. After a march of nine miles the Brigade joined Brigadier

General Albert Lee at sunrise and the 23d Wisconsin and 67th Indiana deployed to reinforce the dismounted cavalry. Green and Major had re¬ tired to Mansfield and Bee was left to delay the combined infantry-cav¬ alry force facing him. Forming his men in successive lines of battle,

Bee forced the Union men to deploy each time they reached a Confederate position. At each position Rawles' four-gun battery and Nims' 2d Massa¬ chusetts six-gun battery unlimbered and shelled the Confederates as the

Union infantry sought the rebel flanks. After advancing three miles, the 77th Illinois and 23d Wisconsin relieved their weary comrades.

Casualties were light, but Lieutenant Colonel Lysander Webb, commander of the 77th Illinois, was killed instantly by a shot below the right eye. For seven miles and seven hours Bee, with three regiments and the

Valverde Battery, masterfully held back the 4,700-man Federal advance, buying valuable time for Taylor to prepare his battlefield.* 72

At 6:30 a.m. Mouton's Rebels broke camp and marched toward the

Moss Plantation. Taylor assigned Mouton that portion of the Confeder¬ ate line to the left (north) of the stage road. Marching his men along an old road alongside the plantation, Mouton found an excellent position in the edge of the woods on a ridge facing Honeycutt Hill. Honeycutt sloped gently into a ravine and then rose again to the ridge where the

Confederates were posted. As the fields had been cleared for cultiva¬ tion, the Confederates had a clear field-of-fire for 1,000 yards. Cap¬ tain Thigpen's company of the Crescent Regiment and companies "A" and

"B" of the 28th Louisiana were deployed as skirmishers in front of

Colonel Henry Gray's brigade. Polignac's brigade formed on Gray's right and deployed skirmishers behind the logs and stumps on the edge of the

o field. By 10:30 a.m. Mouton's men were ready. "The line of Battle has just been formed, and we are ready and eager to meet the damned

O rascals," wrote one participant.

Trail and woods along which Mouton deployed 73

H.C. Medford, escorting the now-sober Lieutenant George Stone to the Provost Marshal in Mansfield, passed Walker's division moving south.

As the Texans marched through the town about 11 a.m., ladies showered them with flowers, prayed God's blessings on them, and beseeched them to throw back the hated Yankees. The day was cool and clear and it must have been a splendid scene--the sun gleaming on bayonets and rifles, the red battle-flags flapping in the gentle breeze, and the regimental bands stirring hearts with the strains of "Dixie." Three miles to the south, Waul's and Randal's brigades deployed to the left (south) of the old stage road on the same general ridge line with Mouton. Here the

Texans had the cover of woods and a rail fence separating the Moss Plan¬ tation from the Birdwell field. Scurry's men were posted in the ravine

600 yards to the front. By 2 p.m. they, too, were ready.^

Ridge along which Walker's men were deployed. Looking southeast. From this point the line at 4 p.m. extended about 400 yards northeast then east about one mile. It extended south about %-mile from here. Honeycutt Hill is in the far background. 74

Lanç's brigade, upon arrival, from Carroll's Mill, was posted, dis¬ mounted, on the extreme left of the Confederate line. Bagby's men were

on Lane's right and Vincent's 2d Louisiana Cavalry on Bagby's right.

As Vincent's men rode past Mouton's infantry, the foot soldiers called

on their comrades to look at the "Buttermilk Rangers," while the cavalry yelled back that infantrymen were only "Dough Boys" good for nothing more than making mud dough as they plodded through the sticky Louisiana

clay.5

Leaving the Pelican Battery, Major T.A. Faries commanding, and

Captain John A.A. West's Horse Battery in reserve, Taylor placed the

batteries of Captains Horace Halderman and James M. Daniels in position

to support Walker; the guns of Florian Cornay's battery (The St. Mary

Cannoneers) supported Mouton. During Bee's delaying action, Captain

M.V. McMahan's battery had replaced the four guns of Nettles' Valverde

Battery. Nettles' men returned to Mansfield and went into the line to

support Mouton, also. Captain John T. Mason Barnes' First Confederate

Regular Light Artillery was also held in reserve. Taylor and his 8,800

men were ready.0

Franklin intended only a short march of eight to ten miles for the

Union army on the 8th. The men of the Nineteenth Corps were tired after

not having reached Pleasant Hill until late the previous night. Emory

had urged Franklin to rest the animals as many had been in harness con¬

tinuously for three days and nights. At 5:45 a.m. the Thirteenth Corps

marched to Ten-Mile Bayou arriving about 10:30, and went into camp.

Soldiers of the Nineteenth Corps left Pleasant Hill at 7 a.m. and made

camp around noon, where fires were quickly built. The aroma of fresh 75 coffee soon filled the air. A.J. Smith's men moved in to Pleasant Hill to rest for the remainder of the day.?

At 10 a.m. Franklin received word from Lee, and Ransom from Landrum, that the infantry which was supporting the cavalry was "literally worn g out" and needed relief. At 11 a.m. the Second Brigade, 4th Division,

Thirteenth Corps, which had only just halted at Ten-Mile Bayou, started forward. Colonel Joseph W. Vance, brigade commander, was so sick he had to ride in an ambulance. All morning the Union infantry had been hearing the clatter of musketry and booming of cannon to the front. The thirteenth Corps commander, Thomas Ransom, decided to accompany the brigade to see for himself what was happening; After a 5%-mile ride,

Ransom joined Lee about 12:30, but the infantry was slowed by Lee's wagon train blocking the way. As Vance's brigade was filing up the road,

Banks -rode past Franklin's headquarters. "There will be no fighting," yelled the Nineteenth Corps commander. "I will go forward and see," q replied Banks.

Union records refer to the coming engagement as the Battle of Sa¬ bine Crossroads from an intersection on the Mansfield - Pleasant Hill road near the Moss Plantation. The road to the west ran southwesterly toward the Sabine River, while that to the east intersected the Blair's

Landing - Pleasant Hill road near Jordan's Ferry. This east-west road was used mainly for hauling cotton from points west to landings on Red

River for shipment to New Orleans. Confusion exists as to which of two intersections, about a mile apart, was the actual Sabine Crossroads.

One, used by Taylor to deploy his troops, was referred to by both Taylor and Banks as Sabine Crossroads. The second, near the present-day 76 intersection of Highways 175 and 522, was known locally as Sabine

Crossroads. Along this second road, the second phase of the upcoming battle was fought.'*'®

Buchel's and Terrell's regiments, having completed their delaying mission, fell into line on the extreme right of the Confederate posi¬

tion. Debray's regiment was placed in reserve on the Natchitoches road. McMahan's battery moved into position to support Major.^ Soon

thereafter the 8th New Hampshire Cavalry, Major Thomas Connally acting

commander, and the 3d Massachusetts Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Lorenzo

Sargent commanding, emerged from the dark woods onto a broad field.

The 8th New Hampshire had been in two columns on the right flank of the

cavalry advance, and Connally, believing himself "under orders to charge

the enemy as soon as [he] came in sight of them," ordered a gallop be¬

fore the entire column emerged from the forest; thus his force became

greatly spread. Reaching the opposite side of the field, the cavalry¬ men had dismounted to tear down the high fence when a terrific volley

from the 18th Louisiana was poured into them. In the return fire a

Minie ball passed through General Taylor's saddle cloth. The 3d Massa¬

chusetts found itself about to be flanked and quickly withdrew from its perilous position. Using their carbines, the 8th New Hampshire fought

off a Confederate advance and withdrew, leaving their dead and wounded 12 behind. Mouton dashed along the line with hat in hand, his French

blood at fever pitch, shouting "Louisiana has drawn the first blood

today, and the victory is ours."^ Colonel Henry Gray quickly ordered

Lieutenant Colonel I.W. Molton to deploy a skirmish line of one or two

additional companies. The Union cavalry pounded back to the Union lines, 77 and companies "D" and "M," 3d Massachusetts, along with a portion of the

8th New Hampshire, quickly deployed as skirmishers. Sargent and Con- nally reported to Lee that the Confederates were in strength to the

front.^

Meanwhile, Lee had reached the clearing on the southwest side of

Honeycutt Hill. Hie 19th Kentucky, supported by the remainder of Lan¬

drum's brigade, and with shells from Nims' and Rottaken's batteries

falling before them, advanced and occupied the hill. 1 Js

Upon arrival on the field the 130th Illinois took a position about

250 yards to the right of the main road with the 48th Ohio on their

right. The 83d Ohio, which, had been detailed to guard the brigade wagon

train, reached the front after a double-quick march of seven miles. As

they approached the field they passed the dead and wounded along the

road and they knew there was desperate fighting ahead. Only by breaking

formation and squeezing between the wagons and underbrush were the men

able to pass the train of Lee's division. Brown's 96th Ohio was guard¬

ing the ammunition train and the Chicago Mercantile Battery when Captain

Cyrus E. Dickey, Ransom's assistant adjutant general, ordered the regi¬ ment forward. After the Ohio men had advanced about four miles, Captain

Patrick H. White, chief of artillery of the Thirteenth Corps, sent a message for the regiment to halt and return to the train and battery to

carry out the original mission. Dickey returned, resolved the conflict,

and the 96th moved on. After piling their knapsacks near the woodline,

the men prepared for battle. Vance, his blood coursing with excitement,

dismounted from his ambulance and, with assistance, mounted his horse

and rode to the scene of action.^ 78

Dudley's 4th Cavalry Brigade deployed on the left with the 31st

Massachusetts on the extreme left, the 3d Massachusetts in the center, the 2d New Hampshire on the right, and the 2d Illinois one-half mile to the rear. The 23d Wisconsin Infantry was next in line. Two guns of the 6th Missouri Howitzer Battery, along with Nims' guns, wheeled into position near the cresi: of Honeycutt. Four of Nims' pieces faced the front while two were angled toward the right flank. Emerson's brigade

formed to the right of the batteries and Vance's brigade to Emerson's right. A section of Rawles' battery and a section of the 6th Missouri

Howitzers were in support on the right. Lucas' 1st Cavalry Brigade dismounted on the far Union right. Captain William Davis with companies

"D" and "K" of the 18th New York Cavalry, 5th Brigade, had been attached

to Ransom personally but had been left by him 1% miles south of the Moss

Plantation. Davis, having nothing to do, reported to Lucas who deployed

the men to the right of the 14th New York. The wagon train, escorted by Harai Robinson's 5th Cavalry Brigade, halted 1% miles to the rear.*?

Despite the added strength afforded the Union position by Honeycutt

Hill, there was a flaw in the dispositions. Rather than curving gently,

the Union line angled sharply. If the Confederates attacked, both wings would be exposed to fire from front and rear while the troops at the

apex would be exposed to a continuous enfilading fire.

Seeing the infantry build-up toward the Union right, Taylor rapidly

shifted units to strengthen his own left. Debray's men were thrown out

as skirmishers to cover the movement of Terrell's regiment across the

Confederate front to join Major's division. Randal also shifted from

the right to the left of the main road. Debray then filled the gap left 79 by Terrell's move. Scurry's men, who retired as the Fédérais moved up

Honeycutt, went into the line between Bee's cavalry and Waul's infan¬ try. With that change, the deployment of Taylor's 8,800 Confederates was completed. About this time Mouton, churning with impatience, rode up to Polignac and said, "Let us charge them right in the face and throw them into the valley

Between 1 p.m. and 3 p.m. Banks joined Lee, Emerson, Vance, and

Ransom to survey the situation. Lee reported there were 15,000 to

20,000 rebels in the woods beyond and advised that either he be rein¬ forced heavily or that he be allowed to withdraw the 5,700 Union troops on the field. Looking about Banks approved the dispositions, agreed with the estimate of Confederate strength, and sent word to Franklin to move forward with all available infantry. ^

A general calm, punctuated by several sharp, quick engagements, settled over the battlefield near mid-afternoon. Captain James Crosson of Bagby's Confederate brigade attacked and dislodged several skirm¬ ishers to his front. The Valverde Battery opened a duel with the guns on Honeycutt, but the exchange lasted only a few minutes. Captain J.E.

Sliger, Company "B," 28th Louisiana, found himself the target of a

Federal sharpshooter intent on eliminating a Confederate officer. Sli¬ ger found a comfortable stump and rifle-fire from his men soon forced the Union man to seek refuge behind a log. For the most part, however, both Rebs and Yanks lay on the ground under a warm sun and wondered whether they would see it set.

Taylor still had not received permission from Kirby Smith to fight

Banks. Hie day before, Major Wilbur F. Blackman had carried a dispatch 80

to Smith from Taylor stating: "I respectfully ask to know if it accords with the views of the lieutenant-general commanding that I should hazard a general engagement at this point, and request an immediate answer,

that I may receive it before daylight to-morrow morning.At 9:40 a.m. on the 8th Taylor wrote Smith: "I consider this as favorable a point to engage him [Banks] as at any other.Smith's reply arrived during the battle and was to the effect that Taylor should fall back

toward Shreveport, select a field of battle, and await reinforcements.

Smith said later; "I hoped to derive an element of morale from the arrival of Churchill's command and my own presence at the moment of

action.To Taylor this message must have seemed like an attempt by

Smith to reap a harvest of glory which had been made possible only by

Taylor's decisiveness and fortitude.

About 4 p.m. Taylor called to Polignac: "Little Frenchman, I am

going to fight Banks here, if he has a million of men."24

Part 2 - First Phase: 4 p.m. until 5 p.m.

Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack. Sun Tzu

At 4 p.m. Taylor ordered the divisions of Mouton and Major forward.

From the throats of gray-clad infantry and dismounted cavalry came that piercing Rebel yell now so familiar to the Union veterans of four years

of fighting. "Aim low boys and trust in God," yelled Lieutenant Colonel

Edward Waller of the 13th Texas Cavalry. Across an open field one-half mile in width they charged. Lane's men got within 20 yards of the fence 81 behind which Lucas' brigade was posted when a terrific volley sent them

25 reeling.

Mouton's division had advanced in two lines alongside the Texas cavalry, but Ransom had seen them coming and advanced his entire right wing to meet them. The Union men reached the protection of the rail

fence first, and a blast from the infantry of the 4th Division wreaked havoc in the Confederate front line, driving it back on the second.

Colonel Leopold Armant, commander of the Creole 18th Louisiana, went down when his horse was killed. At the same time a bullet struck him

in the arm, but he got to his feet and, waving his sword with his good arm, charged with his men until wounded in both thighs. Raising himself

as best he could, he cheered his men until a Union bullet found his 26 heart. Exposed to a withering fire, the men of the 18th Louisiana

found what shelter they could behind stumps or slight rises in the

ground and halted to return fire. In Captain Stevens' company of 18 men, seven lay dead and five wounded. Stevens himself had four wounds

and his orderly carried the marks of 16 bullets either on his body or his clothes.22

Seeing Lieutenant Colonel William Walker, 28th Louisiana commander,

go down with a mortal wound, the men of the regiment began to waiver.

Major Blackman, returning from his errand to Shreveport in time for the battle, seized the colors of the 28th Louisiana and dashed for the Union

line yelling for the men to follow. Follow they did as men from the

Pelican Rifles, DeSoto Blues, and Keatchie Warriors—local boys from

DeSoto Parish—raced for the intervening fence. Sliger had the personal Map IV - 1 82 83 satisfaction of finding his tormentor still behind his log and took him 28 prisoner.

Union position behind fence as seen from Mouton's position.

Colonel J.H. Beard's Crescent Regiment had suffered terribly in

the face of the Union volley, and the remaining men also had sought

refuge in the earth. Lieutenant A.H. Martin, brigade adjutant, seized

the colors and ordered the men forward, but fell dead almost immediately.

Sharpshooters from the 130th Illinois brought down five more color

bearers of that regiment as the men, once more on their feet, struggled

for the smoke-shrouded fence. Beard, Lieutenant Colonel F.H. Clack,

Major Mercer Canfield, and seven of the ten captains in the regiment

died in that charge--a total of 96 killed and wounded. In Beard's

pocket was found a copy of Hardee's Rifle and Infantry Tactics which

had served him so well as commander of the Shreveport Grays in Florida 84

and Virginia and as commander of the Consolidated Crescent Regiment in

Louisiana. The 28th Louisiana had to halt momentarily to allow the

18th Louisiana and Crescent Regiment, now commanded by Captain William

Claiborne, to catch up. Blackman, miraculously unscathed, again gal¬

loped along the brigade line rallying the men, and this time the entire

force rose and charged straight for the Federal line behind that 29 fence.

Polignac's Texans, who once referred to their commander as that

"damn frog-eating Frenchman" but now fondly called him General Pole-Cat,

advanced with Gray's brigade and hit the 77th Illinois and the left of

the 130th Illinois, the pivot of the Union position. Lieutenant Colonel

Sebron Nobles and Lieutenant Jose Garza, 17th Texas Consolidated Caval¬

ry, were killed immediately but the brigade staggered on in a din of

musketry and cannon fire. The 34th Texas led a charge into the right

flank of the 77th Illinois and that Union regiment disintegrated. Ad¬

vancing Confederates quickly bagged 143 prisoners. The Texans then

poured volley after volley into the flank of the regiments facing Gray's 30 brigade.

Resting their rifles on the fence and directing well-aimed fire at

Gray's and Major's troops, the 96th and 83d Ohio men were holding their

ground until their 40-round ammunition boxes were nearly empty. Adju¬

tant Mitchell of the 96th raced to the rear and, along with Quarter¬

master-Sergeant Kirk, returned to the front line with two boxes of

cartridges, which they quickly distributed. But the Confederate fire

was taking effect. Private Orin Walter, Company "B," was killed and

Privates Jacob Feaster and Henry Littick mortally wounded. Captain Sam 85

Coulter, Company "E," was mortally wounded, and Captain Emory Eastman,

Company "F," took a bullet in the right hand. Soon six men lay dead and 24 others wounded.To the right of the 96th Ohio, the 83d Ohio was in dire straits as a result of Lane's men having driven back the dismounted cavalry of Lucas' brigade. Despite severe losses Lane and

Bagby were able to turn on the flank of the 83d with devastating effect.

Looking north across fence from position of 130th Illinois to area across which Mouton's men charged.

Lieutenant Colonel Baldwin perceived the danger to his regiment and

rapidly began shifting his men to counter the threat. At that moment,

however, Lieutenant G.I. Davis, Ransom's aide-de-camp, brought word that

Baldwin was to move his men to the far left of the line to support the

23d Wisconsin. The 83d Ohio commander argued that he should hold the

right to prevent the entire line from being out-flanked, but, at Davis'

insistence that Ransom's order must be obeyed, he withdrew his regiment 86 under a withering cross fire from front and flank. 32

Shortly after Mouton's advance, Randal's brigade entered the fray, falling on the battered 77th Illinois and 67th Indiana. "By the right of companies to the front, forward march! By companies into line! Fix bayonets!" the orders rang out, and then Taylor sent Walker's Division,

Scurry's and Waul's brigades, crashing into the Union left. Swears, yells, dust, smoke, the roar of cannon, and the rattle of muskets filled the air. Battle flags went down only to be picked up again. Officers shouted commands and fell, but the gray tide rolled on. At the double- quick the Confederates advanced. Great gaps were torn in the Texans' line by Ormand Nims' fine battery. As the range closed gunners double- shotted the guns with canister and fired, but even in the face of such hell, on Walker's men charged. To the right and left of the battery the Union infantry was being forced back until Nims' guns were practi¬ cally alone. The Confederates killed most of the horses and three guns had to be abandoned, as well as 18 wounded and three dead. The remain¬ ing three guns retired to the foot of the hill where they replenished their ammunition and again went into battery. In the ensuing melee

Colonel Frank Emerson, 1st Brigade Commander, was wounded and captured.33

Bee, meanwhile, on the extreme Confederate right, was ordered to press the enemy's rear with Buchel and Debray. The progress of many of the men was slowed by a swamp near the ravine where Scurry had been posted originally and by thick underbrush. But part of the division, in conjunction with Scurry's men, slammed into Dudley's men and drove them back. So great was the struggle that Colonel Sargent earnestly 87 advised his 3d Massachusetts Cavalry to "Try to think that you are dead and buried and you will have no fear."34- But the Confederate onslaught was too much for the troops to bear. A wedge had been driven between the cavalry and the 23d Wisconsin, and Dudley's men could either retire or be surrounded. Texas men surged into the gap and Union resistance melted. The 8th New Hampshire and 3d Massachusetts were obliterated.

The 8th had casualties of 25 killed and wounded and 60 captured, while also losing 112 horses, "all its books, all its papers, muster rolls and blanks; all baggage, every blanket and all clothing; all cooking utensils and all rations.The Massachusetts regiment had 73 killed, wounded, and captured, and a loss of 157 horses. Dudley's brigade sustained 212 casualties, 17% of the effective strength, in the with¬ drawal.^

Looking southeast toward Honeycutt Hill at ground over which Randal charged. 88

Seeing the predicament on his left, Ransom ordered Klauss' First

Indiana Battery and Pinckney Cone's Chicago Mercantile Battery, which had just arrived on the field, posted near the road behind the crest of Honeycutt Hill. For a while the guns were able to stem the flood of gray engulfing the Union line, but they only delayed the inevitable.

Slowly the 67th Indiana and 23d Wisconsin were forced back. But then the Confederates seized Nims ' three abandoned guns and a section of

Battery "G," 5th U.S. Artillery, and turned them on the retreating

Fédérais. Other infantrymen surged around the flanks and a general re¬ treat resulted. The 67th Indiana left 24 killed and wounded and 21 prisoners in enemy hands; the 23d Wisconsin 21 killed and wounded and

43 prisoners.^

Looking northwest from crest of Honeycutt Hill across ground over which Walker charged. Con¬ federate positions were on ridge to left center. 89

As Baldwin's 83d Ohio reached the position designated by Ransom,

they found only blue bodies and swarms of gray soldiers. Since the batteries of Cone and Klauss were then coming under intense fire from

Walker's men, the Ohio regiment formed a line on the crest of Honeycutt

to protect the guns. Receiving a fresh supply of ammunition, Baldwin

turned his men to face the Union right as Major's dismounted cavalry

continued to press from that quarter.

With the withdrawal of the 83d Ohio, the right flank of the 96th

Ohio was left hanging in the air. The left of the Union "V"-shaped line

had been blown away, leaving the right subject to being encircled.

Ransom realized the situation was deteriorating rapidly, and the best

he could hope for was to withdraw and establish a new line. Captain

Dickey was sent to find Landrum and order the regiments to fall back.

