70- 14,094

SCHMIEL, Eugene David, 1944- THE CAREER OF , 1828-1900: SOLDIER, SCHOLAR, STATESMAN. The S ta te U n iv e rsity , P h .D ., 1969 History, modem

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor,

Copyright by

Eugene David Schmiel

1970

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED THE CABEEE OF JACOB DOLSON COX, 1828-1900 SOLDIER, SCHOLAR, STATESMAN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By Eugene David Schmiel, B.A.

******

The Ohio State University 1969

Approved By

A d v ise r Department of History PBEFACE

The title of this work amply describes its scope. The topic herein discussed is the life of Jacob Dolson Cox, an admirable, aloof man of integrity who pursued a great number of activities in many fields and became a leader in each. He did so through the force of his character, his marked intellectual abilities, and his rigorous sense of duty. Yet he has not received in the past due credit for his role in shaping American politics, education, science, and railroad policies during and after the Civil War. At least in part that is because Cox was not prone to seek publicity or recognition for himself. In this study the author hopes to redress that balance and give him due credit for being an influential personage in American life from 1858 to I 9 0 0.

In pursuing that goal the author has had the invaluable aid of a great many people, a ll of whom gave generously and graciously of their time to help me to gain a better understanding of both Jacob D. Cox and his times and the effect of each on the other. I would like to take this opportunity to thank each of them individually. Among those who were

i i especially helpful, three, my wife and my parents, stand out. The aid of my wife, Bonnie, in typing large sections of the manuscript, correcting many grammatical and stylistic errors, and serving as my constant and major inspiration throughout this task can never be truly measured. To my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Walter Schmiel, I give heartfelt thanks for supplying me with physical sustenance and a roof over my head while I researched and wrote this thesis and for understanding the need for tolerating the strange ways of the incipient scholar. One of the most important contributors to my efforts was the only living relative of Coz*s who knew him personally, his step-granddaughter. Miss Mary Budd Cochran. Her letters to me, a personal interview with her on March 25, 1969 which also entailed a trip to to see Cox*s gravesite and homes in that city, and her recollections of Cox as an older man were invaluable for this study. Another valuable source of aid to me was the archivist of , Mr. William Bigglestone. Under his guidance I researched the Cox papers and the other papers at Oberlin for five months. He was at all times encouraging, helpful, concerned, and agreeable—a ll of which made that sometimes tedious work a much easier task.

Among the others who have helped me in my research and who also deserve my thanks are Richard D. Maxwell and the

i i i staff of the National Archives; Hoy P. Easier and the staff of the manuscript division of the Library of Congress; William Jeffrey, Jr«, the librarian of the Law School library; Garry D. Byan of the National Archives M ilitary Records division; Peter Bo Thoms, University of Cincinnati Legal Adviser and Archivist; Kermit Pike, Head Librarian, and Florence L# Dawley, Curator, of the Western Reserve H istorical Society; Irene McCreery of the Toledo Public Library; Floyd E. Frederick of the Warren, Ohio City Schools; Congressman William Minshall, Ao Do Mastroguiseppe, Jro, and J. William Hess of the West Virginia University Library; Mrs. Frances Forman of the Cincinnati Historical Society; the staff of the Ohio

Historical Society Library; John Simon of the Ulysses 8. G rant Association; John M. Morgan of the University of Toledo library; Adolf K. Placzek and the staff of the Avery library of Columbia University; and thp staff of the Oberlin College library. All of these people helped me either through letters concerning source m aterial, personal guidance to and througli pertinent materials, and, in many cases, both. None of them had anything, however, to do with whatever errors in fact, grammar, interpretation, use of pertinent materials, or any other facet of this paper which may appear. For those I take full and complete responsibility.

iv To th e man who worked f o r many h o u rs to make su re t h a t as few of such errors as possible would appear in this paper, who gave a great deal of attention to my research and writing problems and provided an enormous amount of aid in solving them, who fulfilled all the ideal goals for which an adviser is supposed to strive, including allowing the w riter a great deal of freedom to grope his way toward becoming a researcher and writer, I give special thanks. Dr. Francis P. Weisenburger has been everything I had hoped my faculty adviser and thesis director would be. The special and concerned attention he gave to my efforts w ill always be highly appreciated. VITA

February 2, 194^ Bom - , Ohio 1966 B.A., St. Francis College, Loretto, Pennsylvania 1966-1969 NDEA Fellow, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1969-1970 Instructor, St. Francis College, Loretto, Pennsylvania

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History The Emergence of Modern America. Professor Francis P, Weisenburger Slavery, Reconstruction, and the New South. Professor Merton Dillon American Diplomatic History. Professor Marvin E. Z a h n ise r The Modern Middle East. Professor Sydney N. Fisher

v i TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PBEFACE...... 11 VITA...... Vi C hap ter I. Ancestry and Early Years ...... 1 II. The Oberlin Student ...... 10 III. The Warren Years...... 23 IV. Incipient Politician ...... 35 V. Ohio S e n a to r ...... 52 VI. The Hoad to W ar ...... 66 VII. From Kanawha to Kanawha ...... 80 VIII. From West Virginia to A tlanta ...... 101 IX. Franklin and War*s End ...... 120 X. The Gubernatorial Candidate ...... l4 0

XI. The Governor In National Politics, 1865-7 • • • l 6l XII. Governor of Ohio ...... 186 XIII. Cincinnati Lawyer ...... 210 XIV. Secretary of the Interior ...... 230 XV. The Party of the Future ...... 288 XVI. Alienated Politician and Bailroad President . . 3^7 XVII. The Return to Politics ...... 382

XVIII. The Educator, 1881-1897 ...... 419 XIX. Private Citizen, 1879-1900 ...... 443 XX. The Author, the C ritic, and the Man ...... 469

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 507

v i i CHAPTER I

THE CAREER OF JACOB DOLSON COX

Ancestry and Early Years A sense of duty was an integral part of the character of Jacob Dolson Cox. Honest, upright, morally strict, he embodied the virtues, if not the vices of the true Victorian. Yet he was also a warm man, with an unselfish love for his family and friends. He was a man who, in some ways, was out of place in his own time. But at the same time he was so typical of many of his contemporaries that he could be called a fitting representative of their attitudes and outlooks. He was a complex and independent man who took on and performed well a diverse group of roles in his life. He was an elitist and an intellectual in an age of democracy and adventurous, active men. He was dedicated to the idea of being true to himself; and though the result was his being cut off from higher political office, he felt the sacrifice was worth the price. Honor above all else was to be preserved, and Jacob Dolson Cox was an h o n o rab le man. This first son of Jacob Dolson Coz I and Thedla Redelia Kenyon was bom on October 27# 1828* His mother, a direct descendant of Elder William Brewster, the religions leader of the colonists on the Mayflower, had come to Albany, from Saratoga Connty, New York with her parents in 1810. His father, the son of Michael Coz and Mary Dolson, had come to Albany with his parents in 1796 at the age of fo'or. Beginning his training as a carpenter and master builder there, in 1818 he met and was captivated by little Thedia Kenyon. After waiting for her to reach a respectably mature age, Thedia*s parents went forward with the wedding plans, and on her seventeenth birthday. May 25» 1821, the two young people were m a rrie d . 1

They then settled down in Albany, and Jacob continued his career as a builder and roofer. In 1825 he was offered the greatest job of his life—designing and superintending the construction of the roof, ceiling, galleries, and floor- supports of the church of the order of St. Sulpice in . This order, having the desire to build the largest

^William Coz Cochran, "Political Ezperiences of Major General Jacob Dolson Coz", 2 vols., unpublished manuscript, Cincinnati, 1940, Oberlin College Archives, Oberlin, Ohio, I, pp. 1-4. The sources on the early life of J. D. Coz are eztremely scarce. Most biographers have borrowed from each other on this phase of his life, but the basic source remains this work, Coz*s stepson's biography. Since the two men were so close and lived near each other until Coz's death, and since they often talked over the past on their daily walks to their offices, most of these and later facts must be accepted as true. Mr. Cochran was not one to embellish the record. He was a good researcher and an accurate scholar. The debt the author owes him is incalculable. church on the continent, had drawn up plans for an interior having a span of eighty feet between two rows of columns. Since nothing of such a magnitude had ever before been done, the local architects called in to look over the task had dismissed it as impossible. But a New York architect, James 0 ‘D o n n ell, who knew Jacob Cox and h i s work in constructing just such "impossible" roofs, suggested that Cox be hired to do the job. He was hired soon after, and with his growing family of two daughters, went to Montreal.

Using his expert knowledge and native intelligence to good effect, Cox completed his task in a little over four years. Late in December, 1829, feeling it was time to go back to New York and set up shop in , Jacob took his family back to the . Along on the trip went two new children bom in Montreal—a third daughter was bom i n 18 2 6, and the pride of his father, their first son, Jacob D olson Cox I I .

As was the custom of the day, the rearing of the children was done to an overwhelming extent by the mother. Coming from a long Puritan and New England tradition of strictness and uprightness of character and conduct, Thedia Cox raised young Jacob (or Dolson, as he preferred to be called) in the same way. Her Puritan conscience, strong religious sentiment, habits of neatness and refinement, love of art and music^, and hatred of slavery all were

Cochran, Political Experiences", pp. 4-5» Important in developing the character of young Jacob. He grew up with a strict sense of integrity and duty to his fellow man and to himself. He was told what he must always be and what he must always do—and his life was a fulfillm ent of both roles.

His political ideals were also a partial product of his upbringing. As Coz said, his mother's "teachings were in sympathy with what she held to be philanthropy, with the devout earnestness of her Plymouth and Old Bay Colony blood. Many a boyish lesson in reading I spelled out from the little tract published by the American Anti-Slavery Society. I could not remember the time, since I could think at all, when slavery did not appear to me to be a blot upon our country, and a national shame and disgrace."3 This hatred of slavery and an identification with its foes were further instilled when he "was led past Dr. Ludlow's church, which had been gutted the day before as mob punishment for antislavery teaching done there." These events began his political education, and such feelings continued throu^out his life. Eventually he "came to feel slavery was indefensible."^

Coz's formal education was not quite as unified in teaching or in method, but was the one accepted as proper for

3Jacob Dolson Coz, "Why the Men of ' 6l Fought for the Union," A tlantic Monthly, vol. 6 9, no. 413 (March, 1892), p . 2 6. ^Coz, "Why the M en...", p. 25. a yotmg man of the time who would he going on to college. His father planned a thorough elementary education for him, including training as an accountant and in reading French. By the age of fourteen he had accomplished this through his training in a private school kept hy a Mr. Eufus Lockwood, a year of study with a classically educated minister, and some private reading with a Columbia college student. He proved an apt student, quick to leam and comprehend, and more intelligent than most of his contemporaries.

The normal course for such an intelligent and well- trained boy was to go on to college, but Coz's father had been hit quite hard by the Panic of I 837 and had had to scrimp to get along. He was, therefore, unable to spare the money for his son's college expenses. Young Dolson felt he should accept the facts and look for a different career. Feeling that a career in the law would be a good, solid choice for himself, he entered, on his fourteenth birthday, the law offices of Harrison and Ogden, equity lawyers of New York City, as an articled clerk, to begin the seven-year path toward admission to the bar. Through long and diligent work in the office and the reading of law in his leisure time, Cox soon became fam iliar with the legal forms and proceedings he would need when practicing. But during his tenure there a new factor in his life made him renew his earlier desire to go on to college. And so, having resolved to continue his formal education, Cox left the law office, a certificate of two-years study in his hand, and became a book-keeper and acooïintant in the offices of Anthony Lane, a broker—a position which gave him ample time to study for college entrance,-5

It was during this period of his life that "he was gaining almost unconsciously a broad education in all that related to the affairs of men by his daily walks up and down Broadway and along the wharves and by listening to the talk of lawyers and prominent business men."^ In addition to this and his voluminous reading, he also prepared himself by working with a friend who was a student in the Union Theological Seminary in New York and gave him lessons in the elements of Greek and Latin, He had already pushed his study of mathematics far enough to enter college,7 and he had even

learned the new Pittman method of shorthand to aid him in his future college work.

But a boy of sixteen or seventeen has other thoughts too—especially if he lives in a port city in an age iidien sea travel seems very fascinating and adventurous. As Cox later confessed, "We should be astonished to find how many of us

^Cochran, "Political Experiences," p, 5» ^Ibid., p, 6, 7James Rees Ewing, Public Services of Jacob Dolson Cox. (Washington, 1902), p, 8, This work, originally written as a doctoral dissertation at Johns Hopkins in 1899» can be taken as a primary source. There is evidence that Ewing and Cox knew each other and corresponded concerning the young man*s future occupation. Thus it is probable that this information, which first appears in this work, was personally given out by Cox him self. went throng a youthful period of half-resolve to 'go to sea' and seek our fortunes there. It is in the Anglo-Saxon blood. We tried it as we did the measles and other mild diseases of childhood.'*® Cox was no exception, and one day, making the decision to become a sailor, he asked for and got the permission of a captain to sail as a member of his crew. He went home, packed his kit, stowed it on board, and then, since the captain had promised not to sail for hours, went home to Staten Island (to which his family had moved) to say his last farewells. But when he returned to the harbor he found his ship gone, the captain having taken advantage of a favoring wind. It was a great blow to the young boy, but when he realized the grief and sorrow his mother had shown at his parting, he accepted it as a providential occurrence, renounced the sailor's life, and returned to his college preparations.9

The decision to go to college had come as a result of the lectures of the Reverend Samuel Cochran, an Oberlin College and Theological Seminary graduate, in New York. In the early 1840's Cochran was holding Sunday services in the lecture room of a local medical college. The Coxes were frequent attendants, and the attention of the minister had O Jacob Dolson Cox, "The Youth and Early Manhood of General James A. G arfield," Oration, Reunion of the Army of the Cumberland, , 1882, p. 9.

9Cochran, "Political Experiences," p. 6. 8 been drawn to young Dolson because of his attentiveness and intelligence. In the winter of 1842-3, Cochran arranged a series of revivals at Niblo*s Garden in New York City. He was to be assisted by the Reverend , already a noted revivalist, who had been pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle in New York, and had gone to Oberlin College to teach systematic theology in its theological sem inary.

One evening, after one of his typically impressive and powerful sermons, Finney, using his deep, penetrating eyes to look, as it were, into the soul of everyone in the room, called out to all those present who wished to give their hearts to God to come forward to him. Almost everyone stood up, and there was a great crush in the middle as the people struggled up to the front. Young Dolson, unable to get through the mass, leaped toward the front, using the backs of the seats as stepping stones. But when he got to Finney*s side, the emotion of the situation became too much for him, and he was unable to speak a word. The exuberance and desire of the youth were closely noted, however, by both Finney and Cochran, and the latter sought, in the next few months, to confirm the new zealot in his resolution. Soon afterward he was baptized, and he joined the church in the fall of 1 8 4 3.

^^Cochran, "Political Experiences," pp. 6-7. The neophyte church member was now so bound up with religion and the desire to preach the gospel, that he resolved to go on to college and train to be a minister. Finishing up his legal work in 1844, he began the dual task of working in the brokerage firm and preparing for college. By the summer of 1846 Dolson felt that he was ready to journey to his chosen school, Oberlin College (his natural choice because of the lure of Mr. Finney and the theological seminary there), and begin his training for the ministry. Setting out from New York with his fourteen year old brother, Kenyon (who was going to attend the preparatory department), the two city boys began their long, muddy trek to the forests and wilderness of Oberlin, Ohio. CHAPTER I I

THE OBERLIN STUDENT

Founded in I 833 as the Oberlin Collegiate Institute, this antislavery headquarters on the Western Reserve of Ohio had achieved its reputation as a "peculiar" college even before Dolson arrived there. Beginning in 1835 it played a large role in the Underground Railroad and abolitionism because of the influence of the Lane Seminary rebels, who had come there in 1834 seeking freedom to discuss such matters and to fight slavery actively. Even though a very strict, moral sense pervaded the atmosphere of the school, and emphasis on religion and the Scriptures in the student's work was the rule, the college was seen by many as a den of rebels, traitors and radicals because of its views on slavery. The presence of Negroes as students and the admission of the first female students into a college did little more than assure the further spread of such beliefs.^

Manual labor was the most prominent feature of the Oberlin Institute, and its use may be classified with its

^See Robert S. Fletcher, A History of Oberlin College. 2 vols., Oberlin, 1943, chapters 18- 1 9, p p . 236- 2 7 0.

10 11 other peculiarities. Its motto was "work and study," and everyone, including the faculty, did a share of the work. The study part of the curriculum was heavily oriented toward religion. Oberlin was first and foremost a religious school, and the coming of Charles Finney was of supreme importance in recruiting many able m inisterial students. His goal and that of the college aimed at training the Lane rebels and others to go out as evangelists to spread the revival movement through the midwest; and the course of study was designed to fu lfill this aim. Biblical study and Hebrew were emphasized, and the "heathen classics" of Greek and Latin were considered secondary at most. It was the perfect school for a m inisterial student who wanted no temptations and no outside influences around him which might sway him from his goal.^

But there were other influences around Oberlin which were known to sway the traveler from simply getting there. In 1846 there were no through railroads to the Western Reserve, and the journey from New York was not an enterprise to be undertaken lightly. Although it is not known exactly how Dolson and Kenyon made their way to Oberlin, they most likely followed the traditional route, using a boat on the Erie Canal, riding a steamboat from Buffalo over Lake Erie to Cleveland, riding a stagecoach from there west to Elyria, and then taking another coach to Oberlin. The crowded conditions on all these conveyances, the long time involved

Z ib id .. p p . 1 9 1, 208, 210, 348. 12 in making the trip, the necessity of getting out and pushing the coach through the mud, ruts, and holes in the road every few miles, and the tedium and boredom which overcame everyone on these trips were almost sure to make the passengers overwhelmingly happy when their trip was over and their destination was in sight,^ But not poor Dolson and Kenyon*

The sight that greeted them on July 19, 1846, when their coach arrived at Oberlin was enou^ to make them cry, and that is exactly what they did. The school*s location had been poorly selected, and in the swamps and mud and forests in the surrounding wilderness there stood only a few buildings in a small clearing known as Tappan Square, The land was flat, dull, uninteresting, and overrun with livestock of every kind and description. "The crude aspect of the town and their surroundings and a sense of utter loneliness and loss overcame the new students, and they broke down and wept"^ in each other*s arms. As Cox said of this experience, "Never was there a poor scamp more homesick than I for two days after my arrival at Oberlin,"^

But even then Dolson had a sense of duty, and, after overcoming his melancholy, he went to the Treasurer’s office

^Ibid,. pp. 537, 538, 542. 4 Cochran, '(Political Experiences," p, 7,

, ^ ^^J« D. Cox, II to Charles P. Cox, December 13, 1864, J, D, Cox Papers, Oberlin College Archives. (Hereinafter r e f e r r e d to a s Cox P ap ers) 13 to arrange for his lodging, studies and work (for the payment of his fees). He was immediately assigned to his first job, at which he was supposed to overcome his trepidations and regain his composure—cleaning out the bottom of a college cistern.6 He was then given a room at Colonial Hall, a men's dormitory, and he immediately began preparing for the beginning of classes with the thought that "for the winter you may just consider me as at work in a little missionary field, and I pray God I may be enabled to do my duty.

Cox's first year at Oberlin was spent in the Preparatory Department, in which he was supposed to become acquainted with the college curriculum and prepare himself for entrance into the regular college department. Studying the Bible, Greek, Hebrew, history, mathematics, and other prescribed subjects, he came along swiftly, and in the spring was adjudged to be ready for college entrance the next year.

But not all the time of a student, even that of a student for the ministry can be spent in study, and Dolson

^He was to hold many other such jobs during his student life. Even before September 1, 1846 he had already put in seventy-seven hours of carpenter work for the Institute. See the receipt, September 1, 1846, Treasurer’s Office Papers, Oberlin College, Oberlin College Archives. *^J. D. Cox II to J. D, Cox I, September, 1846, as quoted in William Cox Cochran, "General Jacob Dolson Cox; Early Life and M ilitary Service^" Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. 58 (October, 1901), p. 443. Hereafter cited as "Early Life and M ilitary Service." 14 was no exception. The tradition of having the young men eat their meals at Ladies Sail with the girls had already begun, and it was here that the two sexes were brought together into closer contact than at any other time during their college years. Dolson Cox had already earned a reputation as a charming, suave youth with a refined manner, and it was in these daily meetings with the girls that he learned how to be the perfect gentleman at all times. And apparently he learned very quickly, for as early as October 4, 1846 he had impressed one girl so much that she wrote, "there is ^ i^ some good folks here, and some slick fellers, too, one in particular, a Mr. Cox from New York C ity ."®

But his major concern continued to be following the road to the ministry, and so in the fall of 184? he began the freshman course, consisting of such subjects as Algebra, Cicero, Acts of the Apostles, History, and the Bible?, with great vigor. Apparently he did quite well, for according to two student friends he already began to show the first signs of his "rema.rkable versatility and symmetry of character. In every department he was quite in his element, and especially

8 M. A. Broadner to Julia Clark, October 4, 1846, as quoted in Fletcher, History of Oberlin. p. 821. ^Oberlin Collegiate Institute Catalogue. 1847-8, p. 7. As one can see from tnis list, the emphasis on religion and against the classics was undergoing a change in the late 1840*s, and conformity to the course used at other schools was slowly becoming an accepted fact at Oberlin. 15 botany, which he made a study at all tim es."10 Dolson impressed his teachers as being "fond of study, dignified of manner, and a clear, solid thinker, always doing his homework thoroughly. He was quiet in his habits and found his greatest pleasure in reading.

He also moved smoothly into the daily routine of physical work, and "the cheerfulness of his nature made the time go swiftly." He exhibited a joy of life in his jobs, and "he might have been observed almost every day kneading dough in a great bread trough in the ‘cuisine* department of the old Ladies Hall. He would often even break out in snatches of song as he kneaded the flaky mass."^^ Apparently the young student had acclimated himself well to the rigors of college life.

During his first college year he joined the smaller of the two debating societies at Oberlin, Phi Delta, so that, because of its size, he could get to speak more often. Subjects such as slavery, predestination, and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 were typical topics, and Cox proved the best

_ ^?A._LA _Shumway and 0 . DeW. B row er, O b e rlin ia n a , C lev elan d , 1883, p . 97 .------11 "Jacob D. Cox, Class of 1851." Oberlin Review, April 22, 1896, p. 412. ' 12 Shumway and Brow er, O b e rlin ia n a . p . 9 6. But perhaps this was just outward display to masklRTs inner feelings. As he wrote to his father, "I think this bread-baking has done me no good...the heat, added to the labor, which is the hardest I ever did, has been too much for me." Cox to J. D. Cox I, as quoted in Cochran, "Early Life and M ilitary Service," p. 443. 16 of his group by his third year. Often given the unpopular view in the group * s debates, he would study the topic's historical background, its relation to Constitutional law, and whatever other material he could gather to insure the accuracy of every point he made. It was here that he developed his characteristics of speaking in a logical and orderly way and the ability to see both sides of a question and assess the qualities of each. By his third year he was Phi Delta's acknowledged leader, and his fund of knowledge in all fields, but especially history, philosophy, and science, had prospered so much from this attachment that he became known as an early day most-likely-to-succeed.

It was in this society and actually through his association with the college and its background and beliefs that his earlier ideas about slavery and its morality were further reinforced. The major debating topic in 1848 and 1849 was the local incident of having the female Negro employee of an Oberlin trustee declared to be slave by a slave-hunter. The case was later dismissed, but it brought the attention of the school to such practices, and when the Fugitive Slave Act was announced as part of the Con^romise of

1850, Oberlin declared its decided opposition to the law. Such events reinstilled in Cox's mind his antislavery feelings, and when he left Oberlin he was as radical as anyone of the Reserve on this fateful question.

During his freshman year Dolson followed another traditional Oberlin practice of using the three months break 17 in the middle of the school year to go to a country school to teach the children of the local farmers and earn some money for the next session. The students who took on this job had to teach all the common subjects and all eight grades, and for most it proved a valuable experience in meeting people and having some responsibility. But for Cox it was just another burden in his life. He wrote to his father, "I used myself up in teaching last winter. I was tired by study when I commenced, and the care of 100 scholars was by no means calculated to rest either mind or body. I came back exhausted, and have not been strong since."13 He had always been a somewhat frail boy, and the dual load had almost proved too much for him. But he knew he must stay on, and so he decided, "it is with me both choice and duty to continue."!^

His sophomore year (1848-9) went very smoothly, and his studies went on apace. But, feeling that he was too old to be only a sophomore, he began to spend most of his spare time reading ahead in the subjects for his junior and senior years. He also began thinking that he would seek permission to skip his junior year so as to move ahead and enter the theological seminary as soon as possible. Two factors which entered his life in this year made it almost necessary to fu lfill this resolve—his father's financial difficulties and Dolson*s relationship with Reverend Mr. Finney*s oldest daughter.

l^Ibid.. p. 443. l^Tbid.. p. 443. 18

Cox»s father had been badly hurt by financial reverses in 1847, and had gone to in a desperate attempt to revive his fortunes. Dolson knew his father could no longer aid his education and that he would need a cheaper place to live for the next session if he was to continue at Oberlin. The perfect place was at the Finney house, and this was arranged by the engagement of Dolson to Helen Finney, Cox had been a frequent attendant at Finney*s services and a constant visitor at his house. There he met and fell in love with Helen, He didn't know he felt so close to her until, at the end of the fall term of 1848, when he came to say goodbye before going home for a vacation. The emotions of both were so strong that they immediately decided to become engaged. This insured his return for the spring term,-^^ When he got back, he arranged to marry Helen the next fall, to live in the Finney house thereafter, to take the last two years of study in one, and to enter the theological seminary in the f a l l o f 1 8 5 0, The prospects for his success, which had seemed so dim before, now looked extremely good.

His future wife was a tall, delicate girl with a keen intellect and a refined taste and manner. Bom on June 10,

1828 in , Helen had spent her early years traveling through the East, where she gained her character­ istics of neatness, culture, graciousness, and aloofness.

^^Ibid,. pp. 444-5. 19

While a student at Oberlin in 1846 she had met Professor William Cochran, and the two were married soon after. They moved to New York, where Cochran was to become editor of the New York Evangelist, but after only a few months he contracted typhoid fever and died in August of 184?. Disconsolate in her widowhood at nineteen, Helen went back to Oberlin to take over the job of housekeeper at the Finney house in place of her ailing mother. Her mother*s death soon afterwards made her melancholy complete, and the lines of sadness became so imbedded in her face that they were visible for the rest of her life. But the discovery that she was pregnant and the meeting of and later engagement to Dolson Cox gave her some comfort in her saddened state.

Cox's last two years of college studies covered a wide range of subjects—from Hebrew and Geology to political economy and law^^, and Cox, feeling that he could not go to all the necessary lectures and recitations for both years at the same time, stopped going altogether, and began to study independently. Since he no longer had to perform meuiual labor to pay his way, he had quite a bit of free time, but

^^William Cox Cochran, "Helen Finney Cox," Oberlin Alumni Magazine, vol. 8 (October, 1911), p. 9. ^"^The f a c t t h a t th e c o u rse work a t O b e rlin was w hat we would call today a liberal education and Cox's ability to be adept in every subject of both arts and sciences were to aid in his work in later life in both fields. His work as an historian and a man of letters he performed as well as that as a scientist and a microscopist, and in both he was recognized as a leader in the field. 20 only for a while. On November 29, 1849 he and Helen Finney were married by Professor John Morgan in the First Church in Oberlin, and the couple began housekeeping in the Finney home, undertaking the care of it, Helen’s younger brothers and sisters^®, and her baby son, William^^.

With this added responsibility, Dolson now applied himself with a new verve, and by the end of 1850 he had completed the college course and had gone so far ahead that he was admitted to the middle (second) class of the Theological department. Delving deeply into Greek and Hebrew Exegesis, the Harmony of the Gospels, and Systematic theology, by the end of his first year he was almost ready to become a third year student. As a matter of fact he was such a good student and so well disciplined that he even found time to teach two classes in Algebra in the college during the spring term of 1851

But his independence of mind and refusal to follow the usual pattern of Oberlin students of accepting at face value

^^Pinney and his new wife had left for England earlier to hold a series of revivals. Thus they did not attend the wedding and needed someone to care for the younger children. The Coxes fit the bill perfectly, ^^On March 29, 1848 she gave birth to her first husband’s son, William, Dolson was a strong comfort for her during this trying time, and as a result the child’s middle name was given as Cox, See Cochran, "Political Experiences," I , 11. ^^Certificate, August 13, 1851, Treasurer's Office Miscellaneous Papers, Oberlin College, Oberlin College Archives, He was paid 18 3/4^/hr, for 179 hours—$33,37, 21 everything their professors said and taught were to prove decisive factors in an all-important event in his life that spring. Dolson had been debating free will with himself and his friends J. A. R. Rogers, Thomas Robinson, and Charles Starbuck, and had come to some very unorthodox conclusions about God and man’s role in the world. When his father-in- law, worn out from his travels and his work in England, re tu rn e d to O b e rlin in May, I 85I» he found Cox’s questioning and independent turn of mind quite irritating. PI Later, during a warm discussion in a class over these matters, after Cox had questioned some dictum of orthodoxy, Finney quite angrily told him, “Dolson, you are not honest, you do not want to see the truth.” Above all else Dolson was honest, and, since he was typical of his contemporaries when it came to a question of honor, he felt he had been deeply insulted. He now presumed that if there was to be no free debate possible in theology, he could not possibly go further in its study. He also could no longer stay at Oberlin or at Finney’s, and so he resolved to find a job and give up the m inistry.^2

21 Even though he himself had been called a radical and a free thinker in theology and had been dismissed by many orthodox thinkers as an outri^t heretic. 22 This account of the split between these two strong- willed men is found in Cochran, "Political Experiences," I, 13-4. It cannot be exactly corroborated elsewhere, for Cox made no mention of such a specific incident in any of his extant papers. However, in letters to his friends and relatives over the next three years, he made reference to his honesty in the faces of the teachings of his orthodox teachers and the fact that he would be in a pulpit had he not been judged on the honesty of his theological conclusions instead of his honest means of coming to those conclusions. See his 22

Learning that the position as superintendent of public schools in Warren, Ohio, in the northeastern part of the state, was open, Cox applied for it and was accepted. With his newly awarded A.B, degree in hand, he took Helen, William Cochran, and his first child, Helen Finney Cox (bom July 8,

185 0) across Ohio to the tiny village of Warren to begin his first job as a family man.

Cox*s experiences at Oberlin proved to be most influential in his later life. It was there that his deep moral convictions were greatly reinforced. It was there that this tall and wiry youth, with a lordly bearing and gait and powerful-looking eyes, first became a leader of men (in Phi Delta). It was there that his intellectual pride and egotism were molded into permanent character traits. It was there that his inclinations to be uncompromising and inflexible were reinforced by the Oberlin "ethic” of rigidity toward anything morally wrong. From this time on Jacob D. Cox proved to be an ideal Oberlin graduate, whose proud, honest, and m oralistic character was an ideal upon which many of his contemporaries modeled their lives.

letters of December 21, 18^4 and June 26, 1853 to Thomas Eoblnson and J. A. B. Rogers, Cox Papers, Oberlin College Archives. He even wrote to Finney, "I have no time to add the ezpressions of diffidence which I really feel when opposing the arguments of those so much older and more learned than myself,” Cox to Finney, September 10, 1852, Cox P a p e rs . CHAPTER I I I

THE WARREN YEARS

Warren, Ohio was little more than a small farming community of 3,000 people when Jacob D. Coz arrived there. The county seat of Trumbull County, its school system accommodated the townspeople and many others from surrounding farms. In l84l three small frame buildings were built for the district schools, and in 1849 a permanent public school system was established, the first sessions under it beginning that September.! As the second superintendent of the system (which had only six or seven teachers), J. D. Cox (as he now began to sign his name in more formal communications) was p a id $6 0 0. The low salary and his growing family were to prove constant problems for him in the years to come, during which the young superintendent of schools experienced a very difficult existence.

But with characteristic aplomb, Cox set out to do his duty and assigned work. There are no official records available for this period of his life, so it is impossible to

^Harriet Taylor Upton, History of the Western Reserve. (C hicago, 1910), I, 187-8.

23 24 judge his performance in this position. But his outlook on education and his administration of the system coincided with his own innate conservatism and that of his students* parents. In a letter to his brother Allyn, he wrote, "The great object of study is to discipline the mind, Latin is of as much use as Science after one leaves school, even though some say the former is of no use," He went on to decry the hubbub over practical education and science as humbug and to call anything which smacked of stressing practicality with no attention to p the arts in education as unnecessary and to be downgraded.

He had had a classical education, and he felt that the tried and true methods were the best. This tendency to shy away from the innovative was typical of Cox, and in his later contacts with education was to be his consistent rule of thumb.

Even though his record as superintendent cannot be judged accurately, it can be inferred that his reputation as a scholar and as a respected man of the county was growing during this period. He was active in many local groups. He joined the Presbyterian church and became its choir leader; gave lectures for the Warren Library Association; became Secretary of the Trumbull County Agricultural Society; and, in general, made himself known around the county. Any man who was known for doing his duty and who became so prominent

^ J , D, Cox to A lly n Cox, May 25# 1852, Cox P a p e rs . 25

In local affairs must, by implication, have been doing his job as superintendent in an acceptable and proper way.

In addition to his duties in the schools, Coz found time for a great number of other activities. A few months after his arrival he gave a "well-matured" speech on "The Struggles of Science" for the local Library Association "in a style doubly pleasing from eloquence and instruction."3 He also gave addresses on such varied topics as "Music" (May 19, 1853 before the County Band Convention), "Fairs" (July 24, 1853 before the Trumbull County Agricultural Society), and "The Emancipation of Science" (October 26, 1853 before the Columbiana Teachers Association).^ In addition, he studied the Pittman system of shorthand, became extremely adept at using it, and in July, 1855, made a perfect stenographic report of a ten-day debate on Spiritualism in Warren. Carrying on a debate on free will and divinity in his correspondence with two Oberlin College classmates, J. A. B. Rogers and Thomas Robinson, who had become m inisters, playing his violin with a trio of his friends, and helping to raise his family were other activities which kept, him constantly busy and active mentally. In addition, he spent much time reading for enjoyment and edification, and preparing for the next phase of his career—as a lawyer.

3 "^Trumbull Democrat. December 15, 1851, p. 2. ^These are in manuscript or printed form in the Cox Papers. 26

While he was teaching and administering the schools, Cox was also devoting himself to an intense study of law and regular attendance at the County courthouse. He knew that his pecuniary status was suffering and that he had to find a better paying position. It is probable that he had some idea of going into politics when he chose his profession, for the law, even then, was the surest road to political prominence. Cox made his preparation so well that on April 28, 1852, he was admitted to practice at the Ohio Bar.^ Yet, he did not begin practicing law immediately because he realized that "the danger of running ashore pecuniarily w ill be considerable for the first year."^ Peeling that it was best to keep the assured job as superintendent for the time being, he put off beginning his practice until the end of his second year in the school system.

Even though he went through a period of melancholy in February, 1853» because of the death of his father and the near death of his stepson William from the scarlet fever, and was so sad that he felt "the tables are fairly turned on me, he went ahead with his previous plans. In April, he wrote his friend Rogers, "I just finished a vacation and now a term of eleven weeks w ill complete my year and finish my connection

^Certificate signed by Jonathan Ingersoll, Clerk of D istrict Court of County of Trumbull, Cox Papers.

^J. D. Cox to J. A. E. Rogers, July 19, 1852, Cox P a p e rs .

^J. D. Cox to Thomas Robinson, February 5» 1853, Cox Papers. 27 Q with the schools, and then farewell to teaching.” He went on to say that he expected to begin his law practice in July, and his happiness at, hopefully, being able to support his family in a better manner showed through his usually austere letters until he began his practice in June, 1853»

Making arrangements with M. D. Leggett, his predecessor as school superintendent and a future general in the Civil War, to join him in practice, Cox became a junior partner in the firm of Leggett and Cox on June 26, 1853* But the expected rise in revenue was not to come very soon, and the pinch of poverty was an evei^-present matter for the next few years. There were many influential lawyers in the Warren area, and the neophyte with few legal connections and only two years as a town resident had little chance to make much of a dent in the old practices. He soon found that "The law is rather a hard road for young practitioners to travel. Because he was only a junior partner in the firm, he received a smaller share of its income; and even though he spent long hours in the court and the ledgers of the firm show a fair amount of business, Cox was not able to get himself into the black for three years.

But he devoted himself to his work and to building up a reputation as a dedicated and responsible lawyer. His

®J. D. Cox to J. A. H. Rogers, April 11, 1853, Cox Papers. ^J. D. Cox to J. A. E. Rogers, December 21, 1854, Cox P a p e rs. 28

••business and law reading occupied most of the day, •• and even his evenings, which he usually spent ‘•upon German, French, and such general philosophical and theological reading as I can find time for, ••^^ were devoted in part to reading concerning his occupation. Slowly but surely his firm 's business picked up (probably at least in part because of Cox's political activities and connections—sea Chapter 4), and by late 1855 he felt that he could set up his own firm and have enough business to support his family.

On January 3, 1856, the partnership with M. D. Leggett was terminated, and Cox set out on his own.^^ His cases consisted mostly of business and civil matters, with an occasional real estate and property case. But apparently his early hopes for success suffered some setbacks, and the offer from John Hutchins, a prominent Trumbull County politican, to join his firm proved a strong temptation, and later in the year Cox's name appeared as a member of the firm of Hutchins, Cox, and B atliff. Hutchins's connections in the county and around the state were to prove extremely helpful to the young lawyer. During his five years as a member of this firm and its successor, Cox, E atliff, and Spear, Cox was ••cheered with the prospect of professional success.•• For five years the tide bore him toward financial success and professional

lOlb id .

^^Law Firm Account Book, Leggett & Cox, Cox Papers. 29 eminence.He was a rising young man who was making a solid reputation as a lawyer and politician.

He also achieved a good reputation as an ideal family man. He often said that the responsibility of being the head of a family changed a man completely, requiring him to do many things he preferred not to do but that he had to do out of duty to his family. He shared the view of his contemporaries that the solidarity of the family could never be sacrificed for any reason. Although not usually an extremely emotional or affectionate man, he loved and respected his wife and children and was devoted to their welfare.

Between Helen and Dolson, there was a very strong affection. Although the evidence is meagre for the early years, their letters during the I 8 6 0*s show the feeling they had for one another. Helen once wrote to Lucy Garfield, "You should come and v isit us so that while our husbands are away, we may cheer each other's loneliness.'*^3 And later, "Don't you feel like going down and breaking up the session of the Legislature by main force? I dol"^^ Cox, whose stiff, conservative nature and sense of correct deportment kept him from becoming very personal or romantic in his letters to his wife, still in later years would write her frequently from

12 Cochran, "Political Experiences," p. l6, ^%elen Cox to Lucy Garfield, February 24, 186l, Lucÿ Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. ^^Helen Cox to Lucy Garfield, March 11, 186l, Lucy Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 30 his Civil War battle fields, giving her an aesthetic view of the countryside, assuring her of his own safety, and signing himself, "Your affectionate husband, Dolson."

This feeling between their parents had an invaluable effect on the children who were raised in an atmosphere of love and respect. Of their five children bom in Warren, the first was a son, J. D. Cox III, who came into the world on

May 1 5 , 1 8 5 2. A frail boy who grew to look very much like his father, he later became a leader in the industrial development of Cleveland, Ohio. The second son, Kenyon, bom on October 27, 1856, and named after Cox*s brother, was very sickly throughout his early life. After a long series of illnesses which brought him near death almost yearly, he was to become a famous artist and muralist later in the century. The third son, Charles Norton, named after his grandfather Charles Finney and his uncle Norton Finney, was bom on

J u ly 2 8, 1858. He later became a ranc} rr and fruit grower in Colorado. A fourth son, William Brewater, bom on January 26,

I 8 6 1, died of an infant disease on September 14, I 86I.

This growing family of five took up much of Cox's time during these years, and they were probably his greatest comfort during the struggling early years and the later busy ones. J. D. Cox III described his father in a way that shows the attachment all the children must have felt for him: "Father was fond of botanizing in those days, and on Sundays 31 we used to take rambles up and down Red Bun picking wild flowers, which we would take home and analyze,,.'* He related that another time "Father thought I ought to know how to swim, and he took me to a farm, I pretended to be afraid because I didn't want him to know that I'd been there many times before. He got in and told me to, I stepped off and dove and came up beside him. For a moment he was awfully frightened, but when he saw me kicking out as fast as I could, he laughed and said he guessed he had had his trouble for his pains,The term s in which Cox's stepson William Cochran described his stepfather showed an equal admiration and respect, and are a further example of the strong bond between Cox, his wife Hélen, and their children.

The Cox family moved in the society of the leading people of Warren, Although he "liked to be alone often," Cox a d m itte d t h a t "we a r e s o c ia l beings,He made many influential friends during his years in Warren, and the major vehicle for these friendships was a club which Cox organized early in 185^5 the "Home Literary Union," Always an avid reader and interested in lively discussions with his intellectual equals, Cox decided to ask a group of friends to meet at each other's homes on a regular basis for the literary

D, Cox III, Building an American Industry; the Story of the Cleveland Twist D rill Co, and its Fomder, an Autobiography (Cleveland. 1951), on, 15, 23. D. Cox to Charles Finney Cox, April 10, 1852, Cox Papers, 32

Improvement of the members.Twenty-five persons accepted, and the club*s series of essays, critiques, poems, addresses, readings, and discussions began in February, 1854, and were to continue until the war took most of the male members to the battlefield.

Among the members of the Union were Emerson Opdycke, who would later become a Brigadier-General in the Civil War; M. D. Leggett, later a Major-General; Robert W. B atliff, Cox's law partner and also a future Brigadier-General; John Hutchins, Joshua Giddings's successor in Congress; William Spear, another law partner and a future justice of the Ohio Supreme Court; and other leading Warren men and women. Although Cox spoke of his own. contributions in a modest way: "Those leisure hours I do have I use in scribbling a hasty essay to read at our 'Union',"^8 it was an acknowledged fact that he was the club's best contributor and its leader. Using his native powers as an articulate speaker and a well-ordered, concise, and intelligent essayist, Cox, in the warm company of friends, gained valuable training in many of the necessary elements of political life. But this was never an ulterior motive with Cox; the value of developing and using his mind was always a sufficient reward.

^^The manuscript copy of the by-laws of the club as th e y were drawn up by Cox i s in th e Cox P a p e rs. iGj. D. Cox,to J. A. E. Rogers, July 22, 1857» Cox Papers. 33

Another valuable and close friend whom Coz met while residing in Warren, one with whom he was to be in constant contact until that friend*s assassination, was James A. Garfield, The future President, who was at that time a teacher at what became Hiram College, first made Cox*s acquaintance when "he came to Warren about the year I 858 to deliver a popular lecture upon the recent advances in science."19 The two future politicians thus first became friends as educators. The Garfields were invited to the Cox home for dinner after the speech, and the lively discussion of science, educational techniques, economics, history, and the political situation which must have ensued made the two men agree that they must continue their relationship so as to keep available the benefits each could receive from knowing the other. Frequent visits by each to the other's house in the next few years were the result of these promises, and the war years were the only ones in which they were apart for v e ry lo n g .

Cox enjoyed his years in Warren among such friends and his loving family, and it was probably his intention to live there for the rest of his life, practicing law and stimulating 20 his mind among his friends. But the Civil War was to change the plans of many men, and Jacob D. Cox was one of them. How

19j, D. Cox, Oration at the Dedication of the Garfield Memorial, May 3 0 , I 8 9 0, p . 7. Of) See his letter of June 28, 1852, to his sister, E e d e lia , Cox P a p e rs . 3k he came to play his part in that conflict and emerge as a leading man of national politics is a story which began in his early years in Warren, with his first contacts with organized politics, when his desire for change in national governmental policy and an end to slavery eventually led him to play an active role in the formation of the Republican party in Ohio and to represent Trumbull County in the Ohio S e n a te . CHAPTER IV

THE INCIPIENT POLITICIAN

The 1850*8 have been described as the critical decade, the years of the height of sectionalism, and the years during which the Union underwent an "ordeal" which tested its strength. This was a time when the issues upon which political campaigns were centered were a ll overshadowed by one issue: slavery with all of its ramifications. Its spread, its role in the economy, its sectionalizing impulses, its very existence were matters on which everyone interested in national and state politics had to take a stand. Disunion had already been threatened, but compromises had quenched the fires for the moment. The latest, in 1850, had again succeeded, but the criticism it engendered on both sides of the political spectrum showed that many felt that no further compromises were possible and that events pointed to "an irrepressible conflict."^

The Western Reserve was a most vociferous area in opposition to the Compromise of 1850, and especially to one

^See Henry H. Simms, A Decade of Sectional Conflict, (Chapel H ill, North Carolina, 1942) and Allan Nevins. OrcCeal of the Union. 2 vols. (New York, 194?), for more complete discussions of these movements.

35 36 part—the Fugitive Slave Act, Known as a “radical” area for many years before 1850, the Western Reserve contained many of the stations on the "Underground Railroad" and was a major source of abolitionist literature and leadership. The city of Warren was typical of Western Reserve attitudes, and Jacob D, Cox*s move there from Oberlin meant that he would be living among people whose views against slavery were as strong as those he had known at Oberlin. It was in this atmosphere that now as a politician with a constituency to represent he developed his ideas on national issues.

As was stated above, Cox was a strong antislavery man, P although not a believer in immediate Negro equality. His upbringing in a Puritan, antislavery home, his strong attachment to religion and Christian ideals, his training under Charles G, Finney, and his very surroundings at Oberlin had been strong influences in determining his thought on the issue. But Cox was always an independent man, and as early as his sixteenth year he was making up his own mind about every aspect of his life. Thus he followed the practice, which he was to continue for the rest of his life on every important issue he faced, of recognizing the issue as important, looking at both sides of it, assessing each side's merits, thinking out the matter completely with as much reading and

"We As they become educated, they w ill have better discernment," A ugust 1 , 1855I Cox P a p e rs , 37 research as he could possibly do, coming to an honest conclusion, and adhering to his final decision no matter what pressures Intervened. Although this was not the type of thinking designed to Insure success as a politician. It was the way Coz did think, and nothing would ever change that aspect of his character. In the Warren, Ohio, of the day, however, his fairness and honesty would lead him to become a very Important leader In county politics and In the state legislature.

According to Coz's stepson, William Cochran, the comparative leisure which Coz enjoyed, while awaiting professional engagements of an absorbing character, enabled him to delve Into the records of the past and to keep thoroughly posted as to the current events.^ He read deeply, especially In Hildreth*s History of the United States, about the underlying causes of the bitter and sectional feeling between the North and the South. He was a constant and welcome visitor at the editorial rooms of the weekly papers In Warren, and had ready access to their reference libraries and the back copies of other newspapers which they received. He also had frequent conversations with the editors, especially In the early years when he had considerable spare time. With the editors and staffs of the papers Coz would freely discuss the contemporary public Issues and affairs. From all of the sources and from the flow of events on the

^Cochran, "Political Ezperlences," footnote. I, 21. 38 national scene, Cox drew his own conclusions about the slavery question which were to remain constant for the rest of his l i f e .

He decided that slavery was indefensible, and that this decision was the "creed of the body of progressive and earnest young men who were to mould the thou^t and the politics of the Northern States during the critical era. He saw th e Democrats as the party of the slave-owners who favored states* rights to keep their own power intact and the expansion of slavery in order to increase the number of slave states and thus their own influence in Washington. He felt the Whigs, and, later, the Republicans were the moderate parties, looking to the greater good of the whole and opposing the spread of slavery. In such a situation his choice was obvious, and in

1852 he declared himself a Whig, and cast his first presidential vote for General "as the man most likely to secure the desired result |Tf keeping the Union togethe^ by peaceful means, if peace were possible."^

Because the Whig party's membership and power decreased rapidly everywhere in the nation after Scott's defeat, Cox's swift move to a high political position in the county organization came as no surprise. By mid-1853 he was one of its two leading spokesmen, and his role at the convention

^J. D. Cox, "Why the Men of *6l Fought for the Union," Atlantic Monthly, vol. 6 9» n o . ^13 (March, 1892), p. 2?. ^Ibid.. p. 2 7. 39 called "by the ooimty Pree-Soilers for June, 1853» foreshadowed his later role in reuniting the two groups into the Republican party. This convention, which the local Whigs charged had been publicized only in the Western Reserve Chronicle, the Pree-Soil organ, and even then too late for publication elsewhere, had only one Whig delegate, Jacob D, Coz, and he was a "progressive” (antislavery) Whig. When the Pree-Soilers tried to force through their nominations for candidates without considering the question of unity with the progressive Whigs, Coz rose, gave his and the Whig opinion on the matter, and urged postponement of final nominations until a general call could be issued for the convention. This would give the Whigs a chance to call a convention the same day to consider joining the Pree-Soilers on the premise of uniting all liberal men opposed to slavery and its eztension. But Coz's motion was defeated by an overwhelming vote, and he left his delegation^ convinced that unity would have to wait for some later time.

His efforts to keep the Whigs ready for that future union were concentrated mostly in a series of five articles he wrote for the party organ, the Western Reserve Transcript and Whig. Ezplaining the case for anti slavery Whiggism and the reasons why it had decided to remain independent for the time, Coz kept the door open for future joint action by

^See the Western Reserve Transcript and Whig. June 30, 1853f P* 2, for a gooa summary of unese proceedings. 40

“free” and “liberal” men. Coz also found time to maneuver himself into the position of being placed on the county ballot as the Whig candidate for Prosecuting Attorney. As the only Whig candidate for the office, his nomination was assured of the Transcript « s enthusiastic endorsement. Althou^ the Free-Soil organ felt that Coz was the “only progressive man on the ticket, and as much out of place as an eagle in a crowds nest,”^ Coz felt that party loyalty had to be served, and he campaigned heartily for his ticket.

But this first effort to gain office was to result in the only election defeat Coz ever suffered. Sunning over one hundred votes behind his ticket (in part because of his favorable view of the temperance question), Coz received

o n ly 1079 votes to 2095 for the Democrat and 1966 f o r th e Free Soil party candidates. The other Whig candidates did just as poorly, and their party organ lamented, “The Whigs O have elected nothing.” The death of the party loomed nearer, and its leaders began looking around for some means of salvaging a remnant of their old political power. The result of the introduction of a new b ill into the Senate by Stephen A. Douglas eventually gave them such an opportunity.

In January, 1854, Douglas brought out of committee a bill to organize the area into a territory. It was

^Western Reserve Chronicle. September I5i 1853» P« 2.

^Western Reserve Transcript. October 1 3 , 1853» p. 2. amended (to gain Southern votes) by providing for two territories to be admitted later as states, the question of slavery to be decided by the inhabitants. Provision was also made for repealing the Compromise. The b ill then passed the Senate. The effect was thunderous. Opponents in all parties of the extension of slavery into the territories began to call for local and state conventions to protest the Eansas-Nebraska b ill, as it was now called. In Warren, the Whigs and the Free-Soil organizations called for a mass meeting for February 11, 185^» to denounce the Senate*s action and to call on the House to reject it. The first name on the list of signers was J. Dolson Cox.

At the meeting Cox played a leading role on the Business Committee and in the floor debates, which consisted mostly of hammering out antislavery and Anti-Nebraska resolutions and calling for action on the state level. But it was in the action behind the scenes that the most important event to come from this convention occurred. Although the process is not clear, the editors of the Whig and Free-Soil party organs worked out a plan by which the former would merge with the latter under a joint title, "for we are forced to separate with the South on this single issue. We must determine whether the South w ill be our master and we all be their slaves."9 With the merger of the party papers, the process

9jbid.. February 23, l85^i P. 2. This was this paper's final issue it having merged with the Free-Soil organ to become the Republican organ. 42 of union "between the two parties in Trumbull County now joined sim ilar developments all around the country, and the ground­ work for the formation of the Republican party was being l a i d .

In Ohio, a state convention of the opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska Act had been called for March 22, 1854. Over a thousand men attended and heard Salmon P. Chase speak for the Missouri Compromise and against the extension of slavery.10 Behind-the-scenes movements toward the formation of a new party, in addition to President 's signing of the Nebraska b ill, made the need to call a state convention to nominate state and Congressional candidates opposed to the current Administration seem a necessity. On June 26, 1854, a formal convention was held in Columbus for this as-yet-unnamed party. Coming out with a strong Anti- Nebraska and anti-Administration platform, the new group nominated Judge Joseph R. Swan to lead their ticket as the candidate for the Chief Justice of Ohio. With the help of a strong Anti-Nebraska feeling throughout the state and the campaigning of able men like Chase, Swan, and Cox, this fusion party (made up of Anti-Nebraska Democrats, antislavery Whigs, Know Nothings and others) swept all the state offices and most of the Congressional districts, keeping the Democrats from carrying any of them. With such an auspicious start,

1®Joseph P. Smith, History of the Republican Party in Ohio, (, 18?8), I, ^ “11-15. ------14-3 the new party coTild now look forward to a large role In the future of Ohio and national politics, which by 1855 would take the name Republican.

Cox, seeking to keep the new party in power in Trumbull County by solidifying the bond between its two "wings," the Whigs and the Free-Soilers, took over the position as Associate Editor of the joint party organ, the Western Reserve Chronicle and Transcript. He did so "to keep both wings of the Republican party represented on the editorship of the

Chronicle, to keep a former Whig on the policy-making side of the paper, and to keep watch that the Union run the paper... for a stem and uncompromising war with the aggressions of slavery."^1 Staying on as Associate Editor for the next seven months, Cox did his job well; and when, in April, 1855» the paper’s new owner took over his duties, Cox was sure that his work for unity had been successfully accomplished, and that the Republican party was solidly entrenched in Trumbull County politics.

Cox himself had become firmly established in the party's leadership; and when, in anticipation of the state convention of July 13, 1855» the Republicans of Trumbull County were called to a mass meeting on July 4 to nominate delegates, Cox’s name was listed as a member of the County Republican

l^Western Reserve Chronicle and Transcript, October 18, 1854, p. 2: C e n tra l Committee.On June 23, at a county-wide meeting held to debate the desirability of holding a political meeting on the Fourth of July, a national holiday, Coz spoke for the Republicans, giving a short history of the activities of the Central Committee and the course of the Republican party. He claimed that the use of July 4 for a political meeting would save the farmers time and money, for they could celebrate the holiday and come to the meeting both in the same trip. This argument, despite the opposition of county Democrats, carried favorably, and the original date stood.

On the Fourth, the program was opened with Cox's reading the Declaration of Independence. The program continued with speeches by all the leading district Republicans and the appointment of a committee to choose the delegates to the state convention. Cox, as a member of this committee, played an important part in assuring that Trumbull County's six representatives were "acceptable" on all the important questions. His future law partners, John Hutchins and Robert R atliff, his friends, T. J. McClain and Ralph Plumb, and two others were selected.

At this first convention at which a complete slate of candidates would be nominated, the Ohio Republicans, led by

^% estem Reserve Chronicle, June 13, 1855» P» 2. l^Some authors credit Cox with being a delegate to this convention, but this was not so. 45

John Sherman, Benjamin Cowen, Joshua Glddings, and Lewis D. Campbell, came out in its platform against the extension of slavery, and the violence in Kansas, and in favor of states rights and lower federal government expenditures. Before nominating Salmon P. Chase for governor, the convention also called for a Republican national convention to nominate a

Presidential candidate for I 8 5 6. The new party was already hoping to secure the top office in the land only two years after it had begun, and its chances of success, especially in Ohio, appeared very good.

The state campaign was a hard-fought one, for the Democrats were struggling to regain some of their early prestige, while the Republicans knew that they had to stay in power if they were to win the state in the next presidential election. Jacob D. Cox played an important part in the Western Reserve campaigning, stumping Trumbull County as a representative of the county central committee, and helping to bring in a large Republican vote in the October elections. The party was again swept into power.

In 1 8 5 6, Cox continued his work as a campaigner, this time stumping Trumbull, Ashtabula, and Mahoning Counties in September and October for Congressman Joshua Glddings and for the party’s Presidential candidate, John C. Fremont. Cox, six feet tall, slender in build, with a commanding presence 46 and a musical baritone v oice,used h i s command o f th e language and his knowledge of logic and history to support his case.^^ He was swiftly making a name and a reputation for himself while helping the party, and part of the large majority Giddings received in Cox’s district could be attributed to the speaking skill of this "coming" man who seemed so able and knowledgeable at the young age of twenty- e ig h t.

Continuing his campaign activities in 1857 and 1858, and writing unsigned editorials for the Western Reserve Chronicle on the slavery question, Cox became an even more prominent member of the . But he shied away from running for office because of his unsettled financial status and his desire to establish himself in the legal profession before taking such a step. He felt that if he were to get into politics, he would have to have enough money accumulated so that the low pay he would receive could be supplemented by personal holdings. Since by late 1858 Cox had a wife and five children to support, he hesitated to run for a public office, feeling that he could contribute to the party’s growth and welfare through his work on the central committee. But an event in September, 1858, which was to

l 4 Cochran, "Political Experiences," I, 3 2 6. friend described the carriage rides to these campaign meetings as ones in which "I drove the buggy and he (Cox) supplied the talk and the politics." William Spear to W. C. Cochran, November 22, 1900, Cox Papers. 47 have a far-reaching effect on Ohio politics for the next few years, was also to prove a factor in making Jacob D« Cox a better-known man in Trumbull County and in the Western Reserve and a logical choice as a candidate for a state office.

On September 10, 1858, a deputy United States Marshall along with a group of Kentucky slave-cat chers, who had come to Oberlin to retrieve an alleged fugitive slave, captured a Negro, John Price, and began to take him South with them. A group of 21 Oberlin men and l6 men from Wellington, Ohio (a town directly south of Oberlin), pursued the captors, overtook them, and recaptured the Negro. Anderson Jennings, the leader of the captors, had the "Oberlin Rescuers" indicted by the U. S. Grand Jury for interfering with a lawful practice. The accused rescuers were jailed, and in April, 1859, the first two were tried in the United States district court in Cleveland, convicted, and imprisoned. The two were given light sentences, one for sixty and one for twenty days in jail. The others, awaiting trial in the Cuyahoga County jail, felt that a similar fate awaited them.^^

But this case had not gone unnoticed. Soon after the facts were made public, mass meetings were held in nearly every county of the Western Reserve denouncing the Fugitive Slave Act and the court's decisions in the matter. A Reserve-wide meeting was held in Cleveland on May 24, 1859,

^^Cochran, "Political Experiences," I, 396-8. 48 and over 10,000 people came to hear the federal government, its fugitive slave legislation, and the decisions of its courts denounced. Jacob D. Cox, a delegate from Trumbull County and a member of the meeting’s Committee on Permanent Organization, spoke for the conservatives who felt that the Oberlin sympathizers should take only legal means to redress their grievances by gaining control of the state and national legislatures through the ballot box. The convention followed this more cautious approach, "exhibiting a pronounced states* rights viewpoint, criticizing the life tenure of federal court * s proceedings in the case," while advocating "steps to 17 help the prisoners' defense."

The strength which the opponents had shown was probably the major factor in the eventual compromise ironed out by the lawyers on both sides, for soon after the had voted 3 to 2 to back the U. S. D istrict Court decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act, all the remaining charges against the rescuers were dropped and they were freed. But the issues involved were to remain partisan ones because the question of the "higher law" had now been contested, and the stand of both parties had become even more solidified than before. The Ohio Republicans now more than ever became united against the Fugitive Slave Act and what they felt was an endless series of

^^Eugene H. Roseboom, The Civil War Era. 1850-1873, V. 4 of Carl Wittke, ed.. The History of the State of Ohio (Columbus, 1944), p. 349, ^9 compromises with the Southern slaveholders. In the whole state by i 8 6 0, "the Western Reserve had become the center of radical T8 Republi cani sm."

In Trumbull and Mahoning, two of the more radical Western Reserve counties, the nominees for state offices in 1859 would have to be very strong antislavery men. On July 27,

1 8 5 9f the Western Reserve Chronicle called the county Republicans to the Senate nominating convention to be held at Niles, Ohio (a town near Warren), on August 22. The paper later mentioned four men as suitable candidates for the nomination: Levi Sutliff, George F, Brown, Charles W. Smith, and Cyrus Bosworth—all strong party supporters. But when the balloting began on August 22, these four were joined by a surprise candidate, Jacob D. Coz.^9 Seven delegates from Mahoning County, who felt that of a ll the Trumbull County candidates Cox was the only one Mahoning could support, joined together on the first ballot to vote for Cox. The second ballot found Cox gaining strength, going from sixth place to a tie for first with 24 votes. The third ballot proved the proverbial charm, and Cox received 55 votes conipared to 27 for Samuel Quimby, 8 for Brown, and one for 20 Sutliff. The non-candidate, who had not campaigned for

^®George H. Porter, Ohio Politics During the Civil War P e rio d . (New York, 1 911), p . I 3 . had refused, a few weeks before, to permit his name to be used because of the press of business at a time when he was taking on a new partner. 20 See the Western Reserve Chronicle, August 24, 1859, p. 2. 50 himself,was now offered a high post in the party. William Spear, Cox*s young law partner, rode from the convention to Warren to bring Cox the news and to take him back to Niles. Cox, who had just formed his newest law firm and had felt that he should stay in Warren to build it up before he went into politics, was convinced by Spear on the way to. Niles that he should accept the nomination. The warm welcome he received in Niles, his sense of duty, his growing ambitions, and his feeling that since the office had come to him unsought, he had to accept it, all helped to make his decision an affirmative one. Addressing the assembly as its candidate, he thanked the delegates for their support and promised a determined effort to labor for the party*s cause.

Cox was a very popular candidate. The Cleveland Herald called him "a young man, a hearty and sincere member of the Old Whig party, who is extremely popular wherever he is known.And the Western Reserve Chronicle said of him: "A man with a popularity second to no man in this D istrict. A finished scholar, an eloquent orator, a ready debater with a keen wit and indefatigable industry."^3 His friend Garfield felt: "I promise myself great satisfaction in making your

^^The Chronicle said, "He has reason to feel highly flattered by this testimonial of the estimate in which he is held by the people of the district, for it was the spontaneous act of the delegates themselves without any solicitation whatever on his part or that of his friends. August 24, 1859» p . 2. Z^Cleveland Herald. August 25» 1859, P« 2.

23Western Reserve Chronicle, August 24, 1859» p. 2. 51 acquaintance in Coltunbus, I can think of no one with whom I can work better.With such recommendations and with the opportunity of being able to campaign against the Fugitive Slave law and the extension of slavery in two Western Heserve counties, Cox was fairly assured of a resounding victory. When in October the voters of the state elected a large Republican majority to the state legislature and William Dennison, the Republican gubernatorial candidate, Cox was swept into office, soundly defeating William Abbott, the

Democratic candidate, 3160 to 1751* Obviously proud of his victory and himself, Cox in somewhat egotistical terms spoke of it later: "It spoke volumes for the character of our people that when the danger of armed collision had become imminent, they still chose intelligent leaders to guide the storm who were professionally men of peace.His popularity in the district and its Republican proclivities had combined to put him into the State Senate, a position which he felt rightfully belonged to one of his character and abilities (Cox always thought a lot of himself). It was from this springboard that his later career was to reach its f r u i t i o n .

oil J. D. Cox to James A. Garfield, August 3 0 , 18 5 9, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress.

D. Cox, Oration at the Dedication of the Garfield Memorial, May. 30, I 8 9 0, p . 14. CHAPTER V

THE OHIO SENATOR

The few weeks between the election and the beginning of the regular session the following January were usually quiet ones for new legislators. But this was a different time, when both North and South were becoming inflamed over every public issue concerned with slavery. Thus the Oberlin rescue was s till fresh in most peoples* minds when, a few days after the Ohio elections, the news of John Brown's raid at Harper's Perry became known. Once again the passions of the country were aroused as the sectional controversy reached a new peak. In almost every state legislature. Democratic representatives began calling for Brown's execution and repressive measures to keep such invasions and disturbances under control.^ It was in this atmosphere that the new session of the Ohio legislature opened on January 2, i860.

Jacob D. Cox arrived in Columbus on December 30 with James Garfield, and they began "boarding with Mr. Bascom,

^See Clement Eaton, A History of the Southern Confederacy. (New York, 195^) # P-

52 53 chairman of the Central Republican Committee, two squares from the State House” and sharing the same room and bed.^ These two, now fast friends, usually joined James Monroe, a professor at Oberlin and a friend (later brother-in-law) of Cox, in their daily walks to the Senate. The three new Senators (Monroe had been a State Representative), who sat together because of the contiguity of their districts, soon came to be known as the "radical triumvirate", leaders of the in the Senate, Only eleven of the thirty-five Senators had ever served before and only two were reelected from the previous Senate, and in such a situation, young, aggressive, and intelligent Republicans (they had a majority of 25 to 10 in the Senate and 58 to 46 in the House) could move up to power swiftly; and Monroe, Garfield, and Cox did exactly that.

Cox's two friends were as different in character and temperament as two Republicans could be. Garfield was a man of "strong physical constitution, with a vigorous, impulsive nature, full of animal spirits. He loved humor and was always jovial."3 Monroe was a more conservative type, "the b rillian t model of what we younger men might hope to become,"^

Zjames A. Garfield to Lucy Garfield, December 31» 1859* as quoted in Theodore Clark Smith, The Life and Letters of James A. Garfield, (New Haven, 1925), I, 144. ^J. D. Cox, "The Youth and Early Manhood of General James A. Garfield," Oration, Reunion of the Army of the Cumberland, 1882, p. l4. D. Cox, "Public Life of James Monroe," Memorial of the Honorable James Monroe, October 30, 1898, p. 3» 54 wrote Cox. Unemotional and professorial in manner, he was the perfect man for cooling the emotions of hot-blooded radicals like Garfield, Cox had elements of both men's characters, and was, to Garfield, "very much a man, though I could wish he were a little more demonstrative," Each added an important part to an "association" which proved "mutually agreable and beneficial."^

The three friends were sitting together when their first session opened with retiring Governor Salmon P. Chase's annual message on January 2. Calling for the repeal of the "visible admixture" law (which made having dark skin a practical cancellation of anyone's voting rights) and the reenactment of the state's personal liberty law, the future Senator and Chief Justice also promised not to allow Ohioans to invade any other state, nor let men of other states invade Ohio.^ The shadow of John Brown thus reached Ohio?, and the legislature would now have to formulate Ohio's policy on this latest outbreak of sectional controversy.

^Garfield to Austin, February 5» i860, as quoted in Smith, Life and Letters. II, l48. Cox felt even more strongly of his association with Garfield, saying, prophetically, "This past winter has thrown links about us which w ill not easily be broken, and both our lives w ill have a somewhat different coloring hereafter," Cox to Garfield, April 4, I860, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, ^Porter, Ohio Politics, p. 28. ^Governor Wise of Virginia had threatened to send troops to any state to chase after invaders or rescuers of the John Brown ilk. See Porter, Ohio Politics, pp. 28-9. 55

Yet, this would have to wait for the more formal matters of organizing the Senate and House. On January 6 the Senate*8 committees were named, with Cox being placed on the committees on agriculture, the judiciary, the library, universities, and the evils resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquors, and being named chairman of the joint rules committee. When this was done, Cox began his formal work as a legislator, presenting his first bills on January 25 (to regulate the responsibilities of innkeepers). In addition, he voted with the rest of the Republicans who elected Salmon Chase to the Senate on February 1.

But the attention of the State Senate and the whole state that first month was centered on the first b ill introduced into the Senate, Senator Harrison*s "Sedative B ill." Designed to keep Ohio "invaders" from setting foot in another state or providing arms for a m ilitary expedition against another state, it was an obvious attempt by the Senate Democrats to conciliate the South for the harm John Brown had caused.® Referred to a select committee of two conservatives and James Monroe, the b ill was reported out favorably, but with Monroe*s minority report calling the b ill unnecessary and an admission that Ohioans were planning such actions. Backing up this stand in the long and strenuous debate that followed, Cox gave his first lengthy political

Q Ohio Senate Journal. 54th General Assembly, First Session, i860, p. 5. 56 speech, denouncing the b ill on February 6. Decrying it as truckling to slave states which had recently cast out Ohio citizens simply because they were from the North (his friend J. A. R. Rogers was one), Cox called on the South to protect Ohioans before Ohio protected her neighbors. He then moved that the b ill be postponed, and this carried I 8-I 5 . I t was never returned again.

