Country Risk and
Vulnerability Assessment
MALI
MAY 2017
ECOWAS COMMISSION COMMISSION DE LA CEDEAO COMMISSÃO DA CEDEAO
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 1
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
Cover photo by JM, accessed via Flickr (https://www.flickr.com/photos/phase3/). Reproduced under CC BY 2.0.
Table of Contents
Acronyms and Abbreviations ...... 4 Message from the President of the ECOWAS Commission ...... 6 Statement from the Vice President of the ECOWAS Commission ...... 7 Preface ...... 8 Executive Summary ...... 9 Introduction ...... 11 Research Process ...... 11 Terminology and Conceptual Definitions ...... 13 Literature Review ...... 14 Research Questions ...... 15 Description of the Sample ...... 16 Data Analysis ...... 18 Scope and Limitations of the Study ...... 18 Country Background ...... 20 National-Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resiliencies ...... 22 Population and Demographics (Most Vulnerable Pillar) ...... 25 Security (Second Most Vulnerable Pillar) ...... 26 Politics and Governance (Third Most Vulnerable Pillar) ...... 28 Economics and Resources (Fourth Most Vulnerable Pillar)...... 29 Rule of Law (Least Vulnerable Pillar) ...... 31 External Factors ...... 32 Gender Considerations ...... 33 Sub-National Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resilience Factors: Observations by Region ...... 36 Bamako ...... 36 Mopti Region...... 38 Gao Region ...... 41 Kidal Region...... 43 Timbuktu Region ...... 45 Conclusion and Recommendations ...... 47 Appendix A: Data Sample...... 49 Appendix B: Vulnerability Index ...... 53 Appendix C: Additional References...... 55 Appendix D: Matrix of Vulnerabilities, Risks, Resilience Factors, and Recommendations by Human Security Pillar ...... 56
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 3
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project AfDB African Development Bank AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb CPIA World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment CRA Conflict Risk Assessment CRVA Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DPA ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs DPKRS ECOWAS Directorate of Peacekeeping and Regional Security ECOWARN ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECPF ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework EWD ECOWAS Directorate of Early Warning FGD Focus Group Discussion GBV Gender-Based Violence GDP Gross Domestic Product GSDRC Governance and Social Development Resource Centre ICC International Criminal Court IMF International Monetary Fund IncReps ECOWARN’s Incident Reports KII Key Informant Interview MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad MUJAO Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa NDP National Development Plan NZAID New Zealand Agency for International Development RASALAO Réseau d’Action sur les Armes Légères REWARD Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa RPM Rally for Mali SitReps ECOWARN Situation Reports SNA Stakeholder Network Analysis SSR Security Sector Reform UMEOA West Africa Economy and Monetary Union UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNOM United Nations Office in Mali USAID United States Agency for International Development WANEP West African Network for Peacebuilding ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project AfDB African Development Bank AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb CPIA World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment CRA Conflict Risk Assessment
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 4
CRVA Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DPA ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs DPKRS ECOWAS Directorate of Peacekeeping and Regional Security ECOWARN ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECPF ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework EWD ECOWAS Directorate of Early Warning FGD Focus Group Discussion GBV Gender-Based Violence GDP Gross Domestic Product GSDRC Governance and Social Development Resource Centre ICC International Criminal Court IMF International Monetary Fund IncReps ECOWARN’s Incident Reports KII Key Informant Interview NDP National Development Plan NZAID New Zealand Agency for International Development RASALAO Réseau d’Action sur les Armes Légères REWARD Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa SitReps ECOWARN Situation Reports SNA Stakeholder Network Analysis SSR Security Sector Reform UMEOA West Africa Economy and Monetary Union UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire USAID United States Agency for International Development WANEP West African Network for Peacebuilding
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 5
Message from the President of the ECOWAS Commission
The 15 Member-States of the ECOWAS Community represent a thriving region of the world, with a population of approximately 366 million and a rich human and topographical diversity. From the coastline to the mountain peaks of Fouta Djallon, across the Sahara and the mangroves of the Niger Delta, ECOWAS is home to diverse families, communities, and nations.
Over the last decade, the region has witnessed significant progress in lifting the standard of living for millions. However, along with the richness of natural resources, human capital and great opportunity, there are also challenges to contend with such as natural disasters, pandemics, ethno-sectarian tensions, and security threats caused by extremism and terrorism.
Global developments and changes such as advances in technology, human migration and climate change, have added new levels of complexity, presenting new challenges for strategic planning and preparedness as we look ahead to the future.
This is where Early Warning plays a critical role in helping ECOWAS to understand the changing dynamics so as to strengthen decision making and early response at the regional and national levels. The Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs) serve as an important resource in this regard. These reports are useful for strengthening the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework action plans as well as to serve as reference materials for an in-depth understanding of the human security dynamics in our Member States, and for our partners across the region.
I therefore invite national stakeholders, all ECOWAS institutions and our partners to make use of these reports for the entrenchment of peace and progress for the benefit of the Citizens of ECOWAS.
Jean-Claude Brou President of the ECOWAS Commission
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 6
Statement from the Vice President of the ECOWAS Commission
ECOWAS takes pride in finalizing this CRVA report which aims to identify structural vulnerabilities, event driven risks and existing resilience factors in each Member State of the Community. Indeed, this is a remarkable feat towards boosting the African Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union, with ECOWAS setting the pace for the development of an African-owned data set that can be tapped into to enhance human security analysis and accurate forecasting to assist policymakers to make informed decisions on pressing issues in the region. This information can be used as a baseline for ECOWAS and its partners to inform early warning and response efforts, particularly in this time when Early Warning and Response Mechanism is being deployed at the National level.
The CRVA research leverages ECOWARN data—gathered by Field Monitors—to establish a country baseline for monitoring patterns and trends across human security pillars. By comparing ECOWARN data to other data sets, and complementing quantitative data with qualitative findings, the assessments also help the Early Warning Directorate of ECOWAS to gather more robust data that is rich, reliable and empirical. The resulting findings are more representative in terms of geography, time, and theme for each country and needs to be updated periodically.
ECOWAS will consolidate this achievement by applying the knowledge and skills embodied in the CRVA Manual. My conviction for this emanates from the fact that the training of all EWD staff in the development of the CRVA Index, which marks the climax of transfer of knowledge and skills from the USAID REWARD technical staff to ECOWAS, will allow ECOWAS to independently conduct future CRVAs. Already, the EWD has initiated a process to put to practice the defined methodological framework to conduct Regional Risk and Resilience Assessment in the Lake Chad Basin, thereby serving as the first pillar in implementing the decision of the joint ECOWAS and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to engage communities in peacebuilding processes.
We hope the Member States of our Community take ownership of this report and anchor development and peace initiatives upon it, in addressing the risks and vulnerabilities in their communities. As we decentralize Early Warning and Response to the ECOWAS countries, the Commission stands ready to accompany each Member States in the implementation of the actionable recommendations embodied in the CRVA report.
Finda Koroma Vice President, ECOWAS Commission
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 7
Preface
The ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate has made giant strides in the practice of data driven early warning, through the qualitative and quantitative analysis of incidents and situations from multiple sources, with the added benefit of original data generated through the ECOWARN system. Indeed, the Center’s state-of-the-art technological tools places it at a vantage position to monitor and analyze risks and vulnerabilities in the ECOWAS region, cutting across the key areas of human security.
ECOWAS has played, and continues to play, a critical role in the monitoring of threats to human security across the region including the Sahelo-Saharan, Mano River, Gulf of Guinea, Lake Chad and Senegambia conflict systems to improve response for the prevention and management of conflict escalation.
Beyond a narrow focus on violent conflict alone, and consistent with its mandate to promote the socioeconomic and political integration of the sub-region, ECOWAS applies a human security lens with a view towards enhancing the well-being of the population in accordance with the ECOWAS Vision 2020. Thus, this report highlights risks, structural vulnerabilities and resilience factors across five dimensions (demographic, economic, security, governance and rule of law) at the national and sub-national levels.
Each CRVA report represents a myriad of perspectives and experiences from affected stakeholders including community leaders, civil society, administrative officials, security agents, traditional and religious leaders, just to mention a few. In this way, the CRVA report serves as a strategic document to provide an overview of the human security challenges in each ECOWAS member state as well as the social and institutional resilience factors that can help manage those challenges.
We hope that this report will be useful for strategic planning in addressing issues of human security as well as to provide insights to a multitude of stakeholders including policy and decision makers in the public and private sectors for conflict-sensitive engagement within the region.
Dr. Abdou Lat Gueye Director, ECOWAS Early Warning
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 8
Executive Summary
From 2016 to 2019, ECOWAS collected Economics/Resources, Politics/Governance and quantitative and qualitative data in Mali to better Rule of Law. understand the structural vulnerabilities that may exist, and how those vulnerabilities affect the Since 2012, Mali has faced significant security and everyday lives of individuals and communities. political challenges. The beginning of 2012 saw the This research was done in collaboration with the emergence of a Tuareg rebel group, the Movement United States Agency for International for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), in the North. Development (USAID)’s Reacting to Early Warning Other armed groups, such as Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda and Response Data in West Africa (REWARD) in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement project, as part of a broader assessment of the for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) have entire West African region. As part of this process, also contributed to violence and insecurity in the a series of focus group discussions and interviews north and across the country. The proliferation of were conducted in October 2016 in Mali to armed groups, weak state presence in the north contextualize the findings and to learn more about and center of Mali, cross-border conflict issues, resilience factors that mitigate risk and promote and conflict over land and resources have human security. The purpose of this report is to displaced thousands and affected humanitarian summarize these insights and perspectives, so conditions more broadly. Environmental that national stakeholders can build on their challenges such as floods and drought have also successes, and also to serve as a baseline for impacted human security for the people of Mali. ECOWAS’s monitoring of patterns and trends. The report provides an overview of national and However, there were also strong social and subnational vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience institutional resilience factors for effective dispute factors, as well as conclusions and resolution and peacebuilding in Mali, including the recommendations. role of traditional leadership, civil society, as well as democratic principles and legislation. Civil The CRVA was conducted by ECOWAS to update society organizations have been active throughout and expand upon the Conflict Risk Assessment the country, with some groups actively providing (CRA) 2013-2014 country reports. To better health, youth, and refugee services. Traditional understand the sub-national patterns and trends, leaders have also played a role in mitigating the research design began with a desktop study conflict and mediating disputes. Although elections involving a social network analysis based on a have been fraught with low pockets of violence and survey of peace and security actors in the country low turnout, Mali has taken significant strides to and a scoping of experts to be consulted during the strengthen its democratic institutions, including a fieldwork. This was followed by a Geographic secular constitution with minority religious groups Information System (GIS) analysis of patterns and being protected by law, media freedom, and a push trends in escalation dynamics and a quantitative to increase female political representation by analysis of relative structural vulnerabilities by requiring 30 percent of appointed and elected country and human security pillar. official positions be filled by women.
In Mali, high levels of vulnerability were found in the The following report aims to provide an overview so areas of Population/Demographics and Security, that regional and national stakeholders can have a while moderate levels of vulnerability were found in clear picture of the challenges faced by the country,
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 9
as well as the capacities that can be leveraged and report, the structural vulnerabilities are reflective of built upon for the promotion of sustainable human medium- and long-term trends. These reports focus on security in Mali. the identification of structural vulnerabilities and resiliencies, and how they may impact upon events and developments as they occur. Though risk/incident data naturally fluctuates and may therefore have changed since the publication of this
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 10
Introduction
Research Process understood for effective early warning and response.2
The CRVA assesses structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risks, and social and institutional As shown in the graphic below, the research was resilience factors according to five human security conducted in three main phases: Desktop Study, Field Research, and Analysis and Validation. pillars as identified by ECOWAS in a 2016 scoping paper.1 The pillars are: 1) Economics and Resources, 2) Politics and Governance, 3) Phase 1: Desktop Study Population and Demographics, 4) Rule of Law, and 5) Security. Findings in this report describe how The Desktop Study included a preliminary risks flow from vulnerabilities in the context of Mali assessment of structural vulnerabilities, event- both within and across the five pillars. In driven risks, and social and institutional resilience recognition of the fact that violent conflict has factors. underlying social, economic, political, and security drivers but expresses itself differently depending For the assessment of structural vulnerabilities, on the context, a holistic human security the research used data from dozens of sources, framework was used in this assessment, and will including ECOWARN Situation Reports (SitReps). be used for the CRVAs in all ECOWAS member Drawing on these pre-existing data sets,3 a CRVA states. Furthermore, the analysis also breaks out Index was created to measure the relative levels of gender considerations and external factors as vulnerability across five human security cross-cutting issues that need to be dimensions in Mali.
