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Home , 1810s, Battle of Leipzig, Battle of Waterloo, Dominic Lieven, George Mosse, Napoleonic Wars

Special Issue of The Journal of History “Ending : Revisiting the Aftermath of the Napoleonic ”1

Denise Davidson, Christine Haynes, and Jennifer Heuer

n July 1815, the Parisian banker Jacques Fournel wrote to his friend Pierre Vitet in Rouen about the first three days of the second allied occupation of IFrance, which he described as: less courteous than last year…. The outskirts of are destroyed…. Our friend R’s [probably Fournel’s partner Vital Roux] house was sacked, all the mirrors, doors, windows and woodwork smashed and 250 horses are roaming around the garden. [R]’s sister took refuge in the church along with a few other inhabitants of the area. Even the temple of God was not respected and she was forced to hide for three days in the bell tower. The sacred vessels, statues of saints and the virgin, all became victims of an enraged soldiery. This was a particularly ironic scene considering that the troops had been sent to place a very Christian king back on his throne. Peasant houses were not saved any more than the bourgeois ones. … Who could ever repair such disasters and erase the memories that they will leave behind?2

1. Our thanks to Rafe Blaufarb and Katherine Aaslestad for their comments and sugges- tions on earlier versions of this introduction. 2. Jacques Fournel to Pierre Vitet, 9 July 1815, Archives Municipales de Lyon, Fond Vitet, 84 II 10.

Denise Z. Davidson is Professor of History at Georgia State University in Atlanta. She is the author of after Revolution: Urban Life, Gender, and the New Social Order (Harvard, 2007). Christine Haynes is an Associate Professor of History at the University of North Carolina Charlotte. She is currently writing a book with the working title “‘Our Friends, the Enemies’: The First Allied Occupation of France (1815-1818).” Jennifer Heuer is an Associate Professor at the University of Amherst. She is the author of The Family and the Nation: Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary France, 1789-1830 (Cornell, 2005).

The Journal of Military History 80 ( January 2016): 11-30. Copyright © 2016 by The Society for Military History, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, or trans- mitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing from the Editor, Journal of Military History, George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute, P.O. Drawer 1600, Lexington, VA 24450. Authorization to photocopy items for internal and personal use is granted by the copyright holder for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), 121 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923 USA (www.copyright.com), provided the appropriate fee is paid to the CCC.

 11 Introduction

Until the twentieth century’s calamitous events, few moments of history have been as eventful and consequential—but also neglected in military history—as 1814 and 1815. Between the of in October of 1813 and the Battle of Water- loo in June of 1815, a coalition of powers undertook a series of military campaigns on the European continent and around the globe to put an end to ’s —not just once, but twice. In November 1813, while British and Peninsular forces under the command of the Duke of began to invade France from the southwest, the coalition agreed at to form three under the command of the Austrian Karl Phillip von Schwarzenberg to invade from the northeast: Schwarzenberg’s own of Bohemia; the Army of led by the Prussian General Gebhardt Leberecht von Blücher; and the , led by the Swedish Crown Prince Bernadotte. In late December, 200,000 Allied soldiers crossed the Upper to invade French-controlled , Franche- Comté, and Alsace. On New Year’s Day 1814, another 75,000 crossed the Middle Rhine, marching through Lorraine to the fortress of . Despite some last- minute victories by Napoleon’s army and continued differences among the coalition leaders, within three months the Allies had marched to Paris, forcing the capital to capitulate and the emperor to abdicate. On May 30, 1814, the Allied powers signed the First . Although France escaped serious punishment for its role in these wars, it was reduced to its borders of 1792. Starting in November, the great powers of met at the Congress of , where over the next nine months they re-configured territories and governments across the continent. Meanwhile, following a summer of war between and , peace was also concluded in , with Norway passing from to Sweden. The still raged between Great Britain and the new , culminating in the burning of the . Despite the conclusion of the Treaty of between these two powers on Christmas Eve 1814, the war continued into the new year, with the Battle of allowing the Americans to claim victory, before this treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate on February 16, 1815. Ten days later, Napoleon escaped from his imposed exile on the island of , landed on the coast of France, marched to Paris, and re-took power for what would ultimately be labeled the “One .” By May, had defeated the , under the rogue leadership of Napoleon’s brother-in-law . On , 1815, Napoleon met his final defeat at the hands of the British and Prussians on the field of Waterloo.3 This battle brought a definitive end to Napoleon’s rule; by late summer, the former Emperor was headed for exile on the remote isle of , where he remained until his death in 1821.4

3. The composition of the troops at Waterloo was far more nationally diverse than these labels suggest; up to one half of the British camp, for example, may have been Dutch. 4. Recent books on these include: Munro Price, Napoleon: End of Glory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Rory Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 1769-1814 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2014); and Roger Knight, Britain against Napoleon: The Organisation of Victory, 1793-1815 (London: Penguin, 2014).  12 THE JOURNAL OF Introduction

Waterloo did not, however, mark a neat conclusion to the . For some Europeans, war essentially ended months before this battle, as armies were chased from their territory. For others, including those soldiers who were re-mobilized in 1815 and took months (or years) to return home as well as those Frenchmen and women who endured invasion and occupation, it persisted well beyond the defeat of the Imperial Guard on the field outside of . In analyzing the “end” of war, we must also remember how slowly and irregularly news of such events spread across Europe and, especially, the Atlantic world. Word of Wellington’s victory took a day to reach and France; it took several days to reach or , and a week or more to arrive in the Americas. On a local, everyday level, war did not “end” at the same time. Long after the , societies across Europe struggled to cope with problems engendered by the “end” of these wars, including the return of soldiers and officers displaced or imprisoned far from home; the demobilization of hundreds of thousands of troops; the re-integration of these men into civilian life; the financial recovery from war debts; and the re-conversion of industry to peacetime goods. For a sense of the scale of these challenges, in 1815, Great Britain alone faced the release of 100,000 foreign prisoners of war; a public debt of 848 million pounds; and the demobilization of over 250,000 British soldiers—and the transfer of tens of thousands more. In France, thousands of prisoners of war crossed borders in both directions: between early 1814 and early 1815, over 16,000 French troops who had been captured abroad returned home via ; in the last ten days of May 1814 alone, 15,000 Spanish and Portuguese prisoners returned to their countries of origin through a prisoner depot in Bayonne; and between January and May of the same year, no fewer than 66,000 soldiers and 5,500 officers of foreign origin left via the cities of Poitiers, Niort, , and Nantes.5 Following the , the continued to employ 240,000 men (many at half-pay), but many were demobilized, the infamous licenciés, and untold tens of thousands more were still imprisoned, displaced, or settling elsewhere on the European continent and around the Atlantic world. Almost every other state in Europe faced similar challenges, if on a slightly smaller scale, for years after the “end” of the wars.6 In the immediate wake of Waterloo, France was invaded and occupied by over a million troops from Spain, , Great Britain, , Austria, Russia, Saxony, , Württemberg, and Denmark, initially covering more than two-thirds of