Seeing Colonel Brown, Dickey delivered the message and moved on to

locate Lieutenant Colonel Cowan, commanding the 19th Kentucky.^9 The

Confederate tide had rolled around the flanks of the Ohio and Kentucky

men like a wave breaking around a boulder near the beach. Standing

firm, Brown hesitated to order a withdrawal. Looking to his right, men

could be seen marching, on the same side of the fence, toward his posi¬

tion, but Brown supposed them to be probably Lucas' men closing the gap

left by the departure of the 83d Ohio. Obeying his orders, however,

Brown ordered his men to retrieve their knapsacks and move to the rear.

A volley from the men on the same side of the fence revealed them to be

men dressed in butternut. Another of Ransom's staff officers breath¬

lessly reined in his horse and invited Brown to double-quick or be lost.

Exchanging volleys with the Louisiana and Texas men rushing towards 90 them, Brown's men reached the position of the 83d Ohio and Chicago and

Indiana batteries. Vance was shot down and Brown took command of the brigade

Looking east at positions of Union right wing.

While galloping to order the retreat of the 130th Illinois and

48th Ohio, Captain Dickey was knocked from his saddle by a Confederate marksman; thus, the order never reached those two regiments. With both flanks uncovered, the Confederates easily encircled the Union forces.

As the 19th Kentucky withdrew, they changed front to protect the exposed flank of the 48th Ohio. This movement was fatal for the Kentuckians, however, for Mouton's men grabbed them along with the Ohio boys. In

Cowan's force 20 officers (including Cowan himself) and 225 enlisted men were casualties, most taken prisoner. The 48th Ohio, too, lost the commander, Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Lindsey, and the second-ranking offi¬ cer, Major J.A. Bering. Only one officer, Captain G.W. Mosgrave, 91 escaped. With the commander, Major John B. Reid, shot through the lungs and most of the men out of ammunition, the 130th Illinois was forced to surrender, and 232 more Union men were marched off to Confed¬ erate prison camps.^

Looking north from crest of Honeycutt Hill toward fence and initial position of 77th Illinois and 130th Illinois.

Leading the charge on his sorrel, Teche, Mouton looked the perfect hero. Waving his men onward, the Confederate general was always in the

thick of the fight. As the Louisiana and Texas men pursued the retreat¬

ing Fédérais, Mouton stopped to receive the surrender of a group of

soldiers who had thrown down their weapons. Five, however, picked up

their guns, fired, and Mouton slipped from his saddle. The enraged witnesses of the act sprang at the Union soldiers and soon 35 blue-coats

lay dead around the Confederate general.^ 92

Polignac quickly took command of the division and Colonel James R.

Taylor of the 17th Texas Consolidated Cavalry (dismounted) took the brigade. Without a pause the Confederates swept on and roared into the

Union force huddled near the Mercantile Battery. The 28th Louisiana became slightly disorganized in the charge through the woods on the right flank until Lieutenant Kidd seized the colors and ran into the open field to serve as a rally point. The 28th quickly reorganized and rushed on.^ The hospital of the 96th Ohio, with Surgeon John H. Hess and Hospital Steward Green still at their posts, was overrun. Seeing the Confederates closing rapidly on their position the men of the Mer¬ cantile and Indiana batteries limbered up their guns and galloped to the rear. Lieutenant George Throop was shot from his horse as he tried to hurry the guns to the rear.^

As the 83d and 96th Ohio attempted to form a line, a Confederate volley from 50 yards destroyed all order in the two units and the Union retreat became a rout. Men threw away rifles, knapsacks, cartridge boxes, and anything which might hinder their flight. Colonel Brown was saved by Quartermaster-Sergeant Kirk who helped him to a horse and led him away, but 26 members of the 96th were rounded up as prisoners. The men of the 83d, coming under fire from Randal's, Scurry's, and Waul's brigades also, could no longer hold their position and they, too, broke for the rear, leaving 21 prisoners in Confederate hands. The 23d Wis¬ consin and 67th Indiana simply melted away in the face of the overwhelm¬ ing force sweeping down upon them.45 "It became a surging mass, strug¬ gling to get back, while the enemy were upon us and pushing by our flanks, and it seemed that every fellow was for himself, and flinging 93 away our guns and knapsacks in one confused mass, we pushed back...."4-6

Richard Taylor sat calmly smoking a cigar, one leg crossed on his saddle, and watched his men destroy the Fourth Division of the Thir¬ teenth Corps, smash the Union cavalry, and turn several Union cannon on their former owners. A messenger, dust-covered and his horse frothing, approached Taylor and gave him Smith's reply to his message of the night before. Taylor's comment, "Too late, sir, the battle is won!"47

Part 3 - Second Phase: 5 p.m. until 6 p.m.

Bringing up forces piecemeal...amounts to throwing drops of water into the sea. Ferdinand Foch

General Franklin had remained at Ten-Mile Bayou with the Third

Division, Thirteenth Corps, throughout the early afternoon. At 3:15 he received an order from Banks signed by George Drake, assistant ad¬ jutant general:

The commanding general desires me to say that the enemy are apparently prepared to make a strong stand at this point and that you had better make arrangements to bring up your infantry.... The general will send again when to move.^®

Less than ten minutes later Lieutenant Sargent, Banks' aide-de-camp, breathlessly reported that Banks wanted the infantry moved forward im¬ mediately. Cameron's division, accompanied by Franklin, marched at once, but left five companies of the 24th Iowa Infantry and five com¬ panies of the 29th Wisconsin Infantry to guard the trains of the Third and Fourth Divisions. Franklin sent word for Brigadier General William 94

Emory, just south of the bayou, to bring his 1st Brigade of the Nine¬

teenth Corps forward also.^

Franklin and Cameron's 1,200 men. arrived near the field of battle

at 4:15 and promptly deployed along the locally-designated Sabine Cross¬

roads. To the right of the road Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Flory placed his First Brigade consisting of the 46th Indiana and companies "B," "D,"

"E," "F," "G," and "H" of the 29th Wisconsin. To the left of the road

Colonel William Raynor's Second Brigade deployed on the edge of a wood

with a gently-sloping field three-quarters of a mile across to the front.

The men took advantage of what cover they could find behind logs, trees,

and fences. Hie 188 men of the 24th Iowa were held initially in re¬

serve on the road but were soon moved to the left of the 28th Iowa.^®

What was left of Landrum's division was soon pouring through Cam¬

eron's ranks with the Confederates hard on their heels. Colonel Harai

Robinson's cavalry fell on the oncoming victors and momentarily slowed

their rush, although Robinson himself was wounded. Thomas' 3d Massa¬

chusetts rallied on Cameron's left and the 31st Massachusetts counter¬

attacked, and lost half its men in the process. A volley from Walker's

Texans wounded Franklin, killed his horse, and brought down Captain

Augustus Chapman of his staff. The Union respite was fleeting, for

Lucas on the right was soon overwhelmed by Major's men and McMahan's

battery which had moved up. Lane and his flag-bearer, John Neff, were

wounded but Colonel George Baylor took command as the advance continued.

Dudley, on the left, experienced the same fate at the hand of Walker's

men as they drove the Union cavalrymen from the field.51 95

Map IV - 2 96

Polignac's division suffered considerably under the steady fire of

Flory's brigade as they attempted to cross the field. Hie 46th Indiana and 29th Wisconsin were pulling back slightly to change front so as to meet the cavalry threat to their flanks when Randal's brigade, charging down the road, hit the left of the 46th and the entire brigade suddenly was no more.The 24th Iowa, 28th Iowa, and 56th Ohio on the left of

the road were holding their own against the repeated charges of Scurry's

and Waul's men. Corporal James Halliday, Company "F," 56th Ohio, seeing

that Jack Williams, the regimental color sergeant was having a desper¬

ate time, rushed into the fray with a few men and saved the flag.

(Halliday would one day command a company in the 56th.)53 But superior numbers and fire-power were beginning to tell. Colonel John Connell,

commanding the 28th Iowa, had his left arm taken off and was captured.

Captain Wilbur Dimmitt, 24th Iowa, was mortally wounded. Privates

Samuel Colby, Charles Spence, and Gillen Crabtree of the 56th Ohio were wounded in rapid success ion. 54- Then the dam broke.

Suddenly there was a rush, a shout, the crashing of trees, the breaking down of rails, the rush and scamper of men. We find ourselves swallowed up, as it were in a hissing, seething, bubbling whirlpool of agitated men. We could not avoid the current; we could not stem it, and if we hoped to live in that mad company, we must ride with the rest of them. Our line of battle had given way. 55

Banks and his chief-of-staff, Brigadier General Charles P. Stone,

exhorted the men to rally. Seemingly possessing the only reason in a

sea of insanity, they rode among the mass of fugitives. But the Rebels were upon them. The wounded were forgotten and weapons discarded.

"This action should not be branded as cowardice, but as an ordinary case

of thoughtfulness. After going as far as one's strength would allow, 97

throwing away a gun, to prevent a soldier's capture, is not a blame¬ worthy act," asserted one participant—an assertion with which few pro¬

fessionals would agree.^6 Many fought from tree to tree, but many more

fled as sheer panic possessed them. Men seized riderless horses or cut

the traces from wagon tongues and rode frantically to the rear. And

then the entire mass churned into the cavalry wagon train parked in the

road near Antioch Church. It was almost a case of the irresistable

force meeting the immovable object. Into the woods on either side of

the road the tide flowed, bypassing the immovable object. But the three

guns that Nims had brought off the field and the guns of the Mercantile

Battery, the Indiana Battery, and the others had no place to go. They

had to be abandoned, along with caissons, baggage wagons, forges, and

mules. Seventeen more cannon were left there for the Confederates.

What cavalry remained in a semblance of organization tried to delay the

gray tidal wave sweeping the blue fugitives before it, but soon they,

too, joined the hysterical flight.^7 The Confederates took throngs of

prisoners—19 from the 56th Ohio, 86 from the 46th Indiana, 51 from the

31st Massachusetts, 5 from Nims' Battery, 12 from the 14th New York

Cavalry.A correspondent who witnessed both the rout at First Manas¬

sas and the flight of Banks' army remarked: "The retreat of the 4th

division was as much a rout as that of the first Federal army, with the

exception that fewer men were engaged."59

One hundred and fifty-six cavalry wagons, 11 ambulances, and num¬

erous privately-owned wagons stood in that narrow road with no place to

turn around—wagons which should never have been there.60 Standing or¬

ders to cavalry quartermaster officers were that "when firing was heard 98

in front to any considerable extent, to draw [the] train out on the side

of the road when possible to do so, in order to permit troops or artil¬

lery to pass either way."61 Lee knew the nature of the road—that in most places it was too narrow to move the wagons off the road--and that he had been facing determined resistance throughout the morning. Con¬

sequently he had sent a message to Franklin: "I am keeping my train

back, in order that I might see the thing settled before I bring them

up to the front.But then Franklin had passed Captain Francis Whit¬

tier, assistant quartermaster of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, and had or¬

dered him to keep his train closed up. Franklin later testified that

the wagons "straggled badly as they passed my camp" and that, by his

order, he meant they should be in a regular march formation. Whittier,

however, interpreted the order to mean that the wagons should be moved

forward and "close up" with the cavalry.63 Consequently the battle

found the trains immediately behind Lee, Landrum, and Cameron.

Whittier went to the front and deemed it best to turn his wagons

around and head them back toward Pleasant Hill. As he was doing this,

Lieutenant Colonel John Chandler, chief quartermaster of the Nineteenth

Corps, rode up and ordered the movement stopped, fearing unnecessary

confusion would result. Captain Holmes Hoge, cavalry division quarter¬

master, agreed with Chandler's position on the matter. When defeat

seemed imminent, Major William Howe, acting assistant adjutant general

of the cavalry division, ordered Whittier to turn the wagons and head

for the rear. As the terrified drivers scrambled to turn their rigs,

chaos resulted. Wagons overturned, wheels lodged in ruts and between

stumps, mules balked, and the first fugitives fell on the train. Panic 99 set in and an "every man for himself" situation resulted 64

Cameron's division was posted to the right of this picture. The Confederates charged across this field from the left.

In a letter to Secretary Stanton Banks accepted overall responsi¬ bility for the order-of-march, but he also stated:

It was supposed that the movement of a single column of 13,000 men, moving in advance on one road for a distance of less than 50 miles...might safely be entrusted to an officer of the reputation and exper¬ ience of Major General Franklin."5

In an earlier letter, and before the Committee on the Conduct of the War,

Banks attributed the disaster at Mansfield to the "fatally incautious advance of the large wagon train," disavowed all accountability for the order-of-march, and held Franklin directly responsible.66 in fairness

to Banks, no commander can be everywhere and do everything himself. He must rely on subordinates. Franklin had graduated first in the West

Point class of 1843 and commanded a corps in the Army of the Potomac. 100

Perhaps Banks put too much trust in him. But the commander is always responsible, and for Banks to attempt to shirk that responsibility indi¬ cates that he was still more the politician than the soldier. In his ride to the battle ground, Banks had passed the column and could have exercised his authority to alter the order-of-march or turn the wagons had he so desired. He chose not to do so.

A slight benefit accrued to the Union army by the very loss of the wagon train. When the Confederate infantry reached the jam, regimental order ceased to exist. Units became inextricably intermingled as they attempted to pass the bottleneck. Many hungry troops who had not seen such a fare in four years stopped to loot. "I fell back on a twenty-

five pound keg of pickled pigs' feet and went partners with one of my chums who had got a twenty-five-pound box of crackers," recalled one participant. "I always did like pickled pigs' feet and these were es¬ pecially spiced."67 General Major had recalled his men to remount in order to pursue the fleeing army and their progress was greatly impeded by the choked road. Many a Federal soldier undoubtedly owed his freedom

to those wagons. In addition to the artillery, the following Federal

losses were incurred:

one hundred and seventy-five army wagons, complete; 328 sets wheel harness, 584 sets lead harness, 920 mules, 81 horses, 11 ambulances and sets wheel harness. These teams when captured were variously loaded with commissary, quartermaster's, and medical supplies, with officers' and soldiers' baggage.69

A private of the 83d Ohio, writing of the defeat, attributed the disas¬

ter directly to Banks, for he had "endeavored to charge the enemy with a baggage train, but it didn't work...."^ 101

Part 4 - Third Phase: 6 p.m. until midnight

Next to victory, the act of pursuit is the most important in war, Clausewitz

About 3:45 p.m. Lieutenant John Williamson of Franklin's staff galloped up to General Emory with the message to move to the front with his division. Two days' rations were quickly distributed and canteens filled. The 153d New York was designated to remain and guard the wagon train, and between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. the three brigades of the 1st Div¬ ision, Nineteenth Corps, marched onto the dusty road. Battery "L," 1st

U.S. Artillery, remained behind also.71 An aide soon approached Emory and instructed him to hurry as the battle was in full progress. Almost immediately Ransom passed in an ambulance and warned of a stiff fight ahead. Breaking into a double-quick march with four companies of the

161st New York in the advance, the men of the Nineteenth Corps soon en— countered the swarms of fugitives rolling down from the north. Said

Emory: "A crowd of perfectly disorganized cavalry, wagons, ambulances, and animals came right down the road upon us, and all said the day was lost. In a short time we began to meet the infantry going to the rear in disorder." Only by fixing bayonets and using them were the men of Emory's division able to push through the demoralized mass.73 "To say that General Emory became desperatèly cross at this critical junc¬ ture is stating it very mildly. He was as savage as an infuriated bear, and his conversation was quite sulphurous if not profane."7^

About 6 p.m. the Union men reached the Chatman farm about three miles from the Moss Plantation and deployed on the crest of the hill 102 overlooking Chatman's Bayou. To rally the fugitives and encourage the newcomers, the band of the 116th New York struck up "Hail, Columbia" as the men filed to their positions. The sounds of blaring trumpets and booming drums floated over the field as the zouaves of Lieutenant Colo¬ nel William Kinsey's 161st New York formed a skirmish line at the base of the hill. Here and there a man would fall from a Confederate bullet as the brigades struggled to take up a new defensive line. General

William Dwight found a narrow farm road leading to the right of the main road and formed his 1st Brigade along it with a fence as protection.

On the extreme right of the Federal position was the 116th New York; to their left, the 389 men of the 114th New York; the 29th Maine was across the road with companies "B," "I," "G," and "K" to the right, and com¬ panies "E," "H," "C," and "F" to the left—about 534 men.75

Colonel Lewis Benedict marched his Third Brigade to the left of the Pleasant Hill road and deployed, from left to right, the 165th New

York, the 173d New York, and the 162d New York. Colonel Francis Fessen¬ den's 30th Maine served as brigade reserve. The Second Brigade, com¬ manded by James McMillan, was held in reserve—the 15th Maine and 160th

New York to the left of the road and the 47th Pennsylvania and 13th

Maine to the right.76

A steady stream of fleeing humanity had made the positioning of the Nineteenth Corps most difficult; but when the stream became a flood, the men in the new line were forced to step aside and open gaps for the mass to pass through to the rear.77 To the men of the retreating dis¬ organized mob, the sight of the pantaloon-clad zouaves and the flags of Emory's division was welcome indeed. Marshall M. Clothier, a member 103

Map IV - 3

X SABINE CROSS-ROADS. APRIL 8, 1864. ATTACK ON EMORY’S DIVISION. FROM ÛENERAL MAP. 104 of the routed 2d Illinois Cavalry, later wrote: "These men fired by volleys and the regular crash of these volleys, as they echoed through the pine forest, sounded to me the sweetest music I had ever heard."^8

About 400 men of the 23d Wisconsin, 46th Indiana, and 83d Ohio were rallied and formed in reserve to the left of the road but did not par¬ ticipate in the renewed struggle.^

Waiting in ambush along the bank of the bayou, Kinsey's men poured in a devastating fire which momentarily halted the onrushing men of

Walker's division. Gray quickly threw his men into the vines and tan¬ gles of the bayou bed on Kinsey's right and drove him from his position.

"It is said that when the zouaves came to the front and then fell back, a rebel was in pursuit of a retreating zouave, and another rebel drew his gun to shoot when the first rebel said, 'Don't shoot, I want to catch the thing alive. "'80

Chatman's Bayou along which the 161st New York deployed. 105

As Kinsey's skirmishers came running back to the Union line, they were formed to the right of the 116th New York in preparation for the expected Confederate assault. The 15th Maine and 160th New York moved forward to plug a gap which had gone undetected between the First and

Third Brigades, thereby possibly saving the Nineteenth Corps from a fate similar to that of the Thirteenth. The 30th Maine was also moved from its reserve position to a point where it could cover the extreme left of the line.

Green's cavalry, mounted now and in hot pursuit of the enemy, charged directly up the hill upon which the First Division of the Nine¬ teenth Corps was hidden. Suddenly the Union line was ablaze from end

to end. Lieutenant Willis, Company "F" of Debray's regiment was killed

immediately. One third of Captain J.L. Lane's company, same regiment, was brought down by the intense fire.8^ Green's men broke-off the charge, but the Texas infantry continued on to within 80 yards of the crest of the hill. From behind knapsacks, fence rails, stumps, and

trees the bullets rained down on the advancing force. Colonel Overton

Young, commanding the 8th (officially the 12th) Texas Infantry, seized his battle flag and urged the men on. Down the line Colonel William

King, 18th Texas, beseeched his men to take the hill, but in the face

of such a devastating fire the tide ebbed and slowly flowed back down

the hill.83

Polignac's brigade found the right flank of Dwight's brigade and began a furious assault to turn it. Several companies of the 116th New

York and the 161st New York swung back in an attempt to repel the Con¬

federates, but superior numbers began to tell. Lieutenant Colonel Henry 106

Morse of the 114th New York fell with a severe arm wound. Dwight him¬

self was entering the line to rally his forces when McMillan came up with the 13th Maine and 47th Pennsylvania and drove the attackers back.

Colonel James Taylor was killed and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stone became the third commander of Polignac's brigade that day.^4

Walker, meanwhile, had reformed his ranks and launched a massive attack against Benedict on the left. Corporals John Greeley and Calvin

Meader, 29th Maine, were killed and Corporal Charles Sloman went down with a ball in the stomach. Privates Alonzo Hill and Joseph Murray were hit in the shoulder and Frederick Tiffany lost a finger to a Rebel ball.

The regimental dog, Major, took a ball in the head and was killed. Dark¬ ness was beginning to descend upon the field when the 165th New York was

driven back on the 30th Maine. The New Englanders rallied their com¬

rades and soon reformed the line. From their positions the 15th Maine

and 160th New York were able to pour a cross fire into the flank of the

attackers. Again and again the Texas men charged, but each time they 85 were driven back.

Finally, mercifully, the sun disappeared over the horizon and the

attacks ceased. Sounds, to many more terrible than the roar of cannon,

filled the gloom—the calls of the wounded for water, men crying for

wives and mothers, prayers to be spared; others, pain taking its fearful hold, prayed that death would soon come. Wounded men, blinded by pain,

cursed the mothers who bore them and the God who created them. In the

darkness whispered shouts of "Company C, is that you?," "13th Maine,

over here," and "22d Texas, where are you?" added to the confusion as

men tried to find the security of their friends and units. In the 107 darkness, Captain Jordan with his company ("C") and 30 men of company

"E," 29th Maine, crawled near the Confederate lines, whispering "come this way" to the pickets. Soon 70 to 80 Rebels found themselves pri¬ soners of Jordan's band.®®

At 3:30 that afternoon Brigadier General Thomas Churchill, who had received orders from Taylor to move at first light, arrived from Keatch- ie with the divisions of Brigadier Generals James Tappan and Mosby

Parsons. Immediately they were positioned on the Gravelly Point road leading from Mansfield to forestall a possible Union flank attack. Whe¬ ther these troops would have made a difference in the outcome of the battle is questionable. The initial battlefield was restricted with thick woods on the flanks. Few additional men could have been crowded into the open area, and, as the Confederates were converging on a cen¬ tral focal point, more troops probably would have added more confusion.

At Chatman's Bayou they could have been used to relieve the disorganized men of Walker's and Polignac's divisions, but Churchill's men had al¬ ready marched 20 miles that day and would have had to go about six more before engaging Emory's division. It is likely that their fighting edge would have been so dulled from weariness that the full effectiveness of the 4,400 additional troops would not have been realized. Colonel

William Parsons' Texas cavalry brigade, which had reached Shreveport on 4 April, was held in reserve by Taylor at Keatchie until the night

OO of the 8th when they, too, were ordered to the front.

To prevent either Kilby Smith from reinforcing Banks or a march by

Banks directly toward Red River, Taylor ordered a cavalry force to guard

Jordan's Ferry on Bayou Pierre between Pleasant Hill and Blair's Landing. 108

Other cavalry was to advise Taylor of what force he still faced, their strength, and their disposition. Unfortunately this order was misunder¬ stood and the cavalry did not set out until the morning of the 9th and did not return until late that night.89

Taylor formed his men on Chatman's Bayou, so close to the Union lines that the roll calls could be heard, and took stock of the day.

