International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION Vol. XXVI No 2 2020

SOE, IASI-CHIȘINĂU OFFENSIVE AND COUP D’ETAT FROM AUGUST 23, 1944

Marian ZIDARU

The Society of Historical Sciences, Constanța, [email protected]

Abstract: Between 1941-1944, S.O.E. (Special Operation Executive)activity in Romania depended heavily on the collaboration with Maniu and P.N.T (National Peasant Party -Partidul National Țărănesc). In order to improve its activity, S.O.E. has taken steps to create a reliable communication channel between S.O.E. residents in Istanbul and . The connections between the residence in Istanbul and the S.O.E. network in Romania were made through the connections of Switzerland and Turkey or through the transmitters sent to Istanbul, Ankara and Cairo, or through radio and radio transmissions launched by the parachute. Our study aims to find the connection between the S.O.E. activity in Romania, the Soviet Iasi-Chisinau offensive and the coup d’etat on August 23, 1944.

Keywords: S.O.E., Soviet offensive, Romania, coup d’etat

1. Introduction influence. Antonescu said he would make In September 1940, Chastelain met the sure that the authorities looked at Maniu's peasant leader in Rică Georgescu's house action kindly [3]. and agreed to work with the S.O.E., but At a meeting, called the S.O.E. - Foreign asked Churchill personally to guarantee Office,in February 1941, the representatives Romania's integrity and the restitution of of the S.O.E. informed that after the departure northwestern [1]. of the members of the legation from The list of Chastelain's agents published by Bucharest, their program in Romania Mr. Buzatu includes 39 names, from which depended on the cooperation with Maniu[4]. the most famous are , Lucreţiu An S.S.I. (Romanian Secret Intelligence Pătrăşcanu, Alexandru Creţianu and Service) note reported that on February 12, Niculescu Buzeşti [2]. 1941, visited the British Regarding Maniu's action, we found Legation. According to the note, Coposu interesting to present an informative note was a liaison between Iuliu Maniu and from the Hungarian vice-consulate in Brasov Reginald Hoare [5]. from November 14, 1940. According to this Upon departure, Hoare left the leader of the document, at the beginning of November P.N.Ţ. a transmission device. The British Maniu visited General Antonescu and told hoped that Maniu would take over the him that the victory of the Axis is not certain subversive actions in Romania. But the at all, and Romania had to prepare for the peasant leader, although pressured by the alternative of a British victory, so it was S.O.E. in 1941-1942 to stage sabotages, he necessary to have a second political set responded to British insistence that they which, if necessary, would determine were useless because they would attract Romania's transition to the sphere of British

DOI: 10.2478/kbo-2020-0105 © 2015. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

