Land, Power and Identity Roots of Violent Conflict in Eastern DRC
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Some Principles of the Use of Macro-Areas Language Dynamics &A
Online Appendix for Harald Hammarstr¨om& Mark Donohue (2014) Some Principles of the Use of Macro-Areas Language Dynamics & Change Harald Hammarstr¨om& Mark Donohue The following document lists the languages of the world and their as- signment to the macro-areas described in the main body of the paper as well as the WALS macro-area for languages featured in the WALS 2005 edi- tion. 7160 languages are included, which represent all languages for which we had coordinates available1. Every language is given with its ISO-639-3 code (if it has one) for proper identification. The mapping between WALS languages and ISO-codes was done by using the mapping downloadable from the 2011 online WALS edition2 (because a number of errors in the mapping were corrected for the 2011 edition). 38 WALS languages are not given an ISO-code in the 2011 mapping, 36 of these have been assigned their appropri- ate iso-code based on the sources the WALS lists for the respective language. This was not possible for Tasmanian (WALS-code: tsm) because the WALS mixes data from very different Tasmanian languages and for Kualan (WALS- code: kua) because no source is given. 17 WALS-languages were assigned ISO-codes which have subsequently been retired { these have been assigned their appropriate updated ISO-code. In many cases, a WALS-language is mapped to several ISO-codes. As this has no bearing for the assignment to macro-areas, multiple mappings have been retained. 1There are another couple of hundred languages which are attested but for which our database currently lacks coordinates. -
Rwanda's Support to the March 23 Movement (M23)
Opinion Beyond the Single Story: Rwanda’s Support to the March 23 Movement (M23) Alphonse Muleefu* Introduction Since the news broke about the mutiny of some of the Congolese Armed Forces - Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in April 2012 and their subsequent creation of the March 23 Movement (M23), we have been consistently supplied with one story about the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A story that puts much emphasis on allegations that the government of Rwanda and later to some lesser extent that of Uganda are supporting M23 against the government of the DRC. This narrative was reinforced when the UN Group of Experts for the DRC (GoE) issued an Addendum of 48 pages on June 25, 20121 making allegations similar to those already made in Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) report of June 3, 20122, that the government of Rwanda was providing direct support in terms of recruitment, encouraging desertion of FARDC soldiers, providing weapons, ammunitions, intelligence, political advice to the M23, violating measures concerning the freezing of assets and collaborating with certain individuals. In response, the government of Rwanda issued a 131-page rebuttal on July 27, 2012, in which it denied all allegations and challenged the evidence given in support of each claim.3 On November 15, 2012, the GoE submitted its previously leaked report in which, in addition to the allegations made earlier, it claimed that the effective commander of M23 is Gen. James Kabarebe, Rwanda’s Minister of Defence, and that the senior officials of the government of Uganda had provided troop reinforcements, supplied weapons, offered technical assistance, joint planning, political advice and external relations.4 The alleged support provided by Ugandan officials was described as “subtle but crucial”, and the evidence against Rwanda was described as “overwhelming and compelling”. -
WATCH February 2019 Foreign News & Perspectives of the Operational Environment
community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/ Foreign Military Studies Office Volume 9 Issue #2 OEWATCH February 2019 FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT EURASIA INDO-PACIFIC 3 Radios in the Russian Ground Forces 21 Chinese Military Launches Largest-Ever Joint Logistics 50 IRGC: Iran Can Extend Ballistic Missile Range 5 Northern Fleet Will Receive Automated C&C System Exercise 51 Turkey to Create Space Agency Integrating Air, Land and Sea 23 Luo Yuan Describes an Asymmetric Approach to Weaken 52 Iran’s Army Aviation Gets UAV Unit 6 The Inflatable Sentry the United States 53 Turkey to Sell ATAK Helicopters to the Philippines 7 The S-350 Vityaz Air Defense System 25 Military-Civil Fusion Cooperation in China Grows in the 54 Chinese Military and Commercial Cooperation with Tunisia 8 Bigger is Better: The T-80BVM Tank Modernization Field of Logistics 10 The Power Struggle for Control of Russia’s Arctic 27 Chinese Military Completes Release of New Set of Military AFRICA 11 The Arctic Will Have Prominent Role in 2019 Operational- Training Regulations 55 Anger in Sudan: Large Protests Against al-Bashir Regime Strategic Exercise “Center” 28 China Defends Xinjiang Program 56 Africa: Trouble Spots to Watch in 2019 12 Preparation for the 2019 Army International Games 29 Is Pakistan Acquiring Russian Tanks? 57 Can Businessmen Bring Peace in Gao, Mali? 13 Cossacks – Hybrid Defense Forces 30 Russia to Deploy Additional Anti-Ship Missile Batteries 58 Chinese Weapons in Rwanda 14 Update on Military Church Construction Near Japan by 2020 -