Senate Democrats tried other measures early in the session to repress the "irrepressible conflict" such as "forbidding the settlement of free colored persons in the state."9 But this and others like it were overridden by the large Republican majority, and were even contradicted by Republican measures to reenact a personal liberty law (which passed) and to repeal the "visible admixture" law (which failed because conservative Republicans voted against it).10

Such measures began to draw a line between proslavery and antislavery Senators, and the refusal by Governor Dennison to return three fugitives from Southern states who had fled to Ohio after being accused of trying to incite a slave rebellion, simply added to the growing tensions.

^Western Reserve Chronicle, January 18, i860, p. 2. This statement is contained in a letter to the editor entitled "Columbus Correspondence" and signed "C". It can be assumed from internal evidence in this and other such "C" letters in the same newspaper that their author was Jacob Dolson Cox, l^Cox called these Republicans "factions," and said "Let the people condemn them." "C" letter. Western Reserve Chronicle, February 8, ].86o,p . 2. l^See Porter, Ohio Politics, pp. 38-42. 57

Senator Cox, who, along with Monroe and Garfield, voted solidly Republican in a ll such matters, was also working on more mundane legislation in the meantime. Doing an immense amount of work in his committees, and especially the Judiciary Committee (which was called the "Slaughter House" because it cut out nine of every ten bills presented to it)12, Cox found little time to present many bills of his own, and only offered a few, such as one defining the powers and duties of civil court officers and another regulating incorporated companies in Ohio. Working for these and his committee's bills, including those to erect a new institution for the deaf and dumb and to regulate the supreme and district courts in Ohio, he also offered petitions from his constituents against the kidnapping of black men and for striking out the word "white" from the state constitution to allow blacks to vote. But Cox was used to hard work, and he was a frequent speaker on the floor, devoting himself to an effort to see that only what he considered just legislation passed the Senate. He spoke against the special privileges granted in a prospective b ill to the buyers of companies (it failed); he advocated the passage of a b ill to give married women the power to own their own property (it passed)13, and in general he proved himself to be a "radical" on questions concerning human rights.

12 h q ii letter. Western Reserve Chronicle, January 25, i 8 6 0, p . 2. ^^See Ohio Senate Journal. 54th General Assembly, First Session, i860. 58

Such hard work "behind the scenes and on the Senate floor usually went unnoticed by the local reporters, because it was their custom to "write up" only their friends and "drinking buddies." Cox, who did not smoke or drink, nor was very outgoing or apt to make new friends because of his reserved manner, nevertheless received a large amount of genuine praise from party organs in Lorain, Hamilton, and Franklin counties, a ll of which stamped him as a "coming man" in the party. His activities in the month of îdarch were to prove such sentiments justified.

On March 1 Cox was present at the state Republican convention which elected the delegates to the Republican Presidential convention. Working with the other radical delegates, he helped pass a resolution urging the convention to choose Chase as its candidate. A few days later he joined with the Senate radicals to try to block the call of an extra legislative session the next January, but their side was defeated. A few days after that Governor Dennison, in a gesture intended as a compliment, appointed him a Brigadier General in the Ohio m ilitia. Then, just before the session ended on March 26, Cox, urged on by his friends, resolved to become a candidate for State Attorney General at the June 13 convention. Thus in one month his m ilitary career was begun, his sights were set on higher political office, and his power among the party’s radicals was solidified. The door to fame was beginning to open. 59

Late in March Cox and Garfield took a stagecoach hack to their homes, all the while discussing the past session and Cox's attempt to become Attorney General, as they were always prone to do, but probably making little reference to Cox's new generalship. But soon after Cox arrived in Warren, he was reminded of his new role when, atfc a reception at John Hutchins's home, planned in honor of the "general”, his friends in a light-hearted mood gave witty speeches about the hero of the "Battle of Bed Bun," and the "Crossing of the Mahoning," and presented him with copies of old m ilitary manuals and works on strategy and training.C heerfully accepting the books and their satire in a good-humored way, Cox thanked his friends for their thoughtfulness. But he also spoke in deep earnestness of the chance that he might have to make use of the books and become an active general. He had seen first hand the political strife the differences between North and South were causing, and he knew that Southern threats to secede if a Bepublican were elected President just might be followed up—and he told them that this might mean war.^^

^^The books were 1. an old edition of U. S. Army Begulations; 2. Mueller's Field ^gineer (I 76O); 3 . F o rb e s 's Manual for Patriotic Volunteers (1855). See note 1 5 . ^^This account comes from Cochran, "Political Experiences," pp. 483-^. He was probably present at this r e c e p tio n . 60

But the chance of war was not as strong then as It would be a year after, and Cox soon put such thoughts aside^^ and began his strategy to gain the Attorney General*s nomination. He and his friends arranged with his landlord, W, T, Bascom, who was also editor of the Ohio State Journal, to have a recommendation of him for that office printed in that paper and for Bascom to use his influence in the party's inner circles. Cox's friends also had the Cincinnati Commercial's editor write an article endorsing Cox. Cox did his part by writing to Garfield, telling him of these events, enlisting his support, and asking him to ask his friend Benedict of the Cleveland Herald to "write it up once Bascom does."^7 He later wrote to Monroe for help, saying, "our relations lead me to presume upon your being inclined to aid me by a good word with those delegates from your county, He was clearly becoming more ambitious as his political career lengthened.

As he waited for the convention to decide the nomination, Cox mused openly in his letters about the office and.his relation to it. Although a believer in the idea of the office

^^ut he never put it too far aside, for, as his stepson tells us, he read and studied all of his new books and bought two more, Hardee's Bifle and Light Infantry Tactics, and Jomini's Grand M ilitary OperationsT Cochran, ^'Political Experiences," pp. 484-^.

^^Cox to Garfield, April 4, i860, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress l^Cox to Monroe, April 27, i860, James Monroe Papers, Oberlin College Archives. 61 seeking the man and not vice versa, and although it seems clear that his friends (like Bascom and Dennison) were the instigators of this movement and began it without his knowledge, the young Senator s till sought the office openly, feeling "ambition is strong in a democracy...and it is natural that men situated as I should reflect on these matters. Youthful ambition and the chance to move quickly up the political ladder had combined with his friends* persuasion to overcome Coz's natural inhibitions and make "it almost a necessity to go forward and try" his "luck with the convention."20 But he also wondered if he was capable of doing the job well, "especially in reference to the manner in which" he "should fill it...and as for being Attorney General and meeting the best lawyers of the state," he felt astonished at his tem erity.21 Though he was not yet sure of himself, he resolved to prepare himself for the office as best he could.

This preparation went on during the next month while Cox, never an extremely energetic mAi, left most of the work to the party newspapers and his friends while he kept himself active in Trumbull county politics. He kept in constant contact with Garfield, asking him how he thought the movement was going and, later, asking him to speak for him at the

^^Cox to Garfield, April 25, i860, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 2®Cox to Monroe, April 27, i860, Monroe Papers, Oberlin College Archives.

21cox to Garfield, April 25, i860, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 62 convention.Cox, who couldn’t attend because of a will suit he had to handle, was probably better off for not going, for his lack of energy in seeking the nomination and his attitude that "as to the Attorneyship I have very little feeling...it would be more of a pleasure to win than to lose, but if I lose 1*11 retain many remembrances of friendship"^^ had made his candidacy lose some of its strength. At the convention his name was placed in nomination, but he received only fifty-two votes on the first ballot, fourth among the eight contestants. Probably under Cox’s instructions, Garfield then withdrew his name, and his chances were gone.^^ Thus ended his first attempt at state office^^; but he had learned some valuable lessons in defeat as to how not to campaign and the way party nominations were gained, and this was to be a valuable aid in the future.

During his campaign for the Attorney Generalship Cox spent most of his time catching up on the business his partner had had to handle while he was in Columbus. After his defeat,

22gee th e l e t t e r s from Cox to G a rfie ld on May 29» June 2, and June 9» i860, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of C ongress.

^^Cox to Garfield, June 9, i860, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. ph Smith, Ohio Republicans, p. 124. Z^Cox was not extremely downcast by his loss, feeling "on the whole, it is best as it is. I was spoken of in better terms than I deserved. As to the job, I feared it would be a pecuniary incumbrance which I could ill afford now." Cox to Garfield, June 16, i860, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of C ongress. 63 his business back in order, Cox moved into the national political campaign in Trumbull County. On June 9 he helped form a county Republican club pledged to help the nominees and to meet weekly to sing campaign songs and hear speeches by Republican office holders. In his role as State Senator, Cox spoke almost every week, using typical campaign rhetoric. But this was an unusual campaign, and as it wore on, the topics changed, and the possibility of secession and war put a completely new cast on it.

Lincoln's nomination was met with much rejoicing by the moderate Republicans, and later, when the Democrats split into two factions, many became sure of victory. But the way in which the Democrats split, with the Southern "fire-eaters" breaking away over sectional issues and slavery, should have given Republicans some foreboding of future events. They had often heard Southern threats of secession if a Republican were elected President, and now, with the Democratic vote sure to be split, that possibility loomed larger. The entrance of John Bell into the race had made Lincoln's election almost inevitable and the chances for secession even greater.

But such threats by the South that they would secede had been made again and again over the years since I 8 1 9, and they had always compromised. Many felt that there was no reason not to expect that compromise could be used again, most likely in Congress. The South would be reminded of its control of the Supreme Court and the Senate, its ability to 64 veto any legislation it felt contrary to its best interests, and the lack of great power in the presidential office. They would then be given some of their demands, the constitution might be rewritten, and the country would go on as it had after 1820 and 1850. Such was what many people hoped would happen, and this kept most from opening the issue of sectional differences during the campaign.

J. D. Cox was no exception, although he knew war was a possibility and he had already begun preparing for it. He viewed the Democrats split happily, rejoicing that "absolute confusion and anarchy reign in the camp of the Democracyl"^^ While he campaigned he made no mention of the chance for secession or war, rather stressing the fact that the Republicans had promised not to interfere with slavery where it already existed and only opposed its further extension into the territories.2? Not even to his close friend Garfield did he mention the possible result of a Republican victory, pQ saying only that that victory seemed certain.

But after the election and the first moves by South Carolina toward secession, the realization that the South would not compromise so swiftly this time (and perliaps

Cox to Garfield, July 13, i860, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. ^^See the Western Reserve Chronicle, August 29, i860, P • 2 • po Cox to Garfield, October 17, i860, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, 65

not at all) put a new light on things. Cox too began to fear the effect of "the crazy excitement of the Southern mind, '• and feel "it cannot be many months before the fire-eaters of the South w ill be either out of the Union or content to obey Mr. Lincoln within it." He was slowly becoming "so exasperated with their bullying determination to rule or ruin" that he preferred that they stay out a while. But if "any trouble arises with the Hotspurs of the South, we shall probably remain in session until Ohio has done her whole duty. that duty, although Cox could not yet be sure of it, was to help provide men and weapons for the bloodiest war in American h i s t o r y .

29cox to J. A. R. Rogers, November 29, i860, Cox Papers. CHAPTER VI

THE ROAD TO WAR

The days between the election and the new year were hectic ones all over the country, but especially in the South. The vote for Lincoln had already stirred South Carolina to call a special convention and. on December 20, i860, declare itself out of the Union. The other states of the lower South were also contemplating such conventions, and some had already set dates for them. All over that section feeling for the new movement for independence and the Southern way of life was becoming stronger. A political crisis was coming to a head.

In the North and in Congress there were varying reactions. Some newspapers called for letting the South go, others felt they had no right to leave, and still others wanted to use compromise and conciliation once again to try to keep th e Union intactThe variance of opinion in Congress was the same; but there, the historic home of compromise, the conciliators led the way in seeking some solution. The offering of the Crittenden Compromise and the use of committees of 13 and

^See Howard H. Quint, Dean Albertson, and Milton Cantor, eds.. Main Problems in American History, (Homewood, Illin o is, 1964), I, 444-8, for examples of such feelings.

66 67

33 from the Senate and House were the major attempts to iron out the sectional differences, but their efforts and those of all others failed to gain the majority needed for passage, and Congress soon became deadlocked and unable to act. In this situation, the Northern state legislatures attempted to step into the breach.

In the Ohio legislature the first such move was Governor Denni son * s annual message in January 9i l86l. As was the accepted custom, he devoted a large part of his remarks to the national political scene. Although he opposed the moves of the Southern states toward secession, he still called for reconciliation through compromise and by granting some of their demands. He also called on the legislature to repeal the state*s Personal Liberty Law if and when the Fugitive Slave law were modified to get rid of some of its more obnoxious sections.^ Thus the leader of the state Republicans came out publicly for conciliation. Both parties then went into caucus to see if either could come to agree on a party policy.

The Democrats, in a minority and easily united, came out with a plan which called on the legislature to endorse the Crittenden compromise and seek a national constitutional convention to amend the constitution. The Republicans, divided into conservaEbives and radicals, took four days to agree on a set of nine compromise resolutions which favored preserving the Union, non-interference in any state's internal matters, and

^Porter, Ohio Politics, p. 5 6. 68 the repealing of the Personal Liberty Law. Offered to the legislature on January 13» they all were carried by a large majority, despite Democratic attempts to amend them to be more conciliatory, Jacob D. Cox, the good party man, joined in passing these resolutions.

But throughout the early part of this session Cox was nevertheless trying to place the Republicans on the side of non-compromise. He felt a tinge of contempt and distrust for those whom he saw as “union-savers”, especially among the Republicans, who would do anything to keep the Union intact. He felt the Democratic resolutions were so overdrawn and compromising that they sacrificed the State»s honor.3 He thought integrity was involved in such matters, and that it could never be sacrificed, even at the cost of war. He even went so far in the opposite direction as to offer, on January 11, a resolution that the m ilitia committee make an accounting of Ohio’s holdings in arms and its needs to "put Ohio in a reasonable condition of preparation for any possible e x ig e n c ie s which may a r is e .I n addition he joined a company of forty legislators to practice drilling and the use of weapons.^ Cox knew war might come, and he was going to be

%enry H. Simms, Ohio Politics on the Eve of Conflict, Ohio Civil War Centennial Commission publication no. 4, Columbus, 1961, p . 14. ^Ohio Senate Journal. 54th General Assembly, Second S e ssio n , 1861, p . 16

^James A. Garfield to Lucy Garfield, January 1 3 , I 86I , as quoted in Smith, Life and Letters. I, 152. 69 prepared for It, but he wouldn't compromise his principles to d e te r i t .

But most of the legislators felt differently, and all through the session conservatives of both parties presented a series of b ills designed to repeal Ohio laws obnoxious to the South, especially concerning the Fugitive Slave act. In reaction, the radicals, led by Cox and Garfield, moved to thwart them. Such opposition was successful early in the session, and b ills to compel the Governor to surrender fugitives from justice and those assisting runaway slaves were killed. But as the situation became more tense and fears of war grew, their power diminished. The final vote on the sending of delegates to the Virginia convention and the passage of an anti-amalgamation b ill signalled the decline of radical power and the triumph of the compromisers.

Cox strongly opposed these actions. After returning to Columbus on January 2? (he had gone home on leave because of his wife*8 difficulty in giving birth to their fifth c h ild , William Brewster), Cox had become the leader of the opposition to such "union-saver s.” On January 25 Governor Dennison communicated to the legislature the call by the Virginia legislature for her sister states to select delegates to a national peace conference in Washington, and a few days later the debate on it began. After failing to secure the passage of a substitute resolution, which would have substantially reduced the power of the delegates, and after voting for 70

Garfield’s motion that the delegates not go until after Lincoln’s inauguration (which also failed), Cox rose and gave his opinion of compromise in one of the most important speeches of his life.

Stamping himself from the start as an out-and-out radical, Cox said, "I feel this convention is an impolitic thing full of peril rather than promise,...and too much like the irregular and revolutionary conventions of the South to be safe.... It has no advantage over Congress as a body for doing the same work. It is not a fair representation of all the people." Further, "the great question of public policy which now divides the country is the extension of the slave system. The Republicans oppose it. The treason and rebellion abettors oppose us and say no! Having held power so long, they feel a divine right to rule and refuse to surrender the reins. If we let them amend the Constitution, we begin the precedent that the administration shall be determined not by the election, but the arms of rebellious factions. We can have no compromise with armed rebels. War may come with all its horrors, but to a free people there may be worse evils than war. Slavery is hideous and if we betray our trust and consent to new constitutional guarantees, we extend that terrible curse. To do so would only prolong the bitterness and strife and bequeath to the next generation a fiercer struggle."^ Clearly Cox was

^This speech was given on January 30, l86l, and is quoted in full in a clipping from an unnamed newspaper in Helen Cox’s scrapbook no. 1, Cox Papers. 71 adamant in his stand against compromise and bending to the Southern w ill, and he now declared himself ready to face the consequences of that stand.

But few other Republicans felt so strongly. In the party caucus called to determine a stand on this issue, the radicals called for the delegates to be appointed by the Governor and for a delay in the conference until April 4. But some of the conservatives, in a "glorious Union-Saving mood"7 joined with the Democrats to agree on a compromise set of delegates to be sent with no instructions. Then, despite the attempt of Cox and Garfield to amend the resolution, the final vote on the entire matter came up on February 4, the sentiment for conciliation was so overwhelming that the Senate favored it 30-3, with only F. D. Parish joining the two young radicals in opposition. Cox, in an angry mood, wrote his wife, "the union-saving spirit makes men crazy here and some seem inclined to throw away everything, and honor first o f a ll." ®

Not emotional by nature, Cox slowly began to become more and more aroused against the compromisers and the South. He saw the conciliators as Southern pawns to whom "to abandon Fort Sumter, give half the navy to South Carolina, and half the

7 "C" letter. Western Reserve Chronicle, February 6. 1861, p. 2. ®Cox to Helen Cox, February 4, l86l, Papers, Avery Library, Columbia University. 72 territories to the South would be no dose at a ll."9 He felt that the honor of the North and, ooncommitantly, his own honor were being questioned by giving in to Southern demands. Of course Southerners were sim ilarly appealing to the "honor" of the South and no compromise on their basic principles, and many on both sides now felt war was to be preferred to dishonor.

But not all of the Ohio Senate's time was taken up with considering the secession crisis. When Lincoln appointed Senator Chase Secretary of the Treasury, a vacancy in the Senate from Ohio occurred, and the various candidates began maneuvering for Republican caucus votes, Cox, feeling "that the radical Republicans w ill support Governor Dennison,"^® became, along with Garfield and Attorney General Christopher Wolcott, his campaign manager. The Governor, somewhat like Cox in his aloofness and aristocratic bent, had taken Cox and Garfield under his wing from the first, and the three had become fast friends. When the Senate nomination came up, Cox and Garfield, feeling a radical should represent Ohio at this crucial time, joined to work for Dennison, Unfortunately, "union-saving" again became a factor in ruining their plans.

The three major Republican candidates were Dennison, , and Robert C, Schenck, The party conservatives, undecided between the latter two, were distressed when Dennison took the lead in the early balloting, Sherman's withdrawal

9"c" letter. Western Reserve Chronicle, February 6, l86l, p, 2, lOlbid.. p, 2. 73 after the twenty-sixth ballot seemed to assure Dennison*s nomination, but the former's representatives (according to Cox's account)!! split their votes among other candidates and then began to vote for Sherman again on a later ballot to make it appear that the conservatives favored him. But this failed, and the caucus adjourned after forty-eight ballots without a decision. The next day, despite radical pressures, the conservatives won the day, and on the seventy-eighth ballot Sherman was nominated. A day later his formal election took p la c e .

Cox, who was also to play an important role in Sherman's next two Senatorial nominations, was visibly disturbed by the result, and would have liked "it better if he were more decidedly radical, for in these days of anarchy, the doubting and conservative minds are the most likely to ruin us."!^ But he accepted the result and returned to the Senate's regular business to renew his fight against compromise.

After the election, the legislature's Democrats, having seen seven states secede and others teetering on the brink, still insisted on proposing bills to try to close the nation's wounds. One offered, on April 2, a joint resolution calling on Ohio to accept the decisions which the Virginia convention

! ! " C " letter. Western Reserve Chronicle, March 20, I86l, p . 2. 12f(Qii letter. Western Reserve Chronicle, March 27, 186l, p. 2. 74 had come to (but which had not been accepted by Congress), but this motion was tabled and killed. Other similar efforts were also lost^3 because they were useless in the face of the inaction of Congress and the President. But this didn't mean that b ills which pointed the other way, toward state defense, would be approved either, and a b ill to buy a small supply of fixed ammunition for the state arsenal's magazine was the subject of a warm debate before it was defeated.^4 The Ohio legislature, like Congress, was deadlocked, and all anyone could do was wait for something to happen which would make the decision for them.

J. D. Cox was also waiting, impatient with the delay and hoping for action. He was living "in the hope and prayer that we may soon have an announcement from Washington of some determined and statesmanlike policy. The people need a trumpet-toned call to the path of honor, of self-respect, and of patriotic duty—God grant the demoralizing delay may not c o n tin u e long.His exaggerated sense of honor and duty now began to compel him to look forward to a war. In preparation for it he and Garfield began using their adjoining rooms in their boarding-house to read Cox's m ilitary books and discuss

^^Although one, a joint resolution calling for a constitutional amendment protecting slaves within Southern states did pass.

14 hq,( letter. Western Reserve Chronicle. April 3» 1861, p. 2.

1 5 hc« letter. Western Reserve Chronicle,, April 10, l86l, p. 2. 75 the many aspects of strategy and topography they would have to know In a war. With Cox translating Jomlni and his other French m ilitary books for Garfield and the two young Senators discussing their usefulness in an American war,^^ they soon became convinced of their readiness to be officers.

It was during the time they were studying that the fact that they would have m ilitary careers was assured. On Friday, the twelfth of April, 186l, the Senate was in session, trying to go on in the ordinary routine of business, but with a sense of anxiety and strain...the gathering of an army on the sands opposite Ft. Sumter was really war, and if a hostile gun were fired, we knew it would mean the end of all effort at arrangement... Suddently a Senator came in from the lobby in an excited way and exclaimed *the telegraph announces that the secessionists are bombarding Ft. Sumter.' The war had begun, and in the Ohio Senate "the gloomy thought that civil war had begun in our own land" overshadowed everything.^?

Cox was almost overjoyed that his long wait had ended and war had finally come. He had no doubt of the righteousness of the Northern cause. He wrote; "We must face the grave fact that war exists by the act of the insurgent disunionists. We cannot live in peace with the South until we have proof that we are as superior in arms as we are in the arts. We must

James A. Garfield to J. H. Rhodes, April 10, I86l, as quoted in Smith, Life and Letters. I, l60. ^?J. D. Cox, M ilitary Reminiscences of the Civil War. (New York, 1900 ) , 1,"% =?:— ------76 crush all opposition as effectually and as finally as one would crush an egg-shell.”^® "The very groundwork of repuhlicanism— the right to enforce a fair interpretation of the Constitution through the election of a President"^? had been threatened by the South, and that war was preferable to its sacrifice. This feeling, combined with his youthful exuberance and devotion to honor and duty helped him to justify the war in his mind and decide to take part in it.

In the Ohio Senate, meanwhile, the news of Sumter had been followed by an adjournment to await Lincoln's reaction. But the next day Ohio's war preparations began when the Senate re-passed a bill to enroll the State's m ilitia. Then another act, to better organize the m ilitia, was also passed. The next day Governor Dennison, hoping to make such war legislation more unified, called in Garfield and Cox to discuss his policy and the type of legislation needed. They decided to proceed to arm and equip the m ilitia and to ask the legislature for the authority to borrow half a million dollars for this purpose. With Garfield heading the drive to pass these requests on the floor and Cox staying in Dennison's office as his unofficial Chief of Staff, the legislature unanimously voted for their requests, appropriating $450,000 for arms purchases and

iSiiQd letter, (dated April 13» 186l), Western Reserve Chronicle. April 17, 1861, p. 2,

^^Cox, M ilitary Reminiscences, vol. 1, p, 2, 77 equipment, $500,000 for carrying into effect Lincoln*s request for Ohio's quota of 75»000 volunteers, and $50,000 for contingent funds. It also allowed for the borrowing of $750,000 for the necessities of war.^® Further m ilitary legislation was passed until the end of the session in May as the spirit of patriotism and loyalty overcame even the Democrats* party loyalty.

J. D. Cox was doing his part in the war effort. Because of his Brigadier General*s commission and his intimacy with Governor Dennison, he was called upon by the governor for such assistance as he could render in the first enrollment of the Ohio quota. He thus gave most of his time to such m ilitary matters as the governor a p p o i n t e d ,and handled Dennison's official correspondence with Washington and Ohio's agents to buy m ilitary equipment.Working for long hours to prepare Ohio for her "duty", Cox showed fine executive ability and his m ilitary reading proved an invaluable aid. But his mind was not wholly centered on his job, for he and Garfield were at the same time debating an important subject upon which both would have to make a stand.

They had often talked since the presidential election of their personal duty in case of war, but in the days after

2®See the Ohio Senate Journal. 5^th General Assembly, Second Session, April 15-lW, Ibbl, pp. 200-302, and Porter, Ohio Politics, pp. 75-7 for a summary of these bills. Z^Cox, M ilitary Reminiscences. I, 8. 22 See Aaron F. Perry, "A Chapter in Interstate Diplomacy," Sketches of War History. Cincinnati, I 8 9 0, p . 346. 78

Sumter their discussions became more serious. They were agreed that their activity in the organizing and support of the Republican party made the duty of supporting the government by m ilitary service peculiarly u r g e n t . ^3 But Garfield, feeling he himself was physically strong enough to go, tried to deter his friend from the same course because of Cox*s frail and slender physical make-up, his recent attack of diptheria, and his family of a wife and six children. But Cox assured him that his constitution was elastic enough to recover from physical ailments quickly. The last argument was really the only one which held any weight with him, but he felt "I believe I can be of service as an officer and it is my duty to serve. I believe my family would be better off if I left behind the reputation of a man who died for his country than if I be called a c o w a r d . "2^ Seeing that Cox was adamant in his resolve, Garfield accepted Cox*s decision and joined him in further preparation for war.

Cox was soon called into active service. On April 23 he was officially named Brigadier General of Ohio Volunteers, and

23cox, M ilitary Reminiscences. I, 6-7. ph Cochran, "Political Experiences," p. 538. His wife was not too happy (at the time) about this decision, for "she never forgave him for going into the war without consulting her. She said 'he had no right to make that decision alone. He left me with little children to support alone. I, not he should have made that decision.* But, she added proudly, *0f course I would have told him to go.*" Note on page 602 of Cochran's work by Mary Rudd Cochran, his daughter and Cox's granddaughter, containing her recollections of a conversation with Helen Cox some years after the war. 79 a few days later was sent by Dennison to meet George B. McClellan, whom the governor had decided upon to lead Ohio's troops, at the Columbus railroad station. When McClellan arrived, he and Cox hurried immediately to the State House where Dennison briefed McClellan on the state's poor preparation and its needs for war and formally offered him the Major Generalship. McClellan accepted and then, wishing to assess the state's situation for himself, requested Cox to go with him the next day to personally inspect the state arsenal. The few rusted, damaged, and outdated pieces they found there were very discouraging and caused McClellan to remark, "a fine stock of munitions on which to begin a great war.”

But there was no time for worrying about equipment, and so the two generals returned to the State House and began preparing schedules and estimates of the needs of Ohio's 10,000 troops who were soon to be sent into the field. This took two days, and in their spare moments Cox and McClellan discussed strategy and the probable movements Ohio troops would have to make. Cox, who had been put in charge of the depot of recruits in north Columbus, Camp Jackson, then was sent by McClellan to look over possible camp-sites for training Ohio's volunteers. His trip on this mission and his role as a m ilitary instructor began the next phase of his career as a m ilitary man.

^^Cox, M ilitary Reminiscences, I, 9-10. CEàPTEB V II

FBOH KANAVHà TO KANÂWBA

On April 29, 1861, Brigadier-General Cox le ft Colnmbue with the Eleventh and half of the Third Ohio Begiments for Camp Dennison, «here he was to take command of the troop training. This camp, which he and Captain (later General) William Bosecrans had picked out as a suitable area a few days earlier, was situated just north of Cincinnati in a long, level field. When his men arrived, Coz set out to make whatever accommodations he could in the rude and comfortless surroundings. But though the conditions were poor, the hard work involved probably affected the men as it did Coz, for as he said, "The depression which had weighed upon me since the news of Sumter passed away, never to return. The consciousness of having important work to do and the absorption in the work proved the best of all mental tonics.

As the work progressed and the quarters were made as comfortable as possible with the rough lumber available, the systematizing of drilling and instruction in weapon use began

^Coz, M ilitary Beminisconces. I, 23.

80 81 on a eai^-inde scale* Each mmn got instm ctlons In d rill, tactics, guarding, and discipline in the temporary "schools" set up for this purpose* As other regiments began to arrive, each one's men mere soon indoctrinated into the camp's routine* The man mere also divided into one of throe brigades under Coz, General Nemton Schleieh, er General J e A u a Batest and each group began to learn mlthin its omn unit hom to fig^t*

Coz took over his brigade on May 20, 1861, mb en General Bates took command of the camqp in McClellan's place. Much of Coz's time mas nom spent in more reading of books on m ilitary history and tactics, but he also had to handle the more difficult tasks of indoctrinating nem recruits, convincing the ninety-day men to sign up for a longer period,^ and keeping up his men's discipline and morale* The roug^ conditions and the nem may of living led to numerous discipline problems among the nem men in the early days* Eventually the troublemakers mere filtered out, and the rest became accustomed to m ilitary life* Coz had as much trouble as the other generals in this regard, but his sternness and demands for strict obedience slomly but surely gained the respect of his men* But just when he had become settled at Camp Dennison, on July 3, 186l

^In this effort he had the help of James Monroe mho visited the cai^ and convinced the Oberlin cxwqaany there to put their anti slavery principles into action* See Coz, "Public Life," p* 5. 82 he reoeired orders from General McClellan to take his brigade to the Great Kanaafaa Elver valley In western Virginia.^

This area was a key to the western part of Virginia* The people there had voted overwhelmingly against secession In Virginia's plebiscite, and It was felt that they could be held In their sympathy for the Union canse If Northern troops could move In quickly and hold the area. Speed was a necessity also because Confederate troops had moved In and burned some bridges In Virginia on the B&O Ballroad line--the major communication link between Washington and the West* In this situation, McClellan felt It best that Cox move Into the Kanawha valley and hold off General Henry A* W ise's men, who were moving toward Charleston, until McClellan could cut them off by coming from the East* Thus, on July 7, his three-year official appointment as Brigadier-General In hand (received on June 22),^ Cox took the 11th Ohio and the 1st and 2nd Kentucky regiments to G allipolis, Ohio, where he was to pick up the 21st Ohio and head for Pt* Pleasant—near the mouth of the Kanawha Elver—and begin his first m ilitary campaign*

Given control of a territorial district from Parkersburg to the Kanawha as deep Into the Interior as he could go, Cox received a new set of orders just before he left* The

^He was happy to be going Into action, but the fact that a ll but two of his regiments had been sent elsewhere before and that he would have to leave with men he hadn't seen before or trained put somewhat of a damper on his enthusiasm* ÈL Salmon P. Chase to Cox, June 17, 1861, Cox Papers* 8 3

The defensiTe netore of his movement had now been changed, and he was to make an offensive march to Charleston and Gavley Bridge, and, if possible, drive out Wise and his men. With 3,000 men Cox moved from F t. Pleasant on July 11, and began the trip up the valley. During the move, various rumors of Confederate troop movements domn the river reached Cox, and he vamed his men to be ready for action at any time. It first came on July 17, I86l, near Tyler Mountain in Western Virginia in a minor altercation between the two advance guards of each side, but neither Cox*s troops nor the Confederates were heavily engaged. But the capture of two of Cox*a officers throu^ their own blunder made it look like a Union defeat,5 and McClellan o rd ere d Cox to rem ain where he was u n t i l h e lp a r r iv e d . Cox d id not get the message before he left the area, but had found it advisable to halt to collect his men together and wait for more men and supplies.

With a ll in readiness Cox moved out, on July 23, striking at Wise and forcing the Confederates' inexperienced men to flee in panic from their posts. The march continued on July 2^^, and by nightfall Cox's men were encaxgied on the outskirts of Charleston. The next morning the town's mayor and some prominent citizens came to Cox to surrender the city since Wise

^McClellan was very upset at this defeat and Cox's slowness at not driving out Wise (Cox was outnumbered four to threo), and complained, "Give me some general officers iriio understand their profession. They can't execute their orders unless I stand by them." Official Records. War of the Hebellion. Washington, 3880-1901, (hereinafter referred to as O.E.) vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 210. 8 4 had left It the night before. After composing a "Message to the People of Charleston, " telling them the army mas about to enter the city, mould march through it in an orderly fashion, and mould act in direct contrast to the "profane and disorderly behavior of the rebel army,"^ Coz accepted their offer and ordered his men into the city.

They immediately pushed tomard Gauley Bridge, forcing Vise farther and farther into the southern interior, until on J u ly 29, 1861, the Confederate threat having been dispersed, Coz*s men moved into and captured the area. General Bosecrans had mritten him earlier implying that Charleston mas as far as Cox could go and that he should defend that point; but Cox had proved him mrong and had captured this village community. Although the Northern disaster at Bull Bun at the same time dominated the mar nems in the Northexn nemspapers, Cox's advances did help to alleviate some of the Northexn despair.

In addition, the capture of Gauley Bridge helped alleviate the criticism Cox had received in the Nem York Times and Tribune in late July. The mar correspondents from these papers idio had oome to Cox at Charleston and asked to go along mith his army mere not satisfied mith conditions Cox offered them for this activity. They refused to accompany him further, and decided to "mrite him domn." Soon after, their papers

^Cox, "Message to the People of Charleston," July 25, I 86I, Boy Bird Cook Papers, Vest Virginia University Collection, Vest Virginia University Library. 8 5 printed aeeounts of hie army as being drunken, demoralized, and without discipline* Fortunately, the dispatches announcing his victory at Gauley Bridge appeared at the same time, and the criticism now looked rather silly.? Coz's good record was proof enough of his conduct of the western Virginia campaign and the abilities of his men; and soon after the Times, recognizing this fact, wrote; "Nowhere else in the war had the so well sustained their cause as in westexn Virginia. General Coz enjoys the unquestionable honor of winning the ixqiortant valley of the Kanawha."^

Coz held that valley by ordering some of his troops to follow Vise's men to see that the Confederate movement out of the area was eonplete and also to warn him of any advances; and by pacifying the countryside with "a most lenient course toward the rebels, giving leave to all to remain quiet in their homes and asking no questions as to opinions or conduct. As a result, many who might've gone have laid down their a r m s . "9 H is treatment of Mrs. Christopher Q. ToBq>kins, whose husband was a Confederate colonel and who had been left behind at Gauley Bridge, was typical, fie was so careful and protective of her that that lady had thoufjit of him as "an elegant, aocoxqilished gentleman," whom "the soldiers believe is my brother-in-law,

^Coz, M ilitary Beminiscenees. I, 76- 8; 8now York Times. September 18, I 86I , p . 2 .

9coz to Helen Coz, July 28, I 86I, Kenyon Coz Papers, Avery Library, Columbia University. 8 6 he Is so attentlTO to protect With suoh policies end actions Cox soon "made himself very acceptable to the 11 Inhabitants of the Kanaidm valley by his considerate conduct," and his position vas *ell-secured,12 It mas for that reason that the Confederates felt that he had to be attacked and driven out If they mere to regain the control and the sympathies of the mestem Virginians*

On August 10, 1861, Cox began to hear rumors from his sources that General Robert E* Lee "had arrived at Lemlsburg to assume direction of the Confederate movements Into mestezn Virginia* "^3 They also said that General John B* Floyd had joined Wise to help attack Cox, and that their forces numbered nearly 10,000 men* Cox, mho mould be outnumbered tmo to one even If these figures mere greatly exaggerated, began spreading his men out over the surrounding countryside to convince the Confederates that he had more troops than he really did. Apparently his ploy morked, for Wise and Moyd only slomly and

^^Mrs* Ellen Toaqpklns to Sarah Coooh, August^^, September 10, and September 1), 1861, as quoted In uxen Wilkins Tompkins, "The Colonel's Lady: Some Letters of Ellen Wilkins Tompkins, July-December, I86l," Virginia Maaazlne of

Upobert E* Lee to John B* Floyd, August 8, I 86I , 0*E*. vol* 51t pt* 2, p* 215* ^^That security mas Increased by the fact that "loyal citizens many times brought nems of open movements or secret plots among the Confederates* **No very hostile movement mas possible mlthin the range of thirty miles mlthout their knemlng It." Clarice Lorene Balles, "Jacob Dolson Cox In West Virginia," West Virginia History. A Quarterly Magazine, vol* 6 (October, 1944), p75i. ^^Cox, M ilitary Reminiscences. I, 91* 8 7 haltlzigly moved toward Gaiiley. But then, on August 26, throufi^ the blunders of a Colonel Tyler, a regiment was routed near Cross Lanes by Floyd, whose men seemed about to move into the

Gauley area.

But Instead they waited because Vise would not put his men under Floyd*s command because of a dispute over superior rank between the two generals. As a result no attack came, and Coz was able to hold them off with his advance guards until Bosecrans joined him with more troops. There they stood until September 9, when Bosecrans advanced on Floyd and on the 10th defeated him at the battle of Camifez Ferry forcing him to retreat. But the countryside of western Virginia was so ragged and mountainous that no immediate follow-up could take place without planned deployment of the two Union groups, and on September 15» Bosecrans called Coz in to discuss their future strategy, especially in view of the reports that Lee was about to unite Floyd and V ise's men under his command. In response, Bosecrans sent Coz's brigade and another brigade south to Sewell Mountain and then on to CaiQ> Lookout, while spreading his other men out over the rest of the area, thus preparing for a massive attack. But after a few minor skirmishes with Vise, their hopes for a battle were quashed by the violent fall rains which ruined the roads, flooded the streams, and brought sickness to some of the men, %e conditions soon became so bad 88 that Boaecrans orderad* on October 5» & general retreat to Gauley for re-grouplng*

The army waited there for a few days, but then begam moving out Into the area once again to search for Floyd's men. Floyd, who now commanded a ll the Confederate troops there, felt he could head off all the Federal forces, and he began moving north toward them In mid-October. By November 2 he had moved some of his men atop Cotton Mountain from which they began shelling the Federal rear. But In this position Floyd was separated from Lee's men, vftio had le ft the area, and Bosecrans and Coz felt they could surround the Confederates by swift flanking moves on both sides. Coz's men kept the Confederate's attention on their front with an attack over the New Blver, while General H. W. Benham was to move around them In the rear. But Benham because of "a fatal want of nerve and Inaction" did not do his part and Floyd escaped.

With winter coming on, Bosecrans decided to set up winter quarters to rest and train his men for the spring campaign. Coz was now put In charge of the Department of the Kanawha, with headquarters at Charleston, while Bosecrans set up h i s command a t W heeling. Coz began d r i l l i n g h i s men and teaching then proper war conduct while he continued his m ilitary reading. He also began philosophizing about the campaign he had

^^General Bosecrans's report In O.B.. vol. 51i pt. 1, p. 251. In a later report of the same battle, Bosecrans said of Coz's service, "Gen. Coz Is the only reliable man here." O.B.. v o l. 5* P* 65?. 89 been through and his own role In the mtr* His early problems with the newspapers and his men's discipline, which for a time almost made him despair and "denbt whether It was possible to work down the slanders which had mmltlplled" even after his successes, had finally been solved. He now had little to complain about on this frontFurthermore, within his "command there had gradually grown up a very different feeling

In regard to" h i m s e l f , ^8 @nd soon there were many proofs of loyalty such as the refusal of his men to be transferred and requests from men In other units to be placed In General Cox's. Even In Washington, where the newspaper slanders had hurt his desires for a larger role In the war, there were no misgivings, and Coz was even spoken of as one of the best civilian brlgadler-generals.^^

With such a good record behind him, Cox felt that he deserved consideration for active work at the real war front. His experiences during the winter helped In this resolve by Instilling In him "a rooted dislike for the military administration of border dlstrlcts."18 He did not think he

^^Cox to Garfield, November 8, 1861, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. ^*Cox to Garfield, September 9# I86l, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. iPcox to Garfield, November 8, 1861, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. One of these was Rutherford B. Hayes, then a Colonel, who wrote in his diary later, "General Cox Is a good talker, a sound man, excellent sense. I wish he commanded our brigade." Charles Richard Williams, ed., Dlarv and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Haves. (Columbus, 192^-6), I I , 198. ^®Cox, M ilitary Reminiscences, I, 163. 90 mis "ambitious of sueeess la |^s~] m ilitary career for the sake of the fame of It," but rather had entered the "aervloe for duty alone and would sacrifice himself and even fall If the ends could be secured. "^9 But s till he wanted to get Into more active duty and had even w ritten to Governor Dennison to ask his aid. However, nothing came of his pleas, and when spring came he was s till at Charleston.

Coz's hopes for real action looked brighter when, on March 11, 1862, General John C. Fremont was put In command of the newly created Mountain Department, while Coz was put In control of the 10,000 men stationed a ll along the KanaiAia and Ohio Hivers. Fremont, the H^ubllcan Presidential candidate In 1856, knew of President Lincoln's desire to aid the loyalists In East Tennessee, and he soon began to devise a plan to make a bold strike throu^ Virginia and on to Knezvllle with a ll his troops, using Gauley and Charleston as supply bases. But the scheme was not adapted to the distance and hazards It had to cover; and after It began, the Confederate troops, who were eztremely well-posltloned to hold off the Federal advances, soon convinced Fremont to retreat. Of the advancing bzlgades, only Coz's men carried out their part of the plan as one brigade pushed over Sewell Mountain to Lewlsburg and the other made It to Princeton on May 2. Fremont's advance regiment, the 23rd u n d e r th e command o f

^^Coz to Garfield, November 8, I 86I, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 91

Batfaerford B« Hayest had even occupied G iles' Court House and advanced to vlthln 10 miles of the railroad to Kaoxrllle, hut the fact that the communications ulth Kanaidia mere helng haiq>ered and the men were In danger of advancing beyond their support line caused them to retreat. Thus, on Hay 18, Coz telegraphed Fremont that he would have to retire to Flat Top Mountain; and with Fremont's approval and praises for his actions, oamp was e s ta b lis h e d .^ ^

There Coz stayed, keeping his position Intact and not risking any further attacks because he feared the Confederates could easily reinforce their ranks.Late' In June, still wishing for a role in the major fighting In the East, Coz heard that the Mountain Department had been abolished and that Fremont had been placed under General John Pope, the Commander of the . After Fremont refused this position because of the subordinate^' status he received, Coz, seeing the opportunity, wrote Pope on July 3t "In view of the report that disciplined troops are wanted at the East, I call your attention to the fact that my division Is among the best

20 v o l . 1 2 , p t . 3# p p . 203" ^ . 2l0ne author felt this was a valid reason, but that Coz also stayed put because he was too cautious, lacked dash and Imagination, did not speak the common tongue, and didn't know how to fire the hearts of his men, althougji he always had their respect and their morale was always hlggi. See T. Harry Williams, Bkves of the 23rd. (Mew York, I 965), pp. 120-1. While most of these statements have some merit, they are too eztreme and fall to take Into consideration Coz's fine m ilitary smse and tactical mind, and his Intelligent use of his men. He was no demagogue or embtlonal leader, but he was a good, safe commander. 9 2 seasoned and eldest troops in the field, and for discipline and d rill s ill compare favorable with any."^^ Pope, irtio did need suoh men, at first (August 8) ordered Coz east through Virginia mith his mhole command, but later changed the orders sending part of the men ( 2,500 o f 1 1 , 600) back to hold the Kanairiia valley. Coz, idio felt that the Virginia route was too dangerous and difficult, wrote back that the route should be modified, for by using a new one the time could be easily reduced. He suggested a ra il and water route over the Kanawha and Ohio Bivers and the BAG Bailroad, a plan which was soon confirmed. But then, just as Coz felt he was about to get into active duty. Pope, having heard of a Confederate buildup near Kanasha, ordered Coz to head a contingent of 5»000 men to hold that district again.

Severely disgruntled by this turn of events, Coz followed this order, but wrote almost angrily to Colonel Buggies of Pope's staff* "I trust it will be possible for the general commanding to reconsider the determination to leave me here, as by my long service, I have some claim to serve with a la r g e r c o l u m n . "23 The nezt day the long-awaited reply arrived* Coz was ordered East with the main contingent of his troops (6,000 men). On August 14, 1862, with his men already on their way to Kanawha, Coz rode off with his staff to meet the troops

22Q.B.. vol. 12, p t . 3 * p . 451. 23o.B.. vol. 12, pt. 3, p. 567. This was w ritten on August 12, 1662. 9 3 at Gauley Bridge. Arriving there on August l6 and preparing his men for their move to Washington, Cox also made arrangements with the B&O Bailroad to carry his men. The movement vent smoothly, end by August 26, a ll of the troops v e re i n Washington.General Cox then reported to Secretary of War Edvin Stanton confident that his long-awaited activity on a major front was soon to begin.

From Stanton Cox received an account of Pope's movements to that time and the situation he now faced south of Washington. Cox was to wait for Pope to come near Washington before he was to join him, and in the meantime he was ordered to wait for his remaining wagons and get his troops ready to move. When a ll was ready. General McClellan, commander (thou^ not in the field because of earlier failures) of the Army of the Potomac, which now included Cox's men, ordered Cox to take his four regiments to Ports Bamsey and Buffalo, Virginia, idiich were on the h ills overlooking Washington and the approach to it from Centerville, to help proteot Washington from any possible Confederate moves. Soon he had to cover an entirely different move, for Pope's defeat at Bull Bun and his troops' subsequent retreat toward Washington gave Cox's men the opportunity to protect them on their hasty retreat. This they did, and afterwards continued patrolling the area for possible Confederate attackers.

^%ne author spoke of the move as "a fine record for a mixed command. Probably it was history's first instance of a movement by forced marches, steamboats, and railroad, and it remains a model for smooth planning and smart execution.** Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds a General. (Mew York, 1957), I , 281. ^^Cox, M ilitary Berniniscenoea. I, 229-246. 9 4

Pope's defeat and Lincoln's desire for a winning general in command of the forces around Washington had made Lincoln decide upon a new commander* Once Pope's men were back in Washington with the other troops. Pope was relieved of his p o s itio n , and once a g a in M cC lellan was p la c e d i n a c tiv e command of the Army of the Potomac. Hearing that Bobert E* Lee had crossed the Potomac to the West and planned to skirt the capitol and head for Pennsylvania thronggi Maryland, McClellan then began planning his strategy to meet this new threat and keep the Worth free from Confederate invasion* The drive to Antietam had began*

Cox'8 part in McClellan's plans consisted of taking his regimraits into Washington and then to Leesboro, Maryland, where he was to report to General Ambrose E. Bnmside, commander of the "right wing" of the Army of the Potomac* On September 7, 1862, Cox's Kanawha division temporarily attached to Bnmside's Ninth Army Corps, and, under the command of Major-General Jesse L* Beno, was ordered to take the advance of that corps on the march to Leesboro, following General Hooker's corps* By short and well-regulated marches, they and the rest of the army slowly moved into a thirty-m ile long front from the Potomac north* Lee, meanwhile, had abandoned Frederick and had advanced to near Harper's Ferry* In response, McClellan now began to move his men farther north also*

Cox, in the middle of the Army, had moved farther into Maryland, and on September 12, drove out the Confederate rear 9 5 guard under Wade Eampten at Frederick and advanced to Middleton on September 13* It was on this day that McClellan received a copy of Lee*8 orders and plans for the which some of his soldiers had found. With a swift move his men could have reached South Mountain, a point between the two sections of Lee*s army, on September 1^, cut the Confederates in two, and won a resounding victory. But caution was a strict byword with the little general, and he failed to take advantage of his good fortunes, which did much to hinder the Union’s chances of victory at Antietam.

But Coz knew nothing of these developments, for he was too busy with his own strategy. Not having received any orders to advance to South Mountain to cut off Haa^ton’s men, on September 14 he advanced with another division toward Fox’s Gap on the Sharpsburg Bead. There they met with the well-entrenched Confederates, and a hard fig^t oasued. Cox, seeing that he would need more men, called on General Jesse Bene to send up the rest of the Ninth Army Corps for support, but before they arrived Cox's men had scored a tei^orary victory and had forced the Confederates off South Mountain. After a two4hour rest by both armies while awaiting reinforcements, the battle began again. Eepulsing a hard Confederate charge with some help from Hooker's First Army Corps, Cox held his ground and gained a fine victory in this ".His

2^Soe Cox, M ilitary Reminiscences. I, 263-292 for his personal account. 9 6 abilities to hold grotmd already taken and defend against direct attacks vere thus proven again.

On the next day, Coz vas appointed the temporary commander of the Ninth Army Corps to replace General Beno vho had been shot and killed at South Mountain. Along vlth the rest of the army, Coz then began moving his men up for lAat McClellan hoped vould be a direct encounter betveen the tvo armies. Marching through Foz*s Gap on the old Sharpsburg Road, Coz reached his corps* assigned place on the east bank of Antietam creek, put them Into position, and rode up to McClellan*8 headquarters to discuss the coming battle and his s t r a te g y .

On September 16, Coz and the rest of the men valted for the battle to begin, but It vas not to come. Instead McClellan delayed, and Coz and the commander of the r l^ t vlng. General Burnside, discussed the vay In vhlch they vould attack the Confederate rlg^t vlng opposite them (part of the Federal rlg^t vlng had been placed on the left of the army by McClellan), Coz, idio felt his temporary assignment as a corps commander had ended a f t e r th e B a tt l e o f South M ountain, v lsh e d t o command only his Eanavha division In the battle. But Burnside, vhose command vas the First and Ninth Army Corps, said that since the former, under Hooker, had been put on the extreme right, he (Burnside) could not lessen his command by ccnwndlng the 9th alone In the battle. Thus he ordered Coz to continue his temporary command of the 9th and thus take control of the 9 7 movement of the army's left wing. Burnside vould only hand dovn Cox's orders from MoClellan and vould leave the actual b a t t l e command to C ox.^?

McClellan's plan vas to use his rlggit vlng under Hooker as the main force and to use Burnside's men as a diversion and possibly a means to out off retreat to the Potomac. Early on September 17 the rl£dit vlng attack began, and at 10*00 a.m. Burnside vas ordered to move his men over the Antietam. TTawdiwg the order to Cox, Burnside returned to his headquarters to vateh hov Cox handled the movement. Cox, knovlng that the only direct vay across the creek In their area vas a narrov stone bridge (aftervards knovn as Burnside's bridge) idilch vas vell-covered by 300 sharpshooters under Bobert Toombs, had no choice but to begin sending one regiment after another over it to try to push across the creek. The first regiment vas met vlth such a torrent of fire that the men had to stop, take a position In front of the bridge, and return the fire. A hard and bloody flgdit began, and Cox, after sending reinforcements,

2^8ee Cox, M ilitary Reminiscences. I, 303-4. It vas this mlx-up In the exact extent of Burnside's command In the relegation of authority that vas to cause a great deal of controversy after the battle. Cox's letter of January 24, I 876 to his friend Emerson Opdycke (Cox Papers) discusses this chain of command and Cox's feelings at not being given due credit for his role at Antietam as actual commander of the left vlng. ^^In his Military ReMnlsconces. I, 296- 7, Cox says that there vere fordable parts of the creek vhere the vater vas shallov enough to cross, but that they, too, vere vell-covered by Confederate sharpshooters. Cox did send one brigade dovnstream to try to cross a ford there, but Its commander vas killed on the vay. 9 8 devised a nev plan* Sending two reglnents, one from each side of the bridge, over it so that they could fan out once they got across, he had a howitzer his men had captured in western Virginia trained on Toombs* men* At its first shot, the rest of Coz's men began firing, and quickly the chosen regiments passed over the bridge as Toombs* brigade flew toward Sharpsburg* Three hours had passed, but the task of the left wing had been completed*

Taking possession of the heights Toombs had held, Coz rested his ezhausted troops, waited for more ammunition, and prepared for the assault on Sharpsburg. By 3 >00 p.m., the corps was ready and a new battle line had been drawn* When the new push began, the Confederate resistance wilted almost Instantly and the rebels were soon retreating* There was almost nothing between Coz and the Sharpsburg Boad now, and £ee*s army was about to be completely outflanked* Just then from Coz*8 le ft came the sound of advancing troops, and when his men looked over and saw the Union blue coats advancing, they thougït more men were coming to aid them* But their cheers at this new development were soon quieted when firing from the new attackers showed that they were Confederates * A. P* Hill*s men who had coapleted the capture of Harper*s Ferry and were hurrying to Lee*s aid* Coz ordered his left flank to thwart the attack, but it was under heavy pressure and partly brokox, so the attack on Sharpsburg had to be halted so that the rigbt wing could help the left* Coz soon 9 9

repulsed the attack, and while the Confederates returned to the road by which they had come, their goal accomplished, he took up a position halfway between the creek and the town. There they stayed as Lee retreated across the Potomac on September 19» 1862.29

The rest of the commanders had not done as well as Coz, and the result had been a standoff. But since Lee had retreated (without McClellan following up the advantage, as usual) and McClellan had claimed a victory for himself. President Lincoln decided to visit the field himself to see if the victory he desired so badly had really been won. On October 1, 1862, in a cortege with McClellan and Lincoln, Coz rode across Antietam Creek, into the East Woods and the cornfield the right wing had fou^t in, showing the President the part of the field in idiieh his men had fougdit, a ll the while analyzing the President's character and intellectual qualities. Although at the time Coz was unsure of Lincoln's abilities because of the President's joking and buffoon-like manner, he later learned of the intense study the President had made of the battle and the army and of his ability to analyze the; m ilitary situation as it s to o d .

^^MeClellan and Burnside appreciated Coz's conduct of his corps and both praised his gallant services both at Antietam and South Mountain, recommending promotion of "this valuable officer" to Major General. O.B.. vol. 19, pt. 1, p p . 383- 4 . 3^800 J. D. Coz, "President Lincoln at Antietam," May 2, 1894, speech. M ilitary Order of the Loyal Legion of the U;S., Cincinnati, I 894. 100

For Coz the sltuatloB geemed perfect. He had gotten his long-awaited action on a major field, had proved his ability, been nominated for a promotion, and felt his permanent connection with the Army of the Potomac was assnred. But on October 4, 1862, the unexpected came in an order to report to Washington for detailed directions for returning to the Kanawha

V a l l e y . 3 1 He arrived in Washington on October 6 , and learned from General Henry W. Halleck that Colonel Lightbuxn, in charge of the 5*000 men around Gauley Bridge, had been driven out by the Confederates itbo had learned of the number of men there and had massed enou^i troops together to complete the task. Coz, who knew the area and the men there, was felt to be the most capable man for the task, and thus he had been ohosen for it. In order to soften the blow, Coz was promised that he would be immediately promoted and made commander of a ll the western Virginian troops. After being given his orders and permission to take his Kanairtia division with him, Coz went to Secretary Stanton's office, received his promotion to Major-General, and began preparations for his return to western Virginia.3^

^^O.R.. vol. 19, pt. 2, p. 380. 3%e also visited President Lincoln's office—the President had recognized him at Antietam because Secretary Chase had talked about Coz often—to "report in person", but Lincoln was in a cabinet meeting. See Cox to Lincoln, October 7* 1862, Papers, Library of Congress. CHAFTEB V III

FBOH WEST VIRGINIA TO ATLANTA

The second phase of the Civil War for Major General Coz was to begin where the first had, in the Kanawha valley. Taking the railroad from Washington to Pittsburgh and on to Wheeling and Columbus, he discussed the m ilitary situation with Governors Francis H. Pierpont of West Virginia and of Ohio on the way. Going on to Cincinnati on October 11, he reported to General Horatio G. W riest, commander of the and then began the trip toward the Kanawha, stopping at several points along the Ohio River to see the brigades stationed there. But before he completed the trip he heard that General Loring, the Confederate commander in West Virginia was retreating from the Kanawha Valley. Although Loring was actually only attempting to move out to join General Lee at Confederate headquarters, Lee, upon hearing of this, ordered Loring back to Richmond and sent his second in command. General John Echols, forward to regain the lost ground.

Coz did not intend to let this happen, however, and using his Kanaidia division and the other troops in the area in fine fashion, he pushed the Confederates back swiftly and entered Charleston for the second time on October 29, 1862. A

1 0 1 1 0 2 few days later, the bridges and reads which the Confederates had blown up on their retreat were restored, and the federal troops marched into Gauley Bridge and the valley was once again secured. Setting up his headquarters in Charleston and ordering his men to position themselves throughout the valley for its defense, Coz once again began a winter near the hills of West V irginia,! this time at Marietta, Ohio.

But this was a different type of winter. Since Coz*s men were all well-trained and there were no threats of Confederate attack, he spent much of his time philosophizing about the war, national politics, and m ilitary strategy in letters to his friends. On November 17 he wrote the first of many letters to Aaron F. Ferry, a Cincinnati politician and lawyer iriiom Cox had met through Governor Dennison and iriio had become a close friend. Fearing that the recent Democratic trituqohs in Congressional races might cause the war to md ingloriously, he called for the massing of a great bulk of the army, around 500,000 men, to make one hard strike into the South and finish the war in a few months.% He reiterated such feelings a month later, while mentioning the defectiveness of

^Coz was quite disgruntled by this fact, since his "canqpaign in Maryland was exciting and fu ll of incident, and to return to a field where the defensive is almost necessarily the policy is not pleasant to look forward to", and he hoped "to be relieved from it." Coz to General George B. Thomas, November b, 1862, Coz Papers.

2coz to Aaron F. Perry, November 17, 1862, Coz Papers. 1 03 the army*m organization and the petty Jealousy and personal rivalries of eonaanding generals as deterrents to overall victory, in another letter to Perry.^ Then, probably feeling that he was discussing evils uhich the government should know about, he wrote long letters to Salmon Chase and General E. A. Hitchcock, chairman of a m ilitary board reviewing the articles of war at the time, to apprise them of his ideas concerning army organization, discipline, and the misuse of volunteer officers and troops in the f i e l d . ^ These letters, idiich probably contained "many of the same ideas irtiich were urged upon the President from other quarters," proved useless at the time, and "nothing came of it."5 it was not until later that their effect was to be felt.

Cox didn't know this yet, and he was still thinking over new ideas to reform the army when the fateful news that his promotion had not gone through the Senate and that he would have to become a Brigadier General again reached him. There was a federal law in existence which stated that only thirty Major Generals could be appointed, and over forty had been named. With political influence on their side, the th irty whom Lincoln had decided upon were chosen with no attention to idien they were appointed. Thus, Cox, who was appointed early enough to be promoted if the final promotions

3cox to Aaron P. Perry, December 18, 1862, Cox Papers. ^Cox to Salmon P. Chase, January 1, I 863, end to E. A. Hitchcock, January 24, I 863, Cox P a p e rs.

5cox, M ilitary Reminiscences. I, 440-1. 1 0 4 were done according to seniority, saw his commission expire ana his rank decreased on March 4, 1863# He had asked for few favors, had not had newspapermen give publicity to him, and had made little use of his political friends to secure his promotion, apparently feeling that his record and merit were enougii to secure him his just due. Having been proven wrong, he never again trusted non-polltleal means toward advancement. Newly-elected Congressman Garfield now became his chief Washington lobbyist, while his other friends In politics did what they could for him.

The disappointment Goaeral Cox felt at this turn of events came at the end of a long series of sim ilar events that winter. All during his stay at Marietta he had applied again and again for removal to duty In the field, feeling no further movements could be made through the mountains of West Virginia and that the area could be held by a small number of troops# But not only had he not been granted this request, but some of his best regiments had been taken from his command and placed in other, more active theatres of war. This and his loss of rank made him quite depressed, "and It took a little time and some philosophy to overcome"^ this feeling, and Cox even considered resigning because of these slights.

But his spirits were undoubtedly uplifted when In late March his department was transferred to the Department of Maryland under General Schenek. Traveling quickly to

^Cox, M ilitary Hemlnlscenees. I, 443# 1 0 5 on April 3t he no sooner arrived than he was met with yet another set of discouraging orders. Probably because of his letters concerning army organization» he was now sent to Columbus to aid Governor Tod in organizing the troops called out under a new enrollment and conscription law. After being assured that this new role was to be temporary and that he would soon have an active command, Coz agreed to go. Stopping at Marietta to clean up his business there, Coz arrived in Columbus on April 9 and met Tod and the new commander of the D istrict of the Ohio (Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee), General .

Because of his desire to spend his time planning an invasion of Tennessee, Burnside decided to place Coz in command of the m ilitary district of Ohio with his headquarters in Cincinnati. In this job Coz's responsibilities were almost strictly administrative, and he once again used his spare hours to catch up on his reading and to visit his wlfe.^ The first two months he spent there went by swiftly, and the reality of a fighting war made itself manifest in the summer with the appearance of Confederate General John H. Morgan and his cavalry "raiders" in Indiana.

Morgan had received orders on June 18 to harass Bosecrans* army in Kentucky, and he began moving at the end of the month. But before long he conceived the idea of crossing the Ohio river into Indiana or Ohio to take some of the

7see Helen Coz to Lucy Garfield, July 19, I 863, Lucy Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 106 attention away from the rest of the army. Moving steadily north on a zig-zag course, he crossed Into Indiana, but mas met by strong m llltla opposition. Taking to a course along the Ohio, Morgan headed for Ohio, which was under Coz's Jurisdiction. Governor Tod called the state m llltla and they were sent to Dayton and Cincinnati to protect those cities. On J u ly 13 Morgan entered Ohio, made a feint at Hamilton, and then, on the l4th passed thirteen miles north of Cincinnati and went Into Clermont County. Coz, knowing that he could not catch Morgan with the untrained m llltla he had had to use In protecting the cities, then called up regiments from Vest Virginia, knowing Morgan would try to cross the Ohio again to the East. When Morgan eventually tried to cross between Marietta and Pomeroy, he was Interested by the reinforcements, and a large number of his men were captured. Morgan fled with the rest to northeastern Ohio, but later was taken also. His raid caused much ezcltement In Ohio, but It had very little m ilitary importance.®

After Morgan's capture Coz returned to Cincinnati to handle new problems which were cropping up. Clement Vallandl^uun, the Democratic candidate for Governor who had been ordered out of the state because of his seemingly

®Coz's account In his M ilitary Reminiscences. I, 495- 509 Is a fine, first-hand picture or this raTd’. ' An account of Its effect on the Cincinnatians Is found In Louis Leonard Tucker, Cincinnati During the Civil War. Ohio Civil War Centennial Commission publication no. 9, Columbus, 1962. 1 0 7 seditious statements, made public in August a statement that he «as coming back from Canada to campaign for office. Coz then let it be known that if he did come back he would immediately be arrested and sent to a m ilitary prison. Thinking better of his earlier statement, Vallandigham decided to remain in ezile and try to make whatever political capital he could from that fact. His activity caused much ezcltement, but he was nevertheless soundly beaten by the Union candidate, , in October.

Once the election was over and the fears of many that a series of riots and disturbances would erupt on election day were quieted, Coz, still nettled at his inactivity, began to ask his friends Garfield, Perry, Dennison and Chase for help in gaining a promotion or at least a command.9 But nothing was forthcoming ezcept Chase's assurances that he was working for Coz's promotion and, possibly, his command of the Trans- M ississippi department (which Ccz would probably have refused anyway because of its lack of activity).^0 And so Coz settled back to wait out the winter in the humdrum routine of his district headquarters.

But then, on November 9» he received a dispatch from the commanding officer at D etroit (Coz had been made commander of Michigan also) that his informants had told him that sometime

9coz to Helen Coz, October 27, 1863, Kenyon Coz Papers, Avery Library, Columbia University. 10Salmon P. Chase to Coz, November 7» 1963, Coz Papers. 108 before the twelfth there would be an atteaq>t to attack the m ilitary prison at Johnson's Island, in Sandusky Bay, in Lake Erie, from Canada and to free the Confederate officers held there. Coz immediately ordered five hundred new recruits and a battery of cannon to Sandusky, and then he consulted with Governor Ted about the situation. The latter decided to call out the northern Ohio m ilitia, and Coz took a train north to supervise the operation himself.

When he arrived, Coz learned that the Confederate steamboats which supposedly were to be used hadn't begun the crossing of the lake yet, and so he began arranging his troops and cannon for the ezpected attack. Using Cedar Point, the end of a peninsula on the bay, for his cannon placements, Coz soon had the island reinforced and protected. But there was to be no need for this, for the Confederates, learning their plans had been discovered and that the area was so well protected, decided to change their plans and attack later, and most of them soon left Canada. The Ohio m ilitia was then dispersed, but Coz remained at Sandusky to supervise the further fortification of the island.

While he was there he received a message from Burnside, who had commenced his advance into Tennessee. Having promised Coz that when the chance came he would give him the command of one of his corps in the field there, Burnside offered Coz the command of the 23rd Army Corps. Eztremely happy at this event, Coz wrote and asked Secretary Stanton for permission to leave immediately, but he was refused because of the needed work at 109

Sanduslcy. Cnee the oriels at Johnson's Island had passed and the neoessary fortifloatlon was done, Stanton finally acquiesoed and, on Deoember 3> 1863, Coz was direoted to report to the general in oomnand at Knozyille.^^ Looking forward to aotive duty and serving under Burnside cnee again, Coz hurried to Cinoinnati to prepare for his trip to Tennessee.

But, when he got to Cincinnati he learned that Burnside had been relieved of command, end that General John G. Foster had just left there to take his place. Coz, feeling that this m i^t make some difference in his personal advancement to a co rp s command,hurriedly left Cincinnati with his staff on December 9* Passing through Lezington on the eleventh, they reached the Cumberland river on the fourteenth and on the eighteenth arrived in Khozville. Though the trip was a difficult one, it was made very quickly, for Coz feared that his orders might be changed by Foster if he delayed. In Khozville he found he had been r i^ t and that Foster had sent him orders which passed him on the way south, assigning him to the D istrict of Kentucky. Foster told him he had issued these orders because he thought Coz would prefer such duty to that involving a joumey over the mountains. Coz then told Foster of his continual attempts to gain active duty and his wish not to go to Kentucky. The commander, whom Burnside had told of

vol. 31. pt. 3, p. 314. ^^Coz to Helen Coz, December 4, 1863. Coz Papers and Coz to Garfield, December 6, I 863. James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 110

Coz*s desire, was Impressed by his vigor in crossing the m o n n tain s, and h e a s s ig n e d Coz to th e f i e l d command o f th e 23rd Corps in his army.13

Two days later, on December 21, after learning of the m ilitary situation of Foster's army and setting up his headquarters, Coz began arranging his winter oangi, organizing his corps, and directing the drilling and marching his men had to do to keep busy. The poor conditions his troops had to bear while in Tennessee in this winter were the worst Coz had ever seen up to that time, and many men had to bear it without shoes and blankets and with tattered uniforms. They were a rag-tag group, and some well ready to leave the army and go home. Their morale needed constant bolstering, and part of Coz's role as commander now became "going through the regimental camps and giving such encouragement and cheer" as he could. "It was heartbreaking work to see their misery,"!^ but the men bore up well under their hardships, and most of them even re-enlisted later.

It was during this winter that Coz first met General Ulysses S. Grant. The latter, who, along with the rest of the army leaders in Washington had felt that the movement in Tennessee had been too slow and unrewarding, visited Foster on December 30 to see for himself if his ezouse of poor conditions

130.E.. vol. 31. pt. 3t p. 457. l^Goz, M ilitary Reminiscences. II, 99. Ill and supplies vas valid. The blizzard and zero weather which greeted him convinced him of Foster's truthfulness, and Grant then discussed the Tennessee strategy only in terms of when the weather would improve. Cox, who was present, saw Grant as a shy and retiring man who conversed little and was, in general, n o t v e ry impressiveThis first isw»reaaion eventually was changed by Grant's later victories and the future meetings of the two men, and they were later to become the best of friends. Unfortunately, they were also to become eventually the worst of enem ies.