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German retaliation and tighten German foreign currency, questionnaires, signal control [6]. plans and cipher. He arrived in Bucharest at the end of 2. Contacts Tozan -Maniu March, where he managed to hand over to After the fall of Rică Georgescu network, Maniu the W/T device, cash, precious the connection with Maniu became quite stones, questionnaires, signal plan and difficult. S.O.E., tried a collaboration with cipher. From there he continued to the N.K.V.D. Thus, in October 1941, the , where he was arrested [9]. S.O.E. established contacts with a Although Maniu was then ready to N.K.V.D.agent from Istanbul, Baklanov, reorganize and restore communications who was acting as assistant secretary of with Istanbul, the W/T machine did not trade at the Soviet Embassy in Ankara. The issue, the answers to the collaboration turned out to be one-sided, S.O.E.questionnaires were not received, to and the British interrupted it in February the exasperation of the Foreign Office. In 1942, when Baklanov did not keep his 1942, through the questionnaires they sent promises on untrue grounds.S.O.E. resorted to Iuliu Maniu, the British asked for to the Turk Satvet Lufti Tozan, who was information about the Romanian Army Finland's honorary consul in Istanbul who operating in a certain district. The British agreed to do courier services for the S.O.E. had no military base to fight the Tozan had several meetings with Maniu .The problem was that they during which he received $ 40,000 and transmitted such information to the Soviets. informed Tozan that he had collaborated with There was a S.O.E.-N.K.V.D. cooperation strong military and civilian groups,and that protocol, which presupposed the existence the scene was ready for revolt. He of S.O.E.representations in Moscow (led by conditioned the success of his revolt, Brigadier General George Alexander Hill however, by obtaining an Anglo- and N.K.V.D. in (led by Colonel Russianguarantee that Romania would not be Ivan Chichaev) [10]. This led to the activity occupied by Soviet troops and asked S.O.E.if of Iuliu Maniu's men in the area of betrayal. this could be achieved to make this known Arrested in Budapest, Tozan was initially throughout Romania through brochures sentenced to death, but following the thrown from the plane [7]. S.O.E.intervention, his sentence was The P.N.T. president sent Tozan information commuted to life imprisonment, but he was about the German General Headquarters, eventually released [11]. which included data on Generals Keitel, von Bock and von Brauchitsch. On his return to 3. Ranji-Autonomous missions Istanbul, Tozan reported to Masterson that Towards the end of 1942 and the beginning and Maniu estimated their of 1943, the British secret services financial needs to organize subversive actions intensified their pressure on the leader of in favor of the British, at about 800 to 900 the P.N.Ţ. to take action. million lei. Maniu received only a part of the It was decided to send a mission called amount until the end of the war [8]. "Ranji", led by Major David Russel, to Tozan returned to Romania on the morning Yugoslavia, which was to arrive in of March 14, 1942. He took two cars with Romania and contact Maniu [12]. him, one containing a large quantity of On the night of June 15, Russel, tobacco as a gift for the Finnish troops on accompanied by radio operator Nicolae the Russian front. In the cigarette boxes Turcanu, was parachuted into Yugoslavia. were hidden some of the materials for They were ordered to enter Romania in Maniu, a quantity of precious stones and order to "open a radio-telegraphy communication channel, to establish

367 contact with Maniu's organization and In his report about the mission in Romania, prepare a parachuting area in the Romanian Chastelain claimed that he did not know Carpathians" [13]. how much truth was in Maniu’s words but On September 4, Russel was reportedly he considered that the Anglo-American air killed for gold coins that any British agent raid from April the 4th must have ruined any on a mission had on him. After Russel's plan that Maniu might have had [18] The death, Alecu Ionescu brought Ţurcanu to civilian losses where high causing such Bucharest and installed him in an apartment resentment to the population that the success on Protopopescu Street [14]. of any coup d’etat was excluded [19]. On November 9, 1943, Maniu notified to the British that he wished to send a special 4. Colonel ’s scheme delegate out of Romania, in order to discuss In May 1943, CătălinVlădescu-Olt, the arrangements for a political change in that vice-consul of Romania in Istanbul, country. After consultations with Moscow presented S.O.E. the document known as and Washington, London agreed, notifying Colonel Black's Scheme. to the leader of P.N.Ţ. that the emissary's This was a politico-military coup plan in only function was to discuss the operational which one of the leading figures was details for the overthrow of Antonescu’s General Sănătescu, who had been dismissed regime and its replacement with a from command by Antonescu, due to government ready to accept unconditional criticism of his government's policy of surrender[15]. waging war on USSR territory. At this In order to accelerate the negotiations, the stage, Sănătescu had been introduced to the "Autonomous" mission formed by Gardyne Palace according to Caranfil's plan to de Chastelain, Ivor Porter and Silviu infiltrate trusted people into key positions. Meţianu was sent to Romania [16] This The plan called for some air support from mission failed and was captured a few Allied aircraft, but was not given the hours after the parachuting. By mutual attention it deserved by the agreement with Vasiliu, Cristescu and with Allies.According to "Black", the group the approval of , a credible consists of three generals - Nicolescu, legend was arranged for the three to be told Protopeanu and Sanatescu - but details to the Germans in case they requested to about what forces could count was missing. participate in the investigation. These details were sent to Istanbul to From the investigation of the three, Cristescu Chastelain by the Romanian Vice-Consul, failed to find out the true purpose of the Victor Caranfil, and at the end of October. Autonomous mission that the British officers In the early 1944, Vladescu-Olt was able to probably did not know either. Today, it is provide additional S.O.E.details. The known that the British used contacts with the generals did not want to surrenderdirectly opposition and the Romanian government to to the Russians, but preferred to surrender confuse the German army. The operation to a British forceby one or two thousand was codenamed "Bodyguard" and managed paratroopers, commanded by a senior to persuade the Germans to maintain troops British officer. in the Balkans to allow the Allies to land in Vladescu-Olt claimed that the group could Normandy [17] On April 2, Maniu met with count on half a million soldiers, who were Chastelain in the Andronache Forest.The only lightly armed and with a few armored meeting with Maniu lasted more than an vehicles. hour and gave Chastelain the opportunity to It was not until February 12, 1944, that a pressure the peasant’s leader to take action. memorandumabout the planned coup Maniu replied that his plan is complete and d’etat,from the British Embassy in in a few days a coup d’etat will take place. Washington was sent to the State

