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Revista História : Debates e Tendências (Online) ISSN: 1517-2856 ISSN: 2238-8885 Universidade de Passo Fundo, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em História

Priorelli, Giorgia The fight against the ‘anti-nation’ as a historical mission: the delegitimization of the enemy in Italian and Spanish Fascism Revista História : Debates e Tendências (Online), vol. 18, no. 3, 2018, September-December, pp. 449-463 Universidade de Passo Fundo, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em História

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5335/hdtv.18n.3.8600

Available in: https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=552459257010

How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System Redalyc More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America and the Caribbean, and Journal's webpage in redalyc.org Portugal Project academic non-profit, developed under the open access initiative The fight against the ‘anti-nation’ as a historical mission: the delegitimization of the enemy in and Spanish Fascism A luta contra a ‘antinação’ como uma missão histórica: a deslegitimação do inimigo no fascismo italiano e no fascismo espanhol La lucha contra la 'anti-nación' como una misión histórica: la deslegitimación del enemigo en el fascismo italiano y el fascismo español Giorgia Priorelli*

Abstract of the Pnf and the Fe articulated their respective campaigns against the anti- For the Italian Partito Nazionale Fascista -national enemies in order to legitimise (Pnf) and the Falange Española (Fe), the their own parties and pave the way to political community coincided with the the effective realization of their own nation, conceived not as an undifferen- nations: nations that had to be clearly tiated conglomeration of citizens but as and totally . a community of believers in a ‘religion of the Fatherland’. The common goal Keywords: Fascism. . Nation. of the Italian and the Spanish fascists, since their appearance on the political scene of their respective countries, was the defence of national values. But the claim to being the only and exclusive representatives of those values denied any effective freedom of dissent, even to * Doutora em Ciência Política pela Universidade those who respected national values but Luiss Guido Carli – Roma, Itália. E-mail: gprio- intended them in a different way. This [email protected] article will analyse how the ideologues Recebido em 03/5/2018 - Aprovado em 24/5/2018 http://dx.doi.org/10.5335/hdtv.18n.3.7304

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 The shout of your fully legitimate exulta- Mussolini’s speech was genuinely pa- tion fuses together with the one rising from radigmatic because it highlighted an impor- all the cities of Spain, that now are com- pletely liberated by the infamy of the reds, tant element in the ideologies of both the Pnf and with the shout of the anti-Bolsheviks and the Falange: the fierce struggle against from all over the world. The wonderful the ‘anti-national enemy’ until its annihila- victory of is another chapter in tion. This was a political constant in the two the history of the new Europe we are crea- ting. Franco’s magnificent troops and our , since it referred to a common his- intrepid legionnaires did not defeat only torical mission. Negrín’s government; many others among In , since the years preceding the our enemies at this moment are biting the March on , the movimento Sansepolcris- dust. The watchword of the reds was this: “No pasarán”; we passed, and I tell you we ta had built its political fortunes on presen- will pass (MUSSOLINI, 1951, p. 283). ting itself as the bulwalk against widespread Bolshevism. As Roberto Vivarelli pointed This was how Mussolini, on the bal- out, Mussolini succeeded because the Fasci cony of the Hall of the Globe in Palazzo Ve- Italiani di Combattimento and, then, the Pnf nezia, addressed the crowd gathered in the appeared to many as defenders of the na- square on January 26, 1939, to celebrate ‘the tional State, whose values were denied by entrance of the nationals’ in the Catalan ca- Socialist maximalism, which drew inspi- pital under the command of the generalissimo ration from Soviet Russia as its own electi- (MUSSOLINI, 1951). The fall of Barcelona, ve homeland (VIVARELLI, 2012, p. 24-25, which was one of the last strongholds of the p. 321-323). The campaign against the anti- , represented a great victory -national enemies was from the beginning both for the insurgent military formation a merciless battle, whose intensity changed and the of Italian Fascism. This was not over time, in inverse proportion to growing only because it rewarded the support that Italian support for Fascism. At the point of the black shirts of the Corpo Truppe Volonta- the regime’s maximum consolidation, when rie (Corps of Volunteer Troops or Cvt) had it seemed that all opposition had been eli- given since the first weeks of the Spanish Ci- minated, the emphasis on the internal oppo- vil War. It was also not only a payback for nents diminished. Then it became stronger the stinging setback – which had a strong in particularly unfavourable, even if not symbolic and value – suffered really dramatic circumstances, as it happe- in March 1937 in Guadalajara by the mili- ned after the collapse of the regime and du- tias led by Mario Roatta, who supported the ring the tragic two-year period 1943-1945. weight of the operation to a great extent.1 In Spain, the Falangist struggle against Above all, it was the triumph of the true and anti-national enemies started with the fou- only Spanish nation, the fascistized nation of ndation of the party in 1933, even if it had , against the anti-nation, fed its forerunner in the Jons of Ramiro Ledes- by Socialism, of the liberal-republican go- ma Ramos and Onésimo Redondo Ortega. vernments. However, it was the Civil War – fought by

