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Annual Report 2018
2018 Annual Report 2 A DEFINING YEAR FOR NAMMO I am pleased to present Nammo’s In a world that is becoming ever Embodying our values of annual results for 2018. more divided and more fearful of Dedication, Precision and Care, its future, we look to the dedicated every day, in everything we do. I believe this might well be the year individuals who, whether in our out we will look back on as the one where A flat, non-bureaucratic organization, of uniform, work to keep us safe, we defined the future of our company. driven by customer needs, offering to help us explore, and to make a truly reliable advantage. We took a major step towards us proud. Nammo’s mission is becoming the world leader in range to enable these individuals to do We will simplify, streamline and extension technologies, which may just that. Our commitment to our improve our organization. We will lead to one of the biggest changes customers must go beyond what remove any obstacles that keep in the role of artillery and missiles can be captured by a contract. us from delivering our best. on the battlefield in decades. Nammo’s 2018 results, with record And we will remain committed to We concluded development of the sales and order books, confirm pursuing niche technologies that M72 Fire From Enclosure, allowing that this commitment is being both deliver not only on the requirements soldiers and marines to fight and recognized and appreciated. of today, but help our customers take win with far less risk to themselves on the challenges of tomorrow. -
Air Defence in Northern Europe
FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES AIR DEFENCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE Heikki Nikunen National Defence College Helsinki 1997 Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the National Defence College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the National Defence College. Editor: Kalevi Ruhala Editorial Assistant: Matti Hongisto Editorial Board: Chairman Prof. Pekka Sivonen, National Defence College Dr. Pauli Järvenpää, Ministry of Defence Col. Erkki Nordberg, Defence Staff Dr., Lt.Col. (ret.) Pekka Visuri, Finnish Institute of International Affairs Dr. Matti Vuorio, Scientific Committee for National Defence Published by NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE P.O. Box 266 FIN - 00171 Helsinki FINLAND FINNISH DEFENCE STUDIES 10 AIR DEFENCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE Heikki Nikunen National Defence College Helsinki 1997 ISBN 951-25-0873-7 ISSN 0788-5571 © Copyright 1997: National Defence College All rights reserved Oy Edita Ab Pasilan pikapaino Helsinki 1997 INTRODUCTION The historical progress of air power has shown a continuous rising trend. Military applications emerged fairly early in the infancy of aviation, in the form of first trials to establish the superiority of the third dimension over the battlefield. Well- known examples include the balloon reconnaissance efforts made in France even before the birth of the aircraft, and it was not long before the first generation of flimsy, underpowered aircraft were being tested in a military environment. The Italians used aircraft for reconnaissance missions at Tripoli in 1910-1912, and the Americans made their first attempts at taking air power to sea as early as 1910-1911. -
Assessment and Selection Process for the Bulgarian Special Forces
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2019-12 ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE BULGARIAN SPECIAL FORCES Vlahov, Petar Georgiev Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64090 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE BULGARIAN SPECIAL FORCES by Petar Georgiev Vlahov December 2019 Thesis Advisor: Kalev I. Sepp Second Reader: Michael Richardson Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2019 Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE BULGARIAN SPECIAL FORCES 6. AUTHOR(S) Petar Georgiev Vlahov 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. -
Nammo Ireland
NAMMO IRELAND INTRODUCTION AND PRODUCTS Derek Harris Business Development Manager Nammo Ireland Limited +353 87 211 9010 DEDICATION [email protected] PRECISION www.nammo.com CARE Nammo Proprietary Information NAMMO SPACE Product Areas: 4 Sites €19.6m Solid Rockets, Hybrid Rockets, Igniters, Launcher Engine Structures, Valves, Pressure Regulators, 3 Countries 145 People Mono- and Bi-propellant Thrusters and Engines Dublin [Ireland], Customers: Raufoss [Norway], France, Germany, Italy, Extensive Test Westcott/Cheltenham [UK] Israel, Japan, UK, USA Facilities Nammo Proprietary Information NAMMO SPACE ON VEGA Nammo Raufoss is responsible for the development of the Hydrogen Peroxide Propulsion System on the Vega-C/E upper stage [AVUM]. Nammo Ireland is responsible for the flow control valves in the Vega RACS system Nammo Proprietary Information NAMMO SPACE – ARIANE 5 and 6 V2.1 Engine Structures • Standard Vulcain hardware qualified for Ariane 5 • Designed, manufactured and tested by Nammo Ireland • Production contract for PC being