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Department for Admiral William Leahy, the meantime, the British would not take any US Chiefs of Staff coordinator. action [20]. The memorandum explained that the InS.O.E’s final report about the operation document described a proposal made to the in Romania it is shown that the coup d'etat S.O.E.by the Romanian vice-consul in of August 23, 1944 was in fact Colonel Istanbul, on behalf of certain Romanian Black's scheme as presented by Vladescu- military elements which were ready to Olt and Caranfil [21]. overthrowAntonescu by the help of a coup d’etatled in the name of the king. 5. Cairo’s negotiations. Moscow's The Memorandumindicated the desire of position. the British government to find out the views On April 30, 1944, Molotov sent a telegram of the U.S.(United States) government on to London in an aggressive tone accusing the proposal. The State Department tended the British of plotting against the Soviets in to cast doubtregarding the probability of its Romania. Churchill retaliated harshly, possible maturity. The memorandum dismissing all accusations, but at the end of mentioned that the group's spokesman was his response, he reminded the Soviet prime a colonel in command of a regiment minister: “I also told you that we consider of1,300 soldiers from Bucharest and it also you the first violin in terms of Romanian added that two or three generals were policy, based on the conditions of connected to the plan. It was known, capitulation on which we agreed, subject to however, that several generals in leadership my concern about compensation "[22]. positions could not be considered for The British considered Molotov's protest support. Officers supporting the coupd’etat unfounded because they had informed were ready to start a riot as soon as His Novikov, the Soviet representative in Cairo, Majesty's government agreed to send [a] about this mission immediately after its high-ranking officer with a force of 1,000 to capture by the Romanians in December 2,000 paratroopersto the Eastern Front, 1943 where, together with the Russian On May 5, 1944, Eden proposed a fair to Command, would receive the Ambassador Gusev, as Greece was in the unconditional surrender of the Romanian British control zone, the British were asking army: 'the generals insisted on the presence Moscow for support for their policy there, of a British parachute force. S.O.E.hoped to just as London was willing to help the Soviets get in touch with the group soon, but the with U.S.S.R.() in Romania. memorandum appeared "embryonic". Two weeks later, Gusev communicated The British information was communicated Moscow's acceptance to Eden, on condition on the same day - February 8 - to the that the U.S. to approve this agreement [25]. Russians when the British ambassador On June 1, Lord Moyne, Novikov, and Archibald Clark Kerr left a note about the MacVeagh met and agreed to hand over a plan in an audience with Molotov's deputy, statement to Romanian emissaries declaring Dekanozov. The ambassador explained that that the extension of the negotiations was His Majesty's government doubted its no longer a purpose and that the chances of success. negotiations were considered closed. If Planning was in its infancy and the figure Maniu wanted to take advantage of the of half a million soldiers who could argue armistice conditions offered, he had to send the coup d’etat seemed an exaggeration. an officer to the front to contact the Red However, his government would be Army [23]. grateful to have the Soviet government's On June 3, 1944, Vişoianu sent a telegram opinion on the coup d’etat. In the to Creţianuinforming him about the following existing situation in Cairo :