The captured wagons, cannon, and hordes of prisoners, many of whom al¬ ready were on their way to prison at Camp Ford, Texas, told him that

Banks' army had been hurt badly and was probably demoralized. He knew that he had to continue the attack in the morning for the foe was still numerically superior. To kick the enemy while they were down was the only way to counter the disadvantage. Still, the resistance at the

Chatman farm had been fierce, and the Confederates had also been badly hurt. Walker's division had ten percent of its strength--600 men—out of action. In Gray's brigade, the 18th Louisiana had 19 killed and 74 wounded. Polignac's brigade suffered heavily. The 15th Texas had two killed and 14 wounded; the 17th Texas, 23 killed and 45 wounded; 22d

Texas, four killed and 30 wounded; 31st Texas, three killed and 26 wound¬ ed, and the 34th Texas had seven killed and 58 wounded. In all, Mouton's

2,200-man division suffered 762 casualties. Nor had the cavalry gone unscathed, for Company "H," 13th Texas Cavalry, alone took 59 casual- ties. The day before the battle local resident Stephen Lord, Company

"G," Crescent Regiment, wrote his wife and expressed his concern for the family. With both Union and Confederate cavalrymen in the vicinity, he feared they might steal her meat and corn, so he advised burying it un¬ til the roving troopers had departed. After the battle his wife claimed 109 his body and buried it in the nearby Grove Hill Cemetery. 9* Mouton,

Beard, Armant, Nobles, Clack, Canfield, Walker, and Captains Sheppard and Chalmers were dead. Raines (8th Texas Infantry) and Sayers (Cre¬

scent Regiment) were wounded. Forty-nine company officers in Polignac's

qo division were dead or wounded.

Back in Mansfield the wounded were rapidly filling the First Bap¬

tist Church on Franklin Street, the Methodist Church, the Mansfield

Female College, the Campbellite Church, storehouses, and residences.

Union and Confederate soldiers lay side by side. Miss Sidney Harding wrote of her visit to one of the hospitals:

Oh what a dreadful sight. Our poor men just lying on the floor in cotton. And such an odor.... There are more than a thousand wounded... every private house full. Sent five pillows to the hospital.93

There was no sanitation, no ice, and little medicine. Two nights later

at the Baptist church, a delirious soldier knocked a candle over and

the place was instantly engulfed in flames. Captain J.H. Garrett, a

paroled prisoner from Vicksburg, and 13-year-old John Hewitt helped

evacuate the wounded, but many were burned and a few died. Among those

saved were D.S. Combs of the 17th Texas and Major John Reid of the 130th

Illinois.94

Taylor's Confederates lay on their arms and listened to the rum¬

bling wagons, creaking saddles, and marching feet. The night was cold

and damp; many of the Union men had lost their blankets during the rout,

but no fires were permitted. The Confederates held Chatman's Bayou and

the nearest water for the Federal's was 3% miles away at Ten-Mile Bayou.

Most of the cavalry horses had not had water since 9 a.m. The men were 110

overcome by a flood of fatigue which sapped them of practically all re¬ maining strength. Battle drains men as nothing else. The excitement,

the fear, the activity, the horror all take their toll on mortals. But

rations to rebuild strength were inaccessible and rest to relieve the weariness was not to be had, for the army was retreating. Banks, Frank¬

lin, Lee, Stone, Dwight, and others had caucused about 200 yards to the

rear of the Union front line to decide the next move. That the feisty

Taylor would attack in the morning was certain. Whether A.J. Smith,

bivouacked at Pleasant Hill, could reach the army through the masses

still flying to the rear was uncertain. Even if he arrived before the

battle was renewed his men would be in no condition to fight. The

Sixteenth Corps had marched 20 miles on the 8th, and an additional 14

miles that night would destroy their combat effectiveness. What cavalry

could be found was useless; the Thirteenth Corps existed in name only.

At least at Pleasant Hill a new line could be formed on Smith's Western¬

ers. The day's battle had been poorly managed. The trains had inter¬

fered with troop movements and the forces had been committed piecemeal

a division at a time. Tomorrow the infantry would be concentrated and

those mistakes would not be repeated.^

At 10:30 p.m. the Nineteenth Corps started for Pleasant Hill with

the First Brigade being detailed as rear guard. The 29th Maine brought

up the rear.^ Not all the men who marched that road that morning

marched it that night. The army had been severely hurt—115 dead, 648

wounded, 1,423 missing. The 130th Illinois, which began the day with

315 men, could muster only 58 men at sundown. Only 122 of the 251 men

of the 56th Ohio present at the close of day had weapons. The Mercan- Ill tile Battery and 2d Massachusetts Battery, suffering the loss of all their guns and 28 and 20 casualties respectively, lost all effective- ness. 97

At 11 p.m. a staff officer reported to A.J. Smith the disaster at

Mansfield, Within the hour the first bits of debris from the battle blew down upon Pleasant Hill. The men of the Sixteenth Corps were called from their beds of leaves among the gravestones of the Pleasant

Hill Cemetery and formed into line to halt the fugitives and prepare for following Rebels.

At midnight the Confederate "day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer," a day in which campaigns were to be interrupted, ended.^ 112

NOTES --CHAPTER IV

1ÇÇW, pp. 36-37; Bentley, pp. 249-50; Scribner, 11:186; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 295-97, 606; Kerby, p. 303; Whitcomb, pp. 64-65;. Moore, VIII: 561; Barr, Texana I, 366-67; Reuben B. Scott, The History of the 67th Regiment Indiana Infantry Volunteers (Bedford, Indiana: Herald Book and Job Printer, 1892), pp. 70-71.

^Bearss, p. 105; Kerby, p. 304; Woods, p. 55; J.E. Sliger, "How General Taylor Fought the Battle of Mansfield, La.," Confederate Veteran 31 (December 1923):457-58; John E. Hewitt, Battle of Mansfield. Mans¬ field. Louisiana. Fought April Eighth. 1864 (Mansfield! [n.p.], 1925; reprint ed., Mansfield: Kate Beard Chapter No. 397 Daughters of the Confederacy, 1949), 12; Coushatta Citizen. 27 February 1964; Official Report of Colonel Henry Gray of the Engagement of the 9th and 10th tsic] April 1864. the Battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, p. 1. (Here¬ after cited as Report of Colonel Henry Gray.)

^Arthur W. Hyatt Papers and Diaries, 1861-1865, quoted in Winters. p. 340.

4 Woods, p. 55; Blessington, pp. 182-85; Henderson, pp. 59-60; Smith and Mullins, 215; Bonner, 462.

5Q,R, XXXIV, Part i, 617; Noel, A Campaign From Santa Fe to the Mis¬ sissippi. p. ,117; Frank L. Richardson, "War As I Saw It," The Louisiana Historical Quarterly VI (April 1923): 223-54.

8O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 563-64; Barr, Texana I:376n; Napier Bartlett, Military Record of Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), Part 111:57-58; Richard P. Weinert, "The Confederate Regulars in Louisiana," Louisiana Studies VI (Spring 1967):69; Taylor, 159-60.

7O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 72, 472-73; ÇÇW, p. 215; Lufkin, p. 77; Beecher, p. 310; Forty-sixth Indiana Regimental Association, p. 87; Alonzo H. Plummer, Battle of Mansfield or Sabine Cross Roads ([n.p., n.d. ] ), p. 2.

8O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 257; Shorey, p. 81.

9Q.R. XXXIV, Part i, 265-67; CCW. p. 10; Woods, p. 54; Bering, p. 131.

^Plummer, Confederate Victory at Mansfield, pp. 19, 26; Hewitt, p. 11. 113

t n0.R. XXXIV, Part i, 563; John Gray Thorp, "The Battle of Mansfield," (unpublished manuscript), pp. 6-7.

12 Stanyan, pp. 400-01, 405-06; Taylor, p. 160; Ewer, p. 146;, Bearss, pp. 105-08; Houston Daily Telegraph. 13 April 1864; Report of Colonel Henry Gray, p. 1.

13Bartlett, Part 111:62.

^Tbid.. 61; Report of Colonel Henry Gray, p. 1; Ewer, pp. 146-47; Bearss, pp. 105-108; Stanyan, pp. 400-401.

*-3CCW. p. 60; Irwin, pp* 301-302.

16O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 298-300; CCW. p. 37; Woods, p. 56.

17Q.R. XXXIV, Part i, 451-52, 457, 462, 470-71; Headley, p. 345.

33O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 564; Taylor, pp. 159-60; Dorsey, p. 263; Bless- ington, p. 186.

19Q.R. XXXIV, Part i,-183, 199-200, 266, 457; O.R. XXXIV, Part ii, 192; CCW, pp. 60, 389.

20O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 266; ÇÇW, p. 61; Hewitt, p. 10; Thorp, p. 9; Sliger, Confederate Veteran 31:458; Noel, A Campaign from Santa Fe to the Mississippi, pp. 117-18.

23-O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 526; Sliger, Confederate Veteran 31:457.

22O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 526.

23Ibid.. 528, 485; William K. Boyd, ed., Military Reminiscences of Gen. Wm. R. Boggs. C.S.A. (Durham: The Seeman Printery, 1913), pp. 75-76.

2^Dorsey, p. 261.

^O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 564; Lane, p. 110; Stark, pp. 5-8.

26 Dorsey, p. 262; CCW. pp. 37-38.

22lbid.; Bearss, pp. 105-108; Bartlett, Part III:6. 114

23Ibid.. 61-62; Sliger, Confederate Veteran 31:458; Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana (Nashville: The Southern Publishing Company, 1890), p. 242.

^Report of Colonel Henrv Gray, p. 1; Bartlett, Part III: 40, 61-62; Hewitt, p. 16; Mansfield Battle Park Museum.

3®Bentley, p. 254; D.S. Combs, "Texas Boys in the War," Confederate Veteran 35:265; Barr, Polignac's Texas Brigade, pp. 39-40,

3^Woods, pp. 60, 174, 195, 203, 219; Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen. Her Generals, and Soldiers, vol 2: The History of Her Regiments and Other Military Organizations (Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach & Baldwin, 1868)^ p. 533.

32Ibid.. 482; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 267, 301, 617; Lane, p. 110.

33O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 292, 462, 564; Blessington, pp. 187-189; Whit- comb, pp, 67-69,

340.R. XXXIV, Part i, 564; Ewer, p. 156.

33Stanyan, p. 426.

36Q.R. XXXIV, Part i, 452; Ewer, pp. 147, 151; Johnson, p. 140n; Massachusetts Office of the Adjutant General, Massachusetts Soldiers, Sailors. and Marines in the Civil War, 8 vols. (Norwood, Massachusetts: Norwood Press, 1932), VI:330.

37O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 266, 298; Irwin, p. 304; Love, pp. 752-53.

38 Reid, p. 482.

39 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 266-67, 292.

40Ibid.. 302-303; Woods, pp. 61-63.

^Victor Hicken, Illinois in the Civil War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), pp. 329T30; Bering, pp. 131-34, 277-78; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 267, 297. Random, in his report, accused Lieutenant Colonel Lindsey of cowardice: "I regret to find it my duty to record the disgraceful conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsey, of the Forty- eighth Ohio Infantry, whom I saw at some distance in the rear of his regiment lying behind a fallen tree, while his veteran regiment was in the thickest of the fight under the lamented Major Bering." 115

^Arceneaux, p. 27; Dorsey, p. 262; B.G. Goodrich, "Battle of Mans¬ field, La.," Confederate Veteran 8 (March 1900): 103;. J.M. Fox, "Con¬ cerning the Battle of Mansfield, La.," Confederate Veteran 8 (July 1900):325; "The Battle of Mansfield," The Southern Bivouac (May 1885), p. 413; Sliger, Confederate Veteran 31:458. Sliger tells a slightly different version of the story, but with the same essential fact that Mouton was shot by a soldier who had surrendered.

^Report of Colonel Henry Gray, pp. 1-2; Bartlett, Part 111:62.

^Woods, pp. 61-63; Kaiser, p. 57.

45O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 297-98, 301-303; Woods, p. 64; Reid, pp. 482, 533; Marshall, pp. 190-227 passim.

^Scott, The History of the 67th Regiment Indiana Infantry Volun¬ teers. pp. 71-72.

^Bartlett, Part 111:13; Clement A. Evans, gen. ed., Confederate Military History. 12 vols. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1962), vol. 10, part 1: Louisiana, by John Dimitry, p. 138.

48O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 257; Part iii, 473.

490.R. XXXIV, Part i, 273; Part iii, 473.

50O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 257, 273, 287; Love, pp. 753, 755, 1106; Forty- sixth Indiana Regimental Association, pp. 88-89; A.A, Stuart, Iowa . Colonels and Regiments; Being a History of Iowa Regiments in the War of the Rebellion (Des Moines: Mills & Company, 1865), p. 441.

^Lane, pp. 110, 118; Irwin, pp. 304-305; Johnson, p. 137; Benson, p. 486; Plummer, Confederate Victory at Mansfield, p. 24; Horace Greeley, The American Conflict: A History of The Great Rebellion in the United States of America. 1860-'65, 2 vols. (Hartford: O.D. Case & Company, 1867), pp. 535-40; O.R. XXXIV. Part i, 617.

52ibid., 273, 282-83.

■^Williams, An Historical Sketch of the 56th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, p. 69.

^4Ibid., p. 69; Stuart, p. 441; Lurton Dunham Ingersoll, Iowa and the Rebellion (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1866), p. 509.

-^Philadelphia Press, [n.d.] quoted in Hewitt, pp. 15-16. 116

56ibid.; Greeley, p. 540; Marshall, p. 136.

57O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 286, 462; CCW. p. 62; Whitcomb, pp. 68-69; Forty-sixth Indiana Regimental Association, pp. 88-89;. Flinn, p. 108;. Frederick Fhisterer, New York in the War of the Rebellion. 1861 to 1865 (Albany: Weed, Rarsons and Company, 1890), p. 314.

^®Forty-sixth Indiana Regimental Association, pp. 90-91; Williams, An Historical Sketch of the 56th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, p. 69; Massa¬ chusetts Office of the Adjutant General, vol. 111:396, vol. V:356; William F. Fox, Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, 1861-1865 (Albany: Albany Publishing Company, 1893), p. 444.

59philadelphia Press, [n.d.] quoted in Hewitt, pp. 15-16.

60Q.R. XXXIV, Part i, 452.

61 Ibid.. 464.

62,CCW . p. 32.

63 CCW. p. 33; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 465.

64 Ibid., 238, 465; Stanyan, pp. 388-89.

65 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 217.

66 Ibid., 182; CCW. pp. 22-23; Boatner, p. 303.

^7Theophilus Noel, Autobiography and Reminiscences of Theophilus Noel (Chicago: Theo. Noel Company Print, 1904), p. 141.

68 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 617; Stark, pp. 5-8.

69 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 241.

70 Greeley, p. 54In.

71O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 390, 409-10, 420-21, 426, 429; CCW. p. 31; Massachusetts Office of the Adjutant General, V:507-508. Battery "L" also contained the remnants of the 6th Massachusetts Battery which had been deactivated on 17 February 1864.

72 CCW. p. 217. 117

73Ibid. ; O.R. XXXIV. Part 1, 416; Gould, pp. 412-13.

74Shorey, pp. 86-87.

73Clark, pp. 154-56; Woods, pp. 66-67; Beecher, p. 317; Gould, pp. 428-29; Plummer, Confederate Victory at Mansfield, pp. 26-27. The third phase of the battle is also known as the Peach Orchard fight and the Battle of Pleasant Grove. A grove of huge oaks near the Chatman home was probably the source for the Pleasant Grove name, while the family peach orchard was the source of the other.

76O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 416, 429; Lufkin, p. 79.

77Bentley, p. 250; Hoffman, pp. 89-90.

78Benson, p. 489.

79O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 298, 301; Forty-sixth Indiana Regimental Asso¬ ciation, p. 91.

80 _ Bentley, p 254; Blessington, p. 189; Report of Colonel Henry Gray. PP 1-2.

81O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 416, 436; CCW. p. 325.

82 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 607; Hewitt, p. 15; Debray, p. 17.

83 Hewitt, p. 15; CCW. p. 179; Stark, p. 8.

84O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 416-17, 422; Pellet, p. 198; Clark, p. 157; Barr, Polignac's Texas Brigade, p. 40; Lester N. Fitzhugh, "Texas Forces in the Red River Campaign, March-May, 1864," Texas Military History III (Spring 1963):18-19.

83Gould, pp. 419, 428; Shorey, p. 89; Blessington, pp. 91-92.

Gould, p. 417; CCW. p. 180.

87O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 604; Johnson, p. 142.

QO °°Ibid.; John Q. Anderson, ed., Campaigning with Parsons1 Texas Cav¬ alry Brigade. C.S.A. (Hillsboro, Texas; Hill Junior College Press, 1967^ pp. 130-31. 118

^9O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 566; Plummer, Confederate Victory at Mans¬ field. p. 31.

^^Bearss, pp. 108, 148-49; Henderson, p. 60; Stark, p. 10; Bartlett, Part 111:13; Barr, Polignac 's Texas Brigade, p. 41; Houston Daily Tele¬ graph. 20 April 1864; Hamilton P. Bee, "Battle of Pleasant Hill—An Error Corrected," Southern Historical Society Papers VIII (April 1880): 184.

^Plummer, Confederate Victory at Mansfield, pp. 51-52.

9^0.R. XXXIV, Part i, 527; Galveston Tri-Weekly News, 18 April 1864.

^Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, p. 242; Miss Sidney Harding Diaries, 1863-1864, quoted in Winters, p. 357.

9^Conibs, Confederate Veteran 35:265; Hewitt, pp. 17-18. Garrett took Reid to his home in Mansfield where, during the next five to six months, the family nursed him back to health. Reid was paroled and returned to Federal lines. After the war he returned to Mansfield and visited Gar¬ ret and Hewitt. From him was obtained much of the information in Hew¬ itt's account..

95 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 201, 617; Stark, p. 8; Stanyan, p. 388; Plum¬ mer, Confederate Victory at Mansfield, p. 12; Bryner, p. 101; Shorey, p. 100; CCW. p. 179; O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 473-474.

96O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 392, 417, 422, 430.

^Ibid.. 259, 261, 280; Irwin, p. 311; Moore, The Rebellion Record VIII:543.

QO O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 307; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa Infantry Volunteers, p. 136.

"O.R. XXXIV, Part ii, 1057. CHAPTER V: NOT SO PLEASANT PLEASANT HILL

Part 1 - Preparation for battle

Next to victory, the act of pursuit is the most important in war. Clausewitz

All night they marched. Slowly the cold, tired, bedraggled mass plodded toward Pleasant Hill. Near Ten-Mile Bayou the 153d New York relieved the 29th Maine from its rear-guard duty and the column treaded on. Between 7 a.m. and 10 a.m. the demoralized men of the Thirteenth

Corps straggled into Pleasant Hill followed by the Nineteenth Corps, followed by the Confederate cavalry.^-

At dawn Lane's Brigade had been ordered to pursue the retreating

Fédérais. As the cavalry galloped on,, they continued to round up strag¬ glers, thus adding to the Confederate catch of prisoners. Along the road they passed abandoned wagons and weapons, burned supplies, and a few dead and wounded men of the Union army. At one point there was the mangled body of a Negro Union soldier who had been run over by the wheels of a hundred passing wagons. Across the road trees had been felled to slow the pursuit, but these barriers were easily negotiated. About 9 a.m. Colonel George Madison’s 3d Arizona Cavalry overtook the 153d New

York about three miles from Pleasant Hill. As the 153d was a new regi¬ ment, the men panicked and the rear of the Union column was thrown into confusion. Madison's men and Lieutenant Colonel John Mullen's 2d Ari¬ zona Cavalry pressed hard until the main Union force was encountered near the town.^

Day dawned crisp and windy over the village of Pleasant Hill on

9 April 1864. Several of the 200 residents had remained when the Yank¬ ees came. Doctor Beal was the only man who stayed, as the others had 120 taken the slaves and livestock away to avoid Federal confiscation. Then located in DeSoto Parish, the town had a fairyland quality about it.

Travelers, suddenly emerging from miles of uncivilized forest, found themselves in a clearing about one mile square upon which was located a post office, church, stores, stage depot, and residences. A short dis¬ tance away was the Pierce and Payne College and the Childers place. Be¬ fore the Yankees came it had been a farming community, but now the fields were barren and brambles were beginning to encroach upon the once-fruitful acreage. Soldiers dressed in blue had first entered the town two days earlier to terrorize the women and children. Sallie Chap¬ man, 17 years old at the time, recalled them ransacking pantries and stores, stealing clothes, and tearing down fences for their fires.

Grandmother Childers had hidden the silverware in the cistern and the grandchildren in the cellar before the Fédérais appeared and was able to save her valuables. To many of the children the Yankees were excit¬ ing. Mrs. William Hampton admonished them to pray, not laugh; but her daughter, Emma, replied, "0 Laudy, mama! It's no use praying now, the 3 Yankees have got us."

At Pleasant Hill the retreating divisions found A.J. Amith's "goril¬ las" being deployed for battle. At 2 a.m. the 3d Division, Sixteenth

Corps, had been awakened to prepare for a possible Confederate advance. r The 117th Illinois was sent to picket a road leading from the west to prevent a Confederate movement from that direction. There they remained until 2 p.m. After a breakfast of hard-tack and coffee, Edwin Nichols,

Company "B," 32d Iowa, engaged in a poker game with nine of his comrades and waited for the sun to come up. Grains of corn were the stakes, but 121 soon they would be playing for greater stakes in a far deadlier game.

At 7 a.m. Battery "L," 1st United States Artillery, with personnel from the disbanded 13th Massachusetts Light Artillery attached, took position on the crest of the hill north of the town. A short time later, the

25th New York Battery relieved Battery "L" which went into park in re- serve. 4

The Childers house in its new location at Pleasant Hill.

Defeated men of the Thirteenth Corps called to the fresh Sixteenth moving into position and warned them of their coming fate.

They encouraged (?) us by expressions of sympathy, advice, and prophesy; telling us that those who lived to return would travel faster on the return trip, and that we had better send word to our sweet-hearts now, while able to do so, and much more of the same sort.^

Smith's rough-necks in turn boasted that they had never been defeated

£ and would not be that day. 122

After a short halt, Banks ordered General Albert Lee to take his cavalry division, minus about 1,000 men from Lucas' and Gooding's bri¬ gades, the remainder of the Thirteenth Corps, and the 97th U.S. Colored

Troops, and escort the trains to Grand Ecore. Banks gave no clue as to why he decided to evacuate the trains. Perhaps Banks was "shaken by defeat" and wanted to insure that his army could retire rapidly if ano¬ ther debacle occurred. Perhaps he "anticipated a reverse" and "hoped he could retreat with order.For some unknown reason the medical sup¬ ply wagons were included with those trains sent south. One correspondent attributed the retrograde movement to "the lack of subsistence for our

O troops, and forage for our horses."0 Yet at Grand Ecore the army had spent several days loading wagons with provisions to accompany them to

Shreveport. Only on the 7th and 8th had the rations been required.

