Transformation of the Corporatist State in the Middle East
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ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 753± 772, 1996 Transformationof the corporatist state inthe Middle East ANOUSHIRAVANEHTESHAMI & EMMA CMURPHY Thisarticle will examine the feature of simultaneous economic and political liberalisationdisplayed by manystates inthe Middle East in the last two decades andthe increasingly apparent tendency of such states toreverse thepolitical aspects ofreform, in substance if not of® cially, as theeconomic elements take root.The article seeks todemonstrate that this may be a functionof the disarticulationof corporatistmodels for political organisation adopted in bureau- cratic±bourgeois states. As thestate seeks tobuild a widerpolitical base in supportof its economic policies, it isitselfresponsible for the breakdown of the corporatiststructures which have provided political stability. The political protestand challenges to the regime which result cannot be contained without resortultimately to the authoritarian assets ofthe state, reversing attempts at politicalreform. The corporatist state is transformedinto an overtlyauthoritarian state. Corporatiststates in the Middle East Ourstarting point must therefore be the nature of the state in the Middle East beforethe era ofeconomicliberalisation. For many countries in theMiddle East andNorth Africa independence ultimately led to the transfer of power from traditional(usually urban-based land-owning) elites to nationalist and populist regimes.It brought with it a movetowards import-substitution industrialisation (ISI)strategiesfor development which were seen as awayof breakingaway from dependenceon exporting cash cropsand commodities and concentrating instead ondomestic industrialisation and production diversi® cation. 1 Theimplemen- tation of ISI carriedwith it considerableimplications for the organisation and role ofthe state. Newregimes were drawn from populist national movements which claimed to beclassless inas muchas theyrepresented all classes, therebymaking class struggleirrelevant. In practice, however, ISI strategies,with the emphasis on rapidcatch-up industrialisation to supply the domestic market, resulted in the growingimportance of the industrial bourgeoisie. In most cases, however,the existingindustrial bourgeoisie was eitherweak and relatively unformed or, in the case ofpreviously colonised countries like Egypt, had largely included foreign bourgeoiselements which left or weredisappropriated with independence. When thestate assumed theresponsibility for planning and resource allocation in development,and later for production and distribution, it became in effect the AnoushiravanEhteshami & EmmaC Murphyare atthe Centre forMiddle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University ofDurham, South Road, Durham DH1 3TG, UK 0143-6597/96/040753-20$6.00 Ó 1996Third World Quarterly 753 ANOUSHIRAVAN EHTESHAMI &EMMA CMURPHY industrialbourgeoisieÐ or created that social class amongits employees and clients. Inthis early populist phase, the state drew the existing but still weak working classes andurban middle classes intoits rank in order to mobilise the human resources ofthe country, and their political support, behind its development strategies.In return for their support, the state offered them welfare services and productionand supply of new consumer products. Guillermo O’ Donnellhas calledthis the easy phaseof ISI,2 pointingout that as theprocess of` deepening’ developmenttakes place, so ISI becomesharder to sustain. The need to direct resources intoinvestment and development forced regimes to withdraw welfare provisionsand abandon the alliance with the working classes. Populismwas likewiseabandoned as anythingother than rhetoric and the state assumed an authoritariancharacter. Thestate is ableto do this because, during the ` easy phase’, itdevelops its own` class’ interestsand resources. The ever-growing role of the state in the planningand development of theeconomy, combined with the impact of sudden widespreadeducational opportunities and employment aspirations, mean that the stateapparatus grows accordingly into an in¯ ated, self-perpetuating and self- interestedbureaucracy. This ability of the state to forge or abandon ties with otherclass interestsis referredto bywriters such as NicosPoulantzas and Ralph Milibandas `relativeautonomy’ and is discussedat length elsewhere. 