Soon after Grant left. Poster sent his men out to reconnoiter the area. At Dandridge one of the advance guards met and fought a brief battle with a group of men under the Confederate General Longstreet. This skirmish and a letter from Grant saying that Longstreet was advancing in force on &ioxville convinced Foster that he should regroup a ll his divisions around that city and prepare for the attack. But after a ll was prepared the news that Longstreet had moved away and would not attack caused Foster to follow Coz's suggestion that the army move back into winter quarters and rest for the s p r in g .

While they were doing so, the news came to them that Foster, who was in ill health, would be replaced in command of the by General John M. Schofield. Coz, who

M ilitary Eeminiscences. II, 102-3. 1 1 2 vas In the azuunolous position of eomnandlns a corps without the corresponding rank, was also replaced, by General George Stonenan»^^ When these two reached Knoxville on February 9, 1864, Cox was left without a position, and for two weeks he remained off duty. But, when Longstreet was reported to be moving again, Schofield, feeling it necessary to attack, asked Cox to become his Chief of Staff in the field until he received further orders. Cox thus became chief planner and co-ordinator of the army of 13,000 marching into the interior.

Their march came to naught, however, for Longstreet was steadily moving out of the state, and Schofield decided not to follow him. Instead he returned to Bioxvllle and consulted with General W. T. Sherman, his immediate superior, on the plans for the spring caaQ>aign. Then, and at a future conference on March 29, Schofield learned of the great campaign Sherman was about to begtn--the march on Atlanta. For it Schofield was named commander of the Tennessee force, irtiich was made into the 23rd Army Corps, as well as the Army of the Ohio. Cox and Schofield, who had become warm friends during their two months together, discussed Cox's role in the army soon after. Sehofield offered him the position as permanent Chief of Staff, but Coz demurred, and so he was given the ohoice of one of the divisions of the corps. Choosing the third, idiioh contained

^^Speeial Order no. 4l, HDQTBS, Dept, of the Ohio, February 10, 1864, Cox Papers. Coz, who had hoped to get this command, felt he hadn't because of political pressure in Washington against him. See Cox to Garfield, February 6, 1864, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 113 many of his former associates and officers, Coz was named its commander and in addition, because of his seniority, was given command of the 23rd whenever Schofield was away from it for consultation or for other duties*^7 on April 3 he took over his command and began preparing his troops for their role in Sherman's grand march.

Coz set up his headquarters at B ull's Gap, Tennessee, where, on April 23 Schofield told him that orders had been received to prepare immediately for the marchOn A p ril 25 Coz ordered his men to destroy the railroad to the Watanga Biver and all the bridges on the road. On the 2?th, with the sick and wounded sent home and only fit troops remaining, Coz moved his men to Knozville. Uniting with other troops on the way, they continued through Tennessee and on to Charleston. By May 5 Schofield's army was out of Tennessee, had crossed the Georgia line, and had advanced to the city of Bed Clay where, "with the Army of the Cumberland on the rigdit, the union of Sherman's forces in the field was completed...The A tlanta canq>aign had begun.

Opposing Sherman was a large Confederate force of about 60,000 under General Joseph Johnston. Because his numbers

17o.B.. vol. 32, pt, 3, p. 245. ^^Coz, Personal Diary, 1864-5, April 23* 1864, Coz Papers. iPcoz, M.lit-arv BemiMseances. II, 107* On it were the Army of the Cumberlana (00 , og6 men), the Army of the Tennessee (24,500 men), and the Army of the Ohio (13,500 men). 114 were considerably smaller than those Sherman oonld bring to bear, Johnston decided that his best tactic was to pursue a Fabian policy, making the fédérais attack him in the front, Tdiere he could in flict heavy damage on them. Then he would retreat cautiously, making sure he could not be flanked, and set up his army for yet another defense. He hoped to continue this process all along the route to Atlanta until Sherman's forces were worn out or so depleted that he would have to retreat and give up the campaign.

At first Sherman was inclined to do just what Johnston hoped, attack directly on the front. Coz saw this at first hand on Kay 9 idien his third division, on the extreme left of the army, advanced to within sight of Dalton, Georgia. There he met the Confederate forces under General John B. Hood, whose men had set up strong entrenchments on the way. Making a "demonstration" at the Confederates, Coz forced their advance troops to move back to the main trenches, but Hood made no effort to attack in return, rather moving his men back slowly, exacting a stiff penalty in federal lives.

Sherman, who had ordered Coz's move as a diversion so that General McPherson's 4th Army Corps could advance more easily, seeing that advance stopped, decided to concentrate on the center of his army now. Calling Coz's division into the main line, Sherman ordered an advance toward Villanow, where they would be placed two miles west of the Army of the Cumberland. But Johnston, following his preconceived plan. 115

retreated before the massed fédérais and concentrated around Besaca. On May 14 and 15 the battle of Besaca was fonght, with heavy losses on both sides. Eventually the Confederates, feeling they had inflicted as: much damage as they could without being overrun, again retreated, allowing Sherman to move over 20 their lines and through Besaca.

It was at this battle that Sherman learned that, considering the environment his men had to fight throu^ and the ease with idiich Johnson*s men could set up defensive positions and train their cannons and rifles on the advancing fédérais, he would have to arrange his men so that a force equal to Johnston's could keep him occupied in the front while the rest could move around the Confederates on a flank. Ordering his men to follow parallel roads to the south, Sherman began a strong advance toward Cassville. It was there that Johnston, who had been receiving criticism for his battle policy and the lost territory, decided to arrange his men for an all-out f i^ t. But when Coz moved his men up on the left and his cannon began to score heavily. Hood convinced Johnston to retreat again and seek a more advantageous position.

Coz was sent to follow the retreating enemy's rear guard to see what the conditions for further advance would be like while the rest of the army began to re-organize itself. Sherman's plan was to move the army in several columns to

20 Coz, Diary, May 14-16, 1864, Coz Papers. 116

Dallas and then to Marietta» Georgia. Leaving on May 24» Cox advanced with the rest of Schofield's corps over the Etowah Biver» skirmishing most of the way. On June 4 Sherman» wishing to make a move to the left» moved the entire army around Cox's division, thus putting Cox on the army's extreme ri^ t.^ ^ Then» moving on despite heavy rains and muddy roads» the army pushed Johnston further south until» on June 2?» in front of Eennesaw Mountain» the two armies had their bloodiest battle to that date.

According to Sherman's plan, some of General Hooker's men were supposed to have taken the h ill on the left rear of Eennesaw and then to have forced the Confederates to leave their entrenched position on the mountainside. Unfortunately they did very l i t t l e , a n d when the battle began Sherman had to make a frontal attack. On the 2?th he began the attack with a show of force on both wings to draw some of the Confederate force from the center. But a blazing and withering fire from the Confederate stronghold on the mountain at the advancing center soon began to make the advance a costly one. Cox, whose division was on the right, moved his men to a hilltop near the: mountain from which his cannon could h it the

^^During this march Cox was assured by Schofield and Sherman that they would recommend his promotion as soon as they had time. But Cox, still rankled by past disappointments, felt, "It w ill probably fail because some Milroy or Schurz or Blair will probably be ahead of me again." Cox to Aaron F. Perry, June 9» 1864» Cox P a p e rs .

Z^Cox, Diary, June 23-4» 1864» Cox Papers. 117

Confederates without facing too much rlak. The fire Coz directed upon them and Sherman*s pressure in the front finally convinced Johnston to retreat, even though the main attack had bean repulsed well,^^ and this he did later in the day*^^

Following them past M arietta, Sherman heard that the Confederates had crossed the Chattahoochee Biver, which ran a few miles north of Atlanta, and had set up entrenchments to aid in preventing any attempted crossing. But they failed to watch their extreme wings very carefully, for, on July 8, Cox, having been sent to the extreme left to cross the river nine miles above the main railroad bridge, moved his men across pontoon bridges early in the morning in a brilliant maneuver; The Confederate outposts didn't even know he was in the vicinity until his men had carried the heights opposite the river and had already begun laying bridges for later crossings; and Confederate fire did little to keep the rest of the army from coming over. By the seventeenth the rest of the army was across, and Johnston had retreated to Atlanta.

It was also on the seventeenth that a new commander of the rebel army was named. Jefferson Davis had become very

23over 2,000 Union troops had died in the attack. ^^hChe retreat came mostly because of Johnston's policy of leaving the battle after inflicting severe damage. This he obviously had done, for Sherman's movement was actually a failure in which, as he said, "Coz's advance was the only success of the day." Sherman, as quoted in John H. Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army. (New York, 1897), p. 1 # . See also Cox's diary, June 2d, 1864, Cox Papers. 118 displeased with Johnston’s tactics and the territory he was losing, and this fact, added to the criticism General Hood had sent to Davis, made him decide to place Hood at the army’s head. This action "was a confession that Sherman’s methods had brought about the very result he aimed at."^^ The Confederates had had the choice of either abandoning Atlanta and north Georgia or becoming aggressive and fighting the fédérais directly. The choice of Hood as commander showed that the former course had been abandoned and the latter was now Confederate policy. Sherman’s long-awaited chance to annihilate the rebels In direct battle now seemed quite close.

On July 20 Hood made the first of his offensive moves, against General Thomas’s Cumberland army at Peach Tree Crrek. He was defeated soundly, losing twice as many men as the fédérais did. But Hood was not one to give up, and on the 22nd he launched an attack on McPherson’s army, which had been sent to the extreme left to advance by way of Decatur to cut off Confederate supplies from the east. The Confederates were again repulsed, and, after another defeat on the 28th, the Confederates refused to continue the assaults, which had taken a heavy to ll. Hood, now trapped in the dilemma of going against his men’s wishes or returning to Johnston’s policy, lAlch he had severely criticized, ordered his men back toward Atlanta and began planning the defense of that city.

25cox, M ilitary Hemlnlsconces. II, 277# 119

Meanwhile, General Cox was moving his division, during the first part of August, to the extreme rlg^t flank again as part of the overall plan to extend the army further to the west and south. On August 18 he reached a point near the Utoy and Caa^ creeks, almost directly west of A tlanta.^

Holding his position there iriille the bulk of the Armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland passed around to the south to cut off a possible retreat by Hood, Cox's division became the base of the curving movement. When this move was completed and Cox's men again had become the extreme le ft wing, the army began swinging toward Atlanta. When the new right wing, under General 0. 0. Howard, moved toward Jonesboro, Hood, feeling It was best to leave while he could, blew up the ordnance stores In Atlanta and abandoned the city. On September 2, 1864, the 20th Army Corps occupied Atlanta, and the rest of Sherman's army were called In for a rest. The goal of the grand march had been completed.

2 6 Cox, Diary, August I-19, 1864, Cox Papers. CHAPTER IX

FRANKLIN AND THE WAR'S END

During the time Sherman's army waited for further action and for Hood's next move, Cox gave himself to his usual leisure activity of reading and writing letters. But most likely he also spent part of the time musing about his activities in Georgia and his past m ilitary career. He knew he had done his share on the way to Atlanta and had proven that the granting of his persistent request for active field work had been justified. Cox could handle himself and his men in the field and he could be, and was, justly proud of his accomplishments. While it was true he had every right to be bitter about losing his promotion and seeing men with far less service gain, througdi their political ties, the rank he had lost (with obviously less m erit), Cox was figniting this war for the nation and the Union and not Mr. Lincoln or any of those scheming Washington politicians. He would do his duty and forget about past disappointments—God's war must be won. If only the cause could be aided by Major General Cox,

Such were the probable inner thoughts of this proud, inflexible and somewhat ambitious young man as he waited for his next duty. They were soon put out «of his mind when the

120 121 order came that he was to he put In temporary command of the 23rd Army Corps while Schofield was In Xhozvllle on Department business.^ After setting up his three divisions around Decatur to keep a lookout for Confederate advances from the southeast or east, Coz heard that Sherman had sent Thomas with some of his army to Chattanooga to watch over communications with the North and to prevent the Confederates from attacking the northeast. Similar placements of the rest of the troops in the area were also made, and by the end of September Sherman's position was completely secure.

But Hood, feeling that with the reduction of Sherman's forces it was time for him to make an attack, began moving to the west of A tlanta, hoping to make Sherman follow him toward Alabama. At first this plan worked, for when, on October 1, Sherman had news that Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee, he ordered the remainder of his men, except for the 20th Army Corps, after Hood. Cox and the 23rd were sent from Decatur to M arietta, idiioh they reached on the fifth.^ Hood, whose plan to cut Sherman's communication line had failed, meanwhile decided to march to Besaca to try to destroy the bridge there. The federal army in turn marched throu^ Allatoona, on to Home, and then throu^ such places as Grover's Gap and Melville, Georgia, and Cedar Bluffs, Alabama, after him. But still Hood

^Before he le ft, he wrote Sherman recommending Coz for promotion, saying, "I have never saan a more able and efficient division commander," O.H.. col. 39» pt. 2, p. 366. ^Cox, Diary, October 1-3, 1864, Cox Papers. 122 could not be caught, and Sherman, who had told Coz previously that if Hood went far enouggi west he (Sherman) would leave only a part of the army to chase him and would march to the sea, became tired of the chase. He wrote "to pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a foz and wear out the army In p u r s u i t . s o he decided the time had come to split his army.

Coz looked forward to this, for Sherman, now his close friend, had promised to take him along on the march to the sea In command of the 23rd. But «hêu Schofield heard of this, he protested vehemently, saying that If Hood were left to turn his whole force upon Thomas In Tennessee, another veteran corps there mlggit make a ll the difference between defeat and victory. Sherman consented after Schofield convinced Coz that the real fighting would be In Tennessee and that Hood would not follow Sherman. He placed Schofield at the head of the 23rd and the 4th and Coz In field command of the 23r d .^ The news that Hood had reached Decatur, Alabama then convinced Sherman tc leave Immediately. Giving to Schofield's army the task of retarding Hood's advance north until Thomas could concentrate at Nashville and then joining Thomas to defend that city, Sherman began pr^aratlons to leave for the sea.

Neanidille, Schofield's men continued on the chase after Hood. On O cto b er 30 C o z 's d iv is io n m arched to Home, G eorgia

3o.E.. vol. 39, p t . 3 , p . 378. h. Coz, M ilitary Reminiscences. II, 320-2. 123 i^ere Coz bid Sherman good-bye and learned that the latter had urged his promotion.^ Schofield's armjr then turned north again toward Eesaca and Tilton where they were to take trains to Nashville to meet Thomas. But because of the rush to cooQ>lete Sherman's preparations, the only available trains were In use, and so Coz marched his men north to Dalton tc take the train from there. On November 7 he left Dalton and later the same day arrived In Chattanooga. On November 9 he reached Nashville where he learned of Hood's latest movements. The Confederate leader had crossed the Tennessee Elver near Florence, Alabama and was moving north. In response, Schofield was ordered to send his army to Franklin and Columbia, Tennessee to await Hood's advance.

On November 15, his men having completed th eir move south were now spread along the road to Nashville, Schofield met Coz at Pigeon Creek, near Pulaski, where they discussed Heed's probable moves and ezamlned the countryside for Its defense capabilities. They ezpected an Immediate attack, but Hood's difficulties In getting necessary supplies kept him from moving for a week. Finally on November 22 Hood moved toward Columbia, his plan being to harass and defeat the western section of Sherman's army so Sherman would have to return to help and give up his march. On the 24th Coz met and defeated Hood's advance cavalry In front of Columbia, but the Confederates' speed and Schofield's desire to keep them

^Coz, Diary, October 30, 1864, Coz Papers. 12k from cutting his force off from Thomas is made him order a retreat north across the Duck Elver.

Hood, idio s till remembered his bad experience with frontal attacks around Atlanta, decided that he could best hurt Schofield by cutting him off by moving his right flank east of Columbia and over the Duck Elver there. This he had accomplished on November 29 when his men came within two miles of Spring H ill. When Schofield heard of this, he knew he would have to retreat quickly or be cut off easily; and so, after ordering General D. S. Stanley (commander of the 4th Army Corps) to Spring H ill, he ordered the rest of the army to retreat to Franklin. With Stanley is artillery holding the Confederates off and Cox is third division acting as a rear guard, the retreat went smoothly, except for the short time when Cox Is men marched within s l^ t and hearing of the Confederates In the night.^ But they got by this force safely, and followed the rest of the army to Franklin, arriving there at 4 o I clock on the moxnlng of November 30.

Schofield, who knew Thomas was not yet ready to fight Hood, decided to use part of his men to hold off Hood at Franklin for as long as he could, sJ.1 the while sending the rest over the Harpeth Elver, which ran behind the city.

^General Hood felt his men should have attacked here and destroyed Coxis division and ended the retreat. Instead they slnq>ly stayed where they were and let the fédérais continue on. See John B. Hood, Advance and Eetreat, (New Orleans, 1880), p. 287. Cox denied that they could have done anything of the sort, and felt that his men could have repelled any attack. See his handwritten note In his personal copy of Hoodis Advance and Eetreat. pp. 287, 291, Oberlln College Library. 125

He Instructed Coz to set up a line of troops to meet Hood's advance and protect the planned retreat.? At dawn Coz rode on a line crossing the main road to Franklin and selected and marked positions for his divisions.® With a division of the 4th Army Corps under General George Wagner in front of the line and a brigade under Colonel Emerson Opdycke, Coz's old Warren friend, in back acting as a reserve, the commandant on the line waited for the attack.

Hood knew that he would have to keep Schofield from getting his army over the Harpeth or he could join Thomas without opposition, and so he felt he would have to attack with his full force. At about 3:30 in the afternoon of the thirtieth his infantry stormed upon General Wagner and his men and routed them easily (he had been ordered to retreat at the first sign of an attack, but hadn't), causing his men to run back toward the main line in utter disorder. This event brou^t out the danger that if Coz's main line waited for the retreating force to come back, the closely-following Confederates could breach the line without being fired upon. Coz decided to have his men in the middle wait until Wagner's men were behind them before firing, while ordering the flanks to open fire as soon as they could and notifying Opdycke to be ready to help in the center. He himself rode there, appearing at the critical moment

?Schofield, Fortv-Siz Years, p. 175* This was. more necessary because the pontoon bridges Schofield had requested from Thomas to cross the Harpeth Hiver had not arrived. Q Coz to Emerson Opdycke, February 2, I876, Coz Papers. 126 when the Confederates hit the line and broke It for a few feet. Sallying his men in the broken line and waving his sword h i^ in the air, Coz called on the troops to hold the advance and help in the center.^ His emotional appeal to his men and Opdycke's charge with his brigade at the same moment saved the day,and soon the hole was closed. The fighting continued over the whole line, and the Confederates held the center until much later that niggit when they were finally forced back.^^

Coz, who had directed the aitire battle,1% reported to

Schofield after it that he could hold his position indefinitely and could even make a counter-offensive the nezt day. But

^Thomas Speed, "The B attle of Franklin, Tennessee," Sketches of War History. (Cincinnati, 1890), pp. 5-6. ^^Coz to Emerson Opdycke, February 9> 18?6, Coz Papers. ^^The Battle of Franklin was one of the bloodiest of the war, with the Confederates losing about 6,000 killed, wounded, or missing. It was also Coz's finest moment and his greatest victory of the war, and it was done "with an inferior force... in the worst position that could be found." Schofield to George Thomas, November 30, 1864, Coz Papers. ^^This fact was disputed later by General Stanley who felt he and not Coz deserved the glory for Franklin. Actually he did very little ezcept try to get some of Wagner's mai to return to the field before he was wounded and had to leave the scene. When he returned home a few days later, he told the editors of the Cincinnati Commercial that he had played the leading role in the battle. This they printed (December 3» page 2 ), and the impression all over the country was that Stanley had been in charge. Twenty years later Stanley was to bring the whole matter up again in a newspaper controversy with Coz. The latter was, actually, in command on the line but he suffered the handicap of being second in command and not being the official commander of the 23rd Army Corps. But he always asserted his claim to field command there, and this seems quite valid. See his Battle of Franklin. Tennessee. November 30. 1864. (New York, 1897), for a complete discussion of the battle, and the controversies it wrought, and ezact proof that Coz was truly the field commander. 127

Schofield felt it wotild be best to continue the retreat to Nashville while Hood was s till weak from the battle, and so, soon after, Coz, still acting as the rear guard, marched his men to Nashville. After arriving there on December 1, he took his men into bivouac. There he stayed for the nezt few days as Hood slowly moved his men toward Nashville and Thomas carefully arranged his troops and artillery for the ezpected b a t t l e .

Finally, on December 15* after Thomas's long delay had caused Grant to be so annoyed that he had sent a replacement for Thomas, the attack was made. Ih the beginning Coz's corps was held in reserve because of its losses at Franklin, and it saw little action on the first day. On the sizteenth they joined in the flanking movement on the weakened Confederate left, and their advance was so strong that soon the Confederates broke their ranks and began retreating on the run. When the center of the Union army attacked and took control of the rebels main line, the battle was over, and Hood had no choice but to retreat, and then the chase was on. A hard rain and the muddy roads made it more difficult, but the chase went on apace for the nezt few days, inflicting heavy damage on Hood. Coz's men took up the rear guard on this move and had to perform the disagreeable task of repairing bridges and roads and helping to keep supply lines open.

Meanwhile, Hood retreated over the Tennessee on

December 29, and there Thomas halted, feeling that since Hood's 128 threat was over, his army was orushed, and Sherman

But he would have to w it for this, for duty soon called again* While recovering from an eztended Illness (December l6- January 2), Coz, knowing that Thomas's army would be going into winter quarters, had requested a thirty day leave to go home to see his family* This was granted on December 30, but when Coz learned from Schofield that his army's active casqpalgning would continue, he disregarded the leave and marched with his corps to Columbia and then to near the Tennessee Elver. There they waited for a week until January 13# 1863, a most eventful day in Coz's life, when his corps was ordered to Annapolis, Maryland from which they were to be sent by ship to the Wilmington, North Carolina area to help pave the way for Sherman's march north from Savannah* (They were sent on a

^%e was again recommended for promotion by Schofield, who wrote, "It Is unnecessary to recite the services of so distinguished an officer*.«in overlooking him the Government oommltted a great act of Injustice*" Schofield to General Henry W. Halleek, December 19, 1864, O.E*. vol. 45, pt. 2, p* 273* Thomas endorsed the recommendation, saying, "at the battle of Franklin he was eminently distinguished for personal courage as well as for skilled management of his command*" Thomas to Halleek, December 20, 1864, O.B.* vol. 43, p t, 2, p* 274. Congressman Garfield was working for the same goal, having seen Secretary of War who told him Coz's name would be put on the promotion list* Garfield to Coz, December 14, 1864, Coz Papers* 129 round-about way because too many Confederate troops were In the direct line.) On the same day Cox received the news that his long-awaited promotion to Major General had finally been confirmed, having been dated December 7# 1864, the date of Schofield's report of Franklin. With his new rank finally achieved and the chance to re-unite with Sherman in the offing, Cox was overjoyed at his luck, and he looked forward to the rest of the war with eagerness.

After spending a week at home in Warren with his family, Cox was ordered, on January 26, to meet his command, idiich had gone to Washington. After Cox arrived there, he spent a few days socializing with Garfield, Henry W. Davis, Salmon Chase, Henry Ward Beecher, and others, and leamed that Grant was to send S c h o fie ld in command o f th e new departm en t o f N orth Carolina with two provisional corps (one of which Cox was to command) to capture Wilmington, North Carolina and help prepare the way for Sherman's march north.On F eb ru ary 4 Cox and Schofield sailed with some of their men and, after having to wait out some bad weather, finally got to Cape Fear and Fort Fisher, near Wilmington, and unloaded their troops on F eb ru ary 9»

On February 11 Cox ordered his men to march north on Federal Point to meet General Alfred H. Terry's corps idiich had landed there earlier. But after two days he was ordered

^^Cox, Diary, January 30-February 2, 1865, Cox Papers. 130 back to Fort Fisher by Schofield vtho wanted him to cross the Cape Fear Elver and come up behind Fort Anderson, which controlled the passage up the river, and capture It.^^ After a delay of two days because of bad weather, Coz and his men crossed on the sizteenth and drove the rebels to the fort on the eighteenth. Then, just as his men were about to move to surround It, he received the news that the fort had been abandoned. Leaving a small force behind to hold It, Coz continued his drive north, pushing the Confederates over Town Creek. On the twenty-first he arrived at Brunswick Ferry and sent an advance guard to Eagle Island, which lay opposite Wilmington. General Brazton Bragg, In charge of the Confederate army In North Carolina, decided the situation there was perilous, and he ordered his men to retreat. On February 22, when the federal troops moved Into and occupied Wilmington, they received no opposition.

With this first part of his overall task completed, Schofield now turned to the taking up of his nezt order- opening the line of communication from Beaufort and New Berne, North Carolina Into the Interior and Goldsboro. Sending Terry directly north to follow the Confederate troops who had retreated from Wilmington, he ordered Coz to take command of the "D istrict of Beaufort" and the three divisions which were assembling there. His task was to cover the reconstruction of the railroad to Goldsboro with his troops so that it could

^^Speolal order no. 7, Edqtrs., Department of North Carolina, February 17, I 865, Coz Papers. 131 supply Sherman when he arrived there. On February 28 he left Wilmington with his staff» and on the same day arrived at Beaufort and took the railroad to New Berne to meet his troops. After organizing them Into flegating condition» he began his march to the Interior on March 2.

Because of the poor roads and the lack of wagons and the need to go only as far as the railroad went each day» the advance went slowly and gave the Confederates a chance to prepare for It. On March 7» near Kinston» some of the Confederate troops who had retreated from Wilmington and new ones from the north prepared to meet Coz. In the battle the nezt day Coz repulsed them^^ and began to push them back. Hard skirmishing followed for the nezt two days» until finally the Confederates retreated over the Neuse Blver behind Kinston. Bragg decided his men were being wasted there since Sherman was reported In the area» and so he ordered them to retreat to Goldsboro where they would Join with Johnston's men and make a stand against Sherman. As a result on March 14 Coz marched his men Into Kinston» occupied It» and began preparing for his further advance.

The nezt few days were spent In waiting for supplies and news of Sherman's advance. On March 20 Coz continued his drive and two days later occupied Goldsboro with little

l^Coz» Diary» March 8-10» 1865» Coz Papers. 132 opposition. There he heard that Terry had completed his move from Wilmington and that Sherman mas approaching, having driven Johnston to Balelgh. The nezt day the three Union commanders met In a trltuqphant mood and discussed their successful campaigns and their plans for Johnston. Sherman also told them of his upcoming trip to Fortress Monroe to discuss the final strategy of the war and the surrender conditions with Lincoln and Grant. He left on March 25, and when he returned he revealed that Coz had been placed In permanent command of the 23r d Army C orps,and was to spend the nezt few days preparing for his part In the final battle with Johnston. It was during this preparation that the news of the fall of Richmond reached the troops, and now they knew that the war would end soon.

But they still had some fighting to do, and so, on April 10, Sherman ordered the advance to begin. Coz moved his corps on the road to Balelgh, but two days later he received from Sherman the news that Lee had surrendered to Grant^^ and that Sherman*s fears that Lee's army would try to unite with Johnston's were over. "The army nearly went crazy with joy," and Coz now felt "further resistance was worse than u s e l e s s . "^9 Apparently Johnston, iriio had also heard the news, felt the

^'^Gœeral Order no. 49, War Department, Washington, March 27, 1864, O.R.. vol. 4?, pt. 3 , p . 34. *1A For an Interesting description of how the news came to Coz, see A. J. Blcks, "Carrying the News of Lee's Surrender to the Army of the Ohio," Sketches of War History. (Cincinnati, 1890), II, 235. ^^Coz, Diary, April 12, I 865, Coz Papers. 133

same vay» and when he saw the federal troops on the outskirts of Balelgh on the l4th he felt it was time to surrender also. Sending Sherman a note asking for an arm istice with a view toward ending the war, Johnston gave up the Confederacy's last chance and began the arrangements for its m ilitary demise.

Soon after Sherman accepted this request and began preparing for negotiations, he received the news of Lincoln's assassination. He immediately ordered Coz and the other commanders to strengthen their garrisons to keep their men from atteBQ)ting to destroy Ealeigh or hurt its citizens when the Union troops heard the news. It was not until after this was done and the news that a conference leading to the disbanding of the Confederate army was announced that Coz told his men what had happened; and th is helped keep them in check while the city was protected. But everyone knew that such arrangements could only be temporary, and that if active operations were to commence again, it would be impossible to restrain the troops from great outrages.

Thus Johnston had no real choice but to surrender. On April 19 Sherman offered him the same basic peace plan Grant had offered Lee—his men were to go peacefully to their home states, surrender their arms under federal jurisdiction at their state eapitols, and be free from prosecution for treason. There was no mention of slavery, for Sherman assumed that the Confederate defeat meant it was dead forever. Sherman also

^®Cox, Diary, April 18, 1865, Coz Papers. 134 agreed that the federal goremment would recognize the existing state governments as agents for Southern submission. Johnston accepted, but Sherman told him the settlement would be valid only if accepted by the new Johnson administration. But this was not to come, for on April 24 Grant arrived aad told Sherman the terms he had arrived at treated of civil policy—lAiich was not supposed to be discussed, in m ilitary negotiations. Thus the administration had refused to accept the settlement. Sherman, who was glad to get rid of his role as. a negotiator, informed Johnston of the refusal, told him their truce would end in forty-eight hours, end began preparing for battle once again.

But Johnston wanted none of that and so, on April 2? he capitulated to the new terms and surrendered his army to Sherman. Coz, who had heard that the whole army would be sent North now that the war was over, was instead ordered to stay in North Carolina as part of the occupying forces under Schofield. His headquarters were to be at Greensboro, where he was to assist in the paroling of the Confederate forces. Arriving there on Nay 1, he met Johnston and discussed the paroling procedure and the discipline he would have to use to keep the now-defeated and unruly rebel troops in order.^^

Setting up his men to guard against the mischief and thievery the Confederate troops had been perpetrating until he arrived, Coz then began parolling them. In a few days he had finished

^^Cox, Diary, May 1, 1865, Coz Papers. 135

that task, and for all practical pnrpcses his contact with the enemy army had ceased. The rest of his m ilitary career was spent in an administrative capacity.

On May 5 Coz was named m ilitary commander of the westexn part of North Carolina and was ordered to pacify the conntryside, which had been somewhat ravaged by returning Confederate troops passing through. To put a stop to such occurrences, he spread his three divisions over the area and ordered his cavalry to scout for anything iriiich might be disturbing the peace. Because of these tactics the area was soon completely under his control, and Coz used the opportunity to inspect his command area. His first stop was at the prisoner-of-war camp at Salisbury, whose former inmates he had seen pass by Greensboro on the way home. The conditions he found there sickened him, and when he was told by a local woman that her pleas for better treatment had been shunned by the Confederate commander there, he became quite angry at such an abuse of command. His feelings for the men idio had had to live there were very compassionate, and he felt they would have been better off had they been shot instead of being subjected to such despicable treatment.

Although he had lived through four years of war and carnage, Coz couldn't stand to stay at Salisbury very long,

^^See his speech, ''The Surrender of Johnston's Army and Closing Scenes of the War in North Carolina," Sketches of War History. (Cincinnati, 1888), pp. 247-52, and hlsTM litarv Beminiscences. II, 537-9* 136 and so le ft the same day* Bettixnlng to Greensboro, he found that Schofield had gone to Washington and that he had been named M ilitary Governor of North Carolina, with headquarters at Balelgh* Since Coz's duties were now completely adm inistrative, he took the time to catch up on his reading and the discussions he had begun earlier with the people living there and with his friends on their respective thou^ts about secession, the war, the Negro and the reconstruction of the South which was to follow *

The most surprising thing he leamed was that most of the people of North Carolina were not originally secessionists, but had become supporters of the Confederacy either out of state loyalty or from fear* Although they also feared that when the war was over they would have a ll their liberties taken away by an avenging Northern army, they were pleasantly surprised to find this untrue.^3 And this fact helped make it easier for many to accept the inevitable truth that slavery was dead and emancipation was the law of the land. In order to help smooth the way to acceptance Coz addressed the people at many places in his district, ezplained these policies, and advised them to recognize slavery's end and tc deal with the freed man with perfect sincerity as free laborers.

Host of them felt this was the correct thing to do, but Coz saw that they would have difficulty in doing so while the

^^Coz, D ia ry , May 8, 1865, Coz Papers. Coz, M ilitary Beminiscences. II, 540. 137

Negro vas acting as he was then. The freedmen, Coz felt, were an Ignorant people, and it was his impression that they felt that the end of the war meant they no longer had to work and that each of them could now appropriate his old master's property. Coz and his men did their hest to dispel their notion that wealth and idleness were to follow emancipation,^^ hut most of the freedmen reacted in no other way than to peacefully remain idle and wait for their “forty acres and a m ule."

Coz's reaction as he discussed these issues with the idiites and saw the racial and political situation there was what one would ezpect from a man slowly developing into an elitist. He felt that the best way for the South to redeem itself would be to give to its “better" men (upper class and intellectuals) the reins of power and allow them to guide each state back into the Union. He thou^t this class would control the whites better than any other and would be the one most capable of showing a sense of noblesse oblige toward the poor Negro. Such men had told him that they were anzious to assent to the end of slavery and to show allegiance to the federal government and free labor. He felt if they were taken back into the Union as state leaders while their people were in a humble mood, the nation's reconstruction would come easily.

The only thing to fear was d e l a y . 26

^^Coz, Surrender of Johnston's Army", p. 256. ^^Coz to Aaron P. Perry, May 25» 1865, Coz Papers. 138

Althou^ Coz had been a radical when the war started, his Innate conservatism and contact with "plantation Negroes" a ll around the South throughout the war cooled his earlier ardor quite a bit. He felt It required "a hardier faith In pure democracy than I have to believe It safe to transfer millions of uneducated slaves to full responsibility as electors and law makers In one bound." Coz had a genuine compassion for the freedman, feeling he had to be protected and cared for during a period of leamlng the ways of civilization and republicanism. But still Coz wondered "If a republic can ezlst without homogeneity of race In Its citizens;" and he felt that lacking this, the situation might lead to another war—this between the races for political dominance. A strong believer In Anglo-Sazon superiority, Coz could not bring himself to believe that the Negro could soon or ever become the white man's equal—and If he ever did become so, Coz feared a racial war. In such a dilemma Coz had to come up with a compromise solution to solve this problem. The answer he decided upon was to have a large effect on the nezt phase of his career and was to be the key to his political future.

But before that aspect of his life Is discussed. It Is necessary to analyze the effect of Coz's war career on his character. He had gone Into the war as a radical on the slavery question, but he had come out of It as a conservative on that Issue. He had commanded army divisions for four years In his usual crisp, methodical, colorless, and efficient way

^7ibld. 139 and had gained the respect and obedience of his men. The war had given him an opportmiity to be a leader of men, and it was clear both that he enjoyed that role and that he felt it was only right that he should be a leader in every other aspect of his life. He never achieved monumental political success, in part because his concept that as a leader his ideas should be accepted or else was an untenable and impractical position for an aspiring politician to hold. Coz probably could see this, but at the same time he always felt the loss of a chance at hig^ office was acceptable because he had not budged from his true convictions at any time. Whether or not he was right, it can truly be said that this factor was the key determinant in almost every aspect of Coz's political career. CHAPTER X

THE GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE

The Civil War vas not only a horrible vaste of life and a destroyer of the Southern economy; it vas also a spur to the political success of a great number of its participants. Some of these» like General Grant, had had no political experience previously, but vere given political trust because of their qualities of leadership and discipline. Others, like James A. Garfield, had previously been politicians and nov had additional factors, a m ilitary rank and a "brilliant" var record, to catch the eye of the voter. Jacob D. Cox vas of the latter class, but he vas too prone to be brutally honest, and unchanging in his public statements to take full advantage of his var experience. His beliefs and principles vere far too important to him to sacrifice for political success. As a result he never achieved the political heights his friend Garfield did.

The major phase of his political career began in March, I 865, Tdien some Ohio soldiers requested the Ohio Union Party's Central Committee to shape the call for the next State convention so as to admit a full representation from each group of Ohio soldiers in the field. By an act of February 13,

140 I 4 l

1863, they had been allowed to vote while in the field, but now they wanted to have some control over the nominees as well. In response the Central Committee's call for the convention, issued on April 10, I 865, gave to each Ohio regiment, battalion, and battery the ri^ t to select delegates.! When this news came to the Ohio troops in North Carolina, they immediately began planning their delegate- selection process and also considering an appropriate candidate for governor to head the ticket. For many of those in th e 23rd Army Corps, the choice was an easy one—their commander. General Jacob D. Coz.^

Coz knew of this movement for his nomination almost im m ediately,3 and he then began to consider its implications. He knew that with the war over the major issue which had led to the formation of the Union and Peace Democratic parties would be gone and would be replaced by the Negro issue. As early as February, I 863, he had considered what to do with the freed Negro, and had decided that the blacks could be trained in m ilitary discipline during the war, and then be put in control of "a m ilitary colony on the Southwest frontier

^Porter, Ohio Politics, p. 204. Each regiment got one vote and each independent battery one-half vote. 2 C in cin n at i Gommft-reifti. May 1 , I 865» p. 2. It reported that Coz was the candidate of Sherman's army. Others mentioned were Hutherford B. Hayes and James B. Steadman.

3Letters from Judge William M. Dickson, John S. Casement, and Aaron F. Perry in early Hay discussed the possibility. All are in the Coz Papers. 142 which cotild absorb the surplus black population and solve the emancipation problem with a system of colonization."^ Two years later he wrote his friend Perry wondering if, since the question of Negro suffrage was being raised in the North and he (Coz) opposed it, while holding such views he would be a proper candidate for the nomination for governor. He felt he could be a candidate only if the party platform didn't hinder him in these views. To insure that he would be covered no matter what happened, Coz requested Perry, idio would be a member of the platform committee, to act as his prozy with the understanding that he could not be bound to be an unconditional advocate of policies in conflict with his own principles. Should a platform Coz could not advocate be presented and accepted by the convention. Perry should preez^torily withdraw Coz's name as a candidate.^ Coz thus drew the line of principle over which he would not step.

By the end of May, having decided to refuse Sherman's offer of a commission as a Brigadier-General in the regular Army, Coz began to consider seriously his nomination strategy. Leaving the active can^aigning in Ohio to Judge William H. Dickson, a party leader, and Aaron Perry, Coz, who had to stay in North Carolina, confined himself to his m ilitary governor's duties. He kept in touch with Ohio througdi Perry and Dickson,

A Coz to Perry, February 9, I 863, Coz Papers. ^Coz to Perry, May 25, I 865, Coz Papers. Coz said he preferred to retire to private professional life and from politics, but would s till be proud to receive the nomination. Ik3 and le a rn e d from h i s f r ie n d s how th e oaoQ>algn was g o in g . He was chagrined to hear of the growing movement to put Negro suffrage on the platform,* but felt that the convention would leave the matter to the administration to solve. And he was probably quite joyful when he heard his possible army opponents had dropped out of the race and left only Governor Brough in opposition. When the latter, idio had become somewhat unpopular during the war, also dropped out of the competition on June 17, 1865, the path to the nomination was wide open.7

When the convention met on June 21, the 143 soldier delegates were almost solidly for Cox and against Negro suffrage.* The first major order of business was the nominations for the state offices, and Benjamin Eggleston, on behalf of Hamilton County, nominated Cox for Governor. This was met by the wildest enthusiasm, and on the motion of General Silas A. Strickland, the nomination was made by acclamation. After the almost-riotous cheering and yelling which resulted had quieted, the other state offices were

*Judge W. M. Dickson to Cox, June 17, 1865. Dickson was an advocate of Negro suffrage and presumed Cox was the same—-and Cox did not te ll him differently until later. ?Most party organs felt Cox, idio was one of only two volunteer officers to reach his rank, was the only candidate left. He was not really well known yet though, and the Cleveland Leader referred to him as «Joseph" D. Cox (June 19, l863, p. 2.) Gporter, Ohio Politics, p. 207. They also favored Johnson ' s reconstruccion policy. 144 filled.^ Then the platform committee, whose chairman was William Dickson, announced its resolutions. Because of Perry's work on the committee, a compromise plank on the Negro suffrage question, only calling on the party to keep in view the principles of the Declaration of Independence, was presented to and accepted by the convention. The other planks, praising the war effort and calling for security against further Southern warfare before reconstruction could begin, also passed e a s i l y .

Cox, quite pleased at the vote of confidence and the non-committal platform, immediately put into effect a plan he had discussed earlier with Perry and Schofield. Requesting duty in Ohio to muster out his troops (and to be there to canvass the state), Cox was told by Schofield that Grant would accede to the request as soon as he (Schofield) returned to N orth Carolina.The Johnson administration, quite anxious to get Cox home and elected, then ordered him to Columbus to command the D istrict of Ohio on June 30, 1 8 6 5 and he arrived there on July 6.

But before going to Columbus, Cox stopped off in Washington to v isit his friend Postmaster-General William

g ^Smith, Ohio Republicans, pp. 205-7# Some of these were: Andrew G. Hcsurney for Lieutenant Governor, Sidney S. Warner for Treasurer, and William West for Attorney General. ^^Schofield to Cox, June 26, 1865, Cox Papers. llspecial Order no. 345, Hdqtrs. of the Army, Adj. General's Office, Washington, June 30, 1865. Cox Papers. Ik5

Dennison and his other Washington aequalntanoes* There, after not being allowed to see President Andrew Johnson to discuss reconstruction because of the President's Illness, Coz learned of the President's policy and the reaction to It. Throu^ a series of proclamations and the exercise of his executive power, Johnson had already launched his program of reconstruction. He had granted amnesty to a ll Southerners (with some exceptions) taking an oath to support all federal laws and had. In a proclamation to North Carolina, set the standards for state admission through a provisional government and a convention of loyal men.^^ Althou^ the radical element In the Republican party had not yet solidified In opposition to this policy, there were already some evidences that idien Congress met later In the year, some of Its members would come out for a much stricter and more vindictive policy and for Negro suffrage In the South. The path toward Impeachment was already being paved.

When Cox arrived In Columbus, these thoughts s till In his mind, he learned that newspapers from all parts of the state had been conjecturing about his stand on Negro suffrage. Almost all of them assumed that because of his Oberlln training and his earlier representation of a Western Reserve district he, as one Democratic paper put It, "faithfully represents the Western

^^Erlc McKltrlck. Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction. (Chicago, i960), pp. 19-20,' 48-50. ------146

Reserve where the African has long been the idol»”^^ and as a radical Republican paper said, "Coz is at this moment an ardent advocate of free suffrage*Since he had not spoken publicly on this matter, confining his discussion of it to his private letters, Coz knew that such conjectures were valid considering his background* But he felt that he should wait until the canqpaign opened, in August, before he should reveal his thoughts and contribute his "ideas to the common stock and try to mold public sentiment" to his outlook and reunite the party on that basis* He would open the campaign with a speech giving his views on dealing with the Negro problem, and then he would do his best to make the people follow him*^^ In the meantime, he would use his personal influence to prepare the way for these doctrines and then trust in God and country*^^

However, things were net to work out so nicely* In mid-July, the Democratic newspapers in Cincinnati and Columbus printed letters from some Ohio soldiers asking Coz ezactly what

^^Cinclnnati Enquirer* June 22, 1865, p. 2* Another said of him, "he was a nonentity from nowhere, a foppish, incompetent, whose m ilitary career was based on the fact that he went to Oberlin, studied with negroes, ate with negroes, and in all probability, slept with them* Ohio Statesman. (Columbus), July 11, 1865, p* 2* l^Portaae Democrat. July 5, 1865, p. 2* l^Coz to Dennison, July 9» 1865, Coz Papers* In this letter he outlined what was to be the basis of his "Oberlin letter's" ideas concerning the Negro* l^Coz to Schofield, July 10, 1865, John M* Schofield Papers, Library of Congress. 14? his stand on Negro suffrage «as.^? They implied that they knew he was against it, and they asked his vindication of this belief. The Democratic organ in Cleveland had previously printed the rumor that Coz had given a delegate permission to withdraw his name if the platform came out for Negro suffrage. When a mass meeting in Oberlin to dramatize the support for Negro suffrage in that area took place on July 19» 1865, and expressed its dissatisfaction over the Union platform, Coz became quite upset and restive about these assumptions and statements about his position. Writing to his classmate, Oberlin professor John M. E llis, who had written previously telling Coz of Oberlin*s unhappiness over the lack of a Negro suffrage plank in the platform, Coz outlined his true stand on this issue. He wrote that the South would be willing to accept the Thirteenth Amendment and Emancipation Proclamation as conditions for retum ing to the Union, but that they would never accept suffrage for the ignorant freedmen. If Congress refused to readmit the Southern states because of the issue, the nation would vote into office Congressmen who would do so without such conditions. If blacks had the vote, they would form their own party, idiich the Whites would gerrymander out of existencee The result would be a race war which the blacks could not win. The only solution Coz could see was the

^^Ohlo Sta-tefliBAn. July 14, 1865, p. 2; Cincinnati Gazette. July I9, 1005, p. 3. ^Qgiavel^d Plain Dealer. July 6, I865, p. 2. This paper also tried to iaQ>ly that Sherman had refused to support Coz, but later was forced to print the truth—that Sherman only felt Coz would be better off taking an army commission, but was well-qualified to be Governor also. 148 separation of the races, giving the blacks sole possession of a strip of the Southeastern coast to develop themselves. The only alternative was genocide for the black raee,^^

This letter was not designed for publication, but singly to explain Cox's views to an old friend. Thus Cox was probably surprised idien, on July 25# 1865, he received a letter from E, H. Fairchild, principal of the preparatory department at Oberlin, and from Samuel Plumb, Oberlin's mayor, telling him that they had heard rumors from Warren that Cox opposed Negro suffrage and asking for his exact stand on the issue as a condition for the South's reinstatement to the Union, Probably feeling that E llis had shown them his earlier letter or had at least told them that Cox held views opposite to theirs,C ox immediately sat down and wrote at one sitting his complete position on the Negro question in his famous "Oberlin Letter" to the self-styled "committee" of Plumb and Fairchild,

The letter began with Cox defending the party platform and the convention's decision to be cautious on such questions. But, Cox said, he reserved the right to have opinions contrary to the platform, especially since his record as an antislaveryite and soldier was proof of his loyalty to Republican principles. His four years of war experience had forced him to the

iPcox to John H, E llis, July 22, 1865, Cox Papers, 20E, H, Fairchild and Samuel Plumb, "Committee" to Cox, July 24, 1865, Cox Papers, They were a committee of two representing only themselves, 21 Most likely neither happened, but there is no evidence either way. 149 conviction that the war had not only embittered relations between blacks and lAiites in the South, but also had developed a rooted antagonism idiich made their permanent fusion in one political community an absolute im possibility. Granting the vote to the blacks would lead to chaos. Thus the only solution which Cox could see in view of his belief in the principle of inalienable ri^ ts, was the peaceable separation of the races on the soil where they were then. His pondering of this problem during the war had impelled him to the belief that the only basis of permanent nationality was to be found in complete homogeneity of people, manners, and laws. If the blacks were to unite with the whites, the former slaves, the weaker, would be reduced to subjugation and then destroyed.

Cox's plan to save them from this end involved taking contiguous coastal territory from South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, and organizing the freedmen there under United States sovereignty in a dependency analogous to a territory. They would then be given schools, political principles, homestead ri^ ts , and the chance to develop themselves into a civilized people. There would be no coercion needed to make blacks go there, for they would come voluntarily to where they could be truly free and independent. Althou^ Cox admitted such a system had some inherent difficulties, it was the best possible solution for everyone concerned. It would give the blacks their rights, reduce Southern representation, and secure Southern peace and allegiance; but 150 it had to be Implemented soon, for delay would only lead to hostility and racial war.^^

In one sitting Cox thus not only became one of the first to call for separation of the races, but also dealt a hard blow to his political future. His plan, while somewhat im practical because many Northern blacks and Southern whites would not want to leave their homes, was the product of some of the most original thinking anyone did on the question for many years. It was the thought-provoking product of a deep­ ly concerned man who, while believing in Anglo-Saxon superiority, still felt a duty and a need to help the freedman. The Negro, he felt, had to be the loser in any system of reconstruction which left him to deal with the Southern whites who deeply hated him. To separate him from his oppressors was the only compassionate thing to do, and the only way in which he could ever develop himself and both goals were worthy of the attempt.

While this plan was meant to be advantageous for the freedmen, it became very much the opposite for Cox. William Dennison had written him earlier, wazning him, because of his doubts as to its expediency in view of the growing sentiment for immediate Negro suffrage in the South, not to present his plan during the c a n v a s s B u t Cox was to o h o n e st to change

^^Cox to Plumb and Fairchild, July 25, 1865, Cox Papers. 23i)ennison to Cox, July 19, 1865, Cox Papers. 151 his mind, especially since, feeling that the returning soldiers had a strengthened racial pride and would not vote for anyone who favored Negro suffrage, their votes were enough to overcome those he would lose for taking his stand on segregation, Cox had begun formulating a compromise plan. He saw the Issue coming, studied Its every aspect deeply, and came to a decision bn It. Although that decision was Impolitic and controversial, Cox would not sway from It no matter what the ultim ate consequences, which were extremely detrimental to him. The problem was that It was not the way a rising politician usually acted, and It cost him dearly.

When it was printed In Ohio newspapers on August 1, I865 (Cox had given It to representatives of the Associated Press), the "Oberlin Letter" brought forth a storm of controversy and the wrath of many radicals down upon Cox. Althou^ he specifically noted In the letter that as chief executive of Ohio he had no real control over such events, the very fact that Cox had such opinions was enough for many radicals to condemn him. Cox felt that their demand that he favor Negro suffrage made them unconsciously play Into the hands of the Democrats, for such a demand would lose the soldier vote.^^ But still the radicals felt Cox had failed to support the true cause and Ideals of the Republican party, and that If he had been a candidate for Congress, a new candidate

2^Cox to Dennison, July 30 , I865» Cox Papers. 152 would have been nominated.^5 over the state radical Republican organs denounced Cox's s ta n d ,b u t still declared their support for the party candidate no matter how wrong his views. Yet, their earlier enthusiasm over the nominee quickly subsided, and most now only declared their support out of party loyalty.

The Democratic and moderate Republican organs were a different story altogether. The Cincinnati Enquirer was positively uproarious with joy, declaring that Coz had turned tall on his party's pet project In a glorlors manner and that he should have been a Democrat.^7 The Cincinnati Commercial, that city's moderate paper, said Cox had been frank and manly and had shown that the radloal element In the party did not have the unanimous support It felt It did.2® Although the Democratic organs eventually realized their mistake in praising the Union candidate and later returned to criticizing him, the moderates stayed with their support throughout the campaign. But the Ohio party had now been split by Cox's statements, and only time would te ll If the wounds would heal.

^^Ashtabula Sentinel. August 2, 1865» p. 2. See, for example, the Bellefontalne Republic. August 14, 1865» and the Elyria Democrat. August 11, lo63» p. 2. ^^Clnclnnatl Enquirer. August 2, 1865, p. 2. Most Southern papers praised him too. See, for example, the Richmond Courler-Bulletln. August 12, 1865, P» 2, which said, "Cox has done well and has originality of mind and Independence of character. A man of commanding Intellect and force of character." 2.8 Cincinnati Commercial. August 2, 1865, p. 2. 153

The abuse Cox received for his stand was also proving difficult to overcome. But he found "In the partial opinion of friends the antidote for the abuse," and this enabled him "to estimate truly the value of the attacks made" on hlm.^* Receiving con^llmentary letters from friends a ll over Ohio, the East, the South, and Oberlln too,30 Coz soon was reassured that his opinions had not hurt him very much and that his campaign could be based on his personal convictions without altogether ruining his chances for election. The only problem was how to keep the Reserve In the fold without antagonizing the soldier vote.

Fittingly his campaign began In Coz*s hometown of Warren, on the Reserve, on August 15* Seated on a platform with John Hutchins, David Tod, and James A. Garfield, Cox was greeted enthusiastically. Rising to speak first, Cox proceeded to reiterate all of his earlier pronouncements on reconstruction and the Negro problem, saying that only one who had personally observed Southern society could rightly judge It, He said that the conservatives and the old leaders of the South would eventually regain political control, and would accept the end of slavery; but, along with the rest of the whites there, would never accept Negro equality. His solution

Cox to Redella Coz, August 2, 1865» Coz Papers, One of the friends Coz didn't yet know was behind him was W. T, Sherman, See his letter to John Sherman, August 3, 1865» In Rachel Sherman Thorndike, ed,. The Sherman L etters. (New York, 1894)» p. 252, ' ^^See C. G, Finney, Jr. to Coz, August 4, I865 and C, F, Coz to Coz, August 4, I865» Coz Papers. 154 of this problem was to urge separation, but since the federal government and President Johnson would have to control reconstruction and were doing a fine job already, and since he had no power In that matter. It was best for everyone, he somewhat lamely concluded, to be free to express his opinions and keep the question open to debate so as to help the President gain a more complete knowledge of how the people felt,^ Apparently the people there agreed, for they gave Cox a fine hand when he finished.

He was followed to the podium by Hutchins who, after declaring his opposition to Cox#s stand, also declared his support for his candidacy. After Tod, the former governor, spoke In favor of Cox's plan and candidacy, Garfield, Cox's closest political friend, rose to speak. Althou^ he had earlier told Cox that he felt repugnance when thinking of Negroes as political equals and would be glad If they were

colonized or got rid of In any decent w a y , 32 Garfield had sensed the shift In the political winds and had begun to

change his m i n d . 33 Paying tribute to Cox's war record and merits as a candidate and praising the spirit which allowed a candidate to say ^ a t he wished, Garfield nevertheless spoke against Cox's separation scheme and declared himself

3^Clnclnnatl Commercial. August l6, I865, p. 2. 3^Garfleld to Cox, July 26, I865, Cox Papers. 33see Garfield to Cox, August 5f 1865, Cox Papers. 155

o/r flatly for Negro suffrage and the principle of party loyalty.^ There is no record of Cox*s reaction, but it is probable that he understood that his friend was a crafty politician who knew idiat to say and where to say it. The two remained friends (although one of Garfield*s biographers says that Garfield was so disgruntled at Coz*s stand that he was pleased when, later, a sprained ankle gave him a reason not to campaign further),35 but their differences over this issue was definite proof of the lack of unity in the Union party ranks.

Cox continued his campaigning in other northern Ohio

cities during the next few d a y s .3^ On August 21 he arrived at Oberlin lAiere he had promised Professor E llis that he would come for the college commencement exercises. But now, because of the "Oberlin letter" and the publicity it had received, Cox knew he would have to defend his opinions against the attacks of some Oberlin citizens. At a scheduled canQ>aign meeting on August 21, speaking to a large crowd (which included his stepson William Cochran and his brother, Charles Finney Coz, both Oberlin students at the time) in Oberlin*s First Church, Coz praised the war effort, the end of slavery, and his Oberlin

3^Westem Reserve Chronicle. August 16, 1865, p. 2. 35sobert G. Caldwell, James A. Garfield. Party C hieftain.(New York. 1 9 3 D » p . I b l . 3^Apparently he was accepted well there and with great enthusiasm. He now began to feel he would have no real trouble on the Reserve. See Cox to Dr. J. Williams, August 17, 1865, in Republican Party of Ohio Records, 1864-5, Cincinnati Historical Society, Cincinnati, Ohio. 156 training ?Aileh had helped him resolve to do his duty to farther both causes* But then he said he wished he could agree with those who felt that Negro rights could best be assured by giving them the vote, but could not because the freedman was not equal to the task. He felt political equality meant nothing If social equality were not attained, and that the Southern whites would never allow or accept It. The black vote would be no protection If Its holders dared not use It from fear of repression. Thus the freedman needed a place of refuge where he could advance without fear. So, Coz added, he opposed Negro suffrage In the South.

At this point a Negro In the audience Interrupted him and asked Coz If he favored Negro suffrage In Ohio. Coz answered "Yes" (receiving loud applause), for the percentage of blacks In Ohio was so small and their Intelligence so high,

that there would be no d a n g e r . 37 But If this were urged as

part of a general scheme to grant universal suffrage all over the nation, Coz said he could not advocate It. When he finished he received mlzed applause. But then the audience called for John Langston, a Negro student, who rose and practically accused Coz of apostasy and treachery for taking such stands. Althou^ he was furiously applauded after each vituperative sentence, much of the clapping was done

37 “"Some authors feel he said this to gain more Seserve votes and to ease tension In Oberlln. Actually he had always favored It and for these same reasons. 157

(according to William Cochran) by students #ho were making fun of hlm.38 When Langston was done the audience dispersed quietlyI probably convinced that Cox was not really an opponent, but a friend of the Negro, although In a way much différent from that to which they were accustomed. The town voted for Cox overwhelmingly In October.

The opponent they helped Cox defeat was General George W. Morgan. The Democrats, who felt they needed a m ilitary man to head their ticket to help regain some of the respectability and votes they had lost In I863, had at first thought to nominate General Sherman; but when he declared his support for Cox, they had to look elsewhere. At their August 24 state convention, with Clement Vallandlgham acting as platform chairman, the Democrats declared themselves In favor of states rl^ ts . Immediate readmis si on Into the Union for the South since the secession ordinances were now void, against Negro suffrage and Negroes In general, for a government of white men, and In favor of President Johnson's reconstruction policy.39 Their nominee for Governor, General George Morgan, a former minister to Portugal and a Brigadier General during the war,

3^The account of this meeting Is taken from William Cochran's note to an account of It In the Cincinnati Commerolal. August 22, I865, p. 2, from which he copied, along with other newspapers, comments about most parts of his stepfather's life . These are In the Cox Papers. Cochran was In the audience and his account, he says, Is more accurate than any newspaper's account because Cox spoke so long and so fluently that no stenographer could get It all, and thus many papers had garbled the speech.

39Clipping In Cox's Pocket Diary, 1865-6, Cox Papers. 158 accepted the nomination with a scathing attack on Coz*s plan for carving out from the South three or four Negro states with Negro representatives. There was never, he felt, a more obnoxious and odious Idea.^® His campaign, based on hatred and contentt for the Negro, had begun.

Coz, who felt he could win the election no matter who the Democratic nominee was, continued to present his own Ideas on the campaign tra il and now had the Issue of Vallandlgham*s Copperheadlsm to ezplcftb also. He made a fine Impression and, despite his somewhat "bland, quiet disposition," he rendered himself "agreeable and pleasant upon acquaintance. With

dignity and aplomb he carefully mapped out for listeners all over the state^^ his beliefs and how he had arrived at them, and he Impressed them with his fine character and speaking ability. In contrast Morgan used the harangue method, warning his listeners that the Negro-lovers In the Republican party would try to place the freedman In a position of power If they were elected. The bulk of his appeal was aimed toward garnering the soldier vote (which was quite anti-Negro).

In this he was successful only to a small degree, for Coz won a solid victory on October 10, election day. Although

Cincinnati Enquirer. August 26, 1865» p. 1. ^^Clnclnnatl Commercial. August 28, 1865, p. 1, Ilo His Pocket Diary, which listed his cao^algn meetings, shows he visited thirty-two cities In flfty-slz days, covering the whole of Ohio. 159 his margin of victory was much smaller than that of more than 100,000 for John Brou^ in I863, this came partially because this was an off-year election in which fewer people voted. In addition, the Union party undoubtedly had lost some War Democrats who retumed to their former party once the war ended. These factors, added to the effect of the Oberlin letter on radical Republicans, led to Coz defeating Morgan by

223,633 to 193,697, a margin of 29,936. On the Reserve Coz showed a marked decline from Brough*8 totals, but most of those who did not vote for Coz did not vote at a ll, for Morgan showed few gains from Vallandlgham*s to tals.^3 The Union ticket swept the state, electing the whole slate with a majority in the State Senate (25-12) and House (70-35), but Coz ran about one to two thousand behind the others on the state ticket. He had gambled and won, but in the process had stamped himself as a conservative at a time when radicals were beginning to gain in power.

L'i ■^Annual Report of the Secretary of State of Ohio. 1865-6. Columbus, ibbC. 6n the Reserve the fib re s compared with Brou^*s and Vallandlgham*s in 1863* C ounti es Coz Brough Morgan Vallandlgham

A sh tab u la 4069 6237 961 886 Cuyahoga 7472 10,963 5809 5864 L o rain 3474 4887 1674 1379 Trum bull 3989 5331 1851 1668 Oberlin (Lorain County) voted Coz-469, Morgan-81, but Coz was forty votes behind the ticket. 160

This election caBç>aign and the Oterlin letter were the keys to Cox's political future. During the canvass he had declared himself in favor of presidential reconstruction, the return to power of the upper classes and conservatives in the South, and separation of the races. He was also on record as being against Negro suffrage in the South and against giving Negroes political equality in a heterogeneous Southern society. He did this at a time Wien "an tineasy feeling that somehow the South had never really surrendered" began pervading the North because of the South's recalcitrance, lack of contrition, harsh treatment of the freedman, and the seemingly easy road to reconciliation which President Andrew Johnson had paved for them. As a result, as the North became more and more angry at Johnson and the South (and those who supported them), Cox's opinions became anathema. The consequence was his identification as a supporter of Andrew Johnson and an opponent of the Negro's advancement. As a result his own chances for political advancement were hindered almost beyond repair. No one with such an Identity could ever hope to rise very far in national politics once most of the country had come to dislike Johnson intensely. Cox kept this brand for the rest of his career in politics, and it was brou^t up whenever his name was mentioned for other offices. The resultant loss of his talent in higher office was as much a loss to the nation as to Jacob Dolson Cox.

^^McEitrick, Andrew Johnson, pp. 21, 35-4-0. CHAPTER XI

THE GOVERNOR IN NATIONAL POLITICS (1865-67)

The days before he took office were hectic ones for Governor-elect J. D. Cox. Not only did he have to prepare himself for the role as Ohio's chief executive, but also for a new position as an arbitrator of the growing dispute between Congress and Andrew Johnson. The last days of 1865 saw the South coming nearer to Johnson's declared goal of retuming to the Union in as short a time as possible. But they were doing so with a haughty air, and some of the states only repealed and did not nullify their ordinances of secession. Some had passed the infamous "Black Codes," and had refused to repudiate the Confederate debt; and none had given the freedman the vote.^ As a result, in the North while the Democratic party and many former Copperheads were openly praising Johnson's policy, the radical Republican newspapers were becoming angrier every day. They felt Johnson was openly siding with the South against the North, and that his policy had not attained the necessary goals of Negro rights, security, and Southern penitence. When Congress opened in December, 1865,

^Erio McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction. (Chicago, i960), p. 39.

161 162 and Johnson In his annual message practically announced that reconstruction was over and that the new Southern representatives should be Immediately accepted Into Congress, the lines of opposition began to form. When the Democrats praised his message and Its theme, the party split widened.

Meanwhile In Ohio Governor-elect Coz was considering whether or not to treat the Negro suffrage question In his Inaugural address when his friends Garfield and Dennison wrote, urging him to come to Washington, to meet with Johnson, and to discuss his policy. Garfield, slowly becoming a radical Republican, wanted him to do so because he hoped that the 1865 gubernatorial elections (all eight of which the Republicans had won) would modify Johnson*s policies and that Coz could show the President the flow of opinion In Ohlo.2 Dennison, a strong supporter of Johnson, felt Coz could help to bring harmony back to Johnson*s relations with Congress by giving disinterested advice having w el^t with both sides.3 Both, for obviously different reasons, also felt Coz should not speak of federal affairs In his Inaugural address until he assessed them for himself. Each felt that Coz would change his views to his own.

2 Garfield to Coz, November 28, 1865, Coz Papers. 3Dennlson to Coz, November 29, 1865, Coz Papers. ^Coz to Perry, December 20, 1865, Coz Papers. 163

But after waiting for Johnson's message and being satisfied that it was a success, Coz, who also had to move his large family during this time, decided to postpone his trip until after the legislative session began. He also decided not to discuss national politics in his inaugural address, idiich would be brief, preferring to leave that, as he had said in his Oberlin letter, to Congress and the President. Besides, he told Garfield, Washington was not a real place to leam public opinion, for it was so full of cliques and passions and prejudices that the atmosphere for cool judgment that Cox had available in Ohio did not exist there.^

The judgment Cox made on reconstruction during December was to remain his approach for the next few months. He decided that President Johnson's policy was the best that could be found, for it was liberal, moderate, and pragmatic. He felt that the extremists in Congress were going to try to change all of this in a spirit of hostility to the South. He thou^t Congress should not legislate in accordance with popular sentiment, but deal with the South in a generous spirit after security was assured. Otherwise the South would become even more recalcitrant. Congress would become even harsher, and the chance for early reconstruction would be lost. The best policy was to follow Johnson, let the South back into the Union soon, and keep.the extremists from controlling Congress.^

5cox to Garfield, December I3, I865, Coz Papers. ^See Cox to Dennison,December 12, I 865 and Cox to P e rry , December 20, I 865, Cox P a p e rs. 164

On January 8, 1866, just before he took the oath of office for his new position,7 j, D. Coz stepped to the speaker's

stand in the rotunda of the Ohio State House and gave his inaugural address* He told his listeners that a new epoch of American history had begun. The war was over, and all future questions would be concemed with peace* The terms of peace should not subvert the principles of human liberty, but confirm them in a prompt, moderate, and just reconstruction policy* The use of m ilitary power to force concessions would be only a confession of the failure of Eepublicanism, and should never be used for an extended time* On the state level, he said, Ohioans must prove their recuperative powers by doing their duties in a humble way, with little show* They must fill up the uncultivated lands by encouraging immigration, improve the common school system, and pay the just debt to Ohio soldiers* Above all, he urged learning the lessons of the past and retuming to the path of right so past strife m i^t be forgotten*®

For this bold statement for moderation which was far above party loyalty, Cox was widely praised by party organs on

?His resignation as a Major General took effect on January 1* He had resigned a few days before* See J* C* Kelton, Assistant Adj* Gen*, to Cox, December 28, 1865, Coz Papers* Q "Inaugural Address of Jacob D* Cox, Governor of Ohio," delivered before the Senate and House of Eepresentatives, January 8, 1866* Columbus, 1866* 165 both sides Before the Inauguration he had asked that the ceremonies be simple and without m ilitary display» emphasizing that the war was over. His speech then emphasized the same facts. He had kept his promise of not specifically mentioning national politics, but he spoke in general terms in favor of the via media and a spirit of forgiveness. He was already looking forward to the day mhai the war would be forgotten and men could go about their daily business with no thou^t of it. He felt that day would be brought nearer if moderation and trust would express the North's feelings toward the South. He made no mention of the dangers which would follow if the North adopted different emotions, but it was understood that Coz was warning against them.

The growth of the trend against moderation nevertheless continued. Despite the attempts of moderates in Congress to get Johnson to agree to a stricter Southern policy by accepting Lyman Trumbull's two proposed b ills, a renewal of the Freedman's Bureau and a Civil Eights act, the President still seemed unwilling to compromise. Coz felt that the President should not because he could not go back on his past policies, which seemed to be proving correct. Coz even advised the newly- reelected Senator from Ohio, John Sherman, to be independent of

^The Cincinnati Enquirer (Democratic) said Coz showed honesty and superior sagacity and integrity in doing what his conscience dictated (January 10, 1866, p. 2). A Republican party historian called it "scholarly, able, and efficient»one of the best of such speeches ever delivered." Smith, Ohio Republicans, p. 222. 166 the radicals and to fi^ t Negro suffrage in the Senate.10 At the same time he followed Dennison's adTioeH and tried to help pass a resolution of support in the state legislature for Johnson's policy, out no action mas taken because the party mas closely sp lit between Johnson and Congressional support era. 12 Thus, in the hope of reconciling these differences in Ohio and in Washington, Coz accepted Sherman's and Dennison's invitations to journey to Washington to speak with the President.

