KUNGL KRIGSVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT

diskussion & debatt Swedish transformation and the Nordic Battle Group – for what and towards what?

By Tommy Jeppsson

o characterize Swedish security policy the 1990’s. As a result, has given Tduring almost half a century cover- up neutrality and non-alignment and has ing the period from 1945 to 1990 can be changed to military non-alignment, while done, at least as a starting point, by using at the same time gaining membership in two words: neutrality and non-alignment. the EU in 1995. The latest report from the A credible defence policy, a reasonably Swedish defence commission2 emphasizes strong total defence structure, conscrip- cooperation between the EU member states tion and a national defence industry were in the framework of the European Security cornerstones in the ability to handle a and Defence Policy (ESDP). As a result of threat which was mainly characterised participation in the as military. Today, almost all European programme, Swedish cooperation with have, for less than two decades, NATO has intensified, which has been a seen profound transformations in order booster for the transformation process of to meet new and broader challenges that the armed forces. mainly originate from outside our own Besides giving facts and figures as well continent.1 as making some reflections concerning the The fundamental change in the security Nordic EU Battle Group (NBG) concept, policy environment influencing Sweden the aim with this article is to discuss per- is the result of events taking place from spectives that derive from two dominating the mid 1980’s and at the beginning of views concerning the future security envi-

1 Eriksson, Arita: “The Building of a Defence Capacity in the – What Internal and External Implications”, (draft) to be published in Hallenberg, Jan & Karlson, Håkan (eds.): The New Strategic Triangle: The US, the EU and in an Evolving Security Environment, Routledge, 2006 p 14. 2 Regeringskansliet, Försvarsdepartementet, Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:48.

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ronment. I also wish to elaborate on what then follow, focusing on the concept as a implications those might have, not so much tool for CM. The aim of the penultimate concerning the NBG concept as such but section is to discuss an alternative to the the Swedish military as a whole. NBG concept in the framework of the The NBG has been presented as having ongoing broadened Nordic cooperation a key role in the transformation of the which will almost certainly have an impact . That role, when on the Swedish military. This is done from it comes to facts, figures and the concept, the basic insight that concepts, structures will be briefly and critically discussed and organizations are continuously un- based on ongoing trends in our security dergoing change. Finally, it is frequently environment, which will most probably communicated that Swedish military have implications for our future. In other capabilities have an international as well words, the future role of the Swedish mili- a national role to play. Therefore, it has tary as an instrument for national defence to be discussed how the NBG, basically or territorial defence, Crisis Management designed for military CM, fits into a na- (CM) or as an instrument for both is the tional context. The final part tries to sum main topic of this article. up some of the broader perspectives earlier The focus will be on Sweden, also touched upon. when dealing with specific NBG issues, although the author is fully aware of the The political process – a guideline importance of troop contributions from for transformation towards a CM- Estonia, Finland, and Norway. The orientated military reason is that the Swedish contribution This section focuses on the Swedish na­ represents the main body of the NBG since tio­­nal perspective. It gives a short over- Sweden has a role as framework nation. view of the development of the security The relevance of the NBG concept for CM and defence policy covering the period operations as well as national defence will 1999–2004. This period has seen greater be discussed. and more dramatic changes regarding This chapter starts with a brief look security and defence policy than probably into the Swedish political process that has ever before in the modern history of Swe- been guiding the military transformation. den . After 1989 these changes have been This will be followed by an overview and closely tied to a new security environment discussion about the European Union’s and the development of the ESDP. strategy, a document that is often referred Starting slowly in the early 1990’s, ac- to as it represents the first published strat- celerating in the late 1990’s and reaching egy document of the Union. Facts, figures top speed after 2000, the Swedish armed and reflections concerning the NBG will forces have undergone a dramatic reori-

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entation from a threatfocused, territorial needed in order to make them interoper- anti-invasion force towards a CM instru- able as well as meeting the required status ment to be used internationally as well as of readiness. Secondly, and of significant nationally. One main driving force has importance, was showing political willing- been the ESDP process, in which Sweden ness as well as the ability to participate in has participated very actively. One reason EU operations. in the for the positive attitude towards the ESDP Democratic Republic of Congo, where a is that Sweden has shown a genuine inter- Swedish Special Forces unit was operat- est in increasing the CM capabilities of ing in close and effective cooperation with the union. Another, more hidden, reason French units, has had positive spillover might be the Swedish resistance against effects regarding how the Swedish mili- a common European defence,3 which tary is viewed internationally. Thirdly, the might explain the effective Swedish EU decision taken by the Swedish government presidency in 2001, also when security to participate in Operation Artemis has issues were being discussed. One example shown an ability to take sensitive, security of effectiveness mentioned is the work policyrelated, decisions at short notice as concerning the development of military ca- well as an increased willingness to use the pabilities. The most important procedural military instrument as a security policy result of the Headline Goal Process, the tool, which also represents something Headline Progress Catalogue (HPC), was fundamentally new compared with the a Swedish reference. In this document, it period. is clearly stated which capabilities the EU In preparing the Swedish Defence Review requires, which ones are operational and taken in December 2004, the government what operational consequences the identi- stressed the importance of participating in fied shortcomings will have.4 the development of EU CM capabilities, The ESDP process is estimated to have including the ability for rapid reaction. In had and still has a significant influence on order to improve the for the restructuring of the Swedish armed more demanding international operations, forces. Firstly, Sweden committed units priority was given to the development of from all services which were reported to a European rapid reaction capability.5 The HPC with high costs associated to the work establishment of the NBG together with

3 Wedin, Lars: “Sweden in European security” in Huldt, Bo; Ries, Tomas; Mörtberg, Jan & Davidson,Elisabeth (eds.): Strategic Yearbook 2004. The New Northern Security Agenda. National Defence College, 2004, p 329. 4 Ibid, p 329. 5 Proposition 2004/05:43, Försvarsmaktens grundorganisation. Regeringskansliet, Stockholm 2004, p. 16.

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Estonia, Finland, Ireland and Norway has the formal membership of a military alli- been viewed as a “main-focus project” ance is, from a political point of view, a within the Swedish armed forces. non-subject. To give one example, support Reasons why Denmark has not con- concerning command and control for NBG tributed to the NBG has, at least partly, 08 was provided by the United Kingdom connections with reservations made in through its Operational Headquarters the Amsterdam Treaty, where it is stated (OHQ). From the Swedish perspective, that Denmark is not going to participate such an arrangement would have been in any activities involving EU military highly doubtful a decade ago. capabilities. Tricky consequences could be Also, the timeframe of establishing the foreseen as a result of this. If the UN tasks NBG gives interesting signals. NBG 08 the EU to launch an operation or if the EU was operational from the first of January takes the decision to go for an operation 2008, which clearly showed a political by itself, or if NATO goes for an opera- willingness to get practical results within tion where the USA is not participating the shortest possible timeframe. This is and the European countries use the EU the output of the fact that the ability to defence dimension, Denmark might find participate in international missions in herself in a situation where the country is the short-term and mid-term timeframe unable to participate.6 For the discussion has been the most important single factor taking part later in this chapter concern- that has influenced day-to-day work in the ing an alternative to the NBG concept in armed forces during the last few years.7 the framework of the ongoing broadening The political process, as well as work Nordic cooperation, it is estimated that done in the Swedish Armed Forces HQ Denmark will change this point of view before and after the parliamentary decision some time in the future. regarding the defence white paper of 2004, The process of developing the first NBG seems to have confirmed the tendency to (NBG 08) represents a practical landmark emphasize the EU’s military dimension. in the rapid shift of Swedish security and This is also seen in countries that have defence policy. In reality, military non- traditionally shown reluctance to use their alignment does not exclude Sweden from military instrument. EU requirements seem cooperating with other nations in all types to have been the most important single of CM operations, while at the same time factor when it comes to the implementa-

6 Nordisk Sikkerhet – Militaerbalansen 2003-2004. Den Norske Atlanterhavskomité, Oslo 2004, p. 66-27. 7 Op cit, footnote 5, p. 16.

