CEU eTD Collection Second Reader: JacekKochanowiczProfessor Lojko Professor Miklos Supervisor: Peace Planning for Poland and the United States during WWII In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Central European University European Central Aaron Seth Ostrovsky History Department Budapest, Hungary Master of Arts Master Submitted to Submitted 2009 By CEU eTD Collection be made without the written permission of Author. of the permission written the made without be part of any in made.Furthercopies made maynot copies such suchinstructions with accordance Central the may beformmustEuropean DetailsLibrary. from librarian.the obtained Thispage a or part, may befull only made in in accordance with instructionsthe by given and Author the either lodged in process, any by Copies Author. the with rests thesis this of text in the Copyright Notice: Copyright CEU eTD Collection opinion. public by shaped be can policy foreign or diplomacy whether and movements lobbyist effective and organized well into themselves mobilize to able are communities ethnic internal whether Thenarrative discusses in Europe. lastingEastern settlement forge global a similar desire to demandfor re-establishment the of pre-war borders withoutconflicting with Sovietthe Union’s influence foreign policy. to able was community Polish-American the not or whether alsobut wartime powers, great provide newinsightinto issuethe Iexamine notonly diplomaticthe exchanges between threethe Poland during and after towards States United the foreign of policy the of this thesis: issue.The subject of the aspects World War II has alsohistorians and books in resultingnumerous articles which have dissectedand exposedvarious been studied by others before me. In order to Abstract: The “Polishdiscussionhasbeen Question” by subject to aprotracted diplomatic The itimpossibleAdministration foundamend popularthe Roosevelt to to Polish CEU eTD Collection endeavor. I alsoduring Iforendeavor. their trialing tothankmyparents this support process. wish I wish tothankfor Lojko his Professor inspiration, insight continued andguidance during this Acknowledgement: 1 CEU eTD Collection ilorpy ...... 86 Bibliography: Conclusion:...... 81 Chapter III: ...... 65 The ‘Fourth Partition’ Chapter II: ...... 38 Poland on the Run Chapter I: The Rise of the Infamous “Polish ...... 17 Question” ...... 11 Introduction: Theoretical ...... 3 Framework: Table Contents:...... 2 ...... 1 Acknowledgement: Contents: Table 3.2 U.S. Betrayal of Poland?...... 76 3.1 President Truman and Polish Question at Potsdam...... 65 2.3 The U.S. Attitude to Soviet Demands in Teheran and Yalta:...... 60 2.2: “Here Comes Uncle Sam:” U.S. entrance into WWII...... 48 2.1 The United States and the Polish ...... 38 Governmentin Exile 1.3 Poland in the eyes of the U.S. during WWI...... 32 1.2 The Polish Question following ...... 26 WWI 1.2 ...... 17 Partitioned Poland 2 CEU eTD Collection Aldershot (UK) and Burlington (Vermont): Ashgate, Variourm Collected Studies Series, p. xiii. 1 secure enable of objectives isthe to states their to chiefpurpose and skillful…its well resourced events. subsequent and contemporary of context in the decision-makers and alsodecisions of andappreciation commentary Iton contains improved methods. with sources and arehopefully avoided. This nota mere isthesis revisiting of international history internationalthe historian, tendentiousselection and the witting unwitting or use biasedof andjudgmentavailable tothe authorat time the of This way,writing. most usual the pitfalls of for bias and hindsight the with wide areexamined afield possible areselectedfrom as sources as Yet, these from is built sources. the directly employed narrative The history. international through the isaspect of past examined the an important isno neededwhen apology perhaps Therefore, spectacles and tools of diplomatic history, or, as it is now geographical, strategicmost and cultural spheres. It has been observed that often processes of called:Central European history in the first half of the 20th century in the economic, social, governingthe political seekcauses of the underlying striven unavoidably,to have alsoYet, I conferences. of proceedings the and oftreaties, texts the exchanges, of diplomatic interpretation Theoretical Framework: Preface to Magda Ádám, Magda to Preface According to historian G.R. Berridge, “Diplomacy is an essentially political activity is“Diplomacy According an essentially historian and, activity political G.R. Berridge, to often unaware of the fateful decisions that were being made in their names. undeservedly) significant role in shaping the fortunes ofmillions of people who were factors making ourup Yet, societies. in the various 1920s and 30s, thediplomats still the played a (perhaps between interactions onthe window narrow too all an opens relations speaking world, detractors of the ‘realist’ school claim that the study of diplomatic Diplomatic history islessnow popular itusedto than be. Especially in the English- The history here the restsprimarily on reproduced traditional exploration and The Versailles System and Central Europe , edited and Preface written by Miklos Lojko, 1 3 CEU eTD Collection (London: Routledge , 1995), 137. 5 4 3 2 foreign policies without resort to force.” deterrent to the waging of war.” aggressive waging of tothe deterrent andasa disputes of settlement for peaceful as aforum both act would which organization public scrutiny and “projected and control second,the of international establishmentan new concepts developed in responseWorld to War I:first, the demand that diplomacy be open to Two principles. byuniversal law andwasregulated ininternational enshrined diplomacy was in obscure an age when merelexical donot suffice.definitions making andthe study treatment word the lacks theoretical adequate Diplomacy, however, science.” political American in elsewhere developments with is contrasted it when perplexing is foreign moreall of the policy state research non-theoretical devoid of general theory…the Policy Theories ofForeign in University foreign theory of histhe discusses 1966study policy entitled of Rutgers Rosenau James Professor instance, For scholars. byAmerican conducted research theoreticallythe ofinternational aspects hasdevelopedpolitics extensive significantly due to Theoretically, foreign policy is one facet ofinternational politics. Since the end of World War II, states.” of of group state another vis-à-vis result“achieve certain a is to policy’s objective activity of a state in an external domain that crosses its political boundaries. In this sense, foreign the to refers policy Foreign terms. these between differences theoretical the understanding term the foreign policy; asymptom of usage indiscriminate the of diplomacy word the without in greater honesty international honesty in greater Britishto politician politics. Ramsay MacDonald, whoresigned Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, Richard and Hamilton Keith Jose Calvet De Magalhaes, De JoseCalvet Jose Calvet De Magalhaes, De JoseCalvet G.R. Berridge, The evolution of diplomacy had drastically changed during WorldWar during had The point I.By diplomacy this drastically evolution changed of Diplomacy: Theory andPractice The Pure Concept of Diplomacy The Pure Concept of Diplomacy . Rosenau, within this study, stated “foreign is policy analysis that stated study, within. Rosenau, this The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration 2 (New York: Palgrave,2002), 1. The term diplomacy is sometimes synonymous with synonymous sometimes is diplomacy term The 5 It was believed that ‘open diplomacy’ would bring would diplomacy’ ‘open that believed was It , 7. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 6. Pre-Theories and 4 4 3 CEU eTD Collection 8 Diplomacy 7 University of CaliforniaPress, 1982), 30. 6 on August 7 between old and new diplomacy is merely an illusion. Cambon remarks: difference alleged the that argues however, Cambon, Jules Monsieur diplomatist Professional this by stating that: on remarked Thayer W. Charles diplomat American nations. between understandings secret held Wilson’sPresident Woodrow calledPoints Fourteen for agreementswhichtransparent longer no conference Versailles in how atthenotion anexample 1919, serves shifted.of of diplomacy the formation has to lead newactors of emergence the another; to relation nation’s a re-defines continuously of new interests classes.” plutocratic and aristocratic the from drawn which men of a handful to policy foreign of over handing the to and diplomacy secret to end an put “to might clash with pre-existing policies. The peace Westphalian state system. modern or the to change isalready adrastic actors; this and non-state states territorial Jose Calvet De Magalhaes, 45. ed., Langhorne Richard and Jönsson Christer F.L. Carsten, F.L. changing. The substance will remain-firstly humanbecause nature changes; secondly the outward appearance, or, ifyou like, the make-up ofdiplomacy which is gradually To talk about new and old diplomacy is to make distinctiona without adifference. Itis making it free of the “old diplomacy.” determinedon the thereforepolicesbeen responsible forwar. Mistaking diplomacy for policy-making,he put the notblame and Wilson, like thatmost theirof his compatriots, clung to the myth that Machiavellianthe diplomacy creatorshad the function ofdiplomacy. Despite his intellectual equipment and academic training,post-war Much of the failure butof the Versailles venture was due to American misunderstandings of onworld the menwas who to hadbe madeto carry safe them for out.democracy He was by (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 7. th War against War: British and German Radical Movements in the First World War , 1914 from , 1914from leadershipthe of parliamentary the Labour Group, stated its that time 7 Diplomacy is therefore based on a system of actors which Diplomacy: Volume III Problems and Issues in Contemporary 8 6 The present world order ismolded present world order byboth The (Berkeley: 5 CEU eTD Collection 9 portrayal of what occurred in respects development Although of awareto events. Iwill book, of this from itas an refrain using accurate Poland during and after WWII. For the of his situation,the Laneincorporated emotions which caused overshadowingsame true of the reason, I Polish issue andyet is flawed due to its biased nature. Instead of objectively assessing the reality People to theAmerican Lane’s Bliss Arthur is example fitting depictions of events through the eyes of individuals who work within the realm of diplomacy.A objectives. personal in own totheir act of accordance millions yet interests the represent in caseRoosevelt, this Sovietthe Union. isunderstanding Thisnotion to paramountamendmentof how certain actors, Statestobeidentified prestigewith United Roosevelt the the of extentallowed of objectives the aligning itself to regulating international stability. In the case of Poland, it is examplestill of howunclear American to whatdiplomacy has amended its democratic diplomacy for the purpose of diplomacy the necessity upholdto the virtues of democracy. However, World War II serves as an crusades of such innovations as Wilsonianliberalism. TheUnitedStatesaffirms in itsregularly ideological such than community international in the preferable therefore and feasible more is diplomacy power of balance Maintaining today. works political American dictate to continues inciting adeplorable between confusion foreign diplomacy and policy. confusion This still Wilson’s effort of establishing a new diplomatic era, ‘democratic diplomacy,’ only contributed to Harold Nicolson, Harold most persuasive method at the disposal of a government is the word of an honest man. honest ofan word the is government ofa disposal the at method persuasive most because isthey only one way of setting internationaldifferences; and lastly because the It is internationalproblematic history that contains considerable limitations through Diplomacy , a book which through the eyes of Ambassador Lane illuminates the illuminates Lane Ambassador of eyes the through which book a , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 29. I Saw I Saw Poland Betrayed:anAmerican Ambassador Reports 9 6 CEU eTD Collection every three Polish-speaker, two were native born Americans, either foreign-born, or mixed,or or foreign-born, either Americans, born were native two Polish-speaker, every three in example, of “out For Americanization. statistics, assimilation 1940population leadthe and to it because is significant immigrants, Polish new of inclusion the without in population, increase and immigration the 1924.This 1921 restriction acts of immigrants; thiswasdueprimarily to Polish-Americansperiod, by increasednumerically natural as to newinfluxesof growth opposed 11 interchangeable. synonymously were ‘Catholic’ and ‘Pole’ word the idealism; defined Polish-Americans how understanding to paramount was Catholicism of role artisans, in 1608, Polish of handful a made in which their Jamestown, of settlement new pre-Mayflower the hometo back traced be in the oldest English settlement in the growth the of The Unitedthe oldest States. historical information the community regarding can New World. The with hasdevelopedcoextensively American Polish mustinbe mindthatthe kept American. It provide the PolishQuestion. Polish-Americanthe to in asolution to community trying played and government U.S. the roles the dissect to necessary becomes it Union Soviet the into Poland in opinion on how American differs which community Polish-American contains alarge States theUnited Since perspectives. foreign policy foreignpicture of overexposed be new from Poland.U.S. musttopic policy led shown The towards to the eventual immersionWhile the Polish has been Question tackled bymany historians, Iwishprovide to a clearer of interwar leaks through book the easily easternexposing his defined clearly for the sympathies Polish-Americans. Richard C. Lukas, “ 10 Wieczerzak. Wandycz Joseph and of Piotr works the characterize II War World book avoided RichardLukas’ using Joseph Swastek, “What is a Polish American?” a Polish is “What Swastek, Joseph George J. Kerski, “Reviewed work: Bitter Legacy-Polish American Relations in the Wake of World War II by II War of World Wake in the Relations American Legacy-Polish Bitter work: “Reviewed J.Kerski, George In order to understand my thesis it is necessary to define what it means to be a Polish- be a to means it what define to necessary is it thesis my understand to order In . Lukas follows the standard monographic model on Polish-American relations that relations Polish-American on model monographic standard the follows Lukas . American Historical Review Bitter Legacy: Polish AmericanRelations intheWake of 88, (Oct.,no.4 1983), 1103. Polish American Studies , vol.1 (1944), 34. 10 Lukas’however, opinion, 11 During the interwar the During 7 CEU eTD Collection to the principles and practices of Catholicism. of practices and principles the to 13 12 or American paramountin defining whois amember of the community andis who not. Therefore, the Polish- is difference religious this them For Catholicism. with connection a strong have community its nature wrought of Thelargelobbyistgroups of complications. Polish-American the because of over- the ancestry of Polish Jewishcommunity American discussing of the role the However thisNaturally, thesis will Jewsnotional no orsentiments. Polish descentbutwith of geographic connections Polish notthe focusperceptions on somethis knowledge had and stratification. there, from came ofofancestors whose or Poland lands, in Polish born thesewere who Jews ethnic Poles; and Poles, three as well as some groups I emotionalhave ties specifically differedwith Polinland offreedom. over dispensed the represented a United the States idealism wasthenotion that American which developedfrom issue with of thirdly,folkPoland’s suchascustoms and traditions In these food. addition to afourthinfluencethree, future. Catholic mirrored backgrounds, life-styletheir agrarian semi-feudal second, Church, which and the first, life: Polish-American dictated influences formative Three Polish. than American Regardless of tradition, the Polish-American community began to identify States. itself United as morethe to loyalty found new a with coincide to tended assimilation of level higher born born. 1,614,640werenativewhile language from astheir Outof language principle wereforeign number,childhood. this 801,680 using persons admitted Polish the parents. Numerically nativespeaking, 2,416,320 born Poland in Yiddish. 35. American?” a Polish is “What Swastek, Joseph The Polish-American community consists of three variations of communities: ethnic communities: of variations three of consists community Polish-American The Polonia terminology I use is directly associated with Polish-Americans who adhere who Polish-Americans with associated directly is use I terminology 12 This growing distinction was important because the 13 ; and ethnic 8 CEU eTD Collection played indeciding the fateof Poland andforeign haswhy policy a natural drasticallytendency to Hopefully, thesis the will a newperspective incomprehendingprovide role the the States United policy was shaped including many the ways it influenced was byinternal ethnic communities. judgment of who was right, but an exploratory search into understanding how U.S. foreign stand not asa This does thesis of States. United the andprinciples interest long-term to the reader to decide whether U.S. foreign policy towards Poland was consistent with or contradictory is allowsthe paintedA that picture been repeatedly tackled. has question since especially this do and say nastiestthe things in nicestthe way.” is“diplomacy, to Goldberg by journalist Isaac American As stated of another. future dictate the or nation a of face the change to ability the has that force amorphous is an it instead but conduct global community. Foreign policy is not a tangible concept that adheres to a standardized form of ensure astabilized to and guarantees policies, alter redirect had to United States the therefore, anticipated, been not had Union Soviet the of role the of importance the of growth radical entered World War II at a relatively late stage, and therefore had adaptto to afluid situation. The interactions with thecontexts Polish-Americanin the here examined are policy foreign U.S. of motivations The others. to relates community. and acts nation of changing One must rememberideas or even methodology. Worldthat War II policyserves as an theexample of how Unitedevents change the way aneeda constituted mold to with coulddoubt which new conflictpre-existing policies potentially States towardsno have changes External of diplomacy. linear pattern a particular adhere to not does nations, Poland similar andreshape toother during redefine States, policy.changes which foreign United occur The or and immediately after WWII, and of In terms of discussing American Foreign Policy one must be aware of the continuous the of be aware must one Policy Foreign American discussing of terms In Understanding the changing attitudes to the Polish Question in U.S. policy is intricate, is policy in U.S. Question Polish the to attitudes changing the Understanding 9 CEU eTD Collection 238. 15 Press, 1988), 287. 14 developmentof American foreign policy during WWIIand howitdefined afuture for Poland. nationsdecideintoinsight fate of the further andpeoples. Hopefully, the will this provide and contribute actors different how examines thesis This history. of study in the importance unintelligible.” almost be would it would be unnecessary. Without diplomatic intermediaries of some kind or other a states system themselves amongst communicate to awill with entities political proximate independent without president. U.S. gap of any credibility largest overseas the maintains nationsof though, scores hebroken promises wereduring to Roosevelt’s still presidency, in foreign Even tooccur policy. America’s many changes caused situation wartime Roosevelt’s Naturally, generation. mistakesolder an of the torepeat not he wished sametime the at yet, an isolationist nation into war. Roosevelt tried to assert the democratic ideal in his methodology, caused which scheme manipulative a WWII as into entry Roosevelt’s saw who ‘revisionists,’ the and interests, American of defense in the a war into them leading therefore U.S. the challenged Axispowers thatthe of ‘internationlists,’who argued nature World and thethe conflicted WarII shift. During the overRoosevelt’s 1960’s,historians debated diplomacy the coming and of Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, Richard and Hamilton Keith Frederick W. Marks III, Diplomacy historically hasbeenfunction anda internationala determinant of order; Wind over Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt 15 Although archaic in form, diplomatic history still holds an holds still history diplomatic form, in archaic Although The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration 14 (Athens: University of Georgia University (Athens: , 10 CEU eTD Collection to the American people. By By 20 the people. American to the appeal which Committee to tried Central Polish the forin example,established Union army, the Foreign Policy 1990),Institute, 7. end year. the of Foreign Minister Vyacheslav to expectMolotov the opening of a secondfrontin by Europe the Alliedthe in Powers WWII.By May Franklin1942, President Roosevelt Delano told Soviet would prepare Poland or the United States for the future written by the aftermath of WWII.nothing However, globe. the throughout echo to continued Question Polish the nations, define Poland.” independent“free, people’s Alliancea National asdefinedby Polish the or independence, withof Polish advocating intent the Unitedthe States theirby homeland Americans. sympathy enlisting the of the plight. By the 1860s, Polish the wasgiven to States, United the especially West, in the little attention However, lands. however, Polish émigrés reorganization afterof Europe theNapoleonicabout Warsbrought redistribution the of Polish in the United StatesQuestion” hadbeen an issue Congressbackongoing tothe dating The Viennaof (1814-1815). tried to interpret events in 18 17 16 York and San Francisco. Brigadier General W stirattemptin inmajorPolesto suchasNew opinion public America to cities rallies through The January and ledinsurrection many almost territory 1863 every of state States. United the Introduction: John L. Harper and Andrew Parlin, Piotr S. Wandycz, Piotr S. Wandycz, On December 8 On December The 19 th 18 The United States and Poland The United States and Poland However,be such not met would a promise until Operation June 1944,when and 20 th , 1941, following the attack joined following theUnitedPearl on attack the Harbor, States , 1941, th century century occupies a unique place inhistory. Polish The“Polish The Polish Question During World War II th century numerous Polish organizations had been formed in formed been had organizations Polish numerous century , 98. