DOCSLIB.ORG

Calendar No. 230

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Calendar No. 230 Calendar No. 230 116TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! 1st Session SENATE 116–126 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 2020 SEPTEMBER 26, 2019.—Ordered to be printed Mr. GRAHAM, from the Committee on Appropriations, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany S. 2583] The Committee on Appropriations reports the bill (S. 2583) mak- ing appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2020, and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon and rec- ommends that the bill do pass. Amounts in new budget authority Total of bill as reported to the Senate .................... $55,158,900,000 Amount of 2019 appropriations ............................... 54,376,900,000 Amount of 2020 budget estimate ............................ 43,507,498,000 Bill as recommended to Senate compared to— 2019 appropriations .......................................... ∂782,000,000 2020 budget estimate ........................................ ∂11,651,402,000 37–539 PDF CONTENTS Page Summary of Appropriations .................................................................................... 5 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 5 General Matters ....................................................................................................... 10 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ............................ 20 Public Law and United States Code References ................................................... 20 Title I: Department of State and Related Agency: Department of State: Administration of Foreign Affairs: Diplomatic Programs .................................................................. 23 Capital Investment Fund ........................................................... 31 Office of Inspector General ......................................................... 31 Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs ........................ 32 Representation Expenses ........................................................... 35 Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials ............................ 35 Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance ................ 35 Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service ............. 37 Repatriation Loans Program Account ....................................... 37 Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan ........................ 37 International Center, Washington, District of Columbia ........ 37 Payment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund ......................................................................................... 38 International Organizations: Contributions to International Organizations ........................................ 38 Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities ....................... 39 International Commissions: International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico ..................................................................................................... 39 Salaries and Expenses ....................................................................... 39 Construction ....................................................................................... 40 American Sections, International Commissions ..................................... 40 International Fisheries Commissions ...................................................... 41 Related Agency: United States Agency for Global Media: International Broadcasting Operations ............................................ 41 Broadcasting Capital Improvements ................................................ 43 Related Programs: The Asia Foundation ................................................................................. 43 United States Institute of Peace .............................................................. 43 Center for Middle Eastern-Western Dialogue Trust Fund .................... 43 Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship Program ............................................ 44 Israeli Arab Scholarship Program ........................................................... 44 East-West Center ...................................................................................... 44 National Endowment for Democracy ....................................................... 44 Other Commissions: Commission for the Preservation of America’s Heritage Abroad .......... 45 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom .......... 45 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ............................. 45 Congressional-Executive Commission on the People’s Republic of China ...................................................................................................... 46 United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission ....... 46 Title II: United States Agency for International Development: Funds Appropriated to the President: Operating Expenses ........................................................................... 47 (2) 3 Page Title II—Continued United States Agency for International Development—Continued Funds Appropriated to the President—Continued Capital Investment Fund .................................................................. 49 Office of Inspector General ................................................................ 49 Title III: Bilateral Economic Assistance: Funds Appropriated to the President: Global Health Programs .................................................................... 50 Development Assistance .................................................................... 56 International Disaster Assistance .................................................... 63 International Humanitarian Assistance .......................................... 63 Transition Initiatives ......................................................................... 64 Complex Crises Fund ......................................................................... 64 Development Credit Authority .......................................................... 64 Program Account ......................................................................... 64 Administrative Expenses ............................................................ 64 Economic Support Fund .................................................................... 64 Democracy Fund ................................................................................. 67 Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia ........................... 69 Department of State: Migration and Refugee Assistance ................................................... 70 United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund ................................................................................................ 70 Independent Agencies: Peace Corps ........................................................................................ 71 Millennium Challenge Corporation .................................................. 71 Inter-American Foundation ............................................................... 71 United States African Development Foundation ............................. 72 Department of the Treasury: International Affairs Technical Assistance ...................................... 