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tion phase of restructuring the Swedish process of establishing the NBG 08 has military. In fact, this is the same as having deepened the interaction and cooperation a focus on the establishment of the NBG.8 between the . The work The ESDP seems to have been looked upon with the NBG concept between Finland, as the overarching “way ahead” for the Norway and Sweden has served as a restructuring process. Half a year before booster for cooperation in a wider area of the Swedish Defence Review in December defence related issues. It is also interesting 2004 was produced, the NBG concept was that cooperation has included the United implemented and the Kingdom. Bearing in mind the specific role was developed.9 The result has been that this country has had as being responsible the EU has affected both Swedish security for the OHQ, a most probable output for policy as well as further development of Sweden is estimated to be deepened co- the armed forces. It could be argued that operation not only with Norway, Finland the process inside the union concerning and the United Kingdom, but also with development of CM capabilities has also other EU and NATO countries. As a re- served the purpose of change at the na- sult of the readiness period for NBG 08, tional level. cooperation has reached more practical A far-reaching and important question and detailed levels. This ongoing practical concerning the future is whether the influ- work will most probably enhance coop- ence of the EU upon its member states, eration between the Nordic countries as including Sweden could be estimated to well as have consequences inside the EU, increase or decrease as a consequence of both politically and militarily, with great results in the ESDP process. So far some integrative effects. positive results have been achieved. For Sweden as a small state the development The European security strategy – of security policy hardware like the NBG a tool for encouraging change is a way of showing political willingness to One reason for publishing the European support the ESDP process and at the same security strategy in December 2003 was a time a way of gaining influence over its need to define and make the security policy further development.10 aims of the union clear. Bearing in mind From practical military aspects the how fast the ESDP was developing during

8 ”Beslut om reformens mål och strategi”, Försvarsmakten, Högkvarteret, STRA UTVS, HKV beteckning 23 100:78621, Stockholm, 2004. 9 Op cit, footnote 1, p. 16. 10 See Op cit, footnote 2.

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these years, the need for a roadmap ahead, coordination.13 This message has to be giving a signal that the EU wished to be an viewed in a broader security context. One independent security political actor, was result of the European integration is that needed. There existed an obvious need the borders of the union are getting closer among the EU member states to enhance to ”security hotspots”, where almost au- a common security policy understanding tomatically a secure environment on the as well as a common culture for Crisis other side of the Mediterranean and in Management.11 North Africa is of paramount importance The strategy clearly states that the EU as is a peaceful Balkan region.14 needs to be a more active international However, questions have been raised player, more unified and more able to if the document represents a meaningful, take action. The document stresses the im- coherent strategy that goes beyond the portance of developing a strategic culture borders of the EU nations. Within the EU that fosters early, rapid and, if necessary, member states there is a very clear prefer- robust interventions. Also, the importance ence for soft power, while at the same time of operations that combine military and there are certain questions to be answered civilian capacities as a consequence of a when it comes to the role to be played by broad capability list at the EU’s disposal the military.15 This limitation becomes is underlined.12 more obvious when one recognizes a The EU strategy communicates the constantly repeated experience that in necessity of developing capabilities in insecure and dangerous environments it cooperation between the member states is often only the military that can achieve more systematically as well as a need for a “civilian effect”, particularly if there are more flexible and mobile forces in order to time limitations involved.16 Yet another be able to handle new threats. The strategy aspect is that although the strategy clearly gives a clear signal that the EU capabilities communicates the view that European and those from member states need better security is going beyond national bounda-

11 Tofte, Sunniva: ”European Securitypolitical Strategy. A secure Europe in a better world”. DNAK 3-2004. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid 14 Ibid 15 Eikenberry, Karl: ”Europe and Conflict Resolution: Isolated or Engaged?”.Perspectives on International Security, Adelphi Paper 400-401, p. 63. 16 Richards, David: ”European Armies: The Challenge”. Perspectives on International Security, Adelphi paper 400-401, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 2008 p. 55.

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Defence against invasion Actively used security policy tool Preventive approach Oriented towards involvement Defence against massive military invasion Continuously ongoing CM operations National perspective Multinational perspective Stored material/ mobilization system Frequently used military capabilities Opponent well defined Blurred picture of opponent (-s) Quantitybased organization Quality based organization Focus: Plans, administration, training of conscripts Focus: Ongoing crisis management operations Fixed structures Modular structures Operational environment defined Variation of operational environment ries it is not clearly addressing regional den, the above table compares the main priorities.17 characteristics between a defence system Arguments for the EU to become a more against invasion versus a military designed active actor indirectly reflects a need for for an active security policy role.18 better coordination of existing resources When listed factors are compared, two as well as better cooperation when new entirely different military systems appear. capabilities are acquired. Increased de- Sweden has disbanded a military which is fence budgets may be an aim, but it is a characterized in the left section of the table highly doubtful wish as long as there is and is moving rapidly towards the direction no perception of a security threat to described in the right-hand section . One the member states of the union. Synergy obvious question when comparing factors effects as a result of good cooperation are presented in the table is if the Swedish probably a faster way of getting results. transformation has focused too much on The tri-lateral cooperation between Fin- qualities presented in the right-hand sec- land, Norway and Sweden has, during the tion of the table and neglected the rationale last few years, identified a great number of behind the left one. This question will be possibilities now under way of probably followed up later in this chapter. being materialized. However, from an overall point of To sum up the transformation process view, some less favourable tendencies that has been and is taking place in Swe- can be observed that tend to hamper a

17 Op cit, footnote 15 p 63-64. 18 The table is originally presented by Sverre Diesen at a presentation at the Swedish National Defence College in the autumn of 2001.