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980),79. á odzimierz Krzy 17 As politics and wars re-shape and re- 16 Ī anowski and other Polish officers By 1860, Poles were present in present were By1860,Poles (Washington DC: John Hopkins 11 CEU eTD Collection 20 Americans voted Americans voted on basisthe freeplansof for a andindependentPoland. interestsin 1944elections,sevenmillion linkedtothe in PolandPolish- were six to which gave never Roosevelt histhat out point to important is It community. consentU.S. and international the both by on be reflected forultimately would and intentions, post-war America’s of Polandtest important an became to become Charter Atlantic The Europe. for post-WWII vision establish a to British the and Americans a SovietWilson and affirmed in 1941Atlantic was The the Charter Charter. drafted primarily by the puppet State. In many Europe and is ways,therefore worth exploring. Roosevelt’snew frontiers would be drawn. Theof the government, meaningPolish which ideology would dominate Polish society, and second,Question how the played a largesolutions with varying ThePolish agendas. majoraddressed Question issues: two first,the nature role in the re-structuring Questionof continued to be discussed among the Allied Powers; each country offering different 19 from 28 heldConference,November Russians grant the Regardless Sovietthe of Union’s eventual influence in Roosevelt Eastern Europe, wished to not Europe. inpost-war would re-shaping play Union realized theSoviet powerful role the Day, the Soviet Union had borne the brunt of the Allied war burden. As the war progressed, FDR Overlord would land Canadian, British, and U.S. troops on the shores of Normandy. Prior to D- a growing problem following the endof war. the gathering pacebyand 1943, November RedArmy’s the become presenceon lands Polish would Anglo-American-Soviet policy on the Polish Question. The Soviet advance towards Poland was John L. Harper and Andrew Parlin, Ibid, 8. Roosevelt democratic anindependent, favored idea inherited an Woodrow Poland, from carte blanche The Polish Question During World War II, in Poland.post-war th to December 1st, 1943, proved to be a turning point in 1943, provedtobeDecember point aturning to 1st, 19 Towards the end of the war, the Polish 8. 20 However, the Tehran the However, 12 CEU eTD Collection 23 22 Polish territory, hecouldnot publically involve himself until endof the 1944. to claims Stalin’s with disagreed Roosevelt Although politics. internal American on have would itRoosevelt todiscussmetimpact with Stalin inorder privately issue the the of Poland and 21 Ciechanowski eventual tohisreturned postin Washington, bringing with him written a letter by in March,to London went towarn Ciechanowski order his torely not colleagues Roosevelt.on By to Polishmisleadingthe ambassador. guarantees provided The abovestatement somewhat statement: following the received Ciechanowski Ambassador war. of end the following the statement from President Roosevelt’s administration on the issue of Europe’s territorial problems January Jan 1944, Polish Ambassador instructed Ciechanowski was to obtain an official of Polishthe anidol cause. andRoosevelt asinceresupporter as Polish issue ‘politicalPolish-American community. Harry Hopkins, one of Roosevelt’s closest advisors, considered the dynamite’ growing the and hisadministration between damage irreparable cause would future on Poland’s due to the numerous negativefeared perspective near,andRoosevelt any that upcoming weredrawing 1944elections Americansrefused himself involve into any which addresseddiscussions Poland’sboundaries. The of Polish descentpresident U.S. The absent. remained RooseveltWinston Churchill, andPrime Minister dictator who saw in the protection of Russia’s western frontier. During these territorial disputes between the Soviet Jan Karski, 513. JanKarski, JanKarski, During the Tehran Conference, Stalin re-emphasized the strategic importance of of Poland importance strategic the re-emphasized Stalin Conference, Tehran the During Polish Government to endeavor to reach a solution with regard to its territory without delay. territory its to regard with solution a reach to endeavor to Government Polish present certain complex and vital considerations which may renderdesirable it for the two havingcountries mutual accord. This Government recognizes that the developments of defeating Germany. Thishowever, attitude,does not preclude the possibility of any run the risk of creating confusion and diverting concentration from overallthe objective European frontier questions during the period of active hostilities against the Axiswill The position of basic United the States Government thatgeneral discussionsofmany the The Great Powers & Poland 1919-1945, The Great Powers & Poland 1919-1945 23 (New York: University Press of America), 476. 477. 21 On December 1 22 By the end of st , 1943, 13 CEU eTD Collection for Europe had been directed from London. The Government-in-Exile which was established in from had been established for Europe Government-in-Exile which London. The was directed role ofBritish in diplomacy dealing Question, with Polish the planning sincemuch of post-war the include to important is it communities these describing to addition In Polish-American. the Union. Soviet the intervene or change the outcome of the elections. The future of Poland found itself entwined with communistwas governmentestablished in Poland. Neither U.S.norGreat the Britain could and Churchill’s holddesire elections in to free Poland. However, byJune ‘new’21, 1945,the Communist Provisional Government set upby the Red Army, the reassertion of the Curzon Line, of the restructuring the points: three highlighting discussed, Polishconference, the issuewas wartime meeting threethe of major Allied Churchill,Powers: Stalin, Roosevelt. and During the cause. thePolish itself to dedicated which Congress, American Polish- the of creation the with culminated this and U.S. the in growing was cause Polish be forced upon Poland by the Soviets. The letter ended with the following statement: In meetresponse, Rooseveltpromised Miko to with expressed Miko The letter reaching Roosevelt. 24 Miko Stanislaw Exile, in Government Polish the of Minister Prime the Jan Karski, 516. While it category,itseems like will a straightforward define bedifficultto and identify The Yalta Conference, which was heldfrom February 4 Forces. Soviet Army and administration Underground dangers from the thatthreaten them from their disclosuresPolish to the safeguard to citizens; of Polish property and lives of the safety sovereign rightsof the lawful people anditsPolish authorities; respect assure to the and your power to prevent thecreation in Poland of accomplished fact; tosafeguard the On behalf of the Polish nation and government, I appeal to you, Mr. President, to do all in 24 á ajczyk’s fear that communism communism fear ultimately would that ajczyk’s á ajczyk sometime inMay. forSympathy the th to the11 to á ajczyk, with the goal of goal the with ajczyk, th , 1945, was 1945, the , 14 CEU eTD Collection Stalin; again a comparison my Stalin; againa is Britain with comparison Hopefully,new needed. through Great research meetings intentions as seen with FDR’s secret Poland for thetrue U.S.’s illuminate through in to order andbeanalyzed will Teheran, Potsdam such asYalta, Aspects of Conferences examine final the decisions made byU.S.foreign makers inpolicy Poland’s regard to future. will chapter concluding on FDR. This pressure placedcontinuous American organizations Polish- particular how and community American Polish the from response the discuss will between beConfederationand discussed.The1943 will third GreatPowers chapter the 1940 and with Polishthe government-in-exileInaddition, inLondon. Czechoslovak-Polish the relationship Churchill’s Winston highlight also will chapter This community. Allied the within comparison will hopefullyfocus on shedU.S. light foreigninfluencing will the diplomaticPolish U.S.publicand opinion Thesecondchapter on Question. on the realpolicy feelings in and shaping played inAmerica during the role Poles bePoland. to attention will paid Particular on the WWII issue and of Statesthe andhow how such a relationship Polish formed itand molded U.S. foreign comparedpolicy towards the futureQuestion of to Great Britain’s. and in especially Europe east-central Poland. Such a settlement post-war the handled viewed and Allied Powers how the U.S.andthe on perspective forming diplomatic have to access to easier wouldPolandrelations allow in in exile Europe establishing agovernment with the Soviet Union. Such research will hopefully offer a new this period, were situated in the United States, PresidentW in situated States, United thisthe were period, during majority Although immigrants, Polish of the Party. Democratic Party and theNational The government was a coalition London Paris leadership moved in to under the GeneralW 1939,eventually of of the Polish Peasant Party, the Polish Socialist Party, Labor The first chapter will deal with the historicalbetweenThe first chapterwilldeal relationshipPolandwith the United and á adyslaw Razkiewicz believed that believed Razkiewicz adyslaw á adyslaw Sikorski.adyslaw 15 CEU eTD Collection outweighed diplomacy. outweighed politics whether and Question Polish the handled U.S. the how about be drawn will conclusions 16 CEU eTD Collection 27 26 3. 25 large army. a and of system taxation, a functionaladopt bureaucracy,had effective yet to Poland powers, Unlike themajor European powerconsolidated and selfishly absorbed remaining the hope the for survival the Poland.of of of Under magnates pretense nation, rights the safeguardingplundering. the the the invasions coupled with rapid decline inthevolume of madeproduction Poland ripe for and socioeconomicconstitutional the period time this During partitions. the from systemcommonwealth the save to of the old commonwealthappear following becameorgans to late however, proved too 1791constitution, the such reforms was decaying. The By 18 legal codes. the and treasuries, armies, administrations, combination of wars whichand was reflected in the dualism of Publica as referred to commonly Kingdom Poland, of The powers. European great of the hands 1.2 Partitioned Poland Question” “Polish Infamous of the Rise I: The Chapter The once progressive nation of personal liberties and political had by hung liberties andrights itself political nation The personal of progressive once supposedly forty times smaller than those Franceof and ten times smaller than those of Russia. speakers. Polish- being majority the identity; national of consciousness clear a had Few tongue. mother withinadhere whichPolish not cohabitationthe to groups of different did astheir thestate same Ibid, 7. Piotr S. Wandycz, Piotr S. Wandycz, Throughout Poland’sThroughout history question the hasre-surfaceexistenceof continued to at the , was a highly diversified nation by nation 18 the , wasahighly diversified 25 Within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth special autonomous regimes existed regimes autonomous special Commonwealth Polish-Lithuanian the Within The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918 26 In1780,for example, revenues the Polandof were Res Publica th century. The ethnic mixture was a result of (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), , ‘two nations,’ that contained separate contained nations,’ that , ‘two 7. th century common executive common century Res 17 27 CEU eTD Collection 30 29 2005), 12. Austria was absolved as an unwilling accessory. an unwilling as absolved was Austria partitions on autocratic Russia; Prussia was seen as a pitiful and subordinate accomplice while England blame of negative placed andFrance light. the ina the historians seethepartitions most however, nobility; the by rule irresponsible of centuries two of denouncement a natural but brigandage,” of ‘act an as be seen not should partition the ways some In state. Polish backward and impotent politically the worsened Poles the of traditions social and political the as ignored youyou havemade traditions are.” what which yourridof …Get ‘digested’ she not it that was see to must she her existence continue wanted to Rousseau, for example,in wrote “Poland1771 that would probably be ‘devoured,’ butif she government. the strengthening would ultimately that reforms new in implementing step identity. their to are traditions and homeland their important ThePolishittraits. cannotbe is provideshow that essence measured,one however, aninklingto Therefore notionthe of wasa ‘Pole’ re-definedmore andmendedcloser to cultural and religious ‘collaboration.’ with be associated to began ‘loyalty’ term of Tsar,the Russian puppets the 1717,whereafter King Republic. and the However, Polish the Kingandthe Republic were be seen in which it was assumed exampleloyalty identity. Another can and of traditions age-old Lithuanian questioned Republic that ‘to be a Pole’ meant being a loyal subject of the Polish 28 17 the underminingits own power. Louis L. Gerson, 4. Louis L. Gerson, 3. Norman Davies, Norman th The first August partition on 5 century and the civil wars of the 18 Obviously national Polish isconsciousness mucholder than partitions.the The Deluge in God’s Playground: A history of Poland Volume II th , 1772, was seen bymany Poles , 1772,was a necessary as patriotic th century are periods in which citizens of the Polish- 29 30 Rousseau’s emphatic advice was unfortunately was advice emphatic Rousseau’s This changedhoweverfollowingscheme the (New York: Columbia University Press, 18 28 CEU eTD Collection 35 34 33 32 faults. herown correct to begin ifdangerous spread.” they Ministerstated AlexanderBezborodko “the that Poles have waysof whichthinking may prove partitioning.to nations time atthe which battled although anarchy,andsuccumb corruption didnot revolutions European other inbased is comparison to This conclusion internal factors. both of and external The of nature fall Polishthe state. of Poland self-destruction the wasacombination illuminated 31 abolished reforms but slowly suffocated the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the Constitution of 1791 resultforeign powers such as Prussia and Russia found that usagethe its of owngreed.Forexample, Polandvulnerable to leaving which liberties Certain Polish structure to the were given power the nobility destroyed who are nothing; and the peasants who are less than nothing.” “Polish the Republic wascomposed noblesbourgeois who orders; three are everything;of the 18 divided Russiaandshock between HabsburgAustria.Thepartitioning did of Poland not Prussia, outcome of WWI in which Prussia was seen as the chief instigator of the partitions. already passed atitby shouting the of member CasimirSmogorzewski, “I do not allow.” Ibid, 56. CasimirSmogorzewski, Louis L. Gerson, th century Europe for even French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau commented that the for that Jean even commented philosopher century JacquesRousseau French Europe The partitions of Poland removed Poland from the map of asits from The mapof territories of were Europe partitions Poland removed Polandthe liberum veto liberum 32 Sejm Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland 1914-1920 The aristocratic republic, as a political form, is strictly a Polish phenomenon. aPolish strictly is form, a political as republic, aristocratic The to force an immediate end to the current session and nullify all all legislation session nullify and end tothecurrent toforce animmediate Poland’s Access to theSea Poland’s Access to theSea and also established the principle of emancipating the serfs. Russian serfs. the emancipating of principle the established also and 35 Poland was therefore torn to pieces because she had the mind to Nie pozwalam! , 57. (London: George Allen& Unwin Ltd, 1934), 56. 34 , delayed anyreforms from Asbe enacted. a , 1. 31 liberum veto Such insight into Polish society liberum veto , which allowed any not only delayed only not 19 33 CEU eTD Collection second partition, engraved with the following words, “I recovered what had been torn away torn been had what recovered “I words, following the with engraved partition, second historical anddynastic claims,further IIwent Catherine however, by metal,ordering a after the of Bug the River. Both Austria andPrussiajustify tried to their byinvoking acquisitions mostly of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ukraine, and several other provinces of the Crown east the old commonwealth and nearly one-half of its population. of nearly one-half and oldcommonwealth the The share of land received by Russia in the partitions was by far the most; moremilitarily. intervened of Russia than Great the Catherine Confederation, Targowica the one-halfof creation of squash intervened vitality. anysigns of inorderto Through corruption magnates of and the the beforelarge it vistas and Alarmed possibilities. by such productivity neighboringthe powers moving in opened some-what that of itswas a direction from decline. state previous country The century Poland was an oligarchy where rule of law benefitedthe of an only rule where Poland was oligarchy century that the great powers of Europe1793, followed by thirdinisthe Hertzberg’s statement 1795.Highlighting in important showing saw both strength andPrussia.” inEast and perhaps weakness in Poland. It West Prussian re-take sooner and will toPrussia is adanger become will by thinkthis Poland that true that 18 hereditary and has received a Constitution more solid and better organized than that of England. I has become “thePoland of Kingdom that BerlinWarsaw, stating of at representative fears tothe of Frederick William Prussian II, Minister Friedrich Ewald von Graf Hertzberg confessed his saved thecountry if notforthe re-grouping of May partitionists.the On 23 38 37 36 partition. On May 3 Piotr S. Wandycz. 17. Term forPolish nobility CasimirSmogorzewski, 58. Unlike the first partition, the last two happened at a moment when Poland was emerging was Poland when moment a at happened two last the partition, first the Unlike Although Russia sensed Poland’s collapse, it wasPrussiawho collapse, Although sensedPoland’s theideaof established Russia rd , 1791,the Polish voted for anew Diet constitution which have would 36 Such a fear however subsided as the second partition occurred in occurred Such subsidedasthepartition however second a fear 38 The annexed territories consisted territories The annexed szlachta rd , after the succession 37 and clergy. the 20 th CEU eTD Collection from from Prussia andAustria savedfrom Poland becoming aRussian province. Following the intervention the that and war from Europe saved which event fortunate a was partition the that an “act of brigandage.” partition was seen “Polish ‘guberniias.’ as An example or isprovinces,” by early provided an 19 of justified power annexation the of ‘rightfully’ Russianlands; landshadhistoricallythese been following: withoutpartitions occurred British concurrence. Irish statesman Edmund Burkewrote the issues play a large role in following territorial WWIthe WWII.disputes and thelargestUkrainians,group. These and Belarusians;represented however, still Poles historical Russia].” and [with united major partof population the Kingdom the fromof Polandof andintheguberniias[taken] Poland the constituting “nation a as Poles the to referred who Arsenevich by I.A. textbook geography 42 41 40 39 ( believed that the partitions were a crime but Russian but crime werea partitions the believed that who furthered byCatherine’s contemporaries argumentwas part of Kievan patrimony.the This ottorzhennaia vozvratikh Louis L. Gerson, 2. Ibid, 1. Piotr S. Wandycz, 17 Ibid, 17. French statesman Duc de Broglie wrote within his book Europe. in countries of the most of destruction the in habits plethoric oftheir strength preserve to public tranquility, mightinclination have they obliged been to find a discharge earnest for the superfluous their with concurred not had circumstance this If united. able to find and greatness.a fourth I agree … that it whichwas extremelynew acquisitions (for I am notfortunate to call themwas conquests) to that the best theadvantageutterly for histhree power alliedI have no doubt that aprince (Frederick powers the so wiseGreat) in politics will improve his were unable to resist any of them, and much less all such that resentful rather were but demise Poland’s with surprised not were British The ).” 40 39 The were ‘Polish by mainlypopulated provinces’ Lithuanians, Catherine argued that she had only reunited lands that had been she thathad lands hadonlyreunited arguedthat Catherine 42 Contrary to Broglie, individuals such as Voltaire believed Voltaire as such individuals Broglie, to Contrary raisond’etat and exigencies of thebalance The King’sSecret 41 th that the century 21 CEU eTD Collection 45 Press, 1953), 7. 44 43 the19 of observers foreign sensitive most the of some by underlined been has nature spiritual Poland’s kingdoms. reign imaginary asperceive totheir of many within cared whocared to as it, ‘kings Poland’ for distinguishing the land lost Poles. There were many different Poland’s as there were people conventions terminological hadtheirown powers of partitioning the bureaucracies Each the of Revolution inof 1830 tostrengthenorder hearts the of Polesthe in exile: Mickiewicz, Poland’s national poet wrote the following poem after the failure of the Polish however,spirit, Polish of lay in the people acceptremoval theirinability history. from Adam to endof atthe Mass: was recited for are-unified An Poland. example of such can bepatriotism seen in followingthe hymn which partitions a wave of patriotism swept across the Polish consciousness as the Polish people prayed Brandes. Norman Davies, Norman Louis L. Gerson, Norman Davies, Norman Following the partitions, Poland disappeared intothe midst of European imperialism. The 45 Poet Kazimierz Brodzi Kazimierz Poet God’s Playground: A history of Poland Volume II God’s Playground: A history of Poland Volume II Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland 1914-1920 th We beseech Thee, OLord. country ofour freedom and integrity independence, the For We beseech Thee, OLord. For national arms and eagles We beseech Thee, OLord. nations of freedom the for war universal a For country. free our Lord, O Restore, entreaty: our we bring altars, Thy Before harm. her cause would that evils From care in Thy Her kept hath shield Whose Hast girded Poland with power and fame, ages the through who O God century: Helmuth von J.H.Sutherland Georg Moltke, century: Helmuth Edwards, and Ĕ ski wrote the following: the wrote ski 44 43 , 7. , 15. (Hamden, Connecticut: Yale University 22 CEU eTD Collection Polish the of Rebirth the statethat believe Others Rising. January the of demonstration innational the attended 1918 was the exactashes. Some highlight thedecisivein moment when 1864, a measure of social emancipation point the from itself rejuvenated nation Polish the in history of point what at argue to sovereignty. continue Historians Numerouslinkage among is these groups thatthe endwould product lead toanindependent Poland. observers envisionedgroups arenewed Poland of that encompassed manyfacets ThePoland’s past. only argue that the 48 not Poland: not 47 46 Commonwealth. Lithuanian Polish- powerful once the resonated which notion a time; same the at Lithuanian and Polish ‘Polishness’ in non-nationalwho terms.looked Mickiewicz trouble identifying themselves andembraced their totheir relationship homeland.forfor Individuals, example, thethehad Poles the notionInternally, proximity. geographical of restoration regardless that ‘Russians’ as classified became a Pole could be both kin, was a ‘Russian.’of a stateman’s other’s the was he if even river, the of bank right the on dwells who however, resemblingneighbor, Kingdom; his he wasa be Congress RiverBugcitizen the the of inthat a ‘Pole,’ called might the old Republic,respective boundaries. For example,in Russian official amanlivingusage, left onthe bank of continuedThe partitioning nations provided however differentterminology forlived Poles who within their to view O Lithuania, my fatherland! You are like health to me. to health like You are myfatherland! Lithuania, O Norman Davies, Norman Ibid, 7. Within Mickiewicz’s masterpiece Within Mickiewicz’s Litwo! Ojczyzno moja!ty jeste Like Thee, too, shall rise again. Like Thee suffers, atThy bidding; treading footsteps Thy in Poland, Hail, OChrist, Thou Lord of Men! God’s Playground: A history of Poland Volume II 47 Following the abolishment of in CongressKingdom the Poles 1874, all Pan Tadeusz, 46 Ğ jakzdrowie an invocation isan toLithuania dedicated , 10. . 