True, most of the forage had been lost, but a few wagons, escorted by part of Lee's cavalry, could have returned to Grand Ecore to replenish the supply. The question of why the bulk of the wagons was returned is not answered by the correspondent's reason or, indeed, by any other account. The army was still a potent force with the capability of de¬ stroying the Confederate army. Yet Banks ordered the wagons, to the rear. Men from the 2d Massachusetts and Chicago Mercantile Batteries, useless now without their guns, also marched toward Grand Ecore. The

19th Kentucky and 77th Illinois were consolidated and marched along with the wagons. Little time was taken to distribute food to either men or animals during the short halt at Pleasant Hill. Weary cavalrymen who obtained corn from nearby fields often took one bite and then let the horse gnaw awhile. Early on-tl^e 10th the tired, weak, discouraged troops 123 q reached Grand Ecore.

Some confusion surrounds the specific orders to General Robert

Cameron's division of the Thirteenth Corps. Franklin ordered Cameron to escort the wagons toward Grand Ecore, but shortly after 2 p.m. Major

Norman Lieber of Banks' staff was sent by General Stone, Banks' chief- of-staff, with further verbal instructions to Cameron. Cameron later claimed the message was "to watch and protect our left flank and care¬ fully cover the train" until it was out of danger.^-® Lieber, however, claimed the message was for Cameron to halt his command and protect the left flank of the army, with no mention being made of the wagons.H At

5:30 p.m. Major C.J. von Herrmann, Lieutenants W. Sampson and C.S. Sar¬ gent, and Aide-de-Camp Alphonse LeDuc were sent to find Cameron and or- der him to attack on the army's left wing. He could not be found. 12c

As General William Emory arrived at Pleasant Hill with the 1st Di¬ vision of the Nineteenth Corps about 9:30 a.m., he deployed his three brigades to resist the Confederate cavalry threatening his rear. Gen¬ eral William Dwight deployed his First Brigade to the right of the Mans¬ field-Pleasant Hill-Natchitoches road on a slight ridge overlooking a wooded ravine. General James McMillan's brigade formed across the road in support of the 25th New York Battery, and Colonel Lewis Benedict's

Third Brigade occupied the woods to the left of the road to the Sabine 13 River.

About 9 a.m. Colonel William Shaw's Second Brigade, 3d Division,

Sixteenth Corps, left its camp, marched through the village, crossed a small stream, and soon thereafter relieved McMillan's brigade. The 32d

Iowa formed on the left, the 27th Iowa in the center with Company "B" 124 deployed as skirmishers, and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Newbold's 14th

Iowa on the right commanding the Mansfield road. Skirmishers from Com¬ panies "I" and "K" tied in with those of the 27th Iowa. The 24th Mis¬ souri, with the non-veterans of the 21st Missouri attached, was posted to the right front on a slight ridge which commanded Shaw's line. Com¬ pany "A" deployed as skirmishers. With three regiments having replaced

McMillan's four, a gap was created between Shaw's left and Benedict's right. A.J. Smith then ordered Shaw to shift further to the right, cor¬ respondingly creating an even greater gap. Shaw later reported that

Emory knew of this gap, but was "beastly drunk" and made no changes.

Shaw also stated that General Stone knew of the dispositions, but ap¬ proved them. (Shaw was afterwards relieved as a result of these and similar charges.) By placing the 24th Missouri on the ridge, Shaw's right failed to tie-in with Dwight's left and, in fact, masked the fire of the 116th New York, Dwight's left-most regiment. A gap, therefore, also existed in the right wing of the Union army.^

William Dwight James Winning McMillan 125

A correspondent wrote, "The plateau had the appearance of a parade ground on a holiday" as troops were inarched and countermarched, as bat¬ teries unlimbered, and staff officers dashed from unit to unit through- 15 out the day. McMillan's men, after being relieved by Shaw, were placed in two lines as a reserve in the rear of Dwight's brigade. The

13th Maine and 47th Pennsylvania were in the first line with the 15th

Maine and 160th New York in the second. Colonel Risdon Moore marched

the Third Brigade, 3d Division, Sixteenth Corps, one mile to the west of his camp and formed to the left of the Natchitoches road. The right of the 178th New York rested on the road with Captain James Cockefair's

3d Indiana Battery between the New Yorkers and the 49th Illinois. At

2 p.m. Cockefair's guns were relieved by the 9th Indiana Battery which unlimbered to the right of the 178th. Several buildings in the town were burned to provide a clear field-of-fire for the battery. The 49th

Illinois then took a position in the immediate rear. The 3d Indiana moved to support Colonel William Lynch and the First Brigade, 3d Divi¬

sion, Sixteenth Corps.

During mid-morning Lynch had marched from his camp and by noon the

119th Illinois was deployed, facing outward, on a ridge in the woods on

the left edge of the large open field on the Pleasant Hill plateau. The

58th Illinois, also facing outward, was about one-half mile forward of

the 119th and about 150 paces from Benedict's left. The 89th Indiana, with the non-veterans of the 52d Indiana attached, deployed to the right

of the 119th with Captain George Hebard's 1st Vermont Battery to the

right of the Indiana men. To their right was the 178th New York. With

this disposition the Union left flank was in a dangerous alignment. 126

Lynch's left flank was "in the air” and at right angles to the Confeder¬ ate axis of approach. A strong blow could easily "roll-up" the Union left and place the Confederates in the rear of the entire Nineteenth

Corps

Benedict's brigade spent the day cooking and sleeping in the warm sun which had taken the early-morning chill out of the air. About 3 o'clock the brigade was withdrawn 300 yards and positioned in the area behind a ditch at the base of a wooded rise to the Pleasant Hill plateau.

Heavy underbrush, bushes, and reeds served to conceal them from view of the Confederate skirmishers who were active on the Union front. The

30th Maine was formed on the extreme left with Boynton's Company,"D" and Randall's Company "E" deployed as skirmishers in the woods beyond the ditch. Company "IJ" commanded by Captain Price, occupied the ditch

30 yards in advance of the line. From left to right the other regiments of the brigade were the 162d New York, the 173d New York, and the 165th

New York. By his withdrawal, however, Benedict further uncovered Shaw's 18 left, widening the existing gap to about 450 yards.

-Several courses of action were open to Banks as he pondered the dispositions from his headquarters in the Childers house. Shaw could be withdrawn slightly to connect with Dwight on the right, and Benedict could be moved forward to connect with Shaw's lèft. Or, McMillan's bri¬ gade could be moved from its reserve location to a new position between

Shaw and Benedict to fill that gap. Unfortunately, the alternative of doing nothing was chosen and the gaps remained.

Also about 3 p.m. the Second and Third Brigades of thie 1st Division,

Sixteenth Corps, were disposed for the expected engagement. Colonel 127

John McClure's 47th Illinois was positioned to the right of the 9th

Indiana Battery, the 5th Minnesota was assigned to picket the road to

Bayou Pierre, and the 8th Wisconsin was placed in reserve. Lieutenant

Colonel William Keeler's 35th Iowa, with 70 non-veterans of the 12th

Iowa attached, and Lieutenant Colonel William Heath's 33d Missouri, both of the Third Brigade, 1st Division, Sixteenth Corps, were assigned reserve positions in the rear of the 89th Indiana. Heath's men were later moved to the right of the 3d Indiana Battery in the front line.^

Benedict's skirmishers were deployed in the ditch on the right of the photograph. Con¬ federates attacked from the left.

Minor changes continued to be made in the Union line throughout the afternoon. Two pieces, commanded by Lieutenant E.L. Appleton, of

Taylor's Battery "L" were positioned to the right of the main road in support of Dwight. The remaining four guns were positioned to support 128

Benedict's brigade. The 1st Deleware Light Artillery, Companies "G"

and "H" of the 1st Indiana Heavy Artillery, and Company "M," 1st Mis¬

souri Light Artillery, were moved into the reserve artillery park.

About 4 p.m. the 49th Illinois marched from its reserve location in rear of the 178th New York and took a new position 100 yards to the

right front of the New York regiment. Why such a move which placed a

lone regiment forward of the division line was made is unfathomable.

The 117th Illinois, picketing the road to Many, was assigned the task

of guarding two other roads in the vicinity. The regiment remained on 20 those roads throughout the day.

Near midmorning Brigadier General Arthur Bagby took a portion of his Confederate cavalry brigade and posted them on the road to Blair's

Landing to prevent a juncture of Kilby Smith's men and Banks' army.^l

About the time Bagby was going into position, the remainder of the Con¬

federate cavalry came upon Colonel Oliver Gooding's Fifth Cavalry Bri¬

gade trotting north to.delay the rebel advance. General Hamilton Bee

deployed Buchel's brigade to the east of the road, Debray's to the west,

and Lane's men to Debray's left. Buchel reconnoitered to his front and

discovered Dwight's brigade in the woods facing a ravine. On the Con¬

federate right the regiments of Colonels William Hardeman and Henry

McNeill detected Union troops extending perhaps a mile into the woods.

General Tom Green, "a terror to Yankees" and a man who "never waited

for the enemy to come to him, arrived and a sharp engagement with

Gooding’s troopers ensued. Heavily outnumbered, the Union cavalry was

forced back with a loss of nearly 30 men. Two officers of the 2d New

York Cavalry were severely wounded, and Gooding, himself, narrowly

130 escaped death when a Minie ball passed through his hat. Green's men then dismounted and skirmished with the Union line while waiting for 23 the Confederate infantry and artillery to come up.

Lucas,, meanwhile, was picketing the roads on the left flank with

500 men from the First Cavalry Brigade. For a distance of five miles west of Pleasant Hill the men of the 16th Indiana, 6th Missouri, and

14th New York watched and waited for the advancing Confederates.^

At 2 a.m. that morning the Confederate infantry had been aroused and put in motion for Pleasant Hill. Brigadier General James C. Tappan and his Arkansas division led the way, followed by Brigadier General

Mbsby M. Parsons' Missourians (the two divisions under the joint command of Brigadier General Thomas J. Churchill.) Next came Walker's Texans and Polignac's command. A detachment of the 18th Texas Infantry was left behind to assist in burying the dead. About six miles from Pleas¬ ant Hill the infantry encountered some of Green's cavalry conducting 300 to 400 zouaves to Confederate prison camps. The Confederates joked and quipped that the war would soon be over since the Union ranks were being filled with women I ^

Between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. Taylor halted the command two miles north of the town. Churchill found the army commander sitting near the road seemingly absent-mindedly whittling, but in actuality devising a plan to deal with Banks. At Churchill's urging, Taylor decided to post¬ pone any further action for two hours to allow the men to rest. In two days the Arkansas and Missouri troops had marched 45 miles. Walker's and Polignac's divisions had marched 18 miles on the 9th after having

fought a desperate battle the day before. To attack an organized enemy 131 with such a fatigued army would have been folly and Taylor wisely deter¬ mined to sacrifice daylight hours for time to rest. Protected by

Green's cavalry screen, the infantry fell-out on the sides of the roads

26 to- sleep.i

Taylor had served with the mighty Stonewall in Virginia and had learned much from the old master. An envelopment was the order-of-the- day for Jackson, and so, too, would it be for Taylor on this day.

Churchill's division with two artillery batteries was to march around the Union left to the Fort Jesup road and attack the enemy's left rear.

Hardeman's, McNeill's, and Terrell's cavalry regiments were to protect

Churchill's right and be prepared to cut the road to Natchitoches. Wal¬ ker was to form on Churchill's left between the road to Fort Jesup and the road to Mansfield and attack once the flanking force launched its assault. To exploit the expected success* Bee, with Buchel's and De¬ bray's brigades, was to be prepared to charge down the main road to further disorganize the Union defenders. The batteries of Captains John

West, T.D. Nettles, and William G. Moseley were also posted near the road to bombard the Union center. To the west of the Mansfield road,

Walter P. Lane's cavalry brigade was posted, dismounted, to harass the

Union right flank. Polignac's battered division was held in reserve.2^

For the most part, Taylor had a splendid tactical plan which well- utilized many principles of war. To his supporting attacks (those of

Walker and Lane) he assigned the minimum essential forces necessary to

fix the enemy in position and reduce Banks' ability to react to the main

attack. To execute his main attack Taylor assigned two divisions which had not been engaged at Mansfield. By massing against the weak Union 132 left, Taylor hoped to surprise those forces and gain a decisive tactical advantage. Having several mounted regiments at hand, the Confederate commander was prepared to destroy the enemy's ability to reconstitute a defense or to retreat in good order. Polignac's infantry would be avail¬ able to overcome any stubborn pockets of resistance which the cavalry might encounter. There was one flaw, however. A major purpose of a supporting attack is to divert the enemy's attention from the main at¬ tack, yet in Taylor's plan Walker was not to launch his supporting at¬ tack until he heard the sounds of Churchill's guns. The proper sequence would have been for Churchill to delay his assault until Banks' atten¬ tion had been fixed on the attacks of Walker and Lane. With luck, Banks might even have deployed his reserve to reinforce the forward portion of his line, thereby leaving no unit available to counter-attack Church¬ ill.

Thomas J. Churchill James Camp Tappan 133

Around 3 p.m. Churchill roused his weary men, and, accompanied by former DeSoto Parish sheriff T.J. Williams as guide, began the circui¬ tous two-mile route to the Fort Jesup road. Unfortunately the command became disoriented and, upon reaching the Sabine River road, formed for the attack. Parsons' division deployed in line on the right and Tap- pan's on the left about 4:30. Three companies of skirmishers from the

33d Arkansas covered Tappan's advance while Major L.A. Pindall's 9th

Missouri Sharpshooters covered the advance of the Missouri division.

After advancing about one-half mile, Churchill realized his divisions would not flank the Union line; therefore, he shifted another one-half mile to the right so as to bring all the Missouri regiments to the right of the Sabine road. This movement, however, still failed to com¬ pensate for the failure to find the correct road. Instead of falling on Lynch's brigade of the Sixteenth Corps in the rear of the Union posi¬ tion, Churchill's men were advancing to strike Benedict's brigade from the left oblique. Walker followed behind Churchill and deployed between 28 the Sabine and Mansfield roads.

Part 2 - CHARGE]!

Flank attack is the essence of the whole history of war. Alfred von Schlieffen

At 4:30 p.m. the earth trembled as the Confederate batteries of

West, Nettles, and Moseley opened on the 25th New York Battery and 24th

Missouri Infantry. Company "B," 24th Missouri had earlier been sent forward to assist Company "A" on the skirmish line and now both companies fell back on the main line. So furious was the fire from the Confederate 134 batteries that the 25th New York was forced to abandon its position, but not before its fire had killed four men and six horses of the Val- 2Q verde Battery. For 30 minutes the cannonade lasted. Hearing the

sounds of firing from his left flank, Green inexplicably ôrdered his

cavalry to charge Shaw's Union brigade in columns of fours, Debray's brigade in the advance. Cautioning his men to "Keep cool" and "Let

them come within 50 yards," Colonel John Scott and the men of the 32d

Iowa awaited the thundering horsemen. On they came, steadily closing

the distance until, with a deafening roar, the entire Second Brigade

erupted and blew Debray's command into oblivion. Horses reared and

fell, saddles were emptied, and a scene of utmost chaos resulted.

Bee's horse was killed and the Confederate general crashed to the ground.

Three captains and one major of the 26th Texas Cavalry were either killed or wounded.30 Debray's horse, too, went down and its rider was

caught underneath. Only by pulling his foot from his boot was Debray

able to extricate himself and limp rearward. Upon reaching the Confed¬

erate line he found Taylor who inquired whether he was wounded. "No,

General," he answered. "I am slightly hurt; but, as you may see, I was

sent on a bootless errand." "Never mind your boot," said Taylor, "You have won your spurs."31

From the front and the flank the fire rained on the survivors. To

remain in the killing zone of that ambush was suicide. Men leaped from

their horses and sought shelter in the small ravines cut by the winter

rains and behind the pines circling the field. Buchel, following De¬ bray, had managed to rein-in his command to avoid the slaughter that had befallen his Texas comrades. Quickly dismounting he led his troops 135 in an attack on the 24th Missouri, driving them back to Shaw's main line, but the gallant German fell mortally wounded in the assault. So furious was the fighting that two bearers of the 24th' s colors were killed. The Missourians lost nine killed, 70 wounded, and 17 captured 32 in the contest.

Meanwhile on the Confederate right, Churchill's attack was pro¬ gressing well. Emerging from the pine woods, the advancing Confeder¬

ates fell like an avalanche upon the three companies of Maine troops posted in the woods and in the creek bed* A few escaped but many were

captured. Across the ditch the Confederates raced and slammed into the

left of Benedict's ;£ine. The Missouri troops poured a volley into the

Union men and then fell on them with muskets used as clubs. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued, but superior numbers told almost immedi¬

ately and the 165th New York fell back. The 162d New York broke next with the 173d New York in their footsteps. The three regiments had

fallen apart so quickly that Benedict had no chance to even order a

retreat. Yelling to Colonel Francis Fessenden to retreat with the 30th

Maine, which was practically encircled, Benedict started to the rear but was hit by five balls—one in each aim, one in the leg, one in the

foot, and one in the head—and fell dead. Fessenden took command of the

remnants of the brigade and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Hubbard succeeded

to command of the 30th Maine. The New Englanders fell back to the vi¬

cinity of Lynch's brigade while the other three regiments of the brigade

streamed toward the center of town. Occasionally Fessenden was able to

restore a semblance of order and fire a volley, but the Union men con¬

tinued to be pushed steadily back. Soon three pieces of Battery ”L" 136 were overrun, only one gun being taken off by the Union gunners. In addition to the artillery, the victorious Confederates bagged scores of prisoners—48 from the 162d, 61 from the 165th, 147 from the 173d, and 28 from the 30th Maine.^

Churchill attacked from woods in background toward position where photograph was taken.

Major General John Walker's Confederate infantry, which had ad¬ vanced simultaneously with Churchill, was having a difficult time against Shaw's front. Despite close artillery support from the Con¬ federate batteries, Walker's first line was thrown back. The second line, however, continued onward and slowly Shaw's front began to bend.

Major's dismounted cavalry, recovering somewhat from the effects of their abortive mounted attack, pressed Shaw's right, forcing companies to change front to contend with the threat. Breaking against the rock of the 32d Iowa, Walker's gray tide soon rolled around the Iowa left to 137 threaten their rear. Walker himself was wounded, but the tide rolled on. Shaw realized his line was in great danger of collapse and sought- out General William Dwight for assistance, but Dwight refused on the grounds that his orders were to hold his position.34

About that time Benedict gave way and Shaw suddenly found himself in the unenviable position of having two Confederate divisions in his rear. With the 24th Missouri practically out of ammunition and Lieu¬ tenant Colonel Joseph Newbold, commander of the 14th Iowa, dead, those units were about to break under the pressure of Walker's and Major's attacks. Colonel Scott of the 32d Iowa exhorted his troops to "show yourselves to be men," and many of them died like men.35 Privates

Jacob Brown, Wilbur Hoyt, and John Ford were killed in rapid succes¬ sion. Lieutenant Thomas Howard and Adjutant Charles Huntley were mor¬ tally wounded, as.was Captain Herbert Peebles of Company "C." Mathias

Hutchinson, Company "I," fell. His father went to him and raised his head, but laid it back saying, "He is dead."36 To the right of the 32d

Iowa, the 27th Iowa was also suffering. Colonel James Gilbert, regi¬ mental commander, Captain J.M. Holbrook, and Lieutenants Frank Brush 37 and S.O. Smith were also wounded.

A.J. Smith, Sixteenth Corps commander, seeing that Shaw's entire brigade was about to be surrounded, sent Captain J.J. Lyon to Shaw with an order to retreat. The three regiments on the right received the order and fell back in confusion. Shaw rode to find Scott but instead found Confederates from Parsons', Tappan's, and Scurry's units. In the center of the Confederate hordes Scott was doing his best to organize a breakout to his left* In the clouds of smoke and indescribable 138 confusion, few men of companies "D," "A," and "B" on the right flank learned of the order to retire. Seven men of "D" and 14 of "A" were captured, while Company "B" left 31 men either on the field or in Con¬ federate hands. Only by individual efforts were the other members of those companies able to escape. As the men swept past the 25th New

York Battery, Lieutenant Irving Southworth attempted to draw off his guns. Finding four horses of number one gun dead, however, he had to 38 spike it and leave it to the enemy.

When Shaw's brigade melted away, Dwight suddenly found himself with a host of victorious rebels in his rear. Driving Union men before them like chaff in the wind, the Confederates were determined to de¬ stroy whatever Union forces they encountered. Having witnessed the impending destruction of Shaw's brigade, Dwight had, about 5:15 p.m., shifted the 153d and the 114th New York to the left of the Mansfield road and positioned them to face the on-rushing foe. Colonel George

Love placed his 116th New York ,to the right of the road. From there he continued to fend-off the attacks of Lane's dismounted cavalry. Because of the dense woods, Dwight ordered Lieutenant Edward Appleton to take his section of Battery "L" to the rear. As the guns were being with¬ drawn, however, the wheels became stuck so that they could neither be moved nor unlimbered. When Shaw's brigade broke, the 114th New York was suddenly in danger of having its left flank rolled up. Dwight quick¬ ly ordered Colonel George Beal to march the 29th Maine across the road and cover that flank. Hie 161st New York was moved to cover the road on the left flank of the 29th Maine.

As the Confederate brigades of Waul and Randal rushed up the slope, 139 the unexpected fire from Dwight's command brought a halt to the impe¬ tuous charge. Again and again Randal's men charged. Once they reached the Union line and took a few prisoners, but were finally thrown back,

Waul's brigade reached a point 125 yards from the enemy when they came upon a gully about three feet deep. Exposed to a withering fire, the men dropped into the ditch to protect themselves. Although now receiv¬ ing fire from all sides, Dwight's brigade was able to prevent further

Confederate gains.

Churchill's four brigades continued driving for the gap which existed between Dwight's left (the 161st New York) and A.J. Smith's main line. General Emory, seeing the eminent danger of such a penetration, ordered McMillan to take his Second Brigade and plug that gap. Placing himself at the head of the 47th Pennsylvania, McMillan exhorted his men to win the foot-race with the rebels. But the rebels had already reached the town and from the houses poured a devastating fire into the

Union ranks--a fire which routed the 47th and wounded Color Sergeant

Walls who was 67 years of age. Back through Mrs. Rembert's yard the

Union men fled, with Confederate balls leaving their mark on her house.