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process towards a higher degree of mili- between nations instead of protecting it tary efficiency inside the EU. In the 1999 nationally seems to be an obvious success Helsinki headline goals, 64 capability criteria. However, the reality is that nations objectives were identified as critical and generally favour the latter approach. The had to be met. In 2006, seven years later, result is the development of nation-specific only twelve of those were successfully systems and the use of different command implemented.19 There are critical short- and control systems in a coalition context.21 comings, for instance when it comes to This is communicated as lessons learned force protection, such as field ballistic from NBG 08, identifying Intelligence, protection from improvised explosive Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Re- devices and rocket-propelled grenades. connaissance Task Forces (ISTAR TF) as Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisi- critical assets. Without collectively owned tion and reconnaissance (ISTAR) as well sensors or sensors possessed by member as inter-theatre and intra-theatre airlifts nations, collecting information according are other areas of concern. Helicopters to the priorities decided upon, the intelli- are a key resource and the identified lack gence branch will be totally reliant on what of those being deployable is especially other nations are willing to provide.22 critical. All the EU nations possess 1,437 helicopters out of which 551 are classed as The NBG as a CM tool: facts, figures NATO deployable. Only 44 are identified and reflections as meeting the operational requirements of The Swedish transformation is from an in the 2006 NATO Defence overall point of view in line with the Eu- Planning Questionnaire.20 ropean security strategy which emphasizes When it comes to command and control the need to transform the armed forces there exists a collective inability to com- inside the union towards more flexibility municate effectively within and between and to give them tools they can use to meet headquarters, which does not only refer to threats identified as new threats.23 The equipment incompatibility. National secu- NBG has significantly showed willingness rity regimes are significant hindrances to to reach a higher ability to participate in operational command. Sharing information international CM operations. At the same

19 Op cit, footnote 15, p 65. 20 Op cit, footnote 16, p 59. 21 Ibid. 22 Nordic Battle Group Force Headquarters Sweden, Lessons learned 2008, 30 June 2008, p. 12 . 23 Ett säkert Europa i en bättre värld. En europeisk säkerhetsstrategi. Europeiska Unionens institut för säkerhetsstudier, Paris 2003, p. 20.

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time, this greater ability is developed in registered units in HPC, mainly those order to meet requirements both from the from the Navy and Air Force. Doubts EU and the UN.24 have concentrated on why one should The transformation of the Swedish de- have units from both these two services fence forces has clearly shown an ambition in the HPC. It has been argued that these to focus on operational requirements, also units are expensive and not asked for in in the near future. Priority was given to missions. It is worth observing that when international commitments and the ability this text is written (in October 2009), EU of rapid reaction, which was expected to operations have been limited in numbers, increase both qualitative and quantitative with the consequence that it might be too aspects.25 Seen from the perspective that early to conclude which resources are the NBG was expected to be operational needed as well as those which are not. In from January 2008, this ambition fits in addition, it is of interest that Sweden shows rather well. The Report of the Parliamen- the ambition to participate with capabili- tary Standing Committee on Defence 2004 ties from the three services.28 Sweden is emphasized the need for high personal as participating with two corvettes and a well as material quality.26 logistics support ship in the EU-led force The Report of the Parliamentary Stand- to secure Somalian waters from piracy. ing Committee on Defence 2004 also This has underlined the necessity of not stressed the importance of Swedish units having a too narrow approach towards the having high and equal quality to units from subject of what could be expected to be the countries that Sweden cooperates with. appropriate capabilities for CM. The importance of flexibility and mobility Missions for the NBG were covered by when talking about rapid reaction forces the Affairs and External Relations means that they are expected to be able to Council (GAERC) on 17 May 2004 and shift between levels of conflict, tasks and includes the following geographical environment as well as being interoperable with a broad spectrum of • Joint disarmament operations partner countries and civilian actors.27 • Humanitarian and rescue tasks There have been questions concerning • tasks and tasks of

24 Sveriges försvarspolitik 2005-2007, Report 2004/05: FöU4, p. 48. 25 Ibid, p 48. 26 Ibid, p 48. 27 Ibid, p 48. 28 Wedin, Lars: ”Tre år i EU:s militära stab”, KKrVAHT, 5. häftet 2004 , p. 144.

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combat­ forces in crisis management, can be expected. The innovative use of including peacemaking tactics and technology in combination • Support for third countries in com- with the ambition to hit as many critical bating terrorism and security sector vulnerabilities as possible with the aim of reform.29 breaking the will of the opponent can also be expected. These methods are tactical Five to ten days after the decision has been in essence. Combined with psychological taken, units from the NBG are expected to tools, results will be reached at the stra- be operational in a minor CM operation (up tegic level, because the will of the entire to 120 days) or have the role as advance nation to continue as a part of an ongoing party in a more complex one. operation can be hampered. There is a Combating terrorism is a task of specific general tendency that asymmetric threats interest. CM today involves a blurred envi- that might influence an EU operation are ronment where activities supporting nation reasonably well defined when it comes to building simultaneously takes place with actors as well as their tools and methods. fighting. Actors using terrorism as a tool One can therefore easily argue that this have convincingly shown their ability of has to be considered when composing and fighting western militaries. The NBG 08 training modern military forces. was not tested (no BG has been so far) in an When it comes to command and control operation. Still, the different views between at the operational level, one or several BGs the Nordic capitals as well as inside the are commanded by Force Headquarters union regarding the use of military force (FHQ), which, together, constitutes the against terrorist groups have to be sorted out rapid reaction capability. One EU OHQ in order to create the same set of rules. (combined and joint) shall, if needed, be Identified tasks as well as possible future able to command the military part of the mission areas make it highly probable that EU-led CM operation where this specific the NBG, if sent into an operation, will HQ gets political guidance from the EU. face actors operating from asymmetrical A FHQ is an instrument for command and concepts. The norm will be that these control at the operational level and is the actors do what is unexpected. Non-tra- highest military level of the Union in a ditional concepts of attacking, which are CM operation. A FHQ for the NBG has the totally different from the rules, tools or capacity to lead one or more BGs as well methods used by the party being attacked, as supporting elements. It can also consist

29 Council of the European Union. Press release 2582 , Council Meeting. General Affairs and External Re- lations. Brussels, 17 May 2004.

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of HQ-units and a staff from participating as well as tactical air transport, close air nations.30 The command and control link support (CAS), airport of departure units, at the militarystrategic level for NBG 08 strategic sealift and traffic control units. has been the OHQ in Northwood in the The NBG 08 numbered 2,850 all ranks. United Kingdom. It is one of four certified Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service OHQs assigned to be at the disposal of the Support (CSS) are included in these fig- EU, which seems to have been a natural ures. NBG 11 will field a smaller amount choice since there is no such headquarters of personnel, about 2,000.32 available either in Sweden or in Finland. From an overall point of view, the ability Also, the Norwegian OHQ in Stavanger to achieve high quality related to the mate- is not an alternative as long as Norway is rial aspects has been met. When it comes to not a member of the EU. From the intel- capabilities, the most serious limitation for ligence perspective, Northwood is a valu- NBG 08 has been the lack of helicopters able choice because it represents one of the for medical evacuation. terminating points of both the EU’s as well A first draft of preliminary costs up to as NATO’s intelligence databases.31 2008 is shown in the table below.34 The core unit and manoeuvre element These figures could be compared with in the NBG 08 was a reinforced bat- the reported costs of SEK 1.2 billion for talion characterized by the possibility of 2008, which flared a debate in the after- an all-arms representation. In addition, math of the arrival of the final bill. The operational and strategic enablers were reason for increased costs is that the unit pre-identified. These consisted of air and had to be raised from the bottom up, where naval forces together with logistic and particularly the recruitment of personnel other special functions, such as strategic was expensive. The situation for NBG

2005 2006 2007 2008 Sek 101 mill 35 sek 302 mill sek 842 mill SEK 1.050 bill

30 Interview with Colonel , 27 February 2005. 31 Interview with Commander Tor Egil Walther, Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 1 March 2005. 32 Interview with Chief of Staff: , Berndt Grundevik 23 March 2008. 33 Ibid. 34 Utveckling av bidrag till EU:s snabbinsatsförmåga (Nordic Battle Group) – beskrivning av verksamhet samt därtill knutna kostnader. Försvarsmakten, Högkvarteret, HKV 23 383: 63848, Stockholm 2005. 35 Swedish crowns.