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 the ‘crusaders’ of the nationalist troops in main political culture in Francoism - the Na- the name and for the salvation of the ho- tional Catholic one - and ‘a considerable re- meland – that represented ‘the greatest na- duction of the patriotic lexicon.’ (CAMPOS; tionalizing and denationalizing episode of ARCHILÉS, 2014, p. 272). the Spaniards. At that moment, the Spanish A note of caution is needed here, ho- nation’s combat against ‘anti-Spain’ beca- wever: the fact that both the Pnf and the Fa- me a battle of not only the Falange – whi- lange at the end failed to complete their own ch meanwhile had become an armed militia plans of ‘integral fascistization’ of the nation and a mass party in the territories controlled does not diminish the central role that the by the latter – but also of the whole Fran- war against internal enemies played in the coist front.2 In Ismael Saz’s opinion, the one ideology of the two parties; a war that, both fought in 1936-1939 was ‘the most total war in Italy and Spain, hit dramatically violent among all the civil wars of contemporary peaks (GENTILE, 2011, p. 184). Spain.’ (CAMPOS, 2003, p. 158). But, as the By exploiting its legitimate and cohesi- Valencian historian has argued, if ‘the war ve potential, black shirts and blue shirts did was total, even more was the victory’, since everything to identify themselves with the it allowed the nationalists to appear as the nation, and tried to interpret the idea of the ‘incarnation of the authentic Spain’ and to homeland fascistically until the end. So the marginalize the defeated by treating them as abbrochment of the nation by the Pnf cor- the sworn enemies of the homeland (CAM- responded to a similar process in the ideo- POS, 2003, p. 159). logical universe of the Falange (GENTILE, The persecutory fury against the anti- 2011, p. 156-160). In both cases, the conse- -nation decreased partially after the victory quence was inevitably the same: discrimina- of the generalísimo in 1939, and even more tion against those who – while being Italian with the diminished influence of the camisas and Spanish citizens in all respects – held a azules in the government, as a consequence different view of what their country was, its of the historical events, previously mentio- founding values, and its historical mission. ned, which took place between the spring of In fact, thinking of the nation in terms other 1941 and the summer of 1942. These events than those proposed by Fascist and Falan- sanctioned the failure of the ‘appropriation gist ideologues represented a betrayal resul- of Spain and the homeland’ by the party ting in the exclusion of the reprobates from that, after merging with the traditionalists in the national community (DI NUCCI, 2003, April 1937, had changed its name to Fet de p. 127-130). las Jons. The reconfirmation of the Christian Certainly, one could argue that the roots of the regime and ‘the resulting total battle against internal enemies was not an identification of the homeland and Catholi- exclusive ideological component of Fascism, cism’ ratified the completion of the project to since it was also present in the political cul- create a Spanish Fascist State on the Italian ture of other movements, parties and regi- model, as well as the dominance of the other mes of opposite political nature. Yet, in the

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 two cases analysed here, the ideological war class was incapable of making the govern- between nation and anti-nation – in which ment work in an authentic democratic way. ‘two Italys’ and ‘two ’ fought each The most glaring symbol of this sys- other within the boundaries of the State – tem, judged both corrupt and corrupting, was dramatized to an extreme, with an ex- was the institution of . Conside- traordinary centrality. red the ‘epidemic illness’ of the Italian po- The clash, as ideologically configured litical organism by Pnf ideologues, it was by the Pnf and the Falange, was a struggle the exclusive instrument of the Giolittian of liberation from opponents who, although ‘bourgeois oligarchy’, which promised with members of the same State group, were per- ‘demagogic perfidy’ to fight for the uplift- ceived as foreigners at home. Deprived of ment of the people, but instead governed their status as citizens and sometimes trea- essentially for the ‘favours of the clienteles’ ted as genuine pariahs, those considered (D’ANDREA, 1927, p. 300; CASINI, 1924, anti-nationals were physically and morally p. 724). excluded from the community (DI NUCCI, For their part, the Falangists accused 2003, p. 132-133). As things stood, it was not the republican government led by Azaña, surprising that Socialists were regarded as seen as heir to the tradition of Spanish ca- enemies of the nation par excellence, since ciquismo, of various forms of nastiness. The they recognised themselves as members of vortex of radicalization in which the country a ‘class’, and championed the cause of pro- had fallen was attributed to its incompeten- letarian internationalism. On closer scru- ce; a radicalization produced by the demand tiny, however, not only were ‘Bolsheviks’ for more social justice, coming mainly from branded invalidators of the homeland, but the peasant population, to which the Repu- so were supporters of a liberal ideology that blic was unable to give an adequate respon- - even if at different times and in different se (RANZATO, 2012, p. 151-169). ways - was dismissed as anti-national. In both Italy and Spain, for the two For both the black shirts and the blue Fascisms, the liberal State was a synonym shirts, the basic anti-national character of for division, certainly not nation. The roots liberalism was determined by the fact that of the disintegration lay in individualistic it legitimized the exclusive domain of the theory, that was the expression of the ra- bourgeoisie. In other words, they believed tionalist culture of the late 19th Century, of that the liberal State, formally representa- which liberal- was in many ways tive, was actually a ‘mono-class’ State, and a manifestation. Man as the centre of life was ignored the social demands of the subordi- considered by the magazine Gerarchia as ‘the nate classes (GENTILE, 2011, p. 166-167). basic error of materialistic philosophical Such a State was also deemed responsible thought’ and the main character in the disu- for the foundation of an articulated network nity of modern civilization. His ‘hyperbolic of corruption based on a solid crony structu- affirmation’ had transformed the State into re, clearly indicating that the liberal political a mere instrument for the protection of civil