72 Debt Restructuring ............................................................................ 72 Title IV: International Security Assistance: Department of State: Economic Support and Development Fund ...................................... 73 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement .................. 73 Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Pro- grams ............................................................................................... 76 Peacekeeping Operations ................................................................... 77 Funds Appropriated to the President: International Military Education and Training .............................. 78 Foreign Military Financing Program ............................................... 81 Title V: Multilateral Assistance: Funds Appropriated to the President: International Organizations and Programs ..................................... 84 International Financial Institutions ........................................................ 85 Global Environment Facility ............................................................. 85 Contribution to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ................................................................................... 85 Limitation on Callable Capital Subscriptions .................................. 86 Contribution to the International Development Association .......... 86 Contribution to the Asian Development Fund ................................. 86 Contribution to the African Development Fund .............................. 86 Contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Develop- ment ................................................................................................. 86 Title VI: Export and Investment Assistance: Export-Import Bank of the United States: Inspector General ............................................................................... 87 Administrative Expenses ................................................................... 87 Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Noncredit Account .............................................................................. 87
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Working Papers
    No. 6, November 2017 WORKING PAPERS MILITARY FACTORS IN THE MENA REGION: CHALLENGING TRENDS Sven Biscop and Julien Sassel This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme under grant agreement No 693244 Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture: Mapping Geopolitical Shifts, Regional Order and Domestic Transformations WORKING PAPERS No. 6, November 2017 MILITARY FACTORS IN THE MENA REGION: CHALLENGING TRENDS Sven Biscop and Julien Sassel1 ABSTRACT Although the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has witnessed a long series of conflicts since the end of the Second World War, it is now in the unprecedented situation where nearly all MENA states are involved to a certain extent in ongoing conflict (e.g. in the Iraq–Syria area; Libya; Yemen). MENA states are involved to different degrees in these conflicts, ranging from direct involvement on the ground or in the air, to the arming and training of armed non-state actors. This report assesses the evolution of the armed forces, procurement and the defence industry in the countries of the MENA region, starting with the major regional powers, whose leverage extends across the region. Second, it looks at the middle regional powers, those who have some capacity for power projection but mostly at the sub-regional level. This is followed by analysis of the remaining states, those with little or no capacity for power projection. Finally, the report looks at those states on whose territory war is currently being waged, where governments and non-state actors are vying for control of the national territory.
    [Show full text]
  • A/64/742–S/2010/181 General Assembly Security Council
    United Nations A/64/742–S/2010/181 General Assembly Distr.: General 13 April 2010 Security Council Original: English General Assembly Security Council Sixty-fourth session Sixty-fifth year Agenda item 65 (a) Promotion and protection of the rights of children Children and armed conflict Report of the Secretary-General I. Introduction 1. The present report, which covers the period from January to December 2009, is submitted pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 1882 (2009), by which the Council requested me to submit a report on the implementation of that resolution, resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005), as well as its presidential statements on children and armed conflict. 2. The first part of the report (section II) includes information on measures undertaken by parties listed in the annexes to end all violations and abuses committed against children in armed conflict that serve as indicators of progress made in follow-up to the recommendations of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. The second part (section III) contains an update on the implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism established by the Council in its resolution 1612 (2005). The third part (section IV) of the report focuses on information on grave violations committed against children, in particular recruitment and use of children, killing and maiming of children, rape and other sexual violence against children, abductions of children, attacks on schools and
    [Show full text]
  • US Military Policy in the Middle East an Appraisal US Military Policy in the Middle East: an Appraisal
    Research Paper Micah Zenko US and Americas Programme | October 2018 US Military Policy in the Middle East An Appraisal US Military Policy in the Middle East: An Appraisal Contents Summary 2 1 Introduction 3 2 Domestic Academic and Political Debates 7 3 Enduring and Current Presence 11 4 Security Cooperation: Training, Advice and Weapons Sales 21 5 Military Policy Objectives in the Middle East 27 Conclusion 31 About the Author 33 Acknowledgments 34 1 | Chatham House US Military Policy in the Middle East: An Appraisal Summary • Despite significant financial expenditure and thousands of lives lost, the American military presence in the Middle East retains bipartisan US support and incurs remarkably little oversight or public debate. Key US activities in the region consist of weapons sales to allied governments, military-to-military training programmes, counterterrorism operations and long-term troop deployments. • The US military presence in the Middle East is the culmination of a common bargain with Middle Eastern governments: security cooperation and military assistance in exchange for US access to military bases in the region. As a result, the US has substantial influence in the Middle East and can project military power quickly. However, working with partners whose interests sometimes conflict with one another has occasionally harmed long-term US objectives. • Since 1980, when President Carter remarked that outside intervention in the interests of the US in the Middle East would be ‘repelled by any means necessary’, the US has maintained a permanent and significant military presence in the region. • Two main schools of thought – ‘offshore balancing’ and ‘forward engagement’ – characterize the debate over the US presence in the Middle East.