5. Thanks to Christopher Tozzi for these figures, which are based on documents held at the Service Historique de la Défense [SHD] (Vincennes): Yj 16 and Yj 18. 6. Jacques-Olivier Boudon and his students have begun to study the topic of prisoners of war. On French prisoners, see Denis Smith, The Prisoners of Cabrera: Napoleon’s Forgotten Soldiers, 1809-1814 (New : Four Walls Eight Windows, 2001), and Gavin Daly, “Napoleon’s Lost Legions: French Prisoners of War in Britain, 1803-1814,” History 89 (2004): 361-80. On the re-organization of the French army, see Richard Holroyd, “The Bourbon Army, 1815-1830,”The Historical Journal 14, no. 3 (1971): 529-552, and Anne Blanchard, et al., Histoire militaire de la France, vol. 2, De 1715 à 1871 (Paris: Quadrige / Presses universitaires de France, 1992).  MILITARY HISTORY 13 Introduction

French territory. According to the terms of the more punitive Second Treaty of Paris of November 20, 1815, 150,000 of these troops were to remain in the area around eighteen fortress towns along the northeastern frontier, under the command of the victor of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington. The French were to bear the expense of this occupation, until they had indemnified the Allies for the damages caused by the return of Napoleon, to the tune of another 700 million francs. Originally planned for five years, the occupation ultimately lasted for three. It had heavy consequences for the French, especially in the occupied regions. Designed by the Allies to ensure political stability in France and hence international peace in Europe, the occupation of 1815- 1818 constituted a new approach to the enduring challenge of how to exit from war.7 Yet, even after the Second Treaty of Paris brought peace to the Continent, conflict continued—or began—to rage elsewhere in the world. While the Napoleonic wars have often been seen as a European story (with the exception of Napoleon’s invasion of ), their repercussions were global, affecting northern Africa, where the U.S. as well as Europe combated the so-called ; the Caribbean, where news of changes in government and territory was slow to arrive from Europe and abolitionism combined with the to destabilize colonial regimes; and Latin America, where independence movements were beginning to challenge the Spanish and Portuguese rulers, with help from demobilized men and weapons from the European .8 Long after the Battle of Waterloo, governments, armies, and civilians across the Atlantic world struggled with the consequences of over two decades of military conflict. In short, peace did not come easily in 1814 and 1815, when many of the challenges of terminating war in the modern age emerged. These included reincorporating millions of demilitarized soldiers, living under foreign military occupation, shifting borders and populations, re-building governments and economies, and re-defining gender roles. These difficulties were amplified by revolutionary political movements such as , , and abolitionism, which remained part of the mix even as conservatives in Vienna worked to control or mitigate those forces for change. Yet, aside from the rich of this period, little historical work has addressed the complexities of “ending” war in 1814 and 1815.

7. In addition to the work of Jacques Hantraye, who has contributed an article to this issue, see Christine Haynes, “The Allied Occupation of France, 1815-1818,” in War, Demobilization and Memory: The Legacy of War in the Era of the Atlantic Revolutions, ed. Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, and Michael Rowe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 51-67. 8. See Ute Planert, ed., Napoleon’s Empire: European Politics in a Global Perspective (Bas- ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). For specific cases, see Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005); Frederick C. Leiner, The End of Barbary Terror: America’s 1815 War against the Pirates of North Africa (Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Rebecca Hartkopf Schloss, Sweet Liberty: The Final Days of Slavery in (: University of Press, 2009); and Rafe Blaufarb, “Arms for Revolutions: Military Demobilization after the Napoleonic Wars and Latin American Independence,” in War, Demobilization, and Memory, 100-116.

 14 THE JOURNAL OF Introduction

Until recently, military historians have devoted little attention to the final years of the Napoleonic Wars (aside from Waterloo). Specialists of the period have tended to focus on earlier campaigns in , Prussia, Austria, Spain, and, especially, Russia in 1812. More than the Great War, II, or even the U.S. Civil War, this field has been dominated by traditional narratives of generals and battles. Since the nineteenth century, scholarly as well as popular work on the Napoleonic period has taken a top-down approach to the history of war. The historiographical revolution of the last half-century has barely affected the study of this important moment of transition. Instead, books on the officers and campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars roll off the press, supported by a number of organizations devoted to Napoleon, including the Institut Napoléon, the Fondation Napoléon, and the International Napoleonic Society.9 Based on an analysis of the corpus in Google Books via N-gram, the highest spike in works on the Napoleonic Wars in English in the last two centuries has come since 2000. A quick search of history books on the subject, again in English, on Amazon generates over 800 titles; many of these concern the Battle of Waterloo. The more scholarly Historical Abstracts yields only 50 books, but 425 articles, on the Napoleonic Wars since the beginning of this century. Some authors have focused on , strategy, or tactics.10 Others have emphasized the role of international diplomacy or government finance in both the

9. Books published just since 2000 include, on Russia: Jacques-Olivier Boudon, Napoléon et la campagne de Russie (Paris: Armand Colin, 2012); Dominic , Russia against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of (New York: Viking, 2010); Marie-Pierre Rey, L’effroyable tragédie: Une nouvelle histoire de la campagne de Russie (Paris: Flammarion, 2012), and 1814: Un à Paris (Paris: Flammarion, 2014); and Alexander Mikaberidze, The Burning of : Napoleon’s Trial by Fire (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword, 2014). On the Peninsular Campaigns: Charles Esdaile, The : A New History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and Women in the Peninsular War (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014). On the campaigns of 1813-1815: Michael V. Leggiere, Napoleon / : The Franco-Prussian War in North , 1813 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002); The Fall of Napoleon: The Allied Invasion of France, 1813-1814 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Blücher: Scourge of Na- poleon (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014). On ending the Napoleonic Wars: Thierry Lenz, Napoléon Diplomate (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2012), and Le Congrès de Vienne: Une refondation de l’Europe, 1814-1815 (Paris: Perrin, 2013), among others. 10. See Jeremy Black, European Warfare in a Global Context, 1660-1815 (London: Rout- ledge, 2006), and The Battle of Waterloo (New York: Random House, 2010), among his many works on military history in this period; Hew Strachan, Waterloo’s Legacy: The Reform of the , 1830-1854 (: Manchester University Press, 1984), and From Waterloo to Bala- clava: Tactics, Technology and the British Army (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Rory Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996); Frederick Schneid, Napoleon’s Italian Campaigns, 1805-1815 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002); Andrew Lambert, The Challenge: Britain against America in the Naval War of 1812 (New York: Faber and Faber, 2012); Huw Davies, Wellington’s Wars: The Making of a Military Ge- nius (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2012); and Mike Rapport, The Napoleonic Wars: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

 MILITARY HISTORY 15 Introduction fighting and the resolution of the Napoleonic Wars.11 This scholarship provides a global overview of these conflicts, but important questions about the experiences of combatants during and, especially, after these wars have only begun to be explored. We know even less about civilian experiences.12 In the wake of ’s seminal 1976 study, The Face of Battle, military historians of the Napoleonic Wars began to consider the experiences of ordinary soldiers, including veterans. Employing local archival sources as well as letters, journals, and memoirs, pioneering scholars such as Jean Vidalenc, Isser Woloch, Alan Forrest, and Natalie Petiteau have recovered the experiences and memories of French and, to a lesser extent, foreign combatants who served with the French in the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.13 Following in their footsteps, others such as Rafe Blaufarb, Stéphane Calvet, Kevin Linch, and Catriona Kennedy have focused on the range of motivations, emotions, practices, and trajectories among soldiers as well as officers during and after these wars. They have demonstrated that, for many of these men, loyalty to regiment trumped loyalty to Emperor or nation; that, in the absence of official recognition of their service, re-integration into civil society depended on networks of alliances on the local level; and that, with the exception of a small minority, veterans were not likely to become Bonapartist agitators.14 Such research challenges both nineteenth-century perceptions and subsequent tendencies to associate former soldiers with nationalism and political dissent.