negotiated New Vulcain structures for Ariane 6 • 2 New structures for Vulcain 2.1 engine • Analysis complete and hardware being produced for test Vinci Engine Structures • Structures have successfully passed qualification review Nammo Proprietary Information FLUID CONTROLS FOR SPACE • Flow Control Valve for Chemical Rocket Engine • Flow Control Valve for Launcher Subsystems e.g. Vega upper stage Roll and Attitude Control System • Cold Gas Thruster Valve • Cold Gas Pressure Regulator • Fill and Drain Valves • Non-Return Valves • Electronic Pressure Regulator • Propellant Flow Control Valve • CubeSAT Propellant Storage Tank Nammo Proprietary Information NAMMO SPACE–AEV/HTAEV FLOW CONTROL VALVE The Apogee Engine Valve (AEV) range has been developed and qualified to be compatible with a wide range of propellants used in chemical propulsion including Hydrazine/MMH/MON/Cold Gases. -
Dutch Arms Export Policy in 2018
Dutch Arms Export Policy in 2018 Report by the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the export of military goods July 2019 Contents 1. Introduction ......................................................................................... 3 2. Profile of the Dutch defence industry ....................................................... 4 3. Procedures and principles ....................................................................... 6 3.1 Procedures .............................................................................................................................. 6 3.2 Changes in 2018 ..................................................................................................................... 6 3.3 Principles ................................................................................................................................ 7 4. Transparency in Dutch arms export policy ................................................ 8 4.1 Trade in military goods ........................................................................................................... 8 4.2 Trade in dual-use goods ......................................................................................................... 9 4.3 Procedures .............................................................................................................................. 9 5. Dutch arms export in 2018 .................................................................... 11 6. Relevant developments -
Defence Strategies of the Smaller NATO States – a Comparative Study Obranné Strategie Malých Států NATO – Komparativní Studie
Vojenské rozhledy č. 4/2020 DOI: 10.3849/2336-2995.29.2020.04.023-045 Peer-reviewed Defence strategies of the smaller NATO states – a comparative study Obranné strategie malých států NATO – komparativní studie Lukáš Dyčka, Taivo Rõkk, Zdzisław Śliwa Abstract: Defence strategies of smaller NATO states represent interesting source of information about defence policies of this pool of countries. Definition of what constitutes “small state” is discussed in first step. In second step, this study compares 10 selected NATO countries Defence Strategies in terms of identified risks and threats, future military capabilities to counter threats, processes of drafting defence papers, level of details and approving authorities. Outlining these indicators and characteristics provide useful overview for future draft of National defence strategies within countries of similar size. Abstrakt: Obranné strategie malých států NATO představují důležitý zdroj infor- mací o obranné politice. Definice “malého státu” je však nejasná a její zpřesnění představuje první část článku. Ve druhé části pak text srov- nává Obranné strategie deseti vybraných malých států NATO z pohledu hrozeb, budoucích vojenských schopností, procesu tvorby dokumentů, úrovně detailu a úrovně, na které je dokument schvalován. Přehledné se- řazení těchto poznatků pak potenciálně může sloužit jako vhodný základ a inspirace při tvorbě obranných strategií menších států. Key words: Defence; strategy; strategic documents; small states; military capabilities; NATO. Klíčová slova: Obranná strategie; koncepční dokumenty; malý stat; vojenské schopnos- ti; NATO. 23 Vojenské rozhledy č. 4/2020 Defence strategies of the smaller NATO states INTRODUCTION The re-emergence of the use of military power in the Eastern Europe after annexation of Crimea has again created a dilemma of making choices within defence policy of small states. -
ANNUAL REPORT Contents CONTENTS
