China's Role in the Evolution of Southeast Asian Regional Organizations

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China's Role in the Evolution of Southeast Asian Regional Organizations China Perspectives 2008/3 | 2008 China and its Continental Borders China's Role in the Evolution of Southeast Asian Regional Organizations Claudia Astarita Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/4103 DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.4103 ISSN: 1996-4617 Publisher Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine Printed version Date of publication: 1 July 2008 Number of pages: 78-86 ISSN: 2070-3449 Electronic reference Claudia Astarita, « China's Role in the Evolution of Southeast Asian Regional Organizations », China Perspectives [Online], 2008/3 | 2008, Online since 01 July 2011, connection on 10 December 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/4103 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ chinaperspectives.4103 © All rights reserved Special feature s e v China’s Role in the Evolution i a t c n i e of Southeast Asian Regional h p s c r Organizations e p CLAUDIA ASTARITA Geographically and strategically, Southeast Asia represents the natural extension of China’s interests in the region. In the course of discussing China’s role in four regional organizations, ASEAN, ARF, ASEAN+3, and EAS, its interactions with the United States, Japan, and India will be reviewed as well. The goal of this paper is to consider whether or not China has maintained and is maintaining a dominant position within these fora. oday more then ever, South, Central, West, and cannot be neglected in an analysis of China’s regional inter - Southeast Asia are crucial gateways for China to ests, aims, and targets. In addition, whether China is achiev - T access natural resources and sea routes that can ing its objectives or not depends on how and to what extent guarantee regular trade flows and stable economic growth. these three countries are counterbalancing Chinese influ - China’s regional neighbours, however, often join forces to ence in the region, and their bilateral and multilateral inter - prevent China from affirming and protecting its own interests actions deeply affect the consolidation of Asian regional in these areas. integration. Rather than choosing the option of open competition, China has progressively adopted a cooperative multilateral China and ASEAN: From approach in the region, and is now involved in several animosity to cooperation regional organizations. Within these fora, China interacts with other Asian countries and negotiates common policies Although China is widely recognized today as having strong and strategies with them. In most cases, China retains its sta - and developed links with ASEAN countries, it is useful to tus as the most powerful country in the region, and can eas - remember that the seed of ASEAN was the strong anti- ily affirm its interests and points of view. However, as Asian communist feeling shared by Southeast Asian nations. countries share a long tradition of mutual suspicion and mis - ASEAN was set up in Bangkok on 8 August 1967 by the trust, these arenas have progressively shown their usefulness governments of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, in regional confidence-building by substantially easing some and the Philippines. It has been documented that of the mutual misunderstandings and sources of mistrust “ASEAN’s founding purpose was to ensure the survival of between Asian nations. its members by promoting regional stability and limiting com - The aim of this paper is to focus on China’s ambitions and petition between them.” (1) The Bangkok Declaration speci - achievements in Southeast Asia through a review of four fied that ASEAN was not an appropriate forum to handle international groupings: the Association of Southeast Asian security matters or political controversies. On the contrary, Nations (ASEAN), with special attention to the China- Southeast Asian countries defined three strategies oriented ASEAN framework; the Asian Regional Forum (ARF); at reducing “the appeal of internal Communist insurgencies the ASEAN+3 platform; and the East Asian Summit by promoting socio-economic development,” limiting “the (EAS). This structure will allow a brief additional overview regional military influence of external actors,” and reducing of China’s interactions with three prominent powers: the United States, Japan, and India. The role these countries 1. Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN. Regionalism in Southeast Asia , London, Rienner are playing in ARF, ASEAN+3, and EAS, respectively, Publisher, Inc., 2002, pp. 12-13. 