11. Among the classics, see Gordon A. Craig, “Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance Against Napoleon, 1813-1814,” in War, Politics, and Diplomacy: Selected Essays (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 22-45, and Henry Kissinger, : Metternich, Cas- tlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822 (: Houghton Mifflin, 1957). More recent studies include Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1994). On government finance in the Napoleonic Wars, see Pierre Branda, Le prix de la gloire: Napoléon et l’argent (Paris: Fayard, 2007). 12. For one attempt to redress this lacuna, see Karen Hagemann et al., eds., Soldiers, Citi- zens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the French Wars, 1790-1820 (Basingstoke: Pal- grave Macmillan, 2009). 13. Jean Vidalenc, Les demi-solde: Etude d’une catégorie sociale (Paris: Rivière, 1955); Isser Wo- loch, The French Veteran from the Revolution to the Restoration (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Alan Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), and Napoleon’s Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire (London: Hambledon, 2002); Natalie Petiteau, Lendemains d’Empire: Les soldats de Napoléon dans la France du XIXe siècle (Paris: Boutique de l’Histoire, 2003), and Guer- riers du Premier Empire: Expériences et mémoires (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2011). 14. Rafe Blaufarb, The French Army, 1750-1820: Careers, Talent, Merit (Manchester: Man- chester University Press, 2002), and Bonapartists in the Borderlands: French Exiles and Refugees on the Gulf Coast, 1815-1835 (Birmingham: University of Press, 2006); Stéphane Calvet, Les officiers charentais de Napoléon au XIXe siècle: Destins de braves (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2010); Kevin Linch, Britain and Wellington’s Army: Recruitment, Society and Tradition, 1807-1815 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); and Catriona Kennedy, Narratives of the Revolution- ary and Napoleonic Wars: Military and Civilian Experience in Britain and (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). This group also includes Alain Pigeard, L’Armée de Napoléon: Or-

 16 THE JOURNAL OF Introduction

More recently, the field has joined the professional trend toward a broader examination of “war and society,” including what by the twentieth century came to be called the “.” Building on pioneering work by Raoul Girardet on the “military idea” in contemporary France as well as Geoffrey Best on “war and society” in revolutionary-era Europe, scholars have begun to analyze what they now often term the “military culture” of this period. Emphasizing the ways in which propaganda and culture shaped and were in turn shaped by the revolutionary and imperial wars, Jean-Paul Bertaud, David Hopkin, and others have shown how military values permeated many—though certainly not all— arenas of social life.15 Perceptions of military values proved particularly important in shaping relations between France and its archrival Great Britain. Inspired by ’s Britons, several studies have explored the role of war and military service in British national-identity formation.16 Following the pioneering work of , historians have examined the significance of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars in the development of national identity. This is especially the case for the German lands, where the myth of the “Befreiungskrieg” or “War of Liberation” has recently come under scrutiny.17 ganisation et vie quotidienne (Paris: Tallandier, 2000), and Michael Broers, Napoleon’s Other War: Bandits, Rebels and Their Pursuers in the Age of Revolutions (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010). 15. Raoul Girardet, La Société militaire dans la France contemporaine, 1815-1939 (Paris: Plon, 1953), and Geoffrey Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770-1870 (Oxford: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1982). For examples of more recent works in this vein, see John A. Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789–1815,” French Historical Studies 16, no. 1 (1989): 159-61; Annie Crépin, La Conscription en débat, ou, le triple apprentissage de la nation, de la citoyenneté, de la République, 1798-1889 (Ar- ras: Artois Presses Université, 1998); Jean-Paul Bertaud, Guerre et société en France de Louis XIV à Napoléon Ier (Paris: Armand Colin, 1998), and Quand les enfants parlaient de gloire: L’armée au coeur de la France de Napoléon (Paris: Aubier, 2006); David Hopkin, Soldier and Peasant in French Popular Culture, 1766-1870 (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Royal Historical Society; Boydell Press, 2003); Marie-Cécile Thoral, From Valmy to Waterloo: France at War, 1792-1815, trans. Godfrey Rogers (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); as well as T. C. W. Blanning’s survey The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802 (Abingdon: Hodder Education Publishers, 1996). 16. Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, Conn: Yale Uni- versity Press, 1992); Gerald Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740- 1830 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); Stuart Semmel, Napoleon and the British (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2004); and Mary Favret, War at a Distance: and the Making of Modern Wartime (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009). 17. George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars to the Third (New York: H. Fertig, 1975). More recently, see Karen Hagemann, “Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre”: Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002); Michael Rowe, “France, Prussia or Germany? The Napoleonic Wars and Shifting Allegiances in the ,” Central European History, 39, no. 4 (2006): 611-640; Ute Planert, Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg: Frankreichskriege und der deutsche Süden: Alltag – Wahrnehmung – Deutung, 1792-1841 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007); Kirstin Buchinger, Napoléomanie (Berlin: Goldencalb Verlag, 2013),

 MILITARY HISTORY 17 Introduction

The most provocative contribution to the history of the “culture of war” in this period is arguably David A. Bell’s The First : Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It, which traces the development of the modern separation between—but also permeation of—military and civilian culture and between war and peace, from the Enlightenment through the revolutionary and imperial wars. In their militarism, he insists, the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars foreshadowed the “total” wars of the twentieth century. Although this claim has been challenged by some historians who insist upon the difference in scale and technology of the twentieth-century wars, Bell’s book has renewed interest in the military history of this period.18 At the same time, there has been a wave of works on the role of gender in military culture, as well as on the memory of war, many in the cutting-edge Palgrave series “War, Culture, and Society, 1750-1850,” edited by Rafe Blaufarb, Alan Forrest, and Karen Hagemann. In addition to illuminating the experiences of women (including camp followers) during wartime, some of these works have shown how femininity and masculinity were re-shaped by war throughout the Atlantic world. Others have focused on how the Napoleonic Wars were memorialized in memoirs, histories, songs, images, and public buildings—if not yet in war “monuments,” per se—well into the nineteenth century.19