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 rights and negative freedoms of individuals; life’, there was a deep laceration of the so- it had deprived citizens of a superior leader- cial connective tissue and the bond of bro- ship; and, even worse, it had obfuscated the therhood between citizens without equal in supreme reality of the nation (SELVI, 1926, the history of the country (RIVERA, 1976, p. p. 235-236). 18). What emerged in the ideological recons- In the context of such an interpretation, truction of the Falange intellectuals was the Italian Fascists denounced the dramatic rea- drama of a ‘sectarian and rancorous’ politi- lity constituted by the antithesis between the cs, inaugurated on April 14, 1931 and foun- ‘false Italy’ of the executive elite and the ‘real ded on a constitution that gave a ‘legal sem- Italy’ of the people gathered in the squares. blance to the most anti-national State that In the opinion of political figures like Enri- Spain ever had.’ (FERNÁNDEZ-CUESTA; co Corradini, the care of national interests SERRANO, 1938, p. 31-32). had given way to the ambition of men. So In the thought of the Pnf and Falange politics had become a ‘curriculum of parlia- ideologues, the clear separation between mentary professionalism’ and an exaltation ‘legal country’ and ‘real country’ ended up of the ‘superstition of the majority.’ (COR- facilitating the appearance of an intrinsically RADINI, 1928, p. 300; MURRI, 1924, p. 704). anti-national political actor: maximalist So- Similarly, Spanish Fascists condem- cialism. The liberal political class had pro- ned the republican government that, in their ven to be incapable of integrating the masses eyes, had only been concerned with produ- into the State and of providing an adequate cing laws and speculating abstractedly on response to their needs. Inevitably, this inca- the individual, with the result that the ‘na- pacity made the Bolshevik danger stronger tional genius’ had become more than any- day by day, and this occurred within both thing else an ‘issue of numbers.’ (RAMOS, Italian and Spanish territorial boundaries. 1933, p. 582-584). The liberal State, devoid of From day one, Mussolini and the Fas- any ideal impulse, was not ‘the resolute exe- cist leaders dragged Giolitti to the dock sin- cutor of patriotic destinies’ but ‘the spectator ce, in their eyes, he represented not only the of electoral fights.’ As José Antonio Primo ‘parecchista’ of the Great War, but was also de Rivera stated, in the years of the Republic the one who had sought to include the Socia- there was: list Party in the government. As is well kno- wn, the pressures from the maximalist wing The farce of the ballots in a glass urn [that] had the virtue of telling us at any instant of the party pushed the leader Filippo Turati if God existed or did not exist, if the truth to reject the invitation. But this rejection was was the truth or not the truth, if the home- not enough to mitigate the political hatred land had to remain or if it was better for it, in a moment, to commit suicide (RIVERA, that the Fasci Italiani di Combattimento had 1976, p. 189). for the Piedmontese statesman. They did not like the Giolittian opening to the Socialist In the interpretation of some, it seemed Party at all, considering it a deplorable choi- that, in such a ‘turbulent and unpleasant