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Public Disclosure Authorized WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011 BACKGROUND CASE STUDY EMOCRATIC EPUBLIC OF THE ONGO Public Disclosure Authorized D R C Tony Gambino March 2, 2011 (Final Revisions Received) The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Development Report 2011 team, the World Public Disclosure Authorized Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent Tony Gambino has worked on development and foreign policy issues for more than thirty years. For the last fourteen years, he has concentrated on the problems of fragile states, with a special focus on the states of Central Africa. He coordinated USAID’s re-engagement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1997 and served there as USAID Mission Director from 2001-2004. He began his work in the Congo in 1979. The author wishes to thank Gérard Prunier, René Lemarchand, Ivor Fung (Director of the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa), Rachel Locke, (Head, Africa Team, Office for Conflict Mitigation and Management, Bureau for Africa, USAID), and Thierry Vircoulon (Project Director, Central Africa, International Crisis Group) for their thoughtful, insightful comments. The paper was greatly improved as a result of their questions, concerns, and comments. Remaining flaws are due to the author’s own analytical shortcomings. This paper was largely Public Disclosure Authorized completed in early 2010. Therefore, it does not include information on or analysis of the change from MONUC to MONUSCO or other important events that occurred later in 2010 or in early 2011. -
ARMING RWANDA the Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT January 1994 Vol. 6, Issue 1 ARMING RWANDA The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War Contents MapMap...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 IntroductionIntroduction....................................................................................................................................................................................4 Summary of Key Findings ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 Summary of Recommendations .......................................................................................................................................... 6 I. Historical Background to the WarWar......................................................................................................................................7 The Banyarwanda and Uganda..............................................................................................................................................7 Rwanda and the Habyarimana Regime............................................................................................................................ 9 II. The Record on Human RightsRights..............................................................................................................................................11 -
The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:Lessom from the Rwanda Experience
The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience March 1996 Published by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Editor: David Millwood Cover illustrations: Kiure F. Msangi Graphic design: Designgrafik, Copenhagen Prepress: Dansk Klich‚, Copenhagen Printing: Strandberg Grafisk, Odense ISBN: 87-7265-335-3 (Synthesis Report) ISBN: 87-7265-331-0 (1. Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors) ISBN: 87-7265-332-9 (2. Early Warning and Conflict Management) ISBN: 87-7265-333-7 (3. Humanitarian Aid and Effects) ISBN: 87-7265-334-5 (4. Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda) This publication may be reproduced for free distribution and may be quoted provided the source - Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda - is mentioned. The report is printed on G-print Matt, a wood-free, medium-coated paper. G-print is manufactured without the use of chlorine and marked with the Nordic Swan, licence-no. 304 022. 2 The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience Study 2 Early Warning and Conflict Management by Howard Adelman York University Toronto, Canada Astri Suhrke Chr. Michelsen Institute Bergen, Norway with contributions by Bruce Jones London School of Economics, U.K. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 3 Contents Preface 5 Executive Summary 8 Acknowledgements 11 Introduction 12 Chapter 1: The Festering Refugee Problem 17 Chapter 2: Civil War, Civil Violence and International Response 20 (1 October 1990 - 4 August -