1 The EWD Scoping Paper was developed by ECOWAS to help International Institute for Democracy and Electoral inform the CRVA process, with the human security pillars Assistance, Transparency International, Freedom House, Mo identified based on best practice approaches such as Ibrahim Foundation, the Armed Conflict Location and Event ECOWARN guidelines and the New Zealand Agency for Database, World Bank, the Center for Security Studies ETH International Development (NZAID) framework. Zurich, Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, Political 2 EWD Scoping Paper on “Risk Assessment of Five ECOWAS Terror Scale, United Nations Refugee Agency, Uppsala Pilot Countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, University, UN Statistics, and Institute for Economics and and Burkina Faso” Peace. 3 Data sources used in the development of the CRVA Index include Global Integrity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 11
For the assessment of event-driven risks, event phase informed the research questions that data, including from ECOWARN’s Incident Reports needed further context and validation in the field, (IncReps), was triangulated against data from the as well as the sample of respondents to be Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project engaged (what was asked, where, and to whom). (ACLED) to estimate the locations and type of conflict issues at the sub-national level over time. A team of experts and researchers then conducted Using multiple sources allowed for cross-validation, an in-country assessment between November 14th the filling of gaps, and the ability to identify trends and November 19th, 2016 with participants from in indicators and sub-indicators using queries and the regions of Bamako, Gao, Kidal, Mopti, and key word searches. Timbuktu. This team included representatives from the ECOWAS Directorates of Early Warning (EWD) For the assessment of social and institutional and Political Affairs (DPA), as well as participants resilience factors, a survey was deployed to all of from USAID and affiliated experts. The KIIs and ECOWAS’s in-country contacts to learn more about FGDs conducted during this in-country assessment the peace and security actors working to manage collected qualitative data and information and reduce risks and vulnerabilities in the country. regarding various perspectives on structural Respondents (including representatives of vulnerabilities, event-driven risk factors, and social religious institutions, public sector actors, civil and institutional resilience factors relating to the society, youth groups, and development actors, different conflict issues across the country. These among others) were also asked to name transcripts have been collated, streamlined to organizations that they have partnered with in the reduce repetition and vagueness, and categorized last two years on issues of peace and security. Data under headings for analysis and prioritization was then uploaded to a Stakeholder Network Map during Phase 3. for quantitative analysis and to identify leverage points, spheres of influence, and social capital. Phase 3: Analysis and Validation Based on this analysis, key technical experts were identified and were contacted for the next phase of After the quantitative, GIS, and survey data was the research. validated and contextualized in the field, and the qualitative data was collected, organized and Phase 2: Field Research summarized, this report was drafted and was then validated by ECOWAS and USAID. This report will The Field Research began with a scoping workshop serve as a baseline and resource for more targeted in Bamako. Using the Stakeholder Network Map, early warning products and analysis/planning highly-networked technical experts were convened towards strategic and operational prevention of in a workshop to validate the initial desktop human insecurity within the country of Mali as well findings and suggest a way forward for the as associated conflict systems (e.g. the Sahel) qualitative analysis in the field. The Scoping more broadly. Workshop was also used to tailor and sensitize the broader research questions and the Key Informant Interview (KII) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) instruments and questionnaires based on local context. Additionally, the Scoping Workshop also served to attain references and contacts for key actors and stakeholders in the field who would be consulted over the course of the next two weeks during the KIIs and FGDs. Thus, the desktop study
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 12
Terminology and Conceptual Definitions For ECOWAS, this framework is useful in that it is aligned with the existing ECOWAS Conflict In this CRVA report: Prevention Framework (ECPF), which is a strategic tool to strengthen the human security architecture “Vulnerability” is defined as any structural factor in West Africa. Key to the ECPF are the categories that has the potential to be a conflict driver. These of “Operational Prevention,” or measures can include such things as youth unemployment, applicable in the face of crisis, and “Structural poverty, inequality, climate, patronage, Prevention,” or measures that ensure that crises demographic factors, etc. do not arise or re-occur. The CRVA framework is aligned with the ECPF such that identified “Risk” is defined as any event-driven factor that Vulnerability Factors are to be mitigated by has the potential to be a conflict trigger. Risk Structural Prevention measures, and Risk Factors factors can include specific controversies or events are to be mitigated by Operational Prevention such as disasters or elections that may occur. measures. This alignment is important for the utility and actionability of this report by users in West “Resilience” is defined as any social or institutional Africa. factor that has the potential to help mitigate or manage risks and vulnerabilities. These include political, cultural, and community leadership with significant social capital to influence conflict dynamics in a constructive way, including public sector, private sector, religious institutions, civil society, opinion leaders, development workers, etc. Resilience factors can include institutions that play a stabilizing role in the short, medium, or longer term.
The CRVA analysis was conducted according to the framework depicted in the figure below, whereby event-driven risk factors flow out of the structural vulnerabilities (per the red downward arrow) while social and institutional resilience factors mitigate and prevent those risks and vulnerabilities (per the green upward arrow).
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 13
Literature Review institutional factors play in preventing conflict. Thus, the human security framework provides a holistic approach to understanding different A Human-Centric Approach to Early Warning threats that affect individuals’ lives, whether this is
through conflict, health, food, environment, or In academic literature, the human security lens to other social, political or economic factors. conflict early warning is a change from the more state-centric approaches that were in vogue The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Historically, outlines a human-centric approach to security in early warning was focused on prevention and five principles: 1) People-centered, with a focus on mitigation of conflict between states. In the post- protecting basic human freedoms; 2) Multi- Cold War period with a surge in intra-state conflict, sectoral, encompassing a broad understanding of early warning was focused on identifying the threats and causes of insecurity; 3) drivers and impacts of civil conflict on states. At Comprehensive, taking into account different types that time, analysis focused on terminology of state of individuals’ security from economic to social; 4) “collapse” and “failure,” emphasizing impacts to Context-specific, emphasizing the need to analyze neighboring countries or regions, and perpetuating specific conflict contexts and root causes of a comparative paradigm of poverty and limited insecurity; and 5) Prevention-oriented, highlighting economic growth and conflict in contrast to more locally tailored risk prevention and mitigation developed countries.4 measures through early warning mechanisms.6
This focus on cross-cutting issues and situation- However, as a more interconnected human and specific analysis and response are central to the global security approach emerged in the 2000s, CRVA process and broader objectives of integrated conceptions of state fragility and conflict analysis conflict early warning and response by ECOWAS evolved in both development aid and policy and its partners. For the CRVAs, this involves approaches. As the Governance and Social identifying conflict risks, vulnerabilities and Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) describes, resiliencies across the human security pillars of “At a very broad level, fragility is the result of a Population and Demographics, Politics and dynamic interplay between internal factors Governance, Security, Economics and Resources, (including violent conflict, poverty, economic and and Rule of Law. structural conditions, weak formal institutions), and external factors (including international Many indices and development frameworks have political economy, regional and global insecurity).”5 emerged for measuring resilience and fragility, While not discounting the role of the state as a key from the Fund For Peace’s Fragile States Index7 to vehicle for managing and preventing conflict, the the African Development Bank (AfDB) and World human-centric approach looks first and foremost at Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional the impact of demographic, economic, political, Assessment (CPIA)8 and Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s and security conflict drivers on individuals and Index of African Governance.9 Today, leading communities as well as the role that a wide variety international development actors and multilateral of social and
4 “Defining and measuring state fragility: a new proposal”, 6 “Human Security in Theory and Practice”, Human Security Ferreira, I., The Annual Bank Conference on Africa, June Unit, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2015 (OCHA), United Nations, January 2009 5 “Topic Guide on Fragile States”, Mcloughlin, C., Governance 7 Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), August 8 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), World 2009 Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) 9 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Mo Ibrahim Foundation
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 14
agencies such as the United Nations, the World pressures within a society with a view to identifying Bank, and the AfDB have also produced strategies, structural vulnerabilities, resiliencies and risks practice areas, and tools, which seek to address across key human security pillars. As defined by the the drivers of fragility. The AfDB, for example, has a United Nations General Assembly, “human security 2014-2019 Strategy for Addressing Fragility and is an approach to assist Member States in Building Resilience in Africa, with a focus on identifying and addressing widespread and cross- building member state capacities and focusing on cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and “fragile situations rather than fragile states dignity of their people.”13 This approach is also in alone.”10 line with the ECOWAS Vison 2020 which seeks to promote peace, prosperity, and cohesion across As the AfDB Strategy notes, however, “there is no the region,14 and includes a focus on strengthening single solution and no predefined ‘toolbox’ for many human security aspects within member addressing fragility.”11 Older academic and policy states. conceptions of “state failure” used analysis centered on “traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of Research Questions states from military aggression,” as outlined in a 2009 paper by the United Nations Human Security Based on the initial desktop findings, the team Unit. Newer models of analysis have taken on a developed a set of framing questions broken out by broader human security lens, which was in the five human security pillars. These framing “response to the complexity and the questions were not asked verbatim in the field, but interrelatedness of both old and new security rather informed the design of the KII and FGD threats – from chronic and persistent poverty to instruments. These instruments included simple, ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, open-ended questions intended to prompt a health pandemics, international terrorism, and discussion during which respondents could sudden economic and financial downturns. Such express their opinions, experiences, and threats tend to acquire transnational dimensions perceptions about the ways in which they had been and move beyond traditional notions of security impacted by vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience that focus on external military aggressions factors in Mali. alone.”12
Politics and Governance: What is the most recent Thus, a human-centric approach, as opposed to a iteration of the Mali Peace Accord? Has there been state-centric approach, is important for analyzing an improvement and how? What do you think has risks and vulnerabilities to society for robust early worked with this peace agreement? The Mali Peace warning and response mechanisms. Human Accord has been criticized for lacking the inclusion security provides a holistic approach to of women. How are women involved in the Malian understanding different threats which affect peace process in line with UN resolution 1325? If individuals’ lives, whether through conflict, health, you were given the opportunity to participate in the food, environment, or other social, political, or peace agreement, what would be the one thing you economic factors. As such, the CRVAs seek to draw would do differently? What challenges to the upon the more dynamic and interrelated aspects of implementation of the peace agreement remain? risk and vulnerability, which look at capacities and
10 “Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa, 13 General Assembly resolution 66/290, October 2012 2014 – 2019”, AfDB 14 ECOWAS Vision 2020: Towards a Democratic and 11 Ibid. Prosperous Community, ECOWAS, June 2010 12 “Human Security in Theory and Practice”, Human Security Unit, OCHA, United Nations, January 2009
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 15
Given the current security landscape, what are Security: Who provides security/law and order in some of the concerns with upcoming elections in your community? As a part of the overall conflict 2018? What measures are in place to ensure fair landscape, to what extent does terrorism threaten and free elections in a secure environment? Will the safety and security of the population of Mali? In such political transitions help consolidate the addition to UN and French military forces, to what peace process or derail it? To what extent do extent does the government rely on proxies to women participate in the political decision-making maintain peace and security as well as law and process in Mali? What are the main barriers order? With the prevailing socio-political and affecting the role of women in a) peacebuilding, b) security situation, could the government of Mali politics and c) governance including electoral protect its borders with a potential withdrawal of processes in Mali? Why don’t more women the French and UN troops? What is the prevailing participate in the political process? How do we security situation in your region? ensure more women are involved in the political process Do you think that women are viable Rule of Law: To what extent do issues of drug political actors, who are playing a positive role in trafficking, human trafficking and criminality fuel the future political, governance and security the conflict in Mali? What are other types of arrangements of northern Mali? If yes, how? If not, criminal activities are fueling the conflict? When why? Are certain groups excluded from the political you have a dispute where do you go for resolution? processes? Have you used the court system in the past? Do you know someone who has used the court system? Population and Demographics: Describe the How did the process play out? Do you have access relationship among ethnic groups/communities in to equitable justice and legal services? Are there your region. Have you witnessed tensions among constraints or limitations to the functioning of the communities? Has religion been a source of judicial system? To what extent is corruption, conflict or a resource for peace in your community? political patronage, impunity or nepotism a Does migration and displacement contribute to problem in Mali? Are you aware of any legal conflict over land and resources? To what extent do framework protecting women and girls against issues of refugees and internal displacement affect violence? If yes, who were the perpetrators? How social cohesion? Is the youth bulge a factor for was the situation dealt with for both the victim and sustainable growth? Does it put a strain on the perpetrator? resources or public services? To what extent are adverse climatic conditions affecting food security Description of the Sample and security in general? What types of social services are available/accessible in your Data collected and analyzed for this research community (health, education, sanitation, water, included hundreds of ECOWARN SitReps, electricity) ECOWARN IncReps, ACLED event data, and a scoping survey, as well as transcripts and notes Economics and Resources: Are traders and from FGDs and KIIs in the field. Other sources, convoys able to transport goods to and from the integrated to form a vulnerability index (the CRVA market, especially in north? What specific Index), included Global Integrity, the Economist challenges and/or opportunities exist for women Intelligence Unit, the International Institute for and men in the emerging environment? To what Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Transparency extent can women help strengthen safety and International, Freedom House, Mo Ibrahim security in Malian communities? Beyond security Foundation, the Armed Conflict Location and Event assistance, how has foreign aid affected/benefited your community?