2017 ANNUAL REPORT Contents CONTENTS 3 Board of Directors’ report 2017 9 Nammo Group 2017 10 Income statement 11 Balance sheet 13 Cash flow 14 Accounting policies Nammo Group 17 Notes to the accounts 26 Nammo AS 2017 27 Income statement 28 Balance sheet 30 Cash flow 31 Accounting policies Nammo AS 33 Notes to the accounts 39 Auditors report 42 Corporate governance Top right image on cover and p26 © ESA Board of Directors’ report 2017 BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ REPORT 2017 Nammo continues to grow in a challenging environment. Through substantial efforts in product development, investments into manufacturing capabilities and the acquisition of new companies, revenues were up 8.0 percent from the previous year. Building a ‘reliable advantage’ for Nammo customers is imperative for a successful journey into the future where Nammo’s growth and profitability go hand in hand. The net profit for the year amounted to NOK 181 million is well positioned in the international market. (NOK 279 million in 2016). This shows that the company is Nammo’s focus on increasing its market share delivering continued growth but that profitability must be in selected geographical areas through organic improved. growth, partnership and acquisitions is unchanged. Nammo has a long and successful collaboration The Board of Directors will propose an ordinary dividend with customers in its home markets. This has been a of NOK 90.3 million (NOK 140 million) at the annual prerequisite for international success. general meeting. The order backlog ended at NOK 4 645 million (4 767) at year-end, which provides a solid base Nammo’s financial performance has been stable in for the future growth of Nammo. -
Norway: Defence 2008
Norwegian Defence 2008 Norwegian Defence 2008 2 CONTENT NORWEGIAN SECURITY And DEFEncE POLICY 4 1. Security Policy Objectives 5 Defence Policy Objectives 5 2. Defence Tasks 6 3. Areas of Government Focus 7 4. International Cooperation 8 UN 8 NATO 9 EU 10 Nordic cooperation 11 5. National Cooperation 12 DEFEncE STRUCTURE And AcTIVITIES 14 1. Constitutional Division of Responsibility in Norway 15 2. The Strategic Leadership of the Armed Forces 15 The Ministry Of Defence 16 3. The Defence Agencies 17 The Norwegian Armed Forces 17 4. The Norwegian Armed Forces 18 5. The Service Branches 19 The Norwegian Army 19 The Royal Norwegian Navy 20 Royal Norwegian Air Force 21 Home Guard 22 6. Personnel Policy 23 7. National Service 23 8. Materiel and Investments 24 Overview of Forces Engaged in International Operations 25 SUppLEMENt – THE FACTS 26 1. The Defence Budget 27 2. International Operations 27 3. Ranks and Insignia 28 4. Non-Governmental Organisations 29 5. Addresses 32 Norwegian Security and Defence Policy 4 1. SECURITY POLICY OBJECTIVES The principal objective of Norwegian security policy is to safeguard and promote national security policy interests. This is best achieved by contributing to peace, security and stability both in areas adjacent to Norway and in the wider world. Nationally Norway must be in a position to uphold its sovereignty and sove- reign rights and to exercise authority in order to safeguard our interests. At the same time, the progress of globalisation means that geo- graphical distance is no longer a determining factor for potential threats to our security. -
The Rise and Decline of the Operational Level of War in Norway Halvor Johansen Operations
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by FHS Brage DEFENCE AND SECURITY STUDIES STUDIES SECURITY AND DEFENCE DEFENCE AND SECURITY STUDIES DEFENCE AND SECURITY STUDIES 2 2009 The rise and decline of the Operational Level of War in Halvor Johansen Norway The rise and decline of Once the hub of Norwegian defence have been addressed mainly by using planning, the Norwegian opera- technological or political science tional level plays a less signifi cant approaches. By adding social theory 2009 2 the Operational Level of role today. e operational level is to the perspectives this book also the link between the strategic and highlights the importance of civil- War in Norway tactical levels, adapting political and military relations and popular politi- strategic ends to feasible plans and cal support as a base of legitimacy Johansen Halvor Norway in War of Level Operational the of decline and rise The operations. is book looks at vari- for building and main taining mili- ous questions regarding the develop- tary institutions. Although the book ment of the operational level. How looks specifi cally at a development were the key institutions built up? specifi c to Norway, it also describes an And which events made them less sig- international trend experienced by a nifi cant? T raditionally, these questions number of military organisations. Lieutenant Colonel Halvor Johansen holds an MA in military studies from the Norwegian Defence University College (2007). He gradu- ated from the Norwegian Army Military Academy in 1993 and has had a variety of command and staff assignments. -
The Challenges and Dynamics of Alliance Policies: Norway, NATO and the High North Wrenn Yennie Lindgren & Nina Græger
