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FOCUS FOCUS Bo Xilai: His Descent Into Darkness A4 Thursday, August 22, 2013 Thursday, August 22, 2013 A5 FOCUS FOCUS Bo Xilai: his descent into darkness After heady years spent climbing the party ladder, the colourful life of Bo Xilai will be judged by what happens in a grim Shandong court ................................................ thought about fleeing, Xinhua enrolled at New York’s Keith Zhai reported. Columbia Law School. [email protected] Gu and Wang had lunch in a As he spoke of his anger, Bo private room at police leaned back and laughed. “Not headquarters on February 4. only my son, but my wife and I January, 2012 Waiters outside the room heard have no personal assets … my No 36 Zhongshansi Road, a Gu crying. wife closed her law firm 20 years compound of rust-coloured On February 6, Wang sought ago to avoid gossip … I’m very villas secluded behind thick refuge in the US consulate in touched and feel deeply sorry for foliage in downtown Chongqing Chengdu , where he told her sacrifice.” , is easily ignored from the US diplomats about Gu’s The details of the mysterious street. And that is just the way involvement in Heywood’s phone call remain unclear, but the people who live there like it. murder. some insiders say it was from his There are no names on the Wang’s dramatic escape brother Bo Xicheng, telling him brick houses and the armed made headlines around the Gu had been detained. soldiers at the gate ensure what world the next day. But Bo Five days later, then-premier goes on inside stays there. carried on as usual, going on a Wen Jiabao said in his There is good reason for the sightseeing tour in Yunnan annual press conference on the secrecy. No 36 Zhongshansi and feeding the seagulls at Dian last day of the NPC session that Road is where the power is. Lake, near Kunming . The the authorities should learn Inside, Bo Xilai , one provincial capital is also home to lessons from Wang’s attempted of the Communist Party’s the 14th Group Army, a People’s defection. highest-flying officials, was the Liberation Army unit led by Bo’s “We will give the people the king of his domain. father, Bo Yibo , in the results of the investigation and He was sometimes referred 1930s. the handling [of the case], so that to by local officials as “building Local media reported that Bo it can withstand the test of law No 3”, after the house in which was there to “cherish the and history,” Wen said. He then his family lived. Bo rode a wave memory of revolutionary launched into a criticism of that swept him to the top of the ancestors”. But online sites were Chongqing’s leadership, without megacity of 32 million people running hot with speculation mentioning Bo by name. and onto the national stage. that with his career facing While the speech was not a Had he clung on a bit longer, disaster, Bo was courting sentence handed down by a the 64-year-old would very political support from the court, in a country where politics possibly have joined the military. trumps the judiciary it signalled Standing Committee of the A person with close ties with Bo’s political doom. Politburo at the 18th party Bo’s family said he had been It’s a system that Bo must congress, and perhaps climbed unruffled and remained understand well. even higher. confident he could turn the But even the best-laid plans situation around. He said Bo can be derailed. looked relaxed and there were ‘Great prospects’ The governor’s fortunes few signs of anxiety at a family Born in Beijing three months started to unravel in building reunion dinner in Beijing in before Mao Zedong No 1of the compound on the early March. proclaimed the founding of the morning of January 29 last year “Bo gave his family members People’s Republic in October when he slapped his trusted the impression that he would 1949, Bo is the fourth son of the crime-buster Wang Lijun handle Wang’s defection late Bo Yibo, a revolutionary in the face. attempt well,” the person said. hero who emerged as a “As a princeling [son of a prominent figure in the new revolutionary leader], Bo was government. excessively confident his family The young Bo grew up at a connections were up to any task time of national optimism, with and thus became too reckless.” Mao declaring that China would take its place as the most g n powerful country in the world. o W On the defensive Mao’s emphasis on the y On March 9, in Beijing’s Great political mobilisation of ordinary r Hen Hall of the People during the citizens, especially the poor, Bo Xilai at a party gathering just National People’s Congress, Bo clearly left a deep impression on before his downfall last year. openly