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 16
The heatmap above shows hot spots of human security fatalities between 2015 and 2018.
Risk and Fatalities (2010-2018) 80 300 250 60 200 40 150 100 20 50
0 0
Jul 2013 Jul
Apr2015
Oct2011 Oct2018
Jan2010 Jan2017
Jun 2016 Jun
Feb2014
Aug2010 Aug2017
Sep 2014 Sep
Nov 2015 Nov
Dec 2012 Dec
Mar 2011 Mar 2018 Mar May 2012 May
Vulnerability (ECOWARN SitReps) Human Security Fatalities (ECOWARN IncReps/ACLED)
The graph above shows the trends in risk layered against vulnerability. The y axis on the left (0-80) shows the level of vulnerability with a score of over 60 reflecting higher levels of vulnerability. The y axis on the right (0-300) shows the number of The map above shows the locations where fieldwork conflict fatalities by month. focused on in October 2016.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 17
Database, World Bank, Bertelsmann Stiftung Event data shows hotspots, patterns, and trends at Transformation Index, Political Terror Scale, United the sub-national level, including communal Nations Refugee Agency, Uppsala University, UN tensions in Mopti and insurgency in Gao and Kidal. Statistics, and Institute for Economics and Peace. Conflict in Mali has had a spillover effect in A complete breakdown is included in Appendix A. neighboring Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso as well. Field research was undertaken to validate and Data Analysis contextualize these findings through Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions. ECOWARN data shows a gradual rise in vulnerability (with a major spike during the coup Quantitative data show rising vulnerability in Mali, d'état in March 2012) as measured by taking a and areas of greatest structural weakness in the monthly average of the SitReps, as well as an Population/Demographics and Security pillars. increase in risk, as measured by fatalities recorded Corroborating these findings on structural in the ECOWARN IncReps and ACLED data. The vulnerabilities, the GIS and Event show rising levels most violent month reported during this seven year of lethal violence over the last seven years. As period was July 2016, during which clashes illustrated in the pages below, in addition to between Tuareg militias killed dozens. validating these desktop findings, the field research also helped to highlight the complex political dynamics at the local level in the context Relative Vulnerability by Human of the Mali Peace Accords. 10 Security Pillar 9 8 7 6 Scope and Limitations of the Study 5 4 3 This report seeks to layer, triangulate, and 2 1 juxtapose quantitative, GIS, and qualitative data in 0 a way that is accurate, meaningful, and representative. However, limitations to this
Security analysis include the two- year date range for the
Politics- Economics
Rule of Law Ruleof event/GIS data and the seven-year date range for
Governance Population-
Demographics the ECOWARN SitReps. If there are conflict cycles that fall outside those parameters, there will be constraints on the ability to analyze those patterns The CRVA Index, shown above, indicates that in in this report. Furthermore, this research sought to Mali the human security pillars that exhibit the ensure representativeness in the sample of most severe levels of vulnerability are Population stakeholders engaged through KIIs (12 prominent and Demographics and Security. Data suggests individuals) and FGDs (14 focus group that even Rule of Law (the best performing sector) discussions). To the extent that these stakeholders is still more vulnerable than other countries in the were representative, they added vital region. See Appendix B for a brief description of contextualization and validation of the desktop how the indicators and sources were selected as research. However, another limitation in this study well as how the data was normalized, scaled, and was that due to security considerations, the integrated. In the graph above, the lower the score research team was unable to travel outside of the on the y axis (0-10), the more vulnerable the capital, Bamako, to conduct interviews. human security pillar.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 18
Scope and limitations also apply to the use and exclusively at the national level, ECOWAS seeks to purpose of the study. The CRVA reports support the support a more decentralized early warning and objectives of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention response infrastructure across the region. As such, Framework (ECPF). In particular, the CRVA reports the CRVA reports also take into consideration identify vulnerabilities across the human security dynamics at the sub-national level. These sub- pillars in order to inform structural prevention. national factors are critical to consider as they help Structural prevention, as defined in the ECPF, analysts and potential responders understand the comprises “political, institutional (governance) and context in which specific events (risks) are developmental reforms, capacity enhancement occurring, which may be markedly different from and advocacy on the culture of peace.” While this the national context. A mapping of sub-national report can also be used to inform operational level risks, vulnerabilities, and resiliencies can also prevention, which includes “early warning, help inform strategies for engaging at the local mediation, conciliation, preventive disarmament level for structural prevention. In particular, as and preventive deployment using interactive defined by the ECPF, taking “measures to ensure means such as good offices and the ECOWAS the crises do not arise in the first place or, if they Standby Force,” it seeks primarily to identify the do, that they do no re-occur.” key areas of structural vulnerability at the national and sub-national levels for strategic planning by Finally, as also noted in the ECPF, conflict in West ECOWAS and other partners in the peace and Africa tends to be highly interconnected, which security space. However, inasmuch that often leads to cycles of violence that cross borders operational prevention can be informed by and can keep countries emmeshed for decades. patterns and trends in the event-driven risk factors The CRVA reports, covering all fifteen member highlighted in this report, the CRVA should serve as states of ECOWAS, are also useful in helping to a baseline analysis of dynamics that are closely inform and understand the dynamics of specific monitored over time. Thereby, in addition to regional conflict systems, such as those that occur informing strategic planning on structural across the Mano River and Sahel. These regional vulnerability issues, the CRVA will also inform early conflict systems are influenced and interconnected warning products such as weekly, monthly, and not only historically and culturally, but also share quarterly situation reports that inform analysts and many of the same structural vulnerabilities that potential responders as to heightened conflict risk give rise to risks and the eventual outbreak of across one or more indicators, and propose violence, decade after decade. Thus, the CRVA recommendations on response. The CRVA reports reports present an opportunity to view not only the can also be used as a foundation to inform more specific national and sub-national factors that lead detailed case studies around identified risks, to structural vulnerability and heightened risk, they vulnerabilities and resiliencies for a country of also help highlight the nature of regional conflict interest or concern. systems, and the need for a holistic and systemic lens in both analysis and response. While many reports that seek to identify structural vulnerabilities and resilience factors focus almost
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 19
Country Background
The Republic of Mali declared independence from pressures that impacted agricultural livelihoods colonial rule in 1960, after 68 years of occupation and food security.17 By the early 1990s, many of under the French administered territory known as the northern Tuareg population had returned from French Sudan. The country’s first president was other North African countries where they had lived deposed in a coup by members of the military in in the 1970s and 1980s after severe droughts 1968, placing Lieutenant Moussa Traoré into drove them from Mali. Some returned with military power. Traoré went on to lead a restrictive single- training and equipment from Libya, having fought party state for over two decades. Post-colonial in campaigns backed by that country’s former long- Malian rule during the period included the time leader, Muammar Qaddafi.18 establishment of martial law and military administration in the northern regions to quash a Though political brinkmanship between parties rebellion by the ethnic Tuareg population.15 Though also caused discontent during the 1990s, the first accounting for only about five percent of the successful democratic transition of power took population, the Tuareg are almost exclusively place from President Konaré to successor Touré concentrated in the Northern regions of Mali which following elections in 2002. The subsequent border Algeria and Niger, while the Bambara, decade of President Touré’s rule helped spur rapid Senofu, Fulani and other ethnic groups are growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which concentrated in the south, center and west of the rose from $US 3.9 billion in 2002 to $US 12.44 country.16 billion a decade later.19 Much of this growth was due to increased Foreign Direct Investment, which Following violent student protests calling for a rose from $US 72.35 million in 2003 to $US 646.6 multi-party state, and a military coup led by the million in 2009.20 The economic growth however, President’s head guard, Lieutenant-Colonel also coincided with rapid population growth, with Amadou Toumani Touré, President Traoré was the population increasing by 38 percent,21 and a ousted in 1991. This paved the way for a civilian concentration of wealth in the south and west, government led by M. Alpha Oumar Konaré, which only exacerbated existing inequalities heralding constitutional reforms and the between the Northern population and the rest of establishment of a multi-party legislative system the country.22 In 2006, a new uprising by the during the 1990s. However, the period was also Tuareg combatants led to violent clashes with the marked by outbreaks of violence in the North Malian army and security forces, before eventually involving Tuareg pastoralists, driven by ethno- reaching a peace agreement brokered by Algeria. nationalism, environmental pressures, and The agreement was wrought with mistrust and in- political grievances. Historically, the socio- fighting, and scattered incidents of violence in economic inequalities between Northern Mali and 2007 prevailed.23 Southern, Central, and Western Mali were a result of some governance challenges and environmental
15 “Chapter 2: Rebellion and fragmentation in northern Mali”, 19 “GDP (current US$)”, World Bank Chauzal, G. and van Damme, T., Clingendael, March 2015. 20 “Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)”, 16 “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – World Bank Mali”, Minority Rights Group International, November 2017. 21 “Population, total”, World Bank 17 “Mali: Economic Factors Behind the Crisis”, European 22 “Mali: Economic Factors Behind the Crisis”, European Union, 2014. Union, 2014. 18 “Chapter 2: Rebellion and fragmentation in northern Mali”, 23 “Tuareg – Mali – 2006-2009”, Global Security Chauzal, G. and van Damme, T., Clingendael, March 2015.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 20