The 15th Maine, with the exception of Companies "A," "D," and "F," was able to find cover behind a board fence from which they began exchang¬ ing volleys with the rebel advance. After urging the 160th New York to hold their position, McMillan succeeded in rallying a part of the 47th

Pennsylvania in the rear of the brigade line. Meanwhile, the 13th Maine was in trouble. Having first been ordered to the extreme right of the

Union line, the unit hastily counter-marched to catch up with the re¬ mainder of the brigade. Acting under conflicting orders, the regiment 140 reached the main road in a confused inarch formation. Under intense fire from the Arkansas Confederates, the 13th was having a difficult time.

At that critical time Appleton's gunners came charging down the road to the rear, minus their guns which had since been overrun. In the con¬ fusion, the Maine men broke but were reformed in a ravine to the rear.

Here, also, many of Fessenden's (Benedict's) brigade rallied.^

From their positions in the rear of the Nineteenth Corps, the men of the Sixteenth Corps heard the booming of cannon and rattle of mus¬ ketry to their front. "Old Abe," the eagle mascot of the 47th Illinois, pranced and screamed, flapped his wings and knew that soon he would

lead his veterans into another battle. Smith's men had watched Bene¬ dict's brigade go to pieces under the impact of the Confederate attack.

Through the ranks of the 178th New York and 9th Indiana Battery the

fugitives had run, and for a moment it appeared the panic would become contagious. But A.J. Smith's "gorillas" had earned a reputation of

toughness and they simply did not give way under adversity. They knew

their time for action was at hand as they carefully loaded their wea¬ pons. The clicks of thousands of bayonets being seated echoed down the

line as the men watched and waited for the onrushing rebs.^

From his position camouflaged by undergrowth, Major Tom Newlan and

the 58th Illinois watched, not 200 yards away, the Missouri troops sweep

Benedict's brigade away. As Parsons' Confederates rushed on toward

Pleasant Hill, exalting in their victory, their right flank was sudden¬

ly "in the air" and their rear completely exposed. Calmly Newlan or¬

dered a volley—a volley which took deadly effect on the exposed right-

flank brigade of Brigadier General John Clark. Seeing the opportunity 141 presented to him, Colonel William Lynch, the brigade commander on Smith's left, ordered the 58th and 119th Illinois and the 98th Indiana, along with Hubbard's 30th Maine, forward. Following a blast of canister from the 1st Vermont Battery, the Union men fell like a thunderbolt on the

Confederate rear. Suddenly the victors became the victims and the gray- clad men began to recoil.^

As projectiles from the 3d and 9th Indiana Batteries blasted gaps in the Missouri ranks, the regiments of Risdon Moore's and Lucius Hub¬ bard's brigades opened fire and charged. In their haste to catch the fleeing Union men of Benedict's and Shaw's brigades, Parsons and Tappan had allowed a 300-yard gap to open between their divisions. Into this gap McMillan ordered his forces and, suddenly, Parsons was being en¬ gulfed from three sides. Slowly, displaying fierce resistance, Parsons' men retraced their steps. Tappan's regiments, suddenly exposed to a withering fire from charging Union troops, were forced to withdraw also.

Battery ”L," now served by Confederate crews, blasted the 33d Missouri and 35th Iowa. The guns, however, were soon retaken after fierce hand- to-hand combat with rammers and rifles used as clubs. Back to the ditch which Benedict had once occupied the Confederates were forced. Volleys from that ditch rocked the Union advance and twice forced it back. Re¬ covering, however, the blue ocean rolled on, supported by the 1st Ver¬ mont Battery which had limbered-up and charged along with the infantry.

Into the ditch the men went. Fighting was fanatical with quarter neither asked nor given. But superior numbers again told, and the Mis¬ souri and Arkansas men were forced back out of the ditch.^

143

Major General John Walker, seeing the retreat of the division on his’right, ordered Scurry's Texans to their assistance. Scurry, riding

at the head of his men, yelled, "Come on, boys, you have got your chance

at last]"45 Into the fray the men charged, but they were too few. Al¬

though fighting desperately, Scurry soon found his brigade in trouble.

The Arkansas brigade of Lucian Gause, driven from the ditch, panicked

and ran through the Texans, closely followed by Union men. Seeing

Scurry's predicament, Walker ordered Waul's and Randal's brigades to

charge and save their comrades. Into the melee they went, but even the

combined Confederate divisions were no match for the Sixteenth Corps.

With the pressure on his regiment relieved, Colonel John Scott moved

his 321 Iowa 200 yards to his left and joined the assault. In the gath¬

ering darkness, the weary Confederates abandoned two of Nims' pieces

which had been captured at Mansfield and withdrew to the edge of the

woods. A volley drove back the 58th Illinois and 35th Iowa, but the

89th Indiana fired into the Confederates and again put them to flight.

One stand of Texas colors and 247 of Walker's men were taken as the

Union pursuit continued. One hundred seventy nine of Churchill's troops

suddenly found themselves in enemy hands. "Our retreat was soon a

panic and a rout," wrote Gus Hall, a member of Churchill's command. De¬

spite exhortations, punctuated by the flat of the sword, from Confeder¬

ate officers, the men continued to stream rearward.46

On the Confederate left, Lane's, Buchel's, and Debray's dismounted

cavalry brigades had continued to fight a holding action against Dwight's

First Brigade. As the Union onslaught also threatened the horsemen,

Taylor ordered Polignac's division to charge. Standing in his stirrups 144 and calling to his weakened brigades, "My boys, follow your Polignac,"

the new division commander led them in a charge on McMillan's advancing

lines. This relieved the threat to Green's cavalry and stymied further

Union advances. In the darkness Polignac, Lane, and Buchel began firing on each other, but fortunately, few casualties were incurred. Fighting

then ceased on the Confederate left.^

/ William R. Scurry Thomas N. Waul

On the extreme Confederate right, the cavalry which was to protect

Churchill's right flank (the regiments of Hardeman, Terrell, and

McNeill) had had a difficult time. These regiments, too, had been

caught in the attack by the Sixteenth Corps. Hardeman had held his position behind a fence for a few minutes, but was forced to fall back before the Union attackers. Colonel Alexander Terrell was separated

from his regiment and had wandered around in the woods near the Pierce

and Payne College before rejoining his troopers several hours later. 48

In the helter-skelter pursuit Union regiments and brigades had become hopelessly intermingled, with several companies being completely 145 separated from their parent units. The resultant confusion, combined with the utter darkness, forced a halt to the pursuit. Part of the

173d New York (Third Brigade, 1st Division, Nineteenth Corps) fought along with the Second Brigade. A portion of the 58th Illinois followed the regimental colors, while several companies followed Lynch, the bri¬ gade commander. Four companies of the 30th Maine became separated and advanced with the 119th Illinois. Not realizing that the main body of troops had halted, three companies of the 15th Maine continued to pursue

Confederates towards Mansfield and almost were surrounded until a staff- officer was able to halt them and direct a withdrawal.49 The 29th

Maine stumbled around in the underbrush until finally brought under control. "I know nothing about where we went nor what we were trying to do, but I know I never worked so hard in any battle to keep the men in line," commented one officer.'’® Working frantically, Colonel Sylves¬ ter Hill, commanding the Third Brigade, 1st Division, Sixteenth Corps, was able to reunite the 33d Missouri and 35th Iowa which had become separated in the darkness. Gradually the firing died away and the Union commanders began restoring order to their commands. As Major General

Banks rode over the battlefield he found A.J. Smith and shook his hand.

"God bless you, general," Banks said. "You have saved the army."51

Only by falling back to the plain of Pleasant Hill were the Union divisions, brigades, regiments, and companies able to be sorted and reorganized. Pickets were sent forward and the men, overcome by fatigue, threw themselves on the ground. As rolls were called, Edwin Nichols learned that he was the only survivor of the ten men who had played poker that morning. James Turner prepared to make coffee in his three- 146 quart pail only to find that three balls had gone through it. The night turned cold, and the terrible sounds of the night before echoed again throughout the woods and fields. Parties scoured the area, bringing in the wounded. Here lay a dead soldier, an Enfield rifle in his left hand, a cartridge between the thumb and forefinger of his right, and

the paper wrapping still clenched between his teeth. There lay a sol¬ dier with his ribs exposed. A wounded officer, imagining himself still

in the charge, called for his men to follow. In groups, too, the dead

CO lay where canister had done its awful work. "There is scarcely a

soldier but that would prefer the hottest engagement rather than spend

such a night amid such scenes...," one witness later remarked.^3

Both Union and Confederate soldiers carried off whatever wounded

they found, regardless of color of uniform. To the Pierce and Payne

College and the Childers house the wounded were taken. Captain Elijah

Parsons Petty, a Bastrop, Texas, native and commander of Company "F,"

17th Texas Infantry, was brought to the home. Knowing he would soon

die, Petty gazed out the window at a large oak and asked to be buried

at its foot. His request was granted. Throughout the night Doctor

J.E. Armstrong, a Federal surgeon, attended the wounded and was assisted

by the local ladies—Mrs. Stephen Chapman and Sallie, Mrs. Hampton and

two of her daughters, Mary and Sarah, and Mrs. Maria Childers. Mary

Hampton was known as the "curly-headed flower girl" for her habit of

always bringing flowers to the hospital.^4

Others scoured the field, too, but they were looking for knapsacks

and the food they might hold. Many searched for canteens, hoping they

would contain water with which to soothe their parched throats and lips. 147

But most simply slept, putting the hunger, thirst, and horror from their minds.55

For General Richard Taylor it had been a long day. But things re¬ mained to be done—orders had to be given, dispositions and plans had to be made. The depressed Churchill reported and was ordered to march seven miles to the rear to find water. Of him Taylor said, "A worthy, gallant gentleman, General Churchill, but not fortunate in war."^® Cer¬ tainly on that day he had not been fortunate. By not extending his right far enough behind the Union flank, his own flank had been rolled- up, and he had lost 459 dead and wounded and 179 prisoners in the pro¬ cess. 57 Walker's and Polignac's divisions, too, were put on the road toward Mansfield. The infantry grumbled as they set out, for they had marched 15 miles since morning and fought a major battle. Food was scarce but so was rest, and at that moment the men preferred rest. Many simply stepped from the formations and slept by the side of the road so that the road had the appearance of a continuous camp from Pleasant Hill 58 to Brushy Bayou.

About 9 p.m. Bee was ordered to picket the field with four com¬ panies of Buchel's regiment while the remainder of the cavalry also marched away from Pleasant Hill. Bee's instructions were to observe the Union army and to fall back before any advance.59

Between 8 and 9 p.m. Kirby Smith arrived on the battlefield after having ridden from Shreveport that day. While searching for Taylor,

Smith's horse stepped on some of the sleeping men who, not too politely, informed Smith where he could go and perhaps find Taylor. The Confed¬ erate field commander was sitting at Bee's campfire listening to the

Union wagons rumbling rearward when Smith joined him. The discussion 148 that followed concerned what course to follow next. The sparks that rose from the fire were indicative of the sparks of anger that occasion¬ ally rose as the two disagreed on future actions. Despite the setback of the day, Taylor wanted to strike Banks another blow: "Banks, with the remains of his beaten army, was before us, and the fleet of Porter, with barely enough water to float upon. We had but to strike vigor¬ ously to capture or destroy both."60

Kirby Smith believed there was little possibility of success in another attack. His analysis of the situation was that "our repulse at

Pleasant Hill was; so complete and our command so disorganized that had

Banks followed up his success vigorously he would have met with but fee¬ ble opposition to his advance on Shreveport.... Our troops were com¬ pletely paralyzed and disorganized by the repulse at Pleasant Hill..."61

As the safety of Shreveport was of great concern to Smith, he feared that if Taylor's army were to follow Banks, Porter's fleet would be able to sail into the town unopposed. Furthermore, Kilby Smith's troops could be disembarked, cut off the Confederate army from its supply base at

Shreveport, and attack Taylor from the rear. Taylor countered that the water in the Red River again was falling, and that fact would force Por¬ ter to withdraw or be trapped at Loggy Bayou. Also, Taylor concluded that Kilby Smith's 3,000 men (actually there were less than 1,700) were too few to effect a landing.6^

Smith "deemed it imprudent to follow Banks below Grand Ecore with my whole force, and leave Steele so near Shreveport."0 Yet Steele's role had been one of caution and hesitancy. Taylor reasoned that Price could delay Steele for the forseeable future and that, once the Union commander in Arkansas heard of Banks' retreat, he, too, would fall back. 149

But if Steele pressed on, Shreveport would be his for the taking. After much arguing, Smith made the decision--Taylor would take all the infan¬ try and most of the cavalry to Mansfield to prepare to march on Steele.

The remainder of the cavalry would be left to watch Banks. Once Steele either retreated or was beaten, operations against Banks would be con- tinued.

From his headquarters in the Childers house, Nathaniel P. Banks reflected on the events of the day. The Confederate army had been de¬ feated but the Union army had paid dearly for the victory. One hundred fifty one Union bodies lay on the field at Pleasant Hill. Eight hun¬ dred forty one other men had been wounded and 379 were missing. Sever¬ al units had taken terrible casualties. The 32d Iowa lost 210 men, the

173d New York 200, the 15th Maine 175, and the 162d New York 106.^

What to do next was the question.

Helmuth von Moltke ("The Elder") once said, "No plan survives con¬ tact with the enemy," and certainly this was a fitting epitaph for the

Confederate defeat at Pleasant Hill. The Union dispositions had been absurd. Gaps, unsupported units, flanks "in the air," and a lack of security characterized the Federal position. In no accounts of the battle is Banks mentioned as providing direction to the army. Franklin,

Emory, and A.J. Smith each seem to have established his line with no thought for a co-ordinated plan. Stone, Banks' chief-of-staff, was on the field but is mentioned by Shaw as having approved his appalling position. Taylor's plan had great opportunity for success in light of the faulty Union position. It had great opportunity for success un¬ til Churchill came into contact with the enemy. Had he outflanked the 150

Union left it is quite possible that a serious defeat would again have been inflicted on Banks' army. Taylor shouldered the blame for the faulty execution of his plan:

Instead of intrusting the attack by my right to a sub¬ ordinate, I should have conducted it and taken Polignac's division to sustain it.... Herein lies the vast difference between genius and commonplace: one anticipates errors, the other discovers them too late.^

Fortunately for Taylor, Cameron's division of the Thirteenth Corps was not available to launch a final attack which probably would have demol¬ ished the Confederate army.

Tomorrow would be a new day for the Confederates, Taylor thought.

Perhaps Kirby Smith would change his mind and allow him to keep the infantry. Or, perhaps, Banks would oblige him by advancing and forcing another battle. Unable to do anything further, Taylor threw himself on the ground and slept. NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

^O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 423; CCW. p. 43; Gould, p. 420; Marshall, His¬ tory of the Eighty-Third Ohio. p# 136.

^O.R. XXXIV, Part 1, 417, 607, 617; Henderson, p. 60; Smith and Mullins, p. 221; Clark, p. 158; Fredericks Ann Meiners, "Hamilton Prio- leau Bee" (Master's thesis, Rice University, 1972), p. 170. General Walker was displeased with Bee's conduct of the pursuit. Walker says Bee was ordered to "be in line of battle before daylight on the 9th," but that he was not ready until one-half hour after daylight. Baylor and Madison by that time were five or six miles in advance. See O.R. XLI, Part ii, 1066-67.

^Moore, Rebellion Record. VIII:536; Johnson, p. 151; Shorey, p. 93; Benson, pp. 502-04, 516. Pleasant Hill was founded in 1840 when John Jordan and his family moved to the area from Pleasant Valley, Alabama. When the New Orleans and Pacific branch of the Texas and Pacific Rail¬ road was constructed nearby, the buildings were dismantled and moved 2% miles south to the railroad in present-day Sabine Parish. See Henry P. Childers, "Reminiscences of the Battle of Pleasant Hill," Annals of Iowa VII (October 1906): 506-07, and Amos J. Barron, A History of Pleasant Hill. Louisiana, DeSoto Parish 1840-1881. Sabine Parish 1881-1968, featuring the Battle of Pleasant Hill April the 9th, 1864. as told by a Seventeen Year Old Girl. She Was There. ([n.p.l, 1968), pp. 2-4.

4O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 340, 373, 375, 410; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, pp. 145-46; Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Massachusetts in the Army and Navy During the War of 1861-65. 2 vols. (Boston: Wright and Potter Printing Co., 1896), 1:192.

^Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, p. 146.

^Hoffman, p. 93.

70,R. XXXIV, Part i, 238-39; Harrington, p. 157.

®Moore, Rebellion Record. VIII:536.

9O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 249, 297-98, 463; CCW. pp. 62, 175-76; Harring¬ ton, p. 157; Kaiser, p. 57; Stanyan, p. 429; Ewer, p. 158.

10O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 268. 152

12Ibid., 270-72.

130.R. XXXIV, Part i, 354, 430; Moore, Rebellion Record, VIII:564.

14O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 354, 360, 362, 366, 369; Stuart, p. 278; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, pp. 137-38, 202-03; Johnson, p. 148. Prior to the beginning of the campaign the enlistments of many of the members of some of the regiments had expired. Those who reenlisted were designated as veterans and were allowed to go on furlough. Those men who were not yet eligible to reenlist were then attached to other regi¬ ments until their regular units returned.

l^Moore, Rebellion Record. VIII:535, 549.

16O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 340, 373, 376, 392; Lufkin, pp. 84-85.

17O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 340, 345, 349-50; Johnson, p. 166; W.H. Ter¬ rell, Indiana in the War of the Rebellion: Official Report of W.H. Terrell. Adjutant General. 8 vols. (Indianapolis: Douglass and Conner, 1869) 11:522.

^•30.R. XXXIV, Part i, 430, 437; CCW. p. 94; Johnson, p. 166; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, pp. 202-03; An Historical Sketch of the 162d Regiment N.Y, Vol. Infantry. 19th Army Corps. 1862-1865 (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1867), p. 26.

19Q.R. XXXIV, Part i, 317, 321-22, 328, 336; Ingersoll, p. 188.

20 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 373, 375, 408-410; Moore, Rebellion Record. VIII:564; Terrell, 11:209; Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Missouri for the Year Ending December 31. 1865 (Jefferson City: Emory S. Foster, 1866), p. 197.

^Kerby, p. 307, Bagby was graduated in the West Point class of 1852. He resigned in 1853 and was practicing law in Texas when the war began. His promotion to brigadier general to date from 17 March 1864 was never approved at Richmond, but was an unauthorized promotion by Kirby Smith. The appointments of Debray and Randal (West Point, 1854) were of the same nature. See Fitzhugh, "Texas Forces in the Red River Campaign,” p. 20n, and Ellsworth Eliot, West Point in the Confederacy (New York: G.A. Baker & Co., Inc., 1941), pp. 95-6.

22O.R. XXXIV. Part i, 607-08, 617; Flinn, p. Ill; Smith and Mullins, pp. 225-26; Barr, "William T. Mechling's Journal of the Red River Cam¬ paign," pp. 367-68; Noel, A Campaign from Santa Fe to the Mississippi. pp. 120-21. 153

230.R. XXXIV, Part i, 452, 607-08; Moore, Rebellion Record, VIII: 535-36; Barr, "William T. Mechling's Journal of the Red River Campaign," pp. 367-68.

24,O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 452; Irwin, p. 316.

25 Blessington, p. 193; Taylor, p. 164; Thomas R. Bonner, "Sketches of the Campaign of 1864: Battle of Pleasant Hill," The Land We Love VI (November 1868), pp. 8-9.

26 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 605.

27 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 566-67.

28 Ibid.. 602, 605; Taylor, pp. 164-65.

29 Ibid.. 369; Smith and Mullins, p. 221.

30 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 360, 369, 567, 608; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, pp. 139-40; Debray, pp. 18-19.

31Ibid.. pp. 19-20.

320.R. XXXIV, Part i, 369, 608; Barr, "William T. Mechling's Journal of the Red River Campaign," pp. 367-68.

33O.R. XXXIV. Part i, 410, 432, 437, 602-03; CCW. p. 94; An Histori¬ cal Sketch of the 162d New York, p. 27. Colonel Lewis M. Peck, command¬ ing the 173d New York, was the subject of a court-martial for cowardice. The court convened in May 1864 at Alexandria, Louisiana, and found Peck guilty. He was sentenced to dishonorable dismissal from the service, but the verdict and sentence were over-turned by a general court-martial in November. He was honorably discharged on 18 October 1865. See O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 432-33.

34O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 361, 423; Winters, p. 353; Taylor, p. 166; Debray, pp. 19-20.

35 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 361; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, pp. 136-37.

36 Ibid., pp. 145-47, 436.

37 Ingersoll, p. 544 154

OO O.R. XXXIV. Part i, 355-56; Benson, p. 496; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, pp. 156, 140-42, 165-66, 182-86, 425.

"ÏQ O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 412, 426, 423-24, 617-18; Clark, p. 160; Irwin, p. 319; Gould, pp. 423-24.

^Bonner, "Sketches of the Campaign of 1864: Battle of Pleasant Hill," pp. 9-11; Stark, pp. 8-9.

41Shorey, pp. 95-97; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 393, 417; Barron, p. 4; Samuel P. Bates, History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5. 5 vols. (Harrisburg: B. Singerly, 1869), 1:1154.

42Q.R. XXXIV, Part i, 376; Bryner, pp. 104-05.

43Q.R. XXXIV, Part i, 346, 413, 350, 603; CCW. p. 94; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, pp. 203-04.

44O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 328-29, 333, 336, 340-41, 410, 413, 605; Moore, Rebellion Record. VIII:565; Shorey, pp. 97r98; Taylor, p. 165; Lufkin, p. 86; Terrell, 111:391, 411.

43Blessington, pp. 195-96.

4^Ibid.. pp. 199-200; Taylor, p. 166; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, p. 199; Moore, Rebellion Record. VIII:565; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 346, 366, 603-05, 350; Greeley, 11:544; Red River Campaign Centennial (Texas Historical Foundation, 1964), pp. 30-31.

470.R. XXXIV, Part i, 426, 608, 618; Taylor, p. 167; Winters, pp. 353-54; Blessington, p. 198; Barr, Polignac’s Texas Brigade, p. 40.

48 Benson, p. 497; Childers, p. 513; Taylor, p. 166; Noel, A Campaign from Santa Fe to the Mississippi, pp. 120-21.

49O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 341, 346, 431-32, 437; Shorey, pp. 97-8.

^Gould, p. 425.

51O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 309, 329.

52gCott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, pp. 146-47; Bearss, p. Ill; Bonner, "Sketches of the Campaign of 1864: Battle of Pleasant Hill," p. 8; Pellet, pp. 212-13; Bryner, p. 106. 155

53Pellet, p. 213.

■>4 Benson, pp. 500, 502; Childers,, p. 514.

^^Shorey, p. 99.

^Taylor, p. 168.