The day before he arrived much of the chance for the success of the meeting was lost. On February 20, Johnson had vetoed the extension of the Freedmen's Bureau and had declared himself, as President of all people, the defender of the Southern viewpoint in the government since Congress would not allow Southern representatives into their chambers. Then, two days later, he spoke to a group of "serenaders" outside the White House and abandoned himself to "transports of passion" idiich appalled even his friends as he denounced his enemies in Congress. Johnson said and Thaddeus Stevens, the leaders of the radical group in each House, were trying to assassinate him and were the leaders of a new rebellion to subvert the Constitution. In the most

^^Coz to John Sherman, January 27, 1866, Coz Papers. ^^Dennison to Coz, January 2, 1866, Coz Papers. l^Coz to Dennison, February 5» 1866, Coz Papers. 167

vituperative language, he condemned his enemies as revolutionaries of the worst kind. ^

When Coz met Johnson on the morning of February 24, for the interview, the latter was under attack by a larger number of Congressmen than had previously been opposed to him. His vile language and his coarse treatment of their fellow representatives had struck a discordant note and had made more enemies for him. But none of this was discussed during Coz*s talk with the President. Instead the Governor was greeted as a friend and supporter to whom Johnson justified his policies. Johnson told Coz his policy aimed at early restoration on the basis of loyalty. Since Congress had presented no alternative, Johnson had gone on alone. He felt the nation desired civil government in the South which would be loyal because unjust terms were not forced on the South by m ilitary means. He had vetoed the Freedmen* s Bureau b ill because the act would have made the Bureau permanent. While the South should be allowed to end it when it appeared to be no longer needed, he would favor a temporary bureau. He had set up conditions for reconstruction, the South had accepted them, and so the only thing to do was to give the South representation in Congress. He would not interfere with Congress in that matter, but would urge it to do so. When that was done, reconstruction oould be called a finality.

^^McKitrick, Andrew Johnson, pp. 292-3.

l^Coz to General George Wright, February 26, 1866, Coz Papers, 168

Coz was quite happy to hear such statements, for they neatly coincided with his own thoughts. After the session, he and Dennison agreed to publicize Coz*s account of the conversation, hoping that it would be seen as a conciliatory statement. Arranging with Johnson to get his permission to do so and for him to approve the statement, Coz wrote it out and asked the Ohio Union delegates in the House to come to Dennison’S home on February 26, to hear it read. All but two, the radicals Robert Schenck and John Bingham, came and listened patiently to the statement. But the representatives, who had been startled and shocked at Johnson's February 22 speech, showed a lack of faith in the import of the interview and the success of friendly negotiations. After Coz finished, an almost fierce discussion broke out, with Representative R. P. Spalding declaring that it offered no compromise and Garfield saying it only put a decent suit of clothes on Ezecutive nakedness and was not different from the speech of February 22. Even the moderates, Rutherford B. Hayes and , who spoke little , looked unhappy. Thus all of Coz's "suavity," which he ezerted to the utmost, did not keep him from "realizing the fate of meddlers in a family b r o i l . "15

l^This account is from Coz's letter to Perry of March 10, 1866, Coz Papers. It is noteworthy that he was surprised at Garfield's comments, for the latter had said in a February 24 conversation with Coz that he was pleased with the statement. Here was the difference between these two men, one who followed his principles, the other political necessity. 169

Àlthou^ irtien, two days later, after John Sherman had called on the Senate floor for harmony, Cox noted a marked change In tone In most of them and a disposition to he more conciliatory and to agree that his visit had probably helped prevent an open rupture. However, the Inclusion In the b ill to admit Tennessee, of Thaddeus Stevens* amendment for Congressional control over reconstruction did much to dissipate Cox*s hopes for an early solution. He even began to fear that at least one consequence of the Intransigence on both sides mlgdit be the formation of a new party In support of Johnson. While In Washington, he had met Lewis D. Campbell, a former Union Congressman who told Cox of his and a few friends* plans to form a new party uniting Johnson* s supporters and the War Democrats and ousting the Badlcals. Cox felt that every day they waited gave the President more strength In the country and that even the people would renounce Congress and call for speedy restoration, and thus no new party would be needed. He thought Ohlo*s legislature would eventually openly support Johnson, but that these things would have to work themselves out. He detested the Democrats and felt joint action with them was out of the question. He would remain loyal to the Hepubllcan party and wait for It to come to Johnson's support. Unfortunately, he had a long wait, for none of these predictions came t r u e .

In fact things soon became worse for Johnson and his supporters. Cox found that even those who favored Johnson's

^^Cox to Lewis D, Campbell, March 12, 1866, Cox Papers. 170 veto were annoyed about his purposes and methods. Althou^ for a while Coz's interview had helped the situation by allowing some of Johnson's supporters to digest his February 22 speech, as time went on even they began drifting away. And the radicals now began to transfer much of their wrath to Coz for removing the pretezt for a fight.^7 Coz still felt the people would back Johnson eventually; but now he felt the President should help this along with some compromise. In a letter to Johnson, who was considering Trumbull's Civil B i^ts b ill, Coz advised him to try to understand the need of those who had fou^t in the war to see the advantages they won secured. He told the President not to accept Democratic support, for they would only use him. Coz believed that Johnson was growing in strength every day, hence it was better for him to strain a point to meet the popular spirit and to sign the b ill. The Negro should be treated with kindness until he could be separated, and in this b ill, this would be done by civil and not m ilitary means. If Johnson signed this b ill, Coz felt, the President would be the master of the situation and remove the further opposition by the party.

^^He was also being severely criticized for returning fugitives whose eztraditions were sought by Southern governments whose adm inistrations many Northerners felt were illegal. Coz did so because they were legal requests and because he recognized the Johnson-reconstructed governments. See his letter to Murat Halstead, March l6, 1866, Coz Papers. 18 Coz to Andrew Johnson, March 22, 1866, Coz Papers. 171

But by this time Andrew Johnson had decided that he could never compromise with his enemies. Even though most of his Cabinet (Including Dennison) advised him to sign the b ill, It soon became apparent that he would veto It. On the day Coz wrote to Dennison (March 2?» 1866) that the President»s veto could be taken "as conclusive evidence that Johnson's purposes are what his enemies declare them to be (leaving the Union party and accepting only Democratic support),"^9 the President declined to follow Coz's advice and vetoed the Civil Eights Act. This action, many historians feel, was the turning point In the whole Imbroglio and was Johnson's last chance to make a success of his policy. But now the ground had been cut from under the leaders of compromise and "Coz's position was d e c id e d ly ezposed.Both sides had now rejected his advice and he stood In the middle not knowing which way to turn.

There were, however, factors developing In March and April idilch would eventually help Johnson to make a decision. Dennison had written Coz that he no longer understood the President or his actions and that Johnson was beginning to make moves which would lead him out of the Union party. Further, Johnson had appointed a Democrat to a postal job In Hartford, Connecticut, without Dennison's approval. The latter began to feel that he would soon have to resign to protest these

^9coz to Dennison, March 27, 1866, Coz Papers.

2®McK1 trick, Andrew Johnson, p. 3 1 1 . 172 policies.21 Cox, who was still using his influence to prevent an Ohio legislature resolution condemning Johnson»s policy and was being condemned for his seeming "superserviceable zeal in behalf of Johnson," which was "fatally compromising his influence with the party,"22 nevertheless found himself

"agreeing with nobody and in accord with no system of measure." But he did feel he might be able to come to the support of Congress if it would come up with a good way to lim it Southern representation.23 But the plan that was agreed upon, as contained in the proposed Fourteenth Amendment presented on April 30, 1866, was still too much for Cox to accept. He felt that disfranchising the South until I870 was not only too harsh, but also unenf or cible and a sure way to ruin the party.24

He felt that if this part of the amendment was removed, which it surely would be, the remaining sections would almost exactly fit with Johnson's policy and would be acceptable by everyone.25

Thus, though he had shown inclinations to change his mind, Cox still remained a Presidential supporter in the hope Johnson would compromise on the revised amendment.

Thus Tdien the annual Ohio Union party convention met in Columbus on June 20, 1866, Cox felt that the spirit of

See Dennison to Cox, March 27 and April 6, 1866, Cox P a p e rs .

22wamer Bateman to John Sherman, March 30, 1866, John Sherman Papers, Library of Congress. ^^Cox to Garfield, April 10, 1866, Cox Papers. ^^Cox to Garfield, May 4, 1866, Cox Papers. 23Bosebeon, War Years, p. 460. 173 compromise should be used so that the party would not split over whom it would support. The Western Reserve delegates were desirous of getting planks placed in the party platform calling for a constitutional amendment allowing Negro suffrage in Ohio, condemning Johnson, and supporting Congress, while the conservatives opposed all of these. Coz, acting as the intermediary between these factions, got the Reserve to agree to put off the suffrage question for a year (according to Ohio law the b ill could only be voted on during state- election years, the nezt of which was in I 8 6 7 ) and to agree to waive any endorsement of either side or their policies. The conservatives agreed to non-endorsement of either side and to endorse the newly-modified Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, the platform was a non-committal compromjse which put the Ohio party behind the Fourteenth Amendment as the best and final solution to be hoped for.^G

Coz, who had now done a fine job in keeping the Ohio party from splitting, wrote Johnson that the compromise he had arranged was a victory and would result in fall elections which would "teach the party what the country really demands" and that the "crisis of our struggle with eztremism 0i£] will have ended with the present session of C o n g r e s s ."^7 Apparently

^^See Coz to Andrew Johnson, June 21, 1866, Coz Papers, and Howard K. Beale, The C ritical Year: A Study of ^drew Johnson and Reconstruction. (New York. 1930). p p . 388-9. 27coz to Andrew Johnson, June 21, 1866, Coz Papers. 174

Coz s till believed that the people actually supported Johnson and would repudiate the radicals at the Congressional elections in the fall. And he now declared himself in favor of such an e v e n t.

But in the next few days he received two shocks from Washington which soon changed his mind. On June 25t 1866, Johnson announced, after having rejected the Fourteenth Amendment, that he would work for the defeat of his Republican opposition. A few days later, the call for a "National Union Convention," which was to unite all supporters of Presidential reconstruction, including most Democrats, was issued for August 14, in Philadelphia. Then, in early July, William Dennison resigned as Postmater-General in protest over Johnson*s support of the National Union Convention and his seemingly- complete transfer to the Democratic party. His resignation, Dennison felt, seemed "to have almost if not altogether completed the breach between the President and our friends.^® But it had only almost done so, for Cox, who, thou^ he felt the Philadelphia convention would be a failure, and would be swallowed up by the Democrats, s till would not go to the radical side.

In Ohio, its plans for using certain high officials in the Congressional campaign being formulated, the state Union party organization beceuae more and more anti-Johnson. Cox

^®Dennison to Cox, July 16, 1866, Cox Papers. 175 felt that they would not want any assistance in the coming campaign from the conservatives unless it was on the basis of full partisanship of Congress against the President.This would be an extreme embarrassment for Cox and Dennison, and Cox felt that he could neither go over to the Congressional theory nor eat his words. He could only advocate the party platform as a moderate and practical statement, but he felt that the party preferred his silence to that alternative because he was not fully in accord with its policies. The Union party now saw itself threatened by a new group trying to steal some of its members, and it was closing ranks to prevent this occurrence. Cox, who had not ^et decided what to do about his support of Johnson personally, decided to "stay in the old party ranks with such graces" as he could, stating his position as frankly as the) would let him, and putting his faith chiefly in time.

His resolve to do so and also to come out against Johnson was assured soon after the National Union Convention had met and declared its support for Johnson and the immediate granting of representation to the South. Cox, who felt that the President had now gone completely over to the Democrats, vdio had dominated the Convention, now saw a ll of his efforts to prevent the conflict between Congress and the President wasted. He did not regret these efforts, for, he felt, they could have been successful if Congress had offered the terms

^^Cox to Dennison, August 3, 1866, Cox Papers. ^®Cox to Charles Anderson, August 7, 1866, Cox Papers. 176 contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the states in December or January instead of in July, for Johnson m i^t have accepted their plan then. But the quarrel had become too bitter for healing, and so it was now time to take sides. Cox "could not hesitate to remain with the party which saved the nation during the war." He felt it was badly piloted, but he felt "no temptation to coalesce with Copperheads on that account."31 He would do his best to ensure the party's success in the fall so that it could compel the South and Johnson to accept the Fourteenth Amendment, and if they did then all the problems would be settled.3% Thus, he along with most of the supporters of the early summer, left Johnson's camp in favor of the party as the best way to hold the gains of the war and the Fourteenth Amendment as the final solution of reconstruction. Party loyalty, though well-tempered, thus had conquered personal loyalty—but with good reason.

Thus Cox began campaigning on the idea that he had come to endorse the Union party's policy and to plead for conciliation and harmony in the party ranks.33 He still wished to keep the party united after the election, and felt Johnson could come back to them. But he changed his mind later, when, on Johnson's famous "," the President made, as one of Cox's friends put it, "such a display of

31Cox to W illard Warner, August 27, 1866, Cox Papers. 3%Cox to William T. Coggeshall, August 27, 1866, Cox Papers.

33cincinnati Commercial. August 22, 1866, p. 2 . 177 vulgarity, blasphemy, and chronic and aggravated egotism as the nation never had to endure before him from its Chief M agistrate.”3^ This behavior was probably one reason why, when Johnson arrived in Columbus on September 12, 1866, with his "entourage," Cox was not there to greet him. With the excuse that he had previously arranged a political meeting at Waynesville, Ohio, for that day, Cox planned to take the afternoon train from Cincinnati to Columbus on which Johnson was riding only to find that the train did not stop in Waynesville. Thus he had to wait until the next train came, and he did not arrive in Columbus until 9*00 p.m. He immediately went to the Neil House Hotel in Columbus and saw the President and had a pleasant talk with General Grant.35

But Johnson, who had received Mrs. Cox with marked coldness earlier, was obviously quite angered by Cox's slight,3& and

the two were never to have friendly relations again.

The final breach in their relationship came on Septem ber 25» 1866, when Cox ap p eared a s a d e le g a te to th e Pittsburg^ Convention of Soldiers and Sailors. A similar

3^C. S. Starbuck to Cox, September 10, 1866, Cox Papers. 35cochran, "Political Experiences", p. 923. Cochran was living in Columbus with the Cox family at the time and probably his account is accurate, though biased. Cincinnati Commercial. September 13, 1866. Cox surely could have postponed one campaign speech to see the President, or at least have checked the train schedule to see if the Johnson train stopped at Waynesville. He did neither, probably deliberately to prove he had finally broken with Johnson and had joined the Congressional supporters. Obviously this helped to keep party support. 178

“soldiers convention” of veterans who supported Johnson»s policies had met on September 1? In Cleveland. The Pittsburgh convention, which had been called for on August 20, was designed to show the unanimity and strength of the veterans who supported the Fourteenth Amendment and opposed “rebel power.“3? When more than 10,000 soldiers and sailors convened in the large shed called the “Wigwam” on September 25, the first order of business was to elect a president of the convention. Since John A. Logan, the leading candidate, was not present, a different leader had to be found. When Robert Schenck, a known radical, gave Ohlo*s votes to Cox after declaring that Ohio*s governor, who had once been tainted by Johnsonlsm, now favored the Congressional platform, the Issue was resolved and Cox was elected with great enthusiasm. Thus In only two months the former, much-maligned, Johnson supporter had changed his position and become the leader of the most In^ortant Republican convention In 1866 and a national leader In the party. It was a truly remarkable transformation, although not a lasting one.

Although his position there was as the presiding officer, Cox also gave a speech concerning the President and reconstruction. In what one author called “a vigorous and (for him) fiery s p e e c h , “38 the usually cool, calm, and collected Governor lashed out at Johnson's desertion of the Republican party and at the President's falseness to his principles. He

3?cinclnnati Commercial. August 28, 1866, p. 1. 3S110KItrick, Andrew Johnson, pp. 446-7. 179 was followed by Ben Butler, that colorful and strange radical, who, well-known for his lack of control, advocated the hanging of Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, After this and other sim ilar speeches, the platform, which backed the Fourteenth Amendment and Congressional control of reconstruction, allowed effective service in the Army to be considered equal to an education at West Point in reorganizing the Army (probably suggested by Coz), and rejected Presidential reconstruction, was accepted unanimously,^^

Upon leaving Pittsburgh, Coz continued on the campaign trail, speaking at Salem, Ohio, the nezt day, and then at Millersburg, Toledo, Elyria, and Delaware, ending his work on October 8, A few days later he was in Columbus, where he watched the election returns which gave the Republicans victories in all but one Congressional seat and a state victory margin of 43,000. Feeling that Johnson*s alliance with the Democrats in Ohio was now forever demolished, he answered the request of the New York Republicans to come there to campaign before their November election. On October 11, he left Columbus and later arrived in New York for two weeks of campaigning,^^ Again the result was the same, as it was all over the country—the Congressional party won a resounding victory and Johnson was defeated everywhere,

^^Clipping, "Resolutions of the Great Convention of Soldiers at Pittsburggi, September 26, 1866," in Coz's Pocket Diary, Coz Papers, Cincinnati Commercial. October 21, 1866, p, 4, 180

But the President did not seem moved. He did nothing to change his position and only helped the Southern legislatures reject the Fourteenth Amendment. Coz, who had hoped the election results would show Johnson that the people were behind the Fourteenth Amendment and Congress, now felt "Mr. Johnson had disappointed everybody, ...th e Democrats who adopted him as well as the Republicans whom he abandoned. As an Administrative officer or as a leader of a party he had proven equally a failure...H e Is obstinate without being firm, self-oplnlonated without being capable of systematic thinking, combative and pugnacious without being courageous.. .He Is very much disconcerted by the results of the election, but seems Incapable of forming any plan of action.Instead th e President merely reiterated his old views and did not even mention the Amendment In his December 4 annual message.

In reaction Congress began working out the means to weaken thoroughly the power of the Presidential office and to assure their control of reconstruction. The first movements toward modifying the Executive patronage, which Cox hoped would "rid us of the abomination we have endured under the maxim of •to the victor belong the spoils’, w h i c h were to lead to the Tenure of Office Act were now begun. Further, there was also evidence "that a formidable attempt" would "be made to

^^Cox to James Monroe, November 21, 1866, Cox Papers. ^^Cox to William T. Coggeshall, December 5» 1866, Cox Papers 181

Impeach the President” when enough evidence against him could be gathered.^3 President Johnson was now In danger of losing most of his power and, possibly, his position.

Jacob D. Cor was In somewhat the same position In Ohio, but of course for much different reasons. He had been thinking about his future for quite a while, especially in view of the fact that his Income was far below what was needed to carry out his official duties and support his family. In January, 186?, a time when his "Influence In political affairs" was "almost purely negative" because of the commonly-understood fact that "he favored prudent and cautious party management rather than the extreme measures" which many party leaders now favored, he felt he would "rather not be negative and fight for his position, for this would deliver the party over to the most ultra radical measures." Earlier Cox had agreed with the Ohio party's radical leaders to keep silent publicly on these questions and had not mentioned them In his annual message for 186?, but still felt "Inasmuch as complications may arise within the next three years when my official position might give force to opinion which may have a better chance of being heard...It is a perplexity to me to determine whether I ought to stay or not." He felt reasonably sure he could be renominated If he were a candidate, but he could not decide what was b est.^

^^Garfleld to Cox, December 25» 1866, Cox Papers. ^^Cox to Perry, January 14, 186?, Cox Papers. 182

Later in the month a party caucus was to meet to decide on action concerning a Negro suffrage amendment to the state constitution which had been put off the year before. Cox had decided to make up his mind about running by then, and on January 17, 186?, he had already made his decision. He surmised that the only attraction in the office was the leisure time it gave him for study, preparation for his future work, and working on a task he had been planning for some time, a history of the rebellion and war. He felt that he could turn his back on the "pleasant sense of wonder at one*s own magnlficance" when extra polite people addressed him as "His Excellency," with little regret. He had been away from his professional practice for seven years, and Cox felt that he had to get back to it soon.^^ He had no great love for politics, and now that he had been reduced to silence on a major political question because of his middle-of-the-road stand, he decided to make the break. On January 25, 186?, he officially notified Benjamin J. Cowan, Chairman of the State Central Committee, that a sense of duty to his family had made him decide to return to his profession and not be a candidate for renomination.

This announcement caused quite a sensation. His nomination had come to be regarded as almost certain since no other candidate combined his ability, m ilitary prestige, and personal popularity. The action, "when a most brilliant future

^5cox to Perry, January 17, 1867, Cox Papers. ^^Cox to Benjamin Cowen, January 25, 1867, Cox Papers. 183 in the political world was opening," was regrettable, according to one editor, and came at a time when "strong personal friends assured him that he would be the second strongest" national presidential candidate in 1868.4? thou^ he was "a good governor," he was "not in accord with the Union party or the great issues of the day." Many felt the nomination (January 8) by the Democrats of Allen G. Thurman for governor meant that the Republicans would have to put up a more radical candidate A8 to oppose him, and to nominate Cox would compromise the party

To save them and h im s e lf t h i s em barrassm ent, Cox r e t i r e d , promising that "whether I find myself »trudging afoot* or on a * through express* to good fortune, I promise myself that there will be no wistful looking back."4?

As a lame-duck Cox now had little power left except in Tdiatever influence he could use in the state legislature or on his political friends in Washington. In this position he watched with dismay as the new Congress passed the M ilitary Reconstruction Act and completely took control of reconstruction, fencing in the President*s power completely. Cox saw in this a possible reign of terror and the end of the Republican party*s belief in republicanism. He felt the South would wait the situation out, let Congress make Negroes the

4?Cincinnati Commeroial. January 25 and January 29, 1867, p. 2 . 4^Cleveland Leader. January 28, 186? , p. 2. 4?Cox to Perry, January 25, I 8 6 7 , Cox P a p e rs. 184 sole rulers of the South, and hope the Democrats could beat the Bepubllcans on that Issue. In the meantime a period of racial antagonism, hatred, and conflict would cause the South to fall in to chaos.But there was little he could do to prevent it since he was returning to private life, and so Cox now gave most of his time to the state political matters with which he had been dealing since the beginning of his tenure of office.

Jacob D. Cox had been caught in the maelstrom which would eventually lead to the first and only impeachment of a President. He had, from the first to the last, been a supporter of a conservative course which he had hoped would be moderate enough to satisfy both sides of a political rift which had grown wider each day it existed. In the process he had been caught in the middle, and even though he had eventually made the decision to support one side, he did so hoping to make the other eventually compromise and conciliate on an agreed basis for future action. In this he had failed, and as a result he fell into the chasm, identified with neither side, silenced to keep harmony in his own state, and, in part, was forced by Ohio radicals and his own recalcitrance to leave p o l i t i c s . A lthough Cox was an u n a g g re ssiv e man who l e f t politics and office without remorse, he was egotistical enough to think the people would eventually come around to his way of

^®See his letters to John Sherman (February 15» 186?), Murat Halstead (February l6, 186?), John Lynch (August 12, 186?), and C. S. Starbuck (August 14, 1867), all of which are in th e Cox P a p e rs. 185 thinking and prove that he was rl^ t. It was the kind of political naivete to be expected from this inflexible, though intellectually honest, man. CHAPTER X II

THE OHIO GOVERNOR

The Ohio constitutions of 1802 and 1851 were very much the products of the spirit of the American Revolution. A consistent disdain for and fear of ezecutive power had influenced the framers of the 1802 constitution to make the office of governor a weak one. Few changes in this matter were made when the new constitution was introduced in 1851. According to it legislation was passed by having both houses of the General Assembly agree on it. The governor did not have to sign laws nor did he have the veto power. Many of his functions were purely ceremonial, and what power his office did have was based on his prestige as titular leader of his party, his personal influence with the legislature, and the small amount of patronage he controlled. He was usually a compromiser and conciliator who ironed out difficulties in the party and kept it unified. He was a leader without much actual or official power, but he often overcame these hindrances by the force of his character or influence.

Jacob D. Coz was no ezception, and he followed the tradition of his predecessors of trying to convince the legislature to pass bills and resolutions which the governor

186 187 felt were essential for the state. As was mentioned before (Chapter 11), Coz's Inaugural address contained references to the needs of the common schools, army veterans, and the return of the state to normal business activity. Since the annual message of the governor, iriilch was akin to the President's State of the Union message In that necessary legislation was recommended, was given at the beginning of the 1866 legislative session (a few days before Coz's Inauguration) by Charles Anderson (who became Governor upon John Brough's death In August, 1865)» Coz's address was the only official means he had to advise the legislature of his recommendations. But because he had used most of his time In discussing national politics and because he still was quite unfamiliar with the state's needs, he did not go Into much detail. But In the nezt few months, lAien he was not tied up with national political matters, he studied the state's needs and learned the processes by which he could have them satisfied. In the process he became a competent, knoirïLedgeable, and worthy governor.

Much of his first few months In office were taken up with considering requests and recommendations for the jobs he controlled, such as trustees of state boards^ etc. Coz was usually non-committal In his answers to such letters,! for he now began the policy he was to follow In later political office; not to appoint anyone to a position iriiose honesty and

^iChese letters and Coz's replies are In the Governor of Ohio's Papers, 1866-8, Manuscript Department, Ohio H istorical Society, Columbus, Ohio. 188 integrity he had not carefully checked. He felt a government official had to assume the burden of being completely above suspicion if he was to do a worthwhile job. Thus the men he did choose were from among the best and leading people of the state, and none of them had ever been touched by scandal.

One of the more important duties Cox had to perform from the beginning of his term was the sale of the 630,000 acres in land scrip granted to the state by the Morrill Act of 1862 so that it could build an agricultural and mechanical college. The legislature had accepted the scrip in 1864, but it was not until April, I 865 that it took steps to sell it. Most of 1866 was spent in selling the land (at about 530/acre, far below the national price). The 186? session saw a whole series of petitions presented pleading for the college to be located in different areas of the state. But the legislature was so crowded with business and concerned with national politics that, despite Cox*s admonition in his annual messages o f 1867 and 1868 that they do so soon because all the land had been sold, it made no final decisions until the next administration.^ One of these decisions was to offer Cox the opportunity to be the first president of it (which was to become Ohio State University) but he d e c l i n e d . ^

2 Cox hoped the money would be divided among colleges already existing, and he tried to make Oberlin one of them. See his letter to John E llis, November 22, 1866, Cox Papers. 3see James E. Pollard, History of the Ohio State University. Columbus, 1952, pp7 I-I 9 . dox was also made the first person to be offered the position. 189

The governor had, at that time, the power to pardon or commute the sentence of criminals who petitioned him for this privilege. But Coz was as much a legalist as a conservative, and he always felt that it was best to trust in the presiding judge and jury's original decision in a case and not to tamper with it unless such a course was necessary. Early in February, 1866 his first such decision set the precedent for the later ones. A certain John Hughes, a convicted murderer, asked that his death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment. Coz, who studied the case intently, felt that Hughes had broken the law and deserved the punishment. In addition he thought "the condition of society demands greater caution in ezercising clemency now than ever before in our history."^ The war had made life cheap and killing a commonplace matter, and if society was ever to return to a normal state, when life was dear and killing a despised evil, he would have to be severely strict in enforcing the punishment for murder and making men regain their respect for life ,5 But though he granted few reprieves, he did commute some sentences when new evidence was presented or good behavior actually warranted it.

But besides these matters and those concerned with national politics, little of interest occurred in the state legislature during the 1866 session. It did pass an "eight hour b ill in both branches," which Coz felt was "a monument to

2l Coz to Ben. A, Benedict, February 6, 1866, Coz Papers. ^Cleveland Leader. February 2, 1866, p. 2. 190 the lack of understanding of the elements of the problems of capital and labor there Is in a very respectable body of men."^ Thus while Coz*s duties were rather engrossing, they were not intensely laborious. They occupied much of his time, but did "not call for severe mental application usually."^ As a result he had a great deal of free time to devote to his favorite leisure activity, reading. Averaging over six large books a month, he delved into such classics as Pepys* Diary. Fronde»s multi-volume History of England, a ll of Prescott*s histories, some of John Stuart Mill*s works, and von Bankers History of the Popes in his first year in office. He concentrated on works in history and political economy, always his favorite academic subjects, and his personal, political, and moral philosophy were greatly influenced by these works.®

The most important political event of his first year in office was probably the party convention of June 20, 1866. There, as was discussed before, he aided in getting a compromise platform passed which looked "beyond the present and put us on such ground that may have a reasonable chance for party existence after the process of reconstruction is over and the issues peculiarly belonging to it are dead."^ At the convention Cox spoke briefly, reviewing its actions, strongly endorsing the

®Cox to Perry, March 24, 1866, Cox Papers. ?Cox to Albert Watson, February 19, 1866, Cox Papers, ®Cox kept a lis t of books he read from 1865-8 in a notebook which i s i n th e Cox P a p e rs . ^Cox to P erry, May 16, 1866, Cox P apers. 191 platform, and urging the continued harmony of a ll Union men to prevent the government from falling into the hands of its enemies.^® Because of this and his later stand behind the party and Congress in its fight with President Johnson, he became increasingly more popular towards the end of his first year in office; and when he gave his first annual message in 186? it was listened to intently by the people of Ohio for hints as to his future political stand.

But since Cox had promised the party's radicals earlier that he would keep silent as to national affairs because his views no longer paralleled that of the rest of the party, he only spoke of his disappointment that a final solution to reconstruction had not yet been achieved. He then turned to state affairs and reported Ohio's debts had been reduced by $3 million in the previous year. He reported that the special examiners he had appointed to audit all the state's finances had found everything in order and that the state had erected more buildings than in any year of the previous decade. He then turned to what was to become one of his major concerns during the rest of his tenure, caring for the less fortunate of Ohio's citizens. While reporting that all the state asylums were in good condition, he also called on the legislature to pass legislation to regularly organize all the asylums so they could give scientific and systematic treatment to those violently insane. He also pointed out that of the convicts in the state penitentiary three-fourths were under 30,

Cincinnati Commercial, June 21, 1866, p, 2, 192

and most were first-offenders. Cox felt that the legislature should consider whether to separate these convicts from the hardened criminals, for they had picked up bad habits during the war which had to be eradicated quickly—and that could hardly be done while their association with the older convicts helped shape their lives in the habit of crime. A system akin to the state's policy in regard to juvenile offenders, who were separated and put on the State Reform farm, would help end this association and keep these youths from a life of crime.

Going on in the message to show another example of his in s is t into popular needs, Cox recommended the formation of a State Board of Charities to supervise all asylums and public charity institutions and to recommend future changes. He then continued on to other matters such as the erection of a state home for disabled veterans, the sale of the college land scrip and the school's location, and county control of the common schools, reforms which his Cabinet had told him were needed and some of which they had noted in their reports. Then Cox, the perennial scholar, recommended the expansion of the state library because "the use and value of public libraries are multiplied at the close of a historical period which w ill always be regarded as a memorable one." He also called on the legislature to perform its "solemn duty" to preserve every single document concerned with the war it could find. Then he presented the Fourteenth Amendment to the legislature and 193 recommended Its passage as the best way to secure permanent 11 peace in the South.

This message was greeted with widespread acknowledgment of Coz*s abilities as a governor and an analyst of state p r o b l e m s . But a few weeks later those who regarded Cox as a good governor were surprised to see him rule himself out as a candidate for reelection. He knew the party would soon bring up a resolution to let the people vote on striking the word "white" from the state constitution and thus give the vote to the state's blacks. Because he knew his past record as a Johnson supporter and an opponent of Negro suffrage in the South would hurt the party, and for other reasons (see Chapter 11), he decided to retire.

Most of the attention of the state legislature for the next few months was given to the resolution on Negro suffrage, and on March 27, before Cox and the other state officers, many House members, and throngs of people in the galleries, the Senate debated the question. After passing it by a strict party vote of 23-11» the Senate sent it to the House, which, on April 2, passed it 63-29. On April 8 the final signing took place and the resolution submitting the amendment to the people

"Governor's Report," Executive Documents. State of Ohio, 1866, Columbus, 186?» pp. 261-2Ô3. The reports of the other members of the Executive department are also contained t h e r e in . ^^Even the Cincinnati Enquirer said "in the prominence he has given to state affairs in m s executive papers and in his general bearing and conduct. Governor Cox has evinced a proper sense of the importance of the office." (January 6, 1 8 6 7 , p . 2 .) 194 in the fall elections was made public. Cox was opposed to the amendment because one clause in it disfranchised rebels, deserters, and draft dodgers. Ohio had a large list of such «deserters''~soldiers who had left their outposts in Texas and on the Indian frontier when the Confederate surrender was announced. Even though they had two years of service left, they didn't want to spend them fighting Indians and had come home. Cox felt the party had gone too far and that the Democrats would sweep the fall elections and then name Vallandigham Senator in reaction to this resolution which would, in effect, disfranchise around 15,000 whites while enfranchising 6,000 b la c k s . ^3

Under such circumstances Cox was glad he retired. "The insecurity of public position and the necessity of laying a foundation for a modest independent income before committing ^im sel^ further to politics would be enough to warrant such a conclusion." But when his dissatisfaction with the party's conduct and his fears for its future were added to them, he was further convinced he had acted correctly. He felt that if he would be eventually proven right, he could return to politics with doubled power. If he was wrong, he would be better off in privacy than in public life where his opinions might retard true progress. After his term was over he would go to Cincinnati to practice law; and, if professional business proved

Papers.to William T. Coggeshall, April 8, 1867, Cox 195 as lucrative as he hoped, he would devote himself for ten years to the accumulation of the means to become Independent of office for a livelihood. If a taste for politics survived all that, he would still be less than fifty years old and all the better prepared for a public career.

So thought the retiring Governor as he waited for the June 1 9, 1867 state convention which would choose his successor. As he waited he probably looked back favorably at the past session and the measures he had recommended which had passed. He had seen the endowment fund of the agricultural college completed and a large amount of Interest on It already accumulated, the appropriations to enlarge the Northern and Southern asylums and to build a new one In Athens approved, and funds to begin construction for a new Institution for the Blind appropriated. His recommendation for a State Board of Charities had been accepted, and Its members had already begun Inspection of all Ohlo*s facilities. All In all It had been a successful term, one of which the retiring governor had reason to be proud.

But events In May and June almost changed Cox Into a non-retlrlng governor. There had been a great deal of talk about renominating Cox no matter what he said about retirement because of the factional dispute between Republicans supporting General Grant and Salmon P. Chase for President. The Chase men hoped to put up Robert A. Schenck as their candidate for governor, while the Grant men favored Rutherford B. Hayes.

l^ ib ld . 196

When the Chase men heard rumors that Schenek mas going to dupe them and support Ben Wade, they deserted him and began looking for a new candidate. The logical choice was Governor Cox, Chase's old protege. Cox, hearing of this movement, felt he couldn't change his attitude as to retirement voluntarily and seriously preferred not to be a candidate under any circumstances. But he did leave the door open when he said that "if the convention w ill indicate its wish that any professed Bepublican shall be the nominee..«I would be forced to take it so far into consideration."^^

A few days later the Cleveland Leader, a Chase paper, came out for Cox's renomination. Cox, who had previously been asked by its editor for his views on the party platform, had answered him "laconically" that he did not wish his views published, but favored standing by the party. As a result that paper had come out for Cox. But still Cox resisted this movement, feeling he s till wanted to carry out his earlier purposes and would change his mind only if "any departure was made to appear a duty." If the convention genuinely requested him to run, he would acc^t, but he couldn't and wouldn't actively seek the nomination. His desire was to pay no attention to the new movement, hope it would die out, and see

l^Gox to Friedrich Hassaurek, May 13, 186?, Friedrich Hassaurek Papers, Collection 113, Box 2, Nmnuscript Department, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. Cox wrote this after Hassaurek wrote him on May 6 asking him to reconsider because he could then be easily renominated and elected. This is in th e Cox P a p e rs . 197

that the convention understood his position. Farther than that he would not go.^^

As the convention neared, a full-scale discussion of Coz's availability for renomination and his stand on the Negro suffrage question took place in most Ohio papers. But Cox did not want the nomination unless he absolutely had to take it, and so, when the day of the convention arrived, his candidacy was not extremely strong. And even though he listened to the pleas of Reserve delegates seeking his renomination and spoke at the convention in favor of party unity, he repeated his refusal to run so often that it was finally accepted.^7 When the nominations were called for, his name was presented, but immediately withdrawn. Then, after Hayes was nominated for governor, the platform, which endorsed the reconstruction measures of Congress, universal manhood suffrage, and the proposed amendment, was presented and approved (the clause of the amendment which disfranchised deserters was not mentioned probably because of the embarrassment it had already caused T8 the party). In addition the convention passed a plank endorsing and approving "the administration of Jacob D. Cox and extending to him hearty thanks for the faithful and able manner in which he has discharged his official duties and

^^Cox to Perry, June 3, 186?, Cox Papers. ^^Cleveland Leader, June 19, 18 6 7 , p . 1 . Importer, Ohio Politics, p. 242. 198

sustained the honor and credit of O h i o .”^9 j n resp o n se Cox gave his approval of the nominees and announced his intention to actively campaign for Hayes.

But before the active canvass began Cox took advantage of the summer inactivity in his office to take a trip in late July with his old friend and subordinate in the war, General Jack S. Casement, now the chief builder of the Union Pacific Bailroad, to see the progress that road was making and to get his first real glimpse of the West. Along with General Sherman, the directors of the road, and a few guests they took a train to Chicago and to Omaha, from where they took the Union Pacific to its terminus at that time. Since this was near the time of the end of most of the Indian wars, there were bands of hostile Indians all around, and the visitors did not dare go more than fifty miles beyond the end of the track and so they rode into Colorado via the overland stage. It was on this trip that Cox learned of the conditions of the West, especially concerning the Indian and the rapidly growing "shanty towns" and their "bawdy" residents.^0 This knowledge was to help him greatly in the next few years when he would become the chief supervisor of all these matters as Secretary of the Interior.

When he returned to Columbus in early August with Casement, he was "tempted to take stock in Credit Mobilier, or

^^Cleveland Leader. June 29, 186?, p. 1. ^®See Cox to Charles P. Cox, August 6, 186? and to Allyn Cox, July 19, 186?, Cox Papers. 199

some sim ilar construction company, but declined to have anything to do with it. General Casement said...after an interview with Cox, *I can't understand the General sometimes. Here he had the chance to make a hundred thousand dollars just as easy as turning his hand over, and he would not turn it. He didn't need to invest a cent, or do a thing. All that was wanted was the use of his name as a stockholder,'"^1 But Cox, a firm believer in many "tried and true" maxims, felt he should have to work for anything he got and that honesty was the best policy, and thus this money was just too easily had to be completely honestly made. Once again his rigid sense of morality and propriety had kept him from doing something questionable; and, in this case, he was quite fortunate, for the scandal which erupted in 1873 over Credit Mobilier thus did not touch him.

But the Governor had no thought of such possibilities as he began campaigning for Hayes and the party. On August 7 he, Hayes, Sherman, Dennison, and the state Central Committee met and arranged the program and speaking dates for the

Z^This account is in William C. Cochran's "Political Correspondence of Jacob Dolson Cox," III, 6 3 . This is a collection of Cox's letters (to and from) as regards politics which Cochran copied in typescripts. Most are letters also found in the original form in the papers, but over one hundred are not, having been lost over the years. Thus this is a valuable source for these letters. Cochran quoted Casement in a note in this collection as the latter spoke to him after an interview with Cox about this matter. Cochran gives no date for this conversation, but the author has assumed after the trip west was the most logical time. 200

QftTtippi gn.^2 Opening his part of it at Mt, Gilead on August 21, Cox there began to follow his plan, arrived at earlier, of supporting the proposed amendment solely on the grounds of consistency with Congressional action in asking the same of the South and speaking as little as he could on issues on which he disagreed with the party. He carefully avoided discussion of Congressional measures, intimating his doubts of their wisdom, but affirming the necessity of bowing to the will of the majority.He now felt he must support the party in face of the threat, but he would do so in an independent m anner. oil

The campaign was one of the most emotional ever witnessed in Ohio to that time. Soon after it began it degenerated into questionable and emotional appeals by both parties, with the Eepublicans painting a picture of the evil of Copperhead control of the government and the Democrats haranguing against Negro equality. Democratic parades featured wagons occupied by girls dressed in white who wore banners saying, "Fathers, save us from negro equality." The Republicans sank just as low, using the slogan "The Democrats murdered our President" to make the voters turn to them.^^

^^Cineinnati Commercial. August 8, 1867, p. 2. 23gee Cox to A. J. Hicks, October 18, 186? and to Charles F. Cox, October 16, 186?, Cox Papers. ^^See his speech at Mt. Gilead, Ohio, August 21, 186?, a copy o f which i s in th e Cox P a p e rs . ^^Eoseboom, War Y e a rs, p . 46o. 201

But though these two "Issues" were the major ones in the campaign, another one, introduced by the Ohio Democratic leader George Pendleton, was to take some of the state*s attention away from them.

The Pendleton plan or "Ohio Idea" (as it came to be called) was designed as a solution of some of the monetary problems the country had to solve since the war had caused it to cease specie payments and to build up a large debt. Pendleton felt that the use of the war greenbacks to pay off bank notes held against the government and then to pay off the government debt would solve the problem.This idea, which the debaters of the question of whether the government should follow a hard (deflationary) or soft (inflationary) policy had already begun discussing in Congress, now became an important part of that debate which was to dominate American politics for years to come. And in the Ohio campaign of I 867 i t f i r s t became a-popular subject of discussion.^7

Governor Cox had been considering his own position on this and the entire money question ever since Garfield had written him in 1866 that the financial question would be the basis of most national political debate once a final reconstruction policy was decided. Thus, after having thought

26 '‘“Irwin Unger, %e Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American Financer 186^-1879."'(Princeton: 1V64I. n.— ” o 2 •

Zfpieveland Leader. September 23, I 867, p . 1 . 202

out this matter thoroughly,he made his decision as to his stand on it. In a letter to his brother Allyn, he wrote that soft money would be the ruin of the economy and that "if the debt is to be paid in inflated currency it will be a national

d i s h o n o r . "29 He thus came out for hard money as the only

"right" and honorable way to run the country»s economy and pay its debts. Then, seeing an opportunity to speak on an issue other than the ones on which he did not completely support the party, in a campaign speech in Cleveland on September 24, he devoted all of his time to the currency debate. He said that the Democrats, having failed to get elected on the Issues on which the war began, had sought a new one. He felt their idea, which would purportedly save the nation millions of dollars, was a perpetual motion machine which must thus have a flaw. The government had given out greenbacks, promising to pay the bearer in coin dollars when the war was over. To inflate or reduce these notes would ruin their worth. Coi felt that Adam Smith and J. S. Mill were right in holding that the quantity of money available affected its worth. Thus if Pendleton*s scheme were accepted, rampant inflation would have to occur and this would ruin the economy and make the currency worthless for foreign trade. The only way to solve the

pp ^°Some of the books he read in 1866-7 are: Martineau, Fronde, and Mahan's Histories of England. J. S. M ill's Political Economyt Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychology, and various histories of Home, Greece, and France, and others. These, and especially his reading on the history of England were to greatly influence his economic thinking.

^^Coz to A lly n Cox, September 13, 186?, Cox P apers. 203 currency problem was to resume specie payments by gradual and regular steps and to keep inflation out.^®

In this speech and in his later letters and writings Cox stamped himself as a member of a hard-money patrician reform current which was just beginning to form around 186?. Such men as David A. Wells, Edward Atkinson, Henry Adams, E. L. Godkin, and others, who were to be leaders of the Liberal Republican and Mugwump movements, had begun th eir activ ities with a strong stand in favor of hard money. They felt sound and honest finances was a happy blend of wisdom and ethics which was the only way the country could solve its monetary problems—any other solution was not only inflationary but almost immoral, "In this way articulate, affluent, and well- placed men—the hard money intelligentsia—enjoyed ready access to a large and influential audience.. .Among the respectable political leaders of New England their views were economic gospel...and they cultivated such westerners as Garfield, Jacob Dolson Cox, and William Allison, whom they considered salvageable."3^ Cox was later to become good friends with all of these leaders and a prime mover in trying to inculcate their beliefs in the minds of the people.

Currency", Speech by Governor Cox, September 24, 1867, a pamphlet found in the Cox Papers. This solution was designed to parallel the British experience in 1 8 1 9 which had led to resumption with no economic upheaval. 3^-Unger, Greenback Era, p. 1. 204

But the question of national finance was not yet the burning issue it would become later, and so it had little effect on the 186? Ohio election. The Republican appeal against Copperheadism had little effect also, for the Democrats scored resounding victories all over the state, gaining a majority in both houses of the General Assembly, defeating the "white amendment" by over 38,000 votes, and losing the governor*s race by a mere 2,983»^^ Probably because most Ohioans opposed Negro equality and because of the Republican adoption of a policy giving complete citizenship to him, Coz*s predictions were proven right once again. He had warned against going too far in favor of the Negro, the party hadn't listened, and it had reaped a sound beating. Apparently Ohio was not yet ready to give every man his equal rights.

Jacob D. Cox had never really been in favor of that, at least in a non-homogeneous society, either. A believer in republicanism as opposed to democracy, he had always felt that only the best kind of man, himself included, should make the decisions for the masses as their "representatives." He thought most of the common people knew little or nothing of politics or the deci si on-making process, and that only the intelligent, honest, well-born, trustworthy gentlemen of the upper-classes could know what was best for the people, who

^^Cincinnati Enquirer. October 24, 186?, p . 2, and Cincinnati Commercial. Qctnbar 31, 1867, p . 1. 205

should then react by following their leaders at all times and reelecting them to office. He felt politics was an occupation for gentlemen only and thus when he saw the Republican party moving to the left, becoming more radical, and following the whims of popular sentiment, he felt his role as a spokesman for what was true and right had been questioned and then denied. In response he retired to wait for the people and the party to see the "error of their ways" and come around to what he believed to be correct viewpoints. In the meantime he would "protest against our party policy...and if the alternative were not giving aid to the Copperheads" he would do more. But his unwillingness to see them in power kept him in the

Republican party in spite of its e r r o r s . 33 But once the social

and political chaos which had, he predicted, to come in the South from the use of such policies, was in full bloom, "either the Democrats w ill take power or we w ill have to form a new party."3^ In either instance the people would then see how wrong they had been and would return power to their rightful leaders, himself included.

It was just such sentiments that began to take Cox down the road of political independence. And during his last months in office he went even further on that way. In hypercritical letters to his correspondents, he blasted radical Republican doctrines as having to lead to an

^^Cox to Charles P. Cox, October 16, 186?, Cox Papers. Cox to Allyn Cox, November 21,67 18, Cox Papers. 206 amalgamation of races which the whites would do anything to keep from happening. The natural distinction of race which made political unity between Europeans and Africans impossible would reassert itself in the South. Social barriers are necessary to keep races apart, for separation is the only way a race can advance.3^ Once the races have to live together, with their old relationships reversed politically because of white disfranchisement, a new revolution is inevitable, especially since the North had refused the Negro the right to vote in the North which it demanded that they have in the South. Then the war of the races would be on,3^ the northerners would see this, their Negro-phobia would become ultra-copperhead, and the instinct of race would make them pitiless toward the poor blacks. Then the anti-Negro party would sweep Ohio and Congress would become as extreme against the blacks as they had been in their favor. The end result would be genocide or Negro subservience as a degraded caste. Either alternative, he believed, must be avoided, and Cox felt he would condemn himself if either came about without his having done a ll he could to prevent this choice from being the only one le ft.3?

It was with such gloomy prediction of the future that Cox prepared to leave the office of Governor of Ohio. But before he left he had to perform his final duty of giving the

^^Cox to J. A. E. Rogers, November 27, 186?, Cox Papers. 3^Cox to Garfield, November 22, 18 6 7, Cox P a p e rs . ^^Cox to Charles Anderson, December 6, I 8 6 7, Cox P a p e rs. 207 annual report for 186? to the new legislature. Thus, on January 8, 1868, the retiring governor addressed the assembled legislators in a brief, businesslike message. As he had done previously, Cox gave little attention to national affairs, sticking almost strictly to past efforts of the legislature and his recommendations for future action. He reported on reduction of taxation, the college land scrip fund, state asylums, reform schools, and the history of Ohio’s railroads his railroad commissioner had written. Then Cox recommended that the legislature pass b ills to lower taxes, distribute money to common schools according to the actual number of pupils in attendance, build an intermediate prison to help reform younger convicts, and choose a site for the agricultural college. He then reported on the only incident of scandal during his term, the padding of accounts by the superintendent and architect of the new Deaf and Dumb asylum, which he had investigated and in which case he had ordered the Attorney General to begin criminal action. After reporting on the sound defeat of the "white" amendment, he justified his stand on the question and his dislike for radical policies by saying "the progress of events has only strengthened the convictions I have heretofore made public in regard to it," Then, with an admonition to do their utmost to do their duties w e ll, Cox ended h i s m essage,^®

38"Governor’s Message," Ohio Executive Documents, 1867, p p , 147- 1 9 6. The Cleveland Leader (January 16, 1068, p. 1) said this final statement, in which "a Republican governor congratu­ lated a Democratic legislature on the defeat of his own party on a vital issue and claimed the result as a confirmation of his own views, deserved condemnation," 208

It is from this message that a better understanding of Coz's social views can be had. He had a compassion for the downtrodden and the outcast and felt society had a duty to help make their lives more livable. While he would not have advocated doing so to achieve the end of making them his political or decision-making equals, he still felt society should aid them nevertheless. So should society (and government, but in a lim ited way only) assure education, protection, and freedom to the people. In this way, he felt, a more intelligent, secure, and unhindered populace could come into existence and could better run the country, under, of course, as he would have said, the tutelage and leadership of their natural leaders, himself included.

A few days later his term ended when his former subordinate in the war, Butherford B, Hayes, took the oath of office as governor on January I 3 , But Cox, 1A10 had proved an extremely competent state executive who had left office because of his stands on national political issues and the criticism he had received for holding such opinions, was probably quite proud of the fact that his successor, for one, recognized his accomplishments. In his inaugural address Hayes said: "The duty of recommending such measures as are expedient has been performed by my predecessor. General Cox, in a manner so thorough and comprehensive that I do not feel called upon" to discuss state issues. He went on to say, "I can think of no better reward for the faithful performance of 209 duties of office than that which, I believe, my immediate predecessor is entitled to enjoy—the knowledge that in the opinion of his fellow-citizens of all parties, he has, by his culture, his ability, and his integrity, honored the office of Governor of Ohio, and that he now leaves it with a conscience satisfied with the discharge of duty.”39 One could not wish for a more fitting tribute to the governorship of Jacob D. Cox.

39Butherford B. Hayes, "Inaugural Address as Governor of Ohio,” Ohio Executive Documents, p. 6?, p. 205» CH/UPTER X III

THE CINCINNATI LAWYER

When he retired from office In Jannary, 1868, Coz looked forward to a ten-year rest from politics and its foibles. As early as I 863, he had written his friend Aaron Perry that his true desire upon returning from the war would be to set up a private law practice in Cincinnati and be left alone to his profession, his reading, and his studies. The Governorship had interfered with his plans, but only tea^orarily, and as he neared the end of his two years in office he made up his mind to follow his earlier plan and settle in Ohio's largest city, "beyond all question the best point for business in Ohio."^ There he would build up a practice, reach the point of financial security he had always searched for but had never attained, and then wait for the proper opportunity to come back into politics (or so he th o u g h t).

Coz knew that starting a practice in am unfamiliar city would be difficult. The political position he had occupied

^Coz to Aaron Perry, November 21, 186?, Coz Papers.

210 211 votü.d be "part of the capital on irtileh" he weald "hope to obtain basinesa» but net to the extent one would imagine, since a political reputation Is In many respects hostile to a professional reputation." He felt no concern as to his ultimate success, but for a few years every dollar he earned would have to be used to support his family, and he could not hope for an adequate business In less time. He was so low on money, In fact, that he had to refuse his younger brother’s request to live with the family and attend the Cincinnati Law School.^ The birth of his sixth child, Dennison Cox, on December 8, I 867, added weight to the factors which meant that his first few years as a Cincinnati lawyer would be difficult ones.^

He, nevertheless, "left the state capltol with a smiling face and elastic st^« He was released from the cares of public office."^ Leaving his family In Columbus irtiere they stayed until just before May 1 when their lease ran out, Cox set up a law office In the same building as his friends Aaron Perry and Samuel S. Fisher, a recognized patent lawyer. The first few months there wore as hard as Cox thought they mle^t be, for little business came his way. Though he did his best to search out clients, ho was net very suooossful. As a

^Cox to Charles P. Cox, September 13» I 867, Cox Papers. ^Thls child, like most of the Cox children, was quite sickly iriien bom and lived only four months, dying on April 10, 1868. See the Cochran Family Record In possession of lâss Nary Rudd Cochran, Mbnroo, Ohio. k ’ Cochran, "Political Escperlonces," p. IOI 5 . 2 1 2 r##Tü.t, «h«n he went te Celnnbue on weekend trips to see his family» for qnite a while he was in a state of utter exhaustion and di soouragement.^

In Fehmarj and early March, 1868, Coz's prospects began to improve somewhat. Host of his business was concerned with civil cases, bankruptcy, and liens, and a great deal of his time seems to have been occupied with giving legal advice to people seeking help for possible future cases.^ Just when his business seemed on the verge of becoming profitable, a possible chance for him to return to politics as a member of President Andrew Johnson's cabinet as Seeretaury of War presented itself, but Coz was not in a mood to accept it.

Soon after Coz had given his final report as governor. General W. T. Sherman had, while having dinner with the Maryland Senator, Reverdy W. Johnson, in Washington, discussed the growing conflict between Congress and Johnson, which was at that time centered upon the issue of lAo was to be Secretary of War. On August 12, 186? Johnson had suiq»ended the then Secretary Edwin Stanton from office, and, pending Senate approval (which was needed because of the Tenure of Office Act), had made General Grant the ad interim Secretary. A Senate committee vindicated Stanton, who had been suspended

^Personal interview with Miss Mary Rudd Cochran by the a u th o r .

^See Coz's Manifold Letterbook #3, Cox Papers, for his business letters in 1868-9. 213 because of his too strict interpretation of the Military Eeoonstruetion Acts and because of a belief that he had become, in essence, a representative of Congress in the Cabinet meetings idio would relay to radical leaders every­ thing that went on in the meetings, including Johnson's plans. A few days later on January 13, 1868, the Senate refused to concur in the suspension; Grant left the office, and Stanton

moved back in.

It was just before this occurrence (on January 11) that W. T. Sherman suggested to that the best way to esoape a conflict was for the President to nominate some good man as Secretary of War whose confirmation by the Senate would fall within the provisions of the law. Then, he suggested Coz, then Governor of Ohio, idio would, he knew, be acceptable to General Grant and the Army generally.7 He felt Cox was "a gentleman in the highest sense of the term, of fine address and education, of a perfect war record." He did not know if he would accept if nominated, but proposed to use his influence to that end. Reverdy Johnson agreed with Sherman that this was a good plan, and he promised to propose it to the President.^ A few days later Sherman spoke to Grant about this proposal and from this conversation there emerged a plan to have Johnson nominate Coz, lAio as a moderate

^William T. Sherman, Personal Memoirs. (New York, 1891), I I , 4 2 1 -2 . ^Sherman to Grant, January 27» 1868, as quoted in "Important H istorical L etters," North American Review. (July, 1886), p. 83. 2 1 4

Sepubllean votüLd hopefully seeure quick blpcrtlSAB confirmation. Then Grant could leave the office and Johnson mould gain the service of the popular Coz, irtie mould add luster to his administration.^

In the time betmeen these tmo meetings Sherman had talked to several gentlemen and some Senators, a ll of mhom seemed to approve of the plan. But as he malted for the President's ansmer to Beverdy Johnson's request and heard nothing, Sherman became Impatient and, a fem days later, ment to Johnson and asked If the question had been proposed to him. The President ansmered that It had and that he had a good opinion of Governor Coz, but he did not Indicate that he mould name him as Secretary of War. Sherman did not pursue the matter, only saying that Coz mas qualified In every may and that Grant favored the appointment.^® Johnson had other plans. He thou£^t that this appointment mould look as If he mere compromising mlth his enemies, and that he never mould do. As a result, he refused to nominate Coz and for the time being, no further talk of Coz's becoming the Secretary of War mas heard around Washington.

Instead most people mere talking about the Impeachment of the President and trial by the Senate. Onee the Issue of

%enjgumln P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stantonx The Life y d Times of Lincoln's Secretyqr of Wy. (Hem ïork, 1962), 368-70. Grant not only approved, but urged Sherman to push the matter, saying that Coz mas perfectly acceptable to himself and the army generally. "Important H istorical Letters," pp. 84-5. 215

Stanton** «iqpport by the Senate had been eonflrned» and Johnson and Grant had become alienated beoanae of the latter*# refusal to stay in the Secretary of Var*s offices (probably because of his desire to rid himself of the burden of being considered a Johnson siq>porter since the Republican Presidential Convention mas coming up and he mas the most prominent candidate), Johnson had appointed General Lorenzo Thomas as Secretary of War and officially and permanently removed Stanton. But Stanton barricaded himself in his office and refused to leave, and Thomas could not force him out, so he too resigned. The House radicals, seeing their chance to get rid of Johnson because he had removed Stanton mithout Congressional permission in apparent violation of the Tenure of Office Act, voted on February 2b, 1868, to impeach the President. A fem days later the actual trial began in the Senate, and for meeks the leading topic of conversation in Washington and in most of the country mas this first attempt to remove legally a President mhile in office.

As the tria l dragged on and the trumped-up charges that Ben Butler, the "prosecuting attorney," mas using to try to oust Johnson mere being presented, some of the more conservative Senators came to feel that this move mas too drastic. Since Johnson mas pomerless anymay, they began to seek mays for the President to agree to some compromise mhich mould bring enough of the Senators to the side of acquittal to keep Johnson from being removed. In mid-May, just before the 21 6 vote OB the first charge, there appeared a newspaper report that "Senators [%yma^ Trunbnll, [willlan Fessenden, and other prominent Republicans agreed with Johnson to vote for acquittal If he would stop his opposition to reconstruction and appoint a new CabinetIn that new Cabinet, Jacob Dolson Cox was spoken of as a possible Secretary of War*

Coz had. In his usual noncommittal and unaggresslve manner, "not even been In correspondence with anyone In Washington, and In no form directly or Indirectly been approached in regard to It." That had been the case In January Sherman urged Johnson to solve the Stanton problem by appointing Coz to the War Department also. Coz had not heard about the proposal until It was all over, but was "sincerely desirous of keeping out of public life," and he took "care not to correspond with anyone Influential In these matters." He felt Johnson might take him not beeauso he was a Johnson supporter, but booause he was conservative enough to be accepted by everyone. But In any case Johnson would have to act In the knowledge that Coz had declared himself in word and deed a Republican supporter of General Grant for the Presidency. Coz would take the job for an extremely strong reason, such as

^^Kenyon Coz (brother) to Coz, May 17, 1868, Coz Papers. 217

Grant's urging him to do so# but he still sincerely wished to be left to his retirement

At the time Cox expressed these sentiments the Senate had already voted on the first charge against Johnson with the result that the conviction fell short by one vote because seven Republicans had voted for acquittal. For all practical purposes the tria l was over, for everyone knew the vote would be the same on the other charges, Cox had "opposed It from first to last, theory of the purpose and object of It [Tmpeachmen^ under the Constitution" forbade his approval of It as a means of removing an obnoxious public officer for any political offense short of bribery, flagrant corruption, or the threat of violent revolution, Johnson had done nothing more, he felt, than Congress would be obliged to tolerate In , George Pendleton, or any Democratic president. If he had been a Senator, he would have voted for acquittal on these grounds, and he felt that the verbal abuse that those idio had voted for acquittal were receiving was a badge of honor for their maintaining their oonvlctlons,^3

The end of the Impeachment tria l qn May 26, 1868, and the nomination of General Grant for President by the

^^Cox to Kenyon Cox, May 19, 1868, Cox Papers, The knowledge that he was a Grant supporter and that Grant favored him for this position made one of Cox's correspondents ask, "Do you think he would feel the same If he were President? Would you accept It? I hope you get It," G, M. Baseom to Cox, June 19* 1868, Cox Papers, ^^Cox to Kenyon Cox (brother). May 19, 1868, Since Cox had left office for essentially the same reasons, his sy^)athy for them Is readily understandable. 218

Bepublloans Just before that did net end the speculation about Cox's role in the administration# Heu rusors, that Johnson would form a new Cabinet (with Cox as a member) once acquittal was assured, began cropping up#^^ Once again Cox resisted# He had taken up the case of a Cincinnati short-span bridge interest which wished to build a railroad bridge over the Ohio Birer between Cincinnati and Kentucky, and he had decided to go to Washington to lobby for Congressional permission to do so before the Senate committee on Post Offices and Post Beads# But when this new movement was rumored, he decided to delay "going to Washington t ill Impeachment and the Cabinet charges are over so that |his~| business trip" would not be made a matter of political gossip#^^ Cox really had little to worry about, for, soon afterward, Johnson decided to appoint Cox's former siqmerior. General John H# Schofield, as Secretary of War#' Then Stanton retired, and so, when Cox finally arrived in Washington on his business trip, early in June, he talked to the new War Seoretary.^^

Cox was s till a popular and prominent name in politics, so he was soon asked by local party leaders to run for Congress in the Second Congressional D istrict,1? but he refused# Then, he was offered the post of Commissioner of Internal Bevenue by

^^Cinclnnmti fioiwiorclal. May 18, 1868, p, 4. l^cox to G# W# Jones, May 23, 1868, Cox Papers# l*Cox to John G. Hallaway, June 22, 1868, Cox Papers# ^^W# S# Bacon to Cox, July 2b, 1868, Cox Papers# 219

President Johnson on Jnly 31, The holder of the post, a certain E, BoUins, had been suspected of corruption and thievery in office. He no* wrote to Cox that he was being "pushed from the office because Johnson feels I favored his Impeachment, Bollins proceeded, as did William Dennison, Secretary of the Treasury Euggi HcCulloch, Henry D, Cooke, and others, to urge Cox to ace^t the post.l* But as early as August 2, 1866, it was reported that Cox had declined the position because his personal business affairs demanded his attention at the time and he could not leave them,2@

These affairs consisted of plans for a partnership with another young lawyer, Henry L, Burnett (Cox was s till only 39 years old), Late in July, Burnett, idiom Cox had known as a young attorney in Warren before the war, had decided to end his partnership and form a law firm with Cox, if Cox decided not to accept the appointment as Commissoner, Cox, who knew that the Commissioner's post paid #6,000,00 a year, was guaranteed a fixed minimum income of #10,000,00 if he joined with Burnett, He knew he could not move his family to Washington and live on the former sum, and that with the latter guarantee he would be able to live comfortably for

^^E, A, Hollins to Cox, August 6, 1868, Cox Papers, ^^These letters came between July 3 1 and August 8, 1868 and are in the Cox Papers, BOgincinnati Commercial. August 2, 1868, p, 2, 220 years to eome.^^ In addition he felt that since as head of the Internal Bevenue System he mould have no opportunity to shape Eepublioan policy, it was best to stay in Cincinnati and follow his profession. On August 1, he «declined the Revenue Commissionership, « feeling that «in the existing strife between the President and Congress the only hope for thorou^ reform is in a new administration. «^^ A few days later Cox completed the arrangements for his partnership with Burnett, and the end of August saw the firm of Cox and Burnett hang out its shin^e for the first time.

The month of August and September also saw the enlargement of Cox's reputation as a scholar and involvement with education. All during his stay in Cincinnati he had been in constant demand as a speaker, presiding officer, and toastmaster for a great many functions all over Ohio. On August 4, 1868, he q»oke to the Literary Society of Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, on the topic, «What Biowledge is of Host Worth, « and proceeded to outline his philosophy of education. He said that an article with the same title had been w ritten by Herbert Spencer, iribio had discussed the ends cf education in it. Spencer shewed a contempt for contemporary education, feeling it was not practical and did not lead to utility, but rather to culture. Man's first goal, he wrote,

^^William Cochran, «The Scholar in Action, « Oberlln Alumni Magazine, vol. 11, no. 6 (Ibtrch, 1915)» p. 230. 22cox to William Henry Smith, August 1, 1868, William Henry Smith Papers, Manuscript Department, Ohio H istorical Society, Columbus, Ohio. 2 2 1

«as self-preservation, and before he could learn anything else, he must leam that. Cox felt this idea made man the same as common beasts and failed to recognize the value of knowledge for its oun sake. Art, morality, and beauty, he felt, had their oun criteria, and the only true practical education uas one based on the truest ideal, uhat he called the law of crystallization, uhich would form a ll minerals into perfect shapes except for obstructions. He felt that man should sim ilarly look to perfection. Spencer felt that most of life is devoted to self-preservation and to preying on others but, Cox said, the small part devoted to culture is far more ii^ortant. The true object of life is, he insisted, to approach the divine ideal and to dignify life as best we can. This he believed is most easily aeconQ>lished by an education which w ill make men cultured, refined, and s c h o la r ly .

A few weeks after this speech he was presented with a chance to make use of these principles as he was offered the presidency of in Gambier, Ohio. Cox did not accept this offer, because, although his "strongest intellectual tastes would be gratified in such a position and the departments of study usually allotted to the office" were

^3cinoinnati Commercial. August 5, 1868, p. 1. It is noteworthy that Cox questioned Spencer's social Darwinism, which philosophy was already becoming prominent in American life. This is proof of Cox's ability to think things out for himself and arrive at conclusions far different from those of most people# 222 those irtiloh he had made his speoialty, it did net offer enomgh of a salary to enable him to support his family. That mas his official reason, but actually he refused because, though he vas a constant attendant of the Episcopal Church, he vas not a communicant. His religious beliefs vere too broad and rationalistic, and he believed too strongly in his ovn intellectual freedom to join any organized church; He kept up the outvard conformity to religious forms because he realized the importance of the Church's influence on society, but he vas not, he felt, religious enough to serve as president of a denominational school such as Kenyon

Cox did feel he could give his services to a secular school to iriiich he did not have to move his family, and so vhen on S^tember 5, 1868, he received an offer to deliver a course of lectures as a professor in the Lav Department of the Cincinnati College^^ (later the Cincinnati Lav School), he accepted readily. He vculd only have to lecture tvice a veek, one hour each on Evidence and Commercial Lav, thus taking little time avay from his lav vork and also giving him an extra income. In addition, he vould be able to train young men in the lav and to mold them into intellectual and cultured citizens. Thus he looked forvard to this nev position, and vhen, on October 27, 1868, th e 36th session of the Lav School opened, he delivered

^^Cox to Judge T.C, Jones, August 27, 1868, Cox Papers. ^^Alexander Ei' McGuffey to Cox, September 5, 1868, Cox Papers. 223 the opening address to the students, ” and he officially began an attachment with that school idiich was not to end nntil

1897.

At the same time that Cox was beginning his work at the Law School, he became involved in the political campaign in Ohio. He had been happy to see General Grant nominated by the Bepnblicans for the Presidency, since he knew "Grant so well personally that |he ha^ faith that he will prove a truly conservative and sagacious President...he w ill take the reins quietly but firmly in his own hands, and, backed by a popularity like Lincoln's, w ill be secure against dictation from any quarter."^7 Grant's nomination, in addition to Cox's relief that the national convention, in what he felt was part of a conservative reaction, had left the Negro suffrage question for later decision, made Cox feel that he could still support the party and campaign for it. Althou^ he only made a few appearances and spoke in moderate terms of the party's policies, his reputation as a true Republican was kept safe from attack for the time. As a matter of fact, he was even being considered as a Cabinet member in Grant's administration by some of his friends. One wrote, "I've been thinking, since Grant's election seems a certainty, whether he couldn't call

^^Cincinnmt^ ercial. October 22, 1868, p. 10. Among his studenus that rirst term were future Ohio political leaders, Joseph Foraker and .

^^Cox to General I. N. Stiles, September 8, 1868, Cox Papers. 22i^ you to head the War Department. • .Grant and Sherman think well of your eapacity.**^^ Since Cox had bad no correspondence or contact with Grant for quite a while, he really did not expect any such development. But, idien on December 15# 1868, he gave a speech to the "Army of the West Beunlon" at Chicago, his chances were Increased enormously.