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 ce since it represented another step towards oligarchy of old Spain, and were united in the disintegration of the nation. support of the republican cause. In other words, the liberal State was After Miguel Primo de Rivera’s autho- accused of sitting by and watching the Psi ritarian experience and once the monarchi- advance. The overwhelming victory of the cal institution was set aside – since it was latter in the 1919 elections and the events of too compromised with the to be the ‘red biennium’, interpreted by the Duce credible in the new liberal-democratic regi- as a ‘criminal attempt to caporettise Italy’, me – the Alcalá Zamora provisional govern- corroborated that conviction.3 The climate of ment and the following Azaña governments tension and violence made it seem like the seemed to be, in the eyes of the Spanish Fas- country was on the brink of civil war and cists, the anteroom of hell. The struggle, as that a spark could start it. Although Bolshe- Onésimo Redondo Ortega wrote, was ‘fa- vism had never seemed as threatening as in tally of reciprocal elimination; Spain or the those years, Giolitti merely brought the dis- anti-Spain.’ (ORTEGA, 1939, p. 157). pute back to the syndical field, hoping that The reformist biennium of 1931-1933 attempting to resolve the crisis in the mould strongly affected the political footprint of of parliamentary debate would be enough to the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish return to normality. But the fact is that inter- Socialist Workers’ Party or Psoe), which nal divisions in the Psi and the emergence then held the majority of seats in Parliament of anti-Socialist blocs in the fall 1920 admi- and controlled three key ministries. Socia- nistrative elections created optimum condi- list leader Fernando de los Ríos first headed tions for a relaunch of Fascist action. Taking the Justice Ministry, then Public Education, advantage of the favourable situation, the and finally Beaux Arts. The ‘Spanish Lenin’, leaders of the provincial squadrismo set off a party president Francisco Largo Caballe- large-scale offensive, which even the signing ro, served as Minister of Labour and Pu- of the pact of pacification on August 2, 1921 blic Welfare. Indalecio Prieto was Minister could not stop (DI NUCCI, 2009, p. 36-41). of Industry until December 1931, and then In Spain, the results of the April 1931 moved to the Ministry of Public Works until elections – determining the victory of the September 1933. republican-Socialist coalition – raised con- Once the term of the Confederación cerns that, along with the Republic, the Bol- Española de Derechas Autónomas (Spanish shevik revolution was also coming. While Confederation of Autonomous Right-wing the Socialists in Italy always adopted clear Groups or Ceda) government during the revolutionary positions, which prevented 1933-1935 ‘bienio estupido’ ended, the victory any agreement with bourgeois-democratic in February 1936 of the Popular Front – in- forces for fears that a proletarian dictator- cluding Psoe, the Partido Comunista Español ship might arise, things worked differently (Spanish Communist Party or Pce), the repu- in Spain. Liberals and Socialists there found blican Leftists, and the Pardido Obrero de Uni- common ground in the struggle against the ficación Marxista (Workers’ Party of Marxist

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 Unification or Poum) – gave new impetus to most extreme class antagonism and insti- Falangist fears, which were later reflected in gating the working class to fight, Socialism the formation led by Franco. completely ignored the national dimension, The outbreak of the Civil War strongly which was sacrificed on the altar of inter- radicalised the blue shirts’ position. From . This was the supreme ideal to July 18, all the labour and republican par- which were dedicated all the energies, in ties, regardless of the differences between order to create a ‘universal proletariat’ in them, were vilified as ‘servants of Russian which States and social distinctions would and lackeys of Stalin’s designs.’ no longer exist. (SEIXAS, 2006, p. 251). Accused of selling By placing above all the principle of out Spain to Bolshevik tyranny, they were international solidarity of the proletariat, deemed guilty of breaking any emotional Bolshevism in its several national variants and ideal bond with the Spanish people subordinated loyalty to one’s country to the (GAY, 1937, p. 6; SEIXAS, p. 251). interest of the revolution. The nation was The formation of Socialist govern- downgraded to a territorial context: nothing ments – the first headed by Caballero in Sep- more than the contingent and marginal fra- tember 1936, and the second led by Negrín mework of the battle of the working class to in May 1937 – represented to Falangist mili- attain power and affirm its supremacy. The- tiamen the materialization of Bolshevik anti- refore, the internationalist doctrine nipped -Spain. At the same time, the fear of massive in the bud any possibility of synthesis bet- Soviet interference in the country was more ween the nation and Socialism, confirming than founded, both from a military and, abo- the anti-systemic nature of the latter in the ve all, political point of view. In fact, at that eyes of both Pnf and Falange ideologues time, Moscow not only provided arms and (GENTILE, 2011, p. 143-144). military advisers to the republicans but also In Italy, the struggle of the Fasci Ita- held Spanish gold reserves, given by the go- liani di Combattimento against Socialist vernment as a ‘pledge’ in exchange for the strongholds started from the beginning of international protection of the Soviet Union the movement, but reached a pivotal point (RANZATO, 2012, p. 455). For that reason, when the black shirts met the agrarians the blue shirts appeared more determined (LOGGIA, 2010, p. 33-42). This encounter than ever to fight the inner enemies of the allowed Fascism to break into the political homeland. After all, as Mussolini wrote, ‘the scene of the country and occupy its centre in human beast is always the same, whether it a stable manner. As is well illustrated in An- is [...] a Russian ghepeù or a Spanish militia- gelo Tasca’s study, the agrarians found com- man.’ (MUSSOLINI, 1951, p. 194). mon cause with Fascism, pouring into it all Italian and Spanish Fascists hated So- the hatred and rage they had harboured sin- cialism for many reasons, a main one being ce ‘their “vital space” [was] reduced by the the fact that it pursued goals detrimental to development of the cooperatives and muni- the integrity of the nation. Fomenting the cipal Socialism.’ (TASCA, 1995, p. 189-228).