    [Show full text]
  • Hizbullah Has Achieved What Arab States Only Dreamed of -More
    Hizbullah has achieved what Arab states only dreamed of -More Hizbullahs next The sixth Arab-"Israeli" war, as some have called it, has ended in the first real setback for "Israel's" deterrent power There was nothing new about the broad objective behind "Israel's" war on Lebanon: through the destruction of Hizbullah it was to wreak fundamental change in a strategic, political and military environment that it had come to regard as menacing to its future. Nothing new about its methods either: the use of massive violence not merely against its military adversary but against the civilians and the infrastructure of the country in which it operates. Or about its official justification: seizing upon one single act of "terrorist" violence from the other side as the opportunity to strike at the whole "terrorist" organisation that was responsible for it. Or about the international support, even outright collaboration, Source: The Guardian, 17-8-2006 Date: 19/08/2006 Time: 04:05 Hits: 57 More... "Mighty" "Israel's" Defeat in Lebanon After a month-long fierce resistance from the Lebanese Hizbullah fighters, "Israel" started Tuesday withdrawing from southern Lebanon and is set to hand over the first of its captured positions to the UN-supported Lebanese army. Army officials said they expect the evacuation of the remaining "Israeli" occupying forces from Lebanon by next week, ending the unjustified operation that began on July 12 following a successful Hizbullah operation in which two "Israel" soldiers were captured by the Lebanese resistance movement. "Israel" is also expected to release many of the thousands of reserve troops called up for the conflict, signaling an end to its largest mobilization in many years.
    [Show full text]
  • Congressional Record United States Th of America PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES of the 112 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
    E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 112 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION Vol. 157 WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 No. 141 House of Representatives The House met at 10 a.m. and was whether or not this is a good idea for dressed that. We had 3.8 percent unem- called to order by the Speaker pro tem- our country. It’s class warfare. It will ployment. pore (Mr. MCCLINTOCK). hurt job creation. You know, these are What have they done to create a sin- gle job so far this year? Nothing. In f arguments. It won’t raise money. These are arguments that certainly are fact, they eliminated jobs. But, you DESIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO very, very telling. know, that’s because we want to give TEMPORE In fact, I have some direct quotes the job creators a break. We don’t want The SPEAKER pro tempore laid be- from one Representative: ‘‘This is real- to tax them, all to protect tax cuts. fore the House the following commu- ly the Dr. Kevorkian plan for our econ- And then, finally, the final quote nication from the Speaker: omy. It will kill jobs, kill businesses, about we don’t have a revenue problem; we have a spending problem is from WASHINGTON, DC, and yes, kill even the higher tax reve- September 21, 2011. nues that these suicidal tax increasers then Representative BOEHNER, now I hereby appoint the Honorable TOM hope to gain.’’ Speaker BOEHNER. MCCLINTOCK to act as Speaker pro tempore Another Representative: ‘‘Class war- Now, of course, our taxes are at 15 on this day.
    [Show full text]
  • General Assembly Security Council Sixty-Ninth Session Sixty-Ninth Year Agenda Item Xx Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children
    United Nations A/69/926–S/2015/409 General Assembly Distr.: General Security Council Xx 2015 Original: English General Assembly Security Council Sixty-ninth session Sixty-ninth year Agenda item xx Promotion and protection of the rights of children Children and armed conflict Report of the Secretary-General I. Introduction 1. The present report, which covers the period from January to December 2014, is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2068 (2012), by which the Council requested me to continue to submit annual reports on the implementation of its resolutions and presidential statements on children and armed conflict. 2. The report highlights recent global trends regarding the impact of armed conflict on children and provides information on grave violations against children in 2014. The main activities and initiatives with regard to the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and the conclusions of its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict are outlined. In line with the resolutions of the Security Council pertaining to children and armed conflict, the report includes in its annexes a list of parties that engage in the recruitment and use of children, sexual violence against children, killing and maiming of children, attacks on schools and/or hospitals and attacks or threats of attacks against protected personnel, in contravention of international law. 3. All information presented in this report and its annexes has been documented, vetted, and verified for accuracy by the United Nations. In situations where the ability to obtain or independently verify information is hampered by factors such as insecurity or access restrictions, it is qualified as such.
