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China Analysis China Perspectives 2010/2 | 2010 Gao Xingjian and the Role of Chinese Literature Today China Analysis Thomas Vendryes and François Schichan Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5278 DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.5278 ISSN: 1996-4617 Publisher Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine Printed version Date of publication: 1 June 2010 ISSN: 2070-3449 Electronic reference Thomas Vendryes and François Schichan, « China Analysis », China Perspectives [Online], 2010/2 | 2010, Online since 01 June 2013, connection on 15 September 2020. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5278 © All rights reserved Current Affairs s e v i a t c n i This section, prepared by the Asia Centre (www.centreasia.org), draws mainly on the press in Chinese, e aiming to reflect the point of view of the People’s Republic of China on international questions and h p issues related to Greater China. s c r e Carbon tax: p How the debate has fared Analysis by Thomas Vendryes based on: • Xiong Jianfeng, (1) “Experts debate the carbon tax: Can China bear the burden?”, Diyi caijing ribao - China Business News , 16 October 2009. • Tan Yao, (2) “Which carbon tax system should China adopt?”, Zhongguo jingji bao , 27 October 2009. • Fan Gan, (3) Liu Chunyan, (4) Sun Lijian, (5) “Time is ripe for China to adopt carbon tax,” Guoji jinrong bao no. 8, 13 October 2009. • Carbon Tax Research Team of the Research Institute for Fiscal Science, “Feasibility of imposing a carbon tax in China,” 21 Shiji jingji baodao , 16 July 2009. n 2007, China emerged as the world leader in green - using this pretext to apply breaks on Chinese exports. This house gas emissions. Two years later, it undertook a fair - strategy is clearly deemed a “counter-attack“ against interna - Ily detailed discussion of the feasibility of imposing a car - tional pressure; China should have first-strike capability in bon tax. Several prominent individuals in the administration, order to prevail, in Fan Gan‘s words. Preoccupation with especially in the finance and environmental protection min - environmental diplomacy has thus taken precedence over istries, as well as researchers, voiced opinions as to the need, environmental concerns as such. feasibility, and methods of implementing such a tax, in the This has led to the emergence of a consensus favouring the context of the run-up to the UN-sponsored climate change introduction of a carbon tax, set at a low percentage and conference in Copenhagen in December 2009. reach at the outset and gradually increasing and expanding Officials and intellectuals seemed to agree that action was in scope. The carbon tax research team of the Research needed to reduce emissions. Behind this consensus lay inter - Institute for Fiscal Science has stressed the need for a grad - national pressure. According to Tan Yao, member of an offi - ual approach to extending the tax so that the Chinese eco - cial working group on global warming, China had to share nomic system can adjust to it without too much pain. The the burden of the fight against greenhouse gases in order to team suggested fixing the initial level of the proposed tax at be a “responsible member of the international community.“ 10 yuan per tonne of carbon in 2012-2013, and increasing it Proactive introduction of a carbon tax would strengthen gradually in line with the country’s development. Journalist Beijing’s hand in international negotiations on global warm - Xiong Jianfeng has noted that the institute’s final report rec - ing and generally boost its credibility in the world arena. ommended introduction of the tax in 2010 at a level of 20 A more immediate and pressing catalyst for initiating a car - to 100 yuan per tonne, and doubling it by 2030. Xiong also bon tax was the threat from Western countries to impose a noted that in comparison, the price level for a tonne of CO 2 carbon tax at the border, endorsed in principle by the World on the Chinese carbon credits market as part of the Clean Trade Organisation (WTO). Xiong Jianfeng, Tan Yao, Fan Development Mechanism under the Kyoto protocol is Gan, and Liu Chunyan all refer to this. However, while around six dollars. Another point of comparison: In the from now on, importing countries will be able to impose dif - ferentiated customs duties on products from countries with 1. Journalist. weaker environmental constraints, “double taxation“ is disal - 2. Member of the working group on global warming and sustainable development at the Environmental Protection Ministry’s international relations centre. lowed. This explains the lively discussion over a carbon tax: 3. Economist and professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). by imposing its own tax, the People’s Republic of China 4. Law professor, Tongji University, Shanghai. seeks to prevent its main trading partners from doing so and 5. Professor of finance at Fudan University, Shanghai. 