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 ‘The agrarians “discover[ed]” Fascism’ in ted to destroying the ideal of the nation. It the administrative elections of October-No- was the Fasci Italiani di Combattimento and vember 1920, in which the Socialists – even then the Pnf – which from the beginning if they did not repeat their incredible suc- had characterized themselves in terms of cess in the previous year’s political elections ‘adherence [...] to the national State and to – won the majority of seats in many muni- its values’ rather than in terms of social class cipalities and provincial councils (TASCA, – who raised the flag of the Fatherland again 1995, p. 190).4 and established in its name a radical new In Emilia, the Psi victory was over- political order (CRESPI, 1929, p. 178-180; whelming, considering that it triumphed in VIVARELLI, 2012, p. 31). 223 municipalities out of 280. And that was Similarly, the Spanish Socialists were where an alliance between the agrarians and accused of spreading the ‘germs’ of the dis- the Fascists began to take shape. The former solution of the country, prostrating them- saw their scope for action in the countrysi- selves at the feet of the Soviet enemy. They de diminishing day by day, while the latter were deemed guilty of not only conspiring looked at the spread of the institutions of So- against the nation and promoting the fra- cialism as a materialization of Bolshevism. tricidal struggle between the classes, but So they organized expeditions to strike at also of undermining its territorial and spi- these institutions, targeting ‘red’ municipa- ritual unity. In fact, the Psoe, in addition to lities, almost like they were a ‘sort of Italian fighting for the ideal of the proletarian re- version of the Soviets’ (DI NUCCI, 2008, p. volution, supported two other causes con- 23-26). Under these circumstances, it was sidered highly anti-national: the cause of not possible to imagine any involvement of regionalisms and the cause of the secular the Psi in government, as this would have State. On the one hand, it showed its bene- meant leaving the field open to the - ‘des volence and support for those who served, troying struggle between the classes, whose in the eyes of the Falangists, the ‘particu- consortium is the foundation of national so- larist ambitions of politicians and regional ciety.’ (CORRADINI, 1923, p. 1065). traffickers who [complicated] the problem The Fascists countered ‘irresponsible of autonomies with blasphemous breaths of Bolshevik action’ – which served the alien separatism.’ (ORTEGA, 1939, p. 72). And on and was cause of ‘despondency’ – with their the other hand, it led its own atheist struggle reorganizing and reconstructive force that, against the that was ‘one of they claimed, they provided to serve the the historical essences of the españolidad’; a national community (MARPICATI, 1934, p. struggle fought with the ultimate goal of eli- 797). In summary, in the Fascist ideologues’ minating the Catholic presence from society, interpretation of the historical events of the often resorting to persecutory and vindicti- country, the Socialists – by identifying them- ve methods (SEIXAS, 2006, p. 247). selves as part of the universalistic horizon The text of the Constitution of the Re- of proletarian internationalism – contribu- public approved on December 9, 1931, ac-

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 cording to the opinion of its detractors, put on the one hand, exploited tools that ‘libe- all this down on paper. Hastily dismissed as ral-parliamentary candour’ offered its sub- the ‘effort of a minority’ who came to power versive propaganda; and, on the other hand, riding a revolutionary wave to ‘build an an- resorted to its revolutionary systems (RA- ti-Spanish State’, the Constitution was con- MOS, 1933, p. 582-584). In the opinion of the sidered a sort of ideological manifestation Falangists, the country was in the tight grip of anti-national ideals, concretely translated of liberalism on one side, and Bolshevism into articles that defined the organization on the other. So they believed they had no of State powers. In fact, the Constitution at- choice but to ‘mercilessly wipe out the in- tributed wide administrative autonomy to ternal accomplices, purple or red, who have regions that had applied for it, recognizing assaulted or projected to assault the foun- the Statutes of self-government, as happe- ding values, freedoms and spiritual fort’ of ned in in 1932. Moreover, it also the Fatherland in order to ‘serve the nation established a wide separation between the powered by hidden masters.’5 State and the Church; guaranteed freedom Significantly, among these ‘hidden of worship; provided for a drastic reduc- masters’, both Italian and Spanish Fascists tion in ecclesiastical privileges; and sanctio- included , completing the list ned the dissolution of religious orders that of anti-national opponents. Associated at had vowed obedience to an authority other different times with the liberal regime and than the State. As if that was not enough, it with Socialism, it seemed to share with both legitimized civil marriage and divorce, and of them a potentially disintegrating, subver- protected the rights of children born outside sive and anti-systemic character. According marriage (RODRÍGUEZ, 1934, p. 183). to an historical interpretation, Masonic lod- The decisively reformist, if not radical, ges were accused of moving the levers of character of the Constitution angered Spa- world finance. But for the Pnf and the Fa- nish Fascists, who saw in it an attempt - not lange, the worst thing was that they plotted even veiled - to sow seeds of discord and ex- in the shadows to control the vital ganglia punge the spiritual element from the lives of of the State. So Freemasonry was considered Spaniards. ‘Tyrannical’ and ‘unstable’, So- a serious threat that had to be counteracted cialism was accused of being the reason for with appropriate measures. the ‘perversions, weaknesses and repugnant The first one was Italian Law no. 2029 deficencies which had profaned the Nation, of November 26, 1925, better known as the the unstoppable deterioration of health, and ‘Law on secret societies’. This included the the inadmissible debasement of the most in- dismissal of all civil servants and military timate national sentiment.’ (ORTEGA, 1939, agents of every order and rank of the State, p. 51; ROMERO, 2008, p. 138). provinces and municipalities or institutes Dragged to the dock, the Psoe was under their protection, belonging to organi- charged with pitting Spaniards against one zations established in the Kingdom or outsi- another by creating a divisive policy that, de it, even partly operating in a clandestine