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11 will be different where a new system as framework nation. Especially, Strategic of recruitment will be established with Airlift has been identified as an area of soldiers already on contract.36 short supply in all European countries and If the concept of the Nordic BG is to is an area that from a Swedish perspec- be fully implemented, strategic transport tive has required special attention due capabilities both in the air and at sea are to the role as framework nation. It is an the most critical assets. This is a problem area where it is critical that the European for all EU members except for France and nations co-operate in order to develop the United Kingdom. Existing railway functioning solutions. Sweden has actively network and road systems used in combi- been searching for common solutions and a nation make it possible to reach probable future- oriented co-operation, the Strategic conflict areas on the European continent. Airlift Capability (SAC), is established. The full use of this combination is possible SAC is an air transport asset consisting in the western parts, and here it is essential of three C-17 aircraft that are commonly to stress the importance of heavy road owned and operated by twelve nations. transport units as a most critical resource. Sweden is the second largest stakeholder in Although not an urgent issue at present, the common pool and will also contribute future operations in the eastern parts of Eu- substantially to the manning of the main rope, however, will be heavily dependent operating base located in Hungary.38 on the railroads.37 The possibility to reach SAC is an example of how European landlocked areas will depend on an airlift capabilities can be strengthened through capacity if the rapid deployment of units a pragmatic interplay between the EU and and their logistics is going to be realized. If NATO. This interplay is of special signifi- airport and port facilities are available in an cance for the two EU nations Sweden and area of tension or conflict, the combination Finland.39 Strategic airlift is a most criti- of air-lift and sea-lift makes a rapid reac- cal tool because of EU requirements that tion possible. Entry forces use airlift assets Rapid Reaction Forces shall be operational and heavier units and the main bulk of in a conflict zone only days after decisions supply uses sealift assets, where the latter have been made and bearing in mind that a is the most economical alternative. number of the most probable conflict areas Adequate strategic airlift and sealift are landlocked. capabilities are Sweden’s responsibility Sealift for the NBG is expected to be

36 Interview with General Anders Lindström made by Sven-Åke Haglund 22 December 2008. 37 Interview with Dr Alpo Juntunen, National Defence College of Finland, 3 March 2005. 38 Swedish Supreme Commanders newsletter 7 July 2008. 39 Ibid.

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provided by Swedish-Norwegian coop- high-intensity/low-intensity operations at eration using contracted ships, and, for both the operational and tactical levels, logistic purposes, by membership in the imply that very different demands have Sealift Co-ordination Centre (SCC) lo- to be met at the same time. High-intensity cated in Eindhoven.40 At the same time, operations will need a robust military lo- proposals have been heard favouring gistic organization which easily can adapt the acquisition of a Swedish amphibious to combat-arms units that are frequently transport ship with a multi-role capacity. task-organized. At the same time, low- The main task would be transportation of intensity operations might be sustained by units and supplies. Additional roles could using civilian contractors, coordinated by be as a command and control facility, as a an integrated civil-military logistic staff hospital-ship as well as a base for rescue element. operations. Using existing know-how such Readiness is closely linked to training a ship could be operational in three to five standards. One overarching ambition with years after a decision has been taken with a the NBG concept is that the units must cost of approximately 200 million euros.41 be able to engage in warfighting without Such a ship would ensure sustainability for complementary training. From a Swedish the NBG during operations, while Sweden perspective, that view represents a great at the same time could offer a most wanted change as soldiers have to be regulars or on resource to other nations, which increases contract. In addition, the mental impact on the role of Sweden as a EU member and the organization as a whole might be quite co-operation partner.42 Concerning na- substantial. In practice, this means that a tional sealift capabilities, small nations new armed forces culture with a code and have obviously found these of consider- ethos focusing on the military’s role as the able value. In the case of Denmark, two Swedish number one repressive instrument command and support ships, Absalon and will develop more professionalism because Esbern Snare, were launched in 2004 and the organization as a whole will have mis- 2005, respectively. sion experience. The tendency from the High logistical demands have to be 1970’s up to the 1990’s, where military met. A most probable conflict scenario personnel were looked upon as just another characterized by simultaneously ongoing, group of public servants, seems to have no

40 ”Särskild redovisning av strategiska transporter i BU 06”, p 8, 12, 19 and 21. 41 Granholm, Niklas: ”Omvärldsbild och självbild – förändrade förutsättningar för marinens strukturella utveckling”. Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet (2:2003), p 155-157. 42 Ibid, p 156.

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future in an organization which is used as future use of NBG 11, will effect further an active security policy tool. transformation of the armed forces as a It is also important for the establish- CM instrument. Firstly, one has to bear ment of the NBG that the structure of in mind that for the foreseeable future the the Swedish officers’ corps will undergo Swedish armed forces will most probably great changes. The consequence of a reflect a small organization, where the newly taken decision that approximately finalized work with NBG 08 as well as 60% will belong to a group of specialist the ongoing work to establish NBG 11 officers means that in practice NCO’s are will have consequences for almost the back, which could be expected to have a entire organization. Secondly, and as a positive effect on training standards from result of a relatively limited volume as the bottom up in the organization. Also, if well as the fact that units are frequently one adapted the Danish way of reducing used in missions, an environment will be the number of officers serving in staff and shaped where transformation is an ongoing administrative positions and increasing the process. It is driven by mission-related numbers serving with the units, this could experience, where it might not be too be expected to raise the total quality of the unrealistic to predict substantial changes organization. in the now adopted concept. Thirdly, The ongoing process in Sweden, where the formalized studies and development will be replaced by regulars system, developed from the late 1960’s, and soldiers on contract, has not been has definitely lost its significance in favour accepted by everyone. Counterproposals of a much more dynamic process, where stress that there is no sign that conscription recently gained experience and lessons could be disbanded if the quality aspects learned have to be implemented rapidly. are taken seriously. The reason is that con- There seems to exist views that the EU scription allows for testing a good portion BG’s will be able to execute autonomous of the population, which helps in the search operations. These views have to be con- for quality. In other words, conscription for nected with some of the main character- these people is a prerequisite for recruit- istics of future operations initiated and ing the right quality of the right numbers executed by the EU: to fill the ranks manned by professionals • A rapid initial response to the actual and soldiers on contract. crisis that will generally serve the purpose of demonstrating political Not the final military CM solution will as well as military ability and at One motivated question might be if and the same time secure the arrival of how the development of NBG 08, as follow-on forces. well as the development and possible • Next, the creation of a secure en-