defended himself and his young Bo, who practised similar ation: family in a two-hour press ideas decades later in r conference. Chongqing. Illust More than 150 journalists “In Mao’s ideology, the crowded into the large meeting masses were the source of his room to soak up his every word, power, and it was important to Bo was confident with hundreds more blocked get their support,” said historian his family ties from entering. Bo held court in Zhang Lifan . “Bo is a the middle of the room, smiling blind follower of Mao’s ideology. were up to any confidently. After innocuous He loves the mass campaigns.” questions from state-controlled His life was turned upside task and thus media, a Japanese down in 1966 when Mao became too correspondent from the Asahi launched the Cultural newspaper finally raised the Revolution. Bo’s father was reckless issue of his right-hand man’s labelled a “rightist” and a dramatic move. “counter-revolutionary” and A SOURCE CLOSE TO BO’S FAMILY “After this problem arose, I purged from his posts. Bo felt sad,” Bo replied in a clear, suffered too, spending five years Bo is mad. “Ingrate,” he yells soft voice. “There was in a labour camp. at Wang. He smashes a glass and negligence on my part when I His father was tortured and waves his hand in Wang’s face. appointed people.” his mother, Hu Ming, Wang unsuccessfully tries to Just then, his phone vibrated committed suicide, according to dodge the slap. Blood streams and, after checking the number, official accounts, though some programme in international ahead of individual liberty. Bo unusually long 10 days. During profusely. “The whole town United States and Europe and quick success, so everything he complained about the expensive tortured – a move critics said television officials to a meeting to his fans, he might well be out of his mouth, according to he left the room, telling historians say she died after journalism at the Chinese learned well, and later went on the trip, he wrote a piece of turned out to say goodbye to attracted additional foreign did in Chongqing was aimed at trees, but they still enjoyed was designed to deter lawyers in late 2010, where he suggested reminded of classic images of senior police officers and Chongqing major Huang Qifan being torture by red guards. The Academy of Social Sciences, to become exceptionally skilled calligraphy describing the city as their good mayor Bo,” local investment. going back to Beijing to become telling visitors about their city’s from helping suspects. halting all advertising from the Mao on the Tiananmen businessmen who were later , who was sitting next to accusations stemmed from a graduating in 1982. in manipulating media coverage a “pearl of the north”. media reported, adding that But one ministry official said someone bigger,” said the new look. One local businessman, start of 2011. rostrum welcoming his red told of the clash. him, to “go on answering the power struggle between Mao Hu Sisheng, a former to boost his public profile. Regardless, the city’s tears were flowing and that it people were scared of Bo Chongqing businessman. Almost every cab driver said Chen Guixue , recalled “Chief Bo, the problem is we guards. “The conflict was made questions”. and former Politburo Standing reporter with the party residents appreciated the took Bo more than half an hour because he would shout abuse “Chongqing was his Bo had made fundamental, $ that the police had once have sold the advertising for next Bo’s powers had peaked. public after Wang was slapped,” When he returned a few Committee chairman Liu Shaoqi mouthpiece People’s Daily, was Politician on the rise improved infrastructure and to walk 200 metres because he at anyone he was dissatisfied springboard.” positive changes to the 160m tormented him with the claim: year,” a station director told him. Today, little more than two said Guo Weiguo , minutes later he became . Bo’s father was widely one of his supervisors. “Bo Xilai public facilities and mainland was surrounded by so many with. “He was like the king and After he arrived in landscape and praised the “Don’t you realise that our chief, “I don’t care. You don’t talk years later, Bo is in a prison former deputy police chief of the agitated and began to defend his seen as a close ally of Liu. was a young man with great In 1984, Bo became the party media hailed Dalian as the people. took the ministry as his personal Chongqing, Bo invited a group affordable public housing and Bo’s relatives are believed to Bo, will become the president in about money with me,” Bo said cell, facing a trial today that municipality and a protégé of family.
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