and especially Katherine Aaslestad, Place and Politics: Local Identity, Civic Culture, and in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era (Leiden: Brill, 2005). 18. David Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (Boston: Mariner Books, 2008), and Jean-Yves Guiomar, L’invention de la guerre totale: XVIIIe- XXe siècle (Paris: Editions du Félin, 2004). Critiques include Roger Chickering, “Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept,” in Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914, ed. Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering, and Stig Förster (Washington: Ger- man Historical Institute, 1999), 13-28, and Michael Broers, “The Concept of ‘Total War’ in the Revolutionary–Napoleonic Period,” War in History 15, no. 3 (2008): 247-68. See also the forums by David Bell, Annie Crépin, Hervé Drevillon, Olivier Forçade, and Bernard Gainot, “Autour de la guerre totale,” Annales historiques de la révolution française, no. 366 (2011): 153-70, and by Jeremy Popkin, Annie Jourdan, Jeremy Black, and Howard Brown in H-France Forum, 2, no. 3 (2007), http://www.h-france.net/forum/h-franceforumvol2.html. 19. Among other works by Karen Hagemann, see: “The Military and Masculinity: Gendering the History of the French Wars, 1792-1815,” in War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 331-352; “Recon- structing ‘Front’ and ‘Home’: Gendered Experiences and Memories of the German Wars against Napoleon—A Case Study,” War in History 16, no. 1 (2009): 25-50; and “Occupation, Mobilization and Politics: The Anti-Napoleonic Wars in Prussian Experience, Memory and Historiography,” Central European History 39, no. 4 (2006): 580-610. On these themes, see also the special issue of European History Quarterly edited by Karen Hagemann, Katherine Aaslestad, and Judith Miller on “Gender, War and the Nation in the Period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars— European Perspectives” (vol. 37, no. 4 [2007]); Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann and John Tosh, eds., Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History (Manchester: Manchester Univer- sity Press, 2004); Thomas Cardoza, Intrepid Women: Cantinières and Vivandières of the French Army

 18 THE JOURNAL OF Introduction

As exciting and important as they are, these new directions in the military history of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars have not fully analyzed the aftermath of these wars, in other words how civilians as well as soldiers moved from war to peace, across the European continent and beyond. Traditionally, narratives of these wars have concluded with the Battle of Waterloo and the , but the conflicts that had involved most of Europe and much of the Atlantic world did not neatly end with Waterloo. In the immediate wake of this battle, France was invaded and then occupied for three years. Over the longer term, all of the countries involved in these conflicts faced numerous challenges, not unlike those of the “postwar” periods of the twentieth century, including military demobilization, economic dislocation, and political reform. In comparison to later “postwar” eras, however, the period around 1814 and 1815 has not been examined through the lens of the “aftermath” of war. In the last few years, some preliminary research on the process of demobilization has emerged. In addition, a few studies have examined the end of the Napoleonic Empire, including the occupations of France in 1814 and 1815, but most are fairly focused case studies of particular national contingents or local populations.20 These exceptions aside, to the extent that this period has been addressed at all in the historiography—and for at least a half-century it has in fact been out of academic fashion—it has been through the lens of politics, as a “Restoration”

(Bloomington: University Press, 2010); and Michael Hughes, Forging Napoleon’s Grande Armée: Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800-1808 (New York: New York University Press, 2012). Relevant books in the Palgrave series “War, Culture and Soci- ety, 1750-1850,” include Gender, War and Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives, 1775-1830, ed. Karen Hagemann, Gisela Mattelle, and Jane Rendall (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Eveline Bouwers, Public Pantheons in Revolutionary Europe: Comparing Cultures of Remembrance, c. 1790- 1840 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); and War Memories: The Revolutionary and Napole- onic Wars in Modern European Culture, ed. Alan Forrest, Etienne François, and Karen Hagemann (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 20. See Forrest et al., eds., War, Demobilization, and Memory, and Jörg Echternkamp, ed., Kriegs- enden, Nachkriegsordnungen, Folgekonflikte, Wege aus dem Krieg im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach Verlag, 2012). Previous studies of the “end” of the imperial wars, including the occupations of France, include: Yves-Marie Bercé, La fin de l’Europe napoléonienne, 1814: La vacance du pouvoir (Paris: Henri Veyrier, 1990); Marc Blancpain, La vie quotidienne dans la France du Nord sous les occupations, 1814-1944 (Paris: Hachette, 1983); Thomas Veve,The Duke of Wellington and the Bri- tish Army of Occupation in France, 1815-1818 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992); François Cochet, ed., Les occupations en Champagne-Ardenne, 1814-1944 (: Presses Universitaires de Reims, 1996); Volker Wacker, Die alliierte Besetzung Frankreichs in den Jahren 1814 bis 1818 (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2001); Jacques Hantraye, Les Cosaques sur les Champs-Elysées: L’occupation de la France après la chute de Napoléon (Paris: Belin, 2005); Emmanuel de Waresquiel, Cent-Jours: La tentation de l’impossible, mars-juillet 1815 (Paris: Fayard, 2008); and a recent comparative volume, Le temps des hommes doubles: Les arrangements fâce à l’occupation, de la Révolution française à la guerre de 1870, ed. Jean-François Chanet, Annie Crépin, and Christian Windler (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013).

 MILITARY HISTORY 19 Introduction with a capital R, and not of the military, as a postwar “reconstruction.” Since the nineteenth century, most histories of the period from 1814 to about 1820 have discussed war as a backdrop to the high politics of the international and domestic counter-revolutionary reaction. They sometimes mention key events such as the invasion of France and occupation of Paris in 1814, the Battle of Waterloo, the second invasion and occupation following this battle, and the liberation of French territory in 1818; but both diplomatic histories and national surveys have generally ignored the question of how these events shaped political (or cultural) life in this period.21 Even the most innovative work on Restoration political culture has largely neglected the links between this culture and the “exit” from war.22 A few interesting exceptions have appeared, including the works of John Bew and Will Hay on the intersection between war and politics in Great Britain in the , and some are beginning to question the very concept of

21. For diplomatic histories, in addition to the above-cited works by Paul Schroeder, Dominic Lieven, and Thierry Lentz, see David King, Vienna, 1814: How the Conquerors of Napoleon Made Love, War, and Peace at the Congress of Vienna (New York: Broadway Books, 2008). For national surveys, see on France: Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, The Bourbon Restoration, trans. Lynn M. Case (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966); An- dré Jardin and André-Jean Tudesq, Restoration and Reaction, 1815-1848, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Emmanuel de Waresquiel and Benoît Yvert, Histoire de la Restauration (Paris: Perrin, 2002); Francis Démier, La France de la Restauration, 1814-1830: L’impossible retour du passé (Paris: Gallimard, 2012). On Germany: James Shee- han, German History, 1770-1866 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); David Blackbourn, , 1780-1918: The Long Nineteenth Century (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002); , Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Press, 2008). On Great Britain, in addi- tion to Colley and Newman, see Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad and Dangerous People? England, 1783-1846 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 22. See, for instance, Sheryl Kroen, Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Resto- ration France, 1815-1830 (Berkeley: University of Press, 2000); Jean-Yves Mollier, Martine Reid, and Jean-Claude Yon, eds., Repenser la Restauration (Paris: Nouveau Monde Edi- tions, 2003); François Ploux, De bouche à oreille: Naissance et propagation des rumeurs dans la France du XIXe siècle (Paris: Aubier, 2003); Peter Fritzsche, Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Pierre Serna, La République des girouettes: Une anomalie politique, la France de l’extrême centre, 1789-1815 et au- delà (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2005); Natalie Scholz and Christina Schöer, eds., Représentation et pouvoir: La politique symbolique en France, 1789-1830 (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2007); Denise Z. Davidson, France After Revolution: Urban Life, Gender and the New Social Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); Emmanuel Fureix, La France des larmes: Deuils politiques à l’âge romantique, 1814-1840 (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2009); Sarah Horowitz, Friendship and Politics in Post-Revolutionary France (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014); Dror Wahrman, Imagining the Middle Class: The Political Representation of Class in Britain, c. 1780-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Leora Auslander, Cultural Revolutions: Everyday Life and Politics in Britain, and France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