In January 2012, an emergent Tuareg rebel group, Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad established to deploy a peacekeeping force of over (MNLA), began an armed separatist fight against 12,000.25 The parties to the Malian conflicts the Malian government. This push was precipitated engaged in peace talks led by Algeria and the by the civil war in Libya and subsequent collapse of international community. These talks culminated in Qaddafi’s regime in 2011 that saw an influx of the Algiers Accord in June 2015, which was signed weapons into Mali.24 The insecurity that ensued by representatives of the government, loyalist created a vacuum for other armed Islamic groups fighters, and a coalition of rebel groups. The Malian to join the northern Mali conflict, including Ansar Peace and Reconciliation Agreement did not offer Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and independence to the Northern regions, but the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa promises a more advanced decentralization as a (MUJAO). means of bridging the economic gaps between the North and the rest of the country. However, the In March 2012, Malian soldiers – who had been enforcement of the peace agreement has proven a overrun by armed Tuaregs – deposed President challenge amidst ongoing insecurity, including Touré in response to his inability to quell the Tuareg assaults on UN peacekeepers, and terrorist attacks rebellion. Under pressure from ECOWAS, the on civilian targets such as the Bamako Radisson military peacefully established an interim Blu hotel in December 2015.26 government led by former parliament speaker Dioncounda Traoré. The coup enabled the MNLA to In attempts to address poverty and continue the declare an independent Azawad territory in April economic growth that stalled during the 2013 2012, but they were overtaken by the stronger insecurity, a focus on improving agricultural Ansar Dine and MUJAO groups who seized control productivity, infrastructure, and economic of the Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal regions. A new diversification is being pursued by the government, northern counter-offensive led by the Malian army, alongside support by international partners.27,28 with French and African military assistance, was Mali’s reliance on exports such as cotton and gold, launched in January 2013, resulting in the Malian which together account for 78 percent of its army regaining control of most of the North, though exports, leaves the economy susceptible to shocks pockets of insecurity prevailed. In April 2013, the from volatile commodity prices.29 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
24 “Chapter 2: Rebellion and fragmentation in northern Mali”, Report; And Statement by the Executive Director for Mali”, Chauzal, G. and van Damme, T., Clingendael, March 2015. IMF, June 2106. 25 “MINUSMA Fact Sheet”, United Nations Peacekeeping 28 “Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Mali 26 “Mali”, Peace Insight, Peace Direct the Period FY16-19”, World Bank 27 “Fifth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility and 29 “Mali”, Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) Request for Extension, Augmentation of Access and Modification of Performance Criteria – Press Release; Staff
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 21
National-Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resiliencies
Based on desktop research using the ECOWARN and ACLED data sets, surveys of peace and security actors in key regions in Mali, field research that included Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), and participatory analysis by the CRVA field research team, the following National Level risks, vulnerabilities, and resilience factors were identified:
Structural Vulnerabilities Population and Demographics • Large youth bulge and rapid population growth • Adverse climate conditions (drought, flooding, pest infestation) exacerbated by climate change • Harmful socio-cultural practices • Caste system • Cross-border migration • Internally displaced persons (IDPs) • Low capacity health services, particularly maternal and reproductive health
Security • Ongoing insecurity in Northeast • Porous borders and regional security pressures • Large ungoverned land mass and harsh terrain of the Sahara Desert • Weak presence and capacity of security and defense forces • Inefficient coordination among multiple security actors • Proliferation of arms • Limited implementation of the 2015 Peace Agreement
Politics and Governance • Weak state presence in the north and center of the country • Perceptions of corruption and nepotism in government • Lack of confidence in government institutions • Manipulation of ethnic identities and tribal affiliations • Embezzlement of public funds • Low representation of women and youth in politics and decision-making • History of military coups
Economics and Resources • North-south and urban-rural development disparities
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 22
• Illicit economies, including drug trafficking and trans-Saharan arms trade • High levels of poverty, especially concentrated in the north-east • Unequal distribution of wealth • Food insecurity and malnutrition • Low participation of women in the formal economy • High unemployment rates • Forced marriage • Undiversified economy - vulnerable to exogenous shocks
Rule of Law • Lack of trust in judicial institutions • Low capacity of law enforcement agencies • Limited government presence to provide law and order • Perceptions of corruption in the judicial system • Lack of state authority in the northern and central parts of Mali Event-Driven Risks Population and Demographics • Displacement and return/reintegration of refugees • Competition over access to scarce natural resources • Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) • Climate change and drought/flood cycles
Security • Recurrence of rebellions in northern Mali • Ineffective implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)/security provision of the Peace Agreement • Proliferation of armed/militia/terrorist groups • Land-based inter-communal conflicts • Attacks on UN personnel and compounds • Armed attacks on soft targets such as hotels • Reported public security force abuses
Politics and Governance • Elections • Slow implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement • Chieftaincy and succession issues
Economics and Resources • Exogenous commodity shocks • Labor protests
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 23
Rule of Law • Crime • Mob justice/vigilantism Social and Institutional • Moderate religious leaders Resilience Factors • Civil society groups, including NGO and humanitarian actors • Women’s organizations • Community leaders • UN peacekeeping Mission (MINUSMA) • France anti-terrorism strategy in the Sahel region
Key themes that emerged in the CRVA research include the fact that despite the signing of the peace agreement in 2015 to resolve the Malian crisis, the security situation has been deteriorating. This has extended beyond the northern regions of Goa, Timbuktu, and Kidal to the rest of the country, impacting on social and community cohesion and also has negatively impacted on the state’s ability to provide basic social services in affected areas.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 24
Population and Demographics (Most Vulnerable Pillar)
Vulnerabilities • Large youth bulge and rapid population growth • Adverse climate conditions (drought, flooding, pest infestation) exacerbated by climate change • Harmful socio-cultural practices • Caste system • Cross-border migration • Internally displaced persons (IDPs) • Low capacity health services, particularly maternal and reproductive health Risks • Displacement and return/reintegration of refugees • Competition over access to scarce natural resources • Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) • Climate change and drought/flood cycles
Vulnerabilities and Risks Social and Institutional Resilience Factors Like many countries in West Africa, Mali has a large youth population – nearly half of the population is To manage these pressures, civil society under the age of 14 – coupled with a relatively high organizations are actively providing services rate of population growth. While the youth around health, youth development and refugee population holds significant potential as a driver of resettlement. Government social programs are key economic growth, high levels of unemployment and to mitigating risks, especially as the peace illiteracy compounded by the exclusion of youth agreement is gradually being implemented across from decision-making processes have turned the the North. Healthcare providers, including so-called “youth bulge” into a vulnerability. Youth in international health partnerships, also play a role Mali have been drawn to illicit economic activities in promoting social wellbeing as regards clinical or criminality as well as to extremist groups. and public health. Growing population pressures may also hinder the delivery of basic social services and threaten food security and sustainable development.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 25
Security (Second Most Vulnerable Pillar)
Vulnerabilities • Ongoing insecurity in Northeast • Porous borders and regional security pressures • Large ungoverned land mass and harsh terrain of the Sahara Desert • Weak presence and capacity of security and defense forces • Inefficient coordination among multiple security actors • Proliferation of arms • Limited implementation of the 2015 Peace Agreement
Risks • Recurrence of rebellions in northern Mali • Ineffective implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)/security provision of the Peace Agreement • Proliferation of armed/militia/terrorist groups • Land-based inter-communal conflicts • Attacks on UN personnel and compounds • Armed attacks on soft targets such as hotels • Reported public security force abuses
Vulnerabilities and Risks (AQIM) and groups such as Ansar Dine, MUJAO and Al-Mourabitoun continue to inflict violence on the Security challenges throughout Mali include civilian population, UN and international forces, separatist violence, extremist violence, communal and the Malian Defense Forces. In recent years, violence, illicit economic activity, and criminality. there have been multiple terrorist attacks reported The security situation has deteriorated since non- throughout Mali. In 2015, extremist attacks state armed groups took over parts of the north in occurred in every major region in Mali over the 2012. Since 2014, violence related to the course of the year. Attacks began in northern Mali separatist movement in northern Mali has been and spread down to the central and southern concentrated in the Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu regions, where spikes in violence continued regions of the country. One of the main separatist throughout 2016. Many of these attacks have groups, the CMA (Coordination des Mouvements targeted the Malian army and security forces, as de l'Azawad), maintains control over several towns well as UN peacekeepers, making Mali the in Kidal. Violent clashes between the pro-territorial deadliest UN peacekeeping operation to date. In integrity GATIA (Groupe d’Autodéfense Touareg 2015, there was an attack on the Radisson Blu Imghad et Alliés) and the CMA has continued in hotel in Bamako, which led to the deaths of 20 northern Mali. In 2015, the different armed people, including expatriate workers and travelers. factions signed the Algiers Peace Agreement. While In 2016, 77 people were killed when a suicide efforts have been made to enforce the terms of the bomber drove into a military camp in Gao. agreement throughout the country, violence continues and is spreading south toward the center Inter-communal violence has also been a risk of the country. factor threatening security in Mali. Some communal conflict has roots in the perennial Extremist violence has also been a serious threat conflicts between farmers and herders over access to security in Mali. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to scarce natural resources.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 26
Criminality has also become a serious security In addition, insecurity in northern Mali has threat in various parts of Mali. Reports of armed displaced thousands of people, resulting in robbery have increased, especially in cities and significant movement of refugees and internally regions that lack a strong security presence and displaced persons (IDPs). Nearly 140,000 Malian robust judicial systems. Reported human rights refugees remain in camps in Niger, Burkina Faso, abuses by armed elements also undermine and Mauritania, and the United Nations estimates security. Abuses have caused the population to that there are more than 35,000 IDPs inside lose trust in government forces, which has the Mali.30 The return and reintegration of these potential to drive the population to seek protection populations may prove to be a challenge for both from non-state actors, such as vigilante or armed the government and for local communities, who are groups, or join extremist groups. already facing significant economic and resource constraints. Social and Institutional Resilience Factors
Illicit economic activities, such as arms, drugs, and Social and institutional entities that play an human trafficking, pose another threat to security important role in managing the vulnerabilities and in Mali. In the North, porous borders allow illegal risks described above include public security goods to flow into Mali. Mali has connections to the forces and International partners, as well as civil broader Sahelian arms flows and there is society-led conflict early warning networks such as documented evidence of weapons in Mali that the West African Network for Peacebuilding originated in Qaddafi-era Libya. There is also (WANEP). Especially in areas where public security evidence of other arms trade routes from Sudan, actors do not have a presence, traditional leaders and from other parts of West Africa.31 play a critical role in striking alliances and mediating disputes to help prevent escalation.