78 N o 2008/3 China’s Role in the Evolution of Southeast Asian Regional Organizations s e v i a “intra-ASEAN competition and improving relationships for the enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth t c n (2) (10) i between members.” According to some other scholars, in and prosperity in the region.” However, the Spratly e h 1967, “on the initiative of (Indonesian) President Suharto Islands remain a source of concern, since the 2002 agree - p s c (…) ASEAN was set up to counter China which was very ment lacks a legally binding code of conduct. Furthermore, r e aggressive in sponsoring ‘revolutionary movements’ across in recent years China has strengthened military control over p Southeast Asia.” (3) occupied islands, islets, and other waters, and has stepped In essence, ASEAN nations became cautious and suspicious up exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the when, “from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s, Beijing placed region. At the same time, “world powers such as the U.S., ideological alignment over state-to-state relations by support - Japan and India have increased their military infiltration in ing Communist insurgents in non-communist countries.” (4) the South China Sea regions, pushing the issue towards a However, the realignment between China and the United more complicated and internationalized level.” (11) States in the early 1970s, and Deng Xiaoping’s launch of From the perspective of economic cooperation, 1997 was a economic reform and the accompanying open-door policy in pivotal year for China-ASEAN relations. It is usually 1978, created more trust (and economic opportunities) for remembered as the year in which “leaders from ASEAN Southeast Asian countries. Indeed, China normalised rela - countries and China held the first informal Summit in Kuala tions with most of them in the 1970s, and the delicate issue Lumpur (Malaysia) to officially recognize the ASEAN- of “overseas Chinese” was resolved. In the 1980s, Deng China process and to adopt the strategy of ‘good neighborli - Xiaoping regarded Singapore as the model for Chinese ness’ and ‘mutual trust’ to strengthen and expand ASEAN- development, and some Southeast Asian countries such as China ties in the twenty-first century.” (12) The Asian finan - Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand began considering China cial crisis in 1997 gave China a further opportunity to offer “a security concern, though not as serious as before.” (5) help to Southeast Asian countries. Following the Thai gov - Despite these improvements, however, the issue of the ernment’s failure to stop the collapse of the Thai baht Spratly Islands, a group of more than 100 reefs, islets, and against the US dollar, the financial crisis rapidly spread to islands in the South China Sea with a total area of less than South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, the Philippines, five square kilometres, has remained unresolved throughout and Hong Kong as well, forcing most of these countries to these decades. “The post-war dispute over (these islands) float their currencies. The crisis also generated panic among originated from the 1951 San Francisco peace agreement, borrowers, a collapse of demand, and a loss of confidence which failed to stipulate who was to possess the Spratlys throughout the region. Moreover, even a potential “export- after Japan.” (6) At that time, six governments claimed partial driven recovery, benefiting from the devalued currencies and sovereignty over these islands: Vietnam, the Philippines, improved competitiveness, was blocked by the fact that many Brunei, Malaysia, China, and Taiwan. In the case of the firms had no access to credit for importing raw materials,” Spratlys, sovereignty was claimed not merely for the sake of its rich fisheries, but rather to attain “the legal right to con - trol and develop the area’s energy resources, which (all 2. Ibid. , pp. 12-15. 3. Ignatius Wibowo Wibisono, “ASEAN-China Relations: Indonesia’s Perspective,” in Lai these countries needed) to fuel their rapid economic devel - Hongyi et al. , Harmony and Development: ASEAN-China Relations , Singapore, World opment.” (7) China’s victory in its skirmish with Vietnam in Scientific, p. 78. 1988, and its occupation of the Philippine-claimed Mischief 4. Lai Hongyi et al. , “ASEAN and China: Towards a Harmonious Relationship,” in Lai Hongyi Reef in 1995, “implied that the balance of power in the et al. , op. cit. , p. xvii. 5. Lai Hongyi, “China’s Evolving Relations with Southeast Asia,” in Lai Hongyi et al. , op. cit. , (8) region was changing to the advantage of China.” pp. 20-21. Moreover, Southeast Asian countries’ disagreements on the 6. Liselotte Odgaard, “Deterrence and Co-operation in the South China Sea,” issue highlighted the need for dialogue. (9) Contemporary Southeast Asia , Vol. 23, n. 2, August 2001, pp. 293-4. 7. Chien-peng Chung, “South China Sea Islands Disputes,” The Journal of Social, Political The situation finally improved in the early twenty-first centu - and Economic Studies , Vol. 24, n. 1, Spring 1999, p. 19. ry after China and ASEAN agreed to create a code of con - 8. Liselotte Odgaard, op. cit. , p. 294. duct aimed at easing tensions over the disputed islands. In 9. Ibid. , p. 300. November 2002, a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 10. China, ASEAN sign code of conduct on South China Sea , Xinhua, 4 November 2002. the South China Sea was signed, and all countries “recog - 11. “The Worrisome Situation of the South China Sea – China Facing the Stepped-up nized the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmo - Military Infiltration by the U.S., Japan and India,” Outlook East Weekly , 12 January 2004.
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