48 It is clear that different nationalist 23 CEU eTD Collection 51 50 49 Paul in I 1796 did release Kosciuszko andmany other Polish Thisby prisoners. act Paul Tsar I However,Tsar such in to thecrown a request. on Prussiagave if TadeuszKosciuszko release of re-forming the Polish state under the crown of the Prussian king; Catherine the II threatened to Europe, Polishthe indeed Question is the elephant. of garden diplomatic in the found be to animals the all of that being point The Question. Polish the and Elephant ‘The entitled a paper produced ‘Elephants’ on competition essay international atan a Polishis candidate that repertoire, in jokes ambassador’s oldestthe One the of idealfor no solution conferenceagendasever bereached. appeared on numerous could subject This bringingEurope. stability beento has as of Poland Europe tantamount to carvingof the Poland’s of Theexistence. future Poland’s frontiers has been dominated by Alliedthe of Powers andre-shaped re-defined, hasre-surfaced, Polish Question The Question. thePolish timethe was uniformly of conscious their national identity; this wouldbe not reached until 1945. national process could not be seen as a complete homogeneous Polish population who were in Poland. interest French could nations re-strengthen tooppressed aid of revolutionary offering declaration hope onFrance, whilepartitioning its The whose another. secondpinned power working against Poland. working Two were possibilities established, thefirst beingcooperate with atactic to one for independence beliefs, was goal, The ultimate gaining of regardless etc. revolutionaries, within encompassed the Polish community; these groups radicals, moderates, evolutionists, Polishthe Question.While the QuestionPolish was newdiscussed political formed groups Revolution and later the War of the first Coalition forced the three partitioning powers to re-open Piotr S. Wandycz, 24. Ibid, 11. Norman Davies, 11. The one and only consistent theme which continued to draw the attention of statesmen of statesmen of attention the draw to continued which theme consistent only and one The 51 Thefirsttactic for hadsome Polish the Berlin poignancy wasconsidering suggestion 50 The growing influence of French the 49 24 CEU eTD Collection Alexander I.In1801,Alexander the took andthrone mademinister Czartoryski foreign the of Tsar become soon would who Alexander, Duke Grand with developed eventually relationship St. Petersburg to pledge allegiancebehalf of the Poles came from Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski.to In 1775, Princethe Adam was sent to Russian tsar on behalfthe Uniates, saw new developments in Russo-Polishof dialogue.the However, the greatest effortCzartoryski’s. on the A strong against measuresdirected of loosening religious in Paul, rise sawa the of Russia, powers Tsar shifted thecenterof to reality.of After toreviving homeland.Theshift 1801, Polish the activity Polish Question, andFrench advancement. the of usefulness the between example an as serves citizenship French honorary Kosciuszko’s Prussia,issue Polish the playedimportant an role in assistingin the French war effort 1793-95; and Russia distracting By enemies. its for diversion auseful was Question Polish the Paris, aristocracy on a shortlease and this was done through the threat of confiscating their estates. For 52 powers. all partitioning lists of three military military Russian services. Prince high Poniatowski and Prussian addition, Józef In wasplaced on D Henryk as such non-aristocrats Even further magnates Petersburg, gains. theirBerlin,political andAustriato usedthe St. own also powers of inengage Thethree court with schemes. political to in powers partitioning the order partitioning torevive twothe other Poland. powers aristocracy Polish The aligned themselves the use of any title with the word Polish in it; this treaty was enacted directly against any plan by rule, were immediately crushed by the supplementary treaty of January 26 was extremely troubling for the Germanic powers. Such concessions for the Poles, under Russian Piotr Wandycz, 25. 19 By the th century, Polish independence seemedmorelike amirage than anything close ą browski received numerous pleas to enter both the both enter to pleas numerous received browski 52 All three powers wished to keep the Polish th , 1797,whichforbade 25 CEU eTD Collection 54 53 regime. cultural autonomy Poles since 1868-75,the on formed of strongestthe pillars Habsburgthe of and political enjoyed had Galicia where Austria, In counsels. imperial in position important an held politician nationalist Polish No in policy-making. role minor a played and center, from the ruled were Polish provinces the influence, Czartoryski’s of regardless andRussia, Poland Romanov under the crown wouldbe appeasingtoboth Russia andPoland.InGermany partitioning would powers of give upsome their shares inof Poland; thissense a reconstituted behad that Czartoryskimodernizinghoped extremely to Russia,the through circumspect. Russianthe government. Although, wished seeafree Czartoryski to Poland anindependenthe andMany many high aPole factthat Russian officials dislikedthe so in distrusted held positions member later a affairs, andasenator. of Council of the Council Education and the on State, of cameconflict into nobody gave athoughtoPoland. Itdidseem not desirablenecessary or any to seemed bleak. 1.2 The Polish Question following WWI WWI. of aftermath appear until the not did also issue the over influence American WWI. of end the until powers many of agendas the had from The Europe. Polish disappeared Question wavespreadthroughout Napoleonic complicated asthemap continuously of Europe changed. Polish shifted territories hands the as agenda of the major European powers. The history of Poland prior to WWI is extremely Norman Davies, 45. Piotr Wandycz, 34. With outbreakof the Firstthe WorldWarin the hopes 1914 for anindependent Poland 54 The Polish Question on the diplomatic front had long since disappeared from from active the longhad sincedisappeared front diplomatic the on Question ThePolish Count Istvan Burian wrote that “when all the great European powers interests powers European great the all “when that wrote Burian Istvan Count 26 53 CEU eTD Collection 59 58 57 56 Press, 1953), 14. 55 problem.” Polish the disturb to in partition the concerned powers of three the On the November 6 when seemed Wilson inrevival. truth to closer the Woodrow European the joined Hope conflict. entrance for into conflict the which hope theirsome Poles nation’s Unitedthe gave States outbreak of thePaderewski declared for anindependent thatbelieved “Nobody orworked Poland before the war and during was clear that noneof these envisagedantagonistic groups afully independent Poland. the first years of war.” For Poland this miracle of independence will come from the West…” again. exist andwill be resurrected Polandwill that tell Ican “My dearPaderewski, Paderewski, independence, extendingindependence, beyond national homeandautonomy territorial rule.” political any of dreamt ever had armies in thevarious engaged Poles “nonethe of that wrote madegroups itdifficultfor any vision of a unified Polandplausible.Writer J.J.Korostovetz following: Pi Gerson, 16. Ibid, 15. Ibid, 15. Louis LGerson, Louis Louis L. Gerson, á sudski, future ruler of Poland, acknowledged these facts and retrospectively in 1931 stated the stated in1931 retrospectively factsand these acknowledged rulerPoland, of future sudski, The eruption of The WWIeruption of dividedinto thePolish people numerous antagonistic It groups. themselves only, in their accounts of all they have done. displeasure hears oneseesthat itor denied by who glorifythose themselves, and powers ordered...This factis so true and incontrovertible that itiswith genuine in each of dismemberedthe all parts of the Poles didwhat their partitioning complete prostration and complete impotence. Itis incontestable then an fact that thethat at outbreak ofwarin the 1914 the were andPoland Poles in a state of continuously twisted continuouslyand falsified. Forthere isno doubt whatsoever I am repeatedly astonished that such simple truthsand historical facts are Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland 1914-1920 Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland 1914-1920 th , 1916 election of , 1916election Ignacy of Jan Wilson followingthe Paderewski, stated to 57 The internal fighting among these among fighting internal The , 15. (Hamden, Connecticut: Yale University 59 56 55 58 However, it was However, Józef Klemens 27 CEU eTD Collection States for ever States for Armies, Allied the to gives victory God Almighty Bilinski.manifesto, which The disclosed policy the Austrian of the Poles “If read asfollowing, Leon members, Club Polish significant most the of one and Monarchy Austro-Hungarian the 61 60 following in September 1914: Poland a“mighty army Russianagainstthe oppressors. peoples,in of to wassending liberty other and parliament Poles the declared that, the defense of beingbrought freedom, acceptance, and religious tolerance. The Polish Club in the Austrian Command of the German and Austrian armies issued a manifesto which told Poles they were WWI Supreme the of following outbreak the Immediately aspirations. Polish recognize autonomous regime. Pi an under Poland Austrian with Poland Russian of union the least at or Poland, independent an of Pi Norman Davies, 281. Ibid, 16. á sudski sudski onthegeneral counted following of realize the outbreak disruption WWI his to dream In Vienna onAugust22 , in with my suchaway , together itinhabitedthat territory byyour compatriots Shall rise from the blood we shed. For dead; be both we’ll that not Caring Now I see the vision clearly, heart. my Polish in Deep And sink your Muscovite bullet I beg you, play your part, sights your me in catch you when So I’m your enemy: youand are mine. other, each confront and stand We Alert to the shellfire’s whine, groaning, with filled trenches In the eye. in the death staring We’re dug-outs opposing two our From By a fate that we can’t deny. We’re kept apart, my brother, that which has not perished á sudski sudski successful Austriainconvinced that would to be advantageous nd , 1914, a draft manifesto wasdrawn , 1914,adraftminister up byfinance of 61 your country shallbeincorporated amongmy 60 Poet Edward S Edward Poet áRĔ ski wrote the ski wrote 28 CEU eTD Collection 63 62 Warsaw.” at Diet the to responsible Government a national a whole-to as Monarchy the of needs and interests best shall form a unified Kingdom of Poland, the administration of which I shall entrust subject tothe and AustrianGerman Kuk, von General and Beseler von General manifesto the with concurrence In commanders of the occupied areas of RussianBerlin and Vienna: Poland, of occupied only.Russia 5 OnNovember part publishedin the beformed only a Polish state that established which drafted was areas, adecree occupied the administer should who over governments German and a Austrian between disagreement avoid to order In Powers. Central the with, allied and of, protection the under kingdom, Polish anindependent create decidedto was, therefore, It wartime. during areas occupied within forces made mobilizeillegal armed it in1907which inestablished HagueConference to the law international of principle a contravening without forces German the into conscripted be not could ThePoles soldiers. demanded front whenthe a time forces inPoland at occupying had analternative solution manpower shortage.theirto Germany afford could not tokeeplarge if they anindependent Poland have whichguaranteed proclamations previous their denounced Poland the intentions of the Central Powers became clearer. Both Austria and Germany would Gerson, 18. Gerson, 17. organization, training, and command will be regulated by mutual agreement. mutual by regulated be will command and training, organization, Polish fellow-combatantsbrave our in of the great was of memory the present the time willand continue times live. to Its frontier of Army Polish the of traditions the army own glorious its In strength. its of development free the for desires it which guarantees, remains reserved.constitution. more The precise regulation of the frontiers ofthe Kingdom of Poland In union form from districtsthese anindependent with state an hereditarymonarchy a and with both brave were armies snatched with heavy sacrificesfrom have Russian agreedpower, to Allied oftheir arms, andPowers guided by the wishtolead victory the to ahappy future districtsPolish which by final their the in confidence firm their by sustained and of Hungary, King theApostolic new Kingdom…His will fin theMajesty the German Emperor and His Majesty the Austrian Emperor and 62 As the German and Austrian forces strengthened over the occupied area of occupied area the over strengthened forces andAustrian As German the th , 1916,the followingmanifesto was publishedin 63 29 CEU eTD Collection 66 :á 65 64 Nation: Polish the to manifesto followingAustria,East Prussia issuedthe and Commander-in-Chief, theGrandDukeNicholas, into offensive Russian the to Prior Front. Eastern the in campaign the lead he would eventually with Pi was created of State Council Poles. Provisional The Vistulathe 14.8%of provinces; Polishthe population of Prussian Poland, and16.3%of Galician By million1916 nearly 1.9 Poles were servingin the war. included This 4%of in population the their dream of an independent Poland could become a reality. The proclamation stated: proclamation asking the Poles to support the new state by enlisting in their armies, so Davies, 283. Took place on 15 July 1410 with the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy Ibid,of 18. Lithuania, led by the king adys á aw II Jagie Resurrection of the nations. ofthe Resurrection is life breaking. new ofbanner May the Cross asasymbol shineforth ofthe and Passion your of dawn The Sea. Northern the to Ocean Pacific the of shores the common enemy atGrunwald brotherly a handextended in with friendship. Shefirmly and believes which that the sword slew the heart open an with you meet to forward steps Russia Great bound history. been your has by fate whose people other those all for respect show you that namely, you, reborn, freeinherown faith, language, expects andself Russia rule. only one thing of in one under scepter the of the Russian UnderEmperor. scepter that will Poland be union. May the frontiers that cut across Poland be erased. May the Polish nation be joined fraternal withunion Great The Russia. Russian Army brings you newsofblessed the that did not die. It was kept alive by a hope for the resurrection of the Polish nation and for its true. Acentury and ahalfago, theliving ofbody in Poland was torn pieces;her but soul Poles! hourThe haswhen struck dreamsthe ofyourfathers forefathers and can come within and without… will provide legions, which formations Army, Polish the will constitute which,united with the strong courageously and gloriously; followin in footsteps and newtheir enlist the support victory your Yourbrothersagainst oppressor. in Polishthe fought legions with us forcrown our andhelpus to volunteers by participate. Stand sidetherefore as our your The struggle with Russia hasyet not ended;in you strugglethis must also new state and will secure its safety both áá o, ranged against the Knights of the Teutonic Order. 64 66 65 has not tarnished. The Russian battalions stretched from á sudski as a military leader; amilitary as sudski 30 CEU eTD Collection the problemthe independence.of Polish Therewould havenot been independentan Poland ifRussia The proclamation by Provisional the playedGovernment alarge in role evolution future the of ministers, stating following: the March a proclamation 30, 1917, appeared bytheProvisional signedGovernment, byall the on for delayed long not was however, act, This independence. Polish of favor in government meaning anannouncement byRussia torevive Polishby territory and a new proclaiming Poles felt that such a politicalmany ‘liberty,’ by rule shift so-called the of wouldintroduction the and be inRussia the absolutism of catalyst downfall the in annulling the workFollowing politics. of internal the Russian partitions; of one as Question Polish the saw always regime tsarist The 68 67 published following:the Dmowski leader Roman Party Democratic National manifesto, the to response Poland. In effect Russian andoutside Poles hadthe proclamation within Petersburg on This aprofound St. Smogorzewski, 80. Smogorzewski, Gerson, 23. peace in the renovated Europe of the future. territorieswhere majority the of the population consists of Poles,is apledge oflasting Governmentconsiders thecreation that independent of an Polish Provisional State, controlling allthe the Germanism, militant against campaign of plan general the to faithful determine her has thrown offwhich yoke,the recognizesequally nation, for her Polish sister-nation Russian the full future The right to of nations. freedom the for combatants the of according ranks the towhich her itroyal could, will.calls you new life,to a toliberty. old Power The made hypocritical but you promises to would Loyal not, now overturned Free forever. toRussia…hastens to yousend her greeting; fraternal she keep…is agreements Brothers Poles! of old the The system Russia, of oursource common slaverydisunity ofour and is of Poland,with its free allies, Russia calls you to join vanish. will nation Polish the divided have which frontiers the body of Poland went to pieces a century and a half ago,will be reunited and that the will be realized, and that thedreams of our fathers and forefathers will be fulfilled; that believe firmly that after theend of thewarthe promises expressed in proclamationthe CommanderWarsaw welcome the proclamation to the Polesof HisImperial Highness, theSupreme of the Russian armies, as an act of the greatest historical weight, and The representativesof theundersigned political parties assembled on August 16 68 67 th in 31 CEU eTD Collection Suzerain boat packet the of captain the Champlin, Captain York. New reached insurrection Polish Insurrection 1830-1831 contributed emigration to the of Poles. On word January 1831, the of the November the of failure The nations. both between bond a stronger to leading sympathy Ko and independence Polish of loss The the thirdled led partition. revolutionRussia whicheventually 1794 against to unsuccessful an servebyBenjaminKorecommendedIn 1789, Franklin. to were heroes both history; American within places their earned and valiantly fought Pulaski American Revolutionary American figures War, notorious Revolutionary such as Tadeusz Ko a longhad traditionmutual both between of friendshipnations. existed 1775 During the 1.3 Poland in the eyes of the U.S. during WWI policy. Polish a common arrive at not could and Austria-Hungary Germany Both andinfluence. power the body of Poland. of body the 70 69 oran ‘buffer state,’ a Polishof andthecreation Russia destruction of the policies: two between wavered Germany movements. their weakened bickering such Poland. During war,Berlin the and Vienna continuously over Polish the squabbled Question; of restoration in the factor important an was Revolution Russian The powers. Western the of hands the freed had Revolution Russian the Russia; Tsarist of assistance the with victory their had not been at war with the Central Powers, nor would it have existed if the Allies had won Bogdan Grzelo Bogdan 81. Smogorzewski, Prior totheUnited entrance State’s into warand the for anindependence support Poland, , brought the news in the form of British, French, and German newspapers. German and French, British, of form in the news the brought , Ĕ ski, Poles in the United States of America, 1776-1865 69 Austria-Hungary saw the Polish Question as a mean of her amean of increasing as Question Polish Austria-Hungary saw the Ğ ciuszko’s captivity in Russia initiated American initiated inRussia captivity ciuszko’s (Warsaw:Interpress, 1976), 113. Ğ ciuszko returned to Poland and in toPolandciuszko returned and entente Ğ ciuszko andciuszko Kazimierz with Russian over Russian with 70 One of the of One 32 CEU eTD Collection 75 internal affairs that could ultimately spark Russian involvement in American internal affairs. In affairs. internal in American involvement Russian spark ultimately could that affairs internal Russian into intervention an as Russians the from seen be could problem Polish the that felt Jackson Union. tosecedefrom the states southern and other Carolinafor South growing support kind.” liberal most the of commercial, our and friendly, most the of is connection political our Russians delivered the following speech infront of Congress in 1831,“WithDecember Empirethe the of Andrew Jackson President at thetime. government oftheU.S. theattitude mention to failed when name lipsher Americans.” was on the of all in United States, the Haiman “this that wrote was indeed theonly whenperiod Poland could be tobe said in voguethe Miecislaus Poet insurrection. the towards Committees American-Polish by raised was dollars Poled of Academy bythecadets U.S.Military the Point; West aroundat all together $5,500 Poles.” behalf the of on meetings calling Hagean “travelappointed P.O. to for andtheneighboringthis thepurpose through states, of organization This Menof Philadelphia. Young the called anassociation sponsored newspaper 74 73 support of Polishthe example, cause.For September on 24 in largealso rallied groups support states Poland Other and the insurrection. invite the to public New York newspaper the newspaper New York emancipation.” for struggle present in their success abundant Poles] [the them wish cordially most will nations, of independence the and men, of rights the justice, of 72 71 newspaper local New York Ibid, 116. Bogdan Grzelo Sizable amount of money during this time period. Bogdan Grzelo Bogdan Ibid, 113. 