In April of that year General Schofield told him that Genral Sherman had arranged a social reunion of the armies of the Tennessee, Cumherland, and Ohio at Chicago on December 15 and 16, the anniversary of the . Sherman asked Schofield to choose an orator for the Army of the Ohio, and he asked Cox, who accepted soon after. qq December 15, he gave his speech, which was, for the most part, a summary of the activities of the Army of the Ohio from the beginning of the march to Atlanta to the battle of Nashville. But near the end he gave a hearty tribute to General Grant, who was In attendance, by saying, "with the administration of the country In such hands...iriio w ill doubt we w ill have peace? Let us hope for an administration In idiloh the even justice of the civil ruler Is meted out with tho honorable courtesy which always makes the true soldier.After he finished. General Sherman

2^W. T. Bascom, October 25, 1868, Cox Papers. ^^John M. Schofield to Cox, April 15» 1868, Cox Papers. Cox to Schofield, Xhy 18, 1868, Schofield Papers, Library of C o ngress.

30chlca

serlonsly. "33-

How, for the third time in a year, Coz knew he was being considered for a high post In the federal government. But he did not leam of It from Grant, who remained silent as to the policies he would follow and the persons he would consult. Grant adhered to the theory that since he had been elected without the help of the politicians, he owed them nothing and he would not pick his Cabinet members for political reasons or from the political leaders of the Hepubllean party. But no one knew whom he would pick and as a result Coz was as much In the dark after Sherman's conversation as the rest of the country. He got "no news politically, but just enough was said of the possibilities of his being called to Washington to prevent" his feeling entirely settled until the Cabinet business was confirmed. He did not think It at all probable that he would hear anything more from it, but yet he would settle down to work a little more quietly iriien the whole matter was over.3^

3^Cechran, "Political Ezperlenoes," p. 1026. 3^Coz to Theodore Coz, January 27, I 869, Coz Papers. 226

Â8 the weeks passed and Inauguration day (March 4, I 869) came closer and s till nothing was heard, Coz became more adamant in his resolve not to leave his profession* In the months since the election there had been a few rumors that he would be named, and so he had *had a good many offers of atteaqpts to use personal Influence" In his favor with General Grant, but had responded to all of these that he was content Tdiere he was and that only a "sense of duty could make fh lm j consent to go Into the Cabinet If Invited." He was thus prepared for any eventuality, but the day before the Inauguration he was still In the dark. He wrote, "Ordinarily I'd regard It as sheer folly to think my name could possibly be In the lis t without my knowing It today...yet no one knows any more about It. I'm as likely to be called as any of half a dozen...and to go would only be an onerous though honorable d u ty ." 3 4

The fact that he was to have to perform that duty was probably known only to General Grant. The President-elect at that time "was undoubtably affected by the adulation that was offered him. Everyone assured him of his greatness and expressed full confidence In him, and so he took no advice— this by a man with no experience either In distributing patronage or administering affairs." He thought of Cabinet

^^Cox to G. B. VrleJit, February 19, I 869, Cox P a p e rs . 3*Cox to Charles P. Cox, March 3, I 869, Cox P a p e rs. 227

Binlsters as he vould staff officers, "iriiose personal relations were so olose that they should be chosen for personal reasons. Thus he selected men he liked as coi^anions or regarded as personal friends."^^ as his chief advisers. On Airch 5t 186$, the day after he had given his inaugural address and had been sworn in as President, he sent to Congress the long-awaited lis t of six Cabinet members. The surprise with which each name was greeted prom>ted one House member to say, "I move that the House take a recess of ten minutes, that the mourners may have an opportunity to condole each other.

Truly the politicians would have to "condole" each other—none of their number had been chosen. In fact five of the six (one. Secretary of War Schofield was not replaced for a week) were genuine surprises, and the other two were strsngers to the federal government. Per his Secretary of State, Grant had chosen his old friend and neighbor, Elihu B. Vashbume. For the Secretary of the Treasury, he named A. T. Stewart, a New York department store owner who had contributed heavily to Grant's cai^aign fund and was one of the principal donors of a $65,000 house for Grant. Adolph Boris, a Philadelphia merchant idio also had collected money for a house for Grant in Philadelphia, was to be the Secretary of the

^^Adam Badeau, Grant in Peace t Prom Anuamatex to Mt. McGregor. (Philadelphia,^888), p. 136. ------

^ ^ is was Hepresentative Charles A. Eldridge of Wisconsin, and the quote is from the Congressional Globe. 45 th Congress, First Session, March 5, 1869, p. 1 5 . 228

NaT7* The g i f t e d and d e b o n a ir, though e r r a t i c , John A. Creswell was named Poetmaster-General. Grant's old ehlef-of- staff, John E. Bawllns mas to be the nev Secretary of War after Schofield retired, while Jndge Ebenezer Boekwood Hoar, a justice of the Supreme Court who had few superiors as a lawyer, was named Attomey-General. 37 For Secretary of the Interior, Grant named the able Jacob D. Coz.

In a letter that same day. Grant wrote Cox, after all the Cabinet officers had been accepted by Congress, "You have been nominated and confirmed as Secretary of the Interior. I hope you w ill Inform me of your acceptance and meet me here as soon as possible."3® The next morning, not hawing yet received the news, Cox was s till wondering what the final verdict as to his future was.3* Later that day, while he was In the midst of teaching a class at the Cincinnati Law School, the news was brought to him. Then, having had time to think the entire matter over since December and having consulted with a ll of his political friends, he decided that "under the circumstances I can do no otherwise than respond to the call, which has been entirely unsolicited and Is therefore a duty which cannot be avoided. I feel the tendency of my own feelings to be much divided, and It would be easy for me to say no and stay home.

^Tdllan Mevlns, Hamilton Pish» The Inner History of the G rant A d m in is tra tio n . (Hew x o rk , 193BJ, p . 16y.

3^17. S. Grant to Cox, March 5* 1869, Cox Papers. 39see his telegram to Schofield, March 6, 1869, Schofield Papers, Library of Congress. 229

But I have aeoepted»"^ Thus he resigned his instruetorship at the lav school, accepted the thanks of his students for his able service to them, and vent home to give Helen the nevs and to prepare for the move to Washington. Duty had called once a g a in .

^Coz to G. B. Wright. March 6, 1869, Jacob D. Coz Papers, Library of Congress (this is a small collection of letters to and from Coz). CHAPTER XIV

SECBETABY OP THE INTEBIOB

The choices General Grant made for his Cabinet were among the worst any President ever made. Borie and Washbnme were inexperienced and lacked any knowledge of their positions and their responsibilities, and Stewart (who was ineligible for the office because of his business connections), would not have been able to perform his duties as Secretary of the Treasury well because of his extremely conservative financial views. Bawlins was a dangerous m ilitarist who tended to support any movement the nation made toward war, especially in Latin America.^ Only Creswell, Hoar, and Cox were well-chosen for their respective positions, and of these only the latter two have received any great praise whatever from historians for their competence and

^Grant did do better when he replaced these four, all of whom left in 1869. replaced Washbume and remained with Grant until 1877 as the real strength of the adm inistration. Borie was replaced by George Bobeson, who was much better qualified. Bawlins died and was replaced by William Belknap idio was later connected with a scandal in his department. George Boutwell, iriio replaced Stewart, was too conservative to be a good Treasury Secretary, but he was sli^ tly better than Stewart would have been.

230 231 abilities.2 But the "central objection to the original Cabinet was not that It lacked ab ility ...The alarming fact was that It suddenly betrayed Grant as confused, uninformed, and groping. It was the Cabinet of an amateur, ulthout fixed principles, adequate Information, or even a p l a n . " 3 And when the President tried to hare a federal law which prohibited Stewart from taking office voided by the Senate, his naivete and apparent belief that he could treat his office as a m ilitary command irtileh could change orders and rules by w ill, made him seem even more Incompetent.

But why was the President that way when a large proportion of the people, including Cox, had thougj&t he would take the reins of the country with a firm hand and lead It on to peace and prosperity? The most likely reason could be found In Grant's personality. He was shy, retiring, and reserved In the presence of people he did not know very well or who he felt were his Intellectual superiors, fie was a listener rather than a talker, and while both types are needed In a conversation. It Is almost a necessity that a President be, at least at times, one of the latter so that he can direct and lead Important conversations as well as the

^ said of Cox (March 6, 1869, P. 2), "He Is, for a politician and a soldier, a man of singularly studious habits, absolute Integrity, and wide and varied a tta in m e n ts . Among a l l p ro m in en t men o f Ohio no one I s h i s superior In classical scholarship and modem literature. He has a methodical, crisp way of doing business and Is well- fitted for the work." %evlns. Fish. 108. 232 country. In addition» Grant was a m ilitary man who know little of the political crafts cf canning, flezihility, and playing off one side against the other. He was a simple, direct man iriio often said vhat he thought without thinking about it. He was faithful to his friends to the end, but once a friend betrayed him h# was like a woman scorned. He thought of the Presidency as a personal reward enabling him to rule as he wished and to help whomever he desired to favor. He knew little of and cared less for the proper bounds of his office. He would be President in the way he thought he should be, not the way the others did. The result was to be disastrous.

One of his policies that was not so disastrous (at least in one sense) was his declaration that he would have no policy to force against the people. Since he would thus refrain from forming policies, it was inevitable that Cabinet members should be the heads of their departments rather than mere advisers.^ At his first Cabinet meeting Grant made it clear that each Cabinet member would be his own boss in a ll department matters coming under his consideration. In the Interior Department, Coz had a greater amount of department matters than most of the rest because he was now the head of what many people called the "catch-all" department. It had been established in 1849 to fill the need for a home department to cover intexnal affairs, which had been greatly increased after the Hezioan War

W illiam B. Hesseltine. Ulvsses S. Grant. Politician. (New Y ork, 1935)# 159. ^ 233 had brou^t nev lands and nev problems. From that time, vhen It vas given control of the Patent, Land, Pensions, and Indian Affairs Offices, the Census, and supervision of marshals, officials of federal courts, mines, and certain other officials, it added even more duties to its list. Thus, in I 869, Coz v a s also in charge of checking construction and giving grants to the transcontinental railroads, supervising the National Hospital for the Insane, and the construction and maintenance of a ll government buildings in Washington, discharging the functions of Mayor of Washington, supervising all territorial and federal penitentiaries, controlling the Bureau of Education, and paying the salaries of all federal judges.^ Truly it vas a catch-all group vhich the Secretary of the Interior had to administer. He had to be able to become knovledgeable in many fields to do then all—and Coz vas so able.

From the very beginning of his tenure in this office, Coz formulated policies vhich vould regulate the affairs of each office and appointed men vhom he fe lt could best run each of them. In the Patent Office he selected his friend and fellov lavyer, S. S. Fisher, idio vas recognized as one of the best patent lavyers in the country. During his administration of this bureau, vhich lasted only a little longer than Coz*s role as Secretary, an overhauling of the bureau and isg@rovements in its methods of dealing vlth patent requests took place. To the

B. Archer, Memorandum History of the Department of the Interior. (Washington;' 1913)» 27"' ' ' " ------2 3 4

Census Bureau Cor appointed Francis À. Walker, idio had been chief of the Bureau of S tatistics and Deputy Commissioner of the Internal Revenue, a reformer and, later, an economic theorist of some repute. He too attempted to change the may his Bureau «as run, denouncing the censuses taken under the old la«s because under them his office had no control over its statistical agents, but he was unsuccessful in changing the la «8.^ In the Pensions Office, Hmry Von Aezman ran his division veil, cutting expenses of the office by implementing a careful investigation of all claims and a removal of all old, invalid ones, vhile increasing the number of pensions accepted a s v a li d .

One of the two most iaiportant bureaus in the Interior Department was the . Having supervision of the large amount of public lands s till owned by the government or being homesteaded and the land given to the railroads for their rig^t of way in the west was Joseph Wilson, who had served as commissioner of the General Land Office for a number of years before and who was kept in office by Cox because of his proven abilities in the position. While the policies Wilson had followed up until that time were continued under Cox, one important change came after the report of December 1868 revealed unsatisfactory conditions on the line of construction of the Union Pacific and oüher railroads. Secretary

- ' James P. Munroe. A Life of . (Now York, 1923), 109-10. ------235

O rville Browning» tüio bad served tinder Andrew Johnson, had ordered a somtlny of land patents granted to the Union Pacific and the Slonx City and Pacific, and when Coz took office, he did the same for the Central Pacific, After a Congressional Investigation shewed there were numerous repairs and structural Improvements needed on a ll three lines, Cox ordered Wilson to Issue patents for only half of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific lands. In alternate, odd-numbered sections, until the necessary changes were made.? But Coz was not In office long enough to see the result of this policy.

It was the Indian Office that was to prove the most active during Coz*s tenure. There, upon Grant's request and after checking with Attomey-General Hoar to see If he were eligible for the office (Grant did not want another A. T. Stewart),8 Coz appointed Brevet Brigadier General Ely S. Parker, a full-blooded Seneoa Indian idio had been on Grant's staff In the war and now was being rewarded for his services. But Parker's role was purely administrative, and Coz set the policy for this office also. The previous Congress, just before It had adjourned, had appropriated $2 million for the Indians, but had left no Instructions as to how It was to be spent. Such a situation gave Grant and Coz a chance to

^Leslie E. Decker, "The Railroads and the Land Of fleet Administrative Policy and the Land Patent Controversy, 1864- 1896," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 46, no. 4 ( M arch, I 960), pp. 687-9.

^Coz to Judge E. H. Hear, March 19, I 869, C o z Papers. 236

ezperiment with Indian relations* So, when Cox snggested that Grant appoint a board of philanthropists to oversee and advise the government on its Indian policies, Grant aoquiesoed*^ These men were to serve without pay as a "Christian commission" having the civilization of the Indians as their goal and laboring to stimulate public interest in th is work*^®

The idea of a commission was just one means by which Cox sought to better the lot of the Indian. Cox had seen for himself, in I 867, the treatment which the Indians received and their reaction to it* He knew land available to them for hunting and roaming was diminishing, and that when the Central and Union Pacific Bailroads linked (Hay 10, I 869) a new barrier would be set up for many tribes* Even though he was someidiat an aloof man, Cox was s till quite coxqaassionate towards those who he felt had received despicable treatment and idio were in danger of genocide because of the overbearing and aggressive nature of the white man*^^ He was genuinely concerned for the future of the Indians, and he felt "a

^Hesseltine, Grant. I 60* l®Cox to John Harwell, April 13, I 669, Cox Papers* The original members were to be Eli K* Price, William Welsh, William Strong, Samuel Shipley, J* S* H illes, and George H* Stuart* After two refused to accept the appointment, Farvell and Felix Brunot were appointed* ^^See his review of Henry H* Stanley's Mv Early Travels y d Adventures in Amartea. in the Nation* August l, I& 9 3* Cox felt the history of Indian relations was a long series of hollow promises and treaties made only to be broken by the stronger party, and was "the deep reproach to our age*" 23 7

concerted, effort between the good, people of the oonntry whose hearts are Interested. In helping the Indian and. the gewemment itself w ill give ground, to hope for results which former systems have failed, to effect.Then, in order to further this admirable goal, he inqolemented two more new policies in Indian relations: the appointment of a group of Quakers to two agencies to see lAether their peaceful and gentle natures could be used to soothe the Indians* relations with the whites and the permitting of only Joseph Williamson, chief Indian trust fund clerk, to dispense trust funds to the tribes. Thus he by-passed the various agents and chiefs for the Indians in Washington who had until then done this job, but had been prone to take some of the funds for themselves and then pay the Indians in large b ills which they could not use unless they were exchanged throng the agent at a heavy discount. ThroUj^ such far-sigdited and intelligent policies, Cox made some progress in improving Indian policy and proved that at least one of Grant's choices for the Cabinet was an excellent o n e .

But one of Grant's early decisions concerning his Cabinet was not so excellent. Because of the overwhelming number of job-seekers who, in March and April, literally

l^Cox to Eli E. Price, March 25» 1869, Cox Papers. ^^Cochran, ^Political Experiences," p. 1050. Cochran himself was a Trust Fund clerk in the Interior Department after he graduated from Oberlin College in August of 1869, so he knew the ins and outs of the office. 238

"Infested the White House a ll day long" and were frightful to behold,^^ the President soon became exasperated and decided that all applications for office would have to come through each Cabinet department. As a result large crowds of the "jobber-hordes" mowed to each government office, &nd Coz soon was In the same position In i&lch Grant had been. Coz wrote his brother, "I am the center of attack for a swarm of office hunters a hundred times more numerous than the places at my disposal. Besides this, there Is a tendency of Congressmen to be jealous that their control over offlolal patronage Is not very distinctly recognized and they coiq>laln that some of the appointments are of the President's household, etc."**-^ For the first three months he was In office, this "swarm" kept him from doing much of his other necessary work and in desperation he had to declare the first two hours of each day free from job-seekers.

Partly In reaction to this problem, one part of this other work was streamlining mast of the department and making Its work more efficient. Coz had been warned by William Dennison that every government department had one-third more clerks than It really needed because Congressional patronage

^^Clnclnnatl Commercial. March l4, I 869, p . 2 . ^^Coz to Charles P.' Coz, March 14, 1869, Coz Papers. These men crowded the lobbies and anterooms of the department and even followed Coz home often. Coz often had to take a drive In the country or hide In friends' homes to escape then. 239 had had to be satisfied with goTexnaontjo b s .^ ^ When Cox took office, he found Dmmlson had been right, and so he then Instituted a new series of employment practices In line with the federal civil service la w o f 1 8 5 3 to reform the old practice. He began by discharging a great number of department clerks because of unsatisfactory service and because of over- hiring. Then he Instituted genuine tests and examinations for Blest appointments In the Patent and Census Offices and "requested" borderline clerks la the Pensions* Office to report to their chief for "examinations touching your qualifications to discharge the duties of a Clerkship. These policies, along with Cox*s efforts In keeping the spoilsmen out of the Indian Bureau, were the first extensive civil service reform of a government department.^® Cox had seen the evils of the old system, had felt a reform was needed so that the government could be administered on strict business principles, and had begun to run his department as he would a business—thus he hired only qualified men who proved themselves capable, and who were not subject to dlsmtlssal because of

^^Dennlson to Cox, March 7» 1869, Cox Papers. l^Interlor Department Appointments Division Letterbeek, Beoerds of the Department of the Interior, National Archives. Many employees and clerks declined to take the test and instead resigned, probably thereby proving they were incapable of doing the job anyway. ^®Arl Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoilsi A History of the C ivil Service Reform MovementT 1005-1883. idrbmma, ipAij, p. 70. Ha hmd wnt been abl* tm mat* hi» systcm complete because of political pressures to keep some jobs open for patronage, especially In the Land Office. 240 p o l i t i c a l OToatsi and who had to s t a r t I n a hnmble position and work their way up In the department.^9

But this was a bad time, In a way, to Institute such a policy. The passage of the Tenure of Office Act during Johnson's administration had given Congress a strong hold over federal patronage, and It was not going to give It up easily. When Grant asked Congress to revise the Act, It did so only In the m ildest way, keeping much of Its newly-acquired power. Further, men with some of the most "practical" and basest political outlooks who were ever to reach high federal office were beginning to gain Grant's ear and a foothold In the power structure. Ben Butler, fioscoe Conkllng, Oliver P. Morton, , Zacharlah Chandler, and others had become quite powerful In the House and Senate during the Impeachment crisis, and they ware not the type of men to give up their strength quickly or easily. The major means, moreover, by which they held that strength was their patronage power of giving jobs to faithful supporters who paid them back by remaining faithful. In this atmosphere Cox's policies were a complete reversal of a ll these men knew and depended upon, and a clash between them end the Secretary of the Interior was almost Inevitable. In fact, as early as May, I 869, Cox got an Inkling of what was to come when Vice President wrote to him protesting the replacement of "a sound Eepublioan and a valued personal

19ho kept this policy Intact at all times, and even his step-son, William Cochran, had to pass a written examination before he could be hired as a clerk. 241 friend** as registrar of a land office in Utah, thus implying that the old system of using party loyalty and personal friendship as the only criterion for office should be continued.Needless to say, Coz disagreed and remained firm in his intentions of reform.

But not all of the nev Interior Secretary's day vas occupied vith department business. He vas also becoming someWiat of a rising figure in the social circles of Washington. His knovledge of almost any topic that could come up in any conversation and his ability to express himself veil on almost any subject made his home a meeting place of some of the most intelligent people in Washington at the time. Many political leaders came and visited, the most important one being the President himself. He and Coz had never been mere than casual friends until Coz vas called into the Cabinet, but from that time on the tvo vere on the closest of terms. Grant, lAio vas often very reticent in conversation vith those he did not knov veil, vas Just the opposite in the coaqoany of intimate friends. He had a fund of humor, enjoyed good stories, and had a great deal of innate refinement.But most people did not knov this, and one can understand William Cochran's surprise vhen, in September, I 869, shortly after Coz had moved from the

^^Sohuyler Colfaz to Coz, May 25, 1869, Coz Papers. Colfaz vas not as base a oharacter as the others mentioned, but he vas later implicated in the Credit Mobilier scandal. ^^Nevins, Pish, p. 135, 242 apartment where he had lived sinee March and into a house near Capitol Hill overlooking the city, the Grants set aside all formality and visited the Coxes at heme. The evening was spent in a most friendly and cordial spirit, and the fluencey and ease of Grant's conversation and the enjoyable talk between the wives were pleasant aspects of the occasion. The Grants remained until a late hour, and even before they left, it became obvious that a strong bond of friendship had grown up between the two fam ilios.^^

But Cox had other friends also. He had met Judge Hoar soon after he came to Washington, and the latter had offered him the opportunity to stay at his boarding houso until Cox's family could move. These two men developed a deep and personal relationship, with Hoar's wit, kindness, integrity, and intelligence matching Cox's personality w e l l . % t was through this friendship that Cox met and cultivated his association with the young Henry Adams. Adams had come to Washington in 1868 with William Evarts (a cousin of Hoar's and later Attomey- General and Secretary of State), and he and Sam Hoar, the Judge's son, bocame close friends. Thus he was a frequent visitor at Cox's place of residence, and the two elitists and intellectuals hit it off well from the start. Adams always

22 See Cochran, "Political Experiences," p. 1045 and the manuscript by Cochran entitled "Why General Cox left Grant's Cabinet," note, p. 13, Cox P a p e rs . ^^Cox to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., February 4, 1895, Cox Papers. 243 spoke of Cox In the best of terms» aü.though he felt that most of the Grant administration vas Ineredlbly Inept. He wrote» "This administration» while quite bad» was made up largely of friends like j^umllto^ Fish, One was still better off In the Interior Department with J. D. Cox. Indeed if Cox had been In the Treasury and Boutwell In the Interior» one would have been quite satisfied, as far as personal relationships went.M^ In fact Adams even thought of Cox as the one man who could redirect the administration» fer» he wrote» "The fact Is that you are the reserved force» the silent agency by which I hope this contest (civil service reform) Is to be decided... we have a r l^ t to expect that you will yourself take the responsibility of bringing it up the Cabinet meetings"]. Give the country a lead! We are wallowing In the mire for want of a leader. But Cox was not that kind of a leader» and he later satisfied himself In this regard with an article about the subject iriilch called attention to the evils therein. (See Chapter 15» notes 41-2)

The association with Adams gave Cox a chance to meet the rest of the Washington Intelligentsia. He later wrote of this experience» "I think of the pleasant tea-cllnklng in Henry Adams* parlors In Washington» iriien Godkln» [cai^ Schurz» [David ^ Wells» and [Francis A^ Walker made a circle that seemed no small part of literary and scientific

2^enry Adams, The Education of Henrv Adams. (New York. 1928)» pp. 266-7. ------^ ^ e n r y Adams t o Cox» November 8» 1869» Cox P a p e rs . 2 # young Anerlea bound together In hearty friendship and gm eral accord on questions affecting public welfare. Along with these, such men as Hamilton Fish, William Evarts, and Judge Hoar joined this circle of cultivated men who came to share common vlespolnts "of the political swine who crowded Washington, the financial swine In New York and the Intermediaries between the two."^^ It was here that the later reform movements leading to the Liberal Republican party and the Mugwumps received much Impetus, and Coz played as great a role as any In their beginnings. In fact some saw him as "the central figure." He was referred to as "the finest-looking man In Washington. His demeanor Is that of a country gentleman, and his dress is faultless...and his friends Intimate he will be President someday."^® While such statements were unrealistic In reference to a man with so many political liabilities, they were the honest thought of men who knew him well and could see his Immense capabilities.

In the Cabinet meetings during his first year In office Coz spoke often In the debates concerning foreign policy and the American attitude toward current Issues. When the matter of formulating a policy In regard to the latest Cuban revolution, which had begun In the fall of 1868, came up. In the first Cabinet meeting on March 19, Coz spoke In behalf of

Coz to James Ford Rhodes, March 3, 1897, Coz Papers. ^^Nevlns, Fish, p. 137. 28Cincinnati Commercial. June 2, 1869, p. 2. 245 the Spanish goYeinment, declaring that the United States owed that cotmtry understanding and kindness now that she was engaged in liberating her institutions at home.^ This argument had some weight, but it was really Secretary of State Hamilton Fish's cool direction of the country's foreign policy that kept Grant from acting rashly in this matter, as he so often showed inclination of doing. As a result, no direct American involvement in Cuban affairs was to come in Grant's first term.

Another iaqportant matter of foreign policy idiich the Cabinet discussed in I 869 was the annexation of the "republic" of San Domingo. Early in April Joseph W. Fabens, an agent of the government of President Baez, which was in dire straits, appeared in Washington and suggested to Grant that the United States take that country into the Union as a state. On April 6, the subject was brou^t up at a Cabinet meeting, but since none of the members seemed in favor of the plan, no discussion of it took place then. But later Grant, who grew more attached to this idea the more he thought about it, decided to send his personal secretary, Oliver Babcock, there to discuss leasing the part of Samana as a coaling station. When Babcock returned, it was found that he had done even more than that. As Secretary Fish reported to Cox, Babcock had brought a treaty of cession of San Domingo to the United States even though he had no diplomatic authority. The two

^^evins. Fish, p. 125. too was undergoing a revolution of sorts in its govemmratal structure. 246

Secretaries discussed the matter and decided to treat It as null and veld and to tell the President of their decision.

At a Cabinet meeting soon afterward, after Babcock, idio was there showing samples of the ores and products of San Domingo to the Cabinet members, had left. Grant told them of the treaty and of his plan to make It official by sending It back and hawing the American Consular agent sign It. The Cabinet was dumbfounded. But after an awkward Interval, Coz rose and said, "But Mr. President, has It been settled that we want to annex San Domingo?" The President, obviously embarrassed, smoked hard at his cigar and looked at the other members to see If they had anything to say. None did, and so Grant moved on to other business.30 But the President was not one to change a position once taken, and so, on October 19, 1869, at another Cabinet meeting, he had Secretary Pish read the annexation treaty he had ordered him to draw up for consideration by the Senate. At this meeting, Cox once again spoke of his desire that Grant not follow such a policy, but by now he knew the President was not about to change his mind, and so he then merely sat back and did not pursue the matter. On November 29, the treaty went to the Senate, and the Issue idilch was to lead to the first major clash between Grant and Congress was begun.

30j. D. Cox, "How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney General," A tlantlc Monthly. (August, 1895), pp. I 63- 6. 3lNevlns, Pish, p. 271. 24?

Most of Coz*8 business days uere oocupied with departmental m atters. One matter In particular, idileh came to his attention soon after taking office, was to play a major part in deteimining his futures On March 24, Coz received a note from John Bingd&am, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, saying that a memorial by a certain William McGarrahan for land in California had been referred to them, and they requested that Coz not act affecting his title to those lands until Congress acted on this memorialCer complied, but soon after Congress adjourned without acting, William Evarts, counsel for the New Idria Mining Company, asked the land office to grant his coi^any*s claim to certain California lands. Coz took the matter under consideration and found that part of idiat it claimed overlapped that described in McGarrahan*s memorial as the Paroche Grande Bancho, whose claim had been rejected by the Supreme Court as fraudulent and void in 1865 being founded on a forged Spanish grant. He also found that McGarrahan had applied to the last Congress, also without result. On June 9, 1869, Coz informed Evarts of the Judiciary Committee's decision and his decision to follow their request and not open the case. To this reply Evarts protested that New Idria had a legal claim and that the Interior Department had to issue it a patent.33 Coz then asked Judge Hoar for his legal opinion, 34 the latter was about to give his decision

32john Bine^iam to Coz, March 23, 1869, Coz Papers. 33william Evarts to Coz, June 12, 1869, Coz Papers. 34 Coz to Judge Hoar, June l6, 1869, Coz Papers. 248 when McGarrahan proetired the interference of the Supreme Court of the D istrict of Columbia*

While his application to the Fortieth Congress had been still pending, McGarrahan had filed a petition in the Supreme Court of the D istrict of Columbia asking for a writ of mandamus commanding the then Secretary of the Interior, Orville Browning, to issue him the patent under a statute giving it to him if the lands did not contain mines of gold, silver, or quicksilver* But since it was a well known fact that McGarrahan wanted the land because a quicksilver mine was on it. Browning denied the D istrict of Columbia court's jurisdiction* His lawyers argued the case at the Court, but the case died irtien Browning retired in March, I 869. The Court adjourned, but McGarrahan got two of the justices to enter a mandamus to Coz, as successor, also commanding Cox to issue the patent* Cox, who felt this was a dishonest and crass act, brought the matter at the next Cabinet meeting* Hoar gave his opinion, which was against McGarrahan, Grant agreed, and the Cabinet decided that Cox should do nothing before the next meeting of Congress except to try to reverse the Court's action by having the federal Supreme Court annul the order*

When Congress met in December, Cox told Bingham of the state of the case, and gave him a copy of Hoar's opinion (which held that the Department had no rig^t to delay the ordinary execution of the law). The two then agreed that they would wait for the hearing of the case in the Supreme Court 2k9 and that they regarded the claim as "a most fraudaient effort to obtain from Congress what he jjoGarrahan] hadn’t from the courts." On December 17, Coz informed Bingham that the case would be heard on January 17, 1870, and soon afterward he agreed to accept the committee’s stipulation that he not act on the New Idria Company’s claim, which that company agreed not to press until a decision had been made by the committee. There the matter stood as the Congress elected in 1868 began to take up its normal business.What it did with the McGarrahan case and how Coz and Grant reacted to that decision were to play a large role in the future relations of the two men.

But that decision was not to come until late in 1870, and the discussion of Coz’s career in I 869 cannot be considered complete without some treatment of his first annual report, which was presented on November 15, 1869.^^ Since he

^^This account comes from Coz’s letter to Charles Nordhoff, editor of the New ïorkÆvening Post, of December 3, 1870, in irtiich the former outlined the history of the McGarrahan claim and his stand on it in case Nordhoff wished to publish it. It is wholly accurate and was probably written from copies of the letters Coz had sent and originals he had received concerning the case. This letter is in the Coz Papers. ^^There were two other events in I 869 which should be given some mention. In one Coz had to decline to caaipaign in Ohio because of his son Kenyon’s illness (Coz to E. B. Hayes, September I 6, I 869, Hayes Papers, a copy of which is in the Coz Papers). The second concerned a letter Coz received from General Francis A. Darr complaining that Spain was shipping guns and men to and asking Coz to ask Grant to stop it. Coz said he couldn’t do anything because the U. S. was a neutral and was thus powerless (Coz to Darr, October 1, I 869, Coz Papers). 250 had so many different types of departments to oversee, the report was quite long, but, like the rest, complete. It began by noting that over seven million acres of public lands had been disposed of in the previous year and that the geological surveys of the territories were being carried out. After giving the patent report, Coz called on Congress to change the pension laws by fixing agents * salaries and requiring applicants to be examined by the Pension Office doctors and not by local ones. He went on to the Indian Office report, saying that the cozQ)letion of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Bailroads on May 10, I 869, had totally changed the conditions in the West. No longer would settlement be gradual, for along the central route to the coast every railroad station would now be a nucleus for settlement and development. Now the Indian would be repressed even more, for he would have to stay on fixed reservations. The government would have to encourage him by giving him the means of agricu].ture and proper clothing. It would also have to thange the old policy of putting each tribe on a separate reservation and instead make larger reservations for groups of tribes, which would then be less amenable to white pressure. What he felt was the best tribes could teach the rest the ways of civilization, and they could then be given spokesmen in Congress to acquaint the country with their conditions and with thé nation's obligation to them. The Indian would have to leam to trust the white man, and the only means to that end, according to Cox, was ceo^lete sincerity and honesty on 251 the part of the white. Quakers had been appointed as Indian agents so the country could see that the government was looking toward a sincere cultivation of peaceful relations with the Indian. The experience of this policy in the summer o f 1869 along with the appointment of a committee of philanthropic citizens to oversee all Indian matters, warranted confidence in the system and had helped lead to a decline of hostilities with the Indians that year.

After this long discussion of Indian affairs,3? Cox turned to the other bureaus and summarized the duties of the new office of education, the preliminary work by the Census Department, the completion of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Bailroads and their deficiencies, the progress of the Capitol building improvement, the nation's benevolent institutions, the D istrict of Columbia jails and police, and the territorial penitentiaries. Then he followed Henry Adams's advice^® and called "forcibly and manfully for a reform of the c i v i l servioe."^9 called for raising the standard of qualifications, making merit the criterion for promotion, and securing permanence for faithful employees. Cox felt that he

^^For this he was praised by a meeting of a committee of "Friends on Indian A ffairs," held March 12, I 870 i n Baltimore, because he had understood the problem well and had made a valiant effort "to secure justice to these Indians". See Benjamin Hallowell to Cox, March 26, I 870, Cox ^apers. ^®Henry Adams to Cox, November 8, I 869* Cox P a p e rs . ^^Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, p. 68. No one else in the Cabinet followed his lead and tinSTt's first message coiqiletely ignored the topic. 2 5 2 oould conduct his departmental work with one-third fewer clerks, but that this reduction was feasible only If the clerks were allowed to stay In office long enough to leam their duties. As the system then worked, eaoh felt he would soon be ousted anyway so he would not work very hard to leam the job. The evils of office-se eking took up three months of department time and retarded and embarrassed public business. Coz called for new legislation to offset these evils and for Congress to pay attention to the strong public demand for such measures.^^

But Coz was ahead of his time In such a stand and In most of the other recommendations he made regarding this matter. He was slowly and surely becoming an outspoken reformer who favored helping certain minority groups and keeping the government from graft and corruption. Yet, he did not remain In office long enough to do much about these needs, at least In part because the President was not very active In these causes. As a matter of fact, Grant's first year In office had shown that he was not very active In any causes, but rather had sought to run the country at a leisurely pace without seeking to Isg^rove radically his quite Imperfect knowledge of the office and Its duties. In addition he had begun to show his Ineptness for the office and had begun

^House of Representatives, Ezecutlye Documents, part 3, 4lst Congress, 2nd session. Report o t the Secretary of the Interior, Washington, I 869, given November 15, I 869. 253 backing causes which were to make him increasingly unpopular with many people. His Cabinet choices had been roundly criticized and his espousal of the annexation of San Domingo had brought Cabinet and Congressional disagreement. Furthermore, his growing friendship with men like Ben Butler and , who had defended him against verbal attacks and to whom he would become eternally grateful and tractable, his slowness in stopping the move by and Jim Fisk to comer the New York gold market on "," September 24, I 869 (with the help of one of Grant's brothers- in-law), and, in general, his inability to cope with the problems of his office had made Grant seem unfit for the presidency. But Grant could not see these inadequacies. Too stubborn to change, he continued moving in a direction which was eventually to lead to his administration becoming widely discredited.

Two of Grant's actions early in I 870 were to pave that road of ineptness even farther. On December I 6, I 869, th e President, feeling that having two men from Massachusetts, Boutwell and Hoar, in the Cabinet was not politically expedient, presented Judge Hoar's name to the Senate as a candidate to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court. Unfortunately for the Attorney-General the Senate was angry with him for appointing circuit judges without considering its patronage desires. As a result Hoar's nomination was rejected. Meanwhile, the President had been trying to push his San Domingo 25^ annexation scheme by bargaining with the Senators who approved of the measure. This number had been Increased when Grant had dismissed his m inister to England, John L. Motley, a close friend of Charles Sumner, who earlier became the President's chief opponent on this matter when, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had opposed this treaty and had led the committee to vote 4-2 against It. In this situation Grant, feeling that he needed all the support he could get, asked some Southern Senators to name their price for a favorable vote. Their answer was Hoar's removal and replacement with a Southerner. The President was quick to act, and the next day sent a note to Hoar that he would accept Hoar's resignation (which Hoar had offered to give the President earlier to ease his embarrassment at having two Cabinet members from the same state, but which Grant had refused to accept) • Cox first read that Hoar had resigned In the New York Times of July 16, 1870, and he immediately rushed to Hoar's house to see what he knew about It, for Hoar had mentioned nothing about It a few days \ rller.

As he reached the gate of Hoar's house, Cox was "buttonholed" by Senator Henry Wilson of Iowa, who asked him about the matter. Cox, embarrassed to answer because he really knew nothing about It, said It was probably done because of the uneven distribution of Cabinet members from Massachusetts. But

Wilson felt that matter was an old consideration and that some new. Insidious reason had been the cause. When Wilson asked 255

Coz what he thou^t of the new man, the Secretary, who did not know who the replacement was, could only mumble, **0h, I think you'll find he's all right." Coz then took a streetcar to Hoar's residence where the "resigning" Attorney-General told him the full story. As he related it to Coz, Grant had written Hoar a note that it was necessary for the President to ask Hoar's resignation. No ezplanation was contained or reasons assigned, and so when Hoar sat down to write his resignation he could think of no reasons to cite for his action. The nezt day he met the President (in the interim Grant's acceptance which was in terms of good w ill had been received) who said he was sorry, but had to replace Hoar to get Senate approval for the San Domingo annezation from the Southern Senators. He promised to keep it secret for the time being until he could think of a replacement. But the nezt day a correspondent from the Times had seen Hoar in his office and told him that the resignation had been publicized. Hoar was naturally upset and went to Grant to te ll him that someone had betrayed the President. However, in actuality, it was not a betrayal, but the President's own carelessness that led to the publicizing of the resignation. Grant had left his letterpress copybook which contained his acceptance of Hoar's resignation in his outer office where someone had apparwitly read it and divulged its contents to the press. After barely being able to restrain his laughter at such a bumbling use of official documents. Hoar left after being told that Amos Akerman, an 256 tinlmoim Georgia lawyer and former Confederate, was to be nom inated.

At the nezt Cabinet meeting, at which Coz ezpected Grant to discuss such an important event, the President said nothing about it and so the matter was never discussed by the Cabinet. Coz did later discuss a related matter which also had brought the President much criticism and Coz*s dismay with Grant. After dining with Judge Hoar, General Sherman, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Balph Waldo Emerson, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, and others at the Boston "Saturday Club," Longfellow asked Coz to te ll Grant in the name of the club that all educated men of New England were offended by his removal of Motley because of that ambassador's friendship with Sumner. Coz later told Grant this, but the President only gruffly replied, "I made up my mind to remove Hr. Motley before there was any quarrel with Mr. Sumner", and there was nothing more said on the topic. Grant had settled on a policy, and no one would stand in his way. Hoar was just one more obstacle that had to be removed, and even the friendship of the two men was not enough to keep Grant from sacrificing Hoar to his own desires. There were indications, moreover, that others might have to go too, for though Grant felt "There is no man whom I love more than Governor Coz," he still regretted "that he also (like Hoar)

^^his entire account is from Coz's article on Judge Hoar's retirement from the Cabinet, pp. 166-71. ^^Ibld.. p. 172. 257

not given the treaty his sïÇ)port.'’^3 Aeoorcllngly, the President probably would have treated him like Hoar If It had served his purposes. But the tie vote of 28-28 which the Senate gave the treaty on June 30 just about ruined all chances for Its passing, and so Coz's position was safe for a little while longer.

But s till rumors that Cox would not last much longer began to appear. Donn P latt, an Ohio newspaper correspondent and politician, wrote In July, "there are Indications Coz Is to be replaced—this would be a great public loss. He has been a source of pride to me, for while knocking about among lobbies and rings, the uniform comment when his name Is mentioned Is 'Oh, d It, nothing can be done with him. ' He has the best political mind of the Cabinet and Grant should l i s t e n t o him and n o t th e f a s t men and women a t Long B r a n c h ," ^ (Grant's summer retreat). But Grant was doing just the opposite more and more, and, despite Hoar's admonition not to lose his original and strong friends by giving too much confidence to a n o th e r c l a s s , those who were supposed to be consulted on all Important matters found themselves shorn of their power to help their chief...and had to look on and see the gradual Increase of mischievous influenceThat Influence had come about

^%evlns. Fish, p. 366. ^CiHciTiTiittl Commercial. July 26, I 870, p . 1 . ^^Hamllton Fish's diary, as quoted In Nevlns, Fish, p. 377. *^Coz, "How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attoxney-General, " p. 173, 258 because of the criticism Grant had been receiving from men like Sumner and many newspapers for his annexation scheme and other failures. The naive President had been supported all along by "the boys", Butler, Conkllng, Chandler, Simon Cameron, and Morton, and so, he reasoned, these were his true friends. They soon became his "kitchen cabinet," and were Grant's actual advisers on all public actions; and their Influence grew as criticism of the President mounted.

In such an atmosphere Coz, a believer In government by gentlemen under strict, moral rules, became more and more distressed. He was sorely hurt by Hoar's retirement, and he saw the cause of It as a presidential bowing to Congress and the politicians who held the reins there. At the same time Secretary of State Fish was equally unhappy at his role In the State Department, and he had already offered twice to resign. Coz hoped he wouldn't because then "Congressional Influence ml (dit determine his successor In a way not pleasant to" his notions. At the same time Coz was "seriously contemplating an early return to Cincinnati." But the President refused Fish's request, and the Cabinet settled back Into the old quiet ways, "awaiting what may come of the various Influences" which they knew would be "actively exerted at Long Branch during the summer." The President had allowed ulterior Influences In Congress to drive a pure and honest man from the Cabinet, and he had gained nothing In return. Every member of the Cabinet felt a liability to "a similar summary severance of his te n u r e ." 259

It had taken Cox a long time to admit to himself that the administration was in a sad state of affairs « hnt he finally had. Each Cabinet department was now an independent office because there was no central direction or policy. Each Cabinet member had been made to feel he was in charge of an independent machine, whose concerns were the only ones he could discuss with the President—-who lacked the faculty of drawing out conversation on general problems in these meetings. As a result the administration was in disarray, andall the Cabinet members could do was to continue their departmental work as best they could and hope that Grant would take more constructive positions. This is what Cox decided to do until he could "see that leaving would not lose whatever had been undertaken,and then he would probably resign.

There were two major issues which were eventually to help lead him to take that step, but the discussion of them must come after another look at Indian affairs. In the early months of I 870 a orisis arose in the territory. The Sioux Indians there, under the leadership of chiefs Bed Cloud and , had seen a great number of settlers moving into areas which the Indians had been told would be closed to

^^cox to Aaron P. Perry, July 29, 1870, Cox Papers. As soon as Hoar left the Cabinet, Cox "lost all faith in the President's ability to stand against the combined efforts of intriguing politicians, and from that moment was resolved to anticipate them, idienever it would become probable he (Grant) would yield to compromise" Cox's plans with regard to the administration of his own department. Cox to Hoar, October 18, I 869, Cox Papers. 260 the white man. Also, the Sioux had been barred from trading on the Platte Birer for a time, and now they were growing impatient because of the hardships many of their people had to endure. As a result rumors of a new Sioux War began spreading over the country, and the m ilitary stationed there began preparing for action. The government was caught in the middle, and was seeking a way out idien a Benjamin Tattram of New York suggested bringing Bed Cloud to Washington for a personal conference with Cox and Grant to try to forestall trouble. A few weeks later a telegram came from Wyoming saying that Bed Cloud wished to come to Washington, and the request was g r a n t e d .^

Cox looked forward to the v isit of "Bed Cloud and the other Sioux chiefs iriio have been the terror of the frontier." He hoped that he could show them "evidence of the nation's determination to keep faith in instead of repudiating solemn treaties," and impress them with the power and grandeur of the nation "so that they would be fearful of ever again attacking it." ^ This latter hope was seemingly made more attainable when the chiefs and their entourages traveled by railroad through the country. "Chicago stunned them, and as they traveled on their ideas of the world toppled end fell in ruins. They reached Washington dazed and rather frightened." Then,

ko George E. Hyde, Bed Cloud's Polks, A History of the Sioux Indians. (Nodnnan, , 1937), pp. ÏY2-3. ^Cox to Edward Cromwell, Hay 14, I 870, Cox P a p e rs. 261

Tdien th e y a r r lv é d , and h i s men were g iv en a to u r o f Washington by the head of the Indian Bureau, Ely Parker, and were shown the sights and wonders in the expeotation that they would be awed and humbled and more likely to conform to the government*s wishes.50

But some of the fear they had when they arrived wore off, and Red Cloud proved as recalcitrant as Spotted Tail had been in his first interview with Cox. The latter chief, leader of the Brule Sioux, met Cox on June 2 and began the meeting by scolding the Secretary for not fully carrying out the treaty of 1868 and thereby keeping his tribe from hunting on its promised grounds. Cox, iriio probably felt insulted by this attack on his policies, which he felt were making huge advances over what had been in use before, began to lecture Spotted Tail about the good effects of that policy and he told that chief that he should face trouble in a manly way and not complain. Spotted Tail replied laughingly that if Cox had had as much trouble as he had had in his life, he would have cut his throat long ago.^^

Because of this acid-tinged exchange Cox was better prepared for Red Cloud*s interview the next day. That chief, who was intent on keeping the old ways for his people and not changing to agriculture as the white man wished him to do,

50Ryde, Red Cloud*s Polks, p. 175» 5lGeorge E, Hyde, Spotted T ail*s Folks. A History of the Brule Sioux. (Norman, OKiahoma, lyol;, pp. 1^4-5. 2 6 2

first asked Cor to telegraph his people that he had arrived safely and that he had asked for food for them. He then began to rail away against the whites for breaking their treaties and forcing the Indian to face starvation and death. But Cox put him off and refused to talk business until later in their stay.^^ He told Red Cloud that he and the other chiefs could see Grant and discuss their problems with him

a ls o .

The rest of the Indians* stay in Washington went somewhat like its beginning. They continued to ask for aid and clothes and ammunition at the various interviews, receptions, and "grand councils" with Grant, Parker, and Cox which followed. On June 7 Cox addressed them through interpreters and tried to placate them by saying that they had seen the "great white father" (Grant) and the power he held and that they could now see that he acted for them not out of fear, but because of a desire to do the right thing. He offered them everything they asked for, except guns, and promised to try to see that their treaties were kept to the letter.53 He repeated this idea at subsequent meetings, but the Indians failed to be impressed, for they had come to Washington with set ideas about keeping the old ways and regaining lost territories and rights, and now the government was telling them to go to their reservations and begin to leam

5^Hyde, Bed Cloud's Folks, pp. 176-7.

53çincinnati Commercial. June 8, 1870, p. 1. 263 to farm. When Coz tried to shorn Bed Cloud the 1868 treaty he had signed which denied him such rl^ ts as he claimed, that chief shouted that he had been tricked Into signing It by an Interpreter who said It was only a peace agreement and that this was typical of a ll the white man's agreements end p ro m ise s.

For all practical purposes all hope for a final legal settlement of the Sioux problem ended there. The chiefs stayed two days longer, but the only further accomplishments were Bed Cloud's apology for the scene he had made and Cox's promise to promote their Interests and to try to make them happy.On June 12 the chiefs left Washington, and on June 16 were paraded before a huge meeting of sympathizers at the Cooper Union In New York. Bed Cloud spoke convlncln^y for his people there, and for a few days afterward Eastern papers loudly dememded a more generous Sioux policy. Because of this, his promises to Bed Cloud, and his belief In the need to aid the Indians, Cox sent that chief's tribe seventeen horses and arranged for a group of reformers to accompany the many gifts and necessities of life he had also ordered sent to Port Laramie to be distributed to the . He also eiqpowered these men and the head of the Indian Commission, Felix Brunot, iriio went with them, to attempt to work out a

^^Hyde, Bed Cloud's Folks, p. 177*

^^Clnclnnatl Commercial. June 12, 1870, p. 1. 264 final settlement with the Sionz. Althou^ none was made by treaty, the arrival of the shipment of goods from Washington calmed the Oglalas somewhat, and they no longer threatened to begin a war. Thus, the original problem was solved at a trifling cost.

The "Bed Cloud affair" was a major example of the working of Coz’s Indiem policy. It had its ups and downs, for no di^Jter what Coz did, the Indiems were euLmost innately suspicious of a ll white men because of broken promises in the past. In addition Coz’s policy seemed to be aimed at "civilizing" the Indians in such a way as to eventually make them just like the whites in manners, morals, and way of life. Coz, like most men of his time, did not give enough thought to Indian culture and pride and was so intent on changing them that he failed to consider whether or not they wanted to be changed, or, if they did, what Indian ideas on the means toward that end might be. His policy was humane and considerate and aimed at "converting the Indian agencies into mission colonies which with true missionary self-devotion, shall give its iriiole time to the real salvation of the tribes."57 But it was not oriented nearly enough to the Indian mind to be completely successful.

5^Hyde, Bed Cloud’s Polks, pp. 180-1. 57coz to Grenville Weeks, July 23, 1870, Indian Office Becords, Becords of the Department of the Interior, National A rc h iv e s. 265

Even though Coz*s Indian policy was a good start and was far better than any previous one, it soon came to be despised by many who considered it too conciliatory and too considerate of the Indian. On this issue, as in others, Coz had made many enemies because he had refused to follow the dictates of the patronage-hungry politicians. As one of the leading religious leaders involved in Indian work wrote Coz, "I hear from several quarters that politicians in the old Indian ring are determined to break up your benevolent plans for the poor I n d ia n s .I t also seemed probable that they would demand that he leave the Cabinet for this and his other political "offenses". Such was the fate of anyone idio tried to reform politics in this ruthless and crass political time.

One of the most ioqportant of Coz*s alleged political sins was his reaction to the means William McGarrahan and his political friends used to push the latter*s land claim. As was noted above, that claim had been left to consideration by the House Judiciary committee. When that group began its deliberations, McGarrahan*s attorney specifically agreed that if the committee decided against his client his case would not be pushed further, but would end there. Then, althou^ no official declaration was made on the House floor of the decision because Representative Peters, who was in charge of

^^Bishop H. B. Whipple to Coz, September 20, 18?0, Coz Papers. For Grant*s policies in relation to the use of missionaries in Indian affairs, see Elsie M. Rushmore, The In^an Policy Duilng G ^t* s Administration. (New York, 1914), and Richard J. Gabel. Public Funds For Church and Private Schools. (Washington, 1934). ——— 266 making the report that the oosmittee had voted 7-3 against McGarrahan*s claim, was deterred from doing so by the hurry of business at the close of the session, he nevertheless did write out the full majority decision and presented it to Coz late in July, 1870•

After Congress adjourned, the New Idria company again demanded that Coz take up and determine their case, since the committee had decided against McGarrahan. Coz agreed with this and decided to put the matter on the docket for consideration by the Land Office, but without ezpressing any personal opinion CO as to the merits of the claim. In the meantime the case in the Supreme Court for a w rit of mandamus against Coz had been thrown out, and McGarrahan had, seemingly, lost a ll legal means to compel Coz to give him the patent. As a result he turned to eztra-legal (if not illegal) means and sought to gain the services of Henry L. Burnett, Coz*s former law partner, as his attorney so that, he hoped, Burnett could use influence on Coz. Burnett, however, asked Coz if he should take the position, and then took the latter*s advice and refused it.^^

But McGarrahan was not through. On July 22 one of his attorneys wrote Donn Piatt, now Coz*s close friend, "I*ve seen B illy McGarrahan and told him you would have nothing to do with the business unless he reduced his proposition to writing. He

^^Coz to Charles Nordhoff, December 3» 1870, Coz Papers. Cochran, "Why General Coz...", p. 22. 26? said If he were successful he would form a Joint stock company and give you stock as good as gold. How would it do then, to make the proposition to pay $20,000 in stock, provided you can bring sufficient personal influence on the Secretary of the Interior? All he wants, or says he wants, is delay.

McGarrahan thought he could use the promise of money to influence a majority of Congress to vote for his memorial (he had already gained many supporters, including John Bingham and Ben Butler) in the nezt session. But the same promise did not work in this instance, for Piatt refused the offer and reported i t to Coz.

As a result McGarrahan, having had no success and fearing that if Coz left the New Idria claim to the normal processes it would gain the patent easily, again sought to use the D istrict of Columbia Supreme Court to help him out. Through Justice D. C. Humphreys he arranged for that court to issue an injunction against the New Idria company's filing a land claim for the disputed area. Then he also arranged to have Coz subpoenaed to appear in court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt because he had allowed the claim to be filed and processed.Coz, surprised at this further attempt to hinder his activities, was further shocked idien, on

^^Clinton Bice to Donn P iatt, July 21, 1870, in an unnamed newspaper. Scrapbook #3,Coz Papers. 62 Coz to Judge D. C. Humphreys, August 29, I870, in a pamphlet entitled "The Ezecutive Department and the Courts", the whole of which is this letter. 268

August 22, he received a letter from President Grant (mho was at Long Branch, Cox being the only Cabinet member in Washington at the time) telling Cox to act on neither the HcGarrahan nor the New Idria claim because the former was s till to be decided by Congress, thus intimating that he (Grant) would not act on it until after the next session.

Cox was **astonished beyond measure" by th is. Two days before he had written his friend Aaron Perry that the way the administration was going and the "utter lack of administrative unity and of consistent policy" gave him some grounds for the conclusion that he was unable to cope with the demands of the situation and would have to "force an issue and secure some agreement on a policy or leave the Cabinet on that question." ^ Apparently he now felt Grant's letter had brought just such an issue, end so the next day Cox wrote a long letter to the President saying that he had followed the President's orders, but not without reservations. He felt Grant had probably been misinformed as to the status of the case in Congress (probably, he felt but did not mention, by some of Grant's political cronies or brothers-in-law). The case was in no sense before Congress in a way to impede departmental action but was merely a memorial to be decided upon. The two disputant parties had awaited the Judiciary committee's decision, which had been against HcGarrahan, and now New Idria wanted its claim to be considered. Cox had not been hindered from acting on that claim previously except by the common consent of the two

^^Cox to Aaron P. Perry, August 20, I870, Cox Papers. 269 parties. The reason for that agreement m a now gone, and now HcGarrahan stood before the Department as a fraudulent claimant. But even so HcGarrahan had again sought to take Coz into the D istrict of Columbia court, even though it had no jurisdiction in the case. "If", Cpz wrote, “the federal Executive is to be at the mercy of such proceedings as these, we shall justly become [si^ the contempt of the nation and the world.”

Coz went on in his letter to prove HcGarrahan*s “unblushing knavery” by telling Grant that Donn P iatt had showed him a letter offering him $20,000 to influence Coz. Coz then said he didn't know what to do about going to court because the Attorney-General was in Georgia so that he had no one to defend him or give him legal advice. In the last paragraph of the letter Coz then did what he had told Perry he would—force an issue to see what would happen. He wrote, belief is that no question more gravely affecting the dignity of the Executive and its independence will be likely to arise during your administration, and I think the situation fully warrants your telegraphing the Attorney General, if not all the Cabinet, to meet you here before the thirtieth. For myself, as I am conscious of having only fought fraud with such vigor as I could, I can make no compromise, and if I fail to secure to the fullest extent your approval of my cause, I must beg you to relieve me at once from duties idiieh without your support I shall utterly fail in .“^^ Once again Coz had

^^Coz to U. S. Grant, August 23, 1870, Coz Papers. 270

reverted to the Idea that he was right on an issue and that if others did not agree with and support him he would have to r e s ig n .

But to this demanding letter Coz got no reply. Later he learned that the letter had "out Grant to the quick" and that "if the President had answered the letter the day he received it, his answer would certainly have been a request for" Coz's immediate resignation. Grant interpreted Coz*s letter as an intimation that ^ desired to protect fraud ("a most mistaken interpretation," said Coz).^^ But the President had calmed down and never did answer Coz—a turn of events which surprised Coz very much. When Coz met Grant several times after this, the President's cordiality of manner led him to believe that Grant regretted the interference and did not desire to reopen the subject. Thus, Coz was assured that Grant had seen the light. Thereafter, the President eqiressed himself to many persons in the most ezplicit terms of confidence in Coz's purposes and motives, and Coz took this as proof that Grant had backed down when the issue had been forced and that he could now hope for a better administration in the future.

Before he found out how Grant felt, however, Coz went ahead and solved the prolem of district court interference himself. He wrote Judge Humphreys that that court had nc

^^Coz to Judge Hoar, October 22, 18?0, Coz Papers.

**Coz to Charles Nordhoff, December 3, 1870, Coz Papers. 271 jTirlsdlctlon over the Interior Department or any section of the federal government. The appellant, William HcGarrahan, he wrote, had had his case thrown ont of both that court and the Supreme Court, and it was thus obviously fraudulent. He wrote that that court had declared against just such interference in an earlier case before it, and thus, for all these reasons, he refused to appear to testify as he had been o r d e r e d .A s a result of this letter Humphreys denied the motion in the HcGarrahan case and Coz*s friends now hoped that this "should place at rest this unquiet claim.Once t h i s decision was made Cox decided to have nothing more to do with the whole matter (so as to keep more ammunition from the politicians) and left it, as Grant had requested, to Congress to decide. HeamAile, however, he took pains to see that the New Idria claim was duly processed by the Land Office, was declared to be lic it, and could be granted in due time. With that he ended, he thought, his connection with HcGarrahan*s claim. But later events proved him wrong.

The discussion of why and how this was so must be tied, however, to another issue upon idiich Coz and Grant were to have a disagreement. On Hay l4, 18?0 Coz received a letter from the Ohio Republican Party Central Committee asking him to give its Secretary "a list of each Federal office-holder appointed from, or resident in, Ohio, so that a small and

^^Coz to 0. C. Humphreys, August 29, 1870.

Hamilton Fish to Coz, September 5t 1870, Coz Papers. 272 eqtiltable assessment may be made upon them and so that each and every recipient of federal patronage be afforded the opportunity to contribute, for the coming canqiaign, his due proportion of the necessary e x p e n s e s .”^9 Another letter, from the Congressional Republican Committee, requested the same type of list of all department clerks. Coz delayed answering these letters because of the HcGarrahan affair and his dislike for having to do such a disagreeable task. When he did answer them he took advantage of the opportunity to decry this system of assessments and expound his views oh civil service reform.

Writing to the secretary of the Congressional Committee, Cox enclosed with the requested lis t a warning that he would follow the policy he had spoken of to that officer earlier. He wrote: "in my efforts to bring about an improvement of the civil service in this Department, I hold it essential that it be understood by clerks and ei^ployees that they hold their places subject to removal for lack of efficiency or integrity, and that no subscriptions to political funds or show of political zeal will secure their retention if capacity and industry be lacking. I have been assured that the list will be used only to invite those who felt free to do so to contribute and not to ioq>ose a tax on anyone...any compulsory assessment would be a political immorality and productive of mischief. We can do no more real service to the party by raising the

^^Bodney Foos, Secretary of the Ohio Republican Party Central Committee, to Cox, Hay 14, 1870, Cox Papers. 273 standard of qualification than by the expenditure of many times the amount they oould possibly afford to contribute.

When Coz later received a letter from H. D. Harrison, chairman of the Ohio Republican Executive Committee, saying that he (Cox) had not answered the earlier letter from that committee, Cox, having had time to "look a little more closely into the history of assessments before acting," had now decided to "decline complying because it is not r i^ t to do so and therefore not to the advantage of the Republican party." He now felt that assessments were directly antagonistic to civil service reform. They had never been made before 1856 and then only by a committee of clerks waiting upon their fellows in person. Now, for the first time, clerks had received a circular from the Congressional Committee, fixing the assessment at 1# on their income. Two or three states also had demanded a percentage, one of li/(, thus making "an income tax of 2^% plus expecting them to travel to their homes, at their own expense, to vote." This new idea of assessing their salaries as funds on which the party could draw at its own discretion, Cox felt, was utterly wrong and an "evidence of the political demoralization" of the times, which had to be stopped.

Going on in the letter, Cox stressed the absolute necessity of civil service reform as a party policy and

^^Cox to Jo W. Clendening. Secretary, Congressional Republican Committee, July 28, I 870, Cox P a p e rs . 274 practice in every department to secure permanence of tenure and popular support. The dependence of appointees on Influence for position had led to the tacit assumption that Congressmen had the right to dictate appointments and removals, and so appointment, promotion, and removal usually had nothing to do with the qtiallflcations for office. Coz himself had seen young men pressed upon him as candidates for Important offices who could neither write nor spell. Such a system needed thorough reform, and because Coz felt that It was the party's duty to aid such a change, he would not follow their request and would seek to revise their policies. He was sure his clerks would respond If they were asked to contribute voluntarily, but If they felt their places depended on It, they would be completely demoralized. Then, probably because he was sure the committee would not easily accept such reasoning and to assure the party leaders that he was sincere In his party support, Coz sent the party $50.00 as a personal contribution and offered his services as a speaker In that fa ll's campaign.

This stand, a very honorable, honest, upright one by a rigid moralist seeking to keep his party on what he felt was Its original path of reform and moral rule, was nevertheless not a practical one to take during this era. The spoils system was just beginning to reach Its peak, and It had permeated almost every phase of government. Place and

^^Coz to H. D. Harrison, August 10, 1870, Coz Papers. 275 patronage were basic to the very structure of polities for many, and almost all politicians were made or broken on such considerations. They were supported for office by their state or local party organization, and the latter had to be rewarded If the politician was to keep his place. Thus a vicious circle of job-placement and off1ce-rewards had become entrenched In the government. No true believer In such a system, and especially no prominent politician, could then change the system which had made him. In many Instances, what he was politically. All party members, moreover, were expected to acquiesce In the system or be called a traitor to the party's Interests. That epithet Coz risked and receive In the ensuing controversy over this Issue, but he did so with a deep conviction that he was right. He would not compromise on a moral principle such as this; and the result was to be the seuae as wh«i he acted sim ilarly In 1867--retlrement from a way of political life he could not accept or countenance as he waited for the people to come around to his way of thinking.

Another custom he could not accept, one closely connected with the political assessments matter, was to combine with that Issue In making Coz even more repugnant to the politicians and firmer In his resolve to leave the Cabinet. A custom In the Interior Department provided that all clerks could take thirty days vacation each year. Coz was willing to keep this practice, but he noted that In I 869 many took elg^t to twenty more days off In the fall to go home to assist In the political campaign and vote. Thus, In the early spring of 276

1870, Coz made a ruling that all who wanted to do the latter must reserve this time out of their allotted thirty days or else lose their pay for additional time away from the office. But few of the clerks, who could ill afford to lose any part of their small salaries, saved any days because it was such a hot summer in Washington that most got away as often as they could in July or August. Thus, the great majority had no extra days left when the campaign began, and this fact they related to their state's party leaders—carefully avoiding to say why they could not leave and letting it appear that Coz was unwilling to let them go.7% As a result, the politicians had another grievance against the Secretary, who again seemed to be a traitor to the party.

Coz did not see it that way. fie felt that it was necessary "to our exist mice as a republic to cut up patronage corruption by the roots." But, since the President had not made use of his and his Cabinet's available power to control patronage and to influence the nation's policies and laws, all of this power had gone to Congress, where, Coz felt, "the rascals" held the reins and influenced Grant to allow their devious schemes to be worked out. Thus Coz decided that he would do his best to change all this by forcing an issue on civil service reform and either secure a change or leave the

^^Cochran, "Political Experiences," p. 1055» Cochran was a department clerk and his account is probably accurate. 277

Cabinet on that laene.^^ He determined not to "back doim on the taxation of clerks” or any other issue connected with this reform, for in his own department he had «broken up that custom, for it can't stand in any d^artment if one repudiates it.”^^ He believed that similar progress could be made in other departments, but he was soon to learn how unacceptable his views were to those in power.

On September 7 yet another letter reached Cox from a state Bepublican organization, this from Pennsylvania. That group wrote that it had appointed a committee to canvass the various departments for "seeing the voters and residents of Pennsylvania employed therein, to urge upon them such voluntary aid and assistance as they may feel able and willing to give, it not being the intention to use any undue influence to force them to contribute." It then asked Cox for permission to go

through his department's offices to do this w o r k . 75 Cox answered affirm atively, as he had had two previous letters from the same group, but only on "condition that that subscription should be really voluntary and that the association should not

73cox to Aaron Perry, August 20, 1870, Cox Papers. His original intention, as is stated here, was to force an issue on civil service reform. But when the President's letter on the HcGarrahan matter reached him cn August 22 Cox decided to "force the issue" on it at that time. When that matter was seemingly decided in his favor, Cox decided to follow his original intention of forcing an issue on this reform.

7^Cox to Charles P. Cox, September 3, 1870, Cox Papers.

73w. A. Short to Cox, September 7, 1870, Cox Papers. 278 attençt in any manner to visit any penalty or hostility on any nho feel nnable to subscribe or choose another channel for aid.But, apparently, that was not how the Pennsylvania committee had planned to act, for just before they wrote to Coz, It had severely denounced him at Its monthly meeting (September 5) for refusing to allow the assessments to be m a d e . 77 a result It did not accept Coz*s conditions and and did not make the canvass of the department.

To the secretary, who was growing quite tired of the burden of his office and his position In Grant's Cabinet, the criticism he was receiving, and the growing strength of the politicians, took advantage of the return of most of the rest of the Cabinet to Washington to take a long-awaited vacation. On September 15 he left for Staten Island, New York, to see his mother and to take a quiet rest. He had no sooner left than, as he put It, "the attack opened In form. The so-called Pennsylvania association was only the cat's paw, used by /"simo^ Cameron, [zacharlah^ Chandler, and that ilk to make a noise under cover of which they Intended to make their attack on the President's purposes." The first sign of giving way was In Indian affairs. Under the President's express authority Coz had divided the Indian country among the several mission associations, and among these had given the American Missionary Association the Lake Superior region. An agent was chosen and

7&C0Z to W. A. Short, September 8, 1870, Coz Papers.

77cinclnnatl Commercial, September 6, 1870, p. 2. 279 was on his way there when Chandler wrote to Grant protesting and insisting upon reinstatement of the old agent. The President sent this letter to the Interior Department with an endorsement which Judge William B. Otto (assistant Secretary of the Interior In charge of the office while Coz was away) regarded as a direction to do so» and Chandler*s man was reinstated. Coz then received a "warmly ezpostulatory" letter from the disappointed association asking what had happened and protesting this action.78 Any ezplanatlon was Impossible without showing the worst side of national politics, and so Coz wrote none Immediately. Instead, he soon had another such Interference to worry about.

On September 24, I870 a Washington paper announced that "Senators Cameron and Chandler are here, looking after the business of the National Republican Congressional Committee, on which they are m e m b e r s . "79 Part of that business was quite eztraordlnary. Soon after they arrived the Washington papers announced that they had called on the President to Insist on a change In Coz's rule In regard to sending clerks home to work and vote. The day before that they had tried to brow-beat Judge Otto Into waiving this rule In the department and to allow their agaits to collect the political assessment. But Otto had refused them and said that Coz had made this an

^®Coz to Judge Hoar, October 22, I 870, Coz Papers.

79pally Homing Chronicle (Washington), September 24, 1870, p. 2. 280 explicit rule, Cameron retorted, "Damn Secretary Cox! We'll see the President about this fool business," and off he and Chandler went,®® In their Interview with Grant they protested the former policies, and Grant, as usual unable to see the delicacy of the situation and forgetful of his earlier decision to let Cabinet members handle all departmental matters, explicitly Instructed Otto In a personal Interview later not to observe these rules. The next day Chandler again visited the department and stormed about Cox's actions and rules, both to Otto and F, A, Walker, "saying significantly that six members and the President were together on these subjects, and they would soon have seven,"®^

Soon after these events the nation's press begsin to be regularly supplied by Grant's friends with Washington dispatches lno>lylng that Cox would soon leave the Cabinet, Cox read these and later felt he was quite "blind not to recognize the fact the time had come idien must bring matters to a focus,"®^ He finally saw the real situation idien, on October 3, Otto telegraphed him at Staten Island that Grant had verbally ordered the Interior Department and himself to have the same policy as the other departments and to allow the clerks to go home without disability, Cox, who now felt that the Issue had to be forced, especially idien the President had gone over his

®®Cochran, "Why General C ox,,,", p, 25» ^^Ccx to Judge Hoar, October 18, 18?0, Ccx Papers, ®%Ibld, 281 head and followed the dictates of his political cronies» immediately sat down and resigned from the Cabinet in a private letter to Grant.