 20 THE JOURNAL OF Introduction

“Restoration” for the decades following 1815.23 On the whole, however, this period has remained the domain of political historians. In short, the period following 1814/1815 is overdue for reconsideration by military historians. A quintessential case of the challenges of war termination, it deserves to be analyzed as a period of “post,” or more precisely “aftermath,” of war.24 For such an analysis, excellent models exist among the many innovative works on the aftermaths of the “total” wars of the twentieth century—for example, by Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Antoine Prost, Annette Becker, Bruno Cabanes, John Horne, and Jay Winter, for the Great War; and by Guillaume Piketty, John Dower, and Norman Naimark, for the Second World War.25 Together, these works have brought to the forefront of military history the problems of what the French term “sorties de guerre,” or exits from war, including military demobilization, political as well as economic reconstruction, psychological trauma, and memory and commemoration.

23. John Bew, Castlereagh: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); William Antho- ny Hay, The Whig Revival, 1808-1830 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); James M. Bro- phy, Popular Culture and the Public Sphere in the Rhineland, 1800-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Markus J. Prutsch, Making Sense of Constitutional in Post-Napoleonic France and Germany (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 24. On the concept of “aftermath” of war, see Matthew Stibbe and Ingrid , eds., Aftermaths of War: Women’s Movements and Female Activists, 1918-1923 (Leiden: Brill, 2011). See also the work of Susan Grayzel, including Women’s Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France during the First World War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999) and her more recent involvement with AHRC (Arts and Humanities Research Council) Network Grant on “Women’s Organisations and Female Activists in the Aftermath of War: International Perspectives, 1918-1923.” 25. Among other works by these authors, see: Stéphane Audouin-Rouzeau and Chris- tophe Prochasson, Sortir de la Grande Guerre: Le Monde et l’après-1918 (Paris: Tallandier, 2008); Antoine Prost, In the Wake of War: “Les Anciens Combattants” and French Society, 1914-1939, trans. Helen McPhail (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2002); Antoinette Becker, Les monu- ments aux morts: Mémoire de la Grande Guerre (Paris: Errance, 1991), and La guerre et la foi: De la mort à la mémoire, 1914-1930 (Paris: A. Colin, 1994); Bruno Cabanes, La Victoire endeuillée : La sortie de guerre des soldats français (1918-1920) (Paris: Seuil, 2004); John Horne, “Demo- bilizing the Mind: France and the Legacy of the Great War, 1919-1939,” French History and Civilization 2 (2009): 101-107, as well as State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1998), and Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006); John Dower, Embracing Defeat: in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000); Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997); Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: From War to Peace (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010); and Bruno Cabanes and Guillaume Piketty, eds., Retour à L'intime au sortir de la guerre (Paris: Tallandier, 2009).

 MILITARY HISTORY 21 Introduction

Inspired by such analyses, some scholars interested in the period 1814/1815 are beginning to take the study of the “end” of the Napoleonic Wars in some exciting new directions. Here we highlight several emerging topics and approaches as well as possibilities for further research. New themes include the difficulties of integrating demobilized soldiers back into civilian life, nostalgia for war, and questions of postwar national and political identities. Methodologically, these new studies incorporate approaches from Atlantic or transnational history, cultural history and gender history, the history of everyday life, and the history of emotions. One promising approach considers the international dimensions not just of peacemaking but also of the repercussions of war, and the insights that apparently peripheral locations can give for understanding these dynamics. This may seem a given—by their very nature, war and peace involved multiple powers. For example, Brian Vick’s new study of the Congress of Vienna is an illuminating reconsideration of the intricacies of international negotiations in 1815. Other scholars have highlighted the importance of civil society, public opinion, and political culture in the Congress.26 However, there is still a tendency to frame this history, particularly in its postwar form, in national terms, in part because nineteenth- and twentieth-century European states celebrated resistance to Napoleon as a key stage of national development. Following new analysis of the Napoleonic Empire as an international phenomenon, scholars are beginning to examine the cross-national effects of the fall of the Empire.27 Contributors to this issue show that even in what is arguably the most “national” and central case—France—we need to think about limits to the nation and national history. Looking at postwar dynamics elsewhere similarly reveals both the power and the limitation of national frameworks. For the German lands, Katherine Aaslestad and Leighton James have illuminated the impact of the wars and their aftermath on Central European society as a whole, suggesting that focusing on Prussia as a proxy for the experience or identity of gives only a partial story.28 Morten Ottosen has explored the dynamics that led to the dissolution of the 434-

26. Brian Vick, The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014). Recent work on the subject has been reviewed by Katherine Aaslestad, “Serious Work for a New Europe: The Congress of Vienna after Two Hundred Years,” Central European History (2015): 225-237. 27. Philip Dwyer and Alan Forrest, eds., Napoleon and the Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), and Michael Broers and Peter Hicks, eds., The Napoleonic Empire and the New European Political Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 28. Katherine Aaslestad, Place and Politics, and “Identifying a Post-War Period in the Ger- man Confederation: The Hanseatic Cities, 1813-1830,” in Decades of Reconstruction: Postwar Societies from the 18th to the 20th Centuries, ed. Ute Planert and Jim Retallack (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, forthcoming), and Leighton James, Witnessing the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in German Central Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

 22 THE JOURNAL OF Introduction year union between Denmark and Norway, and the growth of Danish and Norwegian nationalism.29 Others have argued that hostilities in Spain and Italy should no longer be seen as national uprisings.30 Looking at the wider Atlantic world makes it clear that the reverberations of the Napoleonic Wars lasted long after formal peace treaties, and that demobilization had repercussions that extended far beyond the return of soldiers to their home soil. A number of scholars have begun to position Atlantic World conflicts, including the War of 1812 as well as naval and land battles in the Caribbean and Latin America, in the context of the termination and aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. Perhaps most cogently, Rafe Blaufarb has argued that demobilization after the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812 released dramatic military resources, both and material, for potential service in Spanish American conflicts. These resources permitted insurgents, who seemed on the verge of defeat in 1815, to unleash a powerful comeback only two years later.31