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1. The solidarity between the allies is the present and future understanding with perfect and the terms of the armistice are them. However, the Romanians should not agreed in their entirety by all; Vişoianu also have had any illusions about this result. states that the initiative was left to the 3. Everywhere it is believed that large Soviet delegate, because in fact the war is combined operations are imminent and being waged with his country and he must change in Romania must take place without negotiate with him if Romania changes its delay, so that we can benefit from this political orientation and wants to conclude change since the whole world wants to peace. Maniu'sremarks did not make a very make an Armistice. Vişoianu considered bad impression in the first instance, except that the change in romanian policy will be for the remarks about , which more effective if it is closely connected from the beginning were completely with Allied military operations, it is eliminated by all the allies. Bessarabia was desirable that this coordination should be seen not only as one of the major conditions taken into account and for this reason it of the armistice but also as the sole basis for could be requested that the coup leaders a political agreement with the U.S.S.R. It is send an officer to contact the Soviets. It is considered that the return of Transylvania understandable that change in Romania will to Romania is a great compensation for the be easier and probably more useful if it loss of Bessarabia. Vişoianu remarked that were part of the allied operations plan in the for any responsible politician - even Balkans. It is not the Romanians who assuming that he would accept all the terms change the allied military strategy. Air of the armistice - it would be difficult to support by bombing several targets declare that he accepts the loss of indicated by the coup d’etat will probably Bessarabia and if he did he would be so be considered but also in agreement with vulnerable to attacks by opposing the Soviets.The opposition must not that he would endanger the confuse desires with reality. whole operation of political change. It was Any request addressed separately to the replied that since we already know the Western allies not only has no chance of terms of the armistice we can go before the success, but not being known to the other coupd’etat and then adopt a proper attitude would produce bad political and moral towards these terms and find a formula to effects. follow a conduct related to territorial issues The Soviet delegate made the following in the most appropriate way. statements during a conversation with 2. The delegate of Great Britain is in Visoianu. "I have noticed from the complete agreement with his Soviet messages received from the messages of colleague and did not in any case consider your government that when the government the possibility of any change in terms which uses the word allies it refers only to those in even his boss declared in a speech given in the West. I hope your boss does not share the House of Commons as being "fair and this vision. " Any other idea is wishfull - equitable", Romanians must understand that thinking [24]. the main goal of his country's policy is to On June 10, Maniu telegraphed to the win the war, and the alliance with the Allies that he accepted their terms [25]. As U.S.S.R. for the means of implementing the is fulfilling this, as its leader pointed out. armistice, the peasant leader informed that Moreover, their cooperation on the Peace they were being settled with the responsible Treaty will go beyond secondary issues, factors and would be communicated to the such as our observations given fortheir allies [26]. great common interest in other parts of the world. Bessarabia is the condition no. 1 of

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7. The Iasi-Chisinau offensive and the realized that Germany would lose the war coup d'etat of August 23, 1944 and told Cristescu that "it is important that On June 20, the peasant leader had sent a we do not lose ours," referring to possible message to Ankara containing detailed negotiations for an exit from the alliance plans for the coup d’etat that would lead with Germany and joining the United Romania to the United Nations camp. For Nations coalition. The events intensified the success of the action Maniu asked the rumors about Romania's failure and there U.S.S.R. to undertake a vigorous offensive are sources who say that Berlin was on the and to send to the immediately informed about the gravity of Anglo-Americans three airborne brigades, the situation. in some vital points around Bucharest [27]. On August 21, 1944, Eugen Cristescu, Maniu decided that General Aldea should (head of SSI - Special Intelligence Service) cross the front line and treat the conditions informed the German legation in Bucharest of the armistice with the Russians.The that King Mihai I had received Iuliu Maniu crossing of the lines was to take place on in audience and that, "expect serious events the night of August 8-9, 1944. The in the coming days." Colonel Fritz Baur operation did not take place due to the immediately informed Berlin’s authorities, resumption of fighting [28]. but received no response. In turn, the government was in advanced Moreover, on the 22nd August 1944 Rudolf negotiations in Stockholm with the Soviet Brandsch head of the main department of ambassador, Mrs. Kolontai [29]. the German ethnic group in Romania and On August 20, when Soviet pressure on the head of the Bucharest press office, Otto front rose, Maniu transmitted to Cairo that Liess, informed that a "clique" led by he had decided to act without waiting for a General Nicolae Radescu is ready to carry response from the Allies [30] Mihai out a coup d’etat in order to dismiss Antonescu also asked Turkey to act as an Marshal Antonescu intermediary between Romania and allies The leadership of the Third Reich for the conclusion of the armistice, with the ignoredwarnings on the eve of the coup consent of the king, the marshal and all d’etat and Berlin was unable to respond to members of the opposition. He wanted to the seriousness of the political and military know which of the three alternatives were situation [32]. convenient for the Anglo-Americans: The Soviet offensive (Operation Iasi- sending a Romanian representative to Chisinau) began on August 20, 1944 with Moscow to conclude the armistice; the forces of the armies of the Ukrainian simultaneous contact with the Americans, Fronts 2 and 3, under the command of the British and the Russians to establish the General R. Malinovsky and General F. terms of an armistice; or discussing the Tolbuhin. On August 21, Soviet troops terms of the armistice in Cairo with the captured the city of Iasi and began Allies [31]. advancing on Bucharest. The front of the Eugen Cristescu, the head of the Special German-Romanian forces was collapsing. Intelligence Service (S.S.I.), informed the About 1,000,000 Soviet soldiers had head of state in advance about the managed to break the Romanian-German intentions of a group of generals, in front, to cause great losses to Romanian combination with the Royal Palace and troops (in some places of about 80-90% some political leaders of the "democratic division level), to create two deep breaches opposition", to take power, but Marshal (south of Iasi, with the depth of about 80 Antonescu did not want to believe that "it km, and east of Vaslui, 110 km deep), was something serious." However, as early reaching in the evening of August 23, 1944, as April 1943, Marshal Antonescu had 50-60 km from the fortified alignment from