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 manner or whose members were bound to ment of a Special Court, expressly charged the secrecy.6 The reference to ‘that great cri- with the evaluation of crimes perpetrated minal conspiracy and forge of high treasons against the State and the regime.8 that was Freemasonry’ was explicit (PAVE- Analogously, Falange theorists also SE, 1934, p. 263).7 avowed and strengthened the theory of Ma- Actually, the lodges in Italy were not sonic conspiracy, exploiting the enormous a real danger. From the data reported by potential for legitimization/delegitimization the Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs that it possessed. This happened from the at that time, Alfredo Rocco, it was evident early stages of Spanish Fascism’s develop- that the number of Freemasons in 1925 did ment. The Jonsist Onésimo Redondo Orte- not exceed twenty thousand. Nonetheless, ga, for example, in January 1933 denounced party theorists were convinced that the po- Freemasonry’s strongly anti-religious, secu- wer of the Grand Orient was spreading on lar and ‘foreign’ character, which was alien to the peninsula like a disease attacking the the national historical tradition. In his asses- healthy body of the nation, enfeebling the sment, the liberal State itself as well as Mar- spirit of the people, and weakening the au- xism and the Republic represented ‘export thority of the Pnf from the inside. Hence the goods recommended by the Masonic lodges dangerous character attributed to Freema- and the insurgent Internationals to impose sonry, which ‘was clinging to the State and, upon the nation some myths and laws that in a thousand ways, was binding it and do- [deformed] it.’ (ORTEGA, 1933, p. 6). minating it.’ (ROCCO, 1927, p. 40). Two years later, Falange founder The struggle against secret associa- José Antonio Primo de Rivera, speaking tions, therefore, constituted a relentless fight of the anti-national policy implemented to defend the State and the nation. In fact, during the ‘terrible biennium’ 1931-1933, it was not permissible for a ‘hidden hierar- highlighted how Spain had become a colony chy’ to attempt to dominate the State hierar- of Freemasonry, and legitimized the use of chy and get to a point of trying to replace it. force against what he called a ‘triumphant Once the independence of the country from sect, seeder of discord, denier of the national an alien power was ‘won at such a price and community and obedient to foreign orders.’ at such a price maintained’, it was inconcei- (RIVERA, 1976, p. 581). Advancing from the vable for the nation to find itself again at the same premises, centre of political manoeuvres orchestrated accused ‘secret and exotic’ Freemasonry of by clandestine organizations linked to fo- being closely related to liberal-democracy. reign headquarters, which had nothing to do In accordance with this affiliation, the latter with the homeland of true Italians (ROCCO, had contributed to worsening the economic 1927, p. 40). For this reason, after the defini- crisis and undermining the vital interests of tion of the legislative framework justifying the nation, public order, internal security the persecution, the members of the lodges and social peace (RAMOS, 1935). were subject to the unquestionable judg-