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vironment might involve military reinforcements. For instance, the 82nd operations at low intensity up to high Airborne Division from the USA, the UK intensity – simultaneously. Air assault Brigade and the 11th Mobile • Lastly, it is about sustaining a secure Brigade from the Netherlands meet the environment, which is a prerequisite criteria mentioned above. for post-conflict peacebuilding. This Increased Nordic cooperation might be process generally has a long duration far deeper in the future as has been sig- and requires a lot of work in order to nalled by former Norwegian Minister for create confidence among the popula- Foreign Affairs, Thorvald Stoltenberg.43 tion, which is personal intensive. Or in Nordic operations in the future will most other words, “Boots-on-the-ground” probably give room for further develop- is just another expression of the fact ment. The Nordic Brigade, which was that numbers still count, also in CM. earlier established within the framework This fact will be elaborated on later of the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement in this chapter. for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS), might serve as a framework when discuss- Talking about those operations who might ing future Nordic military CM tools. Char- involve a substantial amount of violence, acteristics discussed earlier in this section autonomous operations are manpower-in- of future CM operations indicates the need tensive and we have to bear in mind that for the following capacities: one capability the core element of the NBG is a batallion. tailored for rapid response in order to secure In order to meet operational demands that the arrival of follow-on forces while at are closely connected with rapid reaction the same time signalling political will and ability, high tactical and operational as military ability. Another capability is to be well as strategic mobility have to be met. able to create a safe environment by being Rapid reaction units at brigade and divi- capable of being involved in operations sion levels are designed for a quick reac- covering the spectrum from low intensity tion to upcoming crises, which in practice to high intensity combat simultaneously. is the same as being operational in the A third capability is designed to sustain a respective “hotspot” within days. Rapid secure environment, which is a prerequisite reaction units also have the capacity to for peacebuilding, a process that generally calm down the situation through their own extends over a long period of time. In other resources, or if that is not possible, to serve words, what might be needed are forces as an advance party by securing incoming that are fast, strong and sustainable enough

43 Stoltenberg, Thorvald: Nordic co-operation on foreign and security policy – a proposal presented to the Nordic foreign ministers during a special Nordic Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 9 February 2009.

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for establishing military presence, creating • One mechanized battalion with a tank a safe enough environment and securing squadron as the main follow-up force as well as supporting the nation-building and provider of fighting power is needed process. in order to create a safe environment. A military solution from identified tasks A broad variety of combat tasks could is a brigade-sized unit with the following be solved with limitations mainly con- main components: nected with operational and strategic mobility. Sealift/ railway/ land trans- • One airmobile battalion as the main tool portations are at present main possibili- for rapid response with high tactical, ties.44 The C 130- system cannot be used operational as well as strategic mobility. and a heavy air transport aircraft such This unit is trained to fulfil combat tasks, as the now available C-17 is required, but has less protection and firepower at least for parts of this battalion. The compared to a mechanized battalion provider of this mechanized battalion or an infantry battalion. The airmobile could be Denmark, where the Danish battalion is relatively modest to support International Brigade includes such a logistically. The C-130 system in service unit. The Danish International Brigade, in Denmark, Norway and Sweden could which, in addition, has two mechanized be used for airlifts. With a light equip- infantry battalions, an artillery battalion ment alternative, including three days together with other CS and CSS ele- of supply (DOS), one squadron can be ments forms a suitable structure from lifted by three C-130’s. The Swedish which augmented capacities for the Army has one such unit in its inventory mechanized battalion can be drawn. The and one squadron has been operational brigade is reported to be a part of the since 2007 with soldiers on contract. To Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) achieve the same status for the rest of the and consists of approximately 4,500 all battalion, it will be necessary to recruit ranks, where 20% are regulars and 80% additional soldiers on contract with an conscripts with a contract that makes estimated timeframe of two years after it possible to call them up for service a decision has been made. during a period of three years.45

44 To give an impression of the logistical demands: when Sweden provided a reinforced CV 90 company to the United Nations Liberia mission, 200 containers were required for getting the company to the mission area. 45 Op cit, footnote 6, p 63

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• One infantry battalion needed both for Military Police units that can carry out more demanding operations in order normal police functions, train the local to secure a safe environment as well police as well as take part in counter- as providing “boots on the ground”, insurgency operations. Organizing such which will be an essential part for a battalion could eventually be made securing the peace-building process. on a trilateral basis between Finland, The Norwegian Telemark Battalion Norway and Denmark. might fit into this role. However, the pure infantry component is limited and • CS and CSS units as well as strategic ena- may need reinforcements, especially blers discussed earlier in this chapter. when entering a peace-building phase. The combat capability of the Telemark Being capable of dealing with an opponent Battalion lies somewhere between a using asymmetric concepts generates a mechanized and an airmobile battalion. need to adopt intelligence-driven opera- Numbering 450 professionals and 80 on tions. In such an environment the need for contract the battalion is built around one technical intelligence components are mechanized infantry company with CV reduced in favour of human intelligence 90s/ M 113s, one tank squadron with (HUMINT) combined with a deep cul- Leopard 2A3s and one combat engi- tural knowledge. This has to be reflected neer company as well as headquarters in an intelligence structure at all levels and supply company. Augmented are that is capable of using both military and antitank, medical, mortar, forward air non-military sources and is capable for control/fire control units and a national smooth coordination with local and re- support element.46 An alternative to the gional authorities and agencies as well as Norwegian Telemark Battalion could commercial organizations of the country be a Finnish unit, bearing in mind that where mission takes place. Here, the need Finland has at its disposal three rapid for Special Forces units from all Nordic reaction brigades. countries seems to be obvious. One important area, when future struc- • One military police battalion which will tures are discussed, is the development of have a limited role in high- intensity network-based capabilities. Of paramount operations, but is a most useful tool importance is interoperability with forces against non- conventional opponents as from EU and NATO countries. From a more well as in the peacebuilding phase. This practical aspect Swedish forces are more phase will need a substantial number of interoperable than most new and in some

46 Ibid, p. 18.

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cases old NATO countries. The creation of poleon I. Task organization in reality is a network-based capabilities is most critical first step to developing modular network- in order to enhance efficiency. For example, structures that are replacing pyramid ones a battalion commander on the ground must created during the industrial era. have the ability to call for fire support, either from artillery, close air support or naval National defence versus Crisis gunfire. What tool or which tools he or she Management decides to use depends on the tactical situa- When stating that the NBG is an engine for tion. However, the communications have to the transformation of Swedish defence, the be knitted together between the Army, naval logical follow-up question is - transformation and Air Force units and the intelligence towards what? To be able to come up with picture has to be the same. a reasonably good answer to that question, Due to the fact that conflicts become a starting point could be to look into the more and more internationalized, expedi- military consequences of the ongoing tionary thinking and structuring is in focus. discussion concerning our future security A structure exemplified by a Nordic bri- environment. From an overarching point gade should be looked upon as a capability of view, mainly two lines of argumentation box from which the actual force structure could be found. The basis for these two is composed, depending on the charac- lines of argumentation is the conviction ter of the actual conflict. The challenge that it is unthinkable to imagine a safe then will be the creation of operational Sweden in our time, or any other safe flexibility and organizational stability, nation for that matter, if the surrounding which are factors that simply cannot be environment is unsafe. This view is also united in an environment characterized by very clearly communicated in the EU multi-dimensionality and tasked organized security strategy from 2003. forces. The key to success in such an envi- The first line of argumentation is almost ronment is well trained personnel that are identical with Sir Rupert Smith’s views able to tackle a wide spectrum of missions expressed in his book The Utility of Force47 with a broad variety of military capacities. where he sees war amongst people as more Perhaps flatter structures can help to solve than a war between nations as the future the problem, taking into consideration challenge for western armed forces. This that land force structures with a pyramid also seems to be the view of most Euro- organization from section to Army Corps pean governments where militaries on the represent a concept originating from Na- continent, since the early 90’s, are being