29. Rasmus Glenthøj and Morten Nordhagen Ottosen, Experiences of War and Nationality in Denmark and Norway, 1807-1815 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 30. Michael Rowe, ed., Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe: State-Formation in an Age of Upheaval, c.1800-1815 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and Charles Esdaile, Outpost of Empire: The Napoleonic Occupation of Andalucía, 1810-1812 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012). 31. Rafe Blaufarb, “Arms for Revolutions,” as well as Emilio Ocampo, The Emperor’s Last Campaign: A Napoleonic Empire in America (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009). For broad overviews of how these wars affected the Atlantic world, see Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds., War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815 (Washington: German Historical Institute; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), and Pierre Serna, Antonio De Francesco, and Ju- dith Miller, eds., at War, 1776-1840: Revolutions, Conflicts and Geopolitics in Europe and the Atlantic World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). On the War of 1812 from an Atlantic per- spective, see: Jon Lattimer, 1812: War with America (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), and Troy Bickham, The Weight of Vengeance: The United States, the and the War of 1812 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). On the impact of war in the Caribbean, see, among others, Roger Norman Buckley, The British Army in the : Society and the Military in the Revolutionary Age (Gainesville: University Press of , 1998); Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004); David Patrick Geggus and Norman Fiering, The World of the Haitian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); and Jeremy Popkin, You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For other dimensions of the impact and aftermath of the Napoleonic Empire in Latin America, see Christopher Belaubre, Jordana Dym, and John Savage, eds., Napoleon’s Atlantic: The Impact of Napoleonic Empire in the Atlantic World (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Matthew Brown, Adventur- ing through Spanish : Simón Bolívar, Foreign and the Birth of New Nations (Liv- erpool: University Press, 2006); Matthew Brown and Gabriel B. Paquette, Connections after Colonialism: Europe and Latin America in the (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013); Alex Borucki, From Shipmates to Soldiers: Emerging Black Identities in the Río de la Plata (Al- buquerque: University of New Press, 2015); Lyman Johnson, Workshop of Revolution: Plebe- ian and the Atlantic World, 1776-1810 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011).

 MILITARY HISTORY 23 Introduction

The end of war also had significant consequences for slavery and colonialism. Britain abolished the slave trade in its empire in 1807 and arranged several treaties on the matter in subsequent years, but regulation accelerated with peacemaking. With the Treaty of Paris in 1814, France agreed to end the slave trade within five years; Napoleon abolished the trade on February 8, 1815, during ; and the Congress of Vienna generalized the principle, on March 29, 1815. Although slave traders continued to circumvent the bans and operated in substantial numbers, historians have found that these restrictions represented real change. Most notably, Ian Clark contends that international declarations against the trade created a new normative framework that could effectively shame those who flouted its provisions.32 At the same time, the political and geographic complexities of the Caribbean complicate any analysis either of national identity or abolitionism and anti-colonialism in the early nineteenth century. The Haitian Revolution and its aftermath shaped many of the dynamics in the era, but the end of the Napoleonic Empire also loomed large. This was particularly true for colonies like and Martinique, which changed hands. As Rebecca Hartkopf-Schloss’s work shows for Martinique, which had been under British control from 1809 and was transferred back to French control in December 1814, the Treaty of Paris influenced ideas about national identity and the future of the plantation system.33 The turmoil of the Hundred Days and the Second Restoration again called into question notions of political legitimacy, the rights of free people of color, and control of the plantation system. If large-scale geopolitical analysis sheds new light onto the lasting repercussions of the wars, more locally-focused studies offer different insights into the experiences of living through mass demobilization, abrupt political change, and the restructuring of economic, social, and cultural life in the wake of war. Here the methodology of the “history of everyday life” has utility, although not all historians engaged in related approaches adopt the label.34 The extent and complexity of postwar repercussions become more visible when we look at “everyday” interactions.35 These can include interactions between military men and civilians, ranging from the small-scale skirmishes between occupying soldiers

32. See the 1810 Anglo-Portuguese, the 1813 Anglo-Swedish, and the 1814 Anglo- treaties. On the continuation of the slave trade after 1814/15, see Christopher L. Miller, The French Atlantic Triangle: Literature and Culture of the Slave Trade (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008). For an argument for significant change, see Ian Clark, “Vienna and the Slave Trade,” chap. in International Legitimacy and World Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 37-60. 33. Rebecca Hartkopf Schloss, “Bourbon Monarchy or Imperial : The Hundred Days in Martinique, 1814-1815,” paper presented at the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, Oxford, , February 22, 2014. 34. Paul Steege, Andrew Bergerson, Maureen Healy, and Pamela E. Swett, “The History of Everyday Life: A Second Chapter,” Journal of Modern History 80, no. 2 (2008): 358-78. 35. On “everyday” economic experiences, including smuggling, trade, and networks, see Katherine B. Aaslestad and Johan Joor, eds., Revisiting Napoleon’s : Local, Re- gional, and European Experiences (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

 24 THE JOURNAL OF Introduction and local villagers in France to the experiences of prisoners of war who straggled home or, conversely, established lives where they had been forced to settle. They also include exchanges between individuals and the state—such as the flood of refugees seeking assistance in Germanic cities devastated by war and repeated occupations, deserters trying to regularize their status, veterans seeking pensions, civilians demanding indemnities for war damages, or spouses and siblings hoping to discover the fates of missing men. Such interactions reveal unexpected economic and social dimensions, from the individual—such as the shifting business of a furniture-maker away from wooden legs to cabinets and chairs as wars ended—to the collective, such as the role of women’s groups in providing charitable support for the victims of war long after the formal cessation of hostilities.36 They also reveal hidden consequences of war for family life. One of the most striking cases may be that of couples who undertook paper marriages so that a man might be counted as a head of household and thus improve his chances of avoiding conscription. These couples then found themselves bound together when the Bourbon government outlawed divorce in 1816.37 Examining such experiences drives home the extent to which the end of war was not simply a question of a treaty or a regime change. Nor were the lived repercussions of war limited to veterans; negotiating the aftermath of war could be a long process for men and women, combatants and civilians. At the same time, these investigations can reveal aspects of the “inertia of the everyday,” practices and assumptions that continued despite dramatic political change.38 The history of emotion also promises new insights into the transition from war to peace. Attracting the attention of historians of various periods and places, the field has proven especially influential among historians of the .39

36. The maker of wooden legs became a symbol for selfishness during the wars. For a quin- tessential example, see the caricature, “Le désespoir du tourneur en jambes de bois,” http://www. histoire-empire.org/docs/caricatures/desespoir.htm. On women’s groups, see Aaselstad, “Identi- fying a Postwar Period.” 37. On marriages, see Jennifer Heuer, “‘Réduit à désirer la mort d’une femme qui peut-être lui a sauvé la vie’: la conscription et les liens du mariage sous Napoléon,” Annales historiques de la révolution française, no. 348 (2007): 25-40, and Cédric Istasse, “Les fraudeurs aux lois conscrip- tionnelles napoléoniennes. Les ‘mariages simulés’ de conscrits des départements belges en 1813- 1815,” in Les Européens dans les guerres napoléoniennes, ed. Natalie Petiteau, Jean-Marc Olivier, and Sylvie Caucanas (Toulouse: Privat, 2012), 75-90. 38. Denise Z. Davidson, “From Emperor to King Twice: Living Through Political Whip- lash in France, 1814-1815,” paper presented at the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, Ox- ford, Mississippi, February 2014. 39. For general theoretical approaches, see the 2012 volume of the American Historical Review devoted to the Historical Study of Emotions, especially Barbara Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in History,” American Historical Review 107, no. 3 (2012): 821-45. See also William Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For an overview of work on the French Revolution, see Sophia Rosenfeld, “Thinking about Feeling, 1789-1799,” French Historical Studies 32, no. 4 (2009), 697–706.