75 The political attitude of the President Jackson reflected the worry surrounding the Ĕ Ĕ ski, ski, Poles in the United States of America Poles in the United States of America Evening Post The Daily Advertiser The Daily published an appeal to the town’s leaders in to leaders order the town’s anappeal to published 72 Nearly$248dollars wasraised for embattled the , 116. , 115. commented on the insurrection, “Every friend “Every insurrection, the on commented th , 1831, the Washington , 71 On May 20 74 Haiman, however, Haiman, th , 1831, the , Globe 33 73 CEU eTD Collection 76 immigrantsof from Polandincreased so did the Polonia. organizations Numerous and societies fill these extremely difficultfocuspositions. Suchjobsmining. tended around to Asthe number force.immigrants Both laborPolish flocked peasants andother from in to Eastern order Europe was in boom America. This of largeindustrial due tothe which course large U.S. requiredthe a agreement the 1833. trade of through manifested stinted; was this not be improved should relations with Russia feltthat Jackson general, industry supportindustry excessto populations. for of becausenature ofexample,in system agricultural primitive the Galicia, the hadno Russia. America These immigrated to inexperiencedandpeasants fanatically politically religious. were whostereotypical peasants weretypical Poles These increased. Galicia and Russian Poland from Poles the whereas, decreased, Germany from émigrés Polish the As aresult, industries. During the many industrialization sawGermany profitof Poles achance to on expandingthe emigration of is1880 seen as religiously unlike motivated theprevious economic driven émigrés. Polish the therefore Bismarck; of policies anti-Catholic and anti-Polish the to due America made government, to denationalizeThe sawahighinflux no Poles. the to of Poles 1880’s effort The United PolishPolonia likegovernment, States German or the and Diaspora. Russian the up made communities These centers. city in forming began communities Polish of pockets American involving policy in intervention foreign European or Duringaffairs. the late1860’s, against largelydueto toprotest in theUnitedinvitation was policy Poland; Russian this to States changed or swayed Polishthe Revolution neitherincreasedof 1863 Polish emigration nor Unitedto the States public opinion. An example is seen in the rejection of Napoleon III’s Gerson, 39. By 1860 every state, with the exception of population. hadaPolish Dakota, of withexception the state, By 1860every By the early By 20 early the th century Polish immigrants were beginning to be received well in well be received to beginning were immigrants Polish century 76 Ironically, 34 CEU eTD Collection contributions to the United States. freedom in Poland?” that “Ko 79 78 77 again. once sovereign become in Poland assistant should and partition,’ ‘fourth the represented they that individuals persuade to America cameto Germany and Austria, from Russia, Poles influential Numerous policy. foreign American influence and united to community Polish-American Polandindependence becoming became a manyreality, Polish strove leaders to persuade the politically active inimmigrants a had comecrisis to America for purely economic reasons andwhich therefore refused to become reminded Polish themajority of However, independence. for Poland’s assistin struggle the to America them of the old country.to the When largerthe possibilityits attention of press shifted WhenWWIinterests the immigrants. the erupted Polish-American question of material and social, cultural, the with greatly concerned were societies Polish andvarious of Polish nationalismorganizations, when they originally arose, served thepurpose of insurance….”social in Europe amongimmigrantand by community, the nunswere largelyconducted andPurely priests. secular the encouragement worker’s chief social schoolscenter of college,organization, and and when developed they immigrant Polish the became parish Catholic Roman Polish “the that wrote Dyboski Roman of PolesWriter Church. Catholic Roman the of establishment the was incommunities these in creating step formedand interests initial representforin protect of the Polish to the community. The order Gerson, 47. Gerson, 46. Gerson, 42. 78 Prior to the outbreak of WWI, the Polish-American press, Polish Catholic organizations, Catholic Polish press, WWI,Polish-American the of outbreak the to Prior Propaganda wasusedby which usageof organizations the through these posters stated Ğ ciuszko and Pulaski fought for American freedom. Will you help American fight for 79 It was at this point that Poles in American became conscious of their of conscious became American in Poles that point this at was It 77 35 CEU eTD Collection president of honorary as thepresidency; the to Polishcloser cause Polish the brought House D. Edward CentralColonel Relief affairs, in foreign assistant Committee top Wilson’s President and Paderewski between relationship The in the United States, Paderewski was able to 81 InstitutionPress, 1977), 5. stated the following: the region. Historians of the American increase in greatly an increased political to contribute would intentions Hoover’s Armistice, the Relief Administration, Harold FisherBritish foreign secretary. Although a starving Poland was refused substantial andAmerican help until Sidney Brooks planmillionprepared to four people without inPolish theconsentof cities Sir EdwardGrey, the 80 inPoland. Relief for Commission International the allowing before conditions particular set would Allies Western the inform that them to General Staff situation. the of seriousness the investigate to of state, future secretary Kellogg, Vernon Dr. associate In response senthissenior permission, In Hoover German November 1915,with out. when thewar broke to Kellogg’s who forhoped Unitedimmediately food and States Poland began suffering clothing assistance. report, andin Warsaw inboth the German-occupied bynumerous Polishapproached organizations Hoover hewas in Belgium Relief for Commission metthe of aschairman responsibility Hoover’s with representativesbecame involved seriously visitwith hisfirst affairs; PolandPolish wasin to 1913.During of the German Ibid, 5. George J.Lerski, George than elsewhere, and this championship…was to be given new force in President Wilson’s speech on January 22 President in force new given be to championship…was this and elsewhere, than Europe…popularsupportof Polish aspirations gained headway for inAmerica rapidly warissue for alarge public long before itwas accepted by the foreign offices of the independenceunity and of the way nation.Inthis their ofPoland restoration become a Sympathy for the warsufferings of the merged Poles with sympathy for their demand for It was not until 1915 that the United States, with Hooverwas not until of Herbert theUnited States, assistance the It 1915 that Herbert Hoover and Poland: A Documentary History of Friendship nd , 1917. 81 80 On February On HooverFebruary 6, 1916, (Stanford: Hoover (Stanford: 36 CEU eTD Collection 82 access Baltic tothe Seain his famous Thirteenth declaredPoint on January 8, 1918. Wilson solidified was later Wilson’sthrough recognition of Poland’s independence free with Polonia American the leadersof rally the The name for Poland in Latin and many other languages, refers in modern Polish to the Polish Diaspora. Polish to the Polish in modern refers languages, other many and Latin in Poland for name The 82 . The joint effort between Paderewski and President and Paderewski between effort joint The . 37 CEU eTD Collection in postwar Europe. It was obvious that the Polish Foreign Ministry win Polishthe hopedto the Ministry Itwas obvious Foreign that(MSZ) in Europe. postwar divergentopinions.it Duringwas 1919, future unclear role what the United States wishedplay to notorious Curzon Line. American consideration as to the Polish frontier problem was marked by December 8 boundary on to the established for areturn calling an armistice, proposed secretary, foreign British the Curzon, Lord assistance. 84 back, Polish Prime Minister W Minister Prime Polish back, push Army When Poles triedthe Redto the into theUkrainefar asKyivin1920. as eastward continued along the Bug River frontier. and from line eastof actual The Brest Litovsk, ran Bialystok through Grodno, then to an area close to the mark Allied Suprememinimumboundary eastern Council to agreed on atemporary Poland’s town of Sokoly. 8 On December inJune1919. heldatVersailles PeaceConference the established at proved to be difficult to distinguish ethnic majorities. The Polish-German frontier was 83 Józef Pi frontierMarshall when especially Polish-Soviet decide temporary on the populations.” Polish include should State…which inhabited territories the byindisputably Polish independent “an for called Points Fourteen Wilson’s Woodrow of thirteenth The boundaries. Poland’s postwar government. However, controversy arose about Poland’s legitimate2.1 The United States and the Polish Government in Exile territorial Run: onthe Poland II: Chapter Ibid, 3. John L. Harper and Andrew Parlin, In 1917, the Allied powers recognized the Polish National Committee, the center of the Committee, National Polish the recognized Allied powers In 1917,the 83 Yet, in areas such as southern Lithuania, western Ukraine, and eastern Galicia it Galicia eastern and Ukraine, western Lithuania, southern as such in areas Yet, The Polish Question During World War II á adys á aw Grabski appealed in July 1920 to the Allies for Allies the to 1920 July in appealed Grabski aw th , 1919,which later woulditself manifest into the , 3. 84 The Allies had yet TheAllieshad to á sudski pushed sudski th , 1919, the , 1919, 38 CEU eTD Collection Archives reference no. PRM 109/26, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum: London, England. London, Museum: Sikorski and Institute Polish 109/26, PRM no. reference Archives 86 Press, 1986), 3. Significantly, arena. global in the wishes Poland’s voice also would but militarily, only not Poland, defend on MarchThis heldguarantee significance grave for Polish the whotruly believed that the Britishwould 9 on August 25 1 September on engulfed lastthrough minute endeavors toestablish Polish-Sovietrelations, better Poland wasultimately Poland’s future. dangerto greatest as the in particular, saw Germany, Sikorski interwar theperiod, Throughout suffocate ofboth growing Nazi Germany Russia Poland. powers Soviet were beginningto and 85 Treaty: Anglo-Polish tothe in respects statement for W had General anincreasingworry location become geographical Poland’s fate or complete West.However, the of bythepowers was redesigned Europe Central South-Eastern and Eastern, restoration would exhumeworld. itself from the ashes in from WWI power the foremost whichhademerged asthe of giant, of patronage transatlantic the WWII. Poland’s Foreign Diplomat Janusz Sleszy Janusz Diplomat Foreign Neal Please, Neal 85 economic penetration or in any other way.’ other inresisting any attempt to undermine independencethe or either ‘processes by of and assistance in support its power. the Articleall 3 declared it that give Britain once and Poland would at support would each Party Contracting other the Party, the against Contracting later the by aggression of consequence in power European a with hostilities Its first article provided that should one of the contracting parties become engaged in Regardlesseven pre-WWII or of tostrengthening predictions attempts alliances, asseen guarantee has ever been given to any country except in certain special cases, such as neutralizedsuch Belgium,where the guarantors cases, were certainly in special a position implementto certain their in except country any to given been ever has guarantee lose territory Poland either toRussia orGermany.should Itmay, indeed, doubted be whether such a circumstances no in that guarantee could Government British No ... The issues surrounding Poland’s boundaries weresymptomatic The issues boundaries of WWII, Poland’s asthe face surrounding of Poland,United the States, and theStabilization of Europe, 1919-1933 th , 1939,which thefollowingguaranteed on behalf Unitedthe of Kingdom: st , 1939. Prior, 1939. toPoland’sinvasion, Anglo-Polish the Treaty was signed th Ĕ 1945,the British secret WarfollowingCabinet passed the top ski, “Depiction of Anglo-Polish relations, March 1939-November 1943,” 1939-November March relations, of Anglo-Polish “Depiction ski, 86 (Oxford: Oxford University Oxford (Oxford: á adys á aw Sikorski aw Sikorski as the 39 CEU eTD Collection Archives reference no. PRM 109/26, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum: London, England. London, Museum: Sikorski and 89 Institute Polish 109/26, PRM no. reference Archives 88 British National Archives at the Kew: London, England. 87 commentary 18 September on commentary and White Russianpopulations longerRussia Poland with forsake valid…no areno could Ukrainian Russiato the one expect Molotov broadcast the following explanation, “As the Polish State ceased to exist, the treatiessigned in 1932. Following the attack,People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav of Pact Non-Aggression Soviet–Polish the of contravention in direct frontier Polish in the crossed Poland’s method worsenarchaic of defense. To matters, onSeptember Soviet 17th troops toppled over sheeronslaught Poland asthe blitzkrieg devastated military of style The German boundaries. territorial maintainingspecific to Poland in respects to were given guarantees that The Anglo-Polish Treaty serves as an example, of the pre-Yalta, Teheran and Potsdam them under her protection.” her under them Ibid. Foreign Diplomat Janusz Sleszy Janusz Diplomat Foreign Printed for the War Cabinet, “Anglo-Polish Secret Protocol of1939,” Archives reference no. CAB/66/63/62, guarantee... strong exception. Itis plain that theAnglo-Polish Treatyof 1939 involved no such Vilnawas obtained mostdubiousby methods,towhich Council ofthe Leaguethe took us, by thoseguaranteed been have to would the Poland by East possession of perpetual whose the territories Curzon Line were acquiredguarantee. In the case particular of Poland there is the contraryfurther that, consideration of the to our express advice, while and Allied purpose…Sympathy for Poland, which was warm and eager yesterday, is aflame today…yesterday, eager and warm was which Poland, for purpose…Sympathy Allied of British and solidity the upon dint or scratch smallest the not leave they that is soundly quite earlier record history experimentsEuropean in chapters blackest the of Some estate. the share in this typeand purposesbehindher foreignpolicy... of crime neighbor, despite bythe identity of their institutions and political idioms, by the principlesthe same clung tothepartners…All ingenious belief thatRussian was tobedistinguished from her Nazi Ukraine. Polish and Russia White of occupation that needscrossed the Polish thewholefront…andborder nowmoving along forward are to the troops toRussian when. but Poland be invade would saidStalin whether most been not for has minds question the now in Europe, war world of a flame first the light to Hitler encouraged From the momentwhich at the ofsignature Soviet-Germanthe agreement liberated and 87 89 Ĕ ski, “Depiction of Anglo-Polish relations, March 1939-November 1943,” 1939-November March relations, of Anglo-Polish “Depiction ski, th 88 , 1939 entitled, “Stalin, 1939entitled, showshis hand.”The commentary stated: In response to Molotov’s broadcast, which formed part of the Polandformer of which part formed Germany todo was murder was and Russia to Only these can be disappointed who , andshewould take The Times issued a 40 CEU eTD Collection Western Europe 92 on on April 13 of warninghim off decision.”that best, only,For them indeed the of guaranteeswerethe usthe Hitleras for war. choosing chance in Britain event from the expectGreat help might they concrete measure the of as to any illusion was under Rumanian government the nor government “…neither Polish the that contended later British’s the commitmentStrategically, partition. another to amount ofwould 1939,demands territorial toStalin’s assist Poland seemed Latvia, 1939-1940: Estonia, Lithuania, BessarabiaandBukovina. Northern Thefearedthat Poles rather illusory. Foreign territoriesthe his from both Hitler,arrangement and with he force, what had through in acquired, Secretary Lordto claim win warbut the to only not desire was Stalin’s territories. eastern all, her not prewar of Halifax defeating the Soviets and the Nazis, Poles wished to preserve Poland’s independence and most, if 91 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), x. 90 Armed Forces believed that Poland would prevail for he states: victory.’ ultimate and restored within its prewar boundaries. Therefore, ‘Poland’s alliances would be a guarantee of liberated ultimatelybe would Germany, Alliedpowers predicted,andthe Poland prevailed, as throughout the war. The continuously whichwouldPoland implications resurface hadto future grave commitment British guarantee of security implied that if Poland lost the war with government. Polish and British the between relationship in the interests Poland’s questioned once theSovietUnion theirshifted The SovietUnion the alliance. antithesisposed to of Britain’s independence unilateral andintegrity becamePoland’s guarantee seriously territorial Anna M.Cienciala, Anna Lord Halifax, Lord V.Kacewicz, George th Fullness of Days of Fullness (London: Routledge,1968), 239. , 1939, had pledged to guarantee hadpledged independence, 1939, toof the British Romania. The 92 Poland and the Western powers 1938-1939: astudy in the interdependence of Eastern and Even General Kazimierz Sosnowski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish the of Commander-in-Chief Sosnowski, Kazimierz General Even Great Britain, theSoviet Union and thePolish Government in Exile 1939-1945 (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1957), 205. 91 In regards to Romania, Inregards to BritishandGerman the government (London: 90 Besides 41 CEU eTD Collection from Romania to France; neither London or Paris were particularly eager for the Polish for the eager particularly were Paris or London neither France; to Romania from move thePolish hadprotested France, andBritishwish to governments government’s theFrench AmbassadorWilliam to According United Bullitt, the States Romanian soil. on to government allowed to fromtransfer Poland.” be will all but difficulties, formal becertain may there Army, Polish the and command, High the travel quickly Romania,unduethrough stopovers. without With regard toMarshal Smigly-Rydz, unbroken Resistance.”Archives reference no. PRM 137/19, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum: London, England London, Museum: Sikorski 94 and Institute Polish PRM137/19, no. reference Resistance.”Archives unbroken 93 Constan to and government president Polish of itsthe territory through transfer unofficial the agrees to Poland,Ambassador to Grigorcea, reported Grigore toBeck“...the Romanian that government Romanian incontroversial government. issue the downfall prewar the culminating of Unfortunately, seemingly uncomplicated journey the a Romaniathrough turnedinto Ambassador to Poland,French such toward amove to inquired attitude French aboutthe Minister, Polish Foreign Leon Nöel, who indicated Beck, Colonel its operations. intentJoseph a temporary the with of the refuge re-establishing thatas Romania hisneutral to move to wished government government Polish the Poland, of invasion the Following was prepared to assist. George V.Kacewicz, George and ofOrdeal years four Ally: Un-wearying and a Faithful been has “Poland Sosnkowski, Kazimierz General The British and American governments were indifferent to the internment of the Polish the of internment the to indifferent were governments American and British The faithful to the watchword of Kosciuszko and Pulaski: “For our Freedom and Yours... and Freedom our “For Pulaski: and of Kosciuszko watchword the to faithful obligations asanAlly United among the Nations.soldiers The have ofPoland remained during the pastfour of years Poland war has faithfully and fully discharged her task that are imposed on itwith the utmost soldierly devotion. All in all, Imay claim that countries conquered the to make among steady progress first in the face ofwas unbelievable difficulties Poland and it again carriesHere out the Poland. Occupied terrorized and numerically my The strongest under command army Underground isthe in army tormented fronts. war various on troops her of struggles subsequent the to or campaign Poland’s in part the war, however,has been by nomeans limited to the September Ġ a or any other point bordering on a neutral country; it asks only that the government the that only asks it country; neutral a on bordering point other any a or Great Britain, theSoviet Union and thePolish Government in Exile 1939-1945 94 93 , 29. 42 CEU eTD Collection on British soil can be The agreementbetween Britain of operatingGreat governmentthe and exiledgovernments the contrasted to the Anglo-American Agreement of July 27 military: British the assist to forces military Polish allow to Cabinet War in British the with Secretary by conjunction Foreign the memorandum issued aninternal in Polishthe exile,Britishgranting status government the to governmentprior legal to official Archives. 97 96 95 their official staffs through the Diplomatic Privileges and (Extension) governments Allied Act. sovereign the of members the to privileges and immunity diplomatic full 5 March On London. to moved government Polish the government, British the of invitation the At Poles. Therefore, General Londonflew to Sikorski to pledge Allied undyingsupporttothe cause. the for secure place longer a no was France 1940, summerof the surrendering. In to were close the Ambassador in Poland, were in favor of a change, both of regime and of personalities.” their government and the regime on which it wasbased. French diplomats, for example M. Nöel, from eye-witness descriptions. The refugees flockedwho into the country were bitterly critical of Raczy demise for MinisterFuture Foreign of Affairs Poland. of Republicthe of Edward Poland inExile Romaniareplace sawan which and opportunity held agovernmentto they for the responsible governmentmove to France. to Internally, Polish opposition some foundparties refuge in th Printed forthe War Cabinet, “Agreement with the Polish Government 1940,” CAB/67/8/2, Kacewicz, BritishNational 44. George V. Kacewicz, 32. , 1941, the Polish government in exile’s legal status was Polishin, 1941,the by exile’slegal government status defined ‘a parliamentary of grant Ĕ ski stated that, “the state of mind among the Poles in Romania was well known to me known to well was inRomania Poles the mind among of “thestate that, stated ski representatives of the Polish Government. Committee and has been negotiated agreed and by the departmentsrespective with the the PolishKingdom and the Polish Government inregard organizationto the and employmentof The draftannexed of the agreement between His Majesty’s Governmentin the United forces has been prepared and approved by the Polish Forces (Official) Although the Polish government in exile finally reached Paris the French French finallyreachedinAlthough exile at this Paris the point Polish the government 97 96 On August 2 th , 1942, which , 1942, nd , 1940, 95 43 CEU eTD Collection shouldnot assist Russia if Germany invade. decides Sikorski to following:the stated Stafford Cripps,Germany the British launched Ambassador Operation in Moscow,Barbarossa, that hethe saw invasion no real reasonof the Sovietwhy Poland Union. Sikorski told Sir purpose of Junepurpose Britishpleasing government. 22 the Therefore, the Poles could neither afford to anger London nor forsake Polish interests for the uniquehowever, not many was during this for smallershared period time powers asimilarfate. intentions. Sikorski’sthat mistrusting governmentnaturally Soviet Poland’s of situation, was obligations with a third state which could prejudice the interests of the other party.” 