47 Smith, Rupert: The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World, Allen Lane, Penguin books, London 2005.

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transformed or in the process of becom- is the current situation which is closely ing so. They are frequently used in order linked to the tendency to extrapolate the to create a safe environment in CM or present situation into the future. This has overseas missions. The focus is on soci- the additional consequence that even more etal reconstruction in countries that have emphasis is put into ongoing operations already failed or are in the process of be- with the obvious risk that long-term stra- coming failed states. The EU’s BG concept tegic perspectives are lost. For a world like is without doubt designed for out-of-area the one mentioned above and character- operations in an environment characterized ized by Gray and Kagan, a useful military by war amongst the people.48 instrument needs war-fighting capabilities A rather different view from Sir Rupert above the level provided by the EU BG/ is expressed by Colin S. Gray,49 who ar- NBG concept. gues that wars between nations are still The post Cold War era has seen an in- probable, not least as a result of the added creasing trend in western states to commit effects that can be foreseen from climate civilian and military resources for CM change, deforestation, desertification, lack operations, while at the same time less and of arable land and an increased stress on less emphasis and resources have been al- water sources as well as added competi- located to secure national/territorial aspects tion regarding energy. At the same time, of defence using the basic argument that the number of people living on the globe there are no or very limited threats directed is increasing. Gray is supported by Robert against western states. In this chapter, it is Kagan50 who states that our world will argued that the development of the NBG also in the future be characterized by con- is founded on such a rationale. flicts driven by nationalism and historical More high-tech capabilities have been rivalry. Gray’s and Kagan’s views raise identified as critical needs in today’s mili- the question if there has been too much tary operations. The ongoing force trans- disarmament by most European states, formation in most western countries fa- including Sweden after the Cold War, when vours advanced military capabilities rather it comes to the ability of raising substantial than less advanced systems. At the same military capabilities if needed. This ques- time, deployable high-tech out-of-area ca- tion is based on the assumption that the pabilities are so expensive that hardly any focus for most nations has been and still European state can independently maintain

48 Haaland Matlary, Janne: European Union Security Dynamics in the New national Interest, Palgrave Mac- millan, New York 2009, p. 125-130. 49 Gray, Colin S: Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London 2005. 50 Kagan, Robert: The Return of History and the End of Dreams, Knopf, New York 2008.

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the sufficient level of military capabilities be correct in their forecasts that there is a to be used in a traditional military con- high probability of intrastate wars in the frontation resulting in increased military future? Those western states that have in- interdependence.51 The NBG concept vested heavily in high-tech expeditionary clearly reflects these realities – five nations capabilities tailored for crisis management have been cooperating in order to raise the like the BG/NBG may have transformed unit while at the same time adequate com- their armed forces to become obsolete for mand and control arrangements had to be an upcoming need to once again be capable found outside the Nordic countries, i.e. in of defending the territory.53 Great Britain. Gray’s estimations concerning the prob- The interdependence has two conse- ability for intrastate wars in the future quences. One is closely connected to represent a logical argumentation based national defence where it becomes more on a chain of interconnected global trends. and more obvious that states no longer An additional argument is that looking can afford to uphold the present variety into the future security situations, with the of capabilities. The other has to do with time frame of 10-20 years when it comes military CM where the NBG concept to international relations, it is practically represents a type of burden-sharing that impossible to predict relations between most states favour today. Consequently, dominating international actors and the Nordic cooperation, including sugges- level of militarized relations between tions recently presented by the former states. 9/11 is a very good example of the Norwegian minister for foreign affairs,52 fact that strategic surprise can occur – and could be looked upon as including both if it does, the consequences may be very the national and territorial dimension as unexpected.54 With relevance for small- well as CM aspects. states these uncertainties raise a question What if emphasizing military crisis concerning the wisdom behind establish- management capabilities in the long run ing exclusive and expensive tools suited proves to be a passing trend? What if mainly for one role, in the case of Sweden Colin Gray and Robert Kagan prove to the NBG tailored for CM.

51 Raitasalo, Jyri: ”(Why on Earth) Should Small States Do Expeditionary Operations?” in Eskola, Susanna (ed.): Crises Management in Crises? National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 2: Research Reports No 40, Helsinki 2008, p.95. 52 Op cit, footnote 43 53 Op cit, footnote 51, p. 96 54 Ibid.

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For centuries bigger European nations they collectively have decided to undertake like the United Kingdom and France have and in which they wish to succeed, seems developed a culture of using intervention to be a motivated one to raise. It might forces for pursuing political objectives. A have to do with the difference between small state like Sweden does not have a resources and interests of bigger versus similar national and, consequently, military smaller nations, the latter having limited culture, whereby it could be argued that the military resources and a military culture truly expeditionary concept has probably, that still might be influenced by the think- with very few exceptions, been preserved ing of national and territorial defence. In for bigger nations. The consequence for such an environment, where the direct link Sweden, like many other small European between national security and committing nations, is the challenge of transforming troops to a war in a faraway country with capabilities and mindsets that have been no obvious chances of success, is difficult focusing on defence against external to forge.55 Partly, this expression might threats for decades or even centuries. The reflect the Finnish view, where the national use of the military only in the case of and territorial dimensions are very much absolute necessity has been a dominating emphasized. This might also reflect a view. The military CM concept is there- general risk-awareness, which is common fore a watershed for Sweden as well as in all western societies sharing almost the for other western small-state militaries. It same reluctance when it comes to putting could be argued that the ongoing struggle military personnel at risk because of the inside NATO and the EU to get enough negative political impact of soldiers fallen troops deployed into crisis management or wounded in remote parts of the world. operations partly reflects the strategic The question could be raised concerning culture mentioned above and partly a risk the usefulness of rapid reaction CM forces awareness that tends to increase with the to be used in operational environments level of danger. The case of Afghanistan similar to Afghanistan, Iraq or . The reflects this. question of usefulness is not only a ques- There is an ongoing struggle inside tion of whether these troops can be used NATO in order to get enough troops de- or not, but also includes the need for an ployed into crisis management operations. analysis about alternative unit concepts In the case of NATO’s ISAF-operation, the that could be available for the same amount question as to why member states do not of resources. CM military capabilities are commit enough troops for an operation the most expensive type of forces presently