 MILITARY HISTORY 25 Introduction

To a lesser extent, historians of Restoration France and the Netherlands have also begun to look at the role of emotions in the political legitimation of post- Napoleonic regimes.40 At the same time, the question of how emotions have been created, controlled, and represented in conjunction with war and its aftermath has generated a substantial, but largely separate, body of scholarship. Like much of the work on the aftermath of war, it has focused largely on the twentieth century, but there has also been a growing interest in the .41 The history of emotion suggests several avenues for understanding the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars that intersect with related work on demobilization, commemoration and memory, constructions of masculinity and femininity, and state legitimacy. Historians have explored the sense of anomie and nostalgia wrought first by revolution and then by war.42 The practice of battlefield tourism provides another way of thinking about emotion and the aftermath of war. This was especially the case with Waterloo, which drew flocks of tourists in the weeks and months after the battle. Commemorations of Waterloo varied across nations and would change meanings over the course of the nineteenth century.43 Visits to battlefields could evoke strong emotions—including admiration or respect, but also sorrow, horror, and titillation—among veterans and civilians. Governments and patriotic groups sometimes deliberately cultivated such reactions.

40. Natalie Scholz has examined appeals to sentiment and emotion in legitimating the post- war Restoration regime in France. See “La monarchie sentimentale: un remède aux crises politiques de la Restauration?” in Représentation et pouvoir. La politique symbolique en France (1789-1830), ed. Natalie Scholz and Christina Schröer (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2007), and “Past and Pathos: Symbolic Practices of Reconciliation during the French Restoration,” History & Mem- ory 22, no. 1 (2010): 48-80. Comparatively, see Matthias Lok and Natalie Scholz, “The Return of the Loving Father: Masculinity, Legitimacy, and the French and Dutch Monarchies (1813-1815),” BMG-Low Countries Historical Review 127, no. 1 (2012), 19-44. 41. In addition to the works cited above on emotionally-charged sites of memory during and after the world wars, see Michel Roper, The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), and Vanda Wilcox, “’Weeping Tears of Blood’: Exploring Italian Soldiers’ Emotions in the First World War,” Modern Italy 17, no. 2 (2012), 171- 181. On the early modern period, see the conference on “Battlefield Emotions, 1550-1850,” held in Ghent, from February 13-15, 2014, www.battlefieldemotions.ugent.be (consulted August 25, 2014). See also Christy Lauren Pichichero, “Battles of the Self: War and Subjectivity in ” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford, 2008), and “Le Soldat Sensible: Military and Social Egalitarianism in the Enlightenment French Army,” French Historical Studies (2008): 553-580; and Philip Shaw, Suffering and Sentiment in Romantic (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013). 42. Fritzsche, Stranded in the Present, and Susan A. Crane, Collecting and Historical Con- sciousness in Early Nineteenth-Century Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Press, 2000). 43. Kennedy, Narratives of the Revolutionary Wars; Alan Forrest, Waterloo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Jean-Marc Largeaud, Napoléon et Waterloo: la défaite glorieuse de 1815 à nos jours (Paris: La Boutique de l’Histoire, 2006).

 26 THE JOURNAL OF Introduction

Other emotions were concealed or suppressed, particularly mourning the dead, as confirming the fates of the missing often proved impossible. While this difficulty presented a challenge throughout the wars, it took on a new urgency in peacetime, when men and women hoped to receive news of absent loved ones—and were often disappointed. The relative absence of rituals, monuments, or representations marking public grief compounded these uncertainties. This was most striking in France, where, as Natalie Petiteau has observed, the Bourbon Restoration organized public ceremonies for those deemed victims of the French Revolution, but not for the war dead.44 In England, official acknowledgement of the war tended to focus on the heroism of elites, rather than the sacrifices of the lower classes.45 The question of individual and collective mourning in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars—crucial after —has received little attention from scholars.46 Further investigation may reveal more about the ways individuals and communities, as well as states, coped with losses, and how governments made use of other kinds of emotionally charged images to deflect problematic or dangerous emotions, including those of grief and suffering. Inspired by the boon of studies on the remembrance and commemoration of the world wars of the twentieth century, historians of this earlier period are also now investigating the ways in which conflicts waged during the Napoleonic Empire were remembered by contemporary and subsequent generations. Much of this work has focused on the official and cultural memory of individual battles, particularly Leipzig and Waterloo. Other scholarship, inspired by theoretical studies such as Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s Culture of Defeat, has sought traces of the memory of Napoleonic warfare in popular culture—including oral traditions— through the nineteenth century. Together, these works illuminate the role of memory—or lack thereof—of the first “total” war in the formation of family, community, and national identity decades after its conclusion.47

44. Natalie Petiteau, “La portée de la politique symbolique à l’égard des armées napoléoni- ennes,” in Représentation et pouvoir: La politique symbolique en France (1789-1830), ed. Natalie Scholz and Christina Schröer (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2007), 147-156. 45. Kennedy, Narratives of the Revolutionary Wars. 46. Calvet touches on veterans’ visits to , particularly later in the nineteenth century, in Les officiers charentais. 47. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning and Recov- ery (New York: Picador, 2004). See Karen Hagemann, “Occupation, Mobilization and Politics: The Anti-Napoleonic Wars in Prussian Experience, Memory and Historiography,” Central European History 39, no. 4 (2006): 580-610; Katherine Aaslestad, “Remembering and Forgetting: The Lo- cal and the Nation in Hamburg’s Commemorations of the Wars of Liberation,” Central European History 38, no. 3 (2005): 384-416; Ute Planert, “From Collaboration to Resistance: Experience, Politics and Memory of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Southern Germany,” Central European History 39, no. 4 (2006): 676-705; David Hopkin, “Storytelling, Fairytales and Autobiog- raphy: Some Observations on Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century French Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Memoirs,” Social History 29, no. 2 (2004): 186-198; and Christine Haynes, “Remembering and Forgetting the First Occupations of France,” Journal of Modern History, forthcoming 2016.

 MILITARY HISTORY 27 Introduction

As the above examples suggest, the history of emotion has often been connected to that of gender. While there is a growing literature on gender relations during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, including on the relationship between military service and citizenship, the literature on the immediate post- revolutionary and postwar moments is less developed. Several historians have begun to offer interesting angles.48 Considering the gendered aspects of war termination illuminates both changing understandings of masculinity and femininity and the dynamics of creating a postwar society. Two decades of more or less constant warfare interacted with other changes—including revolution and industrialization—to shape men and women’s experiences and perceptions of appropriate gender roles. At the same time, various parties mobilized ideas about gender roles to negotiate the transition to postwar societies. This process appears most clearly with regard to masculinity. The revolutionary and Napoleonic wars marked a turning point in creating and promoting new models of masculinity, sometimes labeled martial masculinity or virility.49 These models drew on an array of older ideas of military heroism, but were reshaped by the experiences of revolution and political transformation. Conscription, mass mobilization, and prolonged warfare also meant that ideals of martial masculinity affected many men who might not otherwise have defined themselves as warriors. Examining the aftermath of war presents both the limits of martial masculinity and its long-term reverberations. One of the immediate challenges facing postwar governments was the absorption of returned soldiers into civilian life, which in some cases entailed significant reworking of models of masculinity. Stephan Dudink has found that in the Netherlands, the icon of an arms-carrying hero, ready to sacrifice all for liberty, was quickly replaced by that of a sedate, industrious, domestic father.50 French royalists regarded Napoleonic veterans with suspicion, often refusing or limiting economic support and subjecting veterans to strict policing measures, but postwar governments also mobilized different visions of masculinity—from recognition of