57O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 603-05.

58 Ibid., p. 568; Smith and Mullins, p. 222; Bonner, "Sketches of the Campaign of 1864: Battle of Pleasant Hill," p. 11.

59O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 568, 609; Debray, pp. 19-20; Bee, "Battle of Pleasant Hill—An Error Corrected," p, 185.

^Ibid.; Sliger, p. 458; Taylor, p. 174; Landers, p. 185.

^Johnson and Buel, IV:372.

62 O.R. XXXIV. Part i, 168; Taylor, p. 174.

^Johnson and Buel, IV:372.

^Ibid.; Taylor, p. 175; Parks, p. 412.

65O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 260, 263, 313, 459; Shoreÿ, p. 105; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, p. 141; Phisterer, pp. 500, 505.

6 6 O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 355.

67 Taylor, p. 171 CHAPTER VI: FAREWELL TO WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN

He who leaves a fight, loses it. French proverb

After the battle Generals William Dwight, William Emory, and

William Franklin met Banks at the Childers house to discuss the very question which the Army commander had by then decided—what to do next.

When he saw A.J. Smith shortly after dark, Banks had communicated his intention to push on to Shreveport the following day--a decision with which Smith agreed. Indeed, orders had already been sent to Lee and the cavalry to return with the wagons to Pleasant Hill. In the council- of-war that night, Banks' generals presented opposing views in an attempt to reverse that decision. The water in the town had been con¬ sumed entirely so the army definitely had to move one direction or the other, and move quickly. It could not await reinforcements at Pleasant

Hill. Emory's division had not eaten since the morning of the 8th.

Quartermaster John Chandler had sent a message that it would take two days to turn the wagons on that narrow road and return to Pleasant Hill.

(Again, a solution to this problem could have been found, but the prob¬ lem of water still remained.) Fear for the safety of the fleet was another issue raised to persuade Banks to retreat. Admiral Porter had encountered problems with the water level in the Red River since reach¬ ing Alexandria. If the water continued to fall, that artery would be lost as a means for supplying the Union army when it reached Shreveport.

The low water might even trap the fleet between Grand Ecore and Shreve¬ port, leaving it at the mercy of the Confederates. Banks was persuaded that "by falling back to Grand Ecore we should be able to ascertain the 157 condition of the fleet [and] the practicality of continuing the movement by the river....The Union generals estimated Taylor's strength at

22,000 when actually he had no more than 12,800 on the evening of 9

April. Banks' own force amounted to about 15,000 at Pleasant Hill with another 3,000 from Lee's cavalry and the Thirteenth Corps available on the road to Grand Ecore. But the concensus was that the Union army was outnumbered and only by retreating to Grand Ecore could the army reor¬ ganize and mass for another strike at Taylor.^ What no one considered, apparently, was the condition of the Confederate army. After long march¬ es and two major battles in which heavy losses were incurred, the army was tired and, as Kirby Smith stated, demoralized. Yet the Union gen¬ erals feared another defeat if they attacked.

One other reason for retreating was not stated at that conference.

That reason was the quality of leadership with which the three subordi¬ nate generals were saddled. "From what I have seen of General Banks’ ability to command in the field," said Franklin, "I was certain that an operation depending on plenty of troops, rather than upon skill in hand¬ ling them, was the only one which would have probability of success in his hands....Porter had said of Banks, "I never saw a more faultless- looking soldier."-* It was only when he tried to soldier that the faults showed.

Captain James L. Andrew and an escort from the 14th New York Cav¬ alry were despatched with a verbal message to Porter at Loggy Bayou in¬ forming him of the defeats. On the 10th, specific instructions were sent to Kilby Smith with Porter's fleet: "The general commanding directs that you return immediately to Grand Ecore with supply steamers and your 158 entire command. Please report to him upon your arrival."6 Porter backed his ships out of the bayou and started south.

About midnight A.J. Smith received Banks' order to retreat. Dumb¬ founded, he sought-out the Army commander for an explanation. Banks outlined his reasons and Smith countered that he neither had completed i burying his dead not collecting his wounded. The Sixteenth Corps com¬ mander asked to be allowed to remain until noon on the 10th to complete those tasks, but Banks refused. A subsequent request to remain until

9 a.m. was likewise refused. Seeking out Franklin, Smith proposed that

Banks be ousted from command and that Franklin take charge. Franklin sipped his coffee thoughtfully for a few minutes, then replied, "Smith, don't you know this is mutiny?Smith turned away and a short time later the order to withdraw reached the troops.

"Curses were loud and deep" among the soldiers as they received

Q the message to retreat. To their thinking they had won the battle, but to retreat smacked of defeat. Several subsequent letters from sol¬ diers who heard that order reveal their feelings toward Banks and the other generals. Sergeant Sidney Robinson of the 117th Illinois wrote:

The boys are mad, disheartened and discouraged on account of the way this expedition has been managed and Banks is a hiss and a byword for all of the Western troops here.... Banks has acted the part of a coward, has brot [sic] dis¬ grace and contempt on the American arms and one of my happiest days will be when we leave this department.°

Captain David McFarland wrote: "I think they [Franklin and Lee] are dead as Genls. Their becility [sic] and stupidity in allowing them¬ selves to become the easy pray [sic] to the rebels should never be forgiven. Porter reported that "General Banks lost all his prestige, 159 and the men talked so openly of him that our officers had to check them and threatened to have them punished.Nevertheless, after midnight the retreat began.

Away from Pleasant Hill the men of the Sixteenth and Nineteenth

Corps, marched—away from a tactical victory, away from an opportunity to destroy Taylor's army, away from their unburied dead, away from their untended wounded. Those wounded men who were ambulatory were brought off, but, as the medical wagons had earlier been sent to Grand Ecore, there was no transportation for those who. could not walk. Some were able to ride caissons. Others, like Private Rollin Mead, who had had his right arm removed at the shoulder during the evening, walked all night to avoid capture. Surgeons were left behind to care for the woun¬ ded, but only minimum supplies were available. On the 11th, under a flag of truce, Banks sent several wagons with medical supplies to the hospitals at Pleasant Hill. These supplies undoubtedly relieved the sufferings of many soldiers. The surgeons were afterwards released as 12 noncombatants and told of being well-treated by their captors.

At dawn on 10 April General Hamilton Bee pushed his pickets into

Pleasant Hill where they discovered the entire Union army gone. Taylor was informed and Lieutenant Colonel William Yager was sent in pursuit with Buchel's brigade. Broken wagons, dead horses, burned homes, and tearful women and children marked the way all too well. After 20 miles the cavalry reached the Double Bridges which had been burned. Yager 13 and his men then returned with about 100 stragglers as prisoners.

Despite being encumbered with about 500 prisoners, the Union army 160 was inarching fast. B.G. Goodrich was one of those prisoners and he

wrote:

As the Fédérais..., except for an occasional few minutes rest, made no halt until dark the next day, they must have been worse whipped than we were. As I marched with them, I know in what a hurry they were.

The army sang as it marched.;

In eighteen hundred and sixty-four, Foot balls, foot balls; In eighteen hundred and sixty-four, Foot balls, says I; In eighteen hundred and sixty-four, We all skedaddled to Grand Ecore, We'll all drink stone blind, Johnny, fill up the bowl]

Often the song ended in a shout of "NAPOLEAN P. BANKS]]"15 On the

afternoon of 11 April the Union force reached Grand Ecore, from where

Banks sent Steele, in Arkansas, the following message:

We have met the enemy in full force on the 8th and 9th and beat him both times, but have been compelled to fall back for want of water. His force is 22,000. The enemy will attack us, or assault you in force. Both must be ready.1”

The divisions of Walker, Parsons, and Tappan were on their way to

engage Steele. The men had marched leisurely back to Mansfield where

they drew new danteens, cartridge boxes, and other accouterments from

formerly-Union stocks. Polignac's division remained at Mansfield until

the 14th when it was sent in pursuit of Banks.1^

Federal prisoners, too, marched along with their captors, but they

were headed for prison at Camp Ford, Texas. Some marched farther than

others. On the night of the 11th, Sergeants William Guy and William

Falias of the 32d Iowa cooked beef and corned bread for the following

day's march. They were closely guarded until after midnight when they 161

each took some of the rations and ran for the woods. On 17 April they reached Grand Ecore with the news of how complete the Confederate defeat at Pleasant Hill had been.'*-®

While resting at Grand Ecore on the 13th, Banks wrote Grant that he intended to commence another advance toward Shreveport but by a

19 * different route. Circumstances were not to permit another advance, however, because the 30-day limit imposed on the use of A.J. Smith's divisions had expired. Sherman had sent a reminder to Banks that he

"must have A.J. Smith's troops now as soon as possible. I beg you will

expedite their return to Vicksburg.”20 But Banks was not to expedite

their return; indeed, he was not to release them until 22 May. Banks wrote Grant and Sherman that "the withdrawal of General Smith's force

at this time will place the army at the mercy of the enemy," but that

"as soon as it is in our power your wishes shall be complied with."22

Admiral Porter agreed with Banks' decision, for he worried that his

fleet might be trapped above Alexandria by the falling water. If A.J.

Smith abandoned Banks, Porter feared Banks might abandon him! The army

commander, however, assured him that there was no such possibility.23

Even after the setbacks which he had experienced, Banks was still

convinced of the necessity for the expedition. Without Smith's forces he knew there was no possibility of success. But with Smith, and if

Steele's command and the troops in Missouri and Kansas could join him

at Grand Ecore, he could destroy Confederate resistance west of the

Mississippi.2^ Banks estimated that 25,000 Confederate troops lurked

on his front. He wrote Grant: 162

If this expedition is abandoned without the destruction of the organized forces now in our front, it will leave the Red River in his possession, and enable him con¬ stantly to threaten the navigation of the Mississippi.25

Five days later Banks wrote:

The withdrawal of my command without the destruction or dispersion of this force will enable them to commence offensive operations in Missouri, Arkansas, or Louisiana... It will be difficult to concentrate any considerable force from the army on the Mississippi for operations against Mobile with such an active and powerful army in our rear. Hie destruction or dispersion of this army, the desolation of the country it occupies, and the destruction of the land or water transportation, will make it impossible for a reorganization or any movement against the States bordering upon the Mississippi, and enable a strong force of our troops to commence an immediate and successful campaign against Mobile.26

But Grant had had enough. He wanted Banks' army for the Mobile

campaign and that was that. On 7 April he sent Banks instructions which were received the following day:

I would much rather the Red River expedition had never been begun than that you should be detained one day after the 1st of May in commencing your movement east of the Mississippi. No matter what you have in contemplation, commence your concentration, to be followed without delay by your advance on Mobile. '

On 21 April Banks issued General Orders Number 39 calling for a

retreat to Natchitoches. From there the retreat led to Alexandria.^

The army was without two of the principals of the battles of 8 and 9

April, for on the 17th Brigadier General Stone was relieved as chief-

of-staff, and on the 18th Brigadier General Lee was relieved as cavalry

division commander.29 The axe had begun to fall.

General Richard Taylor and 3,000 cavalrymen and 2,000 infantrymen

of Polignac's division harassed the Union retreat at every opportunity. 163

At Monett's Ferry, Pineville, Wilson's Landing, and Mansura Taylor's on men struck hard at the Union army and fleet. Through a devastated

Louisiana the Confederates passed. According to Governor Allen, "Houses, gins, mills, barns, and fences were burned; negroes [sic] all carried off, horses, cattle, hogs, every living thing, driven away or killed,"31

The cavalry brigade of Colonel William H. Parsons, which had joined

Taylor after the battle at Pleasant Hill, extinguished the flames as

Natchitoches was set ablaze, but could not prevent the later burning of

Alexandria as the Fédérais withdrew.32 Governor Allen:

You can travel for miles...through a once thickly-settled country, and not see a man, nor a woman, nor a child, nor a four-footed beast. The farmhouses have been burned. The plantations deserted. The once smiling fields now grown up in briers and brakes, in parasites and poisonous vines. A painful melancholy, a death-like silence, broods over the land, and desolation reigns supreme.33

Residents who had sympathized or co-operated with the Union army suf¬ fered terribly at the hands of Confederate guerrillas for their sins.34

On 17 May 1864 the army of General Nathaniel P. Banks reached

Simmesport and was ferried across the Atchafalaya River, which the Con-

oc federate army was unable to cross. J The campaign was over.

Grant had also had enough of Banks, and he wanted him removed. On

22 April Grant had written Halleck "that to keep General Banks in com¬ mand was to neutralize a large force" and that "the best interest of the service demand that General Reynolds be placed in command at once."36

The matter was referred to President Lincoln who wanted more information before acting. To relieve Banks prematurely could spell political dis¬ aster in the upcoming elections as Banks had many influential friends. 164

Halleck wrote of this to Grant and also informed him that Franklin would 37 be the next senior officer, not Reynolds.

Despite misgivings about Franklin's reputation as a soldier, Grant concluded that "he is so much better than General Banks that I will

feel safer with him commanding midst danger than the latter."3® A re¬ port from Major General David Hunter, whom Grant had sent to observe conditions in the army of the Department of the Gulf, concluded that on "General Banks has not certainly the confidence of his army."-37 This convinced Grant that Banks had to go. Lincoln said later that "he had rather cousined up to Banks, but for some time past had begun to think he was erring."^® On 7 May the War Department issued General Orders

Number 192: "By direction of the President, Maj. Gen. E.R.S. Canby,

U.S. Volunteers, is assigned to the command of the Military Division of West Mississippi, which will include the Departments of Arkansas and of the Gulf."^ Through the simple expedient of establishing a superior headquarters, Banks was out and Canby was in, and Lincoln had eased him¬

self out of a sticky problem. In September Banks returned to Washington

and ' relinquished his command of the Department of the Gulf to Major

General Stephen A. Hurlbut. He would not return to Louisiana until af¬

ter the assassination of President Lincoln.^

One last effort was made to capture Shreveport during the Red River

campaign. This time the effort was not that of an army, but of the New

York Times. On 1 May the Times reported the rumor that Steele had cap¬

tured Shreveport. "It is quite possible that this news is true...."^ 165

NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

^Henry H. Childers, "Reminiscences of the Battle of Pleasant Hill," Annals of Iowa VII (October 1906):510; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 202.

2O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 184, 202, 204.

3CCW. p. 189; O.R. XXXIV. Part i, 184, 203, 484, 553, 563, 569.

4CCW. p. 35.

^Porter, pp. 218-19.

6Irwin, p. 324; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 380-81; O.R.N. 26, 44.

^O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 309; Hoffman, pp. 96-97; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, pp. 234, 236-37; John Homans, "The Red River Expe¬ dition," The Mississippi Valley. Tennessee. Georgia. Alabama. 1861-1864 (Boston: The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, 1910), cited by Johnson, p. 165.

^Bryner, p. 107.

^Sidney Zebina Robinson Papers, Illinois State Historical Library, quoted in Hicken, pp. 331-32.

10Ibid.. p. 331.

UO.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 171.

^•3CCW. p. 175; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, p. 145; Bry- ner, p. 106; Johnson, p. 165; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 204; Part iii, 125.

^•3O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 609; Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa. p. 197; Barr, "William T. Mechling's Journal," 368.

14O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 184; Goodrich, p. 103.

^Beecher, p. 326; Johnson, p. 206.

16O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 132.

l^Blessington, p. 241; Barr, Polignac's Texas Brigade, p. 41 166

l^Scott, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa, p. 392; A.J.H. Duganne, Twenty Months in the Department of the Gulf (New York: J.P. Robens, 1865), p. 363.

19O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 185.

28William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, 2 vols, in 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 2:13-14.

21O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 715.

22O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 186; Part iii, 266,

23CCW. p. 278; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 186; O.R.N. 26, 64.

24O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 187.

25Ibid., 186-87.

26ÇÇW, p. 393,

27O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 192.

28Ibid.. 244.

29Ibid.. 193, 211. For a discussion concerning the relief of Stone and Lee see Johnson, pp. 218-20*

30Johnson, p. 220; Winters, p. 371; O.R. XXXIV, Part i, 572.

3^Dorsey, p. 279.

32Parsons ' Texas Cavalry Brigade Association, A Brief and Condensed History of Parsons1 Texas Cavalry Brigade (Waxhachie, Texas: J.M. Fle- mister, Printer, 1892; reprint ed., Waco: W. M. Morrison, 2221 Parrott, 1962), p. 12.

33Dorsey, p. 279.

34Paul W. Gates, Agriculture and the Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 365.

35O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 633. 167

38Ibid.. 252-53. Joseph Jones Reynolds was.graduated from West Point in 1843 and commanded the 4th Division of the Nineteenth Corps in early 1864. See Boatner, pp. 694-95.

37O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 293, 332, 409.

38Ibid., 293-94.

39ibid.. 390.

^Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, ed. by Howard K. Beale, 2 vols. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1960), 11:26.

410.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 490.

^Harrington, p. 166; Frederick Dyer, A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion, vol 3: Regimental Histories (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959), p. 256.

^3New York Times. 1 May 1864. CHAPTER VII: END OF THE ROAD

..«one damned blunder from beginning to end.^ William T. Sherman

Federal troops would not enter Shreveport until 6 June 1865 after 2 the formal surrender of the Trans-Mississippi Department. The campaign up the Red River had failed to achieve a single goal for which it had been organized. Yet the United States won the war and the Confederate

States lost it. This final result proves conclusively that the reasons for the campaign were of only minor importance to the overall war ef¬ fort.

Maximilian's Mexican regime failed to pose a serious threat to

Texas during the time the United States was weakest. At the end of the war, 50,000 U.S. troops were sent to the border to reinforce demands for

French withdrawal, and, in March 1867, the French did withdraw and Maxi¬ milian was executed. Marked assistance to the Confederate government 3 from the Mexican authorities never materialized.

Despite Admiral Porter's contention that "cotton killed that expe¬ dition,"^ there was no truth to the statement. Cotton had been seized and shipped to New Orleans and Cairo, but in no way did the seizure af¬ fect the campaign. Most bales were taken while the army and navy were at Alexandria waiting for the water to rise. None of the delays experi¬ enced could be attributed to a desire on the part of the army officials to obtain cotton for personal profit. As only about 3,000 bales were shipped from Alexandria and 3,000 more from the Ouachita River region, this cotton failed either to affect the industrial output of the North or to finance military expeditions. The only publicity which Banks achieved from the cotton seizing was decidedly negative.^ 169

Elections in Louisiana towns also failed to achieve notable re¬

sults. Despite the election at Alexandria, the withdrawal of the Union presence in the area left the Unionist government composed of Orleans

Parish and 15 others under Federal occupation. As it was, Lincoln won

the election by a margin of 191 electoral votes. Louisiana did not participate in the election and its electoral votes would have made no

difference in the outcome.** Hie Committee on the Conduct of the War

viewed Banks' political maneuverings as "clearly a usurpation" of auth¬

ority,^ yet Lincoln had given Banks the authority to oversee all politi¬

cal arrangements in Louisiana.® The elections themselves, however, had no influence upon the failure of the expedition.

Two reasons existed for the Trans-Mississippi Department being the

last Confederate department to surrender. The first is that the indus¬

trial activity of the region, of which Shreveport was the hub, was never

destroyed. Arsenals and factories continued to produce goods to sustain

Kirby Smith's army until the end of the war. But what if Banks had

reached Shreveport? Could not many of the facilities have been moved,

as some had been from Camden? The Union army would have had to continue

on to Marshall and Jefferson to complete the destruction of existing

industries. For the Union army to have sustained and protected itself

so far from its supply bases on the Mississippi River would have been

exceedingly difficult if not impossible. But Banks and his army were

driven back, the factories continued to produce, and the Trans-Missis¬

sippi army continued to be sustained.

Was the Department and its army worth the effort of the United

States Army and Navy to destroy it? The answer, one which Grant fully 170 realized, was no. Once the Navy gained complete control of the Missis¬ sippi River following the fall of Port Hudson, the Trans-Mississippi

South was effectively isolated from the eastern Confederate states.

Only one major effort was made to transfer Confederate troops from west to east across the Mississippi and that effort failed. It failed, iron¬ ically, not because of the Union fleet, but because the men refused to go. While planning the crossing, General Richard Taylor estimated that no more than 4,000 men could be crossed during one night, and no wagons or artillery could be ferried across. Once the Fédérais learned of a crossing, the river would be blocked by gunboats and it would be a con¬ siderable time before other troops could be gotten across. By mid-1864 only about 30,000 effective troops remained scattered across the Trans-

Mississippi Department, certainly not a force which, even if able to o be massed, could decisively influence the course of the war. The se¬ cond reason the Department existed until May 1865 was that is simply was not worth the expenditure of time, men, and money to subdue.

A major result of the campaign was the loss of Union manpower for upcoming campaigns. A.J. Smith's divisions arrived at Vicksburg on 23

May, too late to accompany Sherman who had begun the Atlanta campaign on 7 May. What effect the loss of Smith's 10,000 men had on Confederate

General Joseph E. Johnston's ability to conduct his delaying action can only be surmised. Since the inception of the idea for the Red River

campaign, Grant and Sherman had stressed the importance of speed so that

Mobile could be seized in conjunction with the movement on Atlanta.

Grant had championed an expedition against Mobile in July 1863. Such a maneuver, he reasoned, would place a large Union force in the rear of 171

Confederate General Braxton Bragg's army and probably force him to weaken his defenses at Chattanooga. A Union advance from Mobile to

Montgomery would further split the Confederacy and open the possibility

for a drive to Atlanta.^® Grant wrote of his plan to Halleck:

I propose...to move by way of New Orleans and Pasca¬ goula on Mobile. Should the enemy make an obstinate resistance at Mobile I would fortify outside and leave a garrison sufficient to hold the garrison of the town, and with the balance of the army make a campaign into the interior of Alabama and possibly Georgia. It seems to me this move would secure the entire states of Alabama and Mississippi and a part of Georgia, or force Lee to abandon Virginia and North Carolina. Without this course the enemy have not got army enough to resist the army I can take.H

Instead, Halleck sent the army to Louisiana. With the threat to Mobile

eased, 15,000 men of General Leonidas Polk's Army of the Mississippi were diverted from defense of the Gulf port city to face Sherman march-

ing south from Chattanooga. 12 Added to the army of Joe Johnston, these

troops played a considerable role in resisting the Union advance. Grant wrote Halleck:

General Banks, by his failure, has absorbed 10,000 veteran troops that should now be with General Sherman and 30,000 of his own that would have been moving toward Mobile, and this without accomplishing anÿ good result.^

Strategically the campaign was doomed to fail, but tactically it

should have succeeded. Banks had overwhelming forces and supplies at

his disposal; yet, through the mismanagement of these resources, he was

repulsed short of his goal. From the beginning the planning was poor.