55 Ibid, p 97.

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existing. This is not least because they are ritorial aspects. Such a mix also ensures equipped with high-tech systems and stra- the availability of reserves, a tool that most tegic airlift as well as sealift capabilities, nations try to preserve. but are in addition on constant alert in order Uncertain future prospects within the to be able to participate in an upcoming international system, particularly if great- mission.56 The EU BG/ NBG concept fits power confrontations return to the inter- very well into this description. national security agenda, might be a good Concerning military CM operations of reason for not only emphasizing CM op- today it seems to be important to notice erations, but for seriously considering once their timeframe of years and decades in- again new aspects of national defence. stead of weeks and months. While it is easy Statements that great powers are more to agree upon the need for rapid reaction capable of using military force in order to forces, the question remains unanswered as solve political problems and to fulfil politi- to whether the almost total focus on these cally defined goals as well as that they are capabilities is a wise way ahead. Ongoing more willing to use their military resources, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq seem to might be looked upon as conventional provide evidence enough that sustainabil- truths. They could also be seen serving ity of troops as well as the need for boots as a reminder that when it comes to the on the ground, in other words numbers, development of future military capabilities should still count and should be taken healthy realism is of the utmost importance. into consideration when conceptualizing The statement that resources allocated to military CM forces for the future. This ap- small-state militaries can be expected to proach favours larger formations of lower allow a very smallscale development. When readiness and a lower level of technology it comes to high-tech capabilities seem to as well as it favours a concept that troops be realistic bearing in mind the present can be deployed and sustained over long world economic recession together with the periods.57 Such a high-low mixture of a struggle that most western governments are smaller number of forces at high readiness facing in trying to uphold the social welfare with a hightech profile together with a system. These aspects should be analyzed larger number of forces at lower readiness together with the effects that may be the and with an acceptable technological level result of the accelerated participation in could probably serve CM demands better international operations. At the same time, as well as fitting into the national and ter- an uncertain future within the international

56 Ibid, p 98. 57 Ibid.

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system that might not be favourable for the Swedish defence commission,58 there small states, particularly if great power seems to be a need to develop capabilities confrontations return to the international that can serve the double purpose of being security agenda, has to be considered as a suited both for military CM as well as na- main factor when analyzing future military tional defence. The factor of affordability concepts and capabilities. is a key issue when it comes to an analysis CM operations today are hardly sepa- of the appropriate or acceptable balance rable from wars fought with actors using between quality and quantity. terror as their main tactical tool. This It is up to the government to decide upon reinforces an experience gained over and the contribution Sweden is willing and over again, namely the need to be prepared able to make in CM missions. With that for engagements of long duration, which as a basis for planning, the military can means years and decades instead of weeks have rather accurate contingency plans and months. Rapid reaction forces are criti- characterized by a reasonable substance cal tools in order to be able to respond in when it comes to facts and figures. It gets time to upcoming crises, for example as harder when the question arises as to what entry forces, securing incoming additional capabilities and numbers are needed when troops and civilian crisis management it comes to the defence of the territory. assets. One Nordic view concerning the territorial However, present intense focus on rapid aspects is expressed by Sverre Diesen. As reaction capabilities should be critically the former Chief of Defence of Norway, analyzed at least from two aspects. Firstly, Diesen has argued that an attack on Norwe- if the ability to sustain extended crisis man- gian soil would be characterized by tempo, agement operations is agreed upon with a geographical limitation, with a duration the view that numbers still count (in other of weeks and months compared to years words, the importance of having boots on and even decades when talking about CM the ground), a concept with the ability to operations, and with a very clear political sustain battalions and brigades with lower objective. What rationale could be found readiness and a lower level of technology behind Diesen’s view being aware of the should be weighted versus a continua- fact that theories about the short war have tion of focusing on military capabilities emerged earlier in history and the confron- characterized by high readiness. Secondly, tation with reality has faded almost as fast concerning the national dimension as as they were invented? It seems logical to presented in the latest publication from argue that Diesen’s argumentation is based

58 Op cit, footnote 2.

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on an awareness of the sensitiveness of short duration – are similar to scenarios the critical infrastructure, which could be for which the Norwegian defence concept characterized as the veins of a functioning has been developed. The amount of force post-modern western society. An insight of used in a conflict could be expected to be transnational nonstate actors challenging proportional to its political aim in order the west has increased as well. not to be counterproductive towards its Diesen elaborates on the war in purpose. Limited use of force in a context 8-12 August 2008 and concludes that as of a limited timeline and a geographically an “unsentimental great power”, Russia, constrained unity are Diesen’s character- uses its military instrument when circum- istics for a military conflict.59 stances make it politically suitable and It could be argued that Diesen’s as- militarily possible seen from an acceptable sessment is the logical consequence of risk-assessment point of view. He argues Norway´s membership in the Atlantic that Russia has not lowered the threshold . The use of force from the aggres- when it comes to the use of its military sor’s point of view has to be limited and instrument against the west/ NATO. The politically well orchestrated in order not relationship between military risk-taking to involve NATO in the conflict. The risks and what could be gained politically in of paying too high a price from a conflict such a situation would have been totally which is fundamentally regional in charac- different from that of the Georgian case, a ter has to be avoided. Such a threshold in country governed from Moscow for almost the case of a non- militarily allied Sweden 200 years, with a substantial Russian mi- might be lower. From the point of view of nority and not being a member of NATO. an aggressor, the EU’s solidarity clause Diesen emphasizes the fact that if we de- may be viewed as less substantial than ar- fine a threat as the sum of political will and ticle 5 in the NATO Charter. Consequences military capability, a more intense Russian for military hardware in a land-orientated activity and capacity could be identified scenario similar to the one presented by in the far north. Although he admits to Diesen, seem more favourable to the view an increased Russian ability for limited of having a highly mobile brigadesized operations against Norway, he finds such concept with substantial fighting power actions politically doubtful. He underlines and an all-arms representation compared that the characteristics of the Georgian war to the EU/NBG concept, which, in reality, – short warning-time, high intensity and of represents a reinforced battalion.

59 Diesen, Sverre: ”Status og utfordringer i Forsvaret sett i lys av Stortingets langtidsvedtak”, Norsk Militært Tidskrift nr 6 2008, p. 10.

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Final remarks group concept is a promising one with limi- Three aspects will be covered in this sec- tations mainly identified among strategic tion. I will try to dig a bit deeper as well enablers where the capability shortfalls are as adding some views to those expressed significant. Richards emphasizes that the earlier in this chapter. core quality is the ability to fight. He also Firstly, NBG 08 was not sent into an stresses the need for modern equipment, operation and criticism has been heard while at the same time he seems to look about resources invested in an expensive at the battle group structure as tailored for capability that was never put to use. In small-scale operations.60 These views from discussions, NBG 08 has also been viewed a high- level commander with significant as the natural choice for use in Chad. A experience from international missions looming feeling of disappointment among represents in sum what is stressed earlier in Swedish professional militaries has been this chapter regarding the qualities and the noticed. Much energy and resources have limitations of the concept, respectively. been used in order to establish the unit Elaborating on Richard’s views, it seems within shortest possible timeframe. possible to argue that the EU BG concept is An understanding attitude towards these an instrument for small and short wars, in views is not hard to mobilize. At the same other words a CM tool. However, the main time, additional and more influencing as- focus for militaries in our time is missions pects have to be added. The EU consists in conflicts that can be characterized as of 27 nations and it has to be emphasized small to mediumscale wars of long dura- that decisions such as sending an EU BG tion. In these wars there has been an obvi- to a hotspot has to be taken in consensus. ous need to re-evaluate traditional criteria To reach such a consensus in a general at- for success, because success in small to mosphere of risk-awareness and sensitivity mediumscale wars of long duration with an as regards casualties is an intricate process. opponent using unconventional methods We have also not yet witnessed the deploy- are less dependent on, for instance, mo- ment of any of the EU BG’s availability. bility and firepower. Because these wars That is why it could be argued that it is of tend to be long ones, confidence-building the utmost importance politically as well as towards the civilian population and the militarily to succeed when such a decision additional force protection that might be is eventually taken. One criterion for suc- embedded as a result, is more important. cess might be a “small enough” crisis that Destabilizing actors like warlords, terrorist more or less “guarantee” success. organizations and a guerrilla could, as a David Richards states that the EU battle result of successful confidence-building,