7 The Challenges and Dynamics of Alliance Policies: Norway, NATO and the High North Wrenn Yennie Lindgren & Nina Græger This chapter sets out to discuss two major framework conditions for Norwegian foreign, security and defence policy: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the High North.1 Having to address increasingly heterogeneous security concerns and agendas, how do alliances shape their members’ foreign, security and defence policies? And how do the specific challenges related to the High North, such as Russia and other states’ policy agendas, form Norwegian responses and policies? In answering these questions, we aim to explore the framework conditions in a contemporary and historical context. Apart from contributing to the literature on Norway and NATO, we endeavour to add value to the general understanding of small states’ foreign and security policy enablers and constraints.2 1 The term ‘High North’ (nordområdene) often appears in Norwegian Government documents and is used interchangeably with ‘Arctic’. It does not refer solely to Norwegian territory, but is rather a broad concept that attempts to capture developments in the wider circumpolar area. See Jonas Gahr Støre, ‘The High North and the Arctic: The Norwegian Perspective’, Arctic Herald, Moskva, no. 2, Jun. 2012, www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nord_arktis/id685072/. 2 Christine Ingebritsen, ‘Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics’, in Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann & Sieglinde Gstohl (eds), Small States in International Relations, Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press, 2006, pp. 273–85; Anders Wivel, Clive Archer & Alyson JK Bailes, ‘Setting the Scene: Small States in International Security’, in Clive Archer, Alyson JK Bailes & Anders Wivel (eds), Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond, London: Routledge, 2014, pp. -
Defence Policy and the Armed Forces During the Pandemic Herunterladen
1 2 3 2020, Toms Rostoks and Guna Gavrilko In cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung With articles by: Thierry Tardy, Michael Jonsson, Dominic Vogel, Elisabeth Braw, Piotr Szyman- ski, Robin Allers, Paal Sigurd Hilde, Jeppe Trautner, Henri Vanhanen and Kalev Stoicesku Language editing: Uldis Brūns Cover design and layout: Ieva Stūre Printed by Jelgavas tipogrāfija Cover photo: Armīns Janiks All rights reserved © Toms Rostoks and Guna Gavrilko © Authors of the articles © Armīns Janiks © Ieva Stūre © Uldis Brūns ISBN 978-9984-9161-8-7 4 Contents Introduction 7 NATO 34 United Kingdom 49 Denmark 62 Germany 80 Poland 95 Latvia 112 Estonia 130 Finland 144 Sweden 160 Norway 173 5 Toms Rostoks is a senior researcher at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia. He is also associate professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Univer- sity of Latvia. 6 Introduction Toms Rostoks Defence spending was already on the increase in most NATO and EU member states by early 2020, when the coronavirus epi- demic arrived. Most European countries imposed harsh physical distancing measures to save lives, and an economic downturn then ensued. As the countries of Europe and North America were cau- tiously trying to open up their economies in May 2020, there were questions about the short-term and long-term impact of the coro- navirus pandemic, the most important being whether the spread of the virus would intensify after the summer. With the number of Covid-19 cases rapidly increasing in September and October and with no vaccine available yet, governments in Europe began to impose stricter regulations to slow the spread of the virus. -
Norway: Strategic Defence Concept 2004
Contents The Defence Minister’s Preface 4 Summary 6 INTRODUCTION 13 A National Strategic Concept - Position, Purpose and Validity 13 A New Era in International Security 14 PART I - SECURITY IN A NEW ERA 15 The Concept of Security 16 Fundamental Norwegian Security Interests 17 Norway’s Freedom of Action in the field of Security Policy 19 Exercising Sovereignty, Authority and Sovereign Rights 21 The «Grey Zones» of Security Policy 23 Threat, Risk and Damage 24 PART II - OUR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 25 Security Challenges - a New Risk Assessment 26 Key Global Developments 26 Disparate Global Trends 29 PART III - THE CONSTANTS OF SECURITY POLICY AND NORWAY’S IMMEDIATE SURROUNDINGS 31 The UN 32 NATO 33 The EU 36 The USA and the Transatlantic Dimension 37 The Nordic and Baltic States 39 Our Relations with Russia 39 PART IV - SECURITY CONSEQUENCES FOR NORWAY 41 The Regional Dimension 42 The Global Dimension 44 PART V - THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF SECURITY POLICY 47 PART VI - THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SECURITY POLICY, AND NORWAY’S USE OF MILITARY POWER 49 A Comprehensive Approach to the Use of Security Policy Instruments 50 A Modernised Total Defence Concept 51 Legality and Political Legitimacy 52 Command Authority and Political Control 54 The Conditions for Norway’s Use of Military Force 56 PART VII - THE SECURITY ROLES OF THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES, DEFENCE POLICY OBJECTIVES, AND MILITARY TASKS 57 The Security Roles of the NAF 58 Defence Policy Objectives 60 The Tasks of Norwegian Armed Forces 61 PART VIII - THE DEFENCE CONCEPT 67 PART IX - THE FORCE POSTURE AND CAPABILITIES OF THE NAF 71 Availability of Military Capabilities 72 Institutional Competencies 72 Niche Capabilities, Role Specialisation and Division of Labour 73 Multinational Military Cooperation as a Development Strategy 74 Criteria for Establishing Priorities 76 Transformation and Network-Enabled Defence 78 CONCLUSION 80 The Defence Minister´s Preface accurate.