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Lebanon the Tactic of Political Assassinations in Lebanon

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Lebanon the Tactic of Political Assassinations in Lebanon February 12, 2016 5 News & Analysis Lebanon The tactic of political assassinations in Lebanon Dalal Saoud pull his troops out of Lebanon on Hariri’s assassination, arguing that April 30th of the same year, ending Israel and other forces had interests almost 30 years of military presence. in killing Hariri to create discord in Beirut But the targeted killings did not Lebanon. However, five Hezbollah stop. members were accused of being be- ith two presidents, In addition to Hariri and his close hind Hariri’s assassination and are three prime minis- aide and minister of economy Bas- being tried in absentia by the Special ters, one mufti and sel Fleihan, who died from inju- Tribunal for Lebanon, the first such dozens of top poli- ries sustained in the explosion, ten court established for the Arab world. ticians, ministers, other anti-Syria figures and secu- Wparliamentarians, security officials rity officials were assassinated from Hariri’s killing was and journalists — the bulk of whom June 2005 to December 2014. Four not only meant to were killed over the past decade — escaped attempts on their lives, in- “eliminate the man Lebanon has the lion’s share when it cluding Marwan Hamadeh, a promi- comes to political assassinations. nent politician and journalist who but to create terror Whether such political murders suffered severe injuries in an explo- among the Sunnis”. were meant to eliminate opponents, sion on October 1, 2004. change the course of events and the The attempt on Hamadeh was the While Hezbollah sees the trial as a political dynamics in the country, first signal that the relative peace, US-Israeli plot to discredit the Iran- boost the influence or control of this security and stability Lebanon had backed group, Hamadeh said he or that regional power or provoke enjoyed since its 15-year civil war has no doubt about who carried out terror among the population, the re- ended in 1990 was over. A bloody “systematic assassinations against sult has emptied Lebanon of those and uneven confrontation had start- the most influential people in the who had dared resisting the de facto ed. opposition”. forces. “They (Syrian regime) wanted to “All the assassinations, killings Lebanon has long been the main eliminate me and stop my move- (during the civil war and afterward) scene of targeted assassinations, due ments… I was very active in resisting were aimed at enhancing, keeping to the nature of the political strug- the re-election of (president Emile) total Syrian control over the coun- gles inside the country, its proximity Lahoud and trying to reassemble the try,” he said. Short of total war and to the once Middle East’s main con- opposition,” Hamadeh told the Arab beyond normal politics, assassina- A 2010 file picture shows former Lebanese prime minister flict spot — the Israeli-occupied Pal- Weekly in a lengthy interview. tions were used “as a tool of political Saad Hariri delivering a speech during a rally marking the fifth estinian territories — and other Arab The attempt was clearly “a mes- terror against personalities whose anniversary of the assassination of his father, former premier and regional considerations. sage meant to stop a course” that disappearance would influence the Rafik Hariri (picture) in Beirut. was developing against Syria’s course of events sometimes more Five Hezbollah “heavy-handed” control over the than a war or civil war”, said Hama- to provoke terror, terrorise people ger… It will never weaken neither members were country and its attempts to reim- deh. “They could stop the course or and create divisions along sectar- the Sunnis nor the Shias. Both are accused of being pose Lahoud. start another war.” ian lines: between first Muslims and alternatively victims of terror,” Ki- And that was something Assad And indeed another war has start- Christians, then Sunnis and Syria wan said. “Now, it is terror against behind Hariri’s wouldn’t tolerate. ed, this time between Sunnis and and lately between Shias and Sun- terror.” assassination. Even the thought of electing a new Shias. nis.” To Hamadeh, the assassinations president “who would not be hostile Hariri might have been the first Hariri’s killing, Kiwan said, was fell short of intimidating them. “By The assassination of former prime to Syria but will not be a Syrian pup- victim of the emerging Arab/Persian not only meant to “eliminate the miracle” as he said, they succeeded minister Rafik Hariri in a huge truck- pet like Lahoud,” was not allowed, dispute as he grew in importance man but to create terror among the in having an international tribunal bomb explosion that targeted his according to Hamadeh. “I think politically, with strong international Sunnis” and then divisions and dis- to investigate Hariri’s killing. “The convoy in Beirut on February 14, they did not accept that… It