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The Lebanese Civil War

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The Lebanese Civil War The Lebanese Civil War Lebanese Civil War 1975-1990 Reasons, resolution, effects/significance of the conflict on the region Israel’s invasion of Lebanon 1978 & 1982 Reasons for military intervention/invasion, resolution, effects/significance of conflict on region Events at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps Effects of the massacres on domestic and international opinion Rich v Poor Christians v Muslims PLO v ??? ??? v ??? The quick / simple version? The Lebanese Civil War • Broke out in 1975 due to deep divisions that had developed in Lebanon. • Divisions included: – Rich v poor – Christians v Muslims – PLO v Israelis – PLO v Lebanese – ‘state within a state’ – ‘Rejectionists’ v Camp David supports – … • Very brutal – civil wars often are • Israel became involved because… – Sympathy with Christians – Block any ext. of Syrian power over Lebanon – Limit or destroy PLO camps & militants – … • Very costly to Israel – Money – Casualties – Public opinion – at home and abroad • Massacres The Lebanese Civil War • Consequences – Formation of Hezbollah – Christian regime weakened – Lebanon slid further into economic & political chaos – violence & anarchy – Syria cont to occupy country – Strengthened Syria’s ties with Soviet Union – For Israel: • Failed to achieve its objectives • Public opinion • Israel’s northern settlements no more secure than before war • Conflict between PLO and Israelis exacerbated • Weakness & divisions in IDF exposed • Israel more dependent on US economic assistance – For PLO: • Not good for leadership • Arafat blamed for defeat • HQ moved to Tunis • PLO fractured & weakened The (more) detailed version? The (more) detailed version? ‘A purely religious delineation of the conflict overlooked the complexity of allegiances.’ ‘The Maronite leadership continued to present the question as one of Muslim-Christian strife, all the better to depict the issue as a religious clash to the outside world.’ Oversimplification is dangerous. Key terms / words • Maronite • Muslim • Christian • Phalange • Palestinian • Israel • Lebanon • National Pact • Census • … Lebanon & Civil War? • Under the Ottomans • Under the French (mandate) • Independence & Palestinians • Civil War • Israeli invasion Lebanon? Lebanon Background • Pre-WW1: – Modern Leb actually = three semi-autonomous provinces of Ottoman Empire. • Mount Lebanon • Beirut • Damascus – Pop. of Mount Lebanon: • Maronite Christian = 80% • Druze = 10% • Sunni & Shia Muslims = 10% Lebanon pre-WW1 Background – French Mandate • French took control of areas that = today’s Lebanon & Syria: – Laid long-term foundations to conflicts in second half of 20thC & into 21stC – Annexed additional Muslim areas & separated it from Syria & called it ‘Greater Lebanon’ • Economically viable but... • Altered ethnic composition of pop. of Mount Lebanon – Predominately Maronite Christian enclave into just one group in larger multi-communal society (about half = Christian) • Muslim populations preferred to be part of Syria – part of majority group – Syrian nationalists felt same – Both groups = anti-French • Maronite Christians favoured creation of Greater Lebanon – Hoped French would help them become dominant group • Origin of hostility between Christians & Muslims in Lebanon that continues to this day The French Mandate Background – French Mandate • French rule: – Lack of unity within country & differing goals of groups led = pol. instability & conflict – Little progress made toward Lebanese independence – Muslim opp. to separation from Syria so intense, Maronites & Muslims formed paramilitary groups to defend themselves against armed attacks from the other. • Nevertheless... – By late 1930s = general agreement with French that Lebanon would become independent & it would be separate from Syria Background – The National Pact in Lebanon • 1943 – important event – ramifications for many years: – Maronite & Muslim party leaders agreed to power-sharing arrangement = the National Pact • The National Pact – Power-sharing agreement: – Muslims accepted Lebanese independence separate from Syria – Maronites abandoned their reliance upon French, thus accepting the Arab character & identity of new state – President of Lebanon always to be Maronite Christian – Prime Minister = Sunni Muslim – Speaker of parliament = Shia Muslim – Head of armed forces = Christian • Lebanon gained its independence when last French forces evacuated Dec 1946 • Despite National Pact, pol. situation in Lebanon marked by instability, frequent elections & changes in govt. Religious groups? Background – Religious groups • Maronite Christians – Followers of St Maron (4thC Syrian monk) – Follow teaching of Pope but Maronite Church has own heirarchy & forms of worship – Found mainly in