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KBO Template International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION Vol. XXVI No 2 2020 SOE, IASI-CHIȘINĂU OFFENSIVE AND COUP D’ETAT FROM AUGUST 23, 1944 Marian ZIDARU The Society of Historical Sciences, Constanța, Romania [email protected] Abstract: Between 1941-1944, S.O.E. (Special Operation Executive)activity in Romania depended heavily on the collaboration with Maniu and P.N.T (National Peasant Party -Partidul National Țărănesc). In order to improve its activity, S.O.E. has taken steps to create a reliable communication channel between S.O.E. residents in Istanbul and Bucharest. The connections between the residence in Istanbul and the S.O.E. network in Romania were made through the connections of Switzerland and Turkey or through the transmitters sent to Istanbul, Ankara and Cairo, or through radio and radio transmissions launched by the parachute. Our study aims to find the connection between the S.O.E. activity in Romania, the Soviet Iasi-Chisinau offensive and the coup d’etat on August 23, 1944. Keywords: S.O.E., Soviet offensive, Romania, coup d’etat 1. Introduction influence. Antonescu said he would make In September 1940, Chastelain met the sure that the authorities looked at Maniu's peasant leader in Rică Georgescu's house action kindly [3]. and agreed to work with the S.O.E., but At a meeting, called the S.O.E. - Foreign asked Churchill personally to guarantee Office,in February 1941, the representatives Romania's integrity and the restitution of of the S.O.E. informed that after the departure northwestern Transylvania [1]. of the members of the legation from The list of Chastelain's agents published by Bucharest, their program in Romania Mr. Buzatu includes 39 names, from which depended on the cooperation with Maniu[4]. the most famous are Iuliu Maniu, Lucreţiu An S.S.I. (Romanian Secret Intelligence Pătrăşcanu, Alexandru Creţianu and Service) note reported that on February 12, Niculescu Buzeşti [2]. 1941, Corneliu Coposu visited the British Regarding Maniu's action, we found Legation. According to the note, Coposu interesting to present an informative note was a liaison between Iuliu Maniu and from the Hungarian vice-consulate in Brasov Reginald Hoare [5]. from November 14, 1940. According to this Upon departure, Hoare left the leader of the document, at the beginning of November P.N.Ţ. a transmission device. The British Maniu visited General Antonescu and told hoped that Maniu would take over the him that the victory of the Axis is not certain subversive actions in Romania. But the at all, and Romania had to prepare for the peasant leader, although pressured by the alternative of a British victory, so it was S.O.E. in 1941-1942 to stage sabotages, he necessary to have a second political set responded to British insistence that they which, if necessary, would determine were useless because they would attract Romania's transition to the sphere of British DOI: 10.2478/kbo-2020-0105 © 2015. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. 366 German retaliation and tighten German foreign currency, questionnaires, signal control [6]. plans and cipher. He arrived in Bucharest at the end of 2. Contacts Tozan -Maniu March, where he managed to hand over to After the fall of Rică Georgescu network, Maniu the W/T device, cash, precious the connection with Maniu became quite stones, questionnaires, signal plan and difficult. S.O.E., tried a collaboration with cipher. From there he continued to the N.K.V.D. Thus, in October 1941, the Budapest, where he was arrested [9]. S.O.E. established contacts with a Although Maniu was then ready to N.K.V.D.agent from Istanbul, Baklanov, reorganize and restore communications who was acting as assistant secretary of with Istanbul, the W/T machine did not trade at the Soviet Embassy in Ankara. The issue, the answers to the collaboration turned out to be one-sided, S.O.E.questionnaires were not received, to and the British interrupted it in February the exasperation of the Foreign Office. In 1942, when Baklanov did not keep his 1942, through the questionnaires they sent promises on untrue grounds.S.O.E. resorted to Iuliu Maniu, the British asked for to the Turk Satvet Lufti Tozan, who was information about the Romanian Army Finland's honorary consul in Istanbul who operating in a certain district. The British agreed to do courier services for the S.O.E. had no military base to fight the Tozan had several meetings with Maniu Romanians.The problem was that they during which he received $ 40,000 and transmitted such information to the Soviets. informed Tozan that he had collaborated with There was a S.O.E.