30 “Mali”, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 31 “Investigating Cross-border Weapon Transfers to the Sahel” Conflict Armament Research, November 2016.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 27
Politics and Governance (Third Most Vulnerable Pillar)
Vulnerabilities • Weak state presence in the north and center of the country • Perceptions of corruption and nepotism in government • Lack of confidence in government institutions • Manipulation of ethnic identities and tribal affiliations • Embezzlement of public funds • Low representation of women and youth in politics and decision-making • History of military coups Risks • Elections • Slow implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement • Chieftaincy and succession issues
Vulnerabilities and Risks exact terms of the agreement, especially in rural areas. In addition, the government in Bamako has Since the restoration of an elected government in struggled to regain trust among local populations, 2013, politics and governance in Mali has been a who point to instances of corruption, nepotism, and source of vulnerability, as the Malian government neglect. A number of observers have pointed to the has faced a number of challenges including exclusion of women and youth from the peace reasserting and securing control over parts of the process and from government more generally as North and implementing the provisions of the 2015 shortcomings of the process. Algiers Peace Accord. Social and Institutional Resilience Factors Implementation of many of the provisions of the Algiers Peace Accord has been slow and parts of Mali has historically been a model of the country have yet to see any significant representative governance in the region. But with restoration of government services or the recent civil war and coup d’état, community administration. Political rights have slowly leaders, women leaders, and civil society improved, although the government has been organizations, have emerged as critical players in accused of continued media censorship. Illiteracy the promotion of accountability and trust in state and lack of communication mean that there are institutions, as well as advocating for political rights many people and groups who do not know the and good governance.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 28
Economics and Resources (Fourth Most Vulnerable Pillar)
Vulnerabilities • North-south and urban-rural development disparities • Illicit economies, including drug trafficking and trans-Saharan arms trade • High levels of poverty, especially concentrated in the north-east • Unequal distribution of wealth • Food insecurity and malnutrition • Low participation of women in the formal economy • High unemployment rates • Forced marriage • Undiversified economy - vulnerable to exogenous shocks Risks • Exogenous commodity shocks • Labor protests
Vulnerabilities and Risks further incentives for involvement in criminality, which in turn negatively impacts security. Mali's economy is heavily dependent on agriculture and gold mining, making the economy vulnerable Illicit economies, particularly drug trafficking, have to shifts in global commodity prices. In addition, the played a significant role in Mali and the wider Sahel country suffers from significant economic region generally. Drug trafficking is a cross-cutting inequality. The GINI coefficient –a measure of issue that affects security, governance, health and income or wealth distribution which ranges from 0 economics. Terrorist and extremist groups in Mali (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality) – is and other local groups have historically been assessed as being 33 in Mali.32 While this measure complicit in and benefitted from these illegal has been improving over the past 20 years, trades, highlighting the complex nature and according to the World Bank over a quarter of the interconnectedness of conflict drivers and country’s income is captured by the top ten percent vulnerabilities in the country. of households.33 This translates into unequal access to economic resources, with a widening gap Social and Institutional Resilience Factors between rich and poor. Livelihoods, trade, and social services are Since the start of conflict in 2012, Malians have adversely affected by insecurity in Mali. However, reported inflation, dissatisfaction with salaries and civil society groups are actively involved in rising unemployment, in part due to the insecurity humanitarian relief, the provision of social in Northern and Central Mali, a withdrawal of services, and economic development. Other government services, and the destruction of entities that play a role in managing the infrastructure. This situation has threatened food vulnerabilities and risks described above include access in many communities. Vulnerabilities government ministries tasked with rural around security and the economy feed are mutually development, humanitarian assistance, economic reinforcing. As insecurity negatively impacts development, education, employment, and public employment, the resulting unemployment creates works. Although portions of the country remain under-governed, these ministries are working to
32 “GINI index (World Bank estimate)”, World Bank 33 “Income share held by highest 10%”, World Bank
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 29
resume the delivery of basic social services in the involvement of international financial institutions is North. For the promotion of longer term critical. sustainable economic development in Mali, the
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 30
Rule of Law (Least Vulnerable Pillar)
Vulnerabilities • Lack of trust in judicial institutions • Low capacity of law enforcement agencies • Limited government presence to provide law and order • Perceptions of corruption in the judicial system • Lack of state authority in the northern and central parts of Mali Risks • Crime • Mob justice/vigilantism
Vulnerabilities and Risks judicial results are usually only obtainable with a monetary cost. A major vulnerability in the area of Rule of Law is the lack of state authority in the northern regions Social and Institutional Resilience Factors of the country, which has led to the ineffectiveness of the judicial system in regions such as Kidal, Vulnerabilities and risks with regards to Rule of Law Timbuktu, and Gao. An ongoing risk factor remain elevated in Mali. To mitigate those undermining the rule of law is the prevalence of pressures, the United Nations has worked to build illicit economic activity, which has continued capacity for dispute resolution at a local level, without major consequences. Even when where community leaders are key actors in traffickers are caught, they often go free without mediation and arbitration. Religious leaders also punishment. This has contributed to widespread have significant influence in Mali and play an distrust in the judicial system amongst the Malian important role in spreading peace messages to population, which has been further exacerbated by communities, especially youth, to avoid violence. reports of corruption, nepotism and impunity. The Civil society helps to educate community members system is perceived as inaccessible to the poor, as as to their legal rights and assists with access to justice.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 31
Nations peacekeeping force (MINUSMA). Among External Factors other activities, MINUSMA has a mandate to
protect civilians and to support the implementation The Malian economy is highly susceptible to the of the peace agreement, including disarmament, effects of international price volatility and climate demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities. change, namely intensifying cycles of drought and flooding. These trends have an impact on food With historic colonial ties and ongoing military security and livelihoods, and also have the operations in the country, France continues to potential to create inter-communal conflicts by exert influence in the country as well—Operation creating greater competition for resources and Barkhane is a regional French counter-terrorism shifting herding and farming patterns. Drug effort operating in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad trafficking and regional smuggling networks have and Mauritania. The United Nations, international played a significant role in Mali’s illicit economy. donors and non-governmental organizations also Extremist groups in Mali are connected to regional play a key role in both supporting the Malian and international networks of recruitment, supplies government’s efforts and in pushing for reforms. and funding. The fall of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, Shifting trends within these regional and for example, led to the return of many Tuareg international networks and counter-terrorism fighters to Mali and an infusion of weapons into the efforts around the globe will inevitably affect the Sahel region. Regional and international efforts to calculations of extremist groups operating within combat these networks may impact illicit funding Mali. patterns within the country.
Hundreds of thousands of people have been Neighbors within the region (primarily Algeria, but displaced due to conflict in Mali, and more than also Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania) have 140,000 Malians continue to live as refugees in been key players in the Malian crisis and 2015 countries such as Niger, Burkina Faso and Peace Accords. ECOWAS played a mediating role in Mauritania.34 Repatriation of these populations the immediate aftermath of the 2012 coup, and may place additional pressures on social services the African Union’s International Support Mission and communities in Mali in the future. to Mali (AFISMA) was the predecessor to the United
34 “Mali: UNHCR Operational Update, March 2017”, UNHCR, March 2017.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 32
and revisions.37 Ultimately, the revised family Gender Considerations code, which was finally passed in 2011, reflected much of the same provisions that were featured in As a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination the 1962 Family Code. 38 In addition to statutory of all forms of Discrimination Against Women law, customary and religious laws shape women’s (CEDAW), the Option Protocol to CEDAW and the rights in the country and often include provisions Protocol to the African Charter on Human and that limit women’s rights. Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol), the Government of Mali has Gender representation in political participation and made extensive regional and international decision-making in Mali is limited. Out of the 1,141 commitments to safeguard the rights of its female candidates who vied for seats in the 2013 citizens. However, discrimination on the basis of parliamentary elections, only 156 were women.39 gender and the poor recognition of women’s rights Out of those 156 women, only 14 were elected to persist in the country. the 147-member National Assembly.40 As of 2017, there are 13 women in the National Assembly Although the 1992 Malian Constitution recognizes (8.84 percent). 41 The September 2015 gender equality and bars gender-based reorganization of the cabinet slightly increased discrimination, a majority of the country's legal and female representation, from 10 percent to 16 institutional frameworks include directives that percent, with women making up 5 of the 31 curtail the government's ability to fulfill its regional ministerial positions.42 and international obligations. To address the issue of female under- In August 2009, the National Assembly approved a representation in political participation, a proposal draft of a new Family Code, which was meant to for a 30 percent gender quota law was advanced replace that of 1962. The 1962 Family Code in 2006. Ultimately though, the law was included stipulations that established the husband abandoned after passionate debate in the National as the head of the family and set the age of Assembly.43 Finally, in November 2015, Mali did marriage for girls at 15.35 The draft Family Code of pass a gender quota law which requires that at 2009 looked to expand and protect women's rights least 30 percent of elected or appointed officials by lifting the minimum age for girls to marry to 18, be women. While it is premature to evaluate the removing the obligation for a woman to obey her impact of the law, the composition of the newly husband, acknowledging civil marriage as the only established interim authorities in the northern legal form of marriage, and granting women equal regions, less than three percent of which are inheritance rights.36 women, highlights the gaps in the implementation of the gender quota legislation. After sustained and passionate objections were levelled by Islamic groups, many of whom included Relative to political positions, women are better women, President Amadou Toumani Touré represented within the judiciary. For example, the declined to sign the proposed code into law and President Magistrate of the Constitutional Court is sent it back to parliament for more deliberations
35 “Social Institutions & Gender Index: Mali”, OECD 40 Ibid. 36 “Women’s rights in Mali ‘set back 50 years’ by new ‘Family 41 Ibid. Code’ law”, Diarra, S., The Guardian, May 2012. 42 “Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of 37 Ibid. human rights in Mali”, UN General Assembly, January 2016. 38 “Social Institutions & Gender Index: Mali”, OECD 43 “Mali: Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly), Inter- 39 “Mali: Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly), Inter- Parliamentary Union Parliamentary Union
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 33
a women, Manassa Danioko,44 but she is one of gender-based violence.48 In 2012-2013, thirty- only two women in this nine member institution.45 eight percent of Malian women indicated that they had endured physical violence since the age of Female representation and participation in the 15.49 Of these women, sixty-five percent said their Malian peace process illustrate similar trends to current or most recent husband were their abusers those evident in the aforementioned situations. and twenty percent reported that their parents The peace process, which began with the July 2014 were their abusers.50 Algiers mediation process and extends to the current implementation phase, is characterized by The Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in low levels of female representation.46 As of Mali, on the topic of justice and reconciliation, January 2016, The Ministry for the Advancement of refers to conflict-related sexual violence. On this Women, Children and the Family was not issue, the agreement mentions the establishment represented in the nation’s coordination of an International Committee of Inquiry to committee for the implementation of the investigate, among other things, sexual crimes. Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation.47 However, as of June 2017, this vehicle to promote reconciliation, peace and justice had not been The prevailing insecurity and the occupation of created. 51 parts of Northern Mali by non-state armed groups have had a particularly negative impact on women Additionally, cases of violence against women, and girls. According to reports from local such as sexual assault, go unpunished because populations and human rights organizations, there is either no local judicial system in place or armed groups in the north have forced women and corruption and nepotism allow perpetrators to go girls to wear veils or headscarves in public and free. Furthermore, due to the pre-existing gender flogged or publicly stoned women who were roles and the economic and social marginalization accused of breaking the law. Cases of rape, sexual of women in Malian society, women and girls are slavery and forced marriage are also reported in particularly vulnerable to poverty following regions that are occupied by armed groups. As displacement. noted in the fieldwork, the lack of a trustworthy or effective judicial system means that women often The livelihoods of women and girls in Mali are feel that they cannot rely on the system for justice. primarily dependent on agricultural production and, to a lesser extent, informal trade. Analysis Gender-based violence is widespread in Mali and from the 2012-2013 DHS Report on Mali indicates although the Malian Penal Code, which was that in the twelve months preceding the study, forty amended in 2001, refers to rape, sexual slavery, percent worked in sales and services and about a forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and all forms quarter worked in the agricultural sector.52 of sexual violence as “crimes against humanity,” However, issues relating to credit and land tenure there are no specific legislations that address
44 “Constitutional Court of Mali: Mrs Danioko Manassa, new 49 “Mali Demographic and Health Survey, 2012-13 – Final President”, Conference of Constitutional Jurisdictions of Report”, USAID Africa, February 2015. 50 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 51 “Security Council Extends Mandate of Mission in Mali, 46 “Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2364 (2017)”, UN human rights in Mali”, UN General Assembly, January 2016. Meetings Coverage, June 2017. 52 “Mali Demographic and Health Survey, 2012-13 – Final 47 Ibid. Report”, USAID 48 “Crimes Against Humanity Statutes and Criminal Code Provisions in Selected Jurisdictions: Mali”, Library of Congress
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 34
undermine their ability to pursue economic Women in Mali are particularly vulnerable in the development and empowerment. areas of health and reproductive empowerment. The life expectancy for women in Mali is just short There are no laws that explicitly bar women from of 58 years. In addition, the maternal mortality rate accessing financial services; however, issues such is 587 per 100,000 live births and 55 percent of as low income, lack of financial literacy, lack of women aged 20-24 were married or in some kind sufficient collateral and poorly-documented credit of similar union before the age of 18. FGM is one histories have presented challenges.53 The of the most pervasive health challenges that existence of government-run and privately-run women are subjected to. Without legislation that micro-credit schemes, along with loan capacity- criminalizes FGM, the practice continues to be building programs for women-owned small and widespread in the country. Data shows that as of medium enterprises (SMEs), have slightly 2014, FGM prevalence rates had not decreased in diversified credit opportunities for women. the last 20 years.59 Prevalence rates in females However, only a handful of creditors are women. aged 15-49 in 2013 was calculated to be 91.4 percent, up from 85.2 percent in 2006,60 despite In Mali, land tenure and property rights are some efforts to increase awareness of the governed by both customary and statutory law.54 detrimental effects of FGM. However, the Generally, women are only allowed access to land prevalence of HIV among females aged 15-24 is through their husbands or other male relatives. only 0.6 percent,61 though as of 2013, the latest This structure of land access, however, places year for available data, only 23.7 percent of women at a disadvantage since their control, given females aged 15-24 had comprehensive correct to them by their families, is temporary.55 In knowledge of HIV/AIDS.62 particular cases where fallow land is available, women have greater access to land because the Since 1972, through initiatives such as the land is considered undesirable.56 This form of Association Malienne pour la Promotion et la access has endured setbacks, however, due to Protection de la Famille (AMPPF), the Government developments in agricultural technology and of Mali has accepted and promoted family planning technique, such as permanent cropping, plow services.63 Due to such measures, knowledge of farming, and cash cropping, which have contraception is widespread among women in lengthened cultivation periods.57 The consequent Mali. According to the DHS, 85 percent of women shorter fallow periods have adversely impacted the in Mali are aware of at least one contraceptive ability of Malian females to achieve financial method.64 However, there is a disconnect between stability.58 As a result of these impediments as well this widespread knowledge of contraception and as high illiteracy rates, women in Mali represent a its use, with only 10.3 percent of women aged 15- largely underutilized potential labor force. 49 reporting using any kind of contraception.65
53 “Mali Finance for Food Security and Women 59 “Country Profile: FGM in Mali”, 28 Too Many, September Entrepreneurs”, USAID 2014. 54 “Literature Review of Land Tenure in Niger, Burkina Faso, 60 Ibid. and Mali: Context and Opportunities”, Catholic Relief 61 “Health Nutrition and Population Statistics”, World Bank Services, August 2014. 62 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 63 “Mali Demographic and Health Survey, 2012-13 – Final 56 Ibid. Report”, USAID 57 Ibid. 64 “Mali Demographic and Health Survey, 2012-13 – Final 58 Ibid. Report”, USAID 65 “Health Nutrition and Population Statistics”, World Bank
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 35
Sub-National Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resilience Factors: Observations by Region
Bamako
Bamako is the capital of Mali, located on the Niger River in the south of the country. It is the sixth- fastest growing city in the world,66 with a population of 2,158,000 as of 2014.67 Mali’s urban population has grown quickly, from 28.4 percent in 2000 to 40.7 percent in 2016.68 Bamako’s population includes members of all ethnic groups in the country, as well as foreign nationals.