74 N o 2010/2 China Analysis s e v i a European Union’s pollution rights market framework, a 900 million employable people, China’s main worry has to t c n i tonne of carbon could fetch about 10 euros in early 2010. be job creation. As Xiong has said, quoting Cai, China’s e h Meanwhile, Sweden’s carbon tax is a high 27 euros. economic system, average educational level, and state of p s c Gradual introduction of a carbon tax in China should help available technologies preclude hopes of carbon taxation r e mitigate its negative effects, but its overall consequences are leading to the creation of “green jobs“ in substantial num - p as yet unclear. The Research Institute for Fiscal Science, as bers. In 2004-2007 alone, he says, emission reduction poli - Xiong has noted, appears optimistic on this score. Even at cies would have cost 370,000 jobs. After all, carbon taxation the highest level suggested, namely 100 yuan a tonne, its poses a serious distributive problem. On which economic cost should not exceed 0.5 percent of gross national product agents should the tax be imposed, and whom should it — and this without taking account of the beneficial effects of favour? As Tan has argued, letting the tax burden fall direct - such a tax, especially the diversion of energy sector invest - ly on consumers could prove unpopular; but if it is the big ment towards emerging industries. Of course, much of the energy firms that are made to contribute, they would most apparently painless nature of this tax stems from the fact probably have the means, given their dominant position, to that, as in Europe, it is meant to affect price structure and pass on the burden to their clients, especially small business - not income; it makes carbon more expensive without making es. Moreover, if a carbon tax is introduced without the simul - economic agents poorer. The tax proceeds are thus meant to taneous adoption of an effective redistribution policy, it be redistributed, one way or another. This necessitates a pol - could aggravate regional imbalances in China’s develop - icy mix that is far from easy to put in place, as Tan Yao has ment. In fact, it is the most developed regions that are best stressed. It could be used directly by the state as public placed to seize the opportunities and benefit from the incen - investment, as Xiong has noted, or it could be used to tives offered through such taxation, whereas the central and reduce fiscal pressure on households and businesses through western provinces, which are more dependent on heavy and a focus on the most disadvantaged, as Tan Yao and Fan energy industries, are likely to end up paying more. Gang have said. Thus China appears to be heading towards the adoption of However, sceptics such as Cai Fang and Sun Lijian stress a carbon tax under trade threats. It is likely to be introduced that while the experience of Western countries certainly gradually, in stages stretching up to 2030. Meanwhile, many indicates that the consequences of introducing a carbon tax issues need sorting out, the most crucial being the sharing can be relatively painless, or even positive, China’s situation out of the tasks for reducing greenhouse gases among differ - is quite different. China is still in an initial stage of develop - ent national economic actors. ment, its industry and its economy still highly focused on heavy industry and the energy sector. Furthermore, with • Translated by N. Jayaram Fighting the Chongqing mafia Jockeying for position ahead of the 18th Party Congress? Analysis by François Schichan based on: • Luo Bing, “Anti-triad drive and the 18th Party Congress: Setting the stage for the princeling faction,“ Cheng Ming , January 2010, no. 387. Over the space of a few months, the anti-triad fight has Xilai succeeded in imposing his agenda and policy themes emerged as a major theme on the Chinese political horizon. on his potential rivals (He Guoqiang, Wang Yang, and Xi The Hong Kong monthly Cheng Ming has characteristical - Jinping). (6) It is precisely the consequences of this insertion ly sought to view the crackdown in the context of an inner- Party power struggle. When he proposed the ambitious 6. See François Schichan, “Bo Xilai, the anti-corruption fight at Chongqing and the 18th action plan in mid-2009, Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Party Congress of 2012,“ China Analysis, September-October 2009, no. 25. 75 N o 2010/2 Special Feature s e v i a t of the anti-triad campaign into the national discussion agen - against triad gangs. He Guoqiang, a Politburo member and c n i e da that the Cheng Ming article analyses.
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