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon: Renewed Instability Following August Blast
    INSIGHTi Lebanon: Renewed Instability Following August Blast August 17, 2020 On August 10, Lebanese Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his cabinet resigned in the wake of a massive explosion at the port of Beirut that killed at least 178 people and injured thousands. The blast displaced an estimated 300,000 people, and Lebanese President Michel Aoun estimated the damage at the port to be roughly $15 billion. The explosion triggered widespread outrage among citizens, and has generated renewed protests—at times violent—against Lebanon’s political leaders. Diab’s resignation leaves Lebanon’s government in caretaker status with reduced authorities. Observers speculate that the country could become mired in months of government formation at a time of economic and humanitarian crisis, leaving it vulnerable to paralysis and greater social unrest. Policymakers may review U.S. assistance to Lebanon in the wake of growing humanitarian and economic needs, and in the context of potential shifts in the country’s political leadership. Renewed Protest Movement The August 4 blast renewed the momentum of the protest movement that began in October 2019 and led to the resignation that month of Saad Hariri, the previous prime minister. Following the explosion, thousands of protesters returned to the streets, expressing rage with the country’s political leadership, which reportedly knew of the risks posed by ammonium nitrate stored at the port but took no action. Over 700 civilians were wounded in clashes with security forces, according to the Lebanese Red Cross, and some reports have accused security forces of using excessive force. Protesters called for international aid to be channeled directly to local organizations, bypassing Lebanese state institutions that Lebanese describe as corrupt.
    [Show full text]
  • Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
    DEFENSE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES ANNUAL R E P O R T FISCAL YEAR 2014 www.DIILS.org 1 DIILS International Operations Officer and a Course Participant share a Light Moment after Graduation. THIS PROGRAM HAS MADE A DIFFERENCE IN MY LIFE - IT OPENED MY MIND TO NEW IDEAS. NOW, I HAVE MANY MORE VIEWPOINTS TO CONSIDER. ~ Egypt DIILS LCHR Course Director John Phelps and a Participant 2 3 The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) is the lead U.S. The purpose of this annual report is to better inform stakeholders, policy- defense security cooperation resource for professional legal engagement with makers, and others interested in the DIILS mission and capabilities on the full international military service members and related civilians globally. The goal of spectrum of DIILS global legal engagement activities from October 2013 through DIILS engagement is to strengthen partner nation legal capacity through activities September 2014. that promote equitable and accountable defense and military justice sectors, civilian control of the military, enhanced compliance with human rights standards and international humanitarian law, democracy, and democratic rule of law. “I really appreciated the opportunities provided by the United States of America and pray for universal peace INSIDE... and unity. God Bless the United States Government” DIILS Core Competencies Curriculum Development ~ Sierra Leone Mobile Programs Conclusion Resident Programs FY2014 Schedule Maritime Security Acronyms DIILS Core Competencies ■ Proven expertise in international human rights law, law of armed conflict/international humanitarian law, comparative military justice, legal aspects of combating international financial crimes, corruption, combating terrorism, and peace support and stability operations.
    [Show full text]
  • H. Res. 1017 in the House of Representatives
    H. Res. 1017 In the House of Representatives, U. S., September 26, 2006. Whereas Lebanon’s remarkable Cedar Revolution led to the withdrawal of Syrian occupation troops in April 2005, the most significant step toward true Lebanese independ- ence and sovereignty since the outbreak of civil war in 1975; Whereas the Cedar Revolution reached a dramatic crescendo on March 14, 2005, when one million Lebanese dem- onstrated in Beirut’s Martyrs Square demanding freedom and independence and an end to the Syrian occupation; Whereas true Lebanese independence and sovereignty was not fully achieved even after the Syrian troop withdrawal for many reasons, including especially the apparent ongoing presence of Syrian security personnel in Lebanon, an on- going assassination campaign against Lebanese public figures who oppose appeasement of Syria, and Hizballah’s control and militarization of southern Leb- anon; Whereas, on August 12, 2006, during the fighting between Israel and Hizballah, the Government of Lebanon for the first time in decades called for the deployment of the Lebanese armed forces throughout Lebanese territory ‘‘such that there will be no weapons or authority other than that of the Lebanese state’’; 2 Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the fighting, authorizes an enhanced United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to ‘‘accom- pany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they de- ploy throughout the (Lebanese) South’’, a process which is currently underway; Whereas UNSCR 1701 also calls for the
    [Show full text]
  • The Lebanese Army: Capabilities and Challenges in the 1980S by Joseph A
    Conflict Quarterly The Lebanese Army: Capabilities and Challenges in the 1980s by Joseph A. Kechichian INTRODUCTION In the Lebanese political maze, the army has played an important role in supporting the legitimacy of the ruling establishment, particularly between 1958 and 1970 when the country was governed by Presidents Fucad Shihâb and Snarl Hilü. Historically, Lebanon's ruling oligarchies pursued the goal of preserving the established political and economic in­ terests by holding on to the unwritten National Pact of 1943, as well as the outdated Constitution and parliamentary divisions in place. Suc­ cessive Presidents, including Franjiyah, Sarkis and Al-Jumayyil con­ tinued to pursue this goal and rejected any attempts at compromise of a new dimension. Throughout the past ten years, successive challenges to the stability of the Lebanese Republic have been carefully engineered by both Christian and Muslim leaders to uphold these goals and objectives. The army, traditionally the single most apolitical institution in Lebanon, has been caught in the middle of the country's constitutional quarrels, and has recorded several significant challenges and threats to its unity. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the recent history of the Lebanese army and assess its future capabilities in light of existing and growing challenges emanating from Christian and Muslim militias as well as regional powers. What are the capabilities of the new Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)? Are there sources of threats which may be iden­ tified? How is the new leadership likely to respond to these threats? Ultimately, the question must be raised regarding the future of the Lebanon and its military establishment.