99 Company, 1948), 390. on August 31 and waswell deserved. Bukovina of Bessarabia annexation feltthat Soviets border with included Poland less Russia territory than heldduring times; tsarist the therefore new the that noting Eden, Anthony Secretary, Foreign British the to action Union’s Soviet the cession Bessarabia andof Bukovina.SovietAmbassador in Britain, Great Ivan Maisky explained June 26 Poland, to its prewar borders, after the war, now that Ambassadorthe Soviet to Great Britain, Union noted that ithas would beattacked more difficult than firstPoland. conceived to restore On 98 PolandRussialay to root the early of at our withrelations Soviets.” the Union.Soviet In his “the memoirsMinister Winston Churchill Prime attitude that, stated of courts. British the of jurisdiction the from immune and secured soil British on troops U.S. allowed Kacewicz, 79. Winston Churchill, The Anglo-Polish Agreementof 1939 didguarantee Polish not boundaries as they were The greatest difficulty between the British and Polish governments was the role of the th and 27 st , 1939, but it did however restrict the “contracting parties from entering into entering from parties “contracting the restrict however did it but 1939, , th , 1940, the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum , 1940,the SovietUnion issuedan Romania to ultimatum the whichdemanded The Second World War Vol. III: The Grand Alliance nd , 1941, changed the playing field Nazi as the playing , 1941,changed (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin 98 JosephKennedy, U.S. 99 It was clear It 44 CEU eTD Collection issued followingof the confederation: principles the Stro in spirithistory; this heritage andpast Czechoslovak-Polish thecommon stressed speech which Piotr S. Wandycz recalls Professor Stanislaw Stro Stanislaw Professor Wandycz recalls S. Piotr Minister of Economic Welfare Hugh Dalton and SirEdwardKennard attended. Polish historian Czechoslovak fully governments participated; on Britishthe sidefigures such prominent as placein London in the The first large Czechoslovak-Polish publicmeeting sponsored by twogovernmentsthe took stated: William Strang diplomat British to government-in-exile, Czechoslovak the to Ambassador British Nichols, Philip Sir letter a itif In necessary. felt agreement join they the to states other warandalsopermitted the 101 100 was a form of Favoring Closer Political and Economic Association of November 11 Declaration Polish-Czechoslovak in resulting the in Europe, Eastern a federation establish to necessary it felt in exile government Polish the Therefore, list. priority Britain’s on high not was boundaries within herprewar Polish state of the restoration that the was increasingly clear It Dated 29 Kacewicz, 86. Ĕ ski prophesized a great future for the two countries when united. In this respect, Beneš thisrespect, for countriesfuture two the when In united. ski prophesized agreat what they can to ally themselves with these circles and to harm our interest... are not sympathetic to Anglo-Sovietthe Treaty and we know that the Poles are doing all is can to make trouble for the Russians?...We know there are circles in England who necessary for the Czechoslovaks to bind themselves soclosely to a nation which isdoing extremely ofsuspicious the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation. Why, heenquired, isit In my conversation with AmbassadorSovietAlexandr Bogomolov,he had shownhimself basic attitudes towards Poland and the Poles, we also would not change our line of policy, line which our is the change policynot of would war against also we Russia, imposed Poles, the and on us by thePoland latter. towards attitudes basic the UnionSoviet would be possible. Aslong, however, as Russia did not change her sovereignty by withinrecognized her prewarfrontiers, Polish cooperation full between Poland and should that, and Germany, was Poland of enemy main and first the which A principle was adopted at the meetinglast of theCouncil of Ministers according to th July 1942,” FO 371/30828,British National Archives. pactum decontrahendo pactum Dom Polski, the Polish House on October 11, 1940. Both the and Polish 11,1940. Houseon Polish the October which committed both nations to closer association after Ĕ ski, a member of Polish Cabinet, deliver a deliver Cabinet, Polish member of ski, a th , 1940. The federation , 1940.The 101 100 45 CEU eTD Collection following: approved theapproved government’sin the December22 position in exile, aparliament as functioned which London, in Council National Polish The Russia. Communism onboth nations. Sikorski a completelyargued for independent union vis-à-vis a united Czechoslovak-Polishwas the front stop future way only Russianto toimposeattempts highly Sikorski that believed border. prewarCzechoslovak-Hungarian tothe had support offered Poles the frontier that theeastern for Benešfurther considering have support shouldthat offered Polishflexibleviewpoint problems,hisworried andthe Poles. The Polish government,believed, solution wasapreferable Poland all of limited Benešbelieved that inscope; ‘ethnographic’ The hesitantin Polish accepting Beneš’isgovernment was believing memorandum was that 103 102 Wandycz,42. S.Wandycz, peoples.’ other lands and the population of the orRepublic, toward other lands and their violence,was perpetrated toward the lands and the ofpopulation the Republic, or towards organization of Europe, Poland, cannot recognize any political factsthat are based on independent existence. an to Viewing the small, above and principle as constitutinggreat the foundation of alastingnations, of all rights for respect of basis unchangeable The National Council declares the that Republic of Poland conducts its foreign policy in 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940-43 parliament. d. An Economiceach to and Tradeapproval for Council. submitted be will decisions whose parliaments, both the General Staff ofeach respective countrywill remain. c.A joint Committee of be will approved and out governments.carried by both b.A common but General Staff, resolutions Its transport. and finance trade, foreign affairs, foreign delegates of composed Council, a. be: will Confederation of the of organs both common The states, including standardized. be speciallyArmaments andequipment will be identical andwar production will accordingly their Primerepresentatives will remain. Ministers,There will be a common foreign policy, but the ministers separate diplomatic forunion. commonwill be commerciala policy, atransport, customs and currency and Restriction of sovereigntywill chieflybe directed economicto measures. There government, army, etc. parliament, ofstate, head own its keeping country each confederation, of the The ofsovereignty Poland Czechoslovakiaand will notbe disturbed by the bond 103 102 nd , 1940 resolution which stated the stated which , 1940resolution , 40. 46 CEU eTD Collection Cordell Hull, based its attitude towards Sovietsitsthe Cordell towards Hull, attitude based followingthe on assumptions: Secretary according of State to Russia, States, United the of invasion German Prior tothe between Philip Nichols andWilliam the followingStrang was reported: letter confidential another In verve. and color lose to began confederation Czechoslovak-Polish reorganization postwar planned views on theirtherefore, the East-Central of Europe; Czechoslovak-Polish relations. Both Britain and the United States praised the Soviet ideas on confederation. Roosevelt foundation ‘layingcommended Sikorski for Beneš on the aPolish-Czechoslovak with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, FDR, regional organization of East-Central Europe. and United tothe with Americans.U.S. went Sikorski discussed States OnMarch 1941,General and British the on impression approbatory an making was cooperation their that added and 105 104 Stro visible. Professor became increasingly friendship Czechoslovak-Polish as1941,the asearly In spite undeniable differences, of the Nichols to Strang, 19 September 1942,” FO 371/30828, The National Archives, Kew. Wandycz,49. sacrifice principlesin order to better relations; finally, theRooseveltAdministration maneuvering obtain to unilateral concessions; nor American should the government from her with reserve America until wassatisfied that theRussians were not the United States should make no special approaches to Russia, and treat any approaches however,remained in favor ofthe Czech-Polish Confederation. was up to them explainto matters to the Poles, the British, and the Americans. The Poles, government...Beneš pointed out that if thiswas indeed the attitude of his government it was notin favor of the Confederation, buthespoke of ‘Sovietcircles’ andnot the Soviet invited Bogomolov to luncheon and himsounded out. As aresult Bogomolov said he that Russians were notof infavor Polish-Czechoslovakthe Confederation.Beneš accordingly till half past six. At that time the Czechs had already received indications that the with Benešwe alone, lunch had and aconversation to which lasted without abreak from one o’clock country the to down Iwent Yesterday useful. be would could I subject this on get information further any that me told subsequently you and it, of suspicions Soviet You me wrote to onthe 27 changed ultimately Germany against war the into Union Soviet the of entry The 104 th of August aboutthe Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and Ĕ ski ski between stressed amity the nations both growing 105 47 CEU eTD Collection 107 106 concern for Poland.” little “had genuine of Roosevelt theimportance anation. shapea tendency to andre-shape global balance atthe cost of dividing into Europe spherespower of great influence. attain to endeavor leadersof complicated the as part U.S. of agenda the again yet on appeared territorial rebirthdefinition of fourteen hadpoints aglobal includedagenda which ‘self-determination’ for and the consequent of Poland.such a state.questionsin bylarger powers.Back thefinal Wilson’s world posed WWI,Woodrow days of However, By the middlepolicy. The PolishAmerican appearedin Question the only arena political asasubsidiary to the offamous the foreign inAmerican largeloomed had Poland never Union. Sovietto the Yet, of Europe Eastern second 13 war, priorities lay elsewhere,the the emerging superpower was still unwilling to simply allow the cession Polish Questionthis, initself, itsmanifestedis through strangleholdAlthough on Poland. the United States’ dictate neighbors and its futurerolethe yearnedSoviet of Soviets surrounding to Union. The 2.2: “HereComes Uncle Sam:”U.S. entrance intoWWII strain future relations. during war.As the such, U.S.wasunwilling the tosupportany federationsor group which might U.S.-Soviet relations were yet to be defined as it was still unclear the role the Soviets would play Piotr Wandycz, Piotr Wandycz,56. important, if not more so, to Russia than to the United States. United the to than Russia to so, more not if important, should let Russia understand that theUnited States considered improved relations as It is impossible ignoreto Poland’s historical role in Eastern Europe. However, history has for the concern agrave thewar,was of the end following Europe, of Eastern The fate The United States and Poland 107 His attention to Poland increased together with the recognition that (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1980), 252. th point contained no provisions regarding the regarding provisions no contained point 106 48 CEU eTD Collection 112 111 1942,June p. 6. 110 Studies 109 (1946), 36. 108 parishioners, served of out in5,000, uniform before war.Accordingthe historian to Mieczys example be can seenthroughthe parishHoly Trinity in where New York Utica, over2,000 community; hadbeenthere a large baby boom in many in parishes 1910s the and the 1920s. An Polish-American for the War moment was a nations.World key for II demographic smaller leaving little room therefore, would powers’ domination, Europe be basedon great the postwar over other Slavs inAmerica… Slavs other over influence have Polishindustries. considerable These and workers workingwar inessential are “…some three million Polescomposed a majority of the arework force in many plants. In 1944, accordingconcentrated towriter Eric Estovik, in keyas war citiescoal - Chicago,mining, Buffalo,York Times New steel,York mixed parentage. foreign of or native born electricalPolesestimated that comprised 8.4%of 34.5 the million Americans ‘whowereforeign born or equipment, aircrews. and sailors, soldiers, autos andmade 4% Haiman,WWII,but of Poles madeits of U.S.population up8.5% upabout the during rubber, Poles and their fellow Slavs communities resided were controlled primarily by residedwerecontrolled primarily communities Irish.the wherelargeDemocratic Party and industrial inthese the states unions Polish Department.government, particularly,Whitein HouseandState The Catholic the Church,the in the represented views their have to them for difficult it made which policy-making, to Peter H. Irons, “‘The Test is Poland’: the Polish Americans and the Origins of the Cold War,” 9. Eric Estovik, “Polish American Politics,” “SLAVS HERE PLEDGE AID; American Group Sends Patriotic Address to Roosevelt,” Peter H. Irons, “‘The Test is Poland’: the Polish Americans and the Origins of the Cold War,” Mieczys 30, no.2 (Autumn,1973), 7. á aw Haiman, “The Polish American Contribution to World War II,” in 1942,“represented 50% of nation’sthe industrial workers…” 108 111 Roosevelt,couldignore however, not 1940census,the which Unfortunately,links largePolish the lacked communities direct The Nation 109 , 20May 6.1944, The Slav community, as indicated by The indicated Slav community, as 112 Polish American Studies 110 New Times, York Inindustries such Polish American 3, no.1-2 The New 22 á aw 49 CEU eTD Collection community community emphasizedin on ethnic life United States. the to the homelandKosciuszko forming likethe Foundationin of the the 1925,however, maintaining ties at attempts some there were Although community. the of section born American and younger the within identification ethnic of preservation as such affairs internal on attention intoWWI, President Wilson approved the creation of a Polish Army in the United States. National Department, a cohesive Polish-American1917, the into political community lobby,Polish the organized was with associated Powers victory By of the Western developedthe Polish independence. attitude This newly war. the towards orientation apro-Entente adopted guidance, Paderewski’s mobilizing awell organized political lobby. from support PolishPaderewski the community.ways, tobe Inmany proved a persuasivein rally into order States United the traveled to Paderewski InMarch1915, States. in United the butespecially Europe, inWestern branches future neededfilial thatVevey’s Sienkiewicz knew beforeinternational opinion public hopingfor sympathy. By Paderewski 1915, both and wide relief and elicitsupport for Poland;in addition, the committee re-posed the Polish Question 113 Committee. Vevey the as known commonly the established Henryk Sienkiewicz Polish-American community WWI.during Paderewski and NobelPrize winningjournalist (New York: Columbia University Press,1991), 74. 116 115 114 Association Vol.43, M.B. Biskupski, “Paderewski asLeader of American Polonia, 1914-1918,” Donald E. Pienkos, Wydzia M.B. Biskupski, “Paderewski asLeader of American Polonia, 1914-1918 By the time of the interwar period, the Polish-American community began to focus their focus to began community Polish-American the period, interwar the of time the By By 1914, Ignacy Paderewski was the most significant political figure who represented the á Narodowy Polski-WN no.1 (Spring, 1986): 37. For Your Freedom Through Ours: Polish-American Efforts on Poland’s Behalf 1863-1991 115 under Paderewski’s leadership. Immediately following U.S. entrance following U.S. under Immediately leadership. Paderewski’s Comité generaldes victims delaguerre enPologne 113 The committee’s purpose was to provide world - 114 The Polish-American community, through community, Polish-American The 116 Polish American Historical Unlike the Irish, the Polish- 50 , CEU eTD Collection 118 117 struggle with Soviets.the However, during the ceremony Louis Marshall, constitutional lawyer Civic Forum at the Hoteldetermination.” Astor, in which, hepushed its boundaries inbalanteastward violation of principlethe national of praisedself- the U.S. for racial minoritiespersecuted and astheWarsaw wartime,during government the wasdissipated its aid tomarked so Poland sentiment, “Pro-Polish that, stating by Poland to inrelation during policy foreign American its who wished to community distance Polish-American the on affect adverse an had clearly time the at themselvesPoland in killings from Poland. AmericanThe Jewish lobby was extremely influential in policy-making during this Themassperiod. historian Selig Alder characterized measure of following taken: course the deemed delegation Jewish The in Poland. Jews the of mistreatment the discuss to Grotowski Stephen General Consul Polish and Lubomirski Prince with met others and Hartman Gustave JudgeJulian with along Wise Rabbi population. the Jewish bythePoles on atrocities committed the Wilson Presidentabout to complained Europe, ofin Eastern Jews theStatus of Committee anti-Semitism perpetratednewspapersbeganin publishfocused American Polishon articles which Sovietwar to 1920, by the of the height the during Also, Poles ‘American.’ becoming with primarily dealt overseas. community American Rabbi Stephen Wise, acting on behalf of the Piotr Wandycz, Piotr “Envoy Pledges Aid to Jews in Poland,” Poland freedom from political or economic discrimination. Treaty, and especially such as guarantee the racial, religious and linguistic minorities of To take such measures asshall benecessary to enforce several provisionsof theMinority newspapers other and publicationsthatmy orincite tento provoke uponattacks the Jews. the prohibit display or dissemination of allposters, signs andplacards and of Poland…[To] the circulation of all inhabitants Jewish the of property the with interference To issue immediate orders Polish Army the to forbidding attacks uponthe personsor 118 The United States and Poland On On March 10 th , 1921, an honorary honorary , 1921,an washeldfordinner Paderewskiby the New York Times , 168. , 12 November 1920, p. 25. p. 1920, November 12 , 117 51 CEU eTD Collection 120 119 scarcity of theirPole representation. No held policy-makingany positions in White House or the 1948. was latertwice, who in Federal once to the in again Board reappointed 1936 and Reserve as inmatter governmental positions; of a M.S.Szymczakappeasement Roosevelt1933 appointed Polish complained Numerous leaders absence community the about represented. Polesof inhigh they asthecommunity future for Poland’s passion same lackedthe their representatives Poland. non-Polish from institutions. ThePolish onspokesmen community relied Asaresult, Germany. and Poland between a failure economic the into loan competition American eventual developed dueto actually the Poland; with business do to wished community financial States United the not or whether unclear In was war. the after by Europe endured devastation economic the stabilize to wished rapidly The began States indecline. United situation Polishto the However economic 1923, overseas. problems U.S. society the outweighed to assimilated becoming as seemed farremoved issues these Polish-Americans For the Poland. anti-Semitism with who associated lobbyist Clearly, based on Paderewski’s remarks, the Poles hoped to change the opinion of the Jewish Paderewski issued following the response: ininquiredresponse, leader, Jewish the In Poland. persecution about andJewish community “Paderewski Hailed as Poland’s Savior,” http://www.federalreserve.gov/BIOS/boardmembership.htm 120 It was not until WWII that the Polish-American community shifted its attention back to back attention its shifted community Polish-American the that WWII until not was It prosperity. Poland todowhateverwithin lies their power contribute to to its happiness and afforded be may to them to co-operate with that their brethren in the free and independent Republic of opportunity any welcome will gratitude of out but equality, of principles American citizens willnotbecome only have rejoice at the who adoption thenew-Polandby of Poland the in born those that confident Iam and law, the before equality Our country affords thenoblest example of theblessings that result from absolute While this appointmentpleased the Polish community,italso reminded them the of 119 New York Times , 10 March 1921, p.13. accessed 23May,2009. 52 CEU eTD Collection 123 122 121 country the “enlist and to sympathy the Americans”all Poland, for of while“showing the Roosevelt asked newly elected Polish ambassador tothe U.S., Jan Ciechanowski,speak to across pledgein Poles support. and were Chicago5,000 willing ready absolute to meetinga at Rooseveltthat to wrote Biddle community. Polish the appealing to prior to 15 states toPoland 1940, American from ambassador spoke on Roosevelt’s behalfincities and 1937 to 45 the been had who Jr., Biddle Anthony war. to go to willingness and Depression the end to ran businessman Republican Wendellagainst Willkie, whohighly Roosevelt’s failure criticized in the 1940presidential election solidifywhich would Roosevelt’s third in term Roosevelt office. largeWoodrow Wilson’s wasimportant influence. demography largely This Democratic due to the U.S. had aligned themselves with the Democratic Party since the end of World War I; thishim massivethe by in of support givento Polish-American community. Poles is amount The the awareof clearly was Roosevelt were cordial. Roosevelt and Sikorski between warrelations the entering U.S. the to Prior Poland. independent future in and States United the both in unshaken defense of claims,” bymanyPolish of Pi Pi Marshall to opposition Sikorski’s from Sikorski isbecause important the it throughout consistent remained war. Their stemmed distrust conservativetheiradmiration adamant for Marshall Pi elements in Polish descent. Polish wereof of Representatives politics remainedDuring Rooseveltand Truman’s presidency onlyabloctwelve of ten to membersof House the known war. until the after way Senate Poles no inthe were in there Department; addition State the as ‘Pi Peter H. Irons, 11. Ibid, 10. Peter H. Irons, “‘The Test is Poland’: the Polish Americans and the Origins of the Cold War,” 10. The Polish-American community never fully trusted Sikorski and this was emblematic in emblematic was this and Sikorski trusted fully never community Polish-American The á sudski’s supporters. sudski’s á 121 sudski and was considered “insufficiently obdurate in obdurate “insufficiently considered was and sudski á sudski. Although sudski.Pi 122 Pi á sudski sudski in1935,thedied most á sudski’s heroic status sudski’swas left heroic status á sudskiites.’ This distrust in 123 InMarch 1941, 53 CEU eTD Collection between 1939and 1948the RPA ingathered $11,434,958 financial donations. 23 continuously bombarded Roosevelt’s desk with appeals on behalf Poland.of had toobtainlarge ofdonations enoughsupport form amounts and which to organizations community Polish-American the However, community. Polish-American the by dictated never was policy foreign American frontiers. prewar its with Poland independent an guarantee not both Roosevelt’s campaign and tothe Polish national cause. However, such public assistance did to assistance invaluable provided which organization a Polish-American of example one only John Olejniczak reported that in the and two a halfyear periodfrom November 1 duties.” their of were conscious who citizens good very were elections…they three last in the overwhelming so me for voted they because merely “not was it that stated he therefore policy, foreign interventionist an of supporters active 127 86. 126 125 124 assistance endedwas eventually Alliedinvasion by inthe of Normandy June1944. such inGermany; monthPolish packages food POWs per to Department, sent12,000 State Polonii Amerykanskiej time. atthe enacted being with policies tostay in consistent later order bere-introduced will however, topic, This Roosevelt. for support communities’ Polish-American in the test ultimate the prevent.” urgency of upproduction speeding materialof war communistswhich our aretrying to E. Pienkos, Donald E. Pienkos, Ibid, 12. 