Banks failed to provide Franklin sufficient notice to assemble his com¬

mand and begin marching from south Louisiana, although the resulting

delay was unimportant because of the low water-level at Alexandria. 172

Halleck failed both to provide concrete direction and to designate an overall commander for the operation to coordinate the separate forces.

Banks failed to insist that a commander be designated. When the army and fleet reached Grand Ecore, the prospects for success were bright; but there Banks blundered. By failing to make a thorough reconnaissance to determine the most-suitable route for his army—a reconnaissance for which there was time—Banks chose a route which led away from the Red

River and ran through Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. This movement away from the supply ships necessitated a supply train which was so monstrous that the column stretched for miles. The column was so long, in fact,

4 that the front and rear were not mutually supporting!

Franklin erred by issuing his confusing directive to keep the train closed up and by insisting that the cavalry wagons be placed be¬ tween the cavalry and infantry. After the cavalry clash at Wilson's

Farm on 7 April, it became obvious that Confederate resistance was stif¬ fening; yet Banks and Franklin failed to dispose the column so that it would be prepared to fight. Instead, the infantry marched in three separate detachments with the second and third groups nine and 24 miles respectively behind the first and in position to be defeated in detail.^

At Mansfield the Union position, although weakened by a sharp angle, could have been held quite easily had sufficient infantry been available. Franklin explained that

had the battle been postponed until late the next day, we could have brought 20,000 infantry against the rebels in one body.... Had it been postponed until early the next morning, we could have commenced the fight with 11,000 infantry, and certainly could have held our ground until the arrival of General A.J. Smith with 9,000 fresh men. ^ 173

Franklin failed, however, to take into account the fact that the Union army faced the aggressive General Richard Taylor. How, under the cir¬ cumstances, the fight could have been postponed is not clear. Had Gen¬ eral Albert Lee's cavalry been used simply to provide information, the circumstances would have been different. Then there would have been no infantry to provoke a general engagement, and the Union commanders would have had time to dispose their infantry to counter any threat from

Taylor.

At Pleasant Hill the disastrous Union position almost cost Banks another defeat. Hie Union army won the battle, however, but lost the opportunity to regain the offensive as Banks ordered a retreat. Sher¬ man wrote Porter that

I cannot comprehend why Banks, after his second fight, when the fact is undoubted he had checked the enemy and had his front open, did not push on to Coushatta. It would then have had all the moral effect of a vic¬ tory, and his losses, though heavy, would have been felt less.

Banks and many of his soldiers wanted to continue, but Franklin, Dwight, and others advised against it. These generals took their eyes off the mission and focused on the circumstances. Once accomplishing the mis¬

sion became secondary, the campaign could not succeed.

"But what General Banks lacks in being a great General, he makes up in being a philanthropist, a humanitarian, a statesman, and a gentle¬ man,"1^ wrote Major Elias Pellet, adjutant of the 114th New York.

Therein lies the major problem. Banks was "a philanthropist, a humani¬

tarian, a statesman, and a gentleman," and not a general, but he was placed in command of an army. The practice of rewarding political 174 friendship with military rank was quite prevalent after the shots at

Fort Sumter. Slowly Lincoln and others had realized that soldiering was a profession, not an avocation. Nevertheless, Banks retained his commission for political reasons, despite his lack of military know¬ ledge; and his ineptitude continued to handicap the Union army. Fail¬ ure at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill must rest equally with Banks, who commanded the army, and with Lincoln, who appointed him to command the army.

From the Confederate standpoint, the results of the Red River cam¬ paign and the battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill were creditable.

Twenty-one artillery pieces, 250 wagons, and 2,500 prisoners had accrued to the Confederates since Banks first ventured into the Red River val¬ ley; Banks and his army had been driven back, but had not been destroyed.

Taylor believed that total destruction of Banks' army was within his grasp and that another battle would reap the fruits of the previous victories.

Whether the Confederate army should have pursued Banks rather than turning to face Steele after Pleasant Hill is a key question. Immedi¬ ately after the battle the Confederate army was in no condition to pur¬ sue except with a small cavalry force. Had Taylor attacked Banks in his entrenchments at Grand Ecore, a slaughter probably would have re¬ sulted. Kirby Smith recognized that distinct probability: "If we could not whip him at Pleasant Hill in a fair fight, it would have been madness to have attacked him at Grand Ecore in his intrenchments, sup¬ ported by a formidable fleet of gun-boats."^ Furthermore, Banks' army still out-numbered the Confederates, whereas Steele was marching across 175

Arkansas with only 10,400 men—a force more equal to what Kirby Smith

could throw against him.^0 The probability for success, therefore,

appeared greater against Steele than against Banks, especially as Steele was not encamped in a fortified position.

Subsequent events provide no clear answer as to what course Kirby

Smith should have pursued. At Jenkins' Ferry, Arkansas, the Confeder¬

ate army had a great opportunity to destroy Steele, but* through tacti¬

cal bungling, the Union army escaped to Little Rock. Taylor, with

Polignac's division and Bee's cavalry, attacked Banks at Monett's Ferry

and achieved excellent results despite the great disparity in numbers.

Had Walker's and Churchill's divisions been engaged, a severe defeat

might have been inflicted upon the Union army, but it is quite doubtful

the army could have been destroyed. Banks continued to Alexandria and

then to Simmesport. The result was that Kirby Smith's strategy of

fighting one column while allowing the other to withdraw succeeded.

There are many "what ifs" connected with any decision of the type

Smith had to make. "What if" Banks had been able again to move toward

Shreveport from Grand Ecore? "What if" Smith had massed against Banks

south of Natchitoches and Steele had continued on to Shreveport? The

t task of a military commander is not an easy one. He must make rapid

decisions based on the information which he has available to him at the

moment. He knows that men's lives depend on his decisions and that

knowledge is a tremendous burden. The more-important the commander,

the more he is susceptible to the "second-guessing" of historical per¬

spective. In the case of whether to pursue Banks, Kirby Smith made a

decision which accomplished his objectives. Banks and Steele were 176

thrown back from the gates of Shreveport, the Trans-Mississippi Depart¬ ment continued to function, and the Confederate army remained intact.

Mansfield and Pleasant Hill were past. But now they were more than

just dots on the map, for at Mansfield (Sabine Crossroads) the expedi¬

tion had reached a dead-end. It was a dead-end for the Union army's

drive on Shreveport, and it was a dead-end for the aspirations of the

Union army commander. 177

NOTES FOR CHAPTER VII

^Sandburg, 111:17.

^Winters, p. 427.

^Richard M. Ketchum, The American Heritage Picture History of The Civil War, narrative by Bruce Catton (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), p. 263; Encyclopaedia Britannica. 15th ed., s.v. "Maxi¬ milian."

4CCW. p. 2.

5ÇÇW, p. xliv. See CCW, pp. iii-xv, for majority report and CCW. pp. xvi-xlix, for minority report.

^Winters, p. 389; Reader1s Digest 1974 Almanac and Yearbook (Reader's Digest Association, 1974), p. 336.

^CCW. p. xv.

®Roy P. Bas1er, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. 9 vols. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953), VII:89- 90.

^Kerby, pp. 324, 328-29.

*®Irwin, p. 347; Boatner, p. 30; J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1929), p. 158.

U0.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 349-50.

12O.R. XXXVIII. Part iii, 679; Johnson, p. 279.

13O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 316.

14CCW. p. 33.

15O.R. XXXIV, Part iii, 473-74.

16Ibid.. 410-11.

^•^Pellet, p. 241.

^Blessington, p. 203 178

190.R. XXXIV, Part i, 485.

20Ibid.. 657. 179

APPENDIX A

CONFEDERATE UNITS ENGAGED AT MANSFIELD AND PLEASANT HILL

Texas Cavalry Corps (Brigadier General Thomas Green)

Bee's Cavalry Division - Brigadier General Hamilton P. Bee

Debray's Cavalry Brigade - Brigadier General Xavier B. Debray 23d Texas Cavalry* - Colonel Nicholas C. Gould 26th Texas Cavalry - Lieutenant Colonel J.J. Myers 32d (officially 36th) Texas Cavalry - Colonel Peter C. Woods

Buchel's Cavalry Brigade - Colonel Augustus C. Buehel (Killed at Pleasant Hill, succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel William 0. Yager) 1st Texas Cavalry - Lieutenant Colonel William 0, Yager 35th Texas Cavalry* - Colonel James B. Likens Terrell's Texas Cavalry - Colonel Alexander Watkins Terrell

Major's Cavalry Division - Brigadier General James P. Major

Lane's Cavalry Brigade - Colonel Walter P. Lane (Wounded at Mansfield, succeeded by Colonel George W. Baylor) 1st Texas Regiment Partisan Rangers - Lieutenant Colonel R.P. Crump 2d Texas Regiment Partisan Rangers - Colonel Isham Chisum 2d Cavalry Regiment, Arizona Brigade - Colonel George Baylor (succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel John W. Mullen after Baylor took command of the brigade) 3d Cavalry Regiment, Arizona Brigade - Lieutenant Colonel George T. Madison

Bagby's Cavalry Brigade - Brigadier General Arthur P. Bagby 4th Texas Cavalry - Colonel William P, Hardeman 5th Texas Cavalry - Colonel Henry C. McNeill 7th Texas Cavalry - Lieutenant Colonel Philemon T, Herbert 13th Texas Cavalry Battalion - Lieutenant Colonel Edward Waller

Steele's Cavalry Division* - Brigadier General William Steele

Parsons ' Cavalry Brigade - Colonel William H. Parsons 12th Texas Cavalry - Colonel William H. Parsons 19th Texas Cavalry - Colonel Nathaniel M. Burford 21st Texas Cavalry - Colonel G.W. Carter Morgan's Texas Cavalry Battalion - Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Morgan Pratt's Battery - Captain J.H. Pratt

♦Arrived shortly after battle of Pleasant Hill and engaged in pursuit of Banks' army. 180

Walker's Texas Infantry Division (Major General John G. Walker)

1st Brigade - Brigadier General Thomas N. Waul 8th (officially 12th) Texas Infantry - Colonel Overton C. Young 18th Texas Infantry - Colonel William Henry King 22d Texas Infantry - Colonel Richard B. Hubbard 13th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) - Colonel Anderson F. Crawford Haldeman's Texas Artillery Battery - Captain Horace Haldeman

2d Brigade - Brigadier General Horace Randal 11th Texas Infantry - Colonel Oran M. Roberts 14th Texas Infantry - Colonel Edward Clark 6th Texas Cavalry Battalion (Dismounted) - Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Gould 28th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) - Colonel Eli H. Baxter Daniel's Texas Artillery Battery - Captain James M. Daniel

3d Brigade - Brigadier General William R. Scurry 3d Texas Infantry - Colonel Philip N. Luckett (diverted to Shreveport and saw no action) 16th Texas Infantry - Colonel George Flournoy 17th Texas Infantry - Colonel George Washington Jones 19th Texas Infantry - Colonel Richard Waterhouse, Jr, 16th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) - Colonel William Fitzhugh Edgar's Texas Artillery Battery - Captain William Edgar (Battery was captured at Henderson's Hill)

Churchill's Divisions (Brigadier General Thomas J, Churchill)

Arkansas Division - Brigadier General James C. Tappan

Tappan's Brigade - Colonel H.L. Grinsted 19th and 24th Arkansas Infantry (Consolidated) - Lieutenant Colonel William R, Hardy 27th and 38th Arkansas Infantry (Consolidated) - Colonel R.G. Shaver 33d Arkansas Infantry - Colonel H.L, Grinsted (Lieutenant Colonel Thomas D. Thomson probably commanded the regiment during the campaign.)

Gause's Brigade - Colonel Lucien C. Gause 26th Arkansas Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel Iverson L. Brooks 32d Arkansas Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel William Hicks 36th Arkansas Infantry - Colonel James M. Davie

Etter's 4-gun Battery - Captain Chambers B. Etter 181

Missouri Division - Brigadier General Mosby M. Parsons

First Brigade - Brigadier General John B. Clark, Jx. 8th Missouri - Colonel Charles S. Mitchell 9th Missouri - Colonel Richard H. Musser Ruffner's 4-gun Battery - Captain Samuel T. Ruffner

Second Brigade - Colonel Simon P. Burns 10th Missouri - Colonel William M. Moore llth Missouri - Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Murray 12th Missouri - Colonel Willis M. Ponder 16th Missouri - Lieutenant Colonel P.W.H. Cumming 9th Missouri Battalion Sharpshooters - Major L.A. Pindall Lesueur's 4-gun Battery - Captain A.A. Lesueur

Mouton's Division (Brigadier General Alfred Mouton) (killed at Mansfield, succeeded by Brigadier General Camille de Polignac)

Polignac's Brigade - Brigadier General Camille de Polignac (succeeded by Colonel James R. Taylor who was also killed at Mansfield; succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D, Stone) 15th Texas Infantry - Colonel J.W. Speight (sick leave in Texas) (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James E. Harrison) 17th Texas Consolidated Cavalry (Dismounted) - Colonel James R. Taylor [succeeded by Colonel (?) John A. Wharton1 22d Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) - Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Stone 31st Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) - Major Frederick Malone 34th Texas Cavalry - Lieutenant Colonel John H. Caudle

Gray's Brigade - Colonel Henry Gray Crescent Regiment - Colonel J.H. Beard 18th Louisiana Infantry - Colonel Leopold L. Armant 28th Louisiana Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel William Walker

Texas Cavalry Corps Artillery (Major Oliver J, Semmes)

Moseley's Texas Artillery Battery - Captain William G. Moseley Valverde Texas Artillery Battery - Captain T.D. Nettles McMahan's Texas Artillery Battery - Captain M.V. McMahan West's Louisiana Horse Artillery Battery - Captain John A.A. West

2d Louisiana Cavalry (Colonel William G. Vincent)

1st Confederate Regular Light Artillery (Captain John T. Mason Barnes) 182

APPENDIX B

UNION UNITS ENGAGED IN THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN

Army, Department of the Gulf (Major General Nathaniel P. Banks)

Army Headquarters Troops Companies "A" and "B" Headquarters Troops - Captain Richard W, Francis Company "C" (Escort) - Captain Frank Sayles

Cavalry Division (Brigadier General Alfred F. Lee)

First Brigade - Colonel Thomas J. Lucas 16th Indiana (Mounted Infantry) - Lieutenant Colonel James H. Redfield 2d Louisiana (Mounted Infantry) - Major Alfred Hodsden 6th Missouri Cavalry - Captain Sidney A. Breese 14th New York Cavalry - Major Abraham Bassford

Third Brigade - Colonel Harai Robinson 87thIllinois (mounted Infantry) - Lieutenant Colonel John M. Crebs . 1st Louisiana Cavalry - Major Algernon S. Badger

Fourth Brigade - Nathan A.M. "Gold Lace" Dudley 2d Illinois Cavalry - Major Benjamin F. Marsh, Jr. 3d Massachusetts Cavalry - Lieutenant Colonel Lorenzo D. Sargent 31st Massachusetts (Mounted Infantry) - Captain Elbert H. Fordham 8th New Hampshire (Mounted Infantry) - Colonel Hawkes Fearing (detailed for court-martial duty in New Orleans, command devolved on Lieutenant Colonel George A. Flanders who was on leave in the North on 8 and 9 April. Major Thomas Connelly was acting com¬ mander at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill.)

Fifth Brigade - Colonel Oliver P. Gooding 2d New York Veteran Cavalry - Colonel Morgan H. Chrysler 18th New York Cavalry - Colonel James J. Byrne 3d Rhode Island Cavalry (Detachment) - Major George R. Davis

Cavalry Division Artillery 2d Massachusetts Battery Light Artillery - Captain Ormand F. Nims Battery "G," 5th United States Artillery - Captain H.H. Rottaken (At Mansfield Rottaken actually commanded several of the guns served by the 6th Missouri Cavalry. Lieutenant J.B. Rawles then commanded Battery "G.") 183

Thirteenth Corps Detachment (Brigadier General Thomas E. G. Ransom)

3d Division - Brigadier General Robert A. Cameron

First Brigade - Lieutenant Colonel Aaron M. Flory 46th Indiana Infantry - Captain William M. DeHart 29th Wisconsin Infantry - Major Bradford Hancock

Second Brigade - Colonel William A. Raynor 24th Iowa Infantry - Major Edward Wright 28th Iowa Infantry - Colonel John Connell 56th Ohio Infantry - Colonel Sampson E. Varner

Division Artillery Battery "A," 1st Missouri Light Artillery - Lieutenant Charles A. Callehan

4th Division - Colonel William J. Landrum

First Brigade - Colonel Frank Emerson 19th Kentucky Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel John Cowan 77th Illinois Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel Lysander Webb (killed at Mansfield, succeeded by Major John A. Burdett) 67th Indiana Infantry (non-veterans of 60th Indiana Infantry attached) Major Francis A. Sears 23d Wisconsin Infantry - Major Joseph E. Greene

Second Brigade - Colonel Joseph W, Vance (wounded at Mansfield, succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Albert H. Brown) 130th Illinois Infantry - Major John B. Reid 48th Ohio Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W, Lindsey 83d Ohio Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel William H, Baldwin 96th Ohio Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel Albert H. Brown

Corps Artillery - Captain Patrick H. White, Chief of Artillery Chicago Mercantile Battery - Lieutenant Pinckney S, Cone 1st Battery Indiana Light Artillery - Captain Martin Klauss

Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps Detachments (Brigadier General Andrew J. Smith)

Sixteenth Corps Detachment (Brigadier General Andrew J. Smith)

1st Division - Brigadier General Joseph A. Mower

Second Brigade - Colonel Lucius F, Hubbard 47th Illinois Infantry - Colonel John D. McClure 5th Minnesota Infantry - Major John C. Becht 8th Wisconsin Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel John W. Jefferson 184

Third Brigade - Colonel Sylvester G. Hill 35th Iowa Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel William B. Keeler 33d Missouri Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel William H. Heath (wounded at Pleasant Hill, succeeded by Major George Van Beck)

3d Division - Brigadier General Joseph A. Mower

First Brigade - Colonel William F. Lynch 58th Illinois Infantry - Major Thomas Newlan 119th Illinois Infantry - Colonel Thomas J. Kinney 89th Indiana Infantry (non-veterans of 52d Indiana Infantry attached) - Colonel Charles D. Murray

Second Brigade - Colonel William T. Shaw 14th Iowa Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Newbold 32d Iowa Infantry - Colonel John Scott 27th Iowa Infantry - Colonel James I. Gilbert 24th Missouri Infantry (non-veterans of 21st Missouri Infantry attached) - Major Robert W, Fyan

Third Brigade - Colonel Risdon M. Moore 49th Illinois Infantry - Major Thomas W. Morgan 117th Illinois Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Merriam 178th New York Infantry - Colonel Edward Wehler

Division Artillery 3d Battery, Indiana Light Artillery - Captain James M. Cockefair 9th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery - Captain George R. Brown

Seventeenth Corps Detachment (Brigadier General T. Kilby Smith)

First Brigade - Colonel Jonathan B. Moore 41st Illinois Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel John N. Hale 3d Iowa Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel James Tullis 33d Wisconsin Infantry - Major Horatio H. Virgin

Second Brigade - Colonel Lyman M, Ward 81st Illinois Infantry - Colonel Andrew W. Rogers 95th Illinois Infantry - Colonel Thomas W. Humphrey 14th Wisconsin Infantry - Captain C.M.G. Mansfield

Corps Artillery Battery "M," 1st Missouri Light Artillery - Lieutenant John H. Tiemeyer

Nineteenth Corps Detachment (Major General William B. Franklin)

1st Division - Brigadier General William H. Emory

First Brigade - Brigadier General William Dwight 185

29th Maine Infantry - Colonel George L. Beal 114th New York Infantry - Colonel Samuel R. PerLee (on leave, Lieutenant Colonel Henry B. Morse wounded at Mansfield, succeeded by Major Oscar H. Curtis) 116 th New York Infantry - Colonel George M. Love 153d New York Infantry - Colonel Edwin P. Davis 161st New York Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel W.B. Kinsey

Second Brigade - Brigadier General James W. McMillan 15th Maine Infantry - Colonel Issac Dyer 13th Maine Infantry - Colonel Henry Rust 160th New York Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel John B. VanPetten 47th Pennsylvania Infantry - Colonel Tilghman H. Good

Third Brigade - Colonel Lewis Benedict (killed Pleasant Hill, succeeded by Colonel Francis Fessenden) 30th Maine Infantry - Colonel Francis Fessenden, succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Hubbard 162d New York Infantry - Lieutenant Colonel Justus W. Blanchard 165th New York Infantry (also known as 2d Duryea's Zouaves) - Lieutenant Colonel Gouverneur Carr 173d New York Infantry - Colonel Lewis M. Peck (deserted field at Pleasant Hill, succeeded by Captain Howard C. Conrady)

Division Artillery - Captain George T. Hebard, Chief of Artillery 25th New York Artillery - Captain John A. Grow (commanded by Lieutenant Irving D. Southworth at Pleasant Hill) Battery "L," 1st United States Artillery (members of 13th Battery Massachusetts Light Artillery attached) - Lieutenant Franck E. Taylor 1st Vermont Artillery - Lieutenant Edward Rice

2d Division Brigadier General Cuvier Grover (remained at Alexandria)

Corps Artillery Reserve - Captain Henry B. Closson, Chief of Artillery 1st Battery, Deleware Light Artillery - Captain Benjamin Nields Batteries "G" and "H," 1st Indiana Heavy Artillery (also known as 21st Indiana Infantry) - Captain William S. Hinkle

Army Engineer Brigade (Colonel George D. Robinson)

3d Engineers, Corps d'Afrique - Lieutenant Colonel George A. Harmount 5th Engineers, Corps d'Afrique - Lieutenant Colonel Uri B. Pearsall

Corps D'Afrique First Brigade (Colonel William H. Dickey)

1st Infantry (73d U.S. Colored Troops) - Major Hiram E. Perkins 3d Infantry (75th U.S. Colored Troops) - Colonel Henry W. Fuller 12th Infantry (84th U.S. Colored Troops) - Captain James H. Corrin 22d Infantry (92d U.S. Colored Troops) - Colonel Henry N. Frisbie 187

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

A. Unpublished Works :

Harding (Miss Sidney) Diaries, 1863-1864* Quoted in Winters, The Civil War in Louisiana* p. 357.

Hatton, Roy 0. "Prince de Polignac and the American Civil War, 1863- 1865." Master's thesis, Northwestern State College, Natchitoches, Louisiana, 1963.

Hyatt (Arthur W.) Papers and Diaries, 1861-1865. Quoted in Winters, The Civil War in Louisiana, p. 340.

Meiners, Fredericka Ann. "Hamilton Prioleau Bee." Master's thesis, Rice University, Houston, Texas, 1972.

Morning report of Company "F," 22d Texas Cavalry (Dismounted), Polignac's Regiment. Signed by W.J. Notley.