3 Corporatismin less developingcountries Ironically,the dominance of the state is madepossible via the deliberate deconstructionof class mobilisationthat takes place under a bourgeois,bureau- craticstate. Whilesome colonialregimes left in place primitive forms ofparliamentary democracy,as thestate grew stronger these became decreasingly relevant as fora forpolitical competition. As withcases wherepopulist and nationalist move- mentshad swept away old colonial democratic structures, new political struc- turestook their place. In populiststates, single-party rule on a corporatistmodel becamecommon, with interests being negotiated and incorporated into the state’s decision-makingprocesses throughinternal mechanisms rather than throughexternal challenges. The single party, 4 whichwas supposedto illustrate thevictory of the classless, nationalsociety, became the intermediary between stateand interest groups. The absence of alternative political parties, and the divisionof class interestsbetween established incorporated interest-based organ- isations,prevented the growth of class-based institutionalchallenges to thestate. Politicalsociety was verticallystrati® ed, with the higher echelons of interest- basedorganisations being interchangeable and even indistinguishable from the lowerechelons of the single party which served to mediate the interests of the interestgroup with the state. Equally, the higher echelons of theparty were fused withthe personnel and apparatus of the state. Individual advancement was dependentupon a strictsystem ofhierarchy and ladder-working, with party membershipbecoming both a goaland a quali®cation. The state operated what was,in effect, a divideand rule strategy. Interests could be incorporated into 754 CORPORATIST STATE INTHE MIDDLE EAST politicaldecision making via party mediation, thus diffusing potential grievances againstand challenges to the regime. Interest groups had a chanceof advancing theirinterests so longas theyworked through the established and internalised system ofinterest articulation. By interest groups, we refer hereto functional groupswithin society; agricultural producers, industrial producers, white collar workers,women, the military. Within each group would be members fromhigh andlow income groups, from a varietyof socioeconomicbackgrounds. Thus an organisationfor agricultural interests would include a poverty-strickenlandless peasantas wellas acapitalistfarmer anda cooperativefarm manager.An organisationrepresenting women’ s interestsmight include women from pro- fessionaloccupations, housewives, students and mothers. Horizontal class strati®cation was fragmentedand demobilised. Wheninterest groups attempted to air their grievances outside of this sys- temÐfor example by challenging the dominance of thesingle party and its role asanarm ofthestateÐ the regime would claim that they challenged the national consensusand interest and so couldlegitimately be suppressed. Corporatism considerssociety to be organic, rather like a bodywith many parts functioning harmoniouslytogether but having separate tasks: `Thebrain (the government) andthe nervous system (theparty) control these parts and make sure theywork harmoniouslytogether to achieve a desiredend (once again the technological missionof thestate and society). They must workharmoniously together; just as one’s arms andlegs cannot be atodds with one another if one is towalk,so too thefunctioning parts of the society must be coordinated for the body to live healthily.Occasionally diseases set in;foreign bodies (the Jews inNazi Ger- many)must be purged; con¯ ict may produce paralysis; a speci®c functioning partmay atrophy’ . 5 Corporatismalso appeals to the lower-middle classes becauseit offers a channelfor upward mobility for those from poor backgrounds who have bene®ted from newly available educational opportunities but have little else that canwork to their advantage. However, corporatism sees theexistence of organisedlabour to promote working class interestsas potentiallythreatening. Whilethe regime may seek toorganise and mobilise labour in order to co-opt it,it will equally seek tosegment that mobilisation to prevent any challenge or class-based alliances. Oneinterest group which deserves specialmention is thatof thearmed forces. Inorder to enforce its prohibition against con¯ ict within society, and to secure itsdomination over society, the regime must have the full force of the military atits disposal. The military is givena privilegedposition in the vertical strati®cation, both distinguishing its members fromother individuals with whom theymight have shared common socioeconomic, ethnic or culturalinterests, and offeringtangible rewards which aid in defending the armed forces fromsubver- sivein® ltration. The military provide the regime with nationalist camou¯ age and,as inmore overtly praetorian regimes, provide the ` order’necessary to alloweconomic development to take place. Thus a generals/civiliantechnocrats alliancedefends the control of thenow authoritarian bureaucratic regime, while acorporatistpolitical structure provides the channels for mobilisation through whichit can operate. 755 ANOUSHIRAVAN EHTESHAMI &EMMA CMURPHY Themilitary in the Middle East has ahistoryof