Afr 47/19/98 Dealing with the Truth
AI I INDEX: AFR 47/19/98 DEALING WITH THE TRUTH Amnesty International’s concerns in Rwanda Rwanda is still caught in a cycle of violence. Four years on from a genocide in which as many as one million people lost their lives, the bloodshed has not stopped. Whole families are being wiped out. Civilians, both Tutsi and Hutu, are being ruthlessly killed. This violence is not inevitable. People inside and outside Rwanda can make a difference. The Rwandese Government can do more to protect human rights. Leaders of armed opposition groups can prevent the killing of unarmed civilians. Governments and people around the world can ensure that the international community does not turn its back on Rwanda again. As an international non-governmental human rights organization, Amnesty International campaigns for the respect of the same internationally recognized standards in all countries. This leaflet seeks to explain Amnesty International’s concerns in Rwanda, to summarize the main human rights issues and to address some of the ongoing debates: What could the international community have done to stop the genocide? Will justice ever be done? How can human rights be protected in Rwanda today? In answering these questions, this leaflet also responds to some of the criticisms made regarding Amnesty International’s work on Rwanda. The genocide in 1994 Between April and July 1994, as many as one million people were killed in a genocide organized by extremist elements within the Hutu-dominated government and armed forces, the Forces armées rwandaises (FAR). Many of these killings were carried out by the militia known as interahamwe. -
Virunga Landscape
23. Virunga Landscape Th e Landscape in brief Coordinates: 1°1’29’’N – 1°44’21’’S – 28°56’11’’E – 30°5’2’’E. Area: 15,155 km2 Elevation: 680–5,119 m Terrestrial ecoregions: Ecoregion of the Afroalpine barrens of Ruwenzori-Virunga Ecoregion of the Afromontane forests of the Albertine Rift Ecoregion of the forest-savannah mosaic of Lake Victoria Aquatic ecoregions: Mountains of the Albertine Rift Lakes Kivu, Edward, George and Victoria Protected areas: Virunga National Park, DRC, 772,700 ha, 1925 Volcans National Park, Rwanda, 16,000 ha, 1925 Rutshuru Hunting Domain, 64,200 ha, 1946 added Bwindi-Impenetrable National Park situ- ated a short distance away from the volcanoes in southwest Uganda. Th is complex functions as a single ecosystem and many animals move across the borders, which permits restoration of the populations1. Physical environment Relief and altitude Th e Landscape is focused on the central trough of the Albertine Rift, occupied by Lake Figure 23.1. Map of Virunga Landscape (Sources: CARPE, Edward (916 m, 2,240 km²), and vast plains DFGFI, JRC, SRTM, WWF-EARPO). at an altitude of between 680 and 1,450 m. Its western edge stretches along the eastern bluff of Location and area the Mitumba Mountain Range forming the west- ern ridge of the rift. In the northeast, it includes he Virunga Landscape covers 15,155 km² the western bluff of the Ruwenzori horst (fault Tand includes two contiguous national parks, block) with its active glaciers, whose peak reaches Virunga National Park in DRC and Volcans a height of 5,119 m and whose very steep relief National Park in Rwanda, the Rutshuru Hunting comprises numerous old glacial valleys (Figure Zone and a 10 km-wide strip at the edge of the 23.2). -
Ethnic Cleansing Rears Itshead Inztire
Ethnic CleansingRears ItsHead InZtire POPUI"ATION IN MASISI SUFFERS UNTOLD HARDSEIP I November1996 REPORT SUMMARY MSF is deeply concemed by the on-going situation in Masisi, particularly the humanitariaasituation of the peoplewhom MSF considera population in danger. This is a political conflict for which there are only political solutions.MSF thereforeappeals to the Zairian authoritiesand the internationalcommunity to help the people of Masisi urgently tkough taking the vital carefirl and measuredpolitical steps to enablethe conflict to be resolvedand the elementsexacerbating the crisisto be addressed. Only the Zairian authortties in cooperationwith the international comrnunity can preventfurther blooilsheil and suffering of the people of Masisi Political delaysare killing people. At the worse,and this is the scenafio threatening the whole region at the time of writing of this report, this conflict is spiralling out of control, throwing the region in to further chaos. Therefore, immediate steps ,nust be taken towards the resolution of this crisis. The imminent threat of a regional war causedby the unacceptablesituation which has beenkrt tufestur, can no longer he ignored Humanitarian Crisis Masisi, a region just Northwest of Goma town in Eastern Zaire, is a war zone. Renownedfor tle presenceof I million Rwandanrefugees who left to the areain July 1994,the region is lessknown for tle war tâking placea few kilometresdown the road from the camps. At the dateof this report, anywhereup to 300,000people have been displaced by the Masisi conflict while over 50,000 people, mainly Zairian Tutsis of Rwandan expression,have been forced to flee to neighbouringRwanda since 1994.The numbers killed areunquantifiable due to lack ofaccessor reliablefigures but are estimatedto be in the thousands. -