Cox w ro te : "When C ongress a d jo u rn e d i n th e summer, I was credibly informed that a somewhat systematic effort would be made before their reassembling to force a change in the policies we have pursued in the Interior Department." He indicated that the removal of the Indian service from political patronage had been distasteful to many Congressmen and that his views of the necessity of civil service reform had brought him into "collision with the plans of some of our active political managers," and that his sense of duty had then obliged him to oppose some of their methods. He felt that eventually public sentiment would sustain the efforts at necessary reforms, but for the present they involved opposition which it might not be in the interest of Grant * s administration to provoke, and so he had decided to resign rather than change his fixed and decided policy. Cox added that "acceptance of the position was an interference with plans of life formed" previously, and so a return to his private business, "so far from being an inconvenience or a disappointment, ^ o u l^ only be carrying out what" he had most desired to do as soon as it could be done without embarrassment to Grant or sacrifice of public duty. Then, with assurances that he hoped for the con^lete success of Grant * s administration, Cox ended his le tte r.84

83cochran, "Political Experiences," p. 1060.

84cox to President Grant, October 3, I870, Cox Papers. 282

This missive was not really designed to be a resignation, but rather was written to force another Issue on which Coz really hoped the President would change his mind and support Coz's Ideas of Integrity. As Coz wrote later, "If the President was disposed to give me good backing, and had he said 'You are mistaken about my being embarrassed by your action, and I will guaranty ^ 1 0 your freedom to carry out your Ideas, ' I should w illingly have remained.certainly thought he would at least have expressed some general approval of civil service reform, even If he accepted the resignation on the ground that

I had personal controversies on my hands.

But Grant was not able to see the Implications Coz felt were clear In the letter; and, by coincidence, when he wrote his reply he was not in the best of moods as concerned his Interior Secretary. On the day after Coz wrote his resignation and the day before It arrived In Washington, October 4, Grant held a Cabinet meeting with a ll ezcept Coz present. There Secretary of the Treasury Boutwell brou^t up the HcGarrahan case by remarking that Coz had Issued the disputed patent to the New Idria company. "The President started and flushed and said 'WhatI' Boutwell repeated the remark. Grant then said angrily, 'If the Secretary to sign patents has put my name to that patent I will have him out Instanter'". He then declared he had told Coz not to do so. Boutwell then said his Information must have been Incorrect. Someone then said Joseph Wilson might have done It. Then Grant fumbled In his desk drawer and took out Coz's August 23 letter

®^Coz to Judge Hoar, October 18, 18?0, Coz Papers. 283 and remarked that he had been deeply hnrt by It and had almost asked for Coz*s resignation then, but had thought it over and had let the matter go. He had decided that Coz had run his department better than it had ever been done before, and he repeated these thoughts in the Cabinet meeting.

These assurances were obviously not enough to keep Grant from doing what he had not done idien Coz*s earlier letter came—answering it on the spot without even mentioning the reasons for Coz*s thou^t of resignation. Having received Coz's letter the morning of the $ th , Grant wrote Coz, "Your letter is received...it w ill be accepted, as suggested by you, to take effect upon conviction of the annual report of the department. In parting company permit me to say that I h i^ly appreciate the zeal and ability i^ich you have ever shown in the discharge of all your official duties. I hope your relations in the new sphere...w ill prove as pleasant as our relations have been in the past, to me, and that you may fully realize your brightest ezpectations."^7

When he had finished Grant gave his acceptance letter to a White House clerk to be copied and sent to "Honorable J. D.

®^Coz to Judge Hoar, October 22, 1870, Coz Papers. This account was written to ezplain idiat had happened that day and was accurate because, as Coz wrote in it, "I have learned the particulars of the Cabinet meeting of October 4." The fact that Assistant Secretary Otto was accidentally absent from this meeting prevented an official contradiction of Boutwell'8 false report.

®^President Grant to Coz, October 5, 18?0, Coz Papers. 284

Cox» Secretary of the Interior," with nothing to Indicate It was a private matter. It was then sm t by regular mall to the Interior Department where the Chief Clerk, thinking It was regular correspondence (It was not addressed In Horace Porter's, the President's private secretary, signature), opened It, and read the theretofore unknown fact of Cox's resignation. Soon rumors began to fly about this m atter,88 and a political crisis for the Grant administration was about to begin.

But since that crisis was but one part of the process which was eventually to lead to the Liberal Republican movement of I872, It should be discussed separately from Cox's career as Interior Secretary. That career lasted until the end of October, I870, when Cox presented his annual report to the President, as he had promised Grant to do. It was quite a m atter-of-fact document which gave a ll the pertinent Information with little commentary and few requests for further legislation, Cox did take advantage of this opportunity to put a statement In the public record to extoll his examination system In the Patent Office and show that this had led to an Increase In efficiency, standards, and security. He also praised the handling of the Sioux chiefs' visit maintaining that It had made an enduring lsq>resslon on their minds. Cox also called on Grant to direct his Indian policy toward educating and training Indian children rather than merely helping their aged so that eventually a more capable and educated generation oould lead the

B8see, for example the Nation. October 6, I870. 285

Indians in the future. He also reported that the Commissioner of Education had compiled a complete report on American education for Congress's edification.^9 But that uas as far as he went in an elaboration of the work of the Department, for he really had little hope that the Grant administration could ever rise from the depths into which it had fallen.

Coz had begun his work with Grant with extremely high hopes for a successful tenure and administration. He and his circle of friends had felt Grant would run the country as well as he had his armies, and the result would be reunion, reform, and a new era of national growth. Instead they had seen that the President was incapable of the duties he had to perform and was running the office almost as a personal fiefdom. Accepted rules of political procedure were thrown out while personal whims and needs dictated many of Grant's policies. The President, Coz and a ll of his closest friends in Washington, Adams, Hoar, Cochran, and his undersecretaries felt, had come under the influence of unscrupulous politicians uriio got their way by fawning over the President, becoming his "friend", and then convincing him that their desires were helpful to the country. Those "friends" had supported his San Domingo scheme, his asking of Judge Hoar for his resignation, his removal of Motley and his dispute with Sumner, his inept handling of "Black Friday", his character!stically-weak appointees—in fact

®9hous6 of Representatives, Executive Documents. 4lst Congress, 3rd Session, Report of the Seore^ary of the Interior, given October 31, 1870. 286 everything that he did. He was grateful, showing it by always trusting them and distrusting anyone who did not agree with him in every way.

Coz had become one of those "disagreera^ early in the administration, but he and the President were still in good terms evm until the end of October, I870. By then he had decided the President had gone too far. Coz had been deeply hurt by Hoar's resignation, and the distressing actions of the President in going over Coz's head in the HcGarrahan, Indian agent, and political assessment affairs had finally driven him to the ultimate step of resignation. Even then, however, thou^ he was rapidly becoming more and more financially and socially embarrassed by his inability to handle the proper social functions of a Cabinet officer on a salary ($8,000) far below what he needed to support his large family, he was still willing to stay on at personal sacrifice if Grant seemed willing to change his ways. But the President did not and could not see that he needed to do so, hence the resignation was accepted. Once again Coz had seen the administration going down a path idiich, he felt, was an undesirable one, and because it would not listen to him and reverse itself, he would leave it until it would, as he thought it must, see its errors and accept more constructive principles.

Such was Coz's typically stubborn, idealistic, egotistical, politioally-naive, and impractical view on a matter of political importance. He consistently refused either 287 to accept as valid viewpoints other than his or to try to understand the political pressures Which may have altered that viewpoint. He was too much of an Idealogue, and, at least In part, this Is why he never attained great political su c c e ss . CHAPTER XV

THE PARTY OF THE FUTURE

The year I870 was a key one for the opponents of President Grant. The resignation of Coz, the treatment of Sumner, and other factors had Increased the growing number of administration critics. But It was In Missouri, where a state dispute had been going on since 1865, that the first truly official and formidable opposition to Grant was to become a reality In I870. The state*s constitution of 186$, formulated by the radical Republicans In power then, had made a sweeping proscription of all former rebels. Many moderate Republicans felt this was too harsh and that that faction of the party was controlling federal appointments In Missouri In direct opposition to the "moderates." In reaction these moderates (really conservatives), under the leadership of B. Gratz Brown, began to move against the radicals. In 1868, they succeeded In electing , a German Immigrant who had fought in the Civil War and who had already achieved a reputation as a reformer, to the Senate. Then, at the party convention In I870, when the radicals tried to force through a plank In the platform retaining the disenfranchisement, the "Liberals," as they now called themselves, left, organized a

288 289 separate convention, and named their omi state ticket, with Brown nominated for governor. In the fall, despite the opposition of President Grant, who felt that the Liberals were bolters and not reformers, the new party swept the state by 40,000 votes. Their alliance with the Democrats, which had begun in the state legislature earlier, thus had been successful, and the Liberal Bepublican party began its formal existence with a victory.^

Cox, who was later to become one of the party’s leading members because of his differences with Grant, had little time to give thought to this movement,% at least in October, 18?0. On October 6, he read in the New York papers that his resignation, iriiich had supposedly been made privately to Grant so it would not be published until fall elections were over, had been accepted. He also was surprised to see that he was being falsely accused of making the resignation public to influence the October elections, especially since he had tsiken so many precautions and had been so scrupulous that even his own mother, brothers, and family did not know about it until they read it in the newspaper s. 3 But Cox knew that to comment

^Earle Dudley Boss, The Liberal Bepublican Movement. (New Y ork, 1 9 1 9 ), PP* 2 8 -9 , %e did, however, say of it, "Their bolt looks to me unwarranted, but the Administration can’t afford to proscribe them and has no need of doing it." Cox to Judge Hoar, October 18, 1870, Cox Papers. 3cochran, "Political Correspondence", vol. 2, p. 53* He probably did not te ll them because he s till hoped Grant would change his ways. The publication of the rumor came because of Grant’s handling of the acceptance (See Chapter 14). 290 on suoh reports wonld. only give the matter more publicity, and so he remained silent while clearing up his affairs in Washington and preparing to move back to Cincinnati to resume his law practice.

Because the President also remained silent about the resignation, the newspapers began to conjecture openly about the causes of it. Some felt it was for personal reasons; others said it was because of the HcGarrahan case; still others felt it was because of civil service reform. But none knew anything for certain until, in mid-October, “the President, Tdiilst withholding the correspondence, *• allowed “it to be given out as from 'the best authority' etc., that purely personal and family reasons were assigned" by Coz for that act and that there was no divergence or even a question on the matter of civil service reform.^ It turned out that the President, in private interviews with two correspondents, had told both that the resignation had not come because of any question of public policy and that Senators Chandler and Cameron had nothing to do with it at all. The HcGarrahan business was over long ago. Grant said, and besides, the Secretary had eventually agreed with the President on it. Cox, Grant said, had resigned because

^Coz to Hoar, October 22, 18?0, Coz Papers. 291 he could, not support his family on the pay he received.^ Any more than that the President said, he would, not say.

Cox was only slightly angered by this «exposure," because he probably understood that the President did not wish to stir thé waves of controversy before the fall elections. And even thougdi he was annoyed by the Incorrect reasons reported for his resignation, Cox still, when he sent copies of his resignation and Grant's acceptance to Judge Hoar, asked the latter to "bum them when read so as to provide against accidental publicity which I have reason to believe the President would dislike." Besides, the President was still personally cordial to Cox and had repeatedly said that he appreciated Cox's good work as Secretary of the Interior. But still Grant gave no attention to the Issues of which Cox had spoken In his resignation,^ choosing Instead to conduct

"business as usual." It Is unlikely that Grant would have done so anyway, for by that very fact he would acknowledge his own failure In that regard.

•^«Memoir o f a c o n v e rsa tio n o f J . E. Young w ith P re s id e n t Grant," October, I870, In the Cox Papers. A certain Mr. Crounse of the Associated Press was the other correspondent. H. V. Boynton of the Cincinnati Gazette. Cox's friend, had given Cox this w ritten memorandum soon after. See Cochran, "Political Correspondence," vol. 2, p. 72. Also see the New York Stemdard (October 19, I870, p. 2), and the New York dimes (October 21. I870, p. 1) for examples of Grant's side of th e s to r y .

^Cox to Hoar, October 18, I870, Cox Papers. 292

Eventually the President's attitude on these problems affected the Secretary. He saw report after report coming out in loyal party papers saying that he had resigned for personal reasons. MeamAile his friends E. L. Godkin and W. P. Garrison of the Nation, the leading organ of the "liberal" element of reformers, printed a refutation of this idea on October 20, and said "it is simply because of the President's failure to support him in maintenance and prosecution of reforms in the Interior Department. The politicians have set siege to the adm inistration...and eventually this worked and all good men a re now o u t."7 a battle of words between supporters of Cox and those of Grant had begun, and for many weeks this matter was the subject of newspaper controversy. In this situation Cox felt "the unexpected response in public sentiment has invested the transaction with so much more than common importance that I despair of any permanent concealment of the facts, and may be forced to allow the letters to be published in self-protection; for after all the stir in the public mind I should be Justly blamed if I had permitted the storm to gather when there was no truth in the almost universal assumption that the facts were somewhere near what we know them to be."8

A few days after Cox wrote this, on a day on which the New York Evening Post (whose editor, Charles Nordhoff, was a good friend of Cox as were his brothers Charles, Kenyon, and

^Nation. October 20, 1870, p. 2.

®Cox to Hoar, October 22, I870, Cox Papers. 293

Theodore, all Wall Street hankers or brokers) said, "Print the letter—-Cox is willing, and Grant should do so so the garbled or false accounts can be corrected,"? Cox had just about decided to print the correspondence. He wrote to his brother Charles, "When out of office, my embarrassment w ill end, except as to the question whether I oufisht to keep silent till after the New York elections. Tell Nordhoff I w ill remain quiet while in o f f i c e ,"10 B y the time, two days later. Representative Garfield told him to "publish the correspondence and get the truth out," Cox, feeling his pride had been hurt too deeply and that the facts should be known, had decided to do so feeling "whatever be the outcome I shall not fall to expose the whole matter in the House,"11 Cox had decided to give the two letters to the newspapers. He had had enou^ of "the President and his friends,,«trying to create a public sentiment in accordance with their wishes" and placing the McGarrahan matter into the official reports as a possible reason for the resignation,1^ (which they had begun doing after Grant denied it was a factor)

?New York Evening Post. October 24, 1870, p, 2, lOCox to Charles F, Cox, October 24, I870, Cox Papers, lloarfield to Cox, October 26, I870, Cox Papers, Some historians have written that it was this letter which convinced Cox to publish the correspondence to affect the New York elections, hurt Grant, and make himself seem a political martyr. This is untrue--he did so to protect his reputation, to make the truth known, and to help civil service reform. These other historians are William B, Hesseltine in his Ulysses s. Grant. Politician. (New York, 1935)t pp. 317-8, and Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils» A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement. 1865-93. (Urbana, Illinois. 1961). u. 79. 12 '^Charles P, Cox to Cox, October 26, I870, Cox Papers, 294

and 80, after refusing an invitation to a farewell dinner for himself on October 30, at which Grant, the Cabinet, and prominent politicians would be present, soon before he left Washington on October 31, Cox gave copies of the resignation and Grant * s answer to the Washington agent of the Associated Press. The next morning the letters were published, and Cox reached Cincinnati with his family.

The uproar which followed the publication was as rudely shocking to Grant as it was "perfectly marvellous" |si^ to Cox. Now for the first time the public could read for itself the resignation and the reasons Cox assigned for it, and see that the "best sources" and President Grant were incorrect in their statements of the causes. Many papers now took up the cause for Cox and civil service reform and openly lambasted Grant and his cronies for outright lying and for frustrating the good intentions of his former Interior Secretary. The Philadelphia Evening Telegraph (October 31) said that Grant had not published the correspondence because he was ashamed to do so or admit his faults. The Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican (October 31) said that the resignation was proof of the triumph of party hacks in Washington. The Chicago Republican (November 3) reported that "Grant *s blinding

^%e left with the best wishes of his Interior Department staff lAio professed their regret at his leaving and testified to the "kindness and courtesy and value of the advice and assistance" he had given them and "the healthy and marked effect upon the public service" of his civil service reforms in the department. Commissioners of the Interior Department to Cox, October 29, 1870, Cox Papers. 295 im becility” was leading him into trouble* The New York Eventna; Post (October 31) called the m atter "General Grant * s Unconditional Surrender” and wrote that the President was now the prisoner of the politicians* All over the country the great majority of papers and even most party papers backed Cox and civil service reform against Grant. Coz*s hope that “sooner or later the public faith would sustain the true reform”^^ seemed about to come true, as the whole country seemed prepared to embrace a new and vibrant political cause*

But there were some, especially around the White House, who did not see things that way. The President was extremely angry at idiat he considered Cox's playing the demagogue by publishing the letters* Grant now thought that Cox was not as honorable as he had thought previously* Grant said he knew Cox felt that the resignation would not be accepted and was so chagrined when it was that he was now trying to make himself a martyr and to affect thereby the November elections*^5 G rant could not understand the reformist thinking of his former Secretary (althou^ he did know of Cox's somewhat excessive pride), and thus could only assume that he was now an enemy* The only thing to do with an enemy, to Grant's way of thinking, was to destroy him*

^^Cox to Hoar, October 22, 18?0, Cox Papers*

^^As reported in the New York Standard. November 7» 1870, p* 1* 296

Just after the letters were published, Grant began a series of conferences with Oliver P. Morton, Senator from Indiana, John Forney, editor of the administration*s Washington organ, the Daily Morning Chronicle, and his other cronies to decide upon a course of action to meet this threat. Their first thought was to issue a statement that the real cause of Cox's resignation would be made known from an official source within a few days.^^ Then they had a series of meetings to arrange an authorized version of Grant's side of the story to be given to the press. Apparently as time went on they saw that to discuss civil service reform as a reason would show that Grant did not favor it before Cox resigned, so they settled upon the McGarrahan business as an alternative.1? On November 5» Fomey paved the way with an "authorized statement" (which he wrote) in his papers. He impugned Cox for being a defender and apologist for Andrew Johnson who had now set himself up as a judge in the McGarraheutx case, "a case supported by such statesmen |jfî3 as Oliver P. Morton, John Bin^am, and James F. Wilson." Cox, Fomey said, had tried to shield himself behind "civil service," but Fomey asserted that every department of Grant's administration was open to all citizens and a ll applicants took a thorough preliminary examination (which was untrue), although preference was given to party

^^See, for exançle, the New York Herald. November 1, 1870, p. 1. ^?8ee H. V. Boynton to Cox, November 2 and 3» 1870, Cox Papers. As a Washington correspondent he had much inside information. 297

supporters. He also defended political assessments as necessary to the health of the party,

A few days later Grant did his part In the whitewash by allowing Cox's August 23 letter about the McGarrahan case to be published and saying that Cox's handling of that case was the true cause for his leaving the Cabinet.^9 The reaction was Immediatei the President was ridiculed by almost every paper In the country. Newspapers of all shades of opinion continued to denounce the arrangements lAilch had led to Cox's withdrawal with unsparing vigor. One paper wrote, "We have rarely known the press of the country to be so unanimous on any similar subject,"20 "How the President, even were his mind twice as narrow as It Is," Henry Adams wrote Cox, "could have made the blunder of publishing that letter as an attack on you, I can't understand."2^ Clearly the President's attenç>t to exonerate himself had backfired and made him look foolish and Inept. The large number of defeats Republican Senators and Congressmen suffered In November, thirty Congressional seats and their 2/3 majority In the House, (at least partly as a result of the uproar following Cox's resignation), made him also look like a possible loser In the 1872 Presidential election.

^®Washlngton Dally Morning Chronicle. November 5» 1870, p . 1 . ^9see the New York Evening Post. November 10, I87O, p. 1. 20Rartford (Connecticut) Evening Post. November 12, I870, p. 1. 21 Henry Adams to Cox, November 11, I870, Cox ^apers. 298

Charles Nordhoff and Henry Adams fe lt they knew who the winner oonld be: Jacob Dolson Cox. Nordhoff wrote in his paperI "Who is more capable of saving the Republican party from defeat two years hence—General Cox, who demands civil service reform, or General Grant, the promoter of such abuses."2% Adams told Cox, "What we want from you is a lead. We w ill defend you personally whenever defense is needed, but you must lay down for us the great principles of our movement. "23 That movement, which was a growing response to the politicians* hold over Grant and the need for reform, had had, as was stated above, its official inception in B. Gratz Brown*s victory in Missouri in November. Now Cox*s dispute with Grant had given the growing dissent against Grant national publicity. Most of the intelligent and articulate people of the country began to form ranks against Grant and many even planned the formation of a new national, political party. The faculty of Yale wrote Cox praising his actions, while at Harvard a Republican "caucus" unanimously adopted resolutions supporting Cox.^^ And now that he had been singled out as an enemy of the adm inistration, many people in New York were talking of him as a presidential candidate, if there were no legal objections.

22ncw York Evening Post. November 4, 1870, p. 1. 23nenry Adams to Cox, November 11, I870, Cox Papers. 2^The letter from the Yale faculty is in the Cox Papers. See Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, p. 80, for a discussion of other such activities. 25see Charles F. Cox to Cox, November 4 and 5i 1870, Cox Papers. The objection lay in the fact that he was bom in Canada, thou^ of natural-bom American citizens. 299

This incipient "boom for Cox and a new party grew In November. "At a Hepubllcan meeting In Chicago on November 8 addressed by Senator ^ y m ^ Trumbull, the mere mention of ex- Seoretary Cox's name was received with loud and prolonged cheers."26 Henry Adams at the same time was under the effect of a "rage of reform"^? which was leading him to decide to form a new party based on civil service and revenue (tariff) reform. But at a meeting on November 21-22, 1870, with his brother Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Nordhoff, Godkln, , William Grosvenor, and the officers of the Free Trade League, Adams and the rest decided to delay forming a new party to see If Congress acted on tariff and civil service reform.28 Thus ended, but only for a short time, formal efforts to oppose Grant on a national scale.

Probably one of the more Important reasons for the delay was because the support Cox was receiving would, they hoped, convince Congress to do something about needed reform. In addition, Cox had not been very aggressive In seeking the nomination for President from this or any other party. Early In November he had been Invited to the annual meeting of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland In Cleveland on November 24 and 25 at idilch, he was told, "a very cordial welcome awaits

Palnesvllle Telegraph. November 10, I870, p. 2.

^^Henry Adams to Cox, November 1?» I870, Cox ^apers. 28nenry Adams to Cox, November 28, I870, Cox Papers. 300 you based on the memories of the war and recent events. "2? But Cor, who felt that he had only "accidentally become more prominently identified" with civil service reform than he could rightly claim to be,30 and that if the hubbub over his

resignation "crystallized public opinion into a determination for civil service reform," his "career in office would not be in vain,"31 was "sincere in wishing to avoid sensation." As a result, he "stayed away from the army meeting at Cleveland in large part because thought his presence there would have been construed into an attempt to create a following and personal party for" him self.3% He was not anxious to be President or to join a new party, and he preferred not to do either. His basic desire was to help the country by making civil service reform a reality through the Republican party. Thus he would not actively campaign for or even encourage the movement for himself or for the proposed party, but rather would let someone else with the same principles take the reins while he aided the work of exploring and defending the tenets

of the reformers.

But before Cox could defend these tenets he had to take time to defend himself. Grant*s supporters had not stopped

^^John Coon to Cox, November 5» 1870, Cox Papers. 3®Cox to Theodore D. Woolsey, November 8, 1870, Cox Papers.

31cox to Charles F. Cox, November 8, 1870, Cox Papers.

3%Cox to Garfield, December 9> 1870, Cox Papers. 301 trying to charge Cox with being a liar and a traitor to the President. They continued trying to prove that the McGarrahan case was the real reason for Coz*s resignation, and that his Bureau heads and not Cox had been the true initiators of civil s e r v ic e reform,and that a ll of the other Cabinet members had used and enforced civil service examinations in their departments. These charges were, of course, nntrue. - Many even went so far as to bring false charges against Cox and his friends, such as that Bonn Piatt had lied about the $20,000 in stocks offered to him and that S. S. Fisher was Cox*s brother-in-law and had written articles criticizing Grant which Helen Cox had clipped and sent to Mrs. Grant.3^ Cox remained silent in the face of such charges because he knew that they were so ridiculous that they would only make Grant's case look worse than it already d id .

But then, when Congressman Ben Butler, now a close friend of the President, published a letter backing the President's action in the McGarrahan case, hinting that Cox had favored granting the New Idria company claim, and saying that Grant favored leaving the disputed claims to the public, Cox felt that

33cox exposed the falsity of this idea in a letter to E. L. Godkin, December 6, I870, Cox Papers, which said that Fisher and Walker had initiated reforms, but only after discussing them with Cox and being encouraged to do so. But, as Cox said, "so the work is done, in Heaven's name let anybody have the credit."

3^As reported in the Sprinpcfield Republican. November 12. 1870, p. 1. ------302

he must act. He "felt an indignant disgust at the insincerity of the whole effort to avoid the civil service discussion by the pretense that the real difference was in regard to this ^McGarrahan fraudulent olaim^..and at the recent adoption of the President of the theory that while the McGarrahan claim is a fraud, his purpose was to favor legislation looking to a special disposition of these lands for the public, so far" supported Coz's position that he would not bother to contradict it, though its second part was false. Instead he gave Charles Nordhoff a full statement of the history of and his stand on the McGarrahan case and indicated that his letter of

resignation stated his reasons for that a c t i o n .35

Just after his resignation was announced, Coz had been persuaded by Henry Adams to write an article for the North American Review (of which Adams was the editor) on civil service reform. Setting down to do so in his spare time from his legal work—he had set up an independent law practice in Cincinnati and had arranged for his family to live in the fashionable Mt. Auburn section—36 coz used in part his past ezperiences together with the abuses of the spoils system as source material. He also used the continuing news from his friends in the Interior

33coz to Charles Nordhoff, December 3, 1870, Coz P a p e rs .

3^Coz to Charles F. Coz, November 8 and December 9» 1870, Coz Papers. 303

Department that a ll the old evils he had suppressed were cropping up again under the new Secretary, Columbus Delano, a career Ohio politician who was rather pliable for the designs of the politicians, as inspiration for his article,3? While he wrote, it is probable that he definitely made up his mind that he wanted only to help the reform movement and not to push his own political ambitions. He found himself in full agreement with Nordhoff that forming a new party was the wrong answer, and that a ll reform must come from within the Republican party. His sincere wish was to remain in private life and "to be nobody»s rival for any position." Thus, when the article was finished, early in December, Cox hoped it would be accepted as evidence that he had no personal ambitions to serve, "since much explicit advocacy of the whole truth is no road to political availability."^®

One road to that end was advocacy of a popular theme. This path Grant took in response to the criticism he had been receiving for being opposed to civil service reform. In his annual message to Congress on December 5» the President devoted one paragraph to the abuses which the spoils system had wrou^t and the need for Congress to legislate them out of existence.

^^8ee letters from P. A. Walker (November 19), 8. S. Fisher (November 11), and William Cochran (November 12 and l6) to Cox which described such events as Delano»s hardly ever being in the office, his poor handling of the department in general, and a threatened "clean-sweep" of all disloyal clerks. All are in the Cox Papers. Fisher and Cochran resigned soon after. 3®Cox to Charles Nordhoff, December 3, 1870, Cox Papers. 304

Cox commented, "The outburst of public sentiment had forced the President into saying something.•.1 can afford to smile at the idea that this was done to prove there was no issue between us over civil service reform."39 But Cox also felt, "he will give no help on civil service ^ efo i^ beyond that paragraph in the message." He had begun to doubt the President*s sincerity from the very beginning of the resignation controversy when the President had allowed false reasons to be given out as correct. When Grant "Began, through various mouthpieces, to vociferate that he had been for civil service reform all the time, and to attack the honesty" of Cox's avowed reasons and then go back to the McGarrahan case as "proof" of these "other reasons," Cox was disturbed at Grant's seeming endorsement of such falsehoods. Then, when Cox had published the correspondence and Grant's defenders cried "breach of confidence" and later had said that a Cabinet officer was a mere lackey to the President and had no independent powers at a ll and thus should follow the President's orders exactly, Cox began to feel that Grant had given in completely to the advice of his cronies.

Cox's final decision as to what to make of all this developed slowly, but by December, he thought, "I knew not only that Grant had blundered in seeking an alliance with tricksters and not the people's support, but that he was trying to cover his blunder at the expense of his honor and friendship

39Cox to Garfield, December 6, 1870, Cox Papers. 305 for me. I felt this was infamous. What must be my opinion of the man who can try to cover his stolid folly in that manner, thinking he could part with me as easily...as with Borie. His original fault was in being willing to sacrifice the administration reforms to the support of intriguing polities and hope for re-election." Because of all this and the slur on his honor that Cox felt he had received from the President, he decided that "without some pretty fu ll acknowledgment on his part, our personal relations are of course entirely ended."

The article on civil service reform was a direct blow at Grant. It came out in the January, 18?1, issue of the North American Review and was a thunderous attack on "the corrupting influence of such a use of the appointing power" and the spoils* system. As the system grew, "the horse-leech cry of *Give* was more and more clamorous. Our civil service," he wrote, "is little better than a nuisance which must be reformed, unless we are to admit that republican government is a failure." Each new adm inistration was swarmed over by crowds of office- seekers, and the despair of reaching satisfactory results begot carelessness and haste. As a result, Cox wrote, "What was before an annoyance becomes a positive corruption with terrible depths of abuse. Sycophancy, adulation, and bribery thicken as we descend." The politicians, he felt, were bound together by

^®Cox to G a r f ie ld , December 9 , 1870, Cox P a p e rs . H is letter to Judge Hoar of December 15 expressed the same sentiments. Grant was so angered at Cox*s conduct that his memoirs of the war contained no mention of Cox at a ll. 306 a common threat of the "Ins" to keep themselves In and all others out,^^ The employees worked only for the party and their job and not for the public? otherwise they would lose their positions. As a result, the departments had become "the asylum for the worthless and incompetent dependents of persons of influence." To remedy these evils, Coz said, the government should "apply the principles of common business administration to separate the public offices from all influence," give jobs only to those who have passed the competitive examinations, and dismiss employees only idaen they fail in doing their duties. The effect would be, he felt, to lessen the Présidentes power over Congress; but the use of a system by which Cabinet members could speak on the floor of Congress and te ll that body of the nation*s needs directly would make cooperation between the two branches to serve the nation a reality and a fine replacement for the spoils system.

The article "created more impression that any other article on political reform which" had appeared in recent tim es.^3 From all over the nation came support in the form of letters and newspaper editorials. But this was rather an

^^According to Hoogenboom; the reverse of this was the key reason for civil service reform—the outs wanting to get rid of the ins. See his Outlawing the Spoils, preface and chapter one. D. Coz, "The Civil Service Reform," North American Review, LXII, no. 230 (January, 1871), pp. 81-113.

V. Boynton to Coz, January 10, I87I, Coz Papers. 307

e litist type of backing. By this time the Cox-Grant controversy had had time to settle down. It had never really been a major topic of discussion of the majority of the public, which really knew or cared little about civil service reform or why Coz resigned. It was an interesting story to them for a while, to be sure, but the constant repetition by both sides of their cases had probably eventually bored enough people to make them lose interest. The controversy between Senator

Sumner and Grant over San Domingo and the "Alabama" claims also served to take some attention away from the Coz-Grant imbroglio. For these reasons Charles Nordhoff could write Coz in January, 18?1 that "as far as I can see Reform of the civil service is not a live subject. I do not believe we shall be able to make it a popular question. Though it had been made

a Congressional question when a b ill abolishing Congressional patronage had been introduced into the Senate and was supported by reformers such as Carl Schurz and Lyman Trumbull, both of idiom used quotations from Coz's article as reasons for their

support of that b ill, the b ill encompassed little r e f o r m . Other issues and controversies now began to overshadow civil service reform, and it seemed unlikely that anything would be done about it officially for a long idiile.

^^Charles Nordhoff to Coz, January 16, 1871, Coz Papers. It was not a so-called "gut issue" and thus not designed to gain popular support. -

See Schurz's speech in Prederich Bancroft, editor. Speeches. Correspondence, ^ d Political Papers of Carl Schurz. (New York, 1913)» II# 138-46. He sent the speech to Coz after giving it and asked for suggestions as to how to further the movement. See Schurz to Coz, February 3, I87I, Coz Papers. 308

One of these Issues was one in which Coz had been involved for a long while--the McGarrahan case. Since Grant had decreed that the patent would be considered by Congress in its I870-I session before the Interior Secretary acted on it, hearings once again began in the House Judiciary Committee. During them, Garfield told Coz, "I learned that Joe Wilson (the Land Commissioner) had given testimony which made the impression that he was interfered with by you in the management of the McGarrahan case and that but for your preemptory order the record would have ezhibited the patent as complete.” Coz had replied to a letter from Wilson and told him not to act on the McGarrahan case because of the President’s order but to process the Mew Idria claim for possible later use. Mow Wilson was implying that he had sent Coz no such letter and that the former Secretary had initiated a move to help the Mew Idria c la im .B u t Wilson’s letter was a matter of public record,

and it was subsequently put into the committee’s files. It disproved Wilson’s allegation (idiich was probably motivated by the latter’s desire to please Grant, whose ire he had aroused by ruling against a claim by the President’s father). This fact and the overwhelming evidence against McGarrahan which had caused the same committee to turn down his claim earlier now caused them to do so again. On February 1, I871, the majority report, again written by Mr. Peters, appeared and asked the House to resolve "That W illian McGarrahan is not entitled to the relief prayed for in his petition." The minority report,

^^Garfield to Coz, January 18, I87I , Coz Papers. 309 by Mr. Bingham, given the same day, called for McGarrahan to get the Fanoche Grande rancho lands at the usual price of $1.25/acre.

On February 18 the House debate on the question began. The first action was made by Peters who presented a House resolution denying the claim. Then Bingham moved that a joint resolution declare that the matter be left to the President to

decide, based on the matter as it stood on March 1^, I863 (the date on which, McGarrahan*s supporters claimed, Lincoln*s secretary to sign patents had signed the claim. They also claimed that someone, vdio they hinted was Coz, had destroyed

this filed acceptance.). The debate began with McGarrahan's defenders claiming he was a small investor trying to fight off the large New Idria company. John Bingham and Ben Butler defended the claimant, the former savagely criticizing Coz for

his actions, the latter saying that "the Secretary of the Interior.. .and his understrappers" had taken away "a man's right seven years after the patent was made." But when Butler went on to say that he would not allow the patent himself if he were Interior Secretary, but would vote for it now because it was already signed, Garfield, defending Coz, said this meant Butler believed the government should not "cheat him out of his fraud." To this, Butler agreed, and said, "Do not steal

^^House of Representatives, 4lst Congress, 3rd Session, Report no. 24, parts 1 and 2, "William McGarrahan," February 1, I 8 7 1. 310 from a thief either,”^® On Just such a basis had McGarrahan*s backers decided to push that claim, and they even seemed to be gaining ground when the debate was carried over until February 20.

On that day Garfield, who had written Coz earlier that "if any attempt is made in the Senate or the House to attack you directly or indirectly on any of the points involved |în the controversy with Grant], I shall see to it, and stand by the truth in the case, proved as good as his word. He was thoroughly angry and shocked at the course of the debate so

far, and in a half hour's speech he vehemently attacked the McGarrahan claim and defended his friend Coz. He said that though he had voted in favor of the claim before, it was only because he had not had time to investigate it and had trusted the word of a fellow Congressman. He said he would defend Coz's order in the case against all comers, and that even if McGarrahan's defenders' contention that Coz resigned on this point were true, "he could confer no nobler crown of martyrdom on J. D. Coz." Garfield went on, despite Bingham's request for him to yield, to cover the McGarrahan advocates with scorn and sarcasm by showing that McGarrahan had not said, in his memorial, that the patent had been signed in I863 while Butler and Bingham claimed it was. He continued on with other proofs

^^Congressional Globe. 4lst Congress, 3rd Session, a p p e n d iz , p p . 136-7• ^^Garfield to Coz, December 17, I870, Coz Papers. 311

of the claim's Illegality and fraudulence in a steady tone of indignation and finished with a glowing eulogy of Coz, declaring "in all his public career no part w ill do more honor

to his manhood than his treatment of the McGarrahan swindle.

But this valiant attempt to defend a friend went for naught. Wh«a the vote was called for, the majority opinion was

rejected and the minority decision was accepted by a vote of 110-92, with 38 abstentions. Then, despite Garfield's attempt to have another vote taken or have the whole matter tabled, he only succeeded in having it voted on again and the result was the same, 9^ for, 82 against, 63 abstentions.51 The reason

for this acceptance of a seemingly fraudulent claim was that "the friends of McGarrahan had very adroitly made the impression upon the members of the House that to declare that McGarrahan was not entitled to the grant, was the same thing as giving it to the New Idria company. Many good men were led to believe that the Bingham resolution avoided the expression of any opinion on the New Idria question" because it left all decisions to the President. What they didn't know, Garfield felt, was that the resolution, which he and Bingham knew would never pass the Senate, was intended mostly to hurt Coz and put

•^^This matter is well discussed in Smith, Garfield. Life and Letters, vol. 1, II, 464-3.

^^Congressional Globe, 4lst Congress, 3rd Session, February 18-2^, IWfl, pp."TO2-1457. 312 him in a had light.^2 in this it failed, for most people could see the fraudulence of the claim, and the placing of the entire matter on the table by the Senate a few days later was clear proof that McGarrahan had been found out and finally rejected, and that Cox had acted, as always, honestly.53

This attempt to further damage Cox's reputation and, concommitantly, help Grant, was but one of a series of events which began with the resignation controversy and went on througdi the deposition of Charles Sumner from his chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee, Grant's surrender to the politicians in his attempt to get reelected, the Alabama claims dispute, and Grant's general mishandling of his office to convince Cox that something had to be done about the growing degradation of national politics. He did that something with a group of Cincinnati intellectuals and political reformers with Tdiom he had associated since returning to that city in November. His law practice had grown slowly and steadily since then, and the prospects looked so bright that that fact, along with his disillusionment with politics, had made him decide to live “in the sincere hope of remaining in the future a private

«2 Garfield to Cox, February 27, 1871, Cox Papers. It was also intended "to help Grant," the words of the President's brother-in-law, Lewis Dent, used on the House floor to persuade representatives to vote for Bingham's resolution. See the Cincinnati Commercial. March 2, 1871, p. 1. ^^Cox was disgusted at this whole thing, and felt "Small minds wanted to support the President...and get influence with him," and felt this was the way to do so. Cox to Wendell P. Garrison, March 3, 1871, Cox Papers. 313 man and getting and keeping a private home." He had turned dcwn an offer to be president of the new Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College because he wanted to stay in Cincinnati and continue legal practice and because he felt that the school would probably receive a great deal of criticism from Ohio's rural population idien they saw that it would be much more than an agricultural sc h o o l.A s a result, he had set up his family in Cincinnati, looked forward to living there the rest of his life, and began to solidify his future role as one of that city's leading citizens by serving as a member of the Board of Directors of the soon-to-be-founded University of Cincinnati•

But Coz was not going to have to leave politics altogether. In March, I 871, he wrote his brother Kenyon that "as to politics generally, I mean to say my say, but to keep out of office. My firm belief is that I shall not be supple or easily moulded enough to make me any party's candidate, and that I shall be allowed to follow my bent, and stick to my practice for ten years as I desire to do."^6 A few days later, on March 11, at a private meeting in Cincinnati, he again took up a role in politics. The meeting's leaders, , a Cincinnati lawyer, politician, and later Si^reme Court

^^Coz to John Lynch, March 7, I 871, Coz P a p e rs . ^^Cincinna-ti Commercial. December 17, I 87I , p . 5* ^^Coz to Kenyon Coz, March 2, I 871, Coz Papers. 314

Justice; , later Governor of Ohio; Friedrich Hassaurek, a leader of Ohio*s German population, and nine other prominent Cincinnati Republicans met to form a "club for political discussion, private and public, with a view to help form public opinion within the party, and assist in the crystalization which formal conventions and Congressional caucuses seemed powerless to make."^^ A committee was appointed to draft a declaration of principles as a platform for what would be called the "Central Republican Association of Hamilton C o u n ty ,"

On March 18, the committee finished the platform and spent the next few days getting prominent people to sign it. Among the first approached was Cox, who, although he had been told of and invited to the March 11 meeting, did not attend because he "didn't choose to appear the originator of it" and because he was handling a case at the time. He was shown the platform, which called for amnesty and enfranchisement for

Southern whites, revenue and tariff reform, an early return to specie payments, civil service reform, and opposed to using government for party purposes,^® He approved of it all except the way the tariff plank was expressed. He suggested some modifications and some of them were accepted. When Cox was

^^Cox to Aaron P. Perry, March 2?, 1871» Cox Papers. ^®Cincinnatl Commercial. March 22, I87I, p. 1. Its editor, Murat Halstead, was in complete sympathy with the movement. For a thorough study of Halstead, see Donald W. Curl, "Murat Halstead, Editor and Politician," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. The Ohio State University, 1964. 315 then asked to sign it, he felt that not to do so and thus seemingly to nurse his popularity and availability was an assumption of political importance "a little absurd", and so, since he believed in it, he said so by signing it. Over sixty other local prominent Republicans did likewise, and when the news of the "New Departure," as it was called by the Cincinnati

Commercial, was first reported on March 22, it "fell like a bombshell among the administration sycophants of this city" ^ashingto^ ^9

This reaction probably was for two reasons—one because they felt this really was a preliminary move which, added to the Missouri movement, would eventually form a third party of former Republicans and Democrats in opposition to Grant, and the other because at its formal meeting, on March 22, despite his persistent disavowals, the convention openly favored the nomination of Cox, now Grant's enemy, for President.Cox, who spoke at the in itial meeting and discussed the goals of the organization, felt there was "no dream of a new party organization...which will influence state p o l i t i c s .The group would "get a series of independent speakers, such as

^^Eoeliff Brinkenhoff to Cox, March 24, 18?1, Cox Papers. 60New York World. March 23, 18?1, p. 1. ^^Cox to Garfield, March 20, 18?1, Cox Papers. Cox had always favored staying in the Republican party. See Cox to Friedrich Hassaurek, October 26, 1869, Cox Papers. For a scholarly discussion of Hassaurek, see "Friedrich Hassaurek: Cincinnati's Leading Forty-Eighter," Ohio History. LXVII (January, 1959), 1-18. 316

Schurz, Trumbull, Wells, and others.•.and without pretense do what it can to shape public opinion," but that was all. As to the Presidency, Cox assured his friend Perry that "not only was it no move in that direction," but he thoroughly believed that

"the leading men in the movement would not be any special supporters" of his in that direction. Cox was under "no hallucination on that subject," and because he had not been responsible for the movement except to assent to it, he felt that he would be free to say what he felt without always having to think of the organization.^^

But at a time when the number of critics of the President was growing every day, it was not easy to believe that an organization which looked toward reform within a party was not just a step away from forming a new party. The President had begun as early as 18?0 to make as many possible arrangements as he could to insure his own reelection. Many of those "arrangements" had led to the ousting of some of the leaders of the reform movement from office and alienating the rest and its supporters against the President. From this fact it was quite easy to reason that the Central Republican Association and its backers, such intellectual leaders of the country as Henry Adams and Charles Francis Adams, Stanley Matthews, E. L. Godkin, George W. Curtis (chairman of the Civil Service Commission), Samuel Bowles (editor of the Springfield Republican), Horace

^^Cox to Perry, March 27, 18?1, Cox Papers. One historian has written that Cox formed this association. He had no part in the original formation. See Hoogenboom, Spoils, p. 8 9. 317

White (editor of the Chicago Trihtme), Carl Schurz, Lyman Trumbull, Coz, William Grosvenor, David Wells, and Edward Atkinson were eventually going to replace Grant as the Republican party*s nominee if they could. If they could not, they would, one could reason, form a new party or possibly join with the Democrats, and nominate a candidate to oppose Grant. For these reasons Coz's protestations that the association would only try to "purify and give character to the Republican party from within" and that the "Sumner quarrel probably ended Grant's chance for renomination,were meaningless and naive unless the latter could be attained. The realization that it could not (contrary to Coz's hopes) made the forming of a national liberal Republican party a necessity to all of these men.

And what kind of men were these intellectuals, who were now so openly critical of a President they all, ezcept possibly

Henry Adams, had praised early in I869? They were men who felt that the "Republican party had accomplished its original objectives, \bu^ now had lost its crusading fervor." The party, they felt, had decided to rest on its past glories and sit tight in power without rocking the boat by looking for more problems to solve or solving the ones already present.They felt Grant and his cronies accepted this feeling as a necessity and were too ignorant to see the need for reform and too uncouth and

^^Coz to Charles P. Coz, March 27, I871» Coz Papers.

^^Roseboom, War Years, p. 4?1. 318 immoral to ran an honest government. They felt that ••tinder the toxic of t h e war and an economic boom, American political and bnsiness life had taken on the morals of a gashouse. ••^■^

Th^ thought t h a t ^somehow, somewhere, things had gone wrong, and only by restoring the liberal Idea of a natural balance in society could the political and economic system be saved."

Their goals were good government, economic orthodoxy (free trade and tariffs for revenue only), moral rejuvenation, good men in government, and trust in the natural laws of political econom y.^

The only problem was that they went about things In the w rong v a j and with unrealistic Ideals, They felt that they were realists who knew what the people wanted, but they were actually abstract philosophers who could not see that the public was more interested In economic security and growing wealth than political reforms. Most of these '•best people" believed in the tradition that only gentlemen should run the govemmait, and then only by strict and rigid moral principles. But the spoils system and the election of Andrew Jackson had slowly destroyed that tradition, and the type of men who were in office in I87I because of their opposition to Andrew Johnson and their siq>port of Grant were now doing their best to bury it. The intellectuals could not accept this, and Idealistically

^ % r i c A . Goldman, Bendezvous w ith D e s tin y . (New Y ork, 1952), p. 11.

^ J o h n G» Sproat, "The Best Men"; Liberal Reformers In the Gilded Age, (New York, Ï968), p. 4. 319 sought to change the system to what they felt it had "been. Not even Grant's seeming attempts to throw sops to them in the form of a minor civil service reform act, a small reduction of the tariff, removal of political disabilities from many ei- Confederates, and the establishment of a civil service commission, could change them. They still felt the need for thorough reform, beginning at the top. Not enough people, however, were interested sufficiently in their causes, and they would not adapt to this reality with new ideas. As a result, as one historian has expressed it, they "played the role of querulous aristocrats in a nation long infatuated with democracy," and failed miserably in all their attempts at political reform.^?

In reality this is too harsh a judgment on the many learned men who were doing what they actually thought was best, and it leans too much toward debunking to be accepted completely. These men were for honest government and a civil service system in which qualifications and not friendships were the criteria for appointment and promotion. They wanted to lower a tariff which was protecting supposedly "infant industries," but which was really helping to lead to an era of "robber barons," monopolies, and trusts. They favored enfranchising ez-Confederates—a most forgiving and generous attitude. They felt that Grant, his friends, and other crude and ignorant men should be ousted from governmental power--an

*?Ibid.. p. 280. 320 idea which if realized, would have saved the nation from what is usually regarded as the worst presidential administration in the country’s history. In other words, they were upright (although admittedly too self-righteous), intelligent, admirable men who favored purification of government, reform, and reunion. To castigate them as completely self-centered beings only trying to put themselves and their friends in power is too narrow a view. True, they wanted a change, but for what they felt, as did many others, was the better. They failed because they did not understand a political system which had grown cruder and had lost the respect of most people and because they did not know how to use it to nominate and elect a worthy candidate. Yet, they would not have brought themselves to use the accepted methods if they had understood them. They wanted a better way—but could not get it. But for whatever reason this was so, it was done in the best interest of the nation as well as the "best men."

The decision to nominate someone to oppose Grant, whom they saw would easily be renominated, was arrived at by most of the reformers during the summer of I87I. As one leader wrote Cox, “I think with you that the control of the party cannot be wrested from the men who refuse peace and reform yet...So believing I look to an independent movement as probable and necessary...if a resolute and outspoken endeavor to control and save the Republican party fa ils...," a new party and nominee w ill be necessary.Cox was beginning to feel the same

^®William Grosvenor to Cox, May 12, 18?1, Cox Papers. 321 way, especially after Ohio reform Eepublicans had helped such a movement along by nominating Edward Noyes, an anti­ administration candidate, as the Republican candidate for Ohio's governor. He felt, “My own impression grows strong that we are drifting toward a distinct division in the Republican party, and that the third organization w ill come in that way,” and not from any alliance with the Democrats, whom he did not trust at a l l . ^9

The process by which that third organization was to be formed went on apace. By mid- and late 18?1, when the plans

for the next national campaign were under consideration, the Republican party had had serious factional divisions in nearly every state. In Ohio two aspects of this split were the nomination of Noyes and the desire by reform Republicans to have John Sherman ousted from the Senate by the legislature to be elected in October, 18?1, As was expected, Cox was being mentioned by a great number of reformers as the most likely candidate to replace Sherman. Cox, however, did not want

anything to do with the movement, preferring that either of his friends, Garfield or Perry, be chosen and that he could work

for that end behind the s c e n e s . He had decided not to take an active part in the fall campaign, but rather to sit it out

while hoping his reform-minded friends could bring about the

^9cox to David A. Wells, July 22, 1871, Cox Papers. 70cox to Garfield, August 9, 1871, James A. Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 322 defeat of Democrats everywhere, could show the South that the Democrats could not possibly win the Presidency again, and could make the public realize that they must back the reform elements if there was to be any hope for the nation's future.

Apparently the Ohio voters listened, for on October 17, I871, Cox could say that it seemed that "enough revenue reformers and opponents of Sherman Jwer^ elected to control the vote."71 But his joy at this event soon disappeared when it became apparent that some of his friends wanted him to be the recipient of that vote.7^ Cox did not desire that turn of affairs, even though all of his "friends appear[e*^ to think that” his lot was cast for politics and that it was very seldom that a man had greatness thrust upon him as persistently as it was held out to C o x . 73 s t i l l , he refused to be a part of this movement. His "attitude in regard to public life had not changed a hair's breadth" since he had come to Cincinnati. Politics had become, for him, a dirty business. Besides, he had decided that it was best to devote himself totally to professional legal practice, and that to return to politics before he had achieved the financial security he had not yet attained was out of the question. He had discouraged his

71cox to Garfield, October 17, 1871» Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 7^See Eugene Powell to Cox, October 16, I871, W. T. Bascom to Cox, November 9, I87I, and E. P. Spalding to Cox, November 11, I87I, for examples. All are in the Cox Papers. ^^Charles P. Cox to Cox, November 1, I871, Cox Papers, 323 friends from discussing his name in connection with the Senatorship and had given an unequivocal "no" answer to Democratic representatives asking if he would run as a candidate of a coalition of them and some Eepublicans. Consequently, "it could only be under a sense of duty in circumstances" which he took no part in shaping, that he could at all consent to "forego any private interest for public employment,

Despite such persistent refusals, the Democrats kept bringing his name up and his Republican supporters, led by General Jack Casement, felt that even though Cox did not want any political position, "that was one of the many reasons why j^e^ should be compelled to accept it." They would defy the party caucus (which would probably nominate Sherman again), "use any fair means to defeat Mr. Sherman, " and use Cox as their candidate whether he wanted it that way or not.?^ But in this venture they were not to prove successful. As the day of the Republican caucus neared, it became more and more apparent that Sherman would win its approval easily. On January 5» 18?2, the party decided to nominate him. Then,

nh _ ' Cox to W. T. Bascom, November 20, 18?1, Cox Papers. He had joined with his ex-partner Henry L. Burnett and Oran Follett to form the law partnership of Cox, Burnett, and Follett i n A p r il, 1 8 7 1 , and was in the process of trying to make the partnership more prosperous than it had been when the Senatorial m a tte r came u p . See C h a rle s F . Cox to Cox, Septem ber 25» I 8 7 1 , Cox Papers.

^^John Casement to Cox, November 23» 1871, Cox Papers. Casement would not listen to Cox's refusals and said he would do whatever he wanted and Cox could "put that in your pipe." 324 because Casement knew that some Democrats would vote for Sherman if Cox were presented as his opponent, Casement iand other Hepubllcan dissidents tried to gamer all the Democratic votes they could for Garfield, Rutherford B. Hayes, or Robert Schenck, But all three refused to be a party to It.

Thus, when the vote was taken In the , Sherman received seven more votes (73) than the others (George W. Morgan—64; Cox—1; Schenck—1) combined and seemed duly elected. But when the final margin was known and before the result was announced, five Democrats asked for and received recognition from the Lieutenant Governor Mueller,

presiding. They then changed their votes from Morgan to Cox, and ten or so more were on their feet and prepared to do so.?^ Mueller, who had an Imperfect command of the English language,

asked that those who wished to change should do so more slowly and deliberately and singly. But before he could go further, one of Sherman's friends went up to him and said something to him. Immediately he announced the previous results and declared

Sherman elected. Halfway through this announcement, forty legislators rose and asked him not to do so, but Mueller persisted and declared Sherman duly elected.

Cox was shocked and dismayed by this latter event, feeling that It was a "bare-faced wrong and a piece of

^^John Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years In the House. Senate, and Cabinet. (Chicago, ls95)» If 4yy, 325 dishonesty of the worst type,” He even hinted that he regretted not being elected, feeling that he oonld have been if the legislature's rights had not been kept from it (he still had a twinge of ambition left). But as he thought it over he decided that the result was a "more satisfying one than to be elected. The eight or ten reform Eepublicans who had determined to bring this about would have been |^hi£) only regular legislative constituents, for the Democrats knew that Q ii^ theory as to them" was that their organization must dissolve before much good could be done. And to the regular Eepublicans he would have appeared to be an intriguer.Thus if e le c te d he would have been the constant recipient of criticism from both sides, and for this reason he was glad to have lost, even though his election "might have hastened the day of more healthy political organizations,"*^®

What Coz thought would be the healthiest political organization the country would have in the future, the Liberal Eepublican party, was by that time about ready to fu lfill Coz's prediction that "a third party will come forth," When the nomination of Grant seemed certain, Carl Schurz had taken the initiative, as had his Missouri associates earlier, and began speaking around the countiry in favor of a "new departure" and support for any and a ll Eepublican candidates who opposed the

7?Coz to James Monroe, January12, 1872, Coz Papers, 7®Coz toW, P, Garrison, January 12, 1872, Coz Papers, 326 administration. On November 20, 1871, to a group of Tennessee Eepublicans and Democrats who had joined together to form a reform association there, Schurz clearly forecasted the future policy of the reform groups. Calling on "progressive" Eepublicans and Democrats to unite all over the nation to oust Grant and reform the government, Schurz’s speech was printed by a great number of magazines and newspapers which now began calling for a new party and an end to Grantism.79 This clamor grew apace over the next few months until, soon after William Grosvenor, a confidant of Sohurz's, asked Cox, "What would you think of the possibility of holding a mass consultation of reform Eepublicans from a ll parts of the country at Cincinnati sixty days hence?"®® The Missouri Liberal Eepublican state convention met on January 2^, 1872. Advised by Schurz and attended by a number of new party promoters from outside Missouri, it adopted resolutions calling for universal amnesty, tariff and civil service reform, and states' rights. It then called on all Eepublicans desirous of aiding in serving these reforms to come to meet in a national mass convention at Cincinnati on May 1, 1872.®^

The response to this call during the next three months, though rather hesitant for a time, showed considerable

^^Eoss, Liberal Eepublican. p. 48. 8n "^William Grosvenor to Cox, January 10, 1872, Cox Papers. ®^Eoss, Liberal Eepublican. p. 51» 327

enthusiasm. All over the country, but especially In the Midwest and New York at first, liberals who wished an end to Grant's presidency began forming ranks to elect delegates to this convention. The tide grew every day as intellectuals, politicians, and reformers became more and more sure that this new party was one to be reckoned with in the future. As the May 1 , 1872 convention date approached, many became increasingly optim istic.

Yet, in this rapidly enlarging "constituency" lay the seeds not only of the party's strength, but also of its downfall. The movement had begun as a protest against the disenfrachisement of ex-Confederates. Then were added the issues of civil service reform, tariff reduction, early specie resumption, and government corruption. With such objectives exalted campaigns and a reform candidate could be run without fear of being dominated by crass politicians and their ideas of practical politics. As the movement grew stronger and showed signs of success, however, "the practical politicians moved in. Disappointed office-seekers, political adventurers, and others Joined the chase for spoils, ^he^were a set of supporters iriio could bring nothing but discredit upon any undertaking."®^ Such persons who either opposed Grant for personal reasons or saw in the Liberal Republicans a chance to put themselves in power, now began to seek to take over their state's delegation

G^Ibid.. p . 65. 328 to gain a foothold for the future,83 The seeming shift of the party's basis for reform to anti-Grantism thus not only added supporters but also did much to ruin its chances for change even if it had gained power.

Cox was to perceive some of these disturbing changes later as the movement grew in strength, but at first he was quite happy with its formation, supporters, and goals. He saw the Missouri Liberal Republicans as the "nucleus of a movement that will defeat Grant," and he declared that he would do whatever he could to help it.®^ One of those aids was being appointed as a member of the executive committee of William Grosvenor*s "Tax-Papers Union," a low ta riff group whose membership Included a future, but now youthful, reformer named Henry Demarest Lloyd.Cox also worked behind the scenes, using his "frequent conversations with members of the state Legislature" to make "suggestions" as to how it could realize the Congressional districts of the party's friends for the next election.8& A third was issuing a circular, with his own name at the top, from the Central Republican

®3in New York, for example. Senator Reuben Fenton and , opponents of Senator rather than reformers, were about to take over the party there. See Cox to William Grosvenor, March 23, 1872, Cox Papers. gk Cox to John Lynch, January 31, 18?2, Cox Papers. 85william Grosvenor to Cox, January 19, 1872, Cox Papers. Cox did little active work in this organization. B^Cox to Garfield, February 26, 1872, Cox Papers. As Cox asked Garfield, "Where do you want your district?" 329

AssoGlatien, «hloh declared Its syi^athy irlth the Missouri Liberal Eepublican movement and that groiQ>'8 call for a national convention.^7 x fourth was the gathering of signatures from the members of the Cincinnati association and its supporters in that area for the invitations to be sent out for a preliminary meeting before the convention vfaioh mas "to bring together for consultation, as large a number of Eepublicans as possible lAo agree in regard to certain reforms."®®

It was at this meeting that the decision, previously a matter of doubt, was made to nominate a candidate for President at the Kay convention. This fact, added to the growing clamor for the ouster of Grant, brought the first of the prospective candidates into the open. Judge David Davis, the Senator from Illinois, was among the first mentioned. In February, at a convention of the "Labor Eeform" party, he bad been nominated immediately, for he felt that if he could win the Liberal E^ublican party nomination, the former could be cast off as useless and he would have a broader base of support. Thus he began, through his agents, to try to influence as many Liberal Eepublican delegates as he could to vote for him and to appear to be the best man available to the new party. But the reformers in it thought of him as a representative of everything they were trying to overthrow, and were not inclined to le t him be nominated.

®^Coz to Colonel E. H. Hobson, February 27, 1872, Coz Papers. ®®Villiam Grosvenor to Coz, February 18, 1872, Coz Papers. 330

In addition to Davlo, another candidate, idiom the reformer* also disliked, mas slowly making It know that althou^ he was not an active seeker of the nomination, he would accept It. Horace Greeley, the colorfol and nnpredlotable editor of the New York Tribune and a known protectionist In his tariff beliefs, had become alienated from Grant because of the latter*s patronage policies In New York, When the Liberal Republican movement came along, he w illingly offered his services to It, but with the proviso that It bring forth a non-committal plank on the tariff In Its platform. It was here that the future of the movement rested—and It was here that Carl Schurz unwittingly made the move that eventually gave It over to Greeley. At a meeting at the Cooper Institute on April 12, 1872, he, Lyman Trumbull, and Greeley stood on the platform together, assailed the administration, and endorsed the Cincinnati convention as the means to end It. The real launching of the movement In the E a s t , the embracing of Greeley as a party member, and the downfall of the party all were now assured.

Coz had been opposed to allowing Greeley to come Into the party from the beginning. As he wrote to Garfield, whom he felt would join the party eventually (but did not, fearing domination by Democrats), "Our convention w ill be a g re a t success In numbers and In the Influential character of the persons In attendance. Of course this does not make a

®^Boss, Liberal Republican, p. 59* 331 political success of it. Our present danger arises from the disposition of Greeley and the protectionists to come and offer cooperation. To this I cannot assent. I am net anxioux to be in a movement designed only to beat Grant."90 Xb Cox told Schurz ( "We are not convinced a gain has been made in the coalition with the Greeley men on the tacit assusgption that the revenue reform part of our movement can be held in abeyance for a time." He rather felt that for the next twenty years the issues of taxation and federal revenue would be the major onas on the national scene. "On this question," Cox felt, "Greeley and his associates were the natural leaders of the party in opposition. To start with ignoring our most important political question and affiliating with our most natural opponent" was an obviously wrong approach. Cox really felt that such an alliance "would be too great a load for" the party to carry and would be suicidal. Ambiguity and avoidance of issues of principles might be the life of decaying parties, but was surely the death of new o n e s .91

But this prophecy of future doom, uhich was soon to come true, was ignored with the sentiment that "the reform movement will lose a great deal of its validity if it does so ftake

9^Cox to Garfield, March 22, 1872, Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. As Cox wrote "For me to fail in unambig­ uous and clear enunciation in regard to taxes and tariffs is to give the Démocratie party a reason for continuing its organiza­ tion." Cox to William Grosvenor, March 23, 1872, Cox Papers. ^^Cox to Carl Schurz, April 5» 1872, Cox Papers. 332

Greeley and his supporters Into the parl^» hut if it is to win this year it will be obliged to do it."*2 need to gain as many supporters as possible, no matter idiat issues they supported, if any, had thus overridden the original idea of the movement—.to reform the government on certain accepted principles and to destroy the Democratic party. It had also made Coz's theory that **ve don't have to win, but must educate the public—this is our peculiar work,"93 unacceptable one. Coz was more interested in principles and their acceptance by the public than a victory at the polls in 1872. He felt that once the Liberal Republican party's issues were understood by the public, enouggi people would come over to it so that it could take the place of the Democrats as opponents of the regular Republicans and stand for reform and progress while the opposition stood for the status quo and protectionism. In such a contrast the people would naturally, he felt, vote Liberal Republican from then on.

While such an outlook was admittedly visionary, it may have saved the Liberal Republicans from destruction. As it was, the party continued on the path to Greeley's nomination all througgi April. During that month, while newspapers all over the country began to propose such men as Lyman Trumbull, Charles Sumner, Charles Francis Adams, and Coz (any of whom

^^Samuel Bowles to David A. W ells, March 23, 1872, Coz Papers. 93coz to David A. Wells, April 4, 18?2, Coz Papers. 333 the reformers moixld. have supported) as possible presidential nominees, the politicians irtio had taken over many state organizations of the party seemed to favor a Davis-Greeley ticket. In reaction to this attempt to put a professional politician at the head of a reform ticket, the so-called "Quadrilatéral* of four reform-minded newspaper editors, Henry Vatterson of the Louisville Courier-Joumal. Samuel Bowles of the Suringfield Eepublican. Murat Halstead of the niMAinnati Gt^wmorciatl. and Horace White of the Chicago Tribune, met on the eve of the convention (April 28) and agreed to barrage Davis the next day with bad publicity about the crass means his agents had been using to try to influence delegates. On th e 29th it was done, and the came out so strongly against Davis that his candidacy, it was agreed by everyone at the convention, was dead from that point on.9^

But in its place came a more dangerous one to the reformers—that of Horace Greeley. His newspaper, the New York Tribune, had said that "his men feel he is the second choice to a large measure of both Adams and Davis men, "9^ and now that Davis had little chance, the New York delegation closed ranks around Greeley, and many Davis men came over to him also. The "Quadrilateral" and Senator Schurz had not seen that this might happm, and had even invited ,

9^Matthew T. Downey, "Horace Greeley and the Politicians t The Liberal Republican Convention in 1872," Journal aan History, vol. 53» no. 3 (December, 1986), p. 737. ^4few York Tribune. April 30, 1872, p. 1. 334

Greeley; s advleer and manipulator at the eonrention and later snceeasor at the Tribune, to their meeting designed to destroy Davis*s chanoes» and thus gave him an inside look at the reformers* strategy, irtiieh mas aimed at nominating either

Trumbull or A d a m s . ^6 Their overconfidence, which came from the ease with which they had ended Davis*s movement, was also to lead to their downfall.

They did not see this until much later. In the meantime many of them went on with planning the convention and its platform as if nothing had happened. On April 29, with Coz presiding, the strong advocates of revenue reform met at the Missouri delegation*s headquarters. At the meeting Coz defined their position—that ezpedienoy should be considered as long as principle was not endangered, and thus, though the group was almost wholly in favor of a low tariff plank, it was willing to meet the hig^ tariff people in committee in the spirit of fair concession.97 This policy was agreed to by those present and the unity of the many disparate elements at the convention now seemed more likely than ever, at least on the iaqportant platform q u e s tio n s .

A "variegated omnium" of delegates it certainly was. "There were long-haired and spectacled doctrinaires from

9^enry Vatterson, "Marse Henrv". an Autobiography. (Mew York, 1919), I, 243-^1 97Mew York T rib u n e . A p r il 30, 1 8?2, p . 1 . Among th o se present were aenry L. sum ett, David A. Veils, Edward Atkinson, E. L. Gedkin, Carl Schurz, Villiam Grosvenor, and Mahlon Sands. 335

New England, spliced by short-haired and stnspy enaissarles from New York.. .There was a motley array of Southerners of every sort" from Negro rightists to Southern redeemers.98 They were there for various reasons—from reform to spoils, from freedom to quasi-slavery, from principles to personal power. The party had no national or established state organizations and the varying types of delegates were the result. The Liberal Eepublican party was going to come into existence and nominate a presidential candidate a ll in one sitting. It hoped to change the entire American system of politics throu^ the united action of everyone opposed to President Grant. In other words it was trying to achieve the ultimate without sufficient means or support or the rig^t type of membership to do so. It was a gargantuan task for political middleweig^ts.