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Focsani gate. The undeniable success of the All these lead us to consider that on August 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts was due to the 23, 1944, Romania had no other solution overwhelming superiority of forces in the than to side with the United rupture sectors, as well as the quantity and Nations.Therefore, I appreciate that use of artillery and tanks, which facilitated Romania's passage to the United Nations on the rapid penetration of infantry. The August 23, 1944 saved, at the last moment, Soviets also benefited from the fact that the what could be saved [34]. German High Command had recently On the afternoon of August 23, the marshal withdrawn from the Romanian front about and his main collaborators were arrested. 12 divisions, most of them armored and With or without August 23, 1944, Romania motorized, which they moved to the Polish was still occupied by the Red Army, as a front, as well as some mistakes of result of the Tehran agreements. Romania command and executionof missions from and the other states in this area were placed theRomanians [33]. in the sphere of Soviet influence. Those who challenge the opportunity for Consequently, Romania could not avoid the Romania to join the United Nations at that Soviet occupation. At that time, all time invoke the strength of the fortified politicians sought to save the country, the position of Focşani-Nămoloasa-Brăila, in difference between them being the concrete front of Soviet troops. Theoretically, way in which they believed that this goal theyare right, but in reality it had not been could be achieved. organized in time for a long defense, the Political parties have been involved in the Romanian units in the sector having a total previous period,they created B.N.D. (The strength of only 15,000 soldiers. Those who National Democratic Bloc -June 20, 1944), were to arrive from the interior had not yet but did not act as a driving force on August arrived for various reasons, and those who 23. Brătianu (P.N.L.- National Liberal were retreating from the front, under Party) was at Florica's, at his sister's constant pressure from Soviet troops, had funeral. Maniu (P.N.Ţ.) avoided assuming far too little combat capability to be the responsibility of the government considered for serious resistance. In this leadership (even on the morning of August context, the crossing of the fortified line by 23, 1944), still "negotiated" and did not the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian even give the "letter of guarantee" fronts would have transformed the entire requested by Antonescu to sign the national territory into a devastating theater armistice; the P.N.Ţ. leader appeared on the of war. morning of August 24, when the king had It is also undeniable that the ideal would already left Bucharest, and the Palace had have been to resist the fortified alignment in been bombed by German aircraft. order to negotiate the conditions of the ConstantinTitelPetrescu (Social Democratic armistice with the Soviets and to obtain the Party-P.S.D.) "passed on to " the Palace, most favorable conditions for the country, but finding that Maniu was missing, he also as wanted. left. LucreţiuPătrăşcanu (P.C.R. -Romanian Although bold, the marshal's conception Comunist Party) came with the folder in was unrealistic in that strategic context which he had prepared the documents that because, on August 23, 1944, the Soviets the king had to sign (political amnesty, the were no longer in a position to impose abolition of the concentration camps, etc). conditions on them, already benefiting from The four parties politically endorsed the act the unconditional support of Western of August 23, 1944. The monarchy, after a powers interested in dealing with the period of inactivity (Sănătescu was amazed Soviets. by the fact that in 1943 King Mihai did not even know the evolution of the front, being