-N.K.V.D. cooperation strong military and civilian groups,and that protocol, which presupposed the existence the scene was ready for revolt. He of S.O.E.representations in Moscow (led by conditioned the success of his revolt, Brigadier General George Alexander Hill however, by obtaining an Anglo- and N.K.V.D. in London (led by Colonel Russianguarantee that Romania would not be Ivan Chichaev) [10]. This led to the activity occupied by Soviet troops and asked S.O.E.if of Iuliu Maniu's men in the area of betrayal. this could be achieved to make this known Arrested in Budapest, Tozan was initially throughout Romania through brochures sentenced to death, but following the thrown from the plane [7]. S.O.E.intervention, his sentence was The P.N.T. president sent Tozan information commuted to life imprisonment, but he was about the German General Headquarters, eventually released [11]. which included data on Generals Keitel, von Bock and von Brauchitsch. On his return to 3. Ranji-Autonomous missions Istanbul, Tozan reported to Masterson that Towards the end of 1942 and the beginning Mihai Popovici and Maniu estimated their of 1943, the British secret services financial needs to organize subversive actions intensified their pressure on the leader of in favor of the British, at about 800 to 900 the P.N.Ţ. to take action. million lei. Maniu received only a part of the It was decided to send a mission called amount until the end of the war [8]. "Ranji", led by Major David Russel, to Tozan returned to Romania on the morning Yugoslavia, which was to arrive in of March 14, 1942. He took two cars with Romania and contact Maniu [12]. him, one containing a large quantity of On the night of June 15, Russel, tobacco as a gift for the Finnish troops on accompanied by radio operator Nicolae the Russian front. In the cigarette boxes Turcanu, was parachuted into Yugoslavia. were hidden some of the materials for They were ordered to enter Romania in Maniu, a quantity of precious stones and order to "open a radio-telegraphy communication channel, to establish 367 contact with Maniu's organization and In his report about the mission in Romania, prepare a parachuting area in the Romanian Chastelain claimed that he did not know Carpathians" [13]. how much truth was in Maniu’s words but On September 4, Russel was reportedly he considered that the Anglo-American air killed for gold coins that any British agent raid from April the 4th must have ruined any on a mission had on him. After Russel's plan that Maniu might have had [18] The death, Alecu Ionescu brought Ţurcanu to civilian losses where high causing such Bucharest and installed him in an apartment resentment to the population that the success on Protopopescu Street [14]. of any coup d’etat was excluded [19]. On November 9, 1943, Maniu notified to the British that he wished to send a special 4. Colonel Black’s scheme delegate out of Romania, in order to discuss In May 1943, CătălinVlădescu-Olt, the arrangements for a political change in that vice-consul of Romania in Istanbul, country. After consultations with Moscow presented S.O.E. the document known as and Washington, London agreed, notifying Colonel Black's Scheme. to the leader of P.N.Ţ. that the emissary's This was a politico-military coup plan in only function was to discuss the operational which one of the leading figures was details for the overthrow of Antonescu’s General Sănătescu, who had been dismissed regime and its replacement with a from command by Antonescu, due to government ready to accept unconditional criticism of his government's policy of surrender[15]. waging war on USSR territory. At this In order to accelerate the negotiations, the stage, Sănătescu had been introduced to the "Autonomous" mission formed by Gardyne Palace according to Caranfil's plan to de Chastelain, Ivor Porter and Silviu infiltrate trusted people into key positions. Meţianu was sent to Romania [16] This The plan called for some air support from mission failed and was captured a few Allied aircraft, but was not given the hours after the parachuting. By mutual attention it deserved by the agreement with Vasiliu, Cristescu and with Allies.According to "Black", the group the approval of Mihai Antonescu, a credible consists of three generals - Nicolescu, legend was arranged for the three to be told Protopeanu and Sanatescu - but details to the Germans in case they requested to about what forces could count was missing. participate in the investigation. These details were sent to Istanbul to From the investigation of the three, Cristescu Chastelain by the Romanian Vice-Consul, failed to find out the true purpose of the Victor Caranfil, and at the end of October. Autonomous mission that the British officers In the early 1944, Vladescu-Olt was able to probably did not know either.
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