But to themselves they were heavyweights. As each delegate rode to the Cincinnati convention hall the moming of May 1, 1872, he must have thought of the candidate he would support and the gp.orieus future of the party. By noon, when William Grosvenor called the convention to order, each of them and over seven thousand people in the audience hushed to hear th e opening sp e ec h . G rosvenor beggan by p r a is in g th e g a th e rin g as an outflow of public sentiment for the party's ideals, and then he appointed Stanley Matthews temporary chairman. Matthews then took the chair and asked for acceptance of a

98vattersen, "Marse Henrv". vol. 1, p. 2b2. 336 resolution that each state choose a nunber of delegates twice th e ntUBber of its Electoral College representation. When this was adopted and Matthews was about to aooept a motion to adjourn to await committee appointments and reports the next day» a loud call for Schurz was taken up idiioh erentually caused that Senator to come to speak to the convention. He spoke only briefly, calling on the convention to remove "that which is obnoxious to the American people and put something better in its place," and then he left the stage to the cheers of the crowd. I t was obvious whom the convention would have si:9ported for president if he had been eligible, Carl S c h u r z . 99

Another candidate whom it mic^t have supported but was not given the opportunity was Cox. In the days before the convention "there was quite a strong movement on the part of the friends of Charles Francis Adams and Senator Trumbull, that if either.. .could not be nominated, that their friends should united upon General Cox...There was a distinct understanding that General Cox's name would be brouggit before the convention at the proper moment and opportunity...for the first place. On this basis of agreement a group of reformers including Halstead, White, Schurz, and Bowles had called en Gez at his office the day before the convention met to ask if he would

99proceedings of the Liberal Beuublican Convention. (New York, ioÿz;, pp. 3-3» schurz was ineiigioie uo oe President because he was bom in Germany of German parents. ^^^Henry L. Burnett to William Cochran, November 20, 1901, Cox Papers. 337 eonsider being the eonpromise choice end if he vonld accept the Yice-presidential nomination if either favorite of the reformers vas nominated. Cox» the only possible candidate who vas present in Cincinnati, said it vonld be an honor, but that since he had been born in Montreal, there might arise a dispute as to vhether he vas constitutionally eligible, and so he felt he should not be considered. Despite their protests that since he vas bom of native citizens there vas no conflict, Cox stood his ground and kept to his principle of keeping out of politics. To shov that he vas not an office-seeker, he even vent so far as not to attend either the Liberal Eepublican or the Ohio Reunion and Eeform Club conventions. The latter vas a group made up of Cincinnati Eepublicans vho had formed, as had the Central Republican Association earlier, a discussion club of Republican reformers idio refused to align vith the Democrats, but had said it vould support at their convention, the same day, the Liberal Eepublican candidate if acceptable. In addition he told his lav partner Henry Burnett, a delegate to the Liberal Eepublioan Convention, that if he (Cox) vere nominated, Burnett should refuse it for him.101

Even though Cox had seemingly irrevocably taken himself out of the race, he vas still thought of by many, but especially the Adams men and the Ohio delegation, as the reformers* second ohoice.l®^ But that vas for the third day

l^lcochran, "Political Experiences," p. II 36. l^^Eoseboom, War Years, pp. 480-1. 338 of the convention to decide, end the delegatee were more concerned, for the moment, ahout what the second day had to offer. The second session began with the various committees being appointed with representatives from each state. Then the convention's first crisis came iriaien a group of New York men read a report that since they opposed Greeley's nomination they had been shut out of the delegation by Greeley men, who had made sure that only Greeley's supporters were appointed. This matter was given to the resolutions committee to decide, and the convention adjourned until the afternoon.

The afternoon session began with Carl Sohurz's speech calling for an Intelligent and virtuous statesman to be nominated as a replacement for Grant's system of Jobbery and corruption. It was an obvious plea to the delegates to nominate Adams, and If the voting had begun then, It is probable that the wlldly-cheerlng throng would have named Adams easily. But there was other business to consider. The rules committee announced the convention would follow the rules of the House of Heprosentatlves; the appeal of the anti-Greeley New Yorkers was rejected; a call for nominations was voted down after General John Cochrane, the head of the New York delegation and the Greeley forces, said a platform was needed first; and the convention adjourned until evening to await the rest of the committee reports.103

^^^reoeedlnas. pp. 13-15* 339

A t 7*30 the delegates and the crowded galleries reassembled. The resolutions committee announced that it was s till wnable to report» and so Schurz suggested that the eonrention hare both that presentation and the nominations the next day. This proposal was accepted. Then the eonrention turned to a general discussion of the issue idiieh had been holding up the resolution committee's report, the tariff. Various compromise solutions were offered from the floor, but no final decision could be made in the confusion irtilch reigned as almost ereryone tried to make himself heard on the matter. Then, when Edward Atkinson announced that the committee had already made a tariff resolution and that this was not the basis for dirided opinion, and that it would report the next day, amid the confusion mbioh ensued after this announcement, Matthews decreed the eonrention adjourned until the next day.^®^

Between adjournment and the next session the final agreements were thrashed out by the resolutions committee. On most of the planks all sides had agreed, but the key one throughout their deliberations was the tariff. The reformers had a large representation on this committee and they had fought to put their free-trade ideas into the r^ o rt. They had succeeded in hurting Greeley and the protectionists by roting against the unit rule (thus supposedly keeping the New York delegation from going wholly to Greeley, even though

lo^ bid.. pp. 15-17. 340

It had only three anti-Greeley menbere), hut they vere uusueeessfnl on the tariff* After trying to force through a low tariff plank nntil the night of May 2, they finally agreed to a oompremiee, feeling their candidate would win no natter idiat the platform said*^^^

But there were other evente going on that nig^t which were to help to foil those plans* B* Gratz Brown, iriio had parted with his former ally, Carl Schurz, because of the former's support of Frank B lair for the Senate seat from Missouri, had been telegraphed by the New York delegation to come to Cincinnati to meet with them* On May 2 he and Senator B lair, a Democrat, met with various delegations far into the nigbt and made a great many bargains, knowing that if Adams won the nomination Schurz would have a ll the patronage power in Missouri, With the New York delegation it was agreed that Brown would withdraw after the first ballot for president and throw his votes and weight to Greeley, whose men would then support Brown for the vice-presidential nomination*^®^ A ltheu^ these maneuvers were not the most iiQ)ortaat element in Greeley's victory and were not the only reason for that nomination, they were effective and were the reasons later fo„ht Allyn Cox, May 6, 1872, Cox Papers* IC^Cox fe lt Brown acted in this way to destroy Schurz as revenge "for not supporting Brown more cordially to his credit*" See Cox to Allyn Cox, May 6, 1872, and Downey, "Horace Greeley," pp. 741-2, for a full discussion of these conferences* 341 pointed to by the reformers as the key to their downfall.

That event oaae the next morning, May 3t idien the eonventlon reassembled* After accepting a resolution ruling that no oral nominations would be made, the convention sat back to listen to Horace White present the platform* It castigated the Grant administration for a wanton disregard of the laws and for usurping power, and Grant himself for using his office to promote personal ends and for keeping corrupt men In power* It then presented Its planks, which favored equality of all men before the law; the thlrtem th, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments; removal of all political disabilities Imposed because of the rebellion; states rights and limited government; civil service reform; speedy specie resumption; and no further land grants to railroads, but only people; and friendship with foreign countries* Its key tariff plank read "We favor federal taxation to pay the expenses of government and not to Interfere with the Industry of the people. Becognlzlng that there are In our midst honest but Irreconcilable differences of opinion with regard to the respective systems of Protection and Free Trade, we remit the discussion to the people In each Congressional district and to the decision of Congress thereon, iriiolly free of Executive Interference or dictation*f When the platform had been read, the convention loudly cheered It and then, with few objections, adopted It by voice vote*^®7

^^^Prooeedlngs. pp* 1 8- 2 0 * 3^2

They did so both because they were happy with the oo]Q>romi8e and because they were anzlcus to get on with the balloting for President. Immediately after the platform was accepted, the roll call of the states for nominations and votes began. When it was finished, but before the results

(idiich gave Adams a small lead of 203-1^7 over Greeley, with Trumbull getting 115) could be announced, B. Gratz Brown rose and asked leave to make a personal explanation. He then withdrew himself from the contest, asked his supporters (idio had given him 95 votes on the first ballot) to go for Greeley, and then "wound up with a brief, but passionate and excited harangue in favor of Greeley. With a burst of applause and many persistent hisses aeooflqoanying him, Broun le ft the stage to see if his plans would work out.

He was to find out later. On the second ballot, though Greeley gained 92 votes, $6 from Broun men, he s till trailed Adams by 243-239, with the Trumbull vote holding steady. The third and fourth ballots showed little change, but on the fifth Adams Jumped to a commanding 309-258 lead and seemed within reach of the necessary 358. Everyone there now seemed to sense that the sixth ballot would be the last, and consultations and caucuses were formed all over the floor. The result was disastrous for the reformers. When the sixth ballot's results,

^®®0ox to Allyn Cox, Hay 6, 1872. Cox Papers. Cox felt this made the bargain Broun had made with the Greeley men apparent, but it was too late to prevent its consummation. This is debatable. ^i^3

(332 for Greeley to 324 for Adame), were amaoimoed, the 8taoQ>ede was on. Amid great noise and eonfusien, an avalanehe of delegates switched to Greeley; and when Stanley Matthews had finally gotten some order back, he declared Greeley nominated by a final vote of 482-187.

Thus a ll the hopes of the reformers went down the drain. The man they knew eowld not win had done so. The ensuing nomination of Gratz Brown for vice-president over George W. Julian was but mere proof to them that a dirty deal had been made between the two to frustrate the exalted aims of the party's founders. Cox's proxy, Henry Buznett, had made the first expression of the reformers' disdain for Greeley when, after an Iowa delegate nominated Cox, "the man iriio was too pure to stay in the stink-hole of Washington," for vice- president, Burnett rose and said that "General Cox's name is not before this conv«ition"109 as much because of Cox's

refusal to accept this position as because he knew Cox would refuse to have anything to do with Greeley. The rest of the reformers followed suit soon after.

"Wells, Atkinson, Horace White, Godkin, and a few others met in j^ox'^ office immediately after adjournment, and they a ll agreed that the manner in idiioh the original reformers had been overwhelmed absolved them from any responsibility for srqmporting the convention's action." They

109prooeedings. p.2 9. 3 # also decided that they would watch and wait a little to see if the Democrats would nominate someone else or if Grant would r e t i r e .

At the same time other reformers were acting sim ilarly. Once Greeley was nominated, Boeliff Brinkerhoff and George Hoadly rushed to the Ohio Heunion and Reform Convention, headed by Judge Rufus Ranney. When they got there they found that convention red-hot with indignation at the turn of events. The convention immediately repudiated Greeley, decided to call together as many of the other state Reunion and Reform organizations as it could to hold a national convention and thus replace Greeley, and adjourned to await the results of that call.^^^

On May 3, 16?2 all of Jacob D. Cox's hopes for the improvement and reform of American politics seemingly ended. To be sure he s till Imd some faint hopes that some good would come from forming a new reform party organization which m i^t survive even Greeley's candidacy and eventually become "the party of the future," as he now began to call it—but these hopes were not to be fulfilled. The reformers had come to the convention over-confident, unskilled, and certain that lofty ideals could sway men's minds to vote for a sta te sm an

llOcox to Allyn Cox, May 6, 1872, Cox Papers.

1872, p. 1. 3 ^ 5 rather than a politician. Hov they oonld hare felt so after making so many mistakes Is hard to understand. But that Is the may they mere.

The question arises as to mhether the reformers could have succeeded, even idille keeping Greeley's support In the party? The easiest may mould have been for either Taruabull's or Adams's men to have thromn their strength to the other. If this had been done before the convention, Adams or Trumbull could have been nominated on the second ballot. Another may mould have been to nominate that perennlally-reluctant politician, J. D. Cox, despite his pretests. Despite #xat many historians have said, there mas one candidate besides Greeley idle could have gotten votes In the East, Hldmest, and South, and that mas Cox. He mas a mldmestemer, his Intellectual ties mere mlth the East, and he favored amnesty and the redeemers In the South. He had nothing of the crackpot reputation that burdened Greeley. He had had Democratic support in Ohio and he could get It elseidiere. He could never be the subject of the ridicule Greeley almost almays attracted because of his odd clothes and his eccentric mays. He mas. In almost every may, a far better choice.

Cox m l^t have had the nomination If he had pushed for It, If he had castigated Grant more publicly. If he had given the mord and had been able to secure the Senate seat from Ohio. Instead he did none of these for reasons of principle. Innate caution, a dislike for and a desire to get amay from 346 polities» s misreading of political reality» and a lore for the quiet» intellectually-oriented» professional life. It is an open question as to whether he should hare given up so much of irimt he was attached to so as to actively cai^aign for the nomination» or have been true to himself and done irtiat his better judgment told him to do. But if he had been nominated» he miggkt have helped to reverse the trend of national politics and give the politics of the gilded age some of the benefits of his wisdom» intelligence, honesty» and uprigjit moral beliefs. As it was» he did none of these» at least not from an influential position. The loss» as was stated before in a different context» was as much the nation's as it was that of J . D. Cox. CHÀFTEB XVI

THE ALIENATED POLITICAN AND THE BAILBOAD PRESIDENT

Carl Sohurz» the true leader of the Liberal Bepublleans» felt that the nomination of Horace Greeley "mas net In harmony mlth the spirit of mutual concession...and has disappointed many earnest friends of the reform movement." Since Greeley appeared "nom as a leader of an army no better than the one" Schurz had proposed to overthrom and since the cause nom seemed lo st,l his candidacy mas too much for many reformers to take. While Schurz mas delaying In committing himself to Greeley, many others among the reformers manted to "treat the convention as non-blndlng and to reunite on reform? by nominating a nem candidate.^ Coz felt that the Northern Democrats mould not support Greeley and that the party mould split over It. Such an occurrence then mould be "a favorable time for launching a nem organization mlth a future." To ensure that there mould

^Carl Schurz to Horace Greeley, May 6, I 872, Frederic Bancroft, ed.. Speeches. Correspondence, political Papers of Carl Schurz. CHem York. 1913). II. 361. ^Coz to Hahlon Sands, May 10, 1872, Coz Papers.

347 3k8 be a candidate for that new organization, Coz and his Cincinnati friends sent représentât lyes to Cleveland to meet with Jndge Bafus Banney, chalxnan of the Ohio Betnlcn and Beform Association, to nrge him to call a convention to be held before July 9 (the date of the Democratic National Convention) to nominate a candidate on that group's platform.3

But a meeting with the Judge, who actually favored following Greeley now that he was nominated, could not be arranged. Accordlng3.y Coz and his group decided to follow the lead taken by Nahlon Sands's American Free Trade League and send an endorsement and delegates to the Kay 30 conference at New York's Steinway Hall idilch that group had arranged, and which the Cincinnati group hoped would nominate another candidate.^ At that meeting, presided over by William Cullen Bryant and attended by such notables as Atkinson, Wells, and Sands, the free-traders did most of the talking, denouncing both Greeley and Grant and suggesting that the conference nominate someone like Adams, William Groesbeck, Coz, or Bryant as Its candidate. But no one could agree as to a suitable candidate, mostly because there were not enough delegates present to assure effective support, and so, adopting a resolution denouncing the Cincinnati convention, the conference agreed to Issue Invitations to a larger convention

3coz to Oran Follett, Hay 23, 18?2, Oran Follett Papers, Cincinnati Historical Society, Cincinnati, Ohio. ^Coz to Hahlon Sands, Hay 28, 18?2, Coz Papers. 349 on June 20.5 The Idea prevailed that "it should not be a mass convention, but a meeting of vell-knoun men specially invited.Clearly the reformers had had enough of "democratic" mass conventions and opening their ranks to anyone uho would sxQ>port them.

The major supporter they needed was Carl Schurz, but he held aloof from giving an endorsement to the June 20 conference until he could see idiat the Republican convention of June 6 would do. When Grant was again overwhelmingly nominated there, Schurz decided that it would be best to support Greeley as the only candidate who had a chance to be elected over Grant, With this thou^t in mind, he signed the call for the June 20 conference in the hope that he could convince that group to see the situation as he did. Another signer and inqaortant delegate to the conference, Jacob D. Coz, hoped otherwise, and i t was on t h i s b a s i s t h a t th e two w ere to p a r t compazqr politically.

The 150 chosen delegates to the "Fifth Avenue Conference"? met on June 20 with Coz presiding. After Schurz opened the meeting with a plea for the acceptance of Greeley, who, he thou^t, could be won over to Civil Service Reform and honest goveznment, Coz rose and spoke to his reform-minded friends. He urged them, since it was likely that they would

5 r o s s , L iberal RepubliCfw Mo-wsMsnt. 110. ^Kkhlon Sands to Coz, May 31, I 872, Coz Papers. ?Mew York Tribune, June 18, ^8?2, 1. 350

aot together In present and future political oaiqaalgns» not to Indulge In extreme criticism s tending to embarrass their hearty and harmonious cooperation* Soon Schurz*s plea, the faot that no nominee could be agreed upon by a majority of the states* delegates, and the growing support for Greeley among the Democrats Insuring his nomination by them, made many of the delegates ready to acquiesce In Greeley's candidacy* Cox then discouraged any attempt to go further* The meeting ended with no action being taken, and with the tacit agreement by almost oYoryone there that their only choice was now Grant or Greeley* Although Cox was not one of these, he attempted to discourage a dissident group of twenty-five men, idio met the next day, from further disorganizing the opposition to Grant* When this failed, that totally discouraged reformer left New York for Cincinnati, with a ll hope for reform that year completely destroyed*®

For the first time since he had become a voter, Cox, finding himself unable to stpport any regular party organization then existing became a "wholly Independent looker-on*" He now felt that the Liberal Bepubllcaa movement had changed so much since the May convention that it had "none of the promises of future usefulness*" It was possible, Cox agreed, that Schurz, irtio was supporting Greeley in the feeling that his election would end In a general dissolution of parties, was rl^ t* If so, then the time for Cox to resume

®Boss, Liberal Hepubllcan Movement. 119* 351 relations with him and other Greeley supporters wonld be when they reached that Independence of the Democrats again. But Coz had little hope for that, and so he became a political independent who would refrain from voting for the Presidency and would in state and local matters, choose his candidates without regard to party.9 His alienation from national politics and the two party system, as it then stood, was complete. If things would not go as he wished, he would sooner leave than attempt to put things arigdit.

Coz decided to stay in this independent stand "until the parties of the future" were defined. He felt the Bepublican party could not be one of these because "in the South it is the negro party...and as the ehas^ion of the negro race and social equality, it cannot succeed and its defeat will signal its dissolution.He felt that the Democrats were even worse because of their Copperhead!am. Both had rejected him and his warnings—the Republicans on October 5t 1870, and the Liberal Republican-Democratic coalition on May 3> 1872—and now both must, he felt, be shown to the people as so inept that they would be destroyed forever. The election of Greeley would be a lesser evil because the mess he would cause would make the Democrats

*Coz to John Lynch, July 11, 1872, Coz Papers.

l^Coz to J. Q. Smith, August 6, 1872, Coz Papers. 352 relnvlgoxate themmelves and Join with the reformers to remake the entire system. But until that happened, if it ever did, Cox would wait it out with the vain hope that at least part of his ideals which had been destroyed on May 3 might once again 11 become the goals of a major party*

The chances for Cox's hope, at least in 1872, were soon dashed. The caaqsaign, in which Cox refused to take any part, even to the point of not allowing his name to be used in connection with certain statements made idiile he was Interior Secretary,12 was the typically issue-less one the war and the "bloody-Shirt" were to assure until the 1890's. It was primarily one of personalities, based on personal abuse and misrepresentation, with a healthy dash of mudslinging. Greeley campaigned all over the nation and at the time seemed to be a great success at it. His running mate, B. Gratz Brown, was almost useless and probably did much to lose votes for the ticket. President Grant followed the old tradition (and his practice, idiile in office, in other matters) of B tB jln s aloof and letting others do the dirty work for him.

Apparently that was «dough, for he s till seemed to be the hero of Appomattox to the people. By an ovendielming margin over Greeley, the incumbent President was sw ^t into office. Unfortunately Grant thou^t his victory was a mandate

^ C o x to Garfield, August 14, 1872, Cox Papers.

^2see Cox to W. Hendricks, October 3, 1872, Cox Papers. 353 idiieh Justified the maimer in mhieh he had been running the o f f ic e vep until that time and the way he had treated both his "enemies" and his "friends." As for Greeley, as one of Cox*s old friends put it, "At last it seems a defeat has driven a Presidential candidate mad and killed him. What a strange tragi-comedy it has turned out to be,"13 The Liberal Bepublican and Democratic candidate had gone througji a time of mental depression iriien his wife died soon after he had been defeated. When he found out that he would no longer hold his old position at the New York Tribune, apparently his mind snapped. Thus, even before the electoral college could meet to vote, he died. A strange ending to a variegated career it certainly was.

There is no eonten^orary evidence of Coz*s feelings about the results of the election, but it can be conjectured that he was severely disappointed and disgruntled. He had little respect for either Greeley or Grant, but he did have some hopes that the former could have been swayed to the side of reform by competent advisers like Schurz, Wells, and Grosvenor. But now Coz would be forced to look forward to four more years of the same inept and ignorant direction of the national government.

It was soon after the election that Coz was to see further proof of this belief. In mid-January, 1873: the

l^C. C. Starbuck to Coz, December 30, 1672, Coz Papers. 35^

Cre&i; Mobilier scandal rocked the halls of Congress. Throng testimony at the Congressional hearings It became known that a great many Congressmen had taken stocks In the Credit Mobilier, a supposed construction con^any of the Union Pacific Ballroad. Included among those accused of accepting such payments, which looked very much like bribes, was Coz's old friend Janes A. Garfield. Cox felt that "the Credit Mobilier business was shocking. It Is not so much the acceptance of an Interest In a company irtiose profits must be made and notoriously were made at the ej^ense of the government as the principal creditor of the Union Pacific fiallorad—that would be bad enougdi—but for such men as j^ce President Sehuyl^ Colfax and Garfield to be Involved Is terrible". Coz was gloomy and distressed for days over Garfield's Involvement, but he felt a partial reason for It might have been "the general demoralization In Congress, when men who have stood highest In reputation and character are thus found to have yielded to temptation." But this was no excuse, this Impeccably honest puritan felt, and he decided that for the guilty ones, "no favorable course Is left but confession, square, plain, unreserved. " To cover the matter over to admit that "corruption must be the rule in our Legislative bodies and that our degradation as a people Is beyond all cure.

Such statements were vivid proof of Cox's failure to see the trend of American politics. Covering the matter over

^^Cox to John Hutchins, January 28, I873, Cox Papers. 355 and trying to find some way of taking the blame off oneself for any accusation had become the political way of life long before. Garfield was no exception. Although admitting that he had had contact with Oakes Ames, the chief agent for Credit Mobilier, and had made some moves toward buying stock, Garfield declared that he had not bought it and had ended all relations with Ames long before. He even went so far as to print a review of the whole scandal and a defense of his part in it and to feel injured by "the wicked and malicious assaults" made against him. He said that he now had a strong disgust for political life, but could not leave it because he had to defend his good name,^^ Cox, who could be extremely unforgiving at times, was not this way with Garfield after the latter explained the situation. This statement by the latter, which, Cox felt he was unwise to publish, was unnecessary, for G arfield's friends knew he "could never be bribed." Cox felt that G arfield's assertion that "whatever negotiations were tendered" Garfield, he "had rejected them and not gotten a penny of profit"^^ was proof enough of his non-complicity. As for the others involved, Cox reserved his comments on them and politics in general for a commencement speech in the summer of 1873»

Entitled "Our Country's New Era," Cox's June 25, 1873, speech at Wittenberg College was a somewhat b itter condemnation of everything wrong with national politics which Cox had long

^^Garfield to Cox, May 7, 1873, Cox Papers, ^^Cox to G a rfield , June 23, 1873, Cox Papers. 356 been fighting against and also a snanaxy of his political philosophy. "The debasing struggle for place. ..iriiich the lover order of politicians" always prize, he said, was a product of that era after the Civil War. Politics had fallen to such a low order that no decent man could feel r i^ t in it. Coz asked rhetorically, all that must be changed, but how? His answer was: by the formation of a political order by yet another class of professed politicians, "they who feel repelled from the intrigue and ambitions of common polities." Coz felt it was time for the nation to "put off youthful braggadacio," begin to become the world power it must, and see to its most basic task: keying republicanism strong and prosperous. That could best be done, Coz insisted, by keeping the nation an Anglo-Sazon and Teutonic one and assuring that no other race, any of which would become a downtrodden minority, could be allowed to mingle with it in equality.

The homogeneity of race, the purity of politics, the maturation of the country so it could face its new responsibilities: these were the principles upon which Coz based his political philosophy and his desires for the United S t a t e s .

He had seen the government under President Grant work . for the fulfillm ent of the opposite of each of them, he had

D. Coz, "Our Country's Hew Era," an address to the Society of Alumni of Wittenberg College, June 25» 1873, Manuscript in Coz Papers* 357 tried to protest, he had failed, and now he was calling on the people to reverse this trend and come back to ahat he felt were the true principles of the nation. But few heard him and even fewer did anything about it. Coz had no commanding position from idiich he could greatly influence people to see these "facts" and "needs" and the time for a reaction to some of the civil service and political excesses had not yet come. A combination such as this was sure to keep his stated goals from consummation through any act of his (or anyone else's). Further, his racial views were not (in this case thankfully) accepted either.

Cox was not so embittered about politics that he would net continue working to reform as much of government as he could. As a matter of fact he was still quite involved in state polities in I 873. During that summer a group of Ohio Republican reformers calling themselves the "People's Party" asked Judge J. B. Stallo, Boeliff Brinkerhoff, Cox, and other prominent and known reform Republicans for support of a fusion ticket with Ohio's Democrats in the I 873 election which involved the choice of a govemor.^^ Cox, who wrote a letter of support for the August 5 Cincinnati convention, had some "doubts of the entire and fair committal of this new movement to 'our principles.'" He wanted no "dickering with the Democrats," and he and his friends would remain true to their

^®Ross, Liberal Republican Movement. 201-2. 358 principles no matter irtio was nominated, for their first objective mas the dissolution of the Democratic party.^9 This was not to come, for Judge Hoar's assertion to Coz that the political party "lines were not yet drawn there In Ohio with a precision which would allow you to feel quite comfortable on either side of them"^® came true irtien the two groups were unable to unite on a candidate. However the Independents' candidate. Judge Isaac Collins, did draw enough votes from the Republicans to allow , the Democratic standard- bearer, to win the governorship.

But by the time of the election Coz was so Involved In a new aspect of his many-sided career, one irtileh was not concerned with politics, that he had probably paid little attention to such political matters. The , the subsequent financial loss of his brother Kenyon's Wall Street firm , and h i s own p re s id e n c y o f th e Toledo^ Wabash^ and W estern Ballroad were his major ooncems after September, I 873. U n til l a t e 1876 his efforts to help his brother and to prop up the Wabash railroad during one of the worst financial depressions of American history were to take up all of his time.

This new position was far different from anything Coz had ever before attempted In the private sphere of his life. During his stay In Cincinnati since returning there after his

^^Coz to J. B. Stallo, August 3, 1873, Coz Papers. ZOg. E. Hoar to Coz, August 20, I873, Coz Papers. 359 resignation, most of his time had, of course, been occupied Kith his legal work, with politics mostly a sidelight. Be had also taken up where he had left off in March, 1869, a leader of Cincinnati society and education when he was appointed a trustee of the newly-founded University of Cincinnati in 1870. In that capacity he had become extremely active after 18?1, having been appointed to various trustee committees to work actively for the Ohio State Legislature's permission to issue bonds for the University's buildings^l and for the formation of a number of institutions of higher learning in the Cincinnati area into one composite university.22 He also was chairman of a committee on the University's plan of organization, and in 1872 gave that group's report to show the possible colleges which might join with the university their role within it. Because he was former superintendent of schools and a man deeply interested in education, Cox was chosen to devise the plan, irisich divided the university into ten schools. Ancient Literature, Modem Literature, Philosophy, Mathematics, Chemistry, Mechanics, Geology, Social Science, Law, and Medicine, under one general administration with each having a great deal of individual control. Farther, he recommended that the city high schools be upgraded and that their curricula be such that their graduates

21see Cox to Charles P. Taft, March 26, 1872. , 22g@e for example, Cox to D. Mendenhall. Dean of the Miami Medical College and Dr. Graham, Dean of the Ohio Medical College, May 31, 1872, Cox Papers. 360 would be prepared to begin Immediately work at the University.^3 This latter recommendation he was In the process of fulfilling through an arrangement with the Cincinnati Union Board of Elg^ Schools^^ when the financial problems of the entire country and of his family In particular forced him to leave this work, which he certainly found enjoyable, and to make a new life for himself and his family In Toledo, Ohio, as a railroad man.

The Immediate cause for that move must be traced back even further than the Panic of 1873* Ever since the end of the Civil War, the Treasury Department had been regulating the gold market with purchases and sales. Soon, when after each of a series of disturbances caused by such events as the Chicago Fire of 1871, the economic relapse of September, 1872, and the Credit Mobilier scandal, the government had stepped in and corrected each situation. It became an accepted practice. Such a situation would have been fine If the economy had been well-regulated, but In this age of Individual aggrandizement and caveat emntor. everyone did as he pleased. Part of the result was the extension of the railroads Into areas In which there were no people and the selling of series t^on series of

^^nlverslty of Cincinnati. Report of Committee on the University as to Plan of Ormsnlzatlbn. J1 P." Coz. Chairman.

24,See Coz to W. H. Oliver, June 7, 1873, and Coz to the Union Board" of— Elgdi -Schools, June - -20, , 1 IÔÔ7373, , 'Coz ' Papers. 361 railroad bonds to European bankers and entrepeneurs to pay debts. This practice had extended American credit to near the breaking point by 1871,25 and in that year Cox's brother Theodore, a member of the New York Stock Exchange and the Wall Street firm of Mason, Cox, and Smith, predicted that in such a system there was "only one way out—Euin. It was too late to p re v e n t i t . "26

That prediction came true in late 1873» The Credit Mobilier scandal had shaken the faith of many people in the railroad interests. Then irtien in July, the government decided to withhold the interest payments on Union Pacific coupons, the railroad bond business and the railroads in general received another heavy blow. All over the country the idea that the railroads had overextended themselves and that their bonds would soon be nearly worthless permeated every mind. As a result, a number of railroads began feeling the pinch and, even worse for the Cox family, so did the major holders of the deflated bonds, one of idiich was the firm of Kenyon Cox and Company. Soon after the New York Warehouse and Security Company suspended operations on September 8, I 873, Kenyon Cox's firm did the same. The closing of the doors of Jay Cookers Investment house, idiich held most of the stock in the Northern

Pacific Bailroad, ten days later on September 18, 1873, filled

^%!llis P. Obeiholtzer. Jav Cooke. Financier of the Civil War, (Philadelphia, I 907), il, W :l. ------26 (Theodore Cox to Cox, October 3, I871, Cox Papers. 362 the Stock Exchange with cries of ruin, and the prices on everything tumbled. Scores of firms folded in New York and elseiAere.^^ The era of speculation and deals and maneuvers, a ll of irtiich depended upon the stability of the country and the Stock Market, had thus ended idien the key lynchpins had fallen

out of place.

One of those lynchpins was the firm of Kenyon Coz and Company. Kenyon, who was Cox's oldest brother, had joined the Wall Street brokerage firm of Drew, Bobinson, and Con^any as a bookkeeper and accountant in the l850*s and eventually had become an equal partner with Nelson Bobinson after Daniel Drew, the notorious financial entrepeneur and operator, had left the firm. After the Civil War Kenyon became the sole owner of the firm (with Daniel Drew as his backer and silent partner) and changed its name to Kenyon Cox and Company, hiring his younger brother Charles as a bookkeeper. Their brother Theodore also lived in New York as a member of another brokerage firm, and the three were all fairly prosperous until I 873. In that year, when Daniel Drew's creditors tried to make him pay his debts, he had taken all his property out of his name. But this news leaked out and the creditors at once began foreclosure proceedings on Kenyon Cox and Company, idiose name had been signed to Drew's obligations. Its subsequent fall, along

^^Oberholtzer, Jav Cooke. II, 402-3, 420. ^®Bouck,White. The Book of Daniel Drew. (New York. 1910) , 4 0 3 -6 . ------3 6 3 vlth the rest, broiiggit forth the Panic of I 873 and a time of

tria l for Kenyon Coz.

Kenyon had earlier oonvineed his older brother, Jacob, to take an active interest in the Canada Southern Bailroad. That road, which had been laid out by Frederick Norton Finney, Coz's brother-in-law and a well-known engineer, ran from Buffalo to over a route through Ontario, Canada, the shortest distance between these two points. General Jack Casement, the old war and peacetime friend of Coz, had supervised most of the track-laying, the construction of idiich had been promoted chiefly by Kœyon Coz and Company. To make the road a profitable one, it was necessary that connections east and west from Detroit be arranged. The connection, that Casement as manager of the line, had arranged from Detroit to Toledo (where it oould connect with lines to the West) had to pass over land owned by the Toledo, Wabash, and Western Bailway. A permit by this road's manager had been granted for this purpose and also to allow a junction with its rails so that cars to and from the East could be transferred from one line to the other. This connection was so inQ)ortant that it was arranged that the major Canada Southern stockholders would buy as much stock in the Toledo, Wabash, and Western as they could and atteiQ)t to secure control. At a time iriien Cornelius Vanderbilt was attempting to buy up the same stock, he was foiled by the Canada Southern people, idio had secured control and had announced that a stockholders' meeting would be held 364 on October 1, 1873» In Toledo to elect non directors end to insure their hold on the c o m p a n y . ^9

The failure of Kenyon Coz and Company, uhioh came partially because of its inability to dispose of the vast amount of stocks and bonds issued to it by the Canada Southern Bailroad in exchange for liberal advances of money to build the road, caused the situation to change rapidly. «A. sharp contest to secure control of the stock for the election (of directors) between the Canada Southern interest, whieh had a majority of the board, and the Laûce Shore and Michigan Southern, which preferred not to lose the throufdi traffic contributed by the Wabash's system" seemed about to take p l a c e . 3^ The Canada

Southern, which was built for the through traffic and had little local traffic, would not last long without its connections, and so its owners pulled out all possible stops in efforts to retain control of the Toledo, Wabash, and Western. On September 26, 1873, Casement, manager of the road, wrote to Coz, "In these troublesome times I find myself somewhat cut off from the advice of my associates and am going it blind on my own hook. I therefore take the liberty of requesting your presence here £T ole^ at the election of the Wabash directors...I think it all-important to our interests and I will further state that could you be induced to accept the

^^Coehran, "Political Es^eriences," 1141-2. 3QBailroad Gazette. September 6, 1873, 365. 365

Presidency of the road it votild largely add to the pnhlic confidence in the concern and greatly enhance its Talneo**31

Coz, idio had, in 18?1, refused a like request from Casement, to run for Senator from Ohio, this time accepted the offer to be present at the October 1 meeting as the legal representative for the Canada Southern, undoubtedly because of his desire to help his brothers and because of the fair amount of stock he held in that railroad. Before the meeting the Lake Shore interests and the old owners (who previously had allied with the Lake Shore people and had given them links with the Wabash), represented by William Bamsey of Stanley Matthews* firm of Matthews and Bamsjey, had gott%. an injunction prohibiting the directors from rejecting the proxy votes held by them, many of which were picked up after the Panic had begun and some of idiich were given to them by people who had since died. But despite this legal maneuvering thé stockholders at the meeting, which was chaired by Coz as counsel and holder of the Canada Southern proxies, voted for the Canada Southern ticket by a vote of 76,179 to 63,647 shares. As a result, Kenyon Coz, Jack Casement, and Jacob D. Coz were named directors of the Toledo, Wabash, and Western Bailroad, and the Canada Southern control seemed complete.32

The embittered losers, who felt their interests had been shunted aside, decided to make trouble for the new directors by

33-John Casement to Coz, September 26, 1873, Coz Papers. 32cochran, "Political Experiences," 1143-4. 366 asking for Injnnotlons to prevent the new directors from taking office. However» after William Bamsey told the losers that such measures would be only teiqporary» would eventually be useless anyway, and would hurt the railroad immensely, they agreed to his suggestion that they should accept the results of the election if J. D. Cox were elected President and they were given a minority representative on the Board. When Coz was asked if he would accept, his perennial reluctance to accept a new position made him say he had had no such intention and that he would rather not. He then told Bamsey to see Casement and the other board members to see idiat they thought of the proposal. They were all in favor of the compromise to help the two railroads through this difficult time, and so they accepted the offer and persuaded Cox to take the new position. On the afternoon of October 1, 1873, Jacob D. Cox was elected by the Board of Directors as the

President of the Wabash B a i l r o a d . 33

Cox was someidiat dazed by a ll this, and even on October 6, he could say, "I have not had time to collect my thoughts enough to be entirely sure idiether I am pleased or not with the new position, but incline to the opinion that I shall like it v e ry m u c h . "3^ Even a few weeks later he oould say, "I have

33The Toledo Blade said of the new president, "He has filled many exalted positions in our state and has won a reputation.for financial and executive ability." (October 2, 1873, 3 ) . ^^Cox to Butherford B. Hayes, October 6, 1873, Cox P a p e rs . Hayes had w ritten Coz earlier telling him how gpLad he was Cox was to make Toledo his home and assuring him the new position would be more pleasant than the law, "idiioh, in these days, is dry straw." Hayes to Cox, October 3, I 873, Cox Papers. 367 become used to being surprised at my cun fate, and take It rather quietly, feeling a kind of third person's curiosity at looking on to see Tdiat Is to become of me.” He would have been quite content to remain as a lawyer, but the fact that ”since the active career of the past dozen years £h^ had little enthusiasm In the contests of the bar” made the decision easier. Now he could look forward to new work which was ”very attractive In Itself—It dealt with very large interests. It represented an Investment of #40 million, and It directly connected with the growth and prosperity of the country.” His position, though part of a complicated organization, would enable him to make himself felt through every part of It, would give him an assured salary, and would give him time for much leisure.35 Thus, all In all, the benefits of the position far outweighed the possible losses, and so he looked forward to the new job as yet another Interesting task ihloh duty had called him to.

When Coz took the Vabash presidency It was generally acknowledged that he would hold It for only a year or so until the depression could be overcome and the Toledo, Wabash, and Western once again began making a profit. Thus, when Coz returned to Cincinnati from Toledo after the meeting, he had a conference with his partner, John F.Follett (Burnett had retired in the spring of I 873 to take another position) and they agreed that Coz could stay In the firm for one year. To keep up appearances and to make It possible for Coz to return after a

p 35coz to James Nonroe, October 23, 1873, James Monroe "^apers, Oberlln College Archives, Oberlln, Ohio 368 year if he wanted to, Follett proposed that a new firm be formed in the name of Cox, Follett, and Cochran (Cox's stepson William Cochran who had studied law since leawihs the Interior D^artment) idiich would carry on business as before. This was done soon afterwards.3^ Then, having arranged for his family to move to Toledo in the spring of 18?4, Cox went back to that city to begin work as a railroad president.

The road he was to run had been one of the most prosperous and well-situated in the nation before the panic. It occupied a strategic location, reaching four gateways on the Mississippi: St. Louis,Hannibal, Quincy, and Keokuk. Its fre i^ t trade was enormous. Its route was the shortest from Toledo to Kansas and Missouri. It was the only railroad east of St. Louis idiioh reached the upper M ississippi and Toledo and the only

St. Louis road connecting with the Great Lakes east of C h i c a g o .

It stretched for 473.6 miles on the main route; it had 153*1 miles of consolidated roads under its control; and it operated six railroads under lease which stretched for 328.6 miles more. With a net worth of over $34 million and a yearly profit of a quarter of a million d o l l a r s , 38 the Toledo, Wabash, and Western Railroad was by far one of the grestest and most powerful systems in the c o u n try .

3^Cochran, "Political Experiences," 1146. 37julius Grodinsky, J a v Gould: His Business Career. 1867- 1892. (Philadelphia, 1957) ^®Henry V. Poor, Manual of the Bailroads of the United States for 1873-4. (New York, i87#),"4*8-j6d. 369

But the Fazilo had h it the ooiq>any quite hard. For the last three months of 1873 Its receipts fell off almost $300,000.39 In addition, as Cox found out on an inspection tour of the entire line he took from mid-October to November 12, 1873, extensive repairs and new passenger and freight equipment mere desperately needed and a strong effort had to be made to secure and pay the stockholders their dividends. Further he learned that some of the Wabash crossing agents had been bribed to divert traffic to competing lines. Also there mere many inept administrators of the road mho mere quite incapable of their jobs and mho had to be replaced. With so many problems and so little time to solve them, Cox decided that he mould have to remain as President for much longer than a year, and so in 187% iriien he moved his family to Toledo he expected to be there for quite a mhile.40

His major problem throughout his first year and a half mas "a large floating debt having to be carried through the mhole period from the summer of 1873*" Throughout this period the road*8 adm inistrators mere "struggling mith the problem of mhether 'good times' mould come soon enough to enable to avoid having to suspend operations for not being able to pay its bonded debt."^^ Further, because there mas a great decrease in the amount of traffic because of the Panic and the depressed

39ib id .. 187%-5# 561-2. ^^Cochran, "Political Experiences," 11%7. Cox to Monroe, April 8, 1875* Monroe Papers, Oberlin. 370 economy of the oonntry, that struggle became more and more a losing proposition. When the railroad published its annual report in 18?4, it noted a decrease in gross earnings of 19#, and a deficit of over #188,000.42 All over the country railroads were failing or suspending operations, and the Wabash, though still a strong line, was feeling the pinch of depression a s w e ll.

In such a situation, which was nearer to the desperation point than the public knew, the President and the directors decided that they had to act drastically. First they cut the salaries of all general officers by 20# and that of all other employees in proportion. Then they discharged six executives and gave the work of nine officers over to the President and two division superintendent s. 43 Soon they began to take the lead in some of the rate wars that their competitors had begun after the Panic in their desperate search for business. Attempting to capture all the traffic they could by reason of their road's strategic location, the Wabash gained more business, but also in the process hurt many of its eastern connections.44

But all of these efforts went for nau^t. The road continued to lose money and for one three-month period was unable

^^Bailroad Gazette. August 22, 18?4, p. 323. 43ib id . 44(jrodinsky, Jav Gould. 191. 371 to pay Its employeos.^^ In January, 1875, a general strike mas threatened all along the line hecause of the lack of pay and President Coz*s inability to keep his promise that ereryoae vonld be paid regularly.Then the fear that the end was near became a fact in February, 1875 when the coiq>any announced that unless the bondholders of the coa^any who held coupons which were to be cashed in during that month bought a new bond issue of $2.5 million instead of cashing in, the eon^any would be unable to pay them. Few of the bondholders had confidence in such a scheme and most were in need of money themselves, and so few bought the new bonds. As a result, the company had to announce that it would not pay its February o o u p o n s . ^ 7

This announcement could hardly have been unexpected. The company's net earnings had not increased in nearly eight years. Its fine position as the shortest line to the East from its stations had, in the past, given it a good income because lake shipping rates were h i^ . New that they were low, because of the Panic, the Wabash had to lower its rates also. "The new administration had made earnest efforts to reduce the expenses of the road, and probably had succeeded, but it was not enough to offset all of the other problems.

^%ee the Bailroad Gazette. November 7, 1874, 439» 46aailroad Gazette. January 23, 1875, 38. ^Tgailroad Gazette. February 6, 1875» 56. ^Bailroad Gazette. January 30, 1875, 46. 372

As Cox later admitted, "a large floating debt had had to be carried the whole period since the summer of 1873* We have been struggling with the problem whether good times would come soon enough to enable us to avoid that step, but the probable result has been known to a ll interested in the Boad, although for palpable business reasons we couldn't talk about it." ^

For once reality and economic necessity took precedence over honesty, but it is unlikely that Cox could have acted differently without risking an earlier demise of the road end a critical blow to the fortunes of his relatives and friends.

Cox, who had been reelected President in 1874, was not surprised idien, a few days after this announcement, the creditors and some of the stockholders brought suit in the United States Circuit Court of the Seventh D istrict for the appointment of a receiver for the line. The case was assigned to Judge Walter Q. Gresham, later Secretary of State, idio after a preliminary hearing, sent for Cox and asked if he would act as the receiver. He also asked Cox about the condition of the line and its debt structure. Then, deciding that he would appoint Cox, who accepted the offer, to that position for one year so he could see for himself idiat the prospects were and decide what would be done, Gresham ordered Cox to pay all claims for labor, materials and supplies famished prior to the new appointments.

^ C o x to Monroe, April 8, 1875» Monroe Papers.

^^Bailroad Gazette. March 6, 1875* 99* 373

This new position, Cox felt, would "he less full of anxiety than the old one," and whether the company "organized wnder a foreclosure or succeeded in getting the stockholders to raise enough money to pay off the debt," he felt he would be%ach less burdened with care than £h<^ was during the strug^e to avoid the crisis.51 He had been working with all his native powers of executive ability and intellectual prowess to find any honest way out of the dilemma into which the economic depression had thrown the country. He had shown an ability for the job, had made his leadership in company policy an accepted fact, and had had good relations with his employees. But all of those efforts would be useless unless the road and the nation were economically healthy. That was not so, and all of Cox's work proved fruitless. The cosQ)any would have gone under regardless of idio its president was, for its debts and lack of business could not be overcome. Cox had done his best, but that was not enough in a period of economic crisis.

During his tenure as receiver, Cox st^ervised the various means the stock and bondholders attempted to use to reorganize the oong)any and pay off its debts. The bondholders were the ones with the real power, and an attempted stockholders' meeting in May was held to consider ways in which the company could help them. But, only a few shares were represented and no action was taken. The bondholders, through their appointed committee then

^^Cox to James Monroe, April 8, 1875, Monroe Papers, Oberlin. 374 made a tour of the road, directed by Coz, and were satisfied with the condition of the property and the economy of its management But some of them, fearful that the road would collapse, were seeking to foreclose on the company to secure their payment. At the annual board meeting in Toledo, on October 6, 1875, Coz was reelected President (he was also reappointed as Receiver by Judge Gresham soon after), and resolutions were passed requesting the directors to procure a delay in these foreclosure proceedings until further consultation could be made between the stock and bondholders as to means for paying the debt.^G The bondholders weren't listening, however, end after the gold-bond (the richest) holders refused to follow up on an agreement made on November 4 to deposit their bonds in a New York bank fora certificate, they began foreclosure proceedings in mid-December, I 875.

This legal maneuver, which was granted in Ohio, but depended on concurrent decrees in Illinois and Maryland, provided for the sale of the whole road subject to all prior mortgages and at a price $1 million over the debts. A completely new ownership and organization of the cooq>any seemed about to take place. But the stockholders, who had a great deal to lose if this happened and who feared the company's sale would make it lose all the privileges its charter had given it, began getting together a fund to pay for the legal defense against the foreclosure of the

^^Bailroad Gazette. July 24, 1875t 3 1 1 . ^^Bailroad Gazette. October I 6, I 875, 432 . 375 gold-bond mortgage. But neither the Indiana nor the Illinois court recognized the stockholders as defendants, and both courts concurred in the Ohio decree of foreclosure. The case for the stockholders seemed to be lost.

Further efforts by them through meetings in Toledo also failed. On April 7, I 876, it was announced that President Coz had been appointed the Special Master Commissioner in charge of selling the railroad. He told the stockholders and bond ouners that the sale would take place on June 10, would include a ll the road and its joint branches, and all of its property, and would be sold only as a unit.^^ The sale took place as scheduled despite the attempts of the stockholders to block it, and John W. E llis of New York, the representative of the gold- bonders, bought the property for $2.5 m illion. That group then made arrangements with the stockholders to offer them the right to buy stocks in the new oon^any (called the Wabash Bailway) at a set rate, and in return the stockholders agreed to end the large number of suits they had brou^t against the new owners. On Januasy 1, 1877, the Receiver Coz, turned over the road and property to the Wabash Bailway Company, idiich was eventually to join other roads under the control of the infamous Jay Gould.

With this action, Coz's role as formulator of company policy ended. However, he did remain as "General Manager of the

^^Bailroad Gazette. February 11, I 876, 71.

^^Bailread Gazette. April 7, I 876, 156. 376

Wabash Railway and agent of the purchases 'until a cooqplete organization of the consolidated corporation was arranged. In this position he operated the road ‘until April, idien, as Coz had expected and hoped, the new owners appointed their own nan to the position. Thus ended Cox’s connection with the Wabash Bailroad, one that he had not wanted in the first place, but which he had accepted to help his friends and his brothers and to get into a more active life than the law offered. He had filled the posts of president and receiver as well as he cculd have, but the economic depression into which the nation had come had affected all businesses so greatly that he had very little chance to set things arigdit. While it is probable that he had somewhat enjoyed the challenge of trying to rescue the cozqiany, Cox was also quite glad to leave the railroad business and to take up a new position, in an old role, as a politician.

Before that new position can be discussed, some attention should be paid to two other roles Cox took on during his time in Toledo and to which he was to devote much of his leisure time and scholarly attention in the future. "It was about the time of

3^Circular issued by Cox as General Manager, as quoted in Bailroad Gazette. January 12, 1877» 20. 37He had been nominated and elected to a seat in the national House of Bepresentativee from the Toledo area district. See Chapter 17. He was probably even more glad to be out of the railroad business idien, in July, 1877, the first great American railroad strikes broke out all over the country. 377 his removal to Toledo that Cox became interested in and first adopted it as a recreation.. .In 18?4 he took up the subject of microphotography and in 1875 began a series of photo­ micrographs which were to make him famous throughout microscope circles around the world. His first article, entitled "M ultiplication by Fission in Stentor Nuclei," appeared in the May 1876 issue of the American N aturalist and was the beginning of an avocation idiich was to lead to Cox's writing of thirty-one other such articles and to his twice being elected President of the American Microscope Society.

Yet another avocation idiioh Cox began to pursue while in Toledo was a product of his historical sense and of the friendships he had made in Washington in 1869-70. As was noted before, when Cox gave his report as Ohio governor in 1868, he called for the preservation of as many documents from the war years as possible. He had, since 1864, been thinking of writing a general history of the Civil War. In Washington he had met and become friends with such leading figures as Henry Adams, E. L. Godkln, and W. P. Garrison. The last two, editor and literary editor of the Nation, the leading "liberal" and anti- Grant magazine in the oountry, decided that with the large number of books idiich were sure to be published about the Civil War in the years to oome, they would need a critic and book reviewer for that speoific type of work. As a result they chose an experienced

^^C. M. Vbrce, "Memoir of Jacob Dolson Cox," Tran«anti of the American Microscope Society. 2XII ( 1900) , 1 9 7 -8 . 378 w riter, war veteran, and leading publie figure—Jacob D. Cox, a man who agreed with their political philosophy of liberalism also—to do that job. Cox accepted, but he did no work for them u n t i l 1874, idien he was finally free from politics and was in the early stages of the Wabash Bailroad problems and was able to take advantage of some of the leisure he had. Although he did only three reviews from 1874 to I 877, each showed that Cox could be an incisive and knowledgeable critic of the many memoirs and histories the war veterans would eventually bring forth. Already by 1873, he could see the pattern of maligned generals defending every action they made, with no concern for self-criticism ; and he was always ready to point out the error in such defenses.59 From 1874 until a few months before his death in 1900 Cox was to w r ite I 6I articles and reviews for the Nation. In that time he came to be acknowledged as the leading m ilitary critic in the nation.

In this chapter six different types of activity which this many-sided man performed have been mentioned. Cox was a politician, a lawyer, an active university trustee, a microscopist, a m ilitary critic, and a railroad president. From 1877 on he was to act as all of them except the last. It was in this position that, for the first and only time in his life, Cox acted as a business executive. During his tenure as president of the Toledo, Wabash, and Western Bailroad, which he had begun only as a favor

^^See his review of Joseph E. Johnson, Narrative of M ilitary Operations, in the Nation, no. 464 (hay zl, 1074; , 333-4, and of W. T. Sherman’s Personal Memoirs, in the Nation, no. 519 (June 10, 1875), 397-9. 379 to his friends and relatives, the line had had to operate under the pressures of one of the greatest economic depressions the nation had ever undergone. During that time, the road, while gaining In the number of passengers carried (from 629#799

I n 1873 to 9 3 6 , 0 9 9 I n I B 7 6 ) , saw Its gross and net earnings drop every year from 1873 to 18?6. Signs of change were forthcoming In I 8 7 7 , however, irtxen, while the number of passengers dropped, the freight handled rose almost to idiat It had been In 1873 and both gross and net earnings r o s e . & D a combination of the slow return of the nation to economic stability, the confidence of the people In the new owners, who promised to pay all debts, and the end of the receivership all added to that result.

Both Coz's role In these developments and In company policy and his executive abilities are difficult to analyze. There are very few sources available on this part of his career, and those that are extant reveal little except that Cox did not want the job, ran It as well as he could, hid from the public the fact that the road was near defaulting, and. In general, received the respect of the road's employees. In such a situation one must base his analysis on iriiat can be surmised from the available m aterial, the economically depressed times, Cox's character, and his lack of experience In business enterprises. He knew only one way to approach any task—to absorb himself in It and do the best he could. In this case his approach was clearly not good enou^.

6 0 Poor, MftTinAi of the Bailroads. I878, 686-7. 380

Coz had been given the Jobs of President and Rebelver because of his accepted reputation as an honest and dedicated man. But thou^ he had helped the road in the beginning, Coz's lack of ezperienoe and proven ability as a railroad ezecutive kept him from ever being able to do anything about the road's failures. It is debatable if anyone could have done anything to reverse that fact because of the effects that the Panic had on all railroads, and especially on those with which, among others, Kenyon Coz was connected. The times were simply the wrong ones in which to give the reins of a great business to an inezperienced man. Perhaps this was the major mistake of the entire episode.

Nevertheless this circumstance was one with which Coz had to live and work. He and his fellow ezecutives tried various maneuvers to help the railroad, but in the end they all failed. So did Coz fail, for all of his efforts, idiether wise or not (his promise to pay the workers when he knew that to do so would be difficult at best m i^t fit into this category), did not reverse the downward trend of profits or stave off the receivership. But he was not deeply affected by it, for he probably realized by the beginning of I 877 t h a t he should never have taken the job in the first place. Besides, by then he had been elected to Congress and was looking forward to returning to polities, especially with the Hayes administration in the ezecutive department. Coz never specifically wrote of his reactions to his career as a railroad 381 man, but it can be conjectured that he did not look upon it as one of the hi(gü.i(^ts of his life. It had givoi him experience as an executive, it had shown him the trials and tribulations the workers endured in depressed times, and it gave him much knowledge concerning railroads. He would make use of all three in the near future. CHAPTER m i

the return to p o l it ic s

The retxim of Coz to an active national political role was a surprise to him and to the conntry. He had stayed in contact with his friends in the Liberal Republican movement thronggi occasional correspondence but in general had decided to take no active part in politics at all. He bad h i^ hopes of "avoiding the rank we [the Liberal Republican^ split on before and infusing honesty into our political action,but, he felt, he would not be the means to that end. The presidential election of I 876 seemed like a fine opportunity for the Liberals to achieve idiat they had missed in 1872, especially since Grant would not be a candidate again. Thus all of their plans now aimed at seeing that a reform candidate would be nominated by the Republicans. Coz was among those mentioned as a possibility, but he felt "there is no remote chance of my being offered the nomination."2 The party leaders, he felt, would "confine themselves to those 1A 0 have

^Coz to Carl Schurz, Carl Schurz Papers, February 23, 1875, Library of Congress.

2coz to James Monroe, April 11, I 876, Monroe Papers, O b e rlin .

3 8 2 383 been active in party work for the few years past...and even if it were possible, such a nomination would be a very d o u b tfu l b l e s s i n g . ”3 Thus, while he knew he wouldmt be nominated or even seriously considered, Coz s till hoped the party would reform itself from within.

The "Independents, " as many former Liberals were now called, were working toward that goal throu^out 1875-6. When Coz was in New York on business early in 1876, he talked with many of them and learned of their May 15, I 876 m eetin g at which a number of Republican candidates idiom they could support were named. , Hamilton Fish, E. B. Hoar, and others were mentioned, while Coz was talked of as a vice-presidential possibility.^ But while none of these were eventually accepted by the Republican convention of mid- June, the candidate it did nominate, Rutherford B. Hayes, was a pleasant surprise to Coz and the reformers. Coz and Hayes had been friends since I 86I when both had served in the Kanaidia Valley, and Coz knew that his friend had some proclivities toward reform. Thus he decided that this was an opportunity for honest government to prosper, and so he promised Hayes that he would do whatever he could for him.

Among the first things Coz did for Hayes was give him some friendly advice. He told Hayes* "In New York I met

3coz to J. A. R. Rogers, May 31, I876, Coz Papers. ^Coz to Monrou, May 23, I876, Monroe Papers, Oberlin. 384 every day nxuaibers of Influential business men, and amidst almost universal content and satisfaction with the result of the convention, I found one question put so eaznestly that I think It a feeling of all the best class of citizens. It was *Can Hayes free the Presidency from the management and control of the "Machine Politicians"*? I plead the privilege of an old friend to suggest that the campaign w ill have tireless efforts to put you under obligation to the politicians and tie your hands In advance. You w ill get the cheerful and disinterested support of the real reformers without pledges or committals."3 Clearly Coz felt that what he and his friends had lost In 18?2 could be salvaged througdi Hayes, If he were properly advised.

For this reason for the first time in three years Cox was enthusiastic about politics, and he now took an active role In political campaigning. At a local "ratification of Hayes" meeting of the Toledo Republicans, Cox was onq of the major speakers. He was "listened to with Intense Interest as many were Interested to see and learn his relation to the coming canvass and to discern the degree of attachment to the cause he should m anifest.. .he favored both the candidates and the platform emphatically," and felt the party "was entering a new era." His "sinewy, well-constructed discourse forcibly

^Cox to B. B. Hayes, June 20, 18?6, Cox Papers. Hayes answered: "I am Inclined to say something that will hint at least In the direction you suggest. It is probably the only topic which I shall add to the platform." Hayes to Cox, June 23, 18?6, Cox Papers. 385 presented the old Ideal of the Bepubllcan party and his desire for honest and conqpetent men in goTemment* The speech did not arouse the listeners to Tooal enthusiasm, but it did better--it stirred up a sense of duty as a citizen.

Apparently it did the same for Coz, for he now felt that althou^ he "didn't know how much time j^e woul^ be able to give to politics," he would do idiat he could quite heartily, He began by "obeying the injunction 'attend the primaries' and was made chairman of ^what he felt wa^ the most numerous and ezcited primary meeting ever held in Toledo. It began at 8 and the ballotting closed at 12:45" and Coz kept it orderly. This chairmanship and Coz's renewed political activity made many feel that he would be a proper Republican candidate for the House of Representatives. He had been appealed to by some of the local party leaders, but he had refused the offer. Nevertheless, he knew that some of his friends still said that the August l6 congressional convention might put him in the position of being forced to run or refuse the unanimous offer of the candidacy. But he felt it was hardly likely that they would do so. Coz would have been ^Lad to be a candidate, but since his railroad salary would soon be cut off, he felt it would be best to return to Cincinnati and reestablish his law practice before thinking of public work again. Politics was to be put off until the future, if at all.

^Toledo Blade. June 24, IB 76, 4 . 7Coz to James Monroe, August 14, I 876, Monroe Papers, O b e rlin . 3 8 6

But even as he wrote these words processes were In motion to replace these plans with those of a political nature. On August 14> the Toledo Blade, the local Republican organ, printed a headline on its editorial page which said "General Jacob D. Coz for Congress." The accompanying article said that if Coz were nominated, "he would bring harmony to the party." Coz had said that he would take the nomination if it were not gotten from any special interest. In addition, the article asserted that if Coz were elected, he would "at once take a leading and influential place in Congress and his nomination w i l l command r e s p e c t ( f o r T oledo) in a l l p a r t s o f th e country."®

This article, idiich surprised everyone, including Coz, who had not really been very active in local Republican circles, came as much as a result of a genuine desire to see a man of Coz*s stature representing the district as out of a desire to bring harmony back to the local party organization. I n 1874 the candidacy of General Isaac R. Sherwood, idio had been nominated for Congress and had won the seat in I 872, had been rejected by the party convention in 18?4. In reaction he and his supporters had turned against the party candidates and had supported the Democratic nominee, Frank Hurd, lAio was subsequently elected. In I 876 the Sherwood forces were again seeking the nomination for their man, but the party had split ever letting him back in and it now

^Toledo Blade. August I k , I876, 2. 387 seemed that the result would be the same as in 1874 if this were done, for many party regulars wanted nothing to do with Sherwood. It was in this tense situation that the suggestion that Coz be nominated as a compromise candidate was put forth as a means of bringing the party back together again. The "response entirely favorable" idiich met this suggestion seemed to bide well for the hopes of the compromisers.^

When the convention met, on August l6, it went immediately to the business at hand. The first candidate nominated was John Spillane and the second was Sherwood. The third was Coz, at the announcement of whose "name, the convention broke out into the wildest applause, which lasted f o r some minutes.After Coz was nominated. Wager Swayne, a good friend of his, rose and read Coz’s letter to him outlining his position on the nomination. Coz wrote that he did not want to accept the nomination and hoped that someone else would win it. He would not enter into a contest for the nomination and would not work actively for it. However, he would acc«q)t it if the whole convention concurred in it.^^

His characteristic reluctance and belief in the mazim that the office seeks the man and never vice versa had made him

^Toledo Blade. August 15, 187v, 2. For an account of Sherwood's career see Francis P. Weisenburger, "Gaieral Isaac B. Sherwood," H istorical Society of Northwestern Ohio Quarterly B ulletin. XIV <19^2^. 42-^4. ^^Toledo Blade. August l6, 1876, 3.

^^Cochran, "Political Ezperiences," 1151. 3 8 8 take a typically aloof stand on this chance to reenter p o l i t i c s .

Apparently it was the ri^ t kind of stand to take. On the first ballot Coz received 42 votes, with Sherwood getting 56 and Spillane 52. On the second Coz junked into the lead, receiving 64, with Spillane second at 58 and Sherwood trailing w ith 4 9. At this point Sherwood*s name was withdrawn, and almost all of his votes went to Coz on the third ballot. The results of that count were 102 for Coz with 53 for Spillane, but before this was announced Spillane*s name was withdrawn and a motion to make Coz's nomination unanimous was accepted by the wildly-cheering throng.With that a delegation was sent to Coz to tell him the result and to ask him to come to the hall. He came soon after and accepted the nomination as a genuine call for his services. He went on to praise the Republican presidential nominee as a man and a statesman, and he called on the local party to give Hayes all the support it could muster. He then left the stage, with the applause of the delegates ringing in his ears, probably already making plans as to his upcoming campaign.

Those plans were in part molded by the fact that Coz did not "know the people \]t)here very well." Thus it was

^^oledo Blade. August I 6, 18?6, 3. 389 necessEtry that he w*ork hard and show jh l^self at as many places as possible. **^3 Another factor, the emergence of the greenback issue in the campaign, alsc molded Coz*s plans by making him speak out cn his financial views, many of which were contrary to those held by most orthodox Bepublicans. A third factor idiich made his campaign what it was was the fact that he was a nationally-known and popular candidate who had already made a reputation as an upright and honest political leader. Thus he did not have to speak to local or district Issues very much or attack his opponent directly, but could rely on an approach which touched almost wAiolly on national concerns and issues in which he was interested.

He gave little direct attention to his opponent, Frank Hurd, the incumbent Congressman. Hurd was an anamoly. Ever since I 873 the Ohio Democracy had strongly endorsed Pendleton's "Ohio Idea" and had endorsed greenbacks and inflation. Hurd was a believer in the old Democratic maxims of hard money, and his campaign in 1874 had side-stepped the issue so that the greenback-favoring voters (there were many) in the district would not vote for his opponent. This maneuver had worked then because of the split in B^ublican ranks (the area was traditionally Bepublioan), but 1876 was a new s to r y .

^^Cox to Garfield, August 21, I 876, Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. ^^atrick Falk, "'Our Frank' : The Congressional Career of Frank H. Hurd, I 872-I 886," (unpublished master's thesis). University of Toledo, 1968, 60- I , 66. 390

In that election campaign Surd» seeing that the Bepublicans were united once again and that Coz was not going to be as extreme a hard money man as he expected, said that the H^ubllean party had debased and Inflated the curr

Cox probably helped that result by his fine campaign work. His district, which contained six extreme-northwestern

Ohio counties (Lucas, Williams, Henry, Pulton, Wood, and Ottawa), also had a great number of small towns, with Toledo the only city of any size In the area. As a result Cox had to travel, as was the custom of the day, to as many of these small villages as he could to reach much of the populace.

l ^ I b l d . . 67. 391

Conten^ozary Accounts show that he visited such Ohio communities as Stryker, West Unity, Pioneer, Montpelier, Edgerton, Delta, and Chesterfield in his search for votes

Unfortunately, none of the speeches he gave at these towns are preserved because Coz was not a believer in written speeches, preferring to give them completely ezten^oraneously. In that way he could sense the feelings of his audience and know the issues they wanted to hear about.

Fortunately, one speech has been preserved, the one with which Coz opened the campaign in Toledo. On August 28, 1876, before a large crowd at the Toledo Opera House, Coz spoke of his candidacy and the issues before the people. He began by repeating the fact that the office had called him and that he had not sought it. He then promised to look after the interests of his constituents as well as to devote his attention to national issues. Nezt Coz praised the Republican party as the only one which could be trusted, while the Democrats could not be because they had not supported the war, (a typical Republican charge). He praised Governor Hayes and the presidential nominee*s avowal of civil service reform in his acceptance letter as a step toward ending government corruption and making government into more of a business. He then touched on the crucial issue of greenbacks and pzbved that the Democrats had changed their policy on it over the

^^See the Toledo Blade. September I 3 , I 876, 2 , and The Brvan (Ohio) Press. September 7, I 876, 2 . 392 years lAille the Republloans had been oonslstent. After advocating a return to bimetallism# he told his audience that the best way to return to specie payments, was the one the British used in 1819» gradually retiring greenbacks and bonds so the country's businesses could adapt more e a s i l y . ^ 7

While Coz was campaigning on these stands on the important issues of the day, the Democrats, seeing that Coz had taken their prime issue from them, were forced to attack Coz himself. His "accidental" residence in the district and his position as the Wabash president and receiver led to his being nicknamed "The Gilded Carpet Bagger" in the Democratic organs. They also charged that his campaign was being financed by Wabash Bailroad funds and assessments on Republican office-holders. They sought to attain as large a German bolt from the Republicans as had occurred in 1874 by reprinting Coz's old speeches made in Warren in favor of prohibition.

The Republicans in turn contrasted Coz's enviable war record with Hurd's as a known Copperhead and accused Hurd of being a bourbon reactionary. Such tactics and Coz's popularity were apparently doing their work, for on September 18 Coz could say "Everything looks encouraging. There is

1 7 j. D. Coz, CaaQ>aign Speech, Toledo Opera House, August 28, 1876, Manuscript in Coz Papers.

18Falk, "Our Frank", 73-4. 393 perfect harmony in this district and outside Toledo the Greenbackers had also nominated a candidat^ have no vitality. I should have a 1200-1500 majority. ”^9 By «sarly

October the result seemed clear, and on October 11 the results showed that Coz had reversed Hurd's margin of victory in 1874 (1.837) and defeated him by 1,915 (17,276 to 15.361), the largest margin ever recorded in that district. All across Ohio the Republican party did well, and its Congressional representation was now twelve compared to the Democrats eiggit.^^ Such men as Garfield, James Monroe, Charles Foster, William McKinley (another first-term er like Coz and also a Civil War veteran who, like Hayes, had served under Coz) and Coz were now going to represent Ohio in one of the most turbulent and important Congresses of the post-bellum era.

Coz spent the time between the Congressional and presidential elections of November campaigning in Ohio for Hayes, hoping that since the voters had "increased the right kind of membership in Congress," they mig^t also have "set in motion a tidal wave destined to overflow the country" and e l e c t H ayes.H e gave siz campaign talks, mostly in the northern part of Ohio, and did his best to aid Hayes's cause.

^^Coz to Garfield, September 18, I 876, Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 20smith, Ohio Bepublicans. I, 365. 21j. D. Coz, campaign speech, October 19. I 876, T oledo, as quoted in the New York Times. October 23, I 876, 2 . 3 9 4

But he had some fears about this election, for he knew that the Democrats held control of the solid South and If they gained only a few Northern states they could put Samuel Tllden Into the presidency. Thus he campaigned that much harder to assure that Hayes won Ohio.

He was successful In contributing to this goal, although just barely, for Hayes won Ohio by only 7,000 votes. But, by the time the early returns were In, It became obvious that It would be a close race In the country as a whole and that Tllden had a very good chance to win. To Cox It looked like the end of Republican power. He wrote Monroe, "Our forebodings are only too well founded! The Bepublloan party Is to test the uses of adversity. It looks as If the Democratic majority w ill be kept and two of the three departments of government w ill be In their hands."22 He

changed this ominous early view, however, when the m atter of the disputed electors In Louisiana, South Carolina, Oregon, and Florida came up and seemed to give Hayes a chance to win after all. He now hoped "that a perfectly fair canvassing of the returns would...elect Hayes." But he contended that this had to be done In an open and honest way for, he felt, the "Republicans would rather be beaten than succeed by the assumption of a single doubtful fact."23 xf these principles

^^Coz to Monroe, November 8, 1876, Monroe Papers, O b e rlln . ^^Coz to L. A. Sheldon, Noveiober 13, 1876, Coz Papers. 395 were followed, Cox was sure, Hayes wotCLd win, and if so, be promised the latter all of his help in leading the govexnment toward reform.