Structural Vulnerabilities • Weak security sector and DDR processes • Proliferation of self-defense groups • Poverty, unemployment, inflation and dissatisfaction with salaries • Poor infrastructure and education system • Lack of confidence in institutions • Corruption in government and the judicial system • Growing ethnic tensions • Non-participation or exclusion of women, youth and marginalized communities in governance • Displacement and return of refugees/IDPs
66 “The world’s fastest growing cities and urban areas from 2006 and 2020”, The City Mayors Foundation 67 “Bamako”, Mali Data Portal 68 “Urban population (% of total)”, World Bank
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 36
Event-Driven Risks • Elections • Crime • Land-based disputes • Recurrence or escalation of conflict; non-implementation of the Peace Agreement Social and Institutional • Civil society organizations providing social services Resilience Factors • Community leaders • MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane
Population and Demographics or exclusion of women and youth in political processes. Displacement due to conflict and the exclusion of Economics and Resources women and youth from decision-making processes are ongoing vulnerabilities in Bamako. A rise in regionalism, escalating tensions between ethnic “In Bamako, the biggest problem is insecurity, groups, or a non-implementation of the Algiers especially in the peripheral neighborhoods. Now people return to their homes at 8 o’clock Peace Accord were also identified as potential risk and everyone closes their doors. It is necessary factors. Resilience factors include the provision of to reinforce the security forces who are already social services, including education, and the on the ground doing patrols, so that the involvement of local communities in development population can sleep with both eyes shut.” processes. - Interview with female Bamako resident Security
While Bamako has seen lower levels of conflict fatalities than other parts of the country, the region has been affected by incidents of terrorism, notably Since 2012, Bamako residents have reported the attacks on the Radisson Blu hotel in December dissatisfaction with salaries, inflation, poverty and 2015 and on the European Union Training Mission unemployment as key economic concerns. The headquarters in March 2016. These attacks were presence of MINUSMA staff and peacekeeping claimed by AQIM and al-Mourabitoun. As the troops has resulted in rising prices for food and capital city and seat of government, Bamako has other goods in the district, which has negatively also been the site of protests and strikes, some of impacted some local residents. which have escalated to violence. Interviews in the field also highlighted a perceived rise in crime and Rule of Law drug trafficking, and found a lack of confidence in the ability of Malian forces to secure the region There is a widespread lack of trust in the judicial without foreign assistance. system, due to perceptions of impunity and corruption. Land-based disputes were also Politics and Governance identified as a risk factor, in cases where landowners do not feel they have received justice There is a lack of trust in government institutions through the judicial system. Women also reported and in the state’s ability to control the country’s that corruption in the judicial system has borders and Northern region. Participants in the undermined justice around reports of rape and field work also noted the general non-participation sexual violence.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 37
Mopti Region
The Mopti region is in central Mali and is bordered by Burkina Faso and Mauritania. The region had a population of 2,426,000 as of 2014.69 The largest ethnic groups in the region are the Fulani, Bambara, and Dogon.70 Considered a crossroads between the north and south of the country, tourism, trade, animal husbandry and agriculture have historically played an important role in the regional economy. However, the Mopti region has one of the highest proportion of people living below the poverty line.71
Structural Vulnerabilities • High unemployment • Weak economic administration and lack of access to capital and loans • Deterioration of infrastructure, including roads • Lack of social services • Non-implementation of Peace Accord • Lack of presence of interim authorities • Displacement of population • Manipulation of ethnic identities and tribal affiliations • Poor relationships between youth and security forces • Marginalization and non-inclusion of women and youth Event-Driven Risks • Elections • Return of refugees leading to greater competition for land • Climate change and drought/flood cycles Social and Institutional • NGO and Humanitarian groups Resilience Factors • MINUSMA-led economic activities • Community leaders
69 “Mopti”, Mali Data Portal 70 “Maps & Facts: The Population of Northern Mali”, OECD, January 2015. 71 “Maps & Facts: Poverty in Northern Mali”, OECD, December 2014.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 38
Population and Demographics There is a widespread sense that international and Malian security forces have been ineffective at Mopti is home to a number of ethnic groups, securing the Mopti region beyond the including the Bozo, Songhai, Dogon, Fulani, administrative center. Abuses by both state Malinke and Bambara. Tensions between these security forces and non-state armed groups have groups have reportedly increased since 2012, due continued, including sexual violence against in part to ongoing conflicts between pastoralist and women, and residents report that it is still difficult farming communities as well as marginalization of to travel. specific groups. In addition, Mali has a large youth population, many of whom are unemployed or Politics and Governance underemployed and feel marginalized in decision- making processes. The interim administration is not yet fully in place in many parts of Mopti. There is a sense that the government has not yet done enough to address “There is social tension that is tied above all the conflicts between pastoralist and farming to the problems between the Fulani and the communities in Mopti and that the government Bambara. The Fulani are herders, the does not fully comprehend the grievances of local Bambara are farmers. So these tensions communities. are always going to exist. Perhaps the government can find some ways and Economics and Resources means to pacify them, but these tensions
will always exist.” Insecurity in the Mopti region has had a negative
impact on the regional economy, with a slowdown - Interview with Mopti resident in trade due to deteriorating infrastructure and insecurity along roads. Much of the population lacks basic social services, including health care, Abuses by security forces and ongoing grievances schools, telecommunications, electricity and water, around economic and social opportunities may although there are a number of non-governmental impact youth recruitment into extremist groups in organizations and humanitarian groups operating Mopti. in the area to provide these services. Without a strong government and administrative presence, Security there is a sense among residents that instability will continue to negatively affect the economy. With The Mopti region has seen recurrent inter- the Mopti regional economy heavily dependent on communal conflicts between pastoralist and agriculture, the area is also vulnerable to farming communities, particularly between the intensifying cycles of drought and flooding due to Fulani, Dogon and Bambara ethnic groups. While climate change. these tensions are rooted in competition for natural resources (namely, arable land and water Residents also reported mixed feelings on the access), land conflicts have been exacerbated by economic impacts of MINUSMA and other displacement and an escalation in tensions international forces in Mopti. These groups have between ethnic groups since the start of the 2012 created jobs for local residents, but also have crisis. In addition, armed conflict spiked in the contributed to rising housing prices. region in 2016, with attacks by both the Macina Liberation Front and militias.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 39
Rule of Law inaccessibility for the poor and impunity for the wealthy. Due to this mistrust and the sparse There is the perception that the judicial system in government presence in rural parts of the region, Mopti does not serve the people equally, with community leaders have taken on a primary role in widespread allegations of corruption, nepotism, dispute resolution at the local level.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 40
Gao Region
The Gao region is located in eastern Mali and shares a border with Niger. As of 2014, it had a population of 646,000.72 The largest ethnic groups in the region are the Tuareg and Songhai.73 Gao has recently been seriously affected by the ongoing conflict, as demonstrated by the January 2017 attack in which a suicide bomber killed 77 people in a military camp.74
Structural Vulnerabilities • Absence of Malian security forces • Illicit economy (arms trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking) • Ethnic tensions between rebel groups • Markets are vulnerable to terrorist attacks • Proliferation of sophisticated weaponry • Food insecurity: lack of access to food and water • Insecurity Event-Driven Risks • Delay in implementation of peace agreement • Clashes between communities • Increase in conflict between farmers and herders Social and Institutional • Civil Society groups Resilience Factors • Women and youth groups • Community grassroots organizations • Traditional and religious leaders
72 “Gao”, Mali Data Portal 73 “Maps & Facts: The Population of Northern Mali”, OECD, January 2015. 74 “Death toll from suicide blast at Gao army base rises”, Al Jazeera, January 2017.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 41
Security Politics and Governance
Gao has experienced delays in the implementation During interviews, field respondents emphasized and enforcement of the Algiers Accord. Field the lack of government involvement in the region respondents noted that because of illiteracy and and noted that it would be difficult or impossible to lack of communication, many people and groups facilitate secure elections in Gao. Local elections do not know the terms of the agreement. Moreover, were held in late 2016 however polls were armed rebel groups have not yet been reintegrated canceled in multiple districts due to security into society or into government security forces. concerns. There is little trust in the government Currently, there is a lack of trust between citizens amongst the general population, because the and security forces. Arms and drugs trafficking government has not guaranteed safety and continues to plague the region, especially as security in the region. Additionally, women have corruption has grown among administrators. been excluded from the political process, as no women are currently involved in the interim authority in the region. “There is still mistrust. Because it takes a day to lose trust, but it takes several years to regain Economics and Resources it. There are still displaced people who are afraid to return home. … They cannot forget, it Gao has experienced notable increases in is not easy, but they are trying to understand consumer prices. The local economy has been one another.” affected by the insecurity, particularly on a very local level as markets themselves are vulnerable to - Interview with Gao resident robberies and attacks. There is a lack of economic opportunity in Gao, especially for youth. Economic difficulties and poverty have exacerbated the The border between Mali and Guinea is reportedly security situation, motivating people to engage in porous and illegal goods can be carried into Mali illicit economic activities and criminal activities. for a fee. Such illegal goods often include drugs, Due to the poor conditions of the roads, food which pass over the border and come through Gao. insecurity is also an issue in Gao, as it is difficult to Tensions between farmers and herders has been reach rural populations. another threat to the security of the region. Terrorism also remains a prominent threat to Rule of Law security. Attacks from extremist groups, such as MUJAO and Al-Mourabitoun have been reported in Field respondents emphasized that there is little the region. In August 2016, terrorist attacks rule of law in Gao. Resistance groups make and targeted UN peacekeeping forces, killing one enforce the law arbitrarily and effective justice peacekeeper and injuring six others. In January 18, mechanisms, from proper arrest and detention to 2017, in an attack claimed by AQIM, a suicide investigation and prosecution, are notably absent. bomber drove into a military camp and killed 77 This results in criminals not being charged or being people. released without consequence.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 42
Kidal Region
The Kidal region is located in northeastern Mali and shares a border with Niger and Algeria. As of 2014, Kidal had a population of 80,000.75 The largest ethnic group in the region is Tuareg.76 Much of the population is reliant on livestock raising and, to a lesser extent, agriculture for their livelihood.77
Structural Vulnerabilities • Lack of infrastructure, leading to higher prices and food insecurity • Economic stagnation • Ethnic tensions • Lack of judicial system • Absence of Malian security forces • Unemployment, especially among youth • Insecurity
Event-Driven Risks • Continued drug trafficking • Increased presence of extremist groups Social and Institutional • Local non-governmental organizations Resilience Factors • Women and youth groups • Community based organizations • Traditional and religious leaders
Population and Demographics displaced people who have either moved from, or returned to, Kidal. Some residents felt that According to those interviewed, many people have because many of the people who left Kidal due to been displaced over the past few years due to the violence have not returned, there has been a loss violence in northern Mali, including large groups of
75 “Kidal”, Mali Data Portal 76 “Maps & Facts: The Population of Northern Mali”, OECD, January 2015. 77 “Northern Mali at a glance”, OECD