Lebanon – Role of President in Lebanon reserved for a Maronite Christian Background – Religious groups • Druze: – Distinct Middle Eastern monotheistic religious group – Originated 11thC – Combined elements of many religions & philosophies – Bit reclusive – Found primarily in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan & Israel Background – Religious groups • Sunni Muslims: – Sunni = majority group in Islam – Follow principles of designating leaders of Islamic community after death of Mohammed • i.e. Not by birth – Role of PM of Lebanon reserved for a Sunni Muslim Background – Religious groups • Shia (Shi’ite) Muslims: – Shia = group that followed Ali & his family as legitimate leaders of Islamic community after death of Mohammed. • Ali = Mohammed’s cousin & through marriage became his son-in-law & father of his only grandsons (to reach maturity). – Role of parliamentary speaker of Lebanon reserved for a Shia Muslim Background – Religious groups • Others? • Greek Orthodox... • ... • ... Background – post-WW2 • First 20 years following est. of Israel, Lebanon played little part re: conflict over Palestine • 1976 – pop. = 2 million ish • By early 1980s, Muslim pop. > Christians – About 43% Christians, 44% Muslims, 7% Druze – Because of National Pact arrangements = tensions within govt. (still maintained a Western orientation re: foreign & econ policy) • Drawn into Palest-Isr situation by large numbers of Palestinian refugees post 1948 & 1970 (Black Sep) – Mid-1980s = 400 000 Palestinian refugees (out of total 2.6 million Pal ref) living in Lebanon • Not welcomed by Leb pop., not given same rights as citizens & living conditions in ref camps = appalling. – As with Jordan, Israel made it clear to Lebanese Govt (through punishing mil incursion into Leb) that if it did not control actions of militant Pal groups in southern Lebanon who launched attacks into northern Israel, Isr forces would. Background – PLO in Lebanon, 1969-1978 ‘a State within a State’ • Long-term tensions etc exacerbated + complicated by PLO – Palestinian refugees & militant groups post 1948 & 1970 • Cairo Accords – Nov 1969: – Nasser + Lebanese officials + Yasser Arafat + Arab League exec members agreed PLO could recruit, arm, train & employ fighters against Israel. • Post PLO expulsion from Jordan (1970), PLO created ‘a State within the State’ in southern Lebanon (as they had in Jordan) – Controlled refugee camps (most in poorer suburbs of Beirut or southern Leb) – Gradually = ministate, spurred growth of Maronite militias – Outside govt – Often vied with each other for dominance • Border area = launching site for Pal rocket & guerilla attacks against Isr – Raids into Isr + reprisals • Few Isr towns hit but bombing reprisals meant Lebanon becoming a ‘front-line’ state as far as Isr concerned. – >150 Leb towns & villages constantly under attack from Isr • PLO rule in southern Leb = nightmare for Arab & Christian residents. • Added to tensions & conflicts already taking place – Christians resented – Sympathy amongst Muslims for Pal’s increased Final element? • Divisions bet states & factions either sup or rej American dipl & disengagement accords (Camp David) – Syria, Iraq & Libya = rejection – Within PLO • Arafat & Fatah hedged bets, later became more radical – Motivated by realization PLO would not gain from great power diplomacy • Syria: – Saw Sadat’s willingness to break from other Arab states & seek independent treaty with Isr = Isolated Syria & put it at Isr’s mercy • Assad believed alliance with PLO & Leb militants could help est. new pol structure that served Syria’s interests. – Could only occur as long as Syria controlled Leb pol developments & PLO (to ensure didn’t act unilaterally provoking Isr response) – Once Civil War underway though, Assad switched – supported Maronites • Assad preferred balance of power in which Maronites kept pol & mil role – Syria’s actions show how allegiances could shift as war progressed Long-term causes / tensions – short-term spark? • Long-term tensions/factors: – National Pact in place until 1970s • Consistent source of tensions & conflict • Some Muslim groups & Arab nationalists began to try to limit Christian power – Wanted to dismantle National Pact & recast pol structure of Leb » The National Movement (opp group) • 1975 program called for ‘deconfessionalisation’ of govt. • Would destroy Maronite ascendancy as new census = majority rule • Wrong to characterize this as only a religious conflict though – Majority of those excluded from present system = Muslim – Opposition movement itself inc. Christians & Muslims – Palestinians • ‘state within a state’ • Demographics • Raids into Isr & retaliation by Israel – Camp David talks • Spark? Spark? • April 1975 – Civil war broke out after right-wing Christians massacred 26 Palestinians in a Beirut bus The Lebanese Civil War •
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