372 preoccupied with his own cars), began to -the success of Churchil's Balkan version. "plot," committing himself to finding a This could only be achieved by maintaining solution. Pushed by the circles around him a large number of German troops in (Stârcea, Ioanniţiu), but also by some Romania, which would have delayed the generals (Sănătescu, Aldea), most of them Soviet advance into the Balkans, until the involved in Colonel Black's Scheme, the British occupied Greece and/or concluded a king accepted the idea of Antonescu's gentlemen's agreement with the Soviets to dismissal, not accepting any respite, divide the spheres of influence, in Eastern because he (through MihaiAntonescu) Europe (which in fact has been achieved). wanted to conclude an armistice with the From this point of view, the tactic adopted United Nations. His act of courage was by Maniu until August 1944 was that of overshadowed by the lack of political- negotiation proved to be beneficial. The diplomatic training, by the state of failure of the coupd’etat, predictable confusion created in the army. His between August 1943 and July 1944, would departure from Bucharest, a few hours after have had disastrous consequences for the Antonescu's arrest, increased the state of old Romanian political class and for the chaos, given that the Government was not country. The Germans would have formed (most did not even know that they implemented the Margarette 2 plan, the had been appointed ministers) [35]. country would have been occupied and it would have become a theater of war 8. Some conclusions and personal between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. considerations Disastrous, however, would have been the During the period 1941-1944 S.O.E.activity continuation of the tactics of the atrocities in Romania has depended heavily on beyond August 1944, leading to the collaboration with Maniu and P. N. Ţ.. occupation of the country by battle by the In order to improve its activity, S.O.E. has Soviet army, the loss of Transylvania and taken steps to create reliable the rapid communization of Romania communication channel between When Romania's situation worsened after S.O.E.residents in Istanbul and Bucharest. the defeats at Stalingrad and Kursk Orel, The connections between Istanbul residency the politicians did not join forces, they and S.O.E.network in Romania was made worked separately and even in opposition to through Switzerland and Turkey legations each other (resentments prevailed in the or through emissaries sent to Istanbul, 1930s). Ankara and Cairo, or by radio broadcast This aggravated the country's negotiating and by agents launched with parachute. position, especially in relation to the USSR. - It is estimated that these channels were We believe that the Soviets did not functioning benefiting the help of the seriously negotiate with the Romanians Romanian secret services which have after May 1944, being rather interested in tolerated their activity. occupying the country militarily. In fact, The insistence with which S.O.E.asked this explains the reproaches addressed by Maniu to launch a coupd’etat in Romania in to Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej the autumn of 1943 and the spring of 1944, and the other national communist leaders even if the chances of success were slim, who were asked why they did not consult leads us to believe that Britain was not with Moscow on August 23, 1944. necessarily interested in its success. Regarding the role played by political We think the British were interested in two parties, we believe that this was an things: important one in the preparation of the act -the success of the Bodiguard operation, of August 23, 1944, instead the contribution which is also highlighted by other works; of the political parties to the effective

373 implementation of the act of August 23, of the coup d’etat belonged to the military 1944 was insignificant. On the contrary, and senior officials from the royal palace P.C.R. proved to be active precisely in the coordinated by General Constantin decisive moments, our statement being Sănătescu. supported by the activity carried out by He coordinated the coupd’etat plans, the LucreţiuPătrăşcanu or Emil Bodnăraş. execution and kept the situation under the The king staged the coup d'état of August control of the new authorities until the 23, 1944, from his position as head of state, arrival of the Red Army in the capital. having the main role in the arrest of The regime change of August 23, 1944 was Marshal Ion Antonescu and his a severe blow to Germany, which was collaborators. forced to abandon much of the Balkans and But after reading the Proclamation to the withdraw its armies to Hungary. At the end country on the radio, the monarch of August, the Soviets crossed Romania, practically left the scene, retiring from the entering Bucharest liberated by the capital, to Dobrița in Oltenia. We Romanian army on August 31. Romania appreciate, in these conditions, that the was thus at the discretion of the U.S.S.R. main role in the conception and execution