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 43
of leadership and those trained to provide Politics and Governance essential civil service functions. A temporary authority was installed in the Kidal Security region, but there is still little government presence and a lack of an authority recognized by the people. The security situation in Kidal remains tenuous. There have been disputes over the future of According to reports, the region has experienced elections in Kidal and the organization of a future clashes between the GATIA (Groupe d’Autodéfense administration. Notwithstanding the key role Touareg Imghad et Alliés) and the CMA played by women in Tuareg society, in Kidal women (Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad). are still excluded from the political process and the Violence related to the separatist movement in quota for women in government has not been northern Mali has been concentrated in Kidal and enforced. fighting has erupted multiple times over the past year. Rival armed factions signed the Algiers Peace Economics and Resources Accord in June 2015, but field respondents emphasized that little has been done to enforce Kidal has suffered economically due to the security implementation of the peace agreement. The lack concerns in the region and lack of infrastructure. A of Malian security forces in the region was cited as lack of state involvement or presence has led the a structural vulnerability. The region has been economy in Kidal to remain largely stagnant. dependent on foreign forces to maintain any Despite insecurity, some traders have resumed semblance of peace, but there have also been their activities, but armed groups are the only several reports of attacks on these forces since the forces facilitating the transportation of food and signing of the agreement. In addition to separatist other goods throughout the region. Corruption has violence, violence involving extremist groups, such grown, leading to the growth of drug trafficking. as AQIM and MUJAO was reported in Kidal. There Arms and human trafficking has also increased in are also security issues surrounding arms response to a lack of legal economic opportunities. trafficking and drug trafficking. Youth who are not An increase in NGOs presence in the region has able to find work are often drawn to trafficking as a been identified as a resiliency factor, allowing source of income. some commerce to develop.
Rule of Law “Today there are conflicts between the CMA
and the GATIA… They’re the ones fighting each The lack of presence of state authorities in the other. The real problems we are suffering from region has led to the absence of an organized started at the signing of the Accord. And it’s at that point that our communities started to kill judicial system in Kidal. It is perceived that each other. … There is fighting, even last night corruption and nepotism are prevalent. The city of there was fighting. There is always fighting, Kidal is controlled by CMA and law and order are deaths, hundreds of deaths.” supposed to be maintained by a commission put in place by the group, but this has been largely - Interview with Kidal resident unsuccessful. Previously Kidal had one court and a judge, but the region has not had a judge since 2012. Field respondents emphasized the lack of
rule of law in the region and the perception of
rampant corruption and growing criminality.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 44
Tim buktu Region
The Timbuktu region is in northern Mali and is bordered by Mauritania and Algeria, as well as Burkina Faso to the south. As of 2014 data, it had a population of 807,000.78 The largest ethnic groups in the region are Moor and Tuareg.79 Tauoudenni, the salt-mining center of Mali, is located in the far north of the region.
Structural Vulnerabilities • Lack of government forces or authority • Prevalence of illicit economic activity • Insecurity
Event-Driven Risks • Extremist violence • Communal violence Social and Institutional • Local non-governmental organizations Resilience Factors • Women and youth groups • Community grassroots organizations • Traditional and religious leaders
Population and Demographics Security During the crisis, many people left Timbuktu and traveled toward southern Mali. Most of these Timbuktu has seen a growth in criminality people are afraid to return until there is peace in throughout the region. Field respondents noted the the region and economic opportunities. prevalence of armed robberies, stating that people are sometimes afraid to go outside. Illicit economies, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking and arms trafficking, are also a
78 “Tombouctou”, Mali Data Portal 79 “Maps & Facts: The Population of Northern Mali”, OECD, January 2015.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 45
widespread security issue. There have been multiple reports of clashes involving the CMA and “Timbuktu is a vast region. And there are also GATIA. Interviewees emphasized the lack of currently a lot of problems. There are terrorist cooperation between the government and armed groups and there are other people who are not groups. Additionally, violence is also perpetrated by affiliated or identified with any group. So they extremist groups such as MUJAO and AQIM. are engaging in banditry, and this is a threat to Insecurity in Timbuktu has also contributed to everyone.” sexual and gender-based violence, and there have - Interview with Timbuktu resident been widespread reports of rape and forced marriage. and Kidal and other roads out of Timbuktu are Politics and Governance unreliable, making movement throughout northern Mali difficult and sometimes impossible. Due to insecurity, there is little faith that a fair and Additionally, there is a lack of educational secure election could be organized in Timbuktu. opportunity as there are no universities in the Field respondents emphasized that until the region, which may provide an incentive for youth to security situation is managed, it will be impossible join armed groups. to hold elections that result in successful leadership. Rule of Law
Economics Rule of law in Timbuktu has been threatened by the prevalence of illicit economic activity. Even The economy in Timbuktu has suffered due to the when traffickers are arrested, they are often poor security situation and an absence of reliable released without facing consequences. Incidents infrastructure. The region lacks employment of robbery are rarely investigated or resolved, opportunities and much of the population is causing a lack of faith in the judicial process and impoverished. Trade flow in and out of Timbuktu little expectation of justice. There are also reports has been stunted due to the danger of robbery on of perceived corruption, nepotism, and political the roads, leading to an overall increase in prices sponsorship within the region. of basic goods. No road exists between Timbuktu
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 46
Conclusion and Recommendations
Mali presents a highly complex set of conflict • Provide greater support and programming drivers and risk factors at the regional, national, to women and children who have been and subnational levels. The country has historically displaced and affected by violence been peaceful, but when war broke out in 2012 • Good governance of natural resources between the Malian government and Northern including land tenure and ownership laws rebels, it led to a political crisis and a coup d’état. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda affiliates took advantage of Security the instability to capture territory. Communal • Government should create a collaboration violence also spiked due to the prolonged absence framework between security actors to of state authority in certain areas, the proliferation better address underlying vulnerabilities of weapons, and longstanding competition for and risk factors resources between farmers and herders. Insecurity • Sanction violators of the Peace Agreement in Mali has spilled over into neighboring countries, • Ensure full implementation of counter including Côte d’Ivoire, where an AQIM attack killed terrorism measures and security provisions over a dozen people in 2016, and Burkina Faso. of the Peace Agreement
With respect to the conflict in Northern Mali, a Politics and Governance peace agreement has since been signed between • Support national-level dialogue efforts the Malian government, the Coordination des between signatories of the Peace Movements de l’Azawad (CMA) and the militia Agreement to resolve outstanding Group Autodefense Touareg Imghad et Allies disagreements (GATIA). In response, continental actors including • Sanction violators of the Peace Agreement the Sahel G5, ECOWAS, and the African Union (AU) have intervened alongside the UN, with additional • Encourage renewed engagement between bilateral cooperation from Algeria, France, regional and international organizations Germany, Canada, and United States, to promote a and the Malian government to align peaceful implementation of the agreement. strategies in addressing the root causes of However, there is still little consensus among the conflict signatories as to the practical implementation of • Take necessary measures to fast track the that agreement and Mali remains in a condition of implementation of the peace agreement to limbo, often described as “No peace, no war.” ensure peaceful elections
Population and Demographics Economics and Resources • Support programs to address youth • Expand access to social basic services unemployment (including private sector • Improve access to humanitarian services initiatives, training institution collaboration • Improve access to micro-credit services for employment, training and vocational especially to women, youths and skills and entrepreneurship, youth vulnerable population entrepreneurship funding, etc.) Rule of Law • Support informal mechanisms for dispute resolution and traditional tools of conflict
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 47
mediation, particularly in underserved • Strengthen the application of the rule of areas law
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 48
Appendix A: Data Sample
Phase Dimension Source Metric Sample Phase 1: Desktop Resilience SNA Survey 64 Phase 1: Desktop Vulnerability ECOWARN SitReps 929 Phase 1: Desktop Vulnerability Global Integrity In practice, the 15 (all ECOWAS member agency/agencies states normalized and mandated to scaled) organize and monitor national elections is/are protected from political interference Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability Global Integrity In practice, the 15 (all ECOWAS member agency/agencies states normalized and mandated to scaled) organize and monitor national elections make/s timely, publicly available reports before and after a national election. Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability EIU Democracy Electoral process and 15 (all ECOWAS member Index pluralism states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability EIU Democracy Political Participation 15 (all ECOWAS member Index states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability EIU Democracy Functioning of 15 (all ECOWAS member Index Government states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability IDEA Average Voter 15 (all ECOWAS member Turnout states normalized and Parliamentary scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability Transparency Corruption 15 (all ECOWAS member International Perception states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability BTI Political and Social 15 (all ECOWAS member Integration states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability Freedom House Political Rights 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Proportion of seats 15 (all ECOWAS member held by women in states normalized and national parliament scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability Mo Ibrahim Index Personal Safety 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability UN, ECOWAS, AU Peace Operations 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability ACLED Conflict Fatalities per 15 (all ECOWAS member capita states normalized and scaled)
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 49
Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability UPPSALA Presence/Conflict 15 (all ECOWAS member with Non-State states normalized and Armed Groups scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability PTS Political Terror Scale 15 (all ECOWAS member – Amnesty states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability PTS Political Terror Scale 15 (all ECOWAS member – State states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability PTS Political Terror Scale 15 (all ECOWAS member – HRW states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability UNHCR Refugees by country 15 (all ECOWAS member of origin per capita states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability UNHCR Refugees by country 15 (all ECOWAS member of origin (difference states normalized and 2015-2014) per scaled) capita Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability UNHCR IDPs by Country of 15 (all ECOWAS member Asylum per capita states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability UNHCR IDPs by country of 15 (all ECOWAS member asylum (difference states normalized and 2015-2014) per scaled) capita Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability Global Integrity In practice, the 15 (all ECOWAS member independence of the states normalized and judiciary is scaled) guaranteed. Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability Global Integrity In practice, national- 15 (all ECOWAS member level judges give states normalized and reasons for their scaled) decisions/judgments. Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability Global Integrity In practice, 15 (all ECOWAS member allegations of states normalized and corruption against scaled) senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated by an independent body. Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability Global Integrity In practice, the 15 (all ECOWAS member body/bodies that states normalized and investigate/s scaled) allegations of public sector corruption is/are effective. Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability Global Integrity In practice, the 15 (all ECOWAS member mechanism for states normalized and citizens to report scaled) police misconduct or abuse of force is effective. Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability WB Human Rights % of Women on 15 (all ECOWAS member and Law Report Constitutional Court states normalized and scaled)