Le Président Du Conseil De Sécurité Présente
Le Président du Conseil de sécurité présente ses compliments aux membres du Conseil et a l'honneur de transmettre, pour information, le texte d'une lettre datée du 2 juin 2020, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité, par le Groupe d’experts sur la République démocratique du Congo reconduit suivant la résolution 2478 (2019) du Conseil de sécurité, ainsi que les pièces qui y sont jointes. Cette lettre et les pièces qui y sont jointes seront publiées comme document du Conseil de sécurité sous la cote S/2020/482. Le 2 juin 2020 The President of the Security Council presents his compliments to the members of the Council and has the honour to transmit herewith, for their information, a copy of a letter dated 2 June 2020 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2478 (2019) addressed to the President of the Security Council, and its enclosures. This letter and its enclosures will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/2020/482. 2 June 2020 UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES POSTAL ADDRESS-ADRESSE POSTALE: UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. 10017 CABLE ADDRESS -ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE: UNATIONS NEWYORK REFERENCE: S/AC.43/2020/GE/OC.171 2 juin 2020 Monsieur Président, Les membres du Groupe d’experts sur la République démocratique du Congo, dont le mandat a été prorogé par le Conseil de sécurité dans sa résolution 2478 (2019), ont l’honneur de vous faire parvenir leur rapport final, conformément au paragraphe 4 de ladite résolution. -
Of 20 April 2015
L 102/10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 21.4.2015 COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/614 of 20 April 2015 implementing Article 9(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 of 18 July 2005 concerning restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of Congo (1), and in particular Article 9(4) thereof, Whereas: (1) On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005. (2) On 5 February 2015, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo issued an updated list of individuals and entities subject to restrictive measures. (3) Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 should therefore be amended accordingly, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 is replaced by the text appearing in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Luxembourg, 20 April 2015. For the Council The President F. MOGHERINI (1) OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. -
Mapping Conflict Motives: M23
Mapping Conflict Motives: M23 1 Front Cover image: M23 combatants marching into Goma wearing RDF uniforms Antwerp, November 2012 2 Table of Contents Introduction 4 1. Background 5 2. The rebels with grievances hypothesis: unconvincing 9 3. The ethnic agenda: division within ranks 11 4. Control over minerals: Not a priority 14 5. Power motives: geopolitics and Rwandan involvement 16 Conclusion 18 3 Introduction Since 2004, IPIS has published various reports on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Between 2007 and 2010 IPIS focussed predominantly on the motives of the most significant remaining armed groups in the DRC in the aftermath of the Congo wars of 1996 and 1998.1 Since 2010 many of these groups have demobilised and several have integrated into the Congolese army (FARDC) and the security situation in the DRC has been slowly stabilising. However, following the November 2011 elections, a chain of events led to the creation of a ‘new’ armed group that called itself “M23”. At first, after being cornered by the FARDC near the Rwandan border, it seemed that the movement would be short-lived. However, over the following two months M23 made a remarkable recovery, took Rutshuru and Goma, and started to show national ambitions. In light of these developments and the renewed risk of large-scale armed conflict in the DRC, the European Network for Central Africa (EURAC) assessed that an accurate understanding of M23’s motives among stakeholders will be crucial for dealing with the current escalation. IPIS volunteered to provide such analysis as a brief update to its ‘mapping conflict motives’ report series.