References [1] H.Brestoiu, O Istoriemaipuţinobişnuită, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1987,p. 140. [2] Gh. Buzatu, Din Istoria Secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, Vol. II, 1995, pp. 394-404. [3] 23 August. Documente, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, Bucuresti, 1984 , doc. 117, p. 146. [4] Dobrinescu, V. Florin,Emigraţia română din lumea anglo-saxonă 1939-1945, Institutul European, Iaşi, 1993, p. 89. [5] P. Quinlan, Ciocnire deasupra României. Politica anglo-americană faţă de România, 1938-1947, Centrul de Studii Româneşti, Fundaţia Culturală Română, Iaşi, 1995, p. 67. [6] Mihail E. Ionescu, Puterea Cuvântului. Propaganda mișcării de rezistență din România, Editura Stiințificăși Enciclopedică, București, 1984, p. 164. [7] Pro Kew Gardens, National Archives, HS 7/186,HistoryS.O.E. Romania”, p.10. [8] Ibidem., Document “Roumania. Tom’s intended action” from 11 February 1942, HS5/825, f.1. [9] Ibidem, p.2 [10] Zidaru Marian, The Russian Section of the British Special Operation Executive and the cooperation with the Soviet N. K.V. D. in vol Strategic Changes in Security and international Relations, Universitatea Națioală de Apărare, Bucharest, 2017, pp. 211-217. [11] PRO, Kew Gardens, HS 7/186, p.10. [12] EugenPreda, Săritura de pisică, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1976.p. 109. [13] Ivor Porter, Operaţiunea Autonomous, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1991, p. 112. [14] Ibidem, p. 114. [15] Paul Quinlan, op. cit., p. 84. [16] 23 August 1944. Documente, vol. I Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1984, vol II, doc. 572, p. 260. [17] Cristian Troncotă, Eugen Cristescu, Asul serviciilor secrete româneşti, Memorii, Mărturii, Documente. Editura Roza Vânturilor, Bucureşti, 1994. p. 98. [18] PRO, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom National Archives, Public Record Office, HS 7/186, p. 3-4.

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[19] Ibidem. fo.10. Document “Chronology of Events in Connection with Roumanian Armistice Negotiations”. [20] Denis Deletant, British Clandestine Activities in Romania during the Second World War,Palgrave Macmilan, 2016, pp. 109-110. [21] PRO Kew Garden History S.O.E. History. [22] Ivor Porter, op. cit., p. 205-214. [23] 23 August, vol. II, doc. 583, p. 278., [24] PRO Kew Gardens HS 5/833 cadre736-738. [25] P. Quinlan, op. cit., p. 94. [26] 23 August, vol ii, doc. 593, p. 291 [27] Reuben Markham, România sub jug sovietic, Fundaţia Academia Civică, Bucureşti, 1996, p. 89. [28] 23 August, vol II, doc. 626, p. 346. [29] 23 August, vol. II ,doc 640 ,p.374. [30] I. Porter, op. cit., p. 232. [31] 23 August, vol. II, doc. 666, p. 413 – 414. [32] Ottmar Trașcă, Die Deutsche Volksgruppe in Rumänien und die Ereignisse vom 23. August 1944 im Spiegel eines unveröffentlichten Manuskripts. In: „Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde“, Köln-Weimar-Wien, 34 (105) Jahrgang, Heft 2, S., pp. 190-193. [33] Prof. dr. O.A. Rjeşevsky:„Lovitura de stat de la 23 august1944 a redus din sacrificiile şidistrugerile ce afectau România şia apropiat sfârşitul războiului înEuropa” (RIM NR 3-4/2009 P.28). [34] Prof. univ. dr.Alesandru Duţu:„România nu avea, la 23 august 1944, altă soluţie decâttrecerea de partea NaţiunilorUnite”” (RIM NR 3-4/2009 p.8). [35] Prof. univ. dr. Ioan Scurtu:„...un act necesar, dar insuficient pregătit, ţara fiind lăsată la discreţia Armatei Roşii” (RIM NR 3-4/2009 p.13).

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