60 Op cit, footnote 16, p. 61.

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be denied political support among the together with the factor of coordination, population with severe implications for which reflects the normal behaviour be- recruitment and intelligence. Use of force tween coalition partners and covers the in those wars generally creates sensitive whole chain of command. In a coalition, political situations. As a result, violence continuous inputs in the chain of command cannot be used without a keen analysis of from the different capitals are a reality with the probable consequences. implications in civil-military relations at Some of the criteria for success in wars every level. For instance, the use of avail- described above are different from those able forces is politically guided and often used in intra-state wars. In small to me- limited. This guidance can be foreseen as diumscale wars of long duration with an continuing even tomorrow. opponent using unconventional methods, Secondly, realistic ambitions are critical. the use of force should be avoided as long Even though there seem to be good argu- as possible. When this is unavoidable, the ments for more substantial CM tools than counterpart should ideally be aware of represented by the EU BG, such as, for what kind of behaviour will end up with instance, the concept of a Nordic brigade repressive actions. discussed in this chapter, the issue of the In a situation where two regular forces downsizing of NATO’s response Force are combating each other, surprise is a (NRF) has something to tell us. A few years central factor in order to achieve success. ago ambitions with the NRF were to estab- In crisis management operations, the im- lish a high-readiness expeditionary force portance of surprise might be subordinated of some 25,000 soldiers, numbers that to other factors such as legitimacy and have now been reduced to less than 10,000 predictability. These factors communicate troops. The reasons for this are difficulties political signals that will strengthen the in assembling the rotating force-packages peacebuilding process and therefore be of by the member states. Why do we have increasing importance. Likewise, the im- such a situation when member states of portance of tempo is reduced. Obviously, the alliance have collectively decided to tempo is needed in critical situations when, establish such a high-readiness force con- for instance, the use of force is necessary cept? It seems again that part of the answer to prevent a massacre. But more farsighted lies in weariness among NATO members factors such as patience and confidence to commit resources and put soldiers at are the platforms from which peace can risk in a high-risk operational environment be built. Unity of command is another cri- like Afghanistan.61 The same kind of ex- terion for success that ought to be viewed planations are in line with Janne Haaland

61 Op cit, footnote 51, p. 97.

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Matlary´s laconic statement that the battle area. Karl Eikenberry questions how much group is the realistic type of unit that the progress has been achieved in develop- EU could field today. A larger intervention ing the truly expeditionary, non-military force would be desirable, but has proved to capabilities essential to delivering the be unrealistic. The comprehensive approach in expeditionary presented in 1999 up to 15 brigades with environments. He also raises the question a total of 50,000 – 60,000 troops, but this that if Europe has an advantage in the grandiose idea was nothing more or less comprehensive approach, why does the than a paper tiger.62 EU not put more energy into receiving Thirdly, it is estimated to be of the more synergies as a result of closer civil utmost importance to take advantage – military cooperation and integration? of the unique competence of the EU in More specifically, why does the EU lack an order to meet crises with a broad variety integrated command and control structure of tools. Interagency operations build the that would allow a truly comprehensive ability through the chain of command to approach?63 choose the adequate tool (-s). This means These doubts seem to deal not only with that military staffs at all levels have to be the higher political and military levels but prepared to include liaisons from civil- with the whole civil-military chain of com- ian agencies, commercial organizations, mand, also at the operational and tactical intergovernmental organizations and non- levels. At the same time, the context that governmental organizations in order to forms the basis of Eikenberry`s argumenta- ensure effective coordination. But it also tion seems to be CM. From a conceptual means that the force needs special civil af- point of view, these thoughts of deepened fairs units. It also needs to be suited, when civil-military integration seem to fit very needed, to operate not only as a joint force well into Homeland Defence structures. but as an interagency force prepared for Also, they fit into scenarios in line with civil-military cooperation down to the low- Gray’s and Kagan’s views where there est possibly level in hostile environments exists a high probability for a security envi- representing different cultures. ronment characterized by intra state wars, The EU stresses its advantages when it where nations alone or in the framework of comes to delivering the comprehensive an alliance or coalition might have to fight approach. However, there are doubts about for their survival with every available tool how the EU has developed and taken they have at their disposal. advantage of its obvious strengths in this Looking into the NBG concept as a tool

62 Op cit, footnote 48, p. 129. 63 Op cit, footnote 15, p. 66.

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for CM, it has an organic civil-military forming of the EU Battle Groups is linked element that serves the purpose of being to ambitions inside the union for becoming the commanders’ tool of establishing and a more competent international actor in the maintaining an effective relationship with field of CM. The EU BG is a tool suited a wide range of civilian actors. By doing for a present and future environment very so it serves the aim of delivering a com- much in line with arguments communi- prehensive approach in a given situation. cated by Sir Rupert Smith. Consequently, The same tool could of course be used national/territorial tasks have not been for exactly the same purpose in any unit taken into consideration when launching used for a purely national task, independ- the BG nor the NBG concept. From a CM ent on the level of the conflict at hand. point of view it seems to be a unit suitable If one believes in the thesis that military for small wars with a capability of being effectiveness starts with the development deployed for limited periods and then be- inside each end every single tactical unit, ing replaced. The question is with what? It the concept of having a Civil-Military also seems obvious that if predictions made Co-operation (CIMIC) unit as a part of the by Colin S. Gray and Robert Kagan will NBG may serve as a model for transform- become realities, concepts suited for both ing the CIMIC concept to levels above international CM missions and territorial that of a battalion. By doing so, it will defence will be needed simultaneously. In contribute to an overall strengthening of such a situation, militaries have to field the EU comprehensive approach as well concepts that suit both roles and fit in with as for national/territorial purposes. the economic recourses at hand. As has In this article it has been argued that been stressed earlier in this article, factors the present development of the military in of sustainability and volume still count, most EU countries, including Sweden, is whether we are talking about CM or ter- very much linked to CM needs. In other ritorial defence. words, the development is linked to the current situation. This, in turn, is closely The author is a Lieutenant Colonel serving connected to the tendency to extrapolate at the National Defence University in Fin- the present situation into the future with the land at the Department for Strategic and additional consequence that even more em- Defence Studies. He is a member of the phasis is put into ongoing operations with Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences the obvious risk that long-time strategic and is the Editor of its Proceedings and perspectives are ignored. The concept and journal.

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