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 50
Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability WB – Women, Does the law 15 (all ECOWAS member Business, and Law mandate equal states normalized and remuneration for scaled) work of equal value? Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability WB – Women, Does the law 15 (all ECOWAS member Business, and Law mandate states normalized and nondiscrimination scaled) based on gender in hiring? Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability WB – Women, Is dismissal of 15 (all ECOWAS member Business, and Law pregnant workers states normalized and prohibited? scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Gini coefficient 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Gini WYD 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Income Share Held 15 (all ECOWAS member by Highest 10% states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Population with 15 (all ECOWAS member Improved Sanitation states normalized and (Urban-Rural scaled) Difference) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Population with 15 (all ECOWAS member Improved Water states normalized and Source (Urban-Rural scaled) Difference) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability UN Stats Children under 5 15 (all ECOWAS member moderately or states normalized and severely scaled) underweight, percentage Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Depth of the food 15 (all ECOWAS member deficit (kilocalories states normalized and per person per day) scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Prevalence of 15 (all ECOWAS member Underweight, weight states normalized and for age (% of children scaled) under 5) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data GDP per capita, PPP 15 (all ECOWAS member (current international states normalized and $) scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability UN Stats Literacy, 15-24, 15 (all ECOWAS member Women states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data School enrollment, 15 (all ECOWAS member primary and states normalized and secondary (gross), scaled) gender parity index (GPI) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Employment to 15 (all ECOWAS member population ratio, states normalized and ages 15-24, female scaled) (%) (modeled ILO estimate)
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 51
Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability UN Stats Median Age 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Population Growth 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability UN Stats Prevalence of 15 (all ECOWAS member underweight, weight states normalized and for age, female (% of scaled) children under 5) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Maternal mortality 15 (all ECOWAS member ratio (modeled states normalized and estimate, per scaled) 100,000 live births) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Contraceptive 15 (all ECOWAS member prevalence, any states normalized and methods (% of scaled) women ages 15-49) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability World Bank Data Life expectancy at 15 (all ECOWAS member birth, female (years) states normalized and scaled) Phase 1 Desktop Vulnerability WB – Women, Percentage of 15 (all ECOWAS member Business, and Law women aged 20-24 states normalized and years old who were scaled) married or in a union before age 18 Phase 1 Desktop Risk ECOWARN IncReps 352 (after reducing for duplicates and relevance) Phase 1 Desktop Risk ACLED Incidents 385 Phase 2 Field Risk and Focus Group Broken out by Men, 14 Research Vulnerability Discussions Women, and Youth Phase 2 Field Risk and Key Informant Prominent 12 Research Vulnerability Interviews individuals and local experts
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 52
Appendix B: Vulnerability Index
Index Data Sources
Based on the five human security pillars, a series of indicators were identified based on relevance and measurability. Data sources were then identified from recognized institutions such as the World Bank, United Nations, as well as universities, research institutions, and think tanks. A full list of data sources is attached in Appendix A. During selection and testing of the index, the availability of data was assessed to ensure an even distribution of scores.
Process: Calculating the Scores
The index is scored on a scale of 1-10, with 1 representing the highest level of vulnerability, and 10 the lowest level of vulnerability. Each raw data set is normalized and scaled, before being integrated into the indicator and pillar scores.
1. Normalization An index, by definition, integrates and compares data sets with very different curves and distribution. As a first step, therefore, it is necessary to normalize the data so that it can be properly compared. Without framing the data within the context of the wider group of numbers, its meaning can become skewed. Therefore, the process of finding the mean and calculating the Standard Deviation (SD) of the data set, then using those elements to approximate a normal distribution, can be used to provide this meaning. The Gaussian normalization formula is outlined below.
Where μ is the mean
σ2 is the variance
SD is the quantity calculated to indicate the extent of deviation for a group of numbers as a whole. Normal distribution is then used to find how the variables are approximately normally distributed. In the context of this tool, it will help to understand where countries sit in relation to each other within the group distribution of a particular data set. For raw data sets that have gaps (e.g. data is unavailable for some countries but not others), country data points are left blank. This ensures countries are not provided with an artificial score, where data does not exist.
2. Scaling To create an index where countries are scored within a defined range, the data sets must be scaled so the scores can be integrated. This process of scaling transforms the normalized data into a number between 1 and 10, with 10 representing the lowest level of vulnerability. The below formula was applied to standardize the distribution values from [min, max] to [MIN, MAX], matching the new scale of values both for the highest and lowest edges of the distribution.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 53
(푀퐴푋 − 푀퐼푁) 푋 = 푀퐼푁 + × (푥 − 푚푖푛) (푚푎푥 −푚푖푛)
3. Aggregation Each indicator may be made up of either one or multiple data sources. In cases where multiple data sets were used to make up the one indicator, the data sets were each scaled to preliminary index scores (1-10), as outlined in the above steps. The average was then taken of these scores to reach a final index score for that indicator. This process was repeated at the pillar level, first averaging, then scaling the indicator scores.
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 54
Appendix C: Additional References
Barma, N.H., Huybens, E. & Viñuela, L. ‘Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging Contexts’, World Bank Group, September 2014 http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-1- 4648-0269-0
Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2017: Mali, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country- chapters/mali
International Monetary Fund, ‘Mali: Selected Issues,’ 2016. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15340.pdf
Interpeace, ‘Beyond Ideology and Greed: Trajectories of Young People Towards New Forms of Violence in Cote d’Ivoire and Mali.’ http://www.interpeace.org/resource/executive-ideology-trajectories/
Kodila-Tedika, O., Simplice,A. ‘State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data’, International Journal of Social Economics, 2016, Vol. 43: Issue 10 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/IJSE-11-2014-0234
NZAID ‘Conflict-Risk Assessment Guideline’ 2008 http://www.gaportal.org/resources/detail/nzaid-conflict- risk-assessment-guideline
OECD ‘ States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence’, 2016 http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset- Management/oecd/development/states-of-fragility-2016_9789264267213-en#page1
UNICEF, ‘Annual Report: 2015: Mali’, 2015. https://www.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/Mali_2015_COAR.pdf
USAID ‘Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)’, 2008 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187786.pdf
Woolcock, M. ‘Engaging with Fragile and Conflict-Affected States ‘, Harvard Kennedy School, August 2014 https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/engaging-fragile-and-conflict-affected-states
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 55
Appendix D: Matrix of Vulnerabilities, Risks, Resilience Factors, and Recommendations by Human Security Pillar
MALI VULNERABILITIES RISKS RESILIENCES RECOMMENDATIONS Politics & ➢ Perceived ➢ Weak state ➢ Existence of ➢ Support national- Governance corruption and presence in the accountability level dialogue nepotism in north and center of mechanism to efforts between government the country address signatories of the ➢ Lack of ➢ Low turnout and grievances Peace Agreement confidence in low confidence in ➢ Truth and to resolve government electoral processes reconciliation outstanding institutions ➢ Slow commission disagreements ➢ Manipulation implementation of ➢ The signature of ➢ Sanction violators of ethnic the Algiers Peace the Peace of the Peace identities and Agreement Agreement Agreement tribal ➢ Chieftaincy and ➢ Engagement of ➢ Encourage affiliations succession issues the International renewed ➢ Embezzlement ➢ Fragmentation of community engagement of public funds the State between regional ➢ Low ➢ Proliferation of and international representation separatist ideology organizations and of women and the Malian youths in government to politics and align strategies in decision addressing root making causes of conflict ➢ Recurrence of ➢ Take necessary military coups measures to fast track the implementation of the peace agreement to ensure peaceful elections
Population & ➢ Demographic ➢ Displacement and ➢ “Joking ➢ Support programs Demographics pressures due return/reintegratio relationship” to address youth to large youth n of refugees ➢ Existence of unemployment bulge and ➢ Competition over dynamic Civil (including private population access to scarce society groups, sector, training growth natural resources including NGOs, institution ➢ Adverse ➢ Food insecurity media, Women’s collaboration for climate and malnutrition organizations and employment, conditions ➢ FGM, forced humanitarian training and (drought, marriage actors vocational skills flooding, pest ➢ Existence of and infestation) family planning entrepreneurship, due to climate program youth change
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 56
➢ Harmful socio- ➢ Sensitization entrepreneurship cultural campaign against funding, etc. practice FGM ➢ Provide greater ➢ Caste system ➢ Internship in support and ➢ Cross-border public programming to migration administration for women and graduate youths children who have been displaced and affected by violence ➢ Good governance of natural resources including land tenure and ownership laws
Economics & ➢ Disparities ➢ Economic shock ➢ Support from ➢ Expand access to Resources between north- from volatile bilateral and social basic south and in commodity prices multilateral services urban-rural ➢ Illicit economy financial partners ➢ Improve access to development ➢ Labor protests ➢ Vibrant informal humanitarian ➢ Illicit ➢ Inflation economic sector services economies, ➢ Increase in ➢ Agricultural ➢ Improve access to including drug unemployment programs to micro-credit trafficking and ➢ Slow economic support farmers services especially trans-Saharan growth and herders to women, youths arms trade ➢ ➢ Fiscal reforms and vulnerable ➢ Unequal population distribution of wealth ➢ Food insecurity ➢ Low participation of women in the formal sector of the economy ➢ High unemployment ➢ Undiversified economy - vulnerable to exogenous shocks
Security ➢ Recurrence of ➢ Ineffective ➢ Implementation ➢ Government should rebellions in implementation of of “Loi de create a the North the security programmation collaboration ➢ Porous borders provisions of the militaire” framework ➢ Large Peace Agreement ➢ Inter-religious between security ungoverned dialogue actors to better land mass and address underlying
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 57
harsh terrain of ➢ Proliferation of ➢ Existence of vulnerabilities and the Sahara armed/terrorist dynamic civil risk factors desert groups society groups, ➢ Sanction violators ➢ Land-based ➢ Recurrence or including NGOs, of the Peace conflicts escalation of media, women’s Agreement conflict in the north organizations and ➢ Full ➢ Land-based inter- humanitarian implementation of communal conflicts actors counter terrorism ➢ Multiplication of ➢ Influential measures and militia groups community security provisions ➢ Weak presence of leaders of the Peace security and ➢ UN peacekeeping Agreement defense forces Mission ➢ Inefficient (MINUSMA) coordination ➢ Anti-terrorism among multiple strategies in the security actors Sahel region
Rule of Law ➢ Lack of trust in ➢ Corruption within ➢ Justice sector ➢ Support informal judicial law enforcement reforms mechanisms for institutions and court system ➢ Traditional dispute resolution ➢ Low capacity of alternative ➢ Mob and traditional law dispute enforcement justice/vigilantism mechanism tools of conflict agencies mediation, ➢ Limited particularly in government underserved areas presence to ➢ Strengthen the provide law application of the and order rule of law ➢ Perception of corruption in the judicial system ➢ Lack of state authority in the northern and central parts of Mali
Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Mali | 58