12. Irons, rd , 1943, the RPA had accumulated $1,433,703 from from had RPA $1,433,703in , 1943,the accumulated ethnicthe community; Polish total, By 1941, Polish-American such organizations Polish the Americanas Council, or 124 Roosevelt realized that the Polish-Americans were likely to be among the mostbelikely among the were to Polish-Americans the that realized Roosevelt For Your Freedom Through Ours: Polish-American Efforts on Poland’s Behalf 1863-1991 For Your Freedom Through Ours: Polish-American Efforts on Poland’s Behalf 1863-1991 (RPA) had already, through the assistance of both the Red Cross and the and Cross Red the both of assistance the through already, had (RPA) 125 However, the 1944 election would prove to be 127 st , 1939 to April , 1939to 126 The RPA is RPA The Treasurer , 87. Rada 54 , CEU eTD Collection 1941 in interest genuine Poland. American towards its allies,to andmillion the $12.5 for underground grantdollar activities as a promising step fuel,ship food, medical andservices supplies, to allowed States military equipment, the United Poland. Again the Polishsaw government inclusion the Polandof in the 1941Lend-Lease, which of future the on Union Soviet the with agreement mutual eventual U.S.’s the of context the itis democracy. thisPolandpragmatic reasonable maysound, However andprotect not in clearly assist to desire much inAmerica’s believed how Poles the indicate remarks Ciechanowski’s 128 Ambassador, Jan Ciechanowski remarked, on March 6 representations than Britishthe accepting government.Upon his appointment as Polish itsmore amenable were Roosevelt’s impression to underthe policies that operated support the Polishhowever, cause.This,never would The come true. Polishin government exile community. large Polish-American due tothe administration and evadethe Polish problem,in Anthony which, “terrified” words, Eden’s theAmerican controversies avoidwished Soviet-British to which to Roosevelt extent the never grasped exile, in government Polish The idealism. American with Realpolitik Churchillian ruthless the contrast national self-determination, his conduct was always misleading to the Poles; many were prone to of principle Wilsonian the to adhered Roosevelt Although Americans. the by consideration into S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Meyers ed., (Boston: World Peace Foundation,1941), 441. American people, of explaining its policies to the Government of this great democracy. my country in the Unites States, of interpreting its deep traditional friendship for the great mission entrusted to me, itis because I have had once the privilege of representing …[If] at this time of our history, unworthy though I feel, I have accepted to undertake the The Poles, however, would never be seen as a formal ally that had to be taken seriously be taken to had that ally formal a as seen be never would however, Poles, The The Poles were led to believe that Roosevelt would use his influence with the Soviets to Soviets the with usehisinfluence would Roosevelt believe that led to were The Poles Documents on American Foreign Relations Vol. IIIJuly1940-June th , 1941: 128 55 CEU eTD Collection the anti-Soviet campaign initiated by American Poles and supported by other Eastern by European Eastern andsupported other byAmerican initiated campaign Poles anti-Soviet the America… in elements Catholic and isolationist among inAmericanSoviets the need opinion…especially public for feeling countering anti-Soviet Ciechanowski favorable“wouldpopularize that Polish-Sovietrelations helpto considerably the told State, of Wells, undersecretary Sumner claim. border Polish the to recognize government American the forcing of intent the with campaign anti-Soviet strong a launched U.S. the Americanfor thePolish support claims Union. Sovietthe against official on effects damaging its of because community Polish-American the for ramifications cabinet, including Foreign Minister August Zaleski. Thesplitin the Polish hadlargecabinet territorialYalta. Theagreementsigned Poles onJuly bytheSovietsand the 30 problemintentions be Teheran and atobligate himself. only revealed would not to was true His careful leading to‘uphold’in to integrity. order Although Poland’s territorial Roosevelt werethese slogans used, the resignationCommunism.At samethe time, principles Rooseveltused the as Atlanticthe of Charter slogans of for the theworldwide spreadof highlighted American concern American the public. The Charter three right-winged members of the Polish 130 129 image of the Soviet Union did notfundamentally change. suggested to SovietUnionthe its loosen to banonreligion, would which but eventually occur the American the government opposition, appease thewidespread To forbecame challenging. aid Union as a totalitarian regime whichhadno intention liberatingof therefore, any Europe, support sawtheSoviet TheAmerican population Soviets. the to aid necessary toprovide public support Jan Ciechanowski, 13. Irons, By however, point, andthis Roosevelthis administration rallywas trying to enough The Atlantic Charter, issued on August issued 14 on The Atlantic Charter, Defeat inVictory (Garden City,New York: Doubleday & Company,1947), 30-32. th , 1941, served as a method of reassurance formethod of asa reassurance , 1941,served 130 The Roosevelt administration feared administration TheRoosevelt 129 The anti-Sikorski’s Poles in Poles anti-Sikorski’s The th , 1941 had sidestepped the , 1941hadsidestepped 56 CEU eTD Collection Nationalism in Unitedthe Stated during World WarII,” 8. 133 Nationalism in Unitedthe Stated during World WarII,” 132 131 Departmentissuedin bytheState 1941: people,foreign easily The followingto were 35,000,000 politicians. susceptible decreewas ofsome one-quarter composed which communities, these feared Department that State mirage. wasmerely a The however thisconfidence immigrants in the loyalty confidencesuch of in diplomatic 1943. of relations rupture the Polish-Soviet both activities wareffort, the in with opinions and thePolishregards to exile, government and every memorandaalmostPolish-American analyses,aspect of on and 1600reports, collected Branch Nationalities Foreign Services Strategic of Office The disputes. and unrest internal inter-ethnic with and morale war-time to be detrimental might which factors destructive any with Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and the Office of the Censor. Departments,from the the OfficeOffice Strategic of War Services, Information, the Department Adolph Berle. Secretary of State leadership ofAssistant weeksunderthe met every two theof Justice Officecommittee movements; the anti-Soviet these of goal counteracting the (ICFNP)with Problems and theof FBI,Civil the War Nationality Foreign on Defense,Committee Interdepartmental and the established Welles In response, groups. Navy the office of the Robert Szymczak, “Uneasy Observers: The OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch and Perceptions ofPolish Perceptions and Branch Nationalities Foreign OSS The Observers: “Uneasy Szymczak, Robert ofPolish Perceptions and Branch Nationalities Foreign OSS The Observers: “Uneasy Szymczak, Robert 14. Irons, United States. representing such movementswhich on carry activitiescontrary to the governmentof the general governmentthe of United the States doesnot favor movements” “free or groups United the States of concern first The prospect. in or existence in must government, foreign any and always be theto divide the allegiance of group ofany American residents between the United States unity of The governmentits of theUnited Statesnot does lookwith favor on any activities designed country, based on the American way of life…In individuals also but Department State the of members only not including ICFNP The 133 Polish American Studies 56 132 Publicly, U.S.expressed the its 131 , (Spring,no. 1 1999):7. All these agencies dealt 57 CEU eTD Collection which they are willing to swear.” to are willing which they is theBible by AtlanticCharter the is concerned far in asRoosevelt faith Roosevelt…so religious Roosevelt andMizwa, directorall hisof the KosciuszkoforeignRegardless Foundation, of andthe that variousdomestic “they are types all, I canof Polish-Americansliterallypolicies…The say, 100% for it was Polish-Americansclear, as indicated by Stephen P.have a sort of rivalries.” hamperedpolitical by and lot, fractious personal, organizational, as,“a Polish-Americans government London Polish the of legitimacy the indefend to itself the preparing was community facePolish-American of the Soviet Union.prewar boundaries. Inthespring of FNB warned1943, the the Rooseveltadministration the that The FNB reportsingovernment exile, andhopetoseethe independentreconstruction of an Poland within its had a tendency to refer to the 137 136 135 134 congressmen. nine cultural organizations, newspapers,daily dozensof publications,other and nine Polish-American by million1943 consistedof nearly five people with fraternal over 10,000 and future of The continued. the over Poland international debate community as theacrimonious Polish-American the watched closely FNB, Branch, Nationalities Foreign As aresult the “The Polish-Americans, Their Sympathies and Antipathies,” August 25, 1942, OSS-FNB RG 226. “General Survey of Political Groups Among Polish-Americans,” April 18, 1942, Szymczak, OSS-FNB 16. RG 226. Robert Szymczak, 12. American soil to continue its old way oflife. way old its continue to soil American the same polemic violence. would One say that Poland aLittle has itself formed on years, here reappears withalmost unchanged, struggles same the between personalities, Pi progressives andsocialists.Also, thefundamental division between thepro- and anti- Christians, democratic nationalists, Polish America in find We Poland. in were they strugglesbetween their several orientations are; alsoalive perhapsand more violent than without change, toAmerican soil. The same parties, the same ideologies, remain; and the At firstglance,one receivesthe impression that Polish political life has beentransferred, á 135 sudskiites, which has been a characteristic feature of Polish political life for thirty for life political ofPolish feature characteristic a been has which sudskiites, In one such report the following the Inonesuch wasstated: report 134 The FNB reported majority TheFNBreported the that thePolishof supported Polish-Americans 137 The Polish-American community also had faith in Churchill in faith had also community Polish-American The 136 58 CEU eTD Collection are revealed to the global community and to the Polish-American communities during these during communities Polish-American the to and community global the to revealed are the United States would defend and fightfor Poland’s wishes. Roosevelt’s diplomatic policies not in or whether test true are the Conference Yalta and Teheran policies. The U.S. than stated inproximitybe thePolish more governmenthis carefully to exile, therefore, to aims tended Union on behalf of the Soviet the with Polish relations damaging risk to willing cause. not were Americans, the like Churchill British, the was placed inHowever, a known. fully difficultnot is policy-making British over influence positionin exile’s government Polish because of his the of extent The Poland. for guarantee its honor to in 1939 war the entered formally had Britain indeal with since exile especially inLondon,andthatGreat Polishthe government situated was mechanics between the US and the Sovietin diplomatic the wrench wasapoignant Question ThePolish relations. establish closer Union. The British, similarly, had the same issues to in order to maintain good relations with the Soviets. sentiments anti-Soviet any contain to wanted administration Roosevelt’s publicly. opinions their of the Soviet Union’s intentionswould in bereturned protection U.S. The the Polish-Americanof Poland. wasfearful community however, they werewas so heavily involved hoped in they man-power, provide theirthat military service and loyalty careful during this timein where thePolish military. were community of American 99out Since 300 parishioners the period to convey 138 women. and Polish Americans,for example,made up its28.3% of population but48.9% of all its serviceman 40% of all werein by parishioners uniform In spring 1944. Dudley andWebster, Massachusetts, over in parishes, for Polish example, some WWII; during military in U.S. the served Americans Polish million one Over Roosevelt. with as policies his on swear to unwilling were they but Mieczys The greater the role of the Soviet Union became the more the United States wishedto States United more the the became Union theSoviet of role the The greater á aw Haiman, “The Polish American Contribution to World War II,” 37. 138 Another example can be seen at St. Stanis atSt. beseen example can Another á aw Kostka in Hudson, New York, in New Kostka Hudson, aw 59 CEU eTD Collection relations; in a telegram to Stalin, Roosevelt stated that “Churchill would make the PolesThe act with Rooseveltissueinternals curb changes and anti-Sovietcampaignsthe to of organizationsPolish abroad. administration the to Sikorski border.government Roosevelt Biddle wanted and question of Soviet-Polish the the over dispute further the to for theSoviets pretext necessary became the massacre The Katyn wanted London rupture. veered towards relations hadalready Prior Polish-Soviet totheseaccusations, outrage. to deal massacreasaSoviet in Katyn thebypropagandizing collaborating the with Nazis government with the horrid crime. of this astheculprits Soviets the restoration inSikorski; addition,April on 13 of Polish-Soviet 139 Pawe Stefan Army Home the of commander the complications in the diplomatic relations with the Soviets, darkside the illuminated of politics. second, the it arrestPolish-Americans For Poland. in by play would Union the Soviet the role future Gestapo the highlighting of in monumental were conferences these Both Charter. Atlantic of the principles the of a violation Polish-Americans. Yalta, in particular for Polish-Americans, constituted a betrayal of Poland and 2.3 TheU.S.Attitude toSoviet Demands in Teheran andYalta: independent Poland with its prewar frontiers. betrayal ofconferences, especially Yalta. theToo many Polish-Americans these conferences symbolize the United States in safe-guarding their promise to advocate and strive for an Wandycz,265. The Poles had endured three enormous blows by the spring of 1943: first, increased had The blows enormous by first, enduredthree Poles of 1943: spring the many of minds the in conferences distinctive extremely two became Yalta and Teheran th , the Nazis discovered the mass graves at Katyn and identified and Katyn at graves mass the discovered Nazis the , 139 In response, the Soviets accused Soviets the Sikorski the Inresponse, á Rowecki, and third, the death of General of death the third, and Rowecki, 60 CEU eTD Collection 3:20 pm by ChesterBohlen: translator and wasrecorded Roosevelt’s at place Soviet subject.meeting the followingEmbassy the The quarters took atRoosevelt’s at viewsexpress his on to himself with inorder Stalin closeted Roosevelt actually the precession, obtain. could they best the probably as them to it offer would solution, ingovernment exile and“without Soviettelling the them that Governmentwould acceptsuch a Polish theissuewith the hewould discuss be formula devised” “if could somereasonable that discussion becausePoland Churchill of of upcomingthe elections. agreed with asserting Stalin insistedduring his Poland.silent with remained Secretary the 1939frontier Roosevelt Eden, on up tothe Oder Line. Stalin, he had inhis as done 1941meeting Foreign December with to Stalin at Teheran. Churchill wished toreconfirm the Soviet support for an extension of Poland to discuss among the three leaders. However, it was Churchill whoinsisted on raising the subject invasion France,of and second, the Polish Question. The Polish Question was still a difficult one Europe. Two major questions were resolved at Teheran: first, Operation Overlord, the Allied December 2 December from 27 November held was conference, community. The exile and thePolish-American foreign nationality group in the United States.” actions ofthe largestpolitically-active “influence the and newspapers portray community’s juncture,” critical this at policy foreign American on forces playing “forinterpreting powerful the thepurpose of America, and domestic estimating 143 142 141 140 more common sense.” Correspondence Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley and Manfred Jonas ed., Jonas Manfred and Langley D. Harold Loewenheim, L. Francis Ibid, 32. Szymczak, 32 Wandycz,265. Roosevelt left for Teheran with no established guarantees to the Polish government in thenofor Polish governmentestablished withRoosevelt Teheran to left guarantees nd (New York: E.P. Dutton &Co., INC, 1975), 396. , 1943, a covered an array of issues which had a profound effect on postwar effect on whichhada profound issues a coveredanarray of , 1943, 140 In a 1943survey by conducted FNB the Polishthe of language press in 142 141 concluded that the Polish American Polish the that concluded Roosevelt and Church: Their Secret Wartime 143 Although silentduring th to 61 CEU eTD Collection with the Polish government in exile, bitterly criticized Roosevelt’s failures at Yalta to ensure the ensure to Yalta at failures Roosevelt’s criticized bitterly in exile, government Polish the with conjunction in community, Polish-American The reorganization. postwar Europe’s discuss to to thedecisions finalized The atYalta. conference wasconvened from February 4 iniquity of the decisions. perceived of the because community bythePolish-American outcry of board spring serve asthe would Conference Yalta the However, conference. the during secrecy Roosevelt’s of because protectorate. The asa stood frontier western newextended and Poland’s for that the best were changes unfavorable decisions at Teheran were not felt entirely in the United States resolutions concluded at Teheran. Churchill toconvince Teheran.Miko resolutionstried concludedat Churchill 145 144 Stanis Premier of leadership the under now in exile, government Polish for of Union.in the inform task eyes,unfortunate Stalin’s hadthe Soviet Churchill having the to asavictory, Conference Teheran the remark on would IsaacDeutscher suchas historians British east. in the lost territory for west in the be compensated would Poland that in exile: government whichmadeTeheran.imposed at onthe Polish BigThreehaddecidedonacourse The be would decisionsthe in to community response Polish-American by feared publicoutcry the Roosevelt “FDR Betrayed all at Yalta, Park. PolesCollege Charge,” Archives, National The 594, p. Conference FRUS Tehran 1943,” December 1 Stalin, to Roosevelt “FDR Betrayed all at Yalta, Poles Charge,” Poles Yalta, at all “FDR Betrayed the present time. winter on this subject, and that he could not publicly take part in any such arrangement at reasons outlined he above, could notpolitical participate in for any decision here in Tehran that evenor next understand would Marshal the that however, hoped, He Oder. the Eastern border moved further westand the Western border moved even to the River of views the Marshal with Stalin agreed he as to the necessity of personally the restoration said He ofa Polish vote. state their but would like lose to to see wish not did he man, United States from million to six Americansseven ofPolish extraction, and as apractical again,if warthe was in still progress,he might run have to He to. added therewere that wish in the not did he personally while that and 1944 in election an had we that said discuss amatter briefly and frankly. He said it referred to internal American politics. He The President said he had asked Marshal Stalin to come to see him as he wished to 144 Chicago Daily Tribune 145 is an indication of the immediate reaction immediate the of indication is an , 5 March 1945, p. 5. á ajczyk that these boundary these ajczyk that á aw Miko aw th á ajczyk, of the of ajczyk, to 11 th , 1945 62 CEU eTD Collection free elections in Poland. in elections free of non-communists in the pro-Soviet Lublin regime. This was done in response to Stalin’s unwillingness to allow 149 148 147 Studies 146 much dearer.” is is Poland United national between very the butinternational politics. them dear to States and difference the clearly quite heredistinguished voters majority Polish of “a great that Vanderberg Arthur Senator to explained Januszewski Frank Congress American Polish the of presidents 90% of the Polish-American provedtobebaseless; more than vote Polish-American the about andthefears 1944 elections abroad.” Poles from and communityitself Poland from leaders democratic voted of inclusion the for Roosevelt. Republican with democratic basis “be on a broader of reorganized Poland, would as the‘true’ government and one of theby Soviets the installedrecognized now and inWarsaw Poles, so-called Lublin the decided that vice BigThree the CurzonLine, the also itmadeTeheran addition Yalta.to during In public was boundary the between the Poland and Union; Soviet made had beenalthough decision this at 1939 Polish boundaries in TheAllied east. the leaders verified thethat CurzonLine would be ensued. The Polish American ensued. ThePolish American Congress boundary boundary madedecision by Roosevelt. Some Republicans felt Roosevelthad that his abused Poland. criticizedin dominance Republican Party over The postwar States the United the Although notimmediately evident, the Yalta Conference would serve asa pivotal pointin Soviet Europe. andinfluence inoverEastern SovietUnion the between of States United the power commission America.” and soul of heart hurtthe and deeply frustrated, squandered, miscalculated, have missed, herway America we again that haslost claiming that Consisted of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. The commissionwas established inorder to Richardassist C. Lukas, “The Polishin the American placement Congress and the PolishQuestion, 1944-1947,” 44. Ibid, 43. Richard C. Lukas, “The Polish American Congress and the Question,Polish 1944-1947,” 38, 2 no. (Autumn, 1981): 43. 149 147 , formed to superviseensure, formed would not to in an affairs Eastern equal status Europe, However, following Yalta, sharp criticism from the Polish American Congress American Polish the from criticism sharp Yalta, following However, Bulletin declared that “we want to be on record in 148 It was clear that the tripartite Polish American 146 Ironically, the 63 CEU eTD Collection 152 no. 2(Autumn, 1994), 12. Midwestern Polish American Community during the 1946 Congressional Elections,” 151 the the Conference, 1945-1960,” 150 letters petitions andtotheWhite demanding repudiation House of existing agreements. numerous sent in particular Congress American by Polish Union. The Soviet the dictated be to future Poland’s allow not to government the with pleaded and vented citizens as nation sweptthe newspapers, the through asmanifested outcry, The waveof inPolish-America 1946. In addition Dewey’s to hetelegram, alsooffered support toBor-Komorowski’s nationwide tour that: stated Associations Polish American of Committee Coordinating May in 1945, Taft frontspoke of while 3,000 Poles inNewYork Dewey in the atelegram to leanings. his authority executive with pro-Soviet cause as a mean gainingof hopeful support for their presidential aspirations. Ohio and Governor Thomas administration’sDewey of New York sought decisions tospokesmen, Arthur Vandenbergchallenge Senator Michigan,was to unwilling the Roosevelt capitalize on theon the new Polish-American policies theprimary Republican Yalta. though one of Even of politics quickly tothe responded in Eastern Europe, would voters very prove inelections. TheRepublican Party congressional useful upcoming both Senator Roberttraditional habit of the PolishTaft community to vote for the thebreak Democratic to oforder in Party; such Administration a large body Roosevelt the of with disaffection Polish-American the “Firmness on Soviet Demanded by Taft,” Robert D. Ubriaco Jr., “Bread and Butter Politics or Foreign Policy Concerns? Class versus Ethnicity in the Athan Theoharis, “The Republican Party and Yalta: Partisan Exploitation of the Polish American Concern over Concern American Polish of the Exploitation Partisan Yalta: and Party Republican “The Theoharis, Athan Polish nation, which was the first to bear the full weight of our enemy’s attack and whose and sacrifices andloyalty to attack the common cause have inspired enemy’s us all, be our now of destroyed. weight full the bear to first the was which nation, Polish gallant and brave the should history modern in unsurpassed tragedy ironic an be would It Polish American Studies New York Times 28, (Spring,no.1 1971), 7. 