National Archives, Washington, D.C. Records Group No. 77, Civil Works Map File. Maps M125-1 and M125-2.

Official Report of Colonel Henry Gray of the Engagement of the 9th and 10th April 1864 [sic], the Battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill.

Robinson (Sidney Zebina) Papers, Illinois State Historical Library. Quoted in Hicken, Illinois in the Civil War, pp. 331-32.

Stark, John Thomas. Diary, 25 September 1863-13 October 1864.

Thorp, John Gray. "The Battle of Mansfield." n.d.

Valentine, Irion, "The Battle of Mansfield, April 8, 1864." Address given to United Daughters of the Confederacy Convention, 1951.

Ware, Sarah F. "General Banks's Red River Campaign of 1864." Master's thesis, University of Texas, 1931.

B. Newspapers :

Coushatta Citizen. 27 February 1964.

Galveston Tri-Weekly News. 18 April 1864.

Houston Daily Telegraph. 13, 18, 20 April 1864. 188

New York Herald, 20 March 1864.

New York Times, 1 May 1864.

New York Tribune. 11 April 1864.

Shreveport Journal. 25 June 1975.

C. Published Works :

An Historical Sketch of the 162d Regiment N.Y, Vol. Infantry. 19th Army Corps. 1862-1865. Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1867. r"

Anderson, John Q., ed. Campaigning with Parsons1 Texas Cavalry Brigade. C.S.A.. The War Journals and Letters of the Four Orr Brothers. 12th Texas Cavalry Regiment. Waco, Texas: Texian Press, 1967.

Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Missouri for the Year Ending December 31. 1865. Jefferson City: Emory S. Foster, 1866.

Arceneaux, William. Acadian General: Alfred Mouton and the Civil War. Lafayette: University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1972.

Badeau, Adam. Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, from April. 1861. to April. 1865. 3 vols. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1885.

Barr, Alwyn. "Confederate Artillery in the Trans-Mississippi." Mili¬ tary Affairs XXVII (September 1963):77-83.

. Pollgnac's Texas Brigade. Texas Gulf Coast Historical Associa¬ tion Publication Series. Volume VIII, No. 1, November, 1964.

. "William T. Mechling's Journal of the Red. River Campaign, April 7-May 10, 1864." Texana I (Fall 1963):363-379.

Barron, Amos J. A History of Pleasant Hill, Louisiana, DeSoto Parish 1840-1881, Sabine Parish 1881-1968, featuring the Battle of Pleasant Hill April the 9th, 1864, as told by a Seventeen Year Old Girl. She Was There, n.p., 1968.

Bartlett, Napier, Military Record of Louisiana. Baton Rouge: Louisi¬ ana State University Press, 1964.

Basler, Roy P., ed. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. 9 vols. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953.

Bates, Samuel P. History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers. 1861-5. 5 vols. Harrisburg: B. Singerly, 1869. 189

Bearss, Edwin C., ed. A Louisiana Confederate: Diary of Felix Pierre Poche1. Translated by Eugenie Watson Somdal. Natchitoches: Louis¬ iana Studies Institute, Northwestern State University, 1972.

Bee, Hamilton P. "Battle of Pleasant Hill—An Error Corrected." Sou¬ thern Historical Society Papers VIII (April 1880): 184-186.

Beecher, Harris H. Record of the 114th Regiment. N.Y.S.V. Norwich, New York: J.F. Hubbard, Jr., 1866.

Benson, Solon F. "The Battle of Pleasant Hill, Louisiana." Annals of Iowa VII (October 1906):481-504.

Bentley, W.H. History of the 77th Illinois Volunteer Infantry. Sept. 2, 1862. - July 10. 1865. Peoria, Illinois: Edward Hines, Printer, 1883.

Bering, John A., and Montgomery, Thomas. History of the Forty-Eighth Ohio Vet. Vol. Inf. Hillsboro, Ohio: Highland News Office, 1880.

Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana. Nashville: The Southern Publishing Company, 1890.

Blessington, J.P. The Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division. New York: Lange, Little & Co., 1875; reprint ed. Austin: The Pemberton Press, 1968.

Boatner, Mark M. The Civil War Dictionary. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1959. '

Bonner, Thomas R. "Sketches of the Campaign of 1864: Battle of Mans¬ field," The Land We Love V (August 1868):459-66.

. "Sketches of the Campaign of 1864: Battle of Pleasant Hill." The Land We Love VI (November 1868):7-12.

Boyd, William K., ed. Military Reminiscences of Gen. Wm. R. Boggs. C.S.A. Durham, North Carolina: The Seeman Printery, 1913.

Bragg, Jefferson Davis. Louisiana in the Confederacy. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1941.

Bryner, Cloyd. Bugle Echoes : The History of Illinois 47th. Spring- field, Illinois: Phillips Brothers, 1905.

Cassidy, Vincent H., and Simpson, Amos E. Henry Watkins Allen of Louis¬ iana. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964.

Childers, Henry H. "Reminiscences of the Battle of Pleasant Hill." Annals of Iowa VII (October 1906):505-16. 190

Church, Frank L, Civil War Marine: A Diary of the Red River Expedi¬ tion. 1864. Edited by James P. Jones and Edward F. Keuchel. Washington: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1975.

Clark, Orten S. The One Hundred and Sixteenth Regiment of New York State Volunteers. Buffalo: Printing House of Matthews & Warren, 1868.

Cleveland, Mather. New Hampshire Fights the Civil War. New London, New Hampshire: Mather Cleveland, 1969.

Combs, D.S. "Texas Boys in the War." Confederate Veteran 35 (July 1927):265.

Davis, Edwin Adams. Heroic Years : Louisiana in the War for Southern Independence. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964.

Debray, Xavier Blanchard. A Sketch of the History of Debray1s (26th) Regiment of Texas Cavalry. Austin: Eugene Von Boeckmann Book and Job Printer, 1884; reprint ed., Waco: Waco Village Press, 1956.

Dorsey, Sarah A. Recollections of Henry Watkins Allen. New York: M. Doolady, 1866.

Duganne, A.J.H. Twenty Months in the Department of the Gulf. New York: J.P. Robens, 1865.

Dyer, Frederick H. A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion., 3 vols. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959.

Eliot, Ellsworth, West Point in the Confederacy. New York: G.A. Baker & Co., Inc., £941.

Encyclopaedia Britannica. 15th ed. S.v. "Maximilian."

Evans, Clement A., gen. ed. Confederate Military History. 12 vols. New York: Ihomas Yoseloff, 1962. Vol. X, part 1: Louisiana, by John Dimitry.

Ewer, James K. The Third Massachusetts Cavalry in the War for the Union. [Maplewood, Massachusetts: The William G.J. Perry press.], 1903.

Fitzhugh, Lester N. Texas Batteries. Battalions. Regiments. Commanders and Field Officers Confederate States Army 1861-1865. Midlothian, Texas: Mirror Press, 1959.

. "Texas Forces in the Red River Campaign, March-May, 1864." Texas Military His tory III (Spring 1963):15-22.

Flinn, Frank M. Campaigning with Banks in Louisiana. *63 and *64, and with Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley in '64 and '65. Lynn, Massa¬ chusetts: Press of Thomas P. Nichols, 1887. 191

Foch, Ferdinand. Precepts and Judgments. Translated by Hiliare Belloc. London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1919.

Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. Vol. 3; Red River to Appomattox. New York: Random House, 1974.

Forty-sixth Indiana Regimental Association. History of the Forty-Sixth Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry. Logansport, Indiana: Wilson, Humphreys & Co., 1888.

Fox, J.N. "Concerning the Battle of Mansfield, La." Confederate Vet¬ eran VIII (July 1900):325.

Fox, William F. Regimental Losses in the American Civil War. 1861-1865. Albany: Albany Publishing Company, 1893.

Fuller, J.F.C. The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1929.

Gates, Paul W. Agriculture and the Civil War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965.

Goodrich, B.G. "Battle of Mansfield, La." Confederate Veteran VIII (March 1900):103.

Gosnell, H„ Allen. Guns on the Western Waters : The Story of River Gunboats in the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949.

Gould, John M. History of the First - Tenth - Twenty-ninth Maine Regi¬ ment. Portland, Maine: Stephen Berry, 1871.

Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. 2 vols. New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1886.

Greeley, Horace. The American Conflict: A History of The Great Rebel¬ lion in the United States of America. 1860-'65. 2 vols. Hartford: O.D. Case & Company, 1867.

Hamilton, Holman. Zachary Taylor: Soldier in the White House. Indian¬ apolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1951.

Harrington, Fred Harvey. Fighting Politician: Major General N.P. Banks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948.

Headley, P.C. Massachusetts in the Rebellion. Boston: Walker, Fuller, and Company, 1866.

Heartsill, W.W. Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days in the Confederate Army. Bell Wiley, ed. Jackson, Tennessee: McCowat-Mercer Press, 1954. 192

Henderson, Harry McCorry. Texas in the Confederacy. San Antonio: The Naylor Company, 1955.

Hewitt, John E. Battle of Mansfield. Mansfield. Louisiana, Fought April Eighth. 1864. Mansfield: Kate Beard Chapter No. 397 Daugh¬ ters of the Confederacy, 1949. Originally published 1925, n.p.

Hicken, Victor. Illinois in the Civil War. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966.

Higginson, Thomas Wentworth. Massachusetts in the Army and Navy During the War of 1861-65. 2 vols. Boston: Wright and Potter Printing Co., 1896.

Hoffman, Wickham. Camp. Court, and Siege. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1877.

Homans, John. "The Red River Expedition," The Mississippi Valley. Ten¬ nessee. Georgia. Alabama. 1861-1864. Boston: The Military. Histori¬ cal Society of Massachusetts, 1910. Cited by Johnson, Politics and Cotton in the Civil War, p. 165.

Howe, M.A. DeWolfe, ed. Home Letters of General Sherman. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.

Ingersoll, Lurton Dunham. Iowa and the Rebellion. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1866.

Irwin, Richard B. History of the Nineteenth Army Corps. New York: G.P. Putnam's Spns, 1892.

Johnson, Ludwell H. Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958.

Kaiser, Leo M., ed. "The Civil War Diary of Florison D. Pitts." Mid- America: An Historical Review XL (January 1958):22-63.

Kerby, Robert L. Kirby Smith's Confederacy: The Trans-Mississippi South. 1863-1865. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

Ketchum, Richard M. The American Heritage Picture History of the Civil War. Narrative by Bruce Catton. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960.

Landers, H.L. "Wet Sand and Cotton - Banks' Red River Campaign." Lou¬ isiana Historical Quarterly XIX (January 1936): 150-95.

Lane, Walter P. The Adventures and Recollections of General Walter P. Lane. Marshall, Texas: News Messenger Pub. Co., 1928.

Lonn, Ella. Foreigners in the Confederacy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940. 193

. Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy. New York: Walter Neale, 1933.

Love, William DeLoss. Wisconsin in the War of the Rehellion: A His¬ tory of All Regiments and Batteries the State Has Sent to the Field. Chicago: Church and Goodman, 1866.

Lufkin, Edwin B. History of the Thirteenth Maine Regiment. Bridgton, Maine: H.A. Shorey & Son, 1898.

Marshall, T.B. His tory of the Eighty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry. Cincinnati: The Eighty-Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry Association, 1912.

Massachusetts Office of the Adjutant General. Massachusetts Soldiers. Sailors, and Marines in the Civil War, 8 vols. Norwood, Massachu¬ setts: Norwood Press, 1932.

Maury, Dabney H. "Sketch of General Richard Taylor." Southern His¬ torical Society Papers VII (1879):343-45.

Moore, Frank. The Rebellion Record : A Diary of American Events. 12 vols. New York: D. Van Nostrand, Publisher, 1865.

Moore, Waldo W. "The Defense of Shreveport--The Confederacy's Last Redoubt." Military Affairs XVII (August 1953):72-82.

Napolean I. Napolean's Maxims of War. Notes by General Bournod. Translated by Lieut.-Gen. Sir G.C. D'Aguilar. Philadelphia: David McKay, 1917.

Newsome, Edmond. Experience in the War of the Great Rebellion. Carbon- dale, Illinois: E. Newsome, 1879.

Nicolay, John G., and Hay, John. Abraham Lincoln: A History. 10 vols. New York: The Century Co., 1890.

Noel, Theophilus. A Campaign from Santa Fe to the Mississippi, Being a History of the Old Sibley Brigade. Edited by Martin Hardwick Hall and Edwin Adams Davis. Houston: Stagecoach Press, 1961.

. Autobiography and Reminiscences of Theophilus Noel. Chicago: Theo. Noel Company Print, 1904.

Paris, Comte de [Louis Philippe Albert d'Orleansl. History of the Civil War in America. 4 vols. Philadelphia: Porter & Coates, 1888.

Parks, Joseph Howard. General Edmund Kirby Smith, C.S,A. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954. 194

Parsons' Texas Cavalry Brigade Association. A Brief and Condensed His tory of Parsons' Texas Cavalry Brigade. Waxhachie, Texas: J.M. Flemister, Printer, 1892; reprint ed., Waco: W.M. Morrison, 2221 Parrott, 1962.

Pellet, Elias P. History of the 114th Regiment. New York State Volun¬ teers. Norwich, New York: Telegraph & Chronicle Power Press Print, 1866.

Phisterer, Frederick. New York in the War of the Rebellion. 1861 to 1865. Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1890.

Plummer, Alonzo H. Battle of Mansfield or Sabine Cross Roads. [n.p., n.d.]

. Confederate Victory at Mansfield. Mansfield: Kate Beard Chap¬ ter No. 397, United Daughters of the Confederacy, 1969.

Porter, David D, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1885.

Reader's Digest 1974 Almanac and Yearbook. Reader's Digest Association, 1974.

Red River Campaign Centennial. Texas Historical Foundation, 1964.

Reid, Whitelaw. Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen. Her Generals, and Soldiers. Vol. II: The History of Her Regiments and Other Military Organizations. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach & Baldwin, 1868.

Richardson, Frank L. "War As I Saw It." Louisiana Historical Quarterly VI (April 1923):223-54.

Sandburg, Carl. Abraham Lincoln. Vol. Ill: The War Years. New York: . Harcourt, Brace.& Company, 1939.

Sanger, Donald Bridgman. "Red River - A Mercantile Expedition." Tyler's Quarterly Magazine XVII (October 1935):70-81.

» Schwab, John Christopher, The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865: A Financial and Industrial History of the South During the Civil War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901.

Scott, John. Story of the Thirty Second Iowa Infantry Volunteers. Ne¬ vada, Iowa: By the author, 1896.

Scott, Reuben B. The History of the 67th Regiment Indiana Infantry Vol¬ unteers. Bedford, Indiana: Herald Books and Job Print, 1892.

Scribner, Théo. T. Indiana's Roll of Honor. 2 vols. Indianapolis: A.D. Streight, 1866. 195

Selfridge, Thomas 0, Memoirs of Thomas 0. Selfridge. Jr.. Rear Admiral, U.S,N. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1924.

Sherman, William T. Memoirs of General William T. Sherman. 2 vols, in one. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957.

Shorey, Henry A. The Story of the Maine Fifteenth; Being a Brief Nar¬ rative of the More Important Events in the History of the Fifteenth Maine Regiment. Bridgeton, Maine: Press of the Bridgeton News, 1890.

Sliger, J.E. "How General Taylor Fought the Battle of Mansfield, La." Confederate Veteran XXXI (December 1923):456-58.

Smith, Rebecca W., and Mullins, Marion, eds. "The Diary of H.C. Med¬ ford, Confederate Soldier, 1864." Southwestern Historical Quarterly XXXIV (January 1931):106-140, 203-230.

Snyder, Perry A. "Shreveport,Louisiana: 1861-1865; from Secession to Surrender." Louisiana Studies XI (Spring 1972):50-70.

Stanyan, John M. A History of the Eighth Regiment of New Hampshire Volunteers. Concord: Ira C. Evans, printer, 1892.

Stern, Philip Van Doren. The Confederate Navy: A Pictorial History. New York: Bonanza Books, 1962.

Stover, John F. The Railroads of the South: A Study in Finance and Control.. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1955.

Stuart, A.A. Iowa Colonels and Regiments : Being A History of Iowa Regiments in the War of the Rebellion. Des Moines: Mills & Company, 1865.

Taylor, Richard. Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late War. Edited by Charles P. Roland. Waltham, Massachu¬ setts: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1968.

Terrell, W.H. Indiana in the War of the Rebellion. 8 vols. Indian¬ apolis: Douglass and Conner, 1869.

"The Battle of Mansfield." The Southern Bivouac (May 1885):412-14.

United States Army Infantry School. Tactical Operations Handbook. Fort Benning, Georgia: U.S. Array Infantry School, 1970.

United States Congress. Joint Committee. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Vol. II: Red River Expedition. 38th Congress, 2d Session, 1864-1865. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1865. 196

United States Navy Department. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. 30 vols, and index. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894-1922. Series I, vol. 26: Naval Forces on Western Waters. from March 1^ to December 31. 1864.

War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 70 vols, in 127 and index. Washing¬ ton: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901.

Weinert, Richard P. "The Confederate Regulars in Louisiana." Loui¬ siana Studies VI (Spring 1967):53-71.

Welles, Gideon. Diary of Gideon Welles. Edited by Howard K. Beale. 2 vols. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1960.

West, Richard S. Mr. Lincoln’s Navy. New York: Longman's, Green and Company, 1957.

Whitcomb, Caroline E. History of the Second Massachusetts Battery (Nims' Battery) of Light Artillery 1861-1865. Concord, New Hamp¬ shire: The Rumford Press, 1912.

Wiley, Bell Irvin. The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1951.

Williams, J.M. The Eagle Regiment. 8th Wis. Inf'ty Vols. Belleville, Wisconsin: Recorder Print, 1890.

Williams, Richard Hobson. "General Banks' Red River Campaign." Loui¬ siana Historical Quarterly XXXII (January 1949): 103-44.

Williams, Thomas J. An Historical Sketch of the 56th Ohio Volunteer Infantry. Columbus, Ohio: The Lawrence Press, Co., n.d.

Winters, John D. The Civil War in Louisiana. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963.

Woods, J.T. Services of the Ninety-Sixth Ohio Volunteers. Toledo: Blade Printing and Paper, Co., 1874.

II. Secondary Sources

A. Unpublished Works :

Karnowski, Sister Mary Silverius. "Natchitoches During the Civil War and Reconstruction Period." Master's thesis, The Catholic University of America, 1949.

Muster roll of Company "H," 28th Infantry, 1862-1863. 197

B. Newspapers :

New York Tribune. 8, 25 April 1864.

C. Published Works :

Amann, William Frayne, ed. Personnel of the Civil War. 2 vols. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1961.

Anderson, Bern. B^ Sea and By River: The Naval History of the Civil War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.

Anderson, John Q. A Texas Surgeon in the C.S.A. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: Confederate Publishing Company, Inc., 1957.

, ed. Brokenbum: The Journal of Kate Stone. 1861-1868. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1955.

Barr, Alwyn. "Texas Losses in the Red River Campaign, 1864." Texas Military History III (Summer 1963):103-10.

Bush, Walter H. "Maj. William M. Bush." Confederate Veteran (December 1900):546-47.

Catton, Bruce. Grant Takes Command. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968.

Davis, Edwin Adams. Heritage of Valor : The Picture History of Louisi¬ ana in the Confederacy. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Archives & Records Commission, 1964.

Davis, Jackson Beauregard. "The Life of Richard Taylor." Louisiana Historical Quarterly XXIV (January 1941):49-126.

Evans, Clement A., gen. ed. Confederate Military History. 12 vols. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1962. Vol. X, part 2: Arkansas, by John M., Harrell.

. Confederate Military History. 12 vols. New York: Thomas Yose¬ loff, 1962. Vol. IX, part 2: Missouri, by John C. Moore.

Farber, James. Texas. C.S.A.: A Spotlight on Disaster. New York: The Jackson Coi, 1947. ""

Fortier, Alcee'. A His tory of Louisiana. Vol. IV: The American Domi¬ nation. New York: Manzi, Joyant & Co., 1904.

Holmes, Jack D.L. "The Battle of Sabine Crossroads," Civil War Times Illustrated. November 1962, pp. 14-19.

Jones, Virgil Carrington. The Civil War at Sea. 3 vols. New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1962. 198

Livermore, Thomas L. Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America. 1861-65. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900.

MacBride, Robert. Civil War Ironclads: The Dawn of Naval Armor. Phil¬ adelphia: Chilton Books, 1962.

McHatton-Ripley, Eliza. From Flag to Flag. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1889.

Missouri Adjutant General. Annual Report of the Adlutant General of Missouri for 1864. Jefferson City: W.A. Curry, 1865.

Nash, Howard P., Jr. A Naval History of the Civil War. New York: A.S. Barnes & Company, 1972.

Nevins, Allan. The War for the Union. Vol. Ill: The Organized War. 1863-1864. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971.

Noll, Arthur Howard. General Kirby-Smith. Sewanee, Tennessee: The University Press, 1907.

Pratt, Fletcher. Civil War on Western Waters. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956.

Reed, David W. Campaigns and Battles of the Twelfth Regiment Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infantry. Evanston: Major David W. Reed, 1903.

Roland, Charles P. Louisiana Sugar Plantations During the American Civil War. Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1957.

Scharf, J. Thomas. History of the Confederate States Navy from Its Or¬ ganization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel. 2 vols. New York: Rogers & Sherwood, 1887.

Smith, Walter George. Life and Letters of Thomas Kilby Smith. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1898.

Soley, James Russell. Admiral Porter. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1903.

[Stevens, A. Parsons], The Military History of Ohio. New York: H.H. Hardesty, 1886.

Union Soldiers and Sailors Monument Association. The Union Regiments of Kentucky. Louisville: Courier-Journal Job Printing Company, 1897.

Van Alstyne, Lawrence. Diary of an Enlisted Man. New Haven, Connecti¬ cut: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, 1910.

Waite, Otis F.R. New Hampshire in the Great Rebellion. Claremount, New Hampshire: Tracy, Chase & Company, 1870. 199

Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964.

. Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Commanders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959.

Weddle, Robert S. Plow-Horse Cavalry: The Caney Creek Boys of the Thirty-fourth Texas. Austin: Madrona Press, Inc., 1974.

West, Richard S., Jr. Gideon Welles: Lincoln's Navy Department. In¬ dianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1943.

. The Second Admiral: A Life of David Dixon Porter. 1813-1891. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1937.

Wooten, Dudley G., ed. A Comprehensive History of Texas. 1685-1897. 2 vols. Dallas: William G. Scarff, 1898.

Wright, Marcus J. Texas in the War, 1861-1865. Edited by Harold B. Simpson. Hillsboro, Texas: Hill Junior College Press, 1956.