was too relations. But most importantly — cord between them and the Shias. tribunal is working slowly but it is 2005, was the tip of the iceberg. His much for them to witness the top- as Fadi Kiwan noted — Hariri might According to Kiwan, Hariri’s assas- there. They cannot abolish it… This killing provoked a strong unexpect- pling of (Iraqi president) Saddam have been eliminated after being ac- sination was the first step in “terror- is the one thing we got.” ed reaction from his mainly Sunni Hussein and the failure of their poli- cused of “trying to develop an oppo- ising the Sunnis and was followed by Would the tribunal be able to re- followers who took to the streets cies in Lebanon, with a continuous sition in Syria and Lebanon against killing anyone who could oppose. All veal who gave the killing orders in in large numbers during his funeral rebellion of the Christians and Hariri the rise of the Shia superpower in symbols of resistance to this hegem- Lebanon? Would it be able to stop shouting “Syria out”. against them.” the region”. ony were to be eliminated.” Howev- such assassinations in the future? That angry outburst soon led to At the end, Hariri bowed to Syria’s Kiwan, the director of the Insti- er, she does not rule out the role of Many hardly believe that. widespread popular protests (later pressures and went ahead with re- tute of Political Science at St Joseph “one or many intelligence services” known as the Cedar revolution), newing Lahoud’s mandate but that University, said Lebanon’s assassi- in such killings to create discord be- Dalal Saoud is the deputy which — along with international was not enough to spare his and the nations were meant to create terror tween Sunnis and Shias. editor-in-chief of The Arab Weekly pressure boosted by UN Security others’ lives. for political purposes and change Did such a terror tactic succeed in and has been covering the Arab Council Resolution 1559 — forced Syria and Hezbollah have cate- the dynamics in the country. weakening various parties? region since 1990. She is based in Syrian President Bashar Assad to gorically denied any involvement in “There was a clear determination “It only increases hatred and an- Beirut. Is change impossible in Lebanon? Viewpoint ight months ago, former prime minister Rafik Hariri’s on the ramifications of its demands are promised positions and prestige Lebanon witnessed a assassination in 2005 — is a clear and the lack of coordination among The while a larger circle of followers quasi-revolution understatement. activist groups, with each attempt- benefit from scholarships and other spurred by a garbage “We would not have known ing to shape it according to its own movement welfare services affiliated with the crisis that sent thou- about the garbage crisis’s tricky vision and ideas. From a spontane- should be political groups,” Kiwan explained. sands of protesters to details if not for the movement. We ous protest pressing for a solution centred not In her book Compassionate Com- Ethe street, bringing together the would not have seen so much proof to the garbage crisis, the movement munalism: Welfare and Sectarianism country’s youth from across the of corruption in many institutions,” diverted its demands to overthrow- on ideals in Lebanon, Harvard’s Melani Cam- sectarian spectrum to denounce a said Fadia Kiwan, founder of the ing the country’s sectarian system. and abstract mett explored how sectarian politi- dysfunctional government and Institute of Political Science at St For Kiwan, the movement’s slip- motives but cal parties use their welfare services Nizar Hassan rampant corruption in the ruling Joseph University in Beirut. pery move into a radical political rather on to influence voters, mobilise com- class. Lebanese have been “The movement did not fail,” discourse was a major setback. munities and, when needed, recruit suffering chronic power outages, said Assaad Thebian, a lead figure “What could have been more the material combatants. water shortages and poor public in the “You Stink” campaign, which effective,” Kiwan argued, “is adopt- conditions of She said political activism in services. The garbage crisis was organised most of the major ac- ing one goal (a transparent and the masses. Lebanon is largely associated with the spark that enflamed an already tions. “We succeeded in establish- environmentally friendly solution “higher levels of aid, including food frustrated population. ing the principles of accountability to the waste crisis), achieving a baskets and financial assistance for The anti-corruption youth move- and people’s right to oversee the victory and then moving to other medical and educational costs.” ment “You Stink” has lost momen- government’s work.” causes.” While sectarianism has its roots tum even though no solution has But security incidents and po- For others, the lack of a common in welfare, its main implication is been found to the waste manage- litical manipulation have almost vision was a main weakness.
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