Even though Coz favored Hayes, he was s till very maeh of an independent Republican. As the confusion arising from the disputed election rose and threatened to throw the country into civil war once again, Cox viewed the situation quite im partially. He knew that each party saw only its own side, while ignoring, on the Democratic side, the intimidation of Negro voters, and on the Republican side, eight years of misrule and corrupt carpetbagger government. The Republicans had the better argument but still, Cox felt, it might be best "if the Republicans not take office, become the opposition, and set an example of honesty rather than taking power under such circumstances £frauds in the Louisiana returns") and risk further revolution. " The inauguration of Tilden would be the lesser of two evils. It would not be wholly right, but it would be best for the nation's internal security.

Not many other Republican party leaders felt likewise, and their efforts to secure victory for Hayes began to center around having the president pro tem of the Senate who, according to the constitution, was supposed to open the electoral votes,

^^Cox to R. B. Hayes, November 14, 18?6, R. B. Hayes Papers, Hayes Memorial Library, Fremont, Ohio

23cox to Theodore Cox, December 11, 18?6, Cox Papers. 396 also count them. Since the incumbent in that office, Senator Martin W. Ferry, of Michigan, was a Bepublican, it was assumed he would count only the Bepublican votes from the disputed states and declare Hayes elected. The Democrats, knowing they could not win if this were done, offered a compromise plan in which a commission of five representatives, five senators, and five Supreme Court Justices would decide on each disputed vote. Many Bepublicans did not want to take this risk while giving up a sure thing, but it is likely that the fear of revolution or disorders helped lead them to accept the oon^romise. Then, when it happened that the Bepublicans were an e i^ t to seven majority on the electoral commission, thus assuring Hayes * s election, they were even more sure that they had acted c o r r e c t l y .

Meanwhile the future President, confident that he would be elected fairly, had been going about the business of forming his Cabinet and asking for advice as to the policies his administration should follow. On the former question one of the most prominent advisers was Coz, who consulted with Hayes on January 17, 1877 about his Cabinet c h o i c e s 2 6 and l a t e r accepted an invitation from Hayes to advise him and give him information in regard to certain policies and individuals.^7

^^Charles Bichard William, editor. Diary and Letters of Butherford Birchard Hayes, (Columbus, 1922-b), ill, January " 17, 1877, 402. ^7carl Schurz to Cox, January 30, 1877, Bancroft, Schurz Papers, III, 380. 397

In this regard he gave Hayes his opinion on the "Southern question," which was to assure stable government there by returning power to the respectable iriiltes while helping the Negro gradually to gain social and political rights.28 also advised Hayes not to take General James H. Van Alen of New York or Senator Justin M orrill of Vermont Into the Cabinet and to move toward specie resumption gradually, as the British had In 1819.29 in addition he endorsed a letter from William Grosvenor which the latter had written Cox In praise of Carl Schurz as a fine choice for Hayes's Cabinet, saying that he (Cox) agreed that Schurz would be valuable In a Cabinet position.30 in each of these matters Hayes followed

Cox's advice and on one of them, as he wrote Cox, "of the Southern question your views and mine are so nearly the same that If called on to write down a policy I could use your language."31

The fact that Hayes got to use this advice as President came about because of the famous Coa^romlse of 1877. Hayes's friends and advisors had agreed that (although the President hadn't) as President Hayes would take all

^®Cox to B. B. Hayes, January 31, 1877, Hayes Papers, Frem ont.

29cox to E. B. Hayes, February 19, 1877 and February 20, 1877, Cox P a p e rs.

30willlam Grosvenor to Cox, February 22, 187? and Cox to H. B. Hayes, February 24, I 877, Hayes Papers, Fremont. 3^H. B. Hayes to Cox, February 20, 1877, Cox Papers. 398

federal troops out of the South, be less concerned with Negro rl^ ts , appoint a Southerner to the Cabinet, and aid Southern business. In return the Tilden men were to accept Hayes* election and not prevent his taking office by a Congressional filibuster. In this way this most prolonged and dangerous struggle over the question of the presidency was solved, to the detriment of certain segments of the populace, but to the end that all chances for a return to war as a means of solving constitutional questions were stopped.3%

The new President, idio came under attack as soon as he took office because of his conciliatory Southern policy, began formulating his policies and his plans for the next Congressional session soon after he took office. As was true before the inauguration, he continued to seek the advice of his former army commander, Jacob D. Coz. In late June, Coz met Hayes and his Secretary of State, William Evarts, and the Secretary of the Interior, Carl Schurz, and "told him £^yei^ that he must adopt a principle as to removals and appointments Tdiich could distinctly be formulated." Coz said that Hayes must "shear his and our /Oongressionall offices of patronage as a power for political or personal purposes."33 The President had earlier reiterated his espousal of Coz*s ideas

3^See C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstraction. (Boston. 19^i) f 31-201, for a complete treatment of this topic.

33coz to Garfield, July 23, 1877» Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 399 on the "Southern question," of uhioh, he said, Cox "was such a master," and had asked for a talk with Coz on the civil service reform.3^ Coz had obliged with a letter to the President, summarizing his views on the question and calling for a radical change In the entire system.35 Coz was to continue In this role as an adviser throughout much of his term in Congress.

But most of his time In the days between the Inauguration and the beginning of the Congressional session (on October 15) was spent In discussing the probable Issues which the session would bring up and defining his stands on them. The country at that time was still In the depths of economic depression, and there were many people, especially In the West, ifeo were calling for an Inflated currency or at least the remonetization of silver to help ease their burdens. Coz, who had always been an economic conservative, had changed his mind somewhat on this Issue during his tenure as a railroad president. He had seen what economic dislocation could do to business and labor and he now began to feel that the government had "no right to demonetize either of the metals [^Iver and gol^ [Oliver had been demonetized by the Coin Act of 187^ which custom had flzed for money. "36 He

B. Hayes to Coz, June 4, 1877 1 Coz Papers. 33coz to E. B. Hayes, June 5, 1877, Hayes Papers, Frem ont.

3^Coz to S. D. Horton, June 8, 1877, Coz Papers. 400 now favored bimetallism when and if an international agreement as to the relative value of the two metals could be made. He felt that debts which had been made in silver would not justly be paid in gold, and so a dual system under careful controls was the best answer.3?

Another issue, one on which Coz had a chance to speak publicly, which was a matter of great public concern in mid- 1877, was the great railroad strike. Although Coz no longer had any connection with the Wabash Bailroad, he knew of the problems it and the nation* s other lines had been having with labor and with their efforts to stay solvent. When, in late July, 1877» railroad workers began leaving their jobs and perpetrating violence in many areas of the country in protest over wage cuts and poor conditions, the state governors and President Hayes had reacted by sending in troops to keep order. These tactics had worked, but had left in many workers a feeling of resentment at the lack of concern by government and the public for the low wages and poor conditions under idiich many of them had to work.

One person who did ezpress some concern and landerstanding was, surprisingly, former governor and railroad president Jacob D. Coz. In a speech to the men of Lane Seminary in Cincinnati, Ohio, Coz said, "To the poor and industrious working men, the condition of human society is

3?Coz to Garfield, July 23, 1877» Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. 401 apt to seem a 'muddle'. The distribution of gains seems strangely unequal. His solutions seem revolutionary to those building their prosperity on the status quo who dread change. The grinding con^etltlon of trade had, In many classes of work, reduced the wages of labor to the point where a bare existence for one's family Is all that can be gotten. So class distinctions are becoming more and more between the rich and the poor." The capitalistic system, he said, was producing uncontrollable monopolies and losing a ll Its elements of humanity and generosity while becoming a fierce and destructive struggle. This evil turn of events would continue and even grow worse until, Cox felt, some counter force was developed which could return economic matters to a more humane operation. One such possible force, he thought, was beginning to form already In labor unions, and he saw a good future for them. It was this force and Its exact opposite, unbridled lalssez-falre, which had to meet and mingle and restrain one another and come forth with a more agreeable and fair economic system. "Conscience and right demand," Cox asserted, "that the humblest member of any community be assured he Is not left naked to his enemies In the struggle for life." If this were the case, the only result could be eventual revolution. Both sides had to be heard, r^resented, and protected, and take part In the declsion-making. There could be, he felt, no alternative but c h a o s .3®

D. Cox, "The Relation of Educated Men to the Problem of Capital and Labor," Cincinnati, Lane Seminary, . 1877, Manuscript In Cox Papers. 402

The dissension between capital and labor was to continue for many years after this first great strike was ended, a few days after It began; but Cox was to give little more attention to It In the future. Instead he turned once again to politics. After playing a leading role with his friends James A. Garfield, Charles Poster, and Stanley Matthews

In steering the Ohio Republican convention of 18?7 Into adopting a slightly Inflationary platform, 39 Cox set out to campaign for William West, the Republican candidate for governor, in his Congressional district. Unfortunately for West and Cox, the latter* s hope, "I am very hopeful of satisfactory results,”^ did not come true. West's catering to the railroad strikers In a campaign speech In Cleveland, In Tdilch he called for minimum wages, fixed rates, and profit-sharing, lost him a large number of votes. In October, he and the rest of the Republican ticket were soundly defeated.

Cox felt there was yet another reason for this defeat— the already growing unpopularity of President Hayes. As early as July 30, Cox's old friend Garfield was disappointed with Hayes' policy on civil service reform. He told Cox, '*You and I were among the earliest to urge civil service reform. We can't afford to see the movement made a failure by Injudicious management...He fHayesl has appointed friends and

^^Smlth, Garfield. Life and Letters. II, 655»

^Cox to R. B. Hayes, August 25, 1877, Cox Papers. 403 friends of friends, removing worthy men for no reason. Cox apparently felt the same way, end told Garfield, **We can't can^aign on the basis of his record, but we rather need a policy.”^2 Coz had tried to cover over Hayes's seemin&Ly poor record and a main reason for the President's unpopularity, his Southern policy, in his own campaign speeches by, first, pointing out that Oberlin men then in the South favored Hayes's policy there, and, secondly, spending most of his time on other issues such as the currency, civil service reform, and the labor question.

Both Cox and Garfield were probably too harsh in their criticism of Hayes's civil service reform policies. Cox was an uncompromising idealist, failing to recognize the force of the patronage demands of Republican leaders idio thwarted civil service reform efforts. Garfield's bitter attitude, moreover, was probably due in some degree to Hayes's refusal to follow some of Garfield's patronage requests.^ Present day historians, therefore, have generally paid tribute to Hayes's courage in appointing Carl Schurz, an outstanding civil service

^^Garfield to Cox, July 30, 1877, Garfield Papers, Library of Congress.

^^Cox to Garfield, September l6, 1877» Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. ^3see his campaign speech, September 8, 1877, Toledo, Ohio, Manuscript in Cox Papers.

^A llan Peskin, "Garfield and Hayesi Political Leaders of the Gilded Age," Ohio History. XXVIII (Winter, Spring, Summer, 1968), 116-121. 404 reformer, to his Cabinet and In opposing the patronage demands of Republican stalw arts like Boscoe Conkllng of New York. Thus, three noted historians have recognized Hayes's bold efforts to Improve the standards of public service but have sensed the hard realities which the President faced: "the hardnose antipathy of such Republicans as Conkllng to honest administration was enough to forestall all Hayes's efforts to get Congress to enact a permanent civil service aot."^^

On October 13, a few days before the 45th Congress was to begin an early session because the 44th had not made the usual appropriations for the support of the army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 18?8, Coz and Garfield decided to do something about what they felt was endangering the party— Hayes's unpopularity. They, along with their fellow representatives James Monroe and Charles Foster, visited Hayes In the hope that they could shake him from the con%)lacency Into which they felt he had settled. They hoped to show the President how to retrieve his popularity through energetic leadership. Unfortunatmly, as Garfield put It, "Hayes's slz months administration partially blinded the President to the dangers and criticism of his course. It seems to be Impossible for a President to see through the atmosphere of praise In which he lives."^6 Thus nothing was done, for the

^^Rlchard Hoftstader, William M iller, and David Aaron, The American Republic. (Englewood C liffs, , 1963), I I , 100. ^^As quoted In Smith, Garfield, Life and Letters. II, 657. 405

President coTild not see (as his predecessor was also tuaable to) his mistakes and so would not and could not correct them* In this situation Coz could look forward only to helping Garfield and the other Republican congressional leaders to put forth as much good legislation as they could without

substantial Presidential aid.

On October 15, 1877, the first session of the 45th Congress opened in the House with the election of the Speaker* According to the Compromise of 1877, the House was to have been administration-run by organizing It by making Garfield Speaker with the support of at least nine Southern Democratic votes* But none switched, and the vote, a stralgdit party one, gave the Speakership to Samuel Randall of Pennsylvania with l49 votes over Garfield, who had 132*^7 The next few days were taken up with routine business while the caucuses of the two parties considered the major legislation each might

p r e s e n t.

On October 31 the first such legislation was offered by Representative Richard Bland. His b ill, idiloh called for the free coinage of silver and Its use as legal tender, was the most Important measure of this Congress. After a few days of heated debate on it, which excited a great deal of controversy because of Its Inflationary basis at a time when many felt a monometallic (gold) standard was the only way to

^7woodward, Reunion and Reaction. 230* Further breaches In that agreement, these by President Hayes, followed soon after. 4o6 deter inflation, was passed by the House overwhelmingly and was sent to the Senate. Coz went along with the majority because of his belief that debts contracted on a silver basis should be paid the same way and that this b ill was conservative enough to satisfy everyone while being preferable to the wild experiments some Congressmen were considering.^^

Then, probably because of their exaltation at passing the Bland b ill, the soft money forces tried to repeal the specie resumption act of 1875 In order to keep this deflationary measure from fulfillm ent. Cox spoke In opposition to this move, saying that resumption had to come soon and would be best done by following a plan he was offering In an amendment lAilch would do so gradually, Increasing the value of the paper dollar by one percent a year until It was at par, In 1881.^

^Hen]^ Adams, along with the rest of his Washington group, were shocked and astonished at Cox*s backing of the "silver mania" and his reversal of opinion. See Ernest Samuels, Henry Adamst The Middle Years. (Cambridge, 1958), 17. It was yet another example of Independent thinking on Cox's part and was regarded by many as proof that President Hayes, his old Ohio friend, felt the same way about silver. ^ J . D. Cox, "Eepeal of the Resumption Act," speech in the House of Representatives, November 7, 1877, Manuscript In Cox Papers. Irwin Unger said of Cox during this time: was "the most articulate of this group {Western bim etalllstsj supporting specie restuq>tlon but convlnceoT that If done In gold alone would cripple commerce and Industry. {He)believed that without remonetization resun^tlon would be defeated and the forces of 'Communism' released." Thus he worked closely with and "used" men like Ben Butler and , who supported remonetization but also would have gone much further In Irresponsible remedies for the nation's Ills to assure that only a moderate b ill would be passed and that other "wild schemes" were thwarted. See Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American Finance, 1665-I 879. (Princeton, 1964), 355. 407

But this amendment was defeated (the repeal b ill passed, but not In the Senate), and the act of 1875 remained In effect*

The rest of the session was uneventful, with the Army Appropriations B ill being passed easily. It was during the debate over this measure. Immediately after Cox had called for granting to the Cabinet the privilege of speaking personally to Congress so It could gain authentic official Information about matters under their consideration, that a humorous Incident took place. S. S. "Sunset" Cox, a former Ohio and now a New York Congressman rose and said, "My namesake from Ohio has revived an old proposition which at one time I had

the honor to defeat....Now, for fear the Hr. Cox of Ohio may be mistaken for me, as I notice I was very much vituperated In a Cincinnati Republican paper for offering a fiscal measure and making an admirable speech In Its support, which my honorable friend and namesake himself made, and as the New York Evening Post has attributed to my humble self all the gentleman’s rare skill in finance and far reaching understanding of such recondite topics, I feel reluctant to speak unless our views are the same."^^ But he went ahead and spoke In opposition anyway, and his position prevailed.

The second session of the 45th Congress began just after the first ended, on December 3, 1877. Its first few days were again taken up with routine matters, and Cox’s only major

50Congresslonal Record. 45th Congress, F irst Session, November 10, 1877, 332. 408 function during that time was to give a report on a disputed election in Colorado as a member of the Committee on Elections (the only one of which he was a member).A few days afterward Congress adjourned for the Christmas recess, and Cox went hom to Toledo to v isit his family and to look over the political situation in his district. Apparently he was not too happy with what he found. He learned that Hayes was becoming less popular than ever there and that the evidence seemed "to point to the dissolution of the party and the slow building up of a party of reform," This, the fact that he had been a reluctant candidate for office in the first place, and his inability to pay his expenses on his low ($3,000) salary made him think twice about running again. His discovery that he was not going to be too effective a voice in changing the course of the nation in the House because of his lack of influence and seniority, and that in his district "what with Greenbackers, laboring men, and the roughs of Toledo," he felt he could not win in I 8 7 8, convinced him to "preemptorily refuse to be a candidate" and to shape his plans to go back to Cincinnati to resume his law practice,52 Because of that decision the Congressional phase of Cox's career was to end when his first and only term in Congress came to an end,

^^Congressional Record. 45 th Congress, Second Session, December 1 3 , 18^7, I 89- 9 1. ^^Cox to Monroe, December 31, 1877, Monroe Papers, O b e rlin . 409

But he still had much important work to do in the second session. The month of February, 18?8 saw the return of the Bland free coinage of silver act from the Senate with amendments (made by Senator William Allison) lim iting the amount of silver to be coined to between two and four million dollars a month and calling for an international conference to set the relative values of gold and silver. Both amendments were accepted by large m ajorities in the House (Coz in favor), and so the Bland-Allison Act, the first large-scale attempt to inflate the currency through silver coinage, was sent to President Hayes, whose December 3i 1877 message to Congress had opposed such a measure. He vetoed the b ill, but on February 28 it re-passed the House by a vote of 196-73-23 and the Senate by 43-19,^3 and it became law in March, 18?8. The moderates, led by Coz, Foster and Monroe, had made the passage and overriding of the veto possible54 ighile holding the line against ezperiments which might be too dangerous for the economy. It was by far the most is^ortant task Coz had performed during his Congressional tenure.55

^^Congressional Record. 45th Congress, Second Session, February ZW, 187?. ^^nger. Greenback Era. 364. 55ne had felt that it was **absolutelv necessary to settle this question now in favor of bimetallism, for it is the only way we can resist the >fiat> money men like Butler and Ewing. " He now claimed ^to have saved the world from a financial revolution irtiich would bring other revolutions in its train." Coz to David A. Wells, February 28, 18?8, Coz P a p e rs. 410

The rest of this session was devoted to ordinary business, with Coz backing such measures as an investigation of all ezecutive department members of the past (because, as he said, "I am the only member of the floor against idiom this resolution could possibly be directed,"^6 and he felt his record was clean). and civil service reform through a speech decrying the abuses by the Doorkeeper of the House in hiring too many clerks and abusing his appointing power in other

ways$^7 He also spoke against a b ill providing for an eztremely

undemocratic government for the D istrict of Columbia (which failed), against a b ill placing the power over Indian affairs into the hands of the Secretary of War (which passed), and against a measure to grant $125»000 to railroad trunk lines for mail delivery because the b ill would lim it mail delivery to only four lines which were no better at this job than the other lines. In May, Coz used his railroad ezperience as a background for arguing for a b ill which would outlaw rebates because of the abuses coming from this practice that he himself had seen.^^ He also presented a few minor bills for the relief of his constituents and some petitions for such varied matters as as tariff revision, female suffrage, and a patent eztension.^^

^^Congressional Hecord. 45th Congress, Second Session, January lo, ÎW 78, ^7 3. D. Coz, "Doorkeeper of the House," speech in the House of Representatives, April 3» 1878, Manuscript in Coz Papers. ^^Congressional Record. 45th Congress. Second Session. May 14, iWTB, 3 4 I'0 -I1 .------

■59see th e C o n g re ssio n a l R ecord. 45 th Congress, Second Session, indez. 4 1 1

But besides these matters Cox had little of interest to do$ althou^ one can conjecture from the fact that he was present for every roll call that he was vigilant in working for as good legislation as could be passed.

The work of a legislator was, for Cox, probably not what he had expected. He had hoped that with his close friend, Hayes, as the President, the country would move forward toward the goals Cox had espoused for many years such as civil service reform, complete return of local control to the South, the end of government corruption, and a lower tariff. But few of these were even close to being fulfilled, and Hayes seemed to Cox so lacking in leadership qualities that Cox felt that "the President had utterly failed to accomplish anything in the way of civil service reform and that he had pursued no system that could be defended by any class of politicians. The impression is deepening that he is not large enough for the place he holds."^0

It was clear that Coz was losing faith in his close friend's a b i l i t i e s .

Coz also had lost some faith in the legislative and democratic process. He had little time for making or shaping policy in the House, for as he put it, "What with two hours of Committee work, five of the sessions of the House, fifty errands to the Departments and an equal number of letters to write to exigent constituents, he who imagines he could have an

60As quoted in Smith, Garfield, Life and Letters, II, 664. It is debatable if Cox used such strong terms against his old friend. 412 easy time here would sadly miss the mark.Further, a s a new member, especially In the minority party, who had not been a member of a legislative chamber for seventeen years, he had little Influence. He felt he was not "of a copper*s value In Congress. He drifted along with the party, smitten with a paralyzing sense of the utter uselessness of trying to Impose one*8 Ideas upon m%i who wouldn't change.

Clearly Coz was once again Incensed against a system which would not allow him to lead. In an article written for the Nation during the second session of the 45th Congress, Coz described the other disillusioning ezperlences the new member had to undergo. The lack of recognition by the Speaker; dozens of members talking at once; unfam lllarlty with Parliamentary procedure preventing his Ideas from being heard; committee work which was disgusting and useless unless one had seniority; the Inattaitlon and "murmurous roar" of his fellow representatives; and all the elements of a political system which gave preference to age and party rather than attention to the Issues at hand; Coz (Irritated at his Inability to do anything) condemned them all as frustrating the true spirit of American government,^3 and, of course, his desire to become a leader once again.

^^Coz to J. E. Smith, March 21, 1878, Coz Papers. 62 Coz to Monroe, September 5, 1879, Monroe Papers, O b e rlin .

D. Coz, "The House of Representatives." Nation, n o . 666, April 4, I 878, 225-7. 413

To a proud man who was v e ry much o f an id e a lo g u e , such a system was too much for him to take. Events were not going the way he had hoped they would, and, as in the past, he decided that he would leave office and "refuse a renomination to Congress and move...back to Cincinnati in the fall of I 876 , resuming his law practice there at the close of the short session." He could see no reason, since his railroad connection was over, why he "should not resume former arrangements,"^^ Politics had proven as unrewarding as before. To a proud man, one who felt his ideas should be followed and accepted without question, allowed this was reason enough to feel that there could be but one reaction—leaving before that pride was hurt a g a in .

An event in May, 18?8 gave him yet another reason to feel that being a representative was a less than rewarding position. On May 1?» by a vote of 146-2-114, a committee, of which Coz was chosen to be a member, was authorized to investigate the alleged frauds in the presidential voting in

1876 in Louisiana and Florida. Even though on June l4 a resolution was passed denying to the committee any power to change the election of President Hayes or the decisions of the

E le c to r a l Commission,^5 Coz felt this strictly partisan measure

^^Coz to J. E. Smith, June 9» 1878, Coz Papers. House of Representatives Journal. 45th Congress, Second Session, May 17» June 14, I 8 7 8. 4 l4 was a direct attack at Hayes and the Bepublicans» done in the hope of influwcing the Congressional elections of I 8 7 8 . He was angry at having to take part in it and was peeved because he feared, as he put it, that "this miserable investigating business" would take him to Florida or Louisiana in the hot months of July or A ugust.H e tried to avoid it because he had looked forward to a three-month vacation before the next session, but he was unsuccessful and went along with the o th e r s .

The "Potter Committee," as it was called because its chairman was Representative Clarkson Potter, left for Florida and Louisiana early in July, two weeks after the second session ended. Cox was a member, along with Ben Butler, of the subcommittee which went to Louisiana. Doing most of his work in New Orleans, Cox had a "sweltering time for three weeks" despite having to leave earlier than expected because of an expected wave of yellow fever.^7 His findings, contained in committee's minority report, which he wrote, did much to discredit the Democrats in Louisiana. However, the report did not come out until after the 18?8 elections and so its political insert was not nearly so great as it might have been, although it was an important statement about the sad conditions the Negro had to live with under the "redeemers."

^^Cox to J. E. Smith, May 26, I878, Cox Papers.

^7cox to Monroe, July 29, I878, Monroe Papers, Oberlin. 415

After returning to Toledo from New Orleans» Cox moved his family hack to Cincinnati and spent the Congressional recess paving the way for a return to his law practice after th e 45th Congress adjourned. After spending another week in New Orleans in December working for the Potter Committe, Cox was hack in Washington on January 8 to resume his daily work as a Representative. In the third session, which was mainly concerned with appropriations h ills, Cox worked closely with Garfield to try to deter the Democrats from what had become their latest policy, attempting to attack all powers exercised hy the federal government in the states heyond the necessary minimum. The Democrats offered and passed riders to appropriation h ills which kept federal troops from heing deployed at elections and which restricted the President's use of federal powers in the states, this despite strong Republican opposition and assurances that the Senate would not pass such amendments. The Democrats, nevertheless, pushed them through, and when the Senate refused to pass them, the Democrats would not compromise and the session ended without appropriating the necessary funds for the next year, thus forcing Hayes to call an early session of the 46th Congress.

The final inq)ortant event of the final Congressional session of Cox's career was to bring forth the Potter Committee reportson March 3, the final day of the session. The majority report, written hy Potter, was a lengthy diatribe against the

68See Smith, Garfield, Life and Letters, II, 666, 6?4. 416

Eepublioans and the President which practically accused them of buying the election through fraud and bribery. The minority report was written in "alarm at this partisan effort vo reopen a dangerous contest and disturb the affairs of the country § a party stratagem to make political capital for canç>aign purposes." Cox found no proof of bribes except from Democratic testimony, nor did he find any proof of illegal collusion between Republican leaders to gain Louisiana votes. The greatest wrongs he found were an 1876 Democratic circular warning Negroes not to vote if they wished to stay alive and the deprived and awful conditions under which that race had to live in the South. These he reported in full, but he did not ask for Congressional action, since the Congress which had authorized the investigation was about to end without acting on it. Instead he only said that the only use of the investigation had been to reveal facts and conditions of iriiioh the country could only be ashamed. Only through a complete change in the spirit and temper of the community, the cultivation of respect for law and right, and the recognition by the strong of the rights of the weak, would elections in the South once again become pure and would social relations become

fit for decent men.^^

It was on this despondent note that Cox ended his Congressional and political career. Never again was he to hold

^^House of Representatives, 45th Congress, Third Session, Reports of Committees. Report no. l4o, Investigation of Alleged Frauds in the Late Presidential Election, (Washington, 1879). 417 an elective office. He had come into politics reluctantly in 1858 and had been the always reluctant politician ever since. His career had gone to both heights and depths. At one time or another he had been considered by many as a possibility for the Presidency, condemned for his support of Andrew Johnson, rising to a leading role in the Liberal Republican movement, condemning politics and its ways because of the nomination of Horace Greeley, made a comeback as a Representative hoping to change the system, but only being disappointed both in his friend President Rutherford Hayes and the system's inability to reform itself, and finally leaving politics for a final time, content to live out his remaining years in retirment from the political wars.

Coz was not a practical politician. He had personally arrived at views about every important issue of his time. He was independent and outspoken, and his own man. He was content to be that, hoping (and sometimes demanding) that the nation come around to his way of thinking, but not quick to do much about it if the nation did not. He always hoped the people could be educated to see the truth as he did, but they never seemed able to do so. That in part is probably why Coz was somewhat of an e litis t who had many misgivings about democracy. He failed to realize that there was a possibility that he could be wrong and that his ideas would never become popular. He was always too bound up with his own thoughts and remaining logically consistent to bother with re-thinking 418 his stands. It is this fact that was at the same time one of the greatest political virtues and vices of the man and the key to his political life. CHAPTER XVIII

THE EDUCATOR

The last twenty years of Coz*s life were spent in a great nimber of activities, all of which this many-sided man performed capably. But the two positions which he held the longest, as Dean of the Cincinnati Law School and as President of the University of Cincinnati, were probably the most far- reaching and influential of all. In these roles, Cox was able to instruct both the Cincinnatians who sought a legal education at home and also the local students who sought a college education in Cincinnati. He gave them all the benefits of his wide (and, in many instances, first-hand) knowledge of the law, history and economics and any other subject which he was called upon to discuss. It was as an educator that Cox best used his learned mind to the fullest extent. He was especially fitted for these activities, and he enjoyed his tasks immensely. Accordingly, he gave seventeen years of dedicated service to higher education in Cincinnati.

Before he began his educational career, Cox spent a year as a lawyer in a partnership with his stepson, W illian Cochran. A few days after he left Washington, in 1879, Cox was in "the

419 420 condition of waiting for clients and picking up the broken threads of business.Not many clients were forthcoming, and Cox had to confess that he would have to **expect to be patient in building up a practice a g a in .He still felt, however, that he had made the right decision, for "it had to come sometime." He was satisfied that he "had done wisely in getting out of politics again," and he felt that he would not be drawn in again, unless it were as the Attorney-General.3 Nonetheless, he found, in spite of himself, "a sense of more or less repugnance to entering again into professional management of other people's contests at law," and he could not delude himself into the belief that he would do so "except under the necessity of making a living."^ He was clearly bored with legal work, but he knew of no other way to make a living which would be profitable enough to support his family.

I n J u ly , 1 8 7 9 , the news that he might be offered a position with an assured income and enjoyable duties came to Cox's attention. He wrote to his brother-in-law, James Nonroe (who had married Cox's w ife's sister Julia Finney), "There is a little negotiation on foot to offer me the Presidency and chair of History and Philosophy in the Cincinnati University with a

^Cox to Garfield, March 18, 1879» Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. %Cox to Charles F. Cox, %irch 25, I 8 7 9 , Cox Papers. 3cox to Charles P. Cox, March 31» 1879» Cox Papers. ^Cox to Francis A. Walker, May 28, 1879» Cox l*apers. 421

living salary.”^ Coz felt that such a position would be a luxury, for he would have his favorite studies as the daily business of his life. But he had doubts as to whether the University could "be got upon a footing which would be satisfactory" to him. He feared that the Board of Trustees was "too strongly fastened to the fates of local politics to give anyone the persistent, continuous support necessary to accomplish anything.It was these fears that kept Coz from taking then the position idiich he was to accept siz years later.

While Coz was considering this new position he was also attempting to negotiate a new law partnership for himself and Cochran. These negotiations, which were successful, were important because they gave Coz time for retrospection into his past life and the writing of a straightforward statement about it idiich illustrates the integrity and honesty of the man. He wrote, "On the lAiole I doubt if I could much better it {his life \ My joys have not been of the tumultuous kind. I have tested the hallowness of ambition and proved the incomparable satisfaction of honest effort at growth, and do not care to change my creed in political life to seek the inner ideal and care little for outward recognition."? He had cared for it

^Coz to Monroe, July, 1879» Monroe ^Papers, Oberlin College Archives.

&Coz to Monroe, September 5» 1879» Monroe Papers, Oberlin College Archives.

?Coz to Monroe, September 19» 1879» Monroe Papers, Oberlin College Archives. 422

once, but It had been as he had hoped, and so he left without

r e g r e t .

Though Coz had taken himself out of the political picture completely, he still promised his friends that he would "say his say" as a private citizen. He would do some can^algnlng, but since he wanted no office, he would fit even that work Into his professional business while being content with his dally employment and leisure activities as enough of an "active life."® He had tried to arrange some campaigning In behalf of Charles Foster for governor of Ohio In the fall of I 879, but had had to cancel these plans because of his partnership negotlatlons.9 Yet, his Interest did not die; In fact It was actually Increased when. In January, 1880, his old friend Garfield was elected to the Senate from Ohio. Further, since 1880 was a presidential election year, he took great Interest In the prospective candidates. Coz felt "no small satisfaction In seeing the Grant b u b b le...^e ez-Presldent was attempting to gain the Bepubllcan nomination once again] collapse, and that that attempt at a 'boom* In Cincinnati was the turn In the tide."10 He himself, "In common with a large majority of Ohio Eepubllcans [including G arflej^ supported jÿoh^ Sherman for the Presidency now."

g Coz to Dr. C. 8. Frink, January 12, 1880, Coz Papers. ^ Coz to J. S. fioblnson. Chairman, Ohio State Republican Commitbee, SeptemberSAntATnbAV A.8, 18791 A9 0 ,. Cozh /s r PamPapers. A ye.

lOcoz toto MoMonroe, January 31, 1880, Monroe Papers, Oberlin College Archives. 423

They wanted to "do the best they could to secure an acceptable candidate, and if the machine forced the convention to go for Grant, they would act with full freedom to act differently,”^^

Much to Cox's and most of the nation's surprise, "the acceptable candidate” idien the Republican convention nominated turned out to be James A, Garfield instead of Grant. That darkhorse, a veteran of many years in the House, had been the leader of Sherman's forces in the convention, but had been the compromise choice of the convention when a deadlock between Grant and James G. Blaine could not be broken. Coz was quite happy for his old friend, and though he told Garfield it would have been better if the latter had spent a term or two in the Senate before becoming President, nevertheless "the party and the country deserved to be congratulated for the nomination." Cox warned Garfield of p itfalls of the Presidency, telling him to "make no pledges that are personal, stand on your record, and commit yourself to no one." Doing these things, Coz felt,

Garfield would be s a f e . ^2 cox also promised to campaign for

Garfield and do whatever else he could to help him.^3

His campaigning time was lim ited because of personal illness, business pressures, and the need to prepare for his

^^Cox to J. B. Henderson, April 3 0 , 1880, Cox P a p e rs . ^^Cox to Garfield, June 9» 1880, Garfield ^apers. Library of Congress.

l^Cox to Monroe, June 14, 1880, Monroe Papers, 01'jlin College Archives. 424 new position at the Cincinnati Law School» but Coz did give a few speeches in the Cincinnati area for Garfield. The only one which is s till eztant, given at Hamilton, Ohio, on August 23, 1880, was the last political speech Coz ever gave. In it he spoke on, "The Democratic ^arty. Its Dissolution." The speech was an historical treatise on the failure of that party to present the people with capable leaders or platforms with reform and progressive planks. The Democrats had controlled the Senate for two years and the House for siz and yet had presented no patterns for change. Only by the disorganization of that party, he said, could pertinent issues and not the war be the main topic of legislation and discussion. After this verbal destruction of the Democrats, Coz went on to eztoll G arfield's qualities. "Frank, open-hearted, full of ezuberant life and vigor," Garfield had, in Coz's opinion, "fulfilled in an eztraordinary manner the promise and ambition of his boyhood—to be worthy of a distinguished part in his country's affairs by purity of purpose and honesty of character." He was, Coz told his audience, admirably fitted for the job while his opponent, Winfield Scott Hancock, was equally ill-fitted , hence the choice was an obvious one.l^

The public felt the same way, though by a narrow margin. In an eztremely close race with Hancock, Garfield won a victory

D. Coz, "The Democratic Party, Its Dissolution the Condition of Political Progress and Reform," Speech at Hamilton, Ohio, August 23, 1880, printed copy in Coz's Papers. 425 vrtiioh, Cox felt, was made possible ‘»by the thinking people of the country, honest In their purposes and wise In their broad common sense." It was, he felt, "a memorable popular verdict.For the third time In a row, a native Ohioan and a close friend of Cox's had been elected to the Presidency. The other two had not been exactly what Cox had hoped they would be In their conduct of the office, but he had higher hopes for this closest of all his political friends.

His hopes were probably Increased when the President­ elect called him to his Mentor, Ohio, home to discuss the Cabinet choices and his Presidential policies. On January 29, 1881, Cox and Henry E. Knox met with Garfield a ll day, the former going over the whole situation from the viewpoint of an Independent.Cox also accepted the job of Inquiring Into certain Cabinet possibilities, and later assured Garfield that Robert Lincoln and James G. Blaine would be good and acceptable choices and advised him to have the choices made before he went to Washington, where he would be approached to change them.^? Cox also advised Garfield to give to his former Congressional associate, James Monroe, the diplomatic post, as minister to

^^Cox to Garfield, November 3» 1880, Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. ^^As quoted In Smith, Garfield, Life and Letters. II, 1077. ^?Cox to Garfield, February 10, 1881, Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. See also Cox's letter to the editor of the Cincinnati Commercial (Murat Halstead) of October 22, 1881, 1, discussing these talks with Garfield and the latter's astonishing plan to take both Blaine and Boscoe Conkllng, bitter enemies. Into the Cabinet. 426

Brazil, that he was seeking. The President assured him that he would take care of this matter, but as the months went on and nothing was done, Cox began to feel "disgusted and disappointed to the last degree," and he found it impossible to believe that Garfield could ignore or forget his relations with Monroe and the volunteered promises he had m a d e , ^8 g^t when June came and the President's promise to provide for Monroe was still unfulfilled, Cox felt that the President would never do it, or at least that his faith in that direction was so small that he would count little on it,^9

Even though Cox was beginning to feel greatly disturbed with his old friend, all thoughts of disappointment ended when the President was shot in July, 1881, Cox immediately became greatly concerned over the President's condition and his fight for life, sud "the terrible and prolonged uncertainty in Garfield's case. The desperate hovering between life and death which" the President went through for over two months was "very hard to bear" for Cox,20 It was hardest of all for him to bear when the inevitable, Garfield's death, occurred. There is no

l^Cox to Monroe, May 21, 1881, Monroe Papers, Oberlin College Archives. ^^Cox to Monroe, June 8, 1881, Monroe Papers, Oberlin College Archives. Later, Cox tried to use what influence he had to get President Chester A. Arthur to appoint Monroe, but he failed in that also, Cox to Monroe, August 10, 1882, Monroe Papers. Monroe eventually got a position as a professor at Oberlin College, Cox's influence as a college trustee was helpful in gaining it for him. ^°Cox to Monroe, August 30, 1881, Monroe Papers, 427

eztant contemporary accoxint of Coz* s feeling when he heard of the death of the President, but as he wrote to his friend. Dr. James Woodward, G arfield's attending physician, it had "been a sadly memorable time" for himself and for the whole country.Coz's oration to the reunion of the Army of the Cumberland in May, 1882; on "The Youth and Early Manhood of General James A. Garfield" was a worthy tribute to his closest of political friends,22 a man whom he had known for twenty- three years and who had made it to the pinnacle of political success only to be there for but a fleeting period.

Garfield's assassination sealed the lid on Coz's political career. Coz had agreed to campaign for Garfield, but now his friend was dead and there were no others left who believed in what Coz did or who were so close to him. From that point on Coz felt no desire to take part in politics. He would devote his leisure time to reading, to his writing, and to his microscope work. His daily work time would be occupied with a position he had accepted in June, 1880, one in which he was to serve seventeen years and one in which he was to achieve a reputation as the finest legal scholar in Ohio.

On June 22, 1880, the trustees of the Cincinnati Law School accepted the resignation of Bufus King as Dean and voted

21 Coz to Dr. James J. Woodward, December 24, 1881, Coz P a p e rs.

22j, D. Coz, "The Youth and Early Manhood of General James A. G arfield," Oration at Reunion of Army of Cumberland, Milwaukee, 1882, printed copy in Coz Papers. 428

that his successor be C o z . ^3 The same day Alexander G, McGuffey, the secretary of the Board of Trustees, Informed Cox of this action and asked him to accept.C ox accepted the next day, acknowledging the complimentary way in which he had been approached and admitting that his former connection with the school as a lecturer (in I 868 - 6 9) had much to do with his

d e c i s i o n . 23 That earlier connection and Cox's speech on "The Republicanism of the English Government" which he gave at the school's commencement in May, I 8 7 9 , and in which he praised the improvement and changes the school had undergone since I 8 6 9 , and his well-known legal knowledge made Cox a natural choice to become Dean of the Cincinnati Law School.

That institution was, at that time, the only one of its kind in Ohio. It was also the only remaining and functioning part of the old Cincinnati College. Founded in I 819 u n d er a charter granted by the Ohio General Assembly, Cincinnati College had suffered many monetary problems. It had added a medical department in 1835 and a law school in 1834, but hard times and growing competition had hit it so hard that after 1845 only the law department was left in operation. That section of the college prospered quite well all through the 1860's and I8?0's,

23"Minutes of the Board of Trustees of the Cincinnati College," June 27, 1880, College of Law Library, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio. 24 Alexander McGuffey, June 23, 1880, Cox Papers.

23cox to Alexander McGuffey, June 23, 1880, Cox Papers. Ü-29 and when Coz took over as Dean In IS80 It was nearing Its peak in popularity and reputation,

Coz's duties as Dean were quite numerous and involved a great amount of time. Not only did he do most of the teaching of the Junior Class (the first year of a two-year course) and some lecturing for the Senior Class (in all 7i hours per week of teaching, compared with an average of for the other three professors employed there), but he also handled most of his official correspondence by himself, painstakingly writing to each letter-w riter a personal letter about the school's policies and answering many questions put to him. Through these letters one can get some idea of the policies of an American law school in the Gilded Age. Cincinnati Law School had a two-year course (one if the student had studied for a year under a competent attorney); it emphasized the teaching of Blackstone through the lecture system; it admitted into its courses anyone having a good English education; it did not accept women into its courses because it could not offer the "sort of security for agreeable surroundings which...ought to be assured when ladies leave home;" and it offered courses in every type of law then considered "right and proper" for a law student to know and understand in the America of that day.^^

Reginald G. McGrane, The University of Cincinnati: a Success Story in Urban Higher Education. (New York. 1963). 5 -50. 27 For ezamples of this type of letter see Coz's Letterpress Copybook no. 5» Coz Papers. 430

There Is little eztant evidence concerning how well Cox filled his position as Law School Dean, hut one can Infer from the fact that In 1885 he was offered the position as president of the University of Cincinnati, to be filled concurrently with his Deanshlp, that he had already achieved a fine reputation as an eductor. The University of Cincinnati, a pioneer municipal university, was founded as a result of a large bequest by Charles McMlcken idio died In 1858. Coz had been a trustee of the University for three years In the l870*s and had done a great deal of work on committees which were at that time formulating the basic courses and make-up of the University. In 18?9, the University had hired Its first real executive officer. Rector Thomas Vickers, but he had run Into trouble when. In 1881, a student newspaper accused him of incompetence. Infidelity, hiring his cronies as teachers, and other activities which made him extremely unpopular. The paper's editors asked the Board of Trustees to replace him. An Investigation was made (after the accusing students were suspended), and Vickers was cleared of all the charges by a 3-2 vote of the Investigating committee. The case gave the University much unenviable publicity and the reputations of the Institution and all the parties Involved were seriously Injured. When Vickers tendered his resignation In April, 1884, the University was In great trouble because of pO a declining enrollment and a poor reputation.

^®McGrane, University of Cincinnati, 97-109* 431

Thus It was that its Board of Directors began a search for a new executive officer to head the University in order to reestablish the school's reputation. On April 13» 1885» they found the man they were looking for in the person of the Dean of the Cincinnati Law School. Cox, who felt the other job would help his financial position, had been approached about the job earlier in the month and had asked for and been given permission by the law school trustees to accept the other position if his duties as Dean did not suffer.Thus, when he was offered the Presidency on April 13» he readily accepted it in the hope, as he later put it "of being of some real use to the cause of liberal education in Cincinnati." Cox took the job as the first President of the University of Cincinnati, to "prove that Cincinnati was worthy of such a University, one which had the complete confidence of all friends of higher education, a high moral tone, and an elevating influence on all its students,"30 and to increase his monetary income. He agreed to take the job until the goals of growth and increased prestige were realized.

One of his first moves in this regard was the attempt to effect the consolidation of the various trusts and educational institutions of the city with the University. In

"Minutes of Cincinnati College Trustees," April 4, 8 , 1885. 30j, D._Cox, "Circular Address to the Citizens of Cincinnati," 1886, Manuscript in Cincinnati H istorical Society, Cincinnati, Ohio. 432

May, 1886, he sent a circular letter to the authorities of institutions conferring degrees, concerning the feasibility of uniting. Of the eleven schools sought out, six (the Clinical and Pathological School of the Cincinnati Hospital, the Union Medical College, the Medical College of Ohio, the Cincinnati College of Pharmacy, the Cincinnati College of Medicine, and Surgery, and the Ohio College of Dental Surgery) agreed to the proposal during Cox's tenure as University President.31 This proof that the University had regained much of the confidence of the people of Cincinnati is supported by another evidence— the decline in enrollment which had gone on steadily since 1880 reversed itself, and the college grew at an increasing rate each year Cox was President.

Cox's duties as President were mostly administrative. His only real academic chore was a series of ten lectures on The Outlines of History which he gave to the Junior and Senior Classes from January 6, 1886, to March 10, 1886. Using his vast knowledge of history, gained through his lifelong habit of reading and studying as a prime leisure activity, he gave the students a fine summary of the course of man's history and his personal feelings about the value of the study of history.

^^McGrane, University of Cincinnati. 113-4. The Cincinnati Law School reinised the invitation because it felt it would lose its independence in the University. 32 J. D. Cox, "Outline of a course of ten lectures on the Outlines of History," Manuscript in Cox Papers, 433

Besides this lecture series and the annual reports on the state of the University and its n e e d s , 33 Coz's main job was to serve as an ezecutive officer and to make the major decisions which guided the University, Many of those decisions were almost as important for the University's future as the ones previously mentioned. Coz sanctioned a new student newspaper and library society, the University's first college fraternities, its first annual, Al-Menir, and the growth of student athletics,All in all, he helped, in a small way, the University of Cincinnati evolve into a modem university while making it worthy of the respect of local citizens.

Thus it was that after four years as President of the University of Cincinnati Coz, feeling that the time had come when the Board of Trustees, knowing that he had accepted the appointment as a temporary one and for certain purposes, could release him without serious detriment to the. interests of the institution, decided to resign. He supported his reasoning by a special report to the Trustees outlining the history of the University and its satisfactory growth. He pointed out that since circumstances had made it his first duty to win public

^^See, for ezample, his report on hiring more faculty and on University finances, January 31» 1888, in University of Cincinnati, President's letterpress copybook, 1885-9» in possession of assistant to the President, University of Cincinnati,

34McGrane, University of Cincinnati, 117-20, See also Zane L, M iller, Boss Coz's Cincinnati, (New York, 1968), 98-9» for a look at the ioQ>rovements the University underwent during these years. 434

confidence In the solid value of the curriculum and the moral and mental tone governing the Institution, and since public confidence had Increased to the point where as large a proportion of local hlg^ school students as could be handled were attending the University, he felt he should resign since his job was done. Further, If he resigned and his duties were taken over by the Board, his salary could be used to expand the University even further. Thus he tendered his resignation on December 17, 1888, thanking the Board for Its help during his tenure and wishing the University a bright and successful f u t u r e .35

There were other reasons for Coz's resignation, ones which he told his brother-in-law, James Monroe, made him leave ev«i though he would have liked to have stayed, Cox said, "The economic question had decisive weight with me. The University gets money from public taxes and so everyone can lecture the Board as to Its expenditure. Some questions of the propriety of paying a President's salary while his time Is partly left to other work made me think such criticism well enou^ founded to be likely to return and become an annoyance, and as I felt my services were less necessary than three years ago, I decided

on n o w . "36 Cox felt that his Integrity was being, and m l^t be

35speclal Report of J. D. Cox, President, December 17, 1888, In "Records of the Minutes of Board of Directors, University of Cincinnati," 1885-9t lu possession of Legal Adviser's Office, University of Cincinnati.

3^Cox to Monroe, January 19, 1889, Monroe Papers, Oberlin. ^35 again, questioned. He did not like this, and so this independent man decided to resign rather than be questioned or told how to act. The attempts by the University Board of Trustees to convince him to stay were fruitless for these reasons, so they accepted his decision with an expression of their high regard for him personally and for his valuable services as President in regaining public confidence and a valued reputation for the University of Cincinnati,57

The historian of that University, using words which Cox himself used in his special report to the Trustees, praised Cox's work and even devoted an entire chapter in his University history to Cox's tenure as President because of the importance of the man in that position. He wrote, “The development of the University during the administration of President Cox attested to the increased confidence the general public had in the institution. He assured publicly confidence in the solid value of the curriculum and the institution. He cultivated the relations of the University with the High Schools and the private schools of the city with the result that there existed a more cordial and syn^athetic attitude and more confidence in the University among the authorities of these institutions toward the college. The curriculum was improved, the decline in enrollment was gradually changed to an increase, the University made steady progress during the

57«Minutes of University of Cincinnati Trustees," January 21, 1889 and June 17, 1889, 436

administration of President C o z . «38 once again Coz had been given a job to do, and he had done it in his usual crisp, methodical way. He was not flashy or innovative, but rather was a solid workman, doing the work to the best of his great abilities according to tried and true ways. He had a strong belief in mazims which one might call cliches, but which he felt were guides to living the best life one could. He did his job and he did it well, and he asked for no more than the recognition of that simple fact.

He was modest even in his monetary requests for his services. In a letter to the Law School Trustees just before he resigned from the University, Coz told them that he would be losing the President *s salary and would need more to live on. Half the necessary amount could be gained by a new distribution of the school's tuition income. The old method of paying had been to give the Dean a set salary while giving the rest of the faculty a percentage of the rest of the income. A recent tuition increase had increased faculty income, but the

Dean's salary had remained the s a m e . 39 Thus Coz asked for and later received the desired Increase, putting his yearly income at $5,000, a good-sized sum for those days, but still not enouggi to give the sizty-year-old Dean enough financial security for the future.

^®McGrane, University of Cincinnati. Il4. 39coz to Law Faculty, October 24, 1888, Coz Papers. 4o Coz to Monroe, January 19, 1889, Monroe Papers, Oberlin. 437

But this concern, which Cox helped alleviate in the next few years throu^ timely investments and through the small sums he received for his hook reviews, microscope articles, and book royalties, was not to blunt Cox's desire to keep on in the work he had found so enjoyable, even idille doing the double duty as a University President. He had taught elementary law, the history of law, constitutional law, domestic relations, and real property in his first years at the school. When, in 1895, a state law was passed requiring all law schools to have a three-year instead of two-year course, he also added the teaching of pleading, civil pleading, and conflict of laws to his already heavy load. Thus his teaching burden was increased by another half while no senior class would be gpraduating for two years (the seniors paid more for tuition and also a graduation fee) .41 But Cox stayed with the law school anyway, his sense of duty and loyalty overcoming a ll other concerns and keeping him on the job.

He was in danger of losing that position, or at least seeing a new set of Trustees have control of it, from 1891 to 1895. In November, 1891, Judge M. B. Hog;an, a member of the Boards of both Cincinnati College and the University of Cincinnati, submitted a request to the College for affiliation. Committees were appointed by each institution, but before they could make a decision, the University and the Young Men's

h,l "Minutes of Cincinnati College Trustees," April 6, 1895. 438

Mercantile Library Association combined forces to attempt to dissolve Cincinnati College. The latter group, which had been trying to buy the college property for years, and which, having been refused, joined with the University to try to get the college's charter revoked, and the University directors convinced the Ohio legislature to pass an act on April 15» 1892. The act, saying that since the college's endowment was not sufficient, it would now have its charter amended to put it under the management of the directors of the University of Cincinnati, was a hard blow to the school. The University directors demanded the college's books and property, but were refused because the Law College's Board of Trustees felt that the ordering act was unconstitutional.^2 ^ result, the

University brought suit. On March 12, 1895» after a long litigation, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided that the act was, in truth» unconstitutional and void, for it had violated the rights of private property. The Cincinnati College had won a clear victory over their larger rivals.^3

But the Law College had suffered financially. The expenses involved in the long litigation had almost completely drained the treasury of the college, and the money for ordinary

42 "Minutes of Cincinnati College Trustees," April 19, 1892. Cox made a report to this meeting of the methods used to gain this legislation and he formulated a reply to the University, ^3rhis account is taken from McGrane, University of Cincinnati. 128-9. 439 expenses had to be borrowed from local banks. Another problem the college faced was the decision In May, I 896, by the University of Cincinnati to establish its own law department in direct competition with the Cincinnati Law School. Appointing as its first Dean, the new law school followed the Harvard case system, rejecting the old lecture system and began operations in October, 1896,45 The

Cincinnati Law School could not stand up long under such pressure. Thus when, in late I 896, Alexander McGuffey, the major stockholder in the Cincinnati College Corporation and its secretary for many years, died and left the stock to his wife, the University Board of Trustees moved in, A syndicate of men favoring union with the University of Cincinnati offered Mrs, McGuffey #10,000 for the stock and the forty votes in choosing trustees it represented, an offer which she accepted. On assurance from these men that the union would be carried out on a basis which Cox could approve, he did not oppose the merger; but the plan was in essence one which practically dissolved the law s c h o o l .I n May, 1897» th e B oard o f th e University and the new trustees of the Cincinnati College signed an agreement affiliating for ten years the two law schools; the schools would present degrees concurrently under

^^"Minutes of Cincinnati College Trustees," April 6, 1895.

45'McGrane,» University of Cincinnati. 129, ^^Cox to Kenyon Cox (son), July 20, 1897, Kenyon Co Papers, Avery Library, Columbia University, New York City, 440 the name of the Cincinnati Law School and would have as its faculty Dean Taft, the staff of the law department of the University of Cincinnati, Henry M orrill (of the old Cincinnati Law School), and Dean Coz (now to be only an instructor).^?

Coz, feeling that things had not gone as he had been told they would and that the honesty of the merging agents was questionable, and not wishing to separate himself from the old faculty, felt honorably bound to withdraw from the law school and make common cause with his colleagues.^® His resignation was presented to the joint board soon after the merger was made official. In it he gave as his reason for that act "that the inqportant epoch now reached in the history of the Institution is the appropriate place for me to close my connection with its history."^ He did not know -sdiat he would do with the rest of his life at the age of sizty-eight, but he knew that he could not countenance an alliance with men who, he felt, were motivated by less-than-honest goals.

But Coz kept these reasons quiet, choosing not to embarrass anyone connected with the school, and so he left the law school with good feelings on the other side. This fact can

^?McGrane, University of Cincinnati. I 30. ^®Coz to Kenyon Coz (son), July 20, 1897, Kenyon Coz Papers, Columbia University.

^Coz to Colonel Sidney D. Mazwell, June 10, 1897, Coz Papers. # 1 be seen In the testimonial given him by a special committee of the College Trustees. It said There doubtless had been no name that has stood for more in the history of the school than Jacob D. Coz ...Be has, by the scope of his attainments, the ripeness of his scholarship, the knowledge of the history of the law which he possessed, the nice sense of justice, firmness, and kindness in his official acts, and the ease with which he preserved order and maintained decorum on the part of the students, furnished a combination of conspicuous qualities which have been of inestimable value to the institution...It was reserved to the period comprised by the seventeen years of the adminis­ tration of Governor Coz, for the school to have attained its highest ezcellence, and to have made the greatest impression on the public mind...While easily a leader, he was so kindly and attentive and deferential and his authority always rested so lightly, that his colleagues were scarcely aware of its ezistence, though, at all times, it was moulding the policy of the school. The ripeness of his judgment, his knowledge of the legal ri^ ts of the corporation, his services on the Board of Trustees from 1895 to 1897» the disciplined qualities of his mind and the affectionate regard he had for the institution, all combined to make him an invaluable member of the Board and a useful connection between the educational and administrative agencies of the College. Few men have possessed so wide a range of capabilities or ezhibited them in such a symmetrical combination. Intensely earnest in purpose, eminent in public and private virtue, modest in bearing, fluent in style, paternal toward students who instinctively revered him, his impression on young people was profound in character and infinite in d u r a tio n . ^0 During his tenure as Dean, 1254 young men and women received

Special Committee to prepare a resolution touching the Honorable Jacob D. Coz, by action of the Board of Trustees in relation to the retirement from the faculty of Cincinnati College of the Honorable Jacob D. Coz, November 30, 1897, printed copy in Coz Papers. # 2 the degree of and It can be supposed that most of them felt grateful to the Dean of the College for his consistent, knowledgeable teaching and manner toward them. He could ask for no more fitting tribute, and he never did,

Coz had done well as an educator, a job for which his scholarly and intellectually-oriented mind was well fitted. He was at his best when discussing matters of academic interest, for his fund of knowledge on every subject was so great that he could almost always be relied upon to make a valuable contribution to any conversation or lecture. He was a man who emphasized the mind and careful thought. As an educator he had his first real opportunity to make use of these ideas. He did so with capability and in his usual methodical and consistent way, and won for himself the reputation as one of the most useful educators in the history of higher education in Ohio.

Two of the more famous, both of whom also studied in Coz*s law office, were Charles G. Dawes, later vice-president of the United States, and Byron Bancroft ("Ban") Johnson, later baseball executive. CHAPTER XIX

THE PRIVATE CITIZEN, 1879-1900

The years after Cox left active politics were full of so many activities that It Is not surprising that when, In 1897, he retired from teaching law he was highly nervous and exhausted. Most of the time during this era was occupied, of course, with his work as Dean of the Cincinnati Law School and as President of the University of Cincinnati. These were busy times for both Institutions, and they underwent a great number of changes In this time period. In most of which Cox had a direct hand. He was a hard-working executive who did his work with skill and ability and who devoted himself to both Institutions. The result of that devotion and hard work was a debt of gratitude both Institutions owed him. In one Instance, for making the University a respected and honorable Institution, and In the other, for making the law school a thriving. Important, and Influential Institution.

But not a ll the time of this modem "Renaissance man" was taken up with his dally work, or even with his chores as an author and critic (topics which will be discussed later). He was also a family man, whose six children all lived to

# 3 become either successful businessmen or the wives of influential men. His eldest daughter, Helen Finney, married John Black, a mathematics professor at Wooster College, on August 6, 1878, and lived there for many years afterward. His eldest son and namesake, Jacob Dolson Cor III, became, throu^ a $2,000 loan from his father, a partner in an industrial firm which was eventually to come under his complete control as the Cleveland Twist D rill Company, a successful enterprise which still is operating in Cleveland today. The nezt oldest child, Kenyon, was a sickly child who, through funds given to him by his father, was able to go to Paris to train and work as an artist. It was from this work that he gained the impetus which was later to make him one of the best known and finest mural painters in the United States from I890 until his death in 1919* Charles Norton Cox, the youngest son, became an entrepeneur in Colorado, specializing in orchard growing and cattle-raising.^ The younger dau^ter, Charlotte Hope, bom in I87I, married the son of General John Pope in 1897» Coz*s stepson and first biographer, William Cochran, became a respected lawyer in Cincinnati and the author of legal textbooks. Over this large family there presided Cox's wife Helen, an aloof, aristocratic, but loving mother and wife who

^This son's letters from I890 to 1897 from Colorado trace the ups and downs of life in that section during one of the most difficult times through which its people ever had to go. They are also interesting for some in sist into the one child of Cox's who did not make out nearly as well as the others but continued to take his father's "loans" and optim istically look forward to the future. # 5 outlived her husband for twelve years until her death in 1912. It was a family any man would have been proud of, and Cox, a devoted family man, was justly so.

In addition to being an educator at the University of Cincinnati and the Cincinnati Law School, Cox also performed other activities connected with education. He served as a trustee of Oberlin College from 1876 to 1900, attending every yearly meeting, acting as the legal adviser for the trustees, and taking an active role on a great number of committees, especially after 1897 when he moved to Oberlin.% In addition Cox also served as a trustee for the College of Music of Cincinnati, the Ohio Mechanics Institute, and the Cincinnati

Law School. Cox also had other activities. He was a devoted member in and, for three terms. President of both the M ilitary Order of the Loyal Legion and the Society of Ex-Army and Navy Officers in Cincinnati. He was also chairman of the central board of the Associated Charities of Cincinnati, a group which was set up to oversee all city charitable works after a disastrous flood in I883 had damaged many homes and le ft many people without food. He was an outstanding citizen who did much to make Cincinnati a better place in which to live through his civic-minded devotion.

In early 1884, Cox and other leading citizens had to put forth an extremely strong effort to keep Cincinnati a

^See the "Minutes of the Meetings of the Trustees of Oberlin College," I876-190I, Oberlin College Treasurer's Office, Oberlin, Ohio 446 place in which anyone could live with satisfaction. Cincinnati at that time was a wide-open town with plenty of gambling and women of questionable reputation, heavy drinking, and flourishing crime.3 Public anger and indignation over these circumstances were increased daily as the failure of the authorities to expedite the trials of the large number of criminals in local jails, the slow-moving and inefficient local courts, and the poor local police work seemed to make a mockery of Justice in Cincinnati. Finally the public anger reached a peak when in 1884, at a time when twenty-three indicted murderers were languishing in jail without trials while daily 4 accounts of more and more murders filled the local papers, public attention was centered on the trials of two youths, one of whom was a Negro, who were accused of the robbery-murder of a livery man. When one was convicted, on March 24, of manslaughter only, an explosive reaction of indignation came forth. On March 28, sixty-four prominent citizens called for a public meeting to discuss local law enforcement and demand reforms. The meeting went well, although cries of "Hang ’em all" and the waving of nooses by some of the crowd of about 9,000 did not seem to bode well for its orderliness.^

^McGrane, University of Cincinnati. 109. S. Tunison, The Cincinnati Eiot: Its Causes and Results. (Cincinnati, 1886), 8.

^Miller, Boss Cox, 57-9» # 7

When the meeting ended and the crowd began to leave, a group of men and adolescents began to urge the crowd to go directly to the jail to hang the convicted slayer. A small group left for that purpose, and by the time they arrived about 2,000 others had Joined them. The crowd stormed the Jail entrance, and when the police blocked the door a shot rang out, killing a man in the crowd. The mob then forced its way into the cell blocks, but before it could find its intended victim the local m ilitia arrived and began firing on the crowd. Several were killed during a battle idiich lasted until 3*00 a.m. The nezt two days saw more of the same, as the courthouse was burned to the ground and fifty-four men were killed in the three days of rioting. Finally on March 30, the rioters were dispersed for a final time by the state m ilitia, never to r e tu r n .^

The city of Cincinnati was shocked by this strange and violent means some of its citizens had used to protest the lack of Justice and respect for the law. But it did its best to prevent an immediate recurrence. On March 30, Mayor Thomas J, Stephens called for a meeting of two hundred prominent citizens to devise means to protect city property from the mob. Immediately such local leaders as Manning F. Force and Charles P. Taft came to the mayor*s office where they heard Dean Jacob

^See M iller, Boss Coi. 60-l, and Charles F. Goss, Cincinnati, the Queen "City, 1788-1912. (Chicago, 1912), I, 253» for cosQ)lete accounts of these riots. # 8

D. Cox express the •'universal spirit of every intelligent citizen of acting through constituted authorities only by pledging support to the mayor and the police."? Coz was then appointed to chair the executive committee of the mayor's Citizens' Committee. On April 2, Cox wrote, as part of his duties, to Governor George Hoadly requesting that the 300 state troopers already there be allowed to stay on the rest of the Q week in order to maintain peace. After that request was granted and the expected calmness arrived, Cox requested the mayor to appoint 103 special policemen for a short time to take the place of the m ilitia idien the troops had to l e a v e .9 This too was done and soon all fears of renewed rioting were gone. Once again Cox the active and concerned citizen had aided the city, this time in a state of emergency vdiich had shaken its very existence as an orderly community to the r o o ts .

Cox was glad to see the end of the riots for personal reasons as well as for civic ones. Ever since his return to Cincinnati in 1879» he had been living near the downtown section of the city on Dayton Avenue, in an area which contained most of the overtly criminal and immoral elements of society, as well as most of the city's factories. From

^Cincinnati Enquirer. March 31» 1884, 1. ®Cox to George Hoadly, April 2, 1884, Cox Papers. ^Thomas J, Stephens to Cox, Cox Papers, Cincinnati Historical Society, Cincinnati, Ohio. # 9

1882 Coz desired to move from "the grimy habitation to which we in lower Cincinnati are condemned.'*^® The area was

extremely dirty and sooty, the air had not been clean for years, and in addition, the frequent floods of the Ohio Elver had done much to damage the area. In I 883 Cox decided it was time to "get out of the soot and smoke of lower Cincinnati and build a new home on the hill."^^ Late in 1884 Coz bought a double brick home with twelve rooms at 4l Gilman Avenue in the heart of the upper class Mount Auburn section.^2 There and on the other hilltop areas of Cincinnati (which is shaped like a bowl with surrounding h ills), safe from the crime and sordidness of Lower Cincinnati, "the top echelons of Cincinnati's social and economic register lived. The city's oldest and most successful merchants, bankers, industrialists, brokers, and doctors, at the top of their calling, congregated there in a haven for the economically successful,"13 Coz had now reached the top of Cincinnati society in a way fitting to his civic and professional position, and he now took his ri^ tfu l place among his social peers in stimulating Cincinnati's art, culture, and upper class life.

^®Cox to Monroe, September 6, 1882, Monroe Papers, O b e rlin . l^Coz to Monroe, March 27, 1883, Monroe Papers, Oberlin. ^^A le tte r from Miss Mary Budd Cochran, Cox's step- granddaughter and one time owner of this house, to the author, April 6, 1969. 13Miller, Boss Coz. 4l, 48, 51» 55. ^50

Finally settled in a spacious home and a quiet, clean neifi^hborhood, Cox had time to settle back and think about the past and make some judgments about it. In an extremely interesting letter to William H. Smith, his former Attorney- General, and also a good friend, Cox discussed his political past in possibly the most revealing letter about this subject he ever wrote. Cox said, "I have rarely, if ever, felt the need of repudiating the aims of my youthful enthusiasm, but have generally stuck consciously to the principles while recognizing the lim itation and incompleteness of the earlier application of it...A s to public life, the only merit I can claim is that I have been under no illusions as to its value, and have never been as susceptible as some of my friends to the attractions and pleasures of place. To many the possession of office seems the only satisfactory evidence of their own importance, and they are unhappy when out of it...I am so egotistic that I do not need this proof of my consequences and estimate the Inconvenience of office-holding so highly that it has never been a difficult thing for me to regard the private station as the normal and desirable one, public place being a burden not to be shucked when it comes naturally and without seeking, in the line of current duty, but having no attraction that would make it seem anything but folly to sack it. This is perhaps partly a matter of temperament, but it is also partly the result of my observation of the unhappy condition of so many of our public men (like myself) who are without a private 451 fortüne and to whom every year makes the question a more embarrassing one, what shall I do when I am out of office?'*

He went on to say, "Under our present political management of politics, there is little or no initiative with the public man. He is the mere register of the will of the party cliques and rings, and even in the case of those who seem to be leaders, it is usually of the merest kind and they as well as others obey the public opinion which they do little to form. It is notorious that a man of ideas and of independence is not

‘available* for office. This is only another way of confessing that public opinion is made by those who are out of office. To affect legislation, I would rather be in than out of Congress... Our ablest men are sadly conscious of the hollowness of their role." In I876 Garfield had asked Cox about leaving politics, b u t Cox told him frankly that it was too late for him to return to legal practice. Coz did not want to end his own life that way. He said, "My experience of public life had probably been about as great as may come unsought to one who has stubbomess of opinion. Enough, at best, to warrant me in thinking that I too could have cut a more prominent figure had I thought the game worth the candle, and so without disappointment or envy, regret or longing, I have been able to go my way thinking my own th o u g h ts , a d v o c a tin g my own o p in io n s , c a l li n g no mob m a ste r.

^^Cox to William H. Smith, July 14, 1885, William H. Smith Papers, Manuscript Division, Ohio H istorical Society, Columbus, Ohio. 452

Thus Coz analyzed his political career. He knew he could have made more of it and become more famous than he had been, but he had neither the temperament nor the desire for that. He, like many others, recognized the low state to which post- bellum politics had fallen, and having been raised to believe that the country was more important than the party, he could hardly make himself take too active a part in a new system in which the party superseded a ll else, even to the submission of individual opinion to its needs. He was an independent man who said what he