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 The intensity with which Spanish Fas- a ‘satellite and slave of the criminal Soviet cists conducted this campaign, even before tyranny’ during the 1930s.11 the Alzamiento, gave new impetus and re- Members of the lodges were consi- newed vigour to the anti-Masonic radica- dered guilty of providing support, arms lism of Franco and his army during the Ci- and money to republican oppressors and, vil War years (ARRIBAS, 2009, p. 180-184). along with the Communists, were accused This meant a strong Falangist influence un- of spreading ‘the most atrocious slander derlying the normative measures taken du- against true Spain.’ Like what happened ring the conflict and in its aftermath, which in the Italian Fascist regime, a Special Court were clearly aimed at annihilating the lodges was established to judge those suspected of as secret associations and, above all, as ene- affiliation with Freemasonry. This court also mies of the nation. Hit by along had the discretion to award ‘excusas absoluto- with the Popular Front and trade unions, rias’ (‘absolving justifications’) provided by they were officially banned by the Ley de law for special merits, essentially linked to Responsabilidades Políticas of February 9, participation in the nationalist cause.12 1939, which reiterated Freemasonry’s illegal Falling within the ambit of the puniti- 9 and anti-national character. The legislation ve measures’ exclusion clauses, support for targeted parties and groups that had contri- the Falange – that was a fundamental com- buted to creating or aggravating subversion ponent of the nationalist front since the early of the order in Spain, and all those who had months of the Civil War – ended up being opposed the nationalists ‘with concrete acts a parameter to identify a good citizen, and 10 or serious passivity.’ its absence a discriminating factor for assig- A new law, promulgated on March 1, ning the black mark of ‘anti-national Spa- 1940, intensified the persecution. This legis- niard’. Moreover, although there is no dou- lative provision affected secret societies and bt that the regime never granted Falangists international forces of a ‘clandestine nature’ an appropriate space of political manoeuvre – essentially Freemasonry and seditious or- to implement a ‘genuinely Fascist direction’ ganizations associated with it – since it was in governing the country, it is also true that thought that they constituted the galaxy of the reward nature of certain articles in the international . To justify the March 1, 1940 law surely had something to law that led to another repressive crackdo- do with the efforts of the blue shirts who, wn, many reasons already adduced several since their origins, had attempted to affiliate times before were given. The organizations Falange with the true homeland (CAMPOS, in question were held responsible for all the 2004, p. 167; PAYNE, 1965, p. 163-167). tragedies that devastated the life of the na- So it can be said advisedly that the blue tion: from the war of independence to the shirts’ ideologists conceptualized the image loss of the colonial empire, from the fall of of the anti-national enemy in a form very the constitutional monarchy to the ‘terrib- similar to what the Fasci Italiani di Combat- le atheistic, materialist, anti-militarist and timento first, and later the Pnf, did. Mono- anti-Spanish campaign’ that made Spain

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 polising the ideal of the Fatherland, Fascism Resumen and Falangism identified the nation with themselves. The relevance of this ideologi- Para el Partito Nazionale Fascista italia- cal appropriation process lies in the fact that no y Española, la comunidad it was not just an abstract construction of política coincidió con la nación, conce- some theorists, but was turned into concrete bida no como una conglomeración in- political action aimed at realizing the most diferenciada de ciudadanos, sino como una comunidad de creyentes en una ‘re- ambitious goal of the Pnf and the Falange: ligión de la Patria’. El objetivo común de namely, the effective fulfilment of the Fascist los fascistas italianos y españoles, desde nation in Italy, and the National syndicalist su aparición en la escena política de sus one in Spain. respectivos países, fue la defensa de los valores nacionales. Pero la pretensión Resumo de ser los únicos y exclusivos represen- tantes de esos valores negaba cualquier Para o Partido Nacional Fascista italia- libertad efectiva de disidencia, incluso no (PNF) e a Falange Espanhola (FE), para aquellos que respetaban los valores a comunidade política coincidia com a nacionales pero los entendían de manera nação concebida, não como um conglo- diferente. Este artículo analizará cómo merado indiferenciado de cidadãos, mas los ideologos del Pnf y de la Fe articula- como uma comunidade de crentes em ron sus respectivas campañas contra los uma ‘religião da pátria’. O objetivo co- enemigos antinacionales para legitimar mum dos fascistas italianos e espanhóis, sus propios partidos y allanar el camino desde sua aparição no cenário político hacia la realización efectiva de sus pro- de seus respectivos países, era a defesa pias naciones: naciones que debían ser dos valores nacionais. Mas a pretensão claramente y totalmente fascistas. de ser os únicos e exclusivos represen- tantes desses valores negava qualquer Palabras clave: Falangismo. Fascismo. liberdade efetiva de dissidência, mesmo Nación. àqueles que respeitavam os valores na- cionais, mas os pretendiam de maneira Notas diferente. Este artigo analisará como os ideólogos do PNF e da FE articularam 1 About the Italian intervention alongside the na- suas respectivas campanhas contra os tionalist front and the battle of Guadalajara see inimigos antinacionais a fim de legiti- Payne (1965, p. 98-99, 158-161; 2012, p. 134-139); Preston (1998, p. 92-95, 150-152); Vilar (2000, mar seus próprios partidos e preparar p. 78-80). o caminho para a efetiva realização de 2 The Civil War attributed political legitimacy to suas próprias nações: nações que deve- the Falange and conferred to its project of natio- nalization of the Spaniards the recognition and riam ser clara e totalmente fascistas. the popular approval that had so far been lac- king. On the eve of the Alzamiento, indeed, the Palavras-chave: Falangismo. Fascismo. party had a rather small base of consensus. The Nação. first reason was its low political weight, conside-