150 , 21May 1946, p. 6. Eventually, the Republican Party Eventually, Republican Party the would use Polish American Studies 151 For example, in example, For 152 51, 64 CEU eTD Collection alongside others such as Abraham Lincoln and George Washington. presidents American the greatest oneof as be remembered would Roosevelt Regardless, his medical condition was notfully to exposed publicthe during his declining months. leadingmassiveoffice, to grieving across nationandthe death the world. His forwas shocking be during resolved lifetime. April Roosevelt’s On 12 Poland. The issue of Poland, which would during resurface the Potsdam Conference, would not have in observers election refused to and Molotov legitimacy Lublingovernment the of absolute Yalta.” at hemade promises the every of one broken has 23 AnnaRosenbergSecretary on of March Defense default many began Conference, Stalinon futureto told assistanthis of Roosevelt obligations. all in us asthetemporary of government Poland.” nowleaders in Poland Thisabroad. andthose government newreorganized will by be recognized provisional ingovernment Poland on a broader democratic basis, soastoinclude democratic independent Poland. As stated by Roosevelt, “steps were taken at Yalta to reorganize the existing with thatwasreachedin an contentment levelof Rooseveltestablishing the success expressed anddeteriorated this was visible toCongress hisduringWhen address. Poland,speakingabout Congress on the results of the Yalta Conference. Roosevelt’s physical appearance had drastically 1096. 154 153 3.1 PresidentTruman andPolishQuestion at Potsdam Partition’ ‘Fourth The III: Chapter Conrad Black, “Report of President Roosevelt in Person to the Congress on the Crimea,” On March 2 March On Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom nd , 1945, upon his return to the United States, President totheUnitedRoosevelt States, addressed hisupon return , 1945, rd th that “we can’t do business with Stalin. He , 1945, President Roosevelt, 1945,Presidentwhiledied, in 153 However, six weeks after the Yalta (London: Weidenfeld &Nicolson, 2003), 154 Indeed, Stalin the wasclinging to New York Times , 2March, 1945, p.12. 65 CEU eTD Collection 1986), 11. 155 could survive. wartime grandalliance of the whether stood asasymbol Europe this Eastern time, issues. During international onnumerous cooperate didpolicyUnited Sovietmonitor in in States toview order their Eastern Europe to willingness maintain period 1945-48,the peace.Inthe necessary as inorderto Soviets the as friendly to be not would in Poland structures postwar that was concern only their significantly, government; this attempt was fruitless. At this point, the United States had no special interestin Poland or its persuadeyet guarantee AlliedRozmarek Truman triedto of Polish supervision to the Elections, drasticbewouldensurefair unwilling totake measures to free elections in and Poland. established under the Yaltaformula, the U.S. would pay less attention to the Polish Question and in Warsaw was government the once that Congress American Polish the to clear became Truman would take a tougher stance towards that hoped the Congress Soviet American Union Polish The in defense Francisco. San in of sessions Poland. Nations However, United the attend it to Government Provisional Polish the from a representative allow to refusal Truman’s with seen be can Anexample Soviets. the towards be asserted needsto attitude a firmer and that street one-way a been had Union Soviet the with far, so agreements, the that felt however, Truman, States. United the for crisis Polish the of significance the see not did Stimson Henry War of Secretary Poland, Regarding and strategies. opinions receivedavariety of Truman Forrestal, James Defense of Secretary Harriman, and Stettinius, Edward State of Secretary advice of therefore his domestic and international policies were notan extension Roosevelt’s.of Under the Roosevelt, with interaction little had had Truman president. former the of death the following In accordance with the Constitution, Truman was sworn into office on April 12 Stephen A. Garrett, Stephen Harry Harry Truman had onlybeen vice presidentfor roughly 82 daysbefore Roosevelt’s death. From Potsdam to Poland: American Policy toward Eastern Europe 155 Many lobbyists,of EasternEuropean the (New York: Praeger, th , 1945, 66 CEU eTD Collection Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967), 250. 157 156 thousands.” by signed memorandums and “themass persuade demonstration through wasshown its others ability to exile,” andthat in organization anti-Communist Bulgarian “strongest the was movement the that emphasized who Doceff Ivan in 1947, founded Front, Nation Bulgarian the of President the from seen is example One Europe. Central and in Eastern countries Communist the with relations stabilize in hadeffectively the U.S., been able in1945to delay Administration action against plans to American historianJohnAmerican that: argued Snetsinger ethnicthis towards attitude contradicted the lobbyist principles groups of Unitedthe States. American Ironically, diplomacy. noaffect on little had to groups lobbyist ethnic In reality these University of Buffalo on remarked this issue: Milbrath of the Lester Union. Professor Soviet the hostility towards becauseof their public American Congress successful was during the in 1940’s gainingsympathyfrom American the hadAmericans influential difficulty alterenough rallying to foreign support policy. The Polish Polish- the Bulgarian-Americans, the to Similar Europe. Eastern towards policy foreign U.S. shifting the also but voters Bulgarian of number small the only not underestimated Docheff inBulgarian voters Unitedthe States to pressure politicianssympathy; into unfortunately, the mobilize to had he policy foreign change to in order that thought Docheff influence. of during slowly the Truman administration, asEasternEurope was by engulfed Sovietthe sphere Lester W. Milbrath, “Interest Groups and Foreign Policy, in A. Garrett, Stephen collaboration with public officials, are group propaganda efforts likely to attract sufficient attract to attentionlikely to have even efforts a slight effect. propaganda group are officials, public with close in collaboration campaign, concerted of a part as Only propaganda. group to listen people respect, theirdirect impact onopinion is miniscule…the basic difficulty is that few on was policyforeign limited. severely the Compared to ofpower thePresident in this The ability of interest groups specializing in foreign policy to affect broad public opinion From Potsdam to Poland: American Policy toward Eastern Europe, 156 157 Docheff’s optimism towards U.S. foreign declined Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 13. , ed. James 67 CEU eTD Collection wanted to protect Poland’s future, had not come to fruition. Instead they found a society that society a found they Instead fruition. to come not had future, Poland’s protect to wanted became quickly disillusioned thesociety notion with the that they had pictured, onewhich and citizens. workers U.S. future political butas exiles welcomedasan elitewas not of generation massive immigrant This await liberation. Poland’s to of the Polish-American community fightto for Poland; many émigrés moved to the U.S. in order interests.” and attitudes affiliations, its markon left also fact ‘politically escape had homeland intheir active’ because of were not to andpolitical this changes American sociologist Feliks Gross, the new Polish- Polish to immigrantAccording generations. was immigrant politicalbetween strains and caused “evenarrival their those States; who Following WWIIan newentirely generation Polish immigrants immigrated of to the United dismantling causesethnic groups to question lobby andtheir role in influence Americansociety. Americans to dismiss their Polish heritage and tobecome fully assimilated. Polish- some for desire the haltered had influence an Such community. Polish-American jokesin jokesIt wasbeenPolish the have these had theU.S. on affects arguedthat profound of phenomenon the being An example respect. internal gain to atactic simply are homeland had on U.S.foreign policies. The putative ethnic pressures Americanon diplomacy toward one’s Snetsinger’s isargument valid, however,notplausible considering the little affect lobbyist these 38, (Autumn,no.2 1981), 78. 160 159 158 161 21:3 (1976), 161. Feliks Gross, “Notes on the Ethnic Revolution and the Polish Immigration in the U.S.A.,” Stephen A. Garrett, 40. Garrett, 47. Stanislaus A. Blejwas, “Old and New Polonias: Tensions within an Ethnic Community,” social reasons? should it be lessany legitimate to vote from ethnic considerations than for economic or legitimate than thelobbying efforts of anynumberof economic interest groups? Why is the attempt byethnic minorities toinfluence the direction of foreign policy and less The right of ethnics to lobby for policies they desire no longer seemsquestionable. Why 158 161 Upon new Upon arrival this generation 160 These new arrivals expected all Polish American Studies The Polish Review 159 Such mental 68 CEU eTD Collection provisions of the Potsdam Conference. Whether or not Poland agreed it followed the necessary followedit the Polandagreed not or Whether Conference. Potsdam the provisions of and“Americanized.” assimilated in these WWII. territories during born already million children two more than including Territories, Recovered living inthe were changed thestructuring of Recovered the By1957,seven and Territories. million a half Poles completely Poles andGermans the between Hostilities territories. newly acquired Poland’s 1.5millionthe permanently population,residing Polish challengedandleadtorevisions of Territories. Recovered the hadentered Poles arrived and newly first1946, the Polish that2,725,000 wasconducted revealed census population February 14 accomplish. On to in difficult abalance population making Territories Recovered in the reamed million Germans additionally, 2 Territories; Recovered Poles livedwithin the million 4 By roughly 1945-46, resettlement. German resulting massivethe degreeof due tothe Oder-Neisse Line wouldfor bebad notonly Poland Germanythe disrupt butwould economy that the border issuepresent their must case. invitedbe to government Warsaw the should not be discussed of Stalin, representatives to or atPotsdam, according be eithermust accepted Line Oder-Neisse at Potsdam but at a thelater Polish Government should be given a hearing. The proposal of the date;Polish Government for the he knew caseof the that that Stalin urged arose. again once Question Polish the territorial disputes, postwar the was underway issuesand Europewerebeing concerning postwar many discussed. In addition to 164 163 War II 162 derogatory them subjected to like terms Alfons Klafkowski, Alfons Klafkowski, Wagner, Wolgang (Germany: Brentano-Verlag Stuttgart, 1957), 143. By July By July 16 The Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line: A Study in the Diplomatic Negotiations during World th The Potsdam Agreement, The Potsdam Agreement , 1945, the Potsdam held atCecilienhof in Germany,Conference, Potsdam occupied , 1945,the 164 These population changes were implemented under the under implemented were changes population These (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1963), 256. 257. Polack . The new arrivals viewed the old Polonia as Polonia viewed theold newarrivals . The 163 This new influx of Poles in addition, to 162 Churchill,however, believed 69 th , CEU eTD Collection the new Poland should advance her frontierher Oderbutnot newnot Neisse.the advance Truman should tothe to the Poland could place in September. The British Government did not wish waitto that long; Churchill agreed that of Ministers’favor postponing Conference decision would this which take Foreign the until in was Truman opinions. their to firmly held side each in which a standstill to came discussion satisfaction…” profound actwith an such We receive should states. western the “…Poland hasnotonly been itforwaiting for alongbut time, hadevery demandright to iffrom Gomu Wladys Party Workers' United of Polish the Secretary frontier.First of that recognition ofinternational provide to and guarantees Lusatian to Oderand areasupto rights the Neisse, the This statement according to the Poles constitutes a basis for the demand to validate Poland’s conference: during the followingdefine in stated the Adam other the powers to Tarnowski Poland’s claims to order 167 PUWP.of the 166 165 during10 conference.OnApril the laidcontribute by procedures Poland, itsclaims out to AlliedPowers. although, wished the Ibid, 268. 10 March on made Workers United Polish ofthe Committee Central of the Report Klafkowski, 268. á ka, in ka, of one his speeches conference… considered by all the signatories as final, calling for the formal endorsement by the peace the why decision concerning on is frontiersPoland’s the in wasNeisse,OderPotsdam, and taken This conference. peace the for matter a is of “frontier” formulation the that the formulation “under Polish administration” was only a formal expression, since decision of Bigthe Three concerning Poland’s frontierin the West, he stressed explicitly Polish…as regards theAmerican delegation, itwas second, after theUSSR, to approve the frontiers on the Oder and Neisse. When President Truman was reading the 165 166 in regards to the recognition of Poland’s claims, stated that th , 1947, for example, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs th , 1959, atthe Third Congress 167 The á aw 70 CEU eTD Collection the Polish American Congress unified. Congress American Polish the the U.S. government. By steering clear of the Miko vociferous critic of American foreign policy for he blamed Poland’s status as a Soviet satellite on of of Miko Miko Congress vice president stated, “is a nationalist andPoland not being able to express its own will, accepted a post in apostGovernment.” Lublin accepted [Warsaw] the “I and my people are fully convinced that Miko that convinced fully are my people and “I sided with the prevailing opinion of Dr. Starzy states. The Polish twenty-eightAmerican Congress andparishesclubs, dispersedthroughout local societies, fraternals, reached 3,832 affiliates number of 1945, the fall of the persevered. By Polish aselflessof the American disputes, Congress Regardless the or decision patriotic act. was unsurewhether Miko Poland should be awarded the territory as far as the Neisse. The Polish-American community claimed, would still be smaller than before the war. Miko before beclaimed, the than smaller would still Germany;in remarkedincluding addition, thatshe Bierutofthe Poland, territory the whole themselves totheForeign Ministers. Bierutargued and defended Poland’s East claim to deputy deputy Miko Minister Prime 170 169 War II 168 peace treaty and without consulting the ‘Big Three.’” the before through carried been “had which Germany of parts of occupation Polish to consent Ibid, 65. Szymczak, 65. Wagner, Wolgang á , 144. ajczyk can at least be depended upon to do all the good can be that dodone.” all good the beleast uponto depended at can ajczyk On July 24 July On á ajczyk was notshared had a by Rozmarek ajczyk was become organization. every Polish-American The Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line: A Study in the Diplomatic Negotiations during World th , the delegation from the Polish Government, President Boles President Government, Polish the from delegation the , á ajczyk’s participation in participation was a Warsawregime the ajczyk’s treacherous á ajczyk and Foreign Minister Wincenty Foreignajczyk andMinisterWincenty presented Rzymowski, Ĕ ski of the Polish Falcons, who told the FNB that á á ajczyk controversy, Rozmarek hoped keepto ajczyk knew what he was doing when he when doing he was what knew ajczyk 168 169 á Miko ajczyk also supported the viewsupported alsothat ajczyk á ajczyk, the Polish-American the ajczyk, 170 á aw Bierut, the Bierut, aw Thisopinion 71 CEU eTD Collection destruction of herlegal destruction of government. nation the and Allied an of of “partition the as aconfirmation statement saw this Congress take…of beingyour meet willing to neighbor half-way.” is and give It geteverythingof aquestion it wants. to expect nation can one noexception. No is Poland on agreement The compromise. of element the it in has agreement international every nearly that and purposes,” administrative “for Poland to be given would Germany of section Yalta in respects to the Polish boundcertainPotsdam had to beennaturally which compromises were already agreedupon at Question. In the spirit of compromise, Truman mentioned thatsemi-autonomy. a give Poland might which grant concessions to theSoviets persuade convince or to were unable control over an area which was already under Soviet control. Both the U.S. and Great Britain 173 172 171 Richard Lukasnoted: dependent on the outcome of actual democratic elections under Allied supervision. Historian demanded that the United States withdraw its recognition of the Warsaw regime; this was Neisse. Eastern the Soviet agreement which would allow PolandByrnes to administer in a conversation the territories with as farMolotov,confidants as the Oder at andwhich Truman was present,would proposed overwhelman American- the United States and Great Britain. Secretary of State James Szymczak, 66. 149. Wagner, Wolgang Wagner, 146. Truman, during his 9 August The Polish Government feared that the pressure from the Soviets and their Polish no press the matter in Potsdam. Whatever opportunity may have still been left to alter the of elections. thePolish No hadsuch guarantees supervision Yalta, provided been and at did Truman Allied enable would that guarantees upon insist to Truman urged Rozmarek 171 Molotov would not concede, arguing that he did not wish to give Poles th , 1945,radioaddress declared that United the in States 173 The members of the Polish American Congress American Polish the of members The 172 In response, the Polish American Polish the Inresponse, 72 CEU eTD Collection 175 174 American community, Polish- the tracking still was which Branch, Nationalities Foreign wasThe group. ethnic one unable at this point to monitor of internal than important worldmuchthe resentment more amore was post-war secure better the eventual transitioncostly Soviet of contributionthethe to Polish sympathetic and appreciative was to public victory;American The community. American Polish in addition, they realized that the Rooseveltian petitions the rifts between causedsignificant proveduselessandonly the general and public visionby of administration a Truman the of bombardment continued The nation. American the of good greater as opposed to the concerned interest whowas with sectarian group too disgruntled ethnic The outcry by PolishAmerican the Congress wasoften seen as anguished rantinga from triumph of the Allied powers over theAxis should serve as majora victory for the United States. general public. Many Americans were confused by this embitterment for they felt that the overall the by well received not was community Polish-American the of part the on hostility Such officials: Warsaw the on placement the Polish extraction NewDivision which (KNAPP)’s York followingin the promised to response inWashington 1945.An October wasappeal issuedby Committee ofAmericans National the of to ambassador Polish Lange asthe new of Oskar appointment the with was heightened change thenew regime Congress towards American between Polish the antagonism The growing Ibid, 66. Pienkos, 121. line concessionsto from the Communist side concerning the political future of Poland. Conference when theUnited States failed to link its agreementto the Odra-Nysa River conditions wouldthat make Poland more independentwas lostasthe Potsdam of the nation which never in its history submitted voluntarily to foreign domination, but has always fought for itsindependence, domination, valuing its freedom above everything. foreign to voluntarily submitted history its in never which nation of the traditions the represent not do they nation, Polish the in noble and good is what not do represent they because them to closed be shall manifestations and meetings our to doors The 175 174 73 CEU eTD Collection 180 no. 2(Autumn, 1994), 6. Midwestern Polish American Community during the 1946 Congressional Elections,” 179 178 177 176 conferences. Potsdam of postwarDemocrats independence“abandoning Poland’srightto Teheran, atthe and Yalta, accuse leaders the to many Stalin’s Polish-American caused subjugation Poland of towards position conciliatory Truman’s and Roosevelt’s Both coalition. NewDeal Party’s Democratic Michigan, Chicago, Many etc. started Polish-Americans to re-considermembership their inthe an leading inMilwaukee, ethnic revival satellite to Soviet Europeinto the system Eastern in question Midwesternincorporation industrialbelt, 1946,Polish-Americans beganto the of Ludowy across the nation. andinby betrayed resentment Unitedwas reflected theirthe newspapers States national strong PriorPotsdam. By of Potsdam the end the Polish-American hadConference, the community felt to the Aprilactivities. 1947 Councilwere studies Of ethnic 16,000reports,1,560 (10%) groups. onPolish-Americanthese of Foreign dozen onmore memoranda, were than 16,000 fieldtwo analyticalreports, produced studies and MinistersAmericanintolobby. Congress an However, duringanti-Communist FNB’sexistence, nearly the meeting, the eliminate the aristocratic influence in Poland and usher in a new ‘progressive’ force. Under innewthis in a ‘progressive’ usher Polandand influence aristocratic the eliminate Stalin would Krzycki believedthat Europe. inactivity Eastern Soviet the to sympathetic CIO Polish-American the example, For middle-class. the didAmerican Poles not share exhibitedby community, working-class same the apprehensions fascists.” “pro-German or Poland,” of sons “genuine as themselves show Congress of Industrial Organizations of Industrial Congress Robert D. Ubriaco Jr., “Bread and Butter Politics or Foreign Policy Concerns? Class versus Ethnicity in the “Treachery in Time of Crisis,” newspaper. Polish-American a Voice,” People’s “The Szymczak, 67. 