48. These include Aaslestad, “Identifying a Postwar Period”; Matthias Lok and Natalie Scholz, “The Return of the Loving Father”; Stefan Dudink, “After the : Citizenship, the Military, and Masculinity in the Making of the Dutch Monarchy, 1813-1814,” in Representing Masculinity: Male Citizenship in Modern Western Culture, ed. Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and Anna Clark (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 89-108; and Karen Hagemann, “Re- constructing ‘Front’ and ‘Home’: Gendered Experiences and Memories of the German Wars against Napoleon—A Case Study,” War in History 16, no. 1 (2009): 25-50. 49. Alain Corbin, ed., Histoire de la virilité, vol. 2, Le triomphe de la virilité, le XIXe siècle (Paris: Seuil, 2011), especially Jean-Paul Bertaud, “L’armée et le brevet de virilité,” 63-82, and “Virilité militaire,” 157-202; Michael J. Hughes, Forging Napoleon’s Grande Armée. See also Karen Hagemann, “Manly Valor,” op cit.; and “The Military and Masculinity: Gendering the History of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815,” in War in an Age of Revolution, 1775- 1815; and Brian Joseph Martin, Napoleonic Friendship: Military, Fraternity, Intimacy, and Sexual- ity in Nineteenth-Century France (Durham, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2011). 50. Dudink, “After the Republic.”

 28 THE JOURNAL OF Introduction past glory to appeals to familial duty and the civic importance of agricultural labor— in an effort to reintegrate veterans into domestic life. Notions of martial masculinity were further challenged by the physical state of returned veterans. Wounded men had returned home throughout the wars, but mass demobilization brought home many more crippled, mutilated, or weakened men. The sight of injured soldiers could inspire admiration and respect—sentiments wartime regimes had tried to cultivate—but also pity, disgust, and ridicule. The aftermath of war also affected women’s experiences. Violence against women was common not only during battle, but also in subsequent occupation. Rape was part of the experience of war, especially in areas where troops were given free rein. Leighton James has examined the violence that often followed assaults on fortified communities in German Central Europe, including sexual violence against women.51 Similar behavior took place during the invasions of France in 1814 and 1815, and during the subsequent occupation. In her research on the “occupation of guarantee,” Christine Haynes has found that countless acts of sexual violence were committed by all contingents of Allied troops against French women and girls during the three years of occupation.52 Such attacks could have symbolic significance that went beyond individual brutality. When Bonapartist newspapers described atrocities that the and other foreign soldiers committed against French women, for example, they sought to use these accounts of violence against girls and the elderly to stir up resistance to the invasion of French territory. Jacques Hantraye has argued that rape was a means for the occupiers to demonstrate power over the territory and people of France and was understood as a violation of the French nation. Yet these sexual assaults garnered little attention, especially compared to similar cases in the twentieth century, when real or threatened violence to women and children was invoked to galvanize national sentiment against enemies, or to recount stories of national suffering and grievance.53 At this stage, it is unclear whether the relative absence of this theme is due to different contemporary understandings of violence against women, or to lines of historiographical investigation, or both.

51. Leighton James, “Invasion and Occupation: Civilian-Military Relations in Central Europe during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,” in Civilians and War in Europe, 1618- 1815, ed. Erica Charters, Eve Rosenhaft, and Hannah Smith (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2012), 225-240. 52. Haynes, “The Allied Occupation of France,” in War, Demobilization and Memory. 53. Hantraye, Les Cosaques, 94. For twentieth-century European examples, see Katherine R. Jolluck, “The Nation’s Pain and Women’s Shame: Polish Women and Wartime Violence,” in Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe, ed. Nancy Wingfield and Maria Bucur (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 193-219; , “The ‘Child of the Bar- barian’: Rape, Race, and Nationalism in France During the First World War,” Past and Present, no. 141 (1993): 170-206; and Nicoletta Gullace, “Sexual Violence and Family Honor: British Propaganda and International Law During the First World War,” American Historical Review 102, no. 3 (1997): 714-47.

 MILITARY HISTORY 29 Introduction

Revisiting the aftermath of war with the goal of understanding ideas and practices of women’s citizenship is also a promising avenue for research. Not surprisingly, much work on gender and citizenship has focused on the drama of the French Revolution. In contrast, the legal constraints of the , social reactions, and the violence of the wars combine to make the early nineteenth century seem a deeply conservative one for women’s rights. In some cases in the German lands, however, women’s associations served not only as patriotic organizations, but also assisted in provisioning war refugees, invalid soldiers, veterans, and their families, and continued to take on such roles long after 1815. Katherine Aaslestad has suggested that in cities like Hamburg, which maintained distinctive urban traditions, such groups may lead us to rethink gendered claims to citizenship and their relationships to war.54 Here too more research elsewhere may offer new perspectives. Much remains to be done to grasp fully the complexities of 1814-1815.

The essays published here exemplify some of the best new work regarding the challenges of terminating war in 1814 and 1815. For the 2014 meeting of the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, 1750-1850, which took place in Oxford, Mississippi, we organized four sessions on re-thinking 1814-1815. Of the twelve papers presented at the conference, we selected for inclusion here those that most explicitly addressed military issues. Employing a range of approaches, including medical, gender, transnational and micro history, the authors utilize very different types of sources, including correspondence, pamphlets, military archives, pension petitions, legal records, and diplomatic papers. Each gives a new perspective on the complexities that accompanied post-Napoleonic transitions, outside of as well as inside France. Together, the articles in this issue make clear the value of revisiting the processes involved in ending the Napoleonic wars and embracing peace. These transformations required much more than diplomats sitting around a table in Vienna drawing lines on the map and assigning “legitimate rulers” to their thrones. Ordinary soldiers and civilians faced the transition to peace with a variety of emotions, from resignation to hope, from nostalgia to satisfaction. Particular places and people suffered more than others, as suggested by the articles by Hantraye and Tozzi, while doctors, administrators, and families all worked to cope with these returning veterans. Like the better known and better-studied examples of twentieth-century postwar transitions, the post-Napoleonic peace merits this attention as we move beyond traditional military and diplomatic history and incorporate the findings of social history, cultural history, intellectual history, and the history of the everyday. As after 1918 and 1945, veterans and civilians in the post- had to negotiate complicated and difficult transitions, struggles that these articles attempt to uncover and explicate.

54. Katherine Aaslestad, “Citizenship in Action: Hanseatic Women’s Wartime Associa- tions,” in Gender in Urban Europe: Sites of Political Activity and Citizenship, 1750-1900, ed. Krista Cowman et al. (London: Routledge, 2014), 124-140. See also Karen Hagemann, “Female Pa- triots: Women, War and the Nation in Prussia during the Anti-Napoleonic Wars,” Gender and History 16, no. 2 (2004): 397-424.

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