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História: Debates e Tendências – v. 18, n. 3, set./dez. 2018, p. 449-463 ring that in the elections of February 1936 it had secret organizations were declared out of the law just received 0.4% of votes. The second reason and all the activities related to it were labeled as was the isolation in which it had been relega- ‘crimes of rebellion’. The text of the edict is pu- ted: it was declared illegal in following March blished in Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Santa because of the waves of violence triggered in Cruz de Tenerife, no. 125, October 16, 1936. Two the country by its adepts. The third reason was years later, a new decree issued on December 21, the internal crisis that struck it in the fall of 1936 1938 imposed the elimination, within a term of when, once many of its leaders were killed or im- two months, of all the Masonic inscriptions, sym- prisoned, the party lacked of a solid leadership. bols and documents, including those in the chur- The electoral data is in Campos (2004, p. 71). ches and cemeteries of the national zone. 3 The verb ‘caporettise’ was used by Mussolini to 10 In Article no. 4, letter i, there was an exception for mean the Psi intent to lead Italy to the catastro- those who had abandoned Freemasonry volunta- phe. This neologism comes from ‘Caporetto’, a rily before July 18, 1936, and for those who had former Italian village, now part of the Slovenian been expelled from it for having acted against the territory, where the Italian army was dramati- principles to which it was inspired or against the cally defeated by Austro-German forces in 1917 purposes it pursued (ESPAÑHA, 1939, p. 824- (MUSSOLINI, 1951-1978, p. 241). 847.) 4 With regard to the autumn 1920 administrative 11 Ley de 1 de marzo de 1940 sobre represión de la elections, it is important to remember that the an- masonería y del comunismo, published in Bole- ti-Socialist bloc held 56% of the votes on national tín Oficial del Estado (1940, p. 1537). Cf. Arribas basis, obtaining 4655 municipalities on 8346 and (2009, p. 315-322). 33 provincial councils on 69. Socialists conquered 12 The information about the Special Court can be the majority in 2022 municipalities and in 26 pro- found in art. 12 of Ley de 1 de marzo de 1940 so- vincial councils. The electoral data are reprodu- bre represión de la masonería y del comunismo, ced in Gentile (2012, p. 16-17). above mentioned. To what concerns the excusas 5 The adjective ‘purple’ indicates those who su- absolutorias, see art. 10 of the law. pported the republican cause. It refers to the purple color of one of the three horizontal stripes forming the flag of the Second republic of Spain. Referências The quote is in Ortega (1939, p. 71). Cf. also Bravo (1937). 6 The text of the law is in Regno D’Italia (1925, ARRIBAS, Javier D. El enemigo judeo-masónico p. 4714-4715). en la propaganda franquista (1936-1945). : 7 (PAVESE, 1934, p. 263). It is important to note Marcial Pons, 2009. that Fascism embraced the anti-Masonic prejudi- ce, attributable to Italian nationalism, with some BRAVO, F. Camisas azules. Vértice, n. 4, spe- difficulties. In fact, in January 1923, Mussolini cial issue, July/Aug. 1937. was nomined 33 and was awarded the title of honorary Grand Master by Raul Palermi’s Grand CAMPOS, Ismael Saz. España contra España: Lodge of Piazza del Gesù. This Grand Lodge, Los nacionalismos franquistas. Madrid: Mar- together with Domizio Torregiani’s Lodge, not cial Pons, 2003. only had favoured with financial contributions the rise of Fascism, but it boasted among its ______. Fascismo y franquismo. Valencia: Uni- members prominent figures of the movement. versidad de Valéncia, 2004. Fascism assumed for the first time a clearly anti- -Masonic position at the IV meeting of the Grand CAMPOS, Ismael Saz; ARCHILÉS, Ferran. La Council of February 15, 1923 (PERFETTI, 1977, nación de los españoles. Valencia: Publicacions p. 266). de la Universitat de Valencia, 2014. 8 About the composition of the Special Court and its functions see Law no. 2008 of November 25, CASINI, Gherardo. Problema essenziale. Criti- 1926, in Regno D’Italia (1926, p. 5314-5315). ca fascista, Milano, 1, Dec. 1924. 9 A first measure was already taken with the edict of October 15, 1936, signed by the Gene- CORRADINI, Erico. Libertà e autorità. Gerar- ral Commander of the Canarian Islands, Ángel chia, n. 4, Apr. 1928. Dolla Lahoz. With it, the Freemasonry and other

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