177 176 had branded the Oder-Neisse line as the “acid test” for the Polish-Americans to either to for thePolish-Americans “acid as test” line the Oder-Neisse branded had the Many focused on the Polish American communities’ response to both Yalta and 179 Even though WWII sparked an ethnic revival WWII the Polish- within anethnicrevival Even sparked though Glos Ludowy, EnglishVersion, January 18 180 labor leader, Leo Krzycki Leo Krzycki leader, labor was th , 1947, p.2. Polish American Studies 178 In sections of the 51, Glos 74 CEU eTD Collection 181 in Poland. claims Stalin’s of legitimacy the accepting into Poles working-class rally to tried Krzycki belief, Humboldt Park to commemorate Park to Humboldt of 155 the speakGeneral before PolesBor-Komorowski to 200,000passionate inChicago’s Tadeusz Poland’s future for independence.chance 1946,the InPolishMay American invitedCongress by communists,” dominated movement Truman Administration,” 183 182 Midwestern Polish American Community during the 1946 Congressional Elections,” 8. German aggression. The Polish-American community, for forty-five years demonstrated, years forty-five for community, Polish-American The aggression. German potential issuedand Soviet about organization warnings the line.recognition addition, of In the surrounding the line.Oder-Neisse PolishAssociation Western The American lobbiedof for U.S. issues on focus the specifically which would organization aseparate Congress established theworld.” by throughout butPoland peoples peace-loving of by people only the not resistance met with terrific “be would from Poland territory restored the remove to attempts any that U.S. the warned also memo the addition, In militarism. German foreign totheU.S.,Poland, andthebyunleashing of represented athreat world policy of form new this that fear the highlighted which Congress American Polish the by sent petitions the similar to was very ironically, memorandum, The Potsdam. at reached agreements from the foreignof in American expensewasdivergent rebuildingthe Germany atPoland’s policy toward newthe shift that community, Polish-American the of concern, the which conveyed Department fight for Poland’s independence and postwar frontiers. devotionstill wantedto indicates number persistentwhothe Polish-Americans participants of of Debra Allen, “An Unacknowledged Consensus: Polish American vies about the Oder-Neisse Line during the during Line Oder-Neisse the about vies American Polish Consensus: Unacknowledged “An Allen, Debra Robert DUbriaco Jr., 9. 181 Robert D. Ubriaco Jr., “Bread and Butter Politics or Foreign Policy Concerns? Class versus Ethnicity in the In 1951, labor organizers Stanley Nowak and Krzycki sent a memorandum to the State the memorandum Krzyckito senta and Nowak organizers Stanley labor In 1951, 181 The middle-class, however, consider Krzycki’s ideas as a “fifth column a“fifth ideas column whitewash as Krzycki’s consider however, Themiddle-class, Polish American Studies 182 57, (Spring,no.1 2000), 82. whicha supported regimewas destroying that th anniversary of the Polish constitution. The sheer The constitution. Polish the of anniversary 183 By American Polish1955, the 75 CEU eTD Collection were especially upset during the war by the political inactivity of the Polish-Americans for they for Polish-Americans the of inactivity political the by war the during upset especially were it is difficult to see the extent to which the community as a whole felt betrayed. Polish émigrés Polish Misery” Outsmarted in Outsmarted Poland” Grab of Truman Administration, 83. 184 Mr. Roosevelt Let Poland Down” Help Save Homeland” 1943 to1946.Headlines such“Payingfor“Polesas: the Fiddler Stalin’s tune”, FDR to Implore of figured question inthis everymajor prominently almost newspaperin during United States the coverage media The community. Polish-American the of members the of backgrounds political and cultural economic, social, different the responses considering has multi-faceted however, diplomacy and actionsgovernment theU.S. had betrayed its promises Poland. to This question, 3.2 U.S.Betrayal ofPoland? Sovietthe inUnion Coldthe War. and between confrontation States theUnited by besurrounding overshadowed Polandthe would issues the Eventually policy. American change to unable were factions both memorandums issuesthe internationalas an struggle againstfascism.” view tendedto Polish pro-Soviet Americans militarism,the while world German peaceagainst of and inthecause fought dies whohad Americans descent of Polish as themselves “identified community splitintowas two factions opposing by point:this anti-Soviet the Polish Americans participatingissue. inevents involved the which border Oder-Neisse The Polish-American historianaccording by both to Pienkos, supportingtheir“ethnic consciousness”Donald and Debra Allen, “An Unacknowledged Consensus: Polish American vies about the Oder-Neisse Line during the during Line Oder-Neisse the about vies American Polish Consensus: Unacknowledged “An Allen, Debra The most pertinent question for the Polish-American community is whether through its through whether is community Polish-American the for question pertinent most The , “Poland Being Sacrificed”. Since the Polish-American community was diverse, was community Polish-American the Since Sacrificed”. Being “Poland , “Voters Demand a Free Poland” , , “FDR Betrayed All Yalta” All at “FDR Betrayed “Polish Group in U.S. Charges Big 3 ‘Sell-Out,’ Asserts FDR , “FDR’s Double Talk to Poles” to Talk “FDR’s Double 184 Regardless of their petitions and , “FDR Charged with Blame for , “Why 76 CEU eTD Collection 187 186 Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 40. 185 Polandlonger no existed. formany them because list that astheir residence didnot exampleshows Poles Poland previous a inprotest.” as America weconsider Ourstay under communists. the free, not Poland their residence. previous Oneman explained that,“he waspatriotic, believing livingfor he was Persons Act. Of allowedthose between into theU.S. 1946 and 1954only listed3% Poland as under the1948Displaced U.S. the entered WWII; ethnic Poles 120,000 during around and after Roughly of favor ina communist Power. Poles United immigrated to the States Great 200,000 Poland betrayed had U.S. the that belief the with coincided resentment anti-Soviet growing The Sovietthe Union:hostilities towards increasing ingovernment 1944, expressingtheir about Polish-Americanthe concern community’s U.S. the to memorandum a issued branch Nationalities Foreign The Council. Labor American Polish the and Congress Slavic American the as such organizations, Polish-American pro-Soviet the of bytheactivities disturbed were Polish-Americans moderate massacre. These Forest Katyn however,moderates, the1943 becameforeign after policy Many openly anti-Soviet directly. American challenge to not chose andtherefore ‘American,’ as ethnicity sawtheir community the of members most alliance; U.S.-Soviet the acknowledged least at or respected Polish-Americans Poland.” to obligation a political had “still all Polish-Americans that insisted Mary Patrice Edmans, 44. Edmans, Patrice Mary Mary Patrice Edmans, Patrice Mary Mary Patrice Edmans, Patrice Mary Descent (KNAPP). Descent Sovietleadership of numericallythe small National Committee of Americans ofPolish the alignment of these powerful organizations with the ultra-nationalist, openly anti- include leadershipmoderate asideofa shoving Polish-American the in the fraternals politics, and American in disturbing seriously become may month next Buffalo in meeting Concrete manifestations ofanewmovement taking whichform, after themammoth Opposite Poles: Immigrants and Ethnics in Polish Chicago, 1976-1990 Opposite Poles: Immigrants and Ethnics in Polish Chicago, 1976-1990 186 185 The majority of , 41. (Pennsylvania: 187 This 77 CEU eTD Collection 190 189 188 concerns.” humanitarian and security reasons: fundamental two “for States United the to wasvital Europe Eastern that of State William Luers stated before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe, of how this polarity of politics can shift dramatically. In 1978, former Deputy Assistant Secretary serves Easternexample best by asthe Europe understanding States. reacheddecisions United the to central been has idealism, and realism both of use the in seen as relations, foreign American of polarity The stability. international affecting problems the to solutions altruistic advocate for democracy.” “make the worldsafe is to United State the WWI that entering before 1917comment Wilson’s under President dictated were original case powers.of balancing the just than more on based be should Americanrelations that notion the asserts policy foreignpower considerations. In strong contrast, the Wilsonian policyor idealist concept of American foreign focus on must foreign relations Therefore, diplomacy. national balanced of real a the objectives should uphold not moralto American This realistforeign approach does as regard policy to relevantconcerns the principles of democracy, which in Ottomans: the against independence the inin Adamsassist 1823global response tothe on U.S.to the theGreeksinpressure their warof and realism. realist The is approach best understood through statementthe made by John Quincy Wilson’s Fourteen Points, where the thirteenth point calls for an independent Poland, but also but Poland, independent an for calls point thirteenth the where Points, Fourteen Wilson’s Garrett, 130. Ibid, 129. Garrett, 129. In pastthe 200 years distinctive two themes have defined American diplomacy: idealism struggles…America goes not abroad in search of a monster to destroy. to monster of a search in abroad not goes struggles…America such in responsibility direct assume not could and should the States hand United other the On freedom. for struggling those to out go would people American Wherever the flag of freedom may unfurl, the heartfelt sentiments and sympathy of the 190 The humanitarian concerns are reflected in not only President only not in reflected are concerns humanitarian The 189 The idealist concept tries to 188 78 CEU eTD Collection later haunt U.S. policy makers grappling with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. At inWar.Union same with Soviet the Coldthe the policy makers U.S. grappling hauntlater would conferences and postwar of wartime the outcome U.S.The for the majorlonger aconcern wasno Europe Eastern in context which “GrandAlliance” asamemberof the responsibilities U.S.’s by overridden became community Polish-American the and in exile government Polish tothe made readilysince promises did betray Polandargue not United that the States possible to scheme of realitiesstop Hitler. thisinto million In theby sacrificedconsidering effort SovietUnion 20 the the the United Stalin’s demands, hadoppose if to Many right U.S. the in the thewar. questioned involvement States had no real say hisreached Senate. the with Stalin to reported agreement in the futurenot had for Roosevelt Constitution of U.S. violation the in weredirect atTeheran actions of Eastern Europe.instancePoland arguedthat Roosevelt’s for Lane abetrayal. toBliss Lane Arthur Ambassador as U.S. Itlike officials U.S. is prominent and community Polish-American the of members the Poland. The DLE stood as a symbol of the American concern for the future of Eastern Europe. democratic Eastern for formulations postwar European regimes, which obviously included had Europe call(DLE) pressed Declaration Liberated Stalinfreeof to for and elections treatment by United became WWII of method evident during increasingly superpower inaspecific resulting States. RegardlessPoland’s future, butsometimes idealism. outweighsrealism The Soviet Union’s role asafuture of the outcomes TheHouse. United States duringWorld War IIhad ahumanitarian inconcern of at respect Yalta, the United States under the Wilson’s sympathetic reception of Tomáš Masaryk and Wladys and Masaryk Tomáš of reception sympathetic Wilson’s The United States was placed in a thorny political arena considering their late their considering wasarena political placedina thorny The United States both by seen been have Potsdam and Yalta Teheran, at U.S. the by made decisions The á aw Paderewski at the Whitethe at aw Paderewski 79 CEU eTD Collection forces, Poland’s postwar future was never truly in the hands of U.S. contravening any circumvent would idealism American that along all felt many while time, 80 CEU eTD Collection However, the community represented the largest Slav ethnic group which gave it status which a unique largestgave Slav ethnic the group community the represented However, total inwhite stock population, exceedonlyby million 5.2 Germans and 4.6 million Italians.” Wisconsin. New Illinois,Connecticut, Ohio, Jersey, Pennsylvania Massachusetts, and NewYork, Five of out six of industrializedhighly dwelledthese innine Polish-Americans states: million.” 10 to 7 of range in the somewhere is probably descendants distant and close living claimed that “the group of Polish immigrants alive today in the United States together with their 194 193 Review W Stefan sociologist In1945, heartland of country. industrial the tobein tended the centers urban these centers; urban in concentration high in its but size population in its not lay community Polish-American the of power The 1950s. in the McCarthyism of rise the with by fissuresperpetuated caused appear inPolish whichbegan organizations to correspondence had foreign with causedvolatilemovements policy-makers. relations U.S. Theanti-Soviet that Question of Polish the bytheconsequences All wereaffected areas three Party. Democratic the and movement labor the Church, Catholic the areas: three following the in majority constant a with influence political powerful relatively a wielded time the at community American 191 issuesPoland. with concerning dealing weeksinoffice two his first day every of during and after the war than the Polish Question. President Truman, for example, spent nearly Conclusion: 192 Studies Ibid, 7. Peter H. Irons, “’The Test is Poland:’ PolishAmericans and the Origins of the Cold War,” 7. Peter H. Irons, “’The Test is Poland:’ Polish Americans and the Origins of the Cold War,” Stefan W Stefan (August, 1945), (August, 151. 30, no.2 (Autumn,1973), 5. No other issue andtheUnitedStates between Union tension theSoviet No other placedgreater á oszezewski, “The Polish ‘Sociological Group,’ inAmerica,” Group,’ ‘Sociological Polish “The oszezewski, 193 The Polish-American community made up “thirdthe largest component of the American Slavic and Eastern European Polish American Polish 191 The Polish- The á oszezewski 194 192 81 CEU eTD Collection Academy of Political and Social Science, 195 Ko and Pulaski being examples time, our of heroes influential most the of some given has yearshundredfor had and community nearly organizations. ThePolish-American existed 400 community could mobilize formation itself through the largeof lobbyist and cultural what degree did the Polish-American Community influence U.S. foreign policy? Nationalities Branch as a possible threat tonational security. The question that still remains is: to combined.groups felt wasdocumented Clearly,later was by theirand presence Foreign the ethnic minor Slav than largerall inthe population States; Polish-American the was the United came toshapingforeign policy? it futile when community actions of the why Polish-American Israel.the were then, So towards American has be community to very proved successful in influencing Americanforeign policy is staggering. Irish-American issuesthe community concerning whichfocused on 30 40 million of hearings reached congressional to The number people. about couldfor an obtain support undivided Ireland; sheernumberthe Irish-Americans of by had 1950 which group ethnic a national an of example serves as community relations. TheIrish-American Question a was not matter of upholdingWilsonian principles butof preventing rifts in post-war Polish the administrations Truman and Roosevelt the For becomes it policy-makers. guide sway to impossible political without mobilization, of Regardless power. of positions political obtain to Jews asthe such communities ethnic other to in relation more difficult madeitPole’ factor in theirability engenderto significant changes. The stereotypical persona of the ‘industrial Franklin L. Burdette, “Influence of Non-congressional Pressures on Foreign Policy,” Foreign on Pressures of Non-congressional “Influence L. Burdette, Franklin Ğ ciuszko. The socio-economic stratum of the Polish-Americans, however, wasahindering however, Polish-Americans, the of stratum socio-economic The ciuszko. The simple answer would be: none. However, it is interesting to observe how an how ethnic itobserve is interesting to be:none. However, answerwould The simple Prior to World War II, the Irish-American campaign had been effective in creating an in creating effective been had campaign Irish-American the War II, World to Prior vol.289, Congress Foreignand Relations (September, 1953), 94. 195 Recently, the Jewish- the Recently, Annalsof the American 82 CEU eTD Collection 197 1995), 815. 196 identity.” communal generate of and sustain a sense to diasporic institutions affected ability by of the and arehighly community diversity overseas the the sizeand dependslargely the of affairs upon country’s home in the involvement diasporic of range and nature “the Shain, Yossi scientist political andAccordingBritain. to Great States United between the relationshipantagonistic line. pressure from the Soviet Union made thespared. The of combination desire U.S.’s the maintain tostability global and the continuous Polish Question a simple matter of where was develop.class inconceivabletime during It to took WWII that andafter be Poland would to draw the communism. For the Polish-American community to break the shackles of its socio-economic increased number and against Polish-American of the unqualified politicians support public the point, Polish-American had community obtainedpolitical enough leverage,duetothe ironically, is thePolish-American supportof eventual the movement. By 1981 Solidarity this infreedom émigrés to their providing wereunsuccessful ‘captiveTheonly nations.’ example, European Eastern postwar The majority forof thePolish cause. publicsupport political or enough gain not could community Polish-American the how of examples as serve Potsdam hadlong run profound on affects future.TheIreland’s decisions made atTeheran, Yaltaand The large Irish-American population was ableform to a strong political component, which,in the political itselfentity. a power into base manifest potentially time could structured which over establish to awell for aDiaspora possibility the media, hasprovided global American and mixedto foreign the accessof policy,with Congress hasavitalvoiceethnic inU.S.groups community.” an cultural to not ethnically-based, and and principles humane Yossi Shain, “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 811. Yossi Shain, “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 196 Yossi continues to define American patriotism “as the devotion to liberal-democratic Political Science Quarterly 109, no.5 (Winter,1994- 197 Thefactthat 83 CEU eTD Collection Christians and Polish Jews. Polish and Christians Polish between distinguish not did IRO the that noted be should it countries; 47 in resettled been between indicated Organization that 1946 and(IRO) Polish citizenshad 1952nearly 360,000 formed inthe United States andin nationsother The duringWWII. International Refugee Poland. independent an for hope on-going in the stages However,final the marked history in Polish moment this in Once officially freeandgovernmentthe Thissymbolic disbanded. Polandexile was again was accomplishment did not radically affect the large Diaspora that had Culture, etc., serve as examples of how the community continues to bridge the gap between the between gap the bridge to continues community the how of examples as serve etc., Culture, Congress, The Ko American Polish asthe such organizations, Polish-American in Europe. nations American warm feelings towards the United States.” Americanforeign“declared indicatedof Poles favored 70%of survey the that 90% policy, while in(CBOS) asurvey1991 took on PolishAmerican toward attitudes Foreign policy. Theresults would not become a realitycitizenship Hungarianafree the after realizingreturning Revolution 1956 that of Hungary to in the near future. The PolishKunzEgon arguedthataround200,000Hungarians tookmainly BritishU.S., and Australian Centersociologist Similarly, for emerge. still would Poland Public independent an that expectation the with years Opinion Research of President Republic the Wa of newly installed Lech and democratically Poland, elected in exile, from along with an delegation London, cededofficial to the the insignia state the of http://www.time.com/time/europe/html/030602/story.html 200 48. 199 Polish American Studies 198 A. Purvis, “New Europe, Old Economy, Poland is American’s new best friend,” Anna D. Jaroszy Anna D. Jaroszy On December 20 Ĕ Ĕ ska-Kirchmann, “The PolishPost-World War IIDiaspora: An agenda fora New Millennium,” ska-Kirchmann, “The PolishPost-World War IIDiaspora: An agenda fora New Millennium,” Ğ ciuszko Foundation, The Pilsudski Institute, the American Center of Polish 57, no.2 (Autumn, 2000), 47. th , 1990, Ryszard Kaczorowski, the president of Kaczorowski, Polishthe governmentof Ryszard president the , 1990, 199 Some of these Polish communities became disillusioned over the over disillusioned became communities Polish these of Some 200 Poland today is considered one of the most pro- ; accessed June 2 June ; accessed nd , 2009. Time Europe , May 25, 2003, áĊ sa. 198 84 CEU eTD Collection to a certain degree, overridden the archaic diplomacy WWII. of diplomacy archaic the overridden to acertain degree, have, War Cold the of end the following relations in U.S.-Polish developments Yet, Americans. foreign American Polandpolicy towards WWIIcontinues stir andafter during into many resentment Polish- Soviets. the with relations peaceful long-term establishing of anticipation political the by but community Polish-American the by influenced materially not was policy foreign American end, the In public. American entire the for speak not did that group national United States the of interests national and population the of interests islong-term the served in fact another method this matter. The millions.whether of But secretly thefuture discussed states of leaders ‘oldwhereby diplomacy,’ so-called “betrayalforeign Polandanything, U.S. a policy towards duringandafter WWIIreversion constituted to of Poland”If principles. Wilsonian basedon was ofdiplomacy limitations severe the demonstrated such and as an expression of onewell definedaltogether not a through forcing than promise. rather adversary apotential of appeasement the through The outcome represented the triumph of powerUnited States and Poland through cultural, economic,politics or political activities. over diplomacy The Polish Question during WWII represented a major diplomatic issue that was resolved 85 CEU eTD Collection Primary Sources: Primary Bibliography: 12. 11. 10. 9. 8. 7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. RG 226. “The Polish-Americans, Their and Sympathies Antipathies,” August25, 1942,OSS-FNB Park. Archives, College Roosevelt toStalin, 1December 1943,” FRUS Tehran Conference p. 594, The National 1959, atthe Third of Congress PUWP.the Report of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers made on March 10 reference no. CAB/66/53/18, TheNational Archives, Kew. Archives of Liberation,” National for theWar “Polish Committee Printed Cabinet, no. 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