    [Show full text]
  • Legitimacy and Peace Processes from Coercion to Consent ISSUE 25 Accord 25 ISSUE an International Review of Peace Initiatives
    Accord Logo using multiply on 25 layers 2014 Accord ISSUE Logo drawn as Editors seperate elements with overlaps an international review of peace initiatives coloured seperately Alexander Ramsbotham and Achim Wennmann 2014 Legitimacy and peace processes From coercion to consent Legitimacy and peace processes From coercion to consent ISSUE 25 25 Accord ISSUE an international review of peace initiatives Legitimacy and peace processes From coercion to consent April 2014 // Editors Alexander Ramsbotham and Achim Wennmann Accord // ISSUE 25 // www.c-r.org Published by Conciliation Resources, to inform and strengthen peace processes worldwide by documenting and analysing the lessons of peacebuilding Published by Acknowledgements Conciliation Resources Accord’s strength and value relies on the Burghley Yard, 106 Burghley Road expertise, experience and perspectives of the London, NW5 1AL range people who contribute to Accord projects www.c-r.org in a variety of ways. We would like to give special thanks to: Aden Telephone +44 (0)207 359 7728 Abdi, Ali Chahine, Catherine Barnes, Ciaran Fax +44 (0)207 359 4081 O’Toole, Ed Garcia, Elizabeth Picard, Judith Email [email protected] Large, Lisa Schirch, Nerea Bilbatua and Teresa Whitfield. UK charity registration number 1055436 In addition to all our authors, we also extend grateful thanks to the many other expert Editors contributors to this Accord publication: Alexander Ramsbotham and Achim Wennmann Abdulrazag Elaradi, Andrew Tomlinson, Antonia Executive Director Does, Asanga Welikala, Babu Rahman, Catherine
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing Prospects for Peace in Lebanon
    .usip.org U N I T E D S T A T E S I N S T I T U T E O F P E A C E 1200 17th Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington D.C. 20036-3011 202.457.1700 Fax 202.429.6063 Web Site www.usip.org USIPeace Briefing May 20 08 For more information: [email protected] Half Full or Ha lf Empty: Assessing Prospects for Peace in Lebanon By Alistair Harris On the surface, peace has broken out in Lebanon, bringing to an end the 18-month political impasse between the governing March 14th coalition and opposition March 8th parties. Following a week of sectarian violence in Beirut, Tripoli and the Chouf mountains—the worst since the end of Lebanon’s 15-year civil war in 1990—the opposing sides agreed to undertake talks in Qatar to resolve their longstanding political stalemate. The Qatari-sponsored Doha Accord that broke the logjam paved the way for the May 25 election of former Army Commander Michel Suleiman as a consensus president, to be closely followed by the formation of a national unity government and the adoption of a revised election law. The re-invigoration of Lebanon’s political institutions, the opening of parliament and ending of the presidential vacuum are welcome signs of a return to what passes for normalcy among Lebanon’s confessional elites; they are not however a return to the status quo ante. For many months Arab League Chairman Amr Moussa, like French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, had tried to cajole the Lebanese belligerents into a compromise deal based on the much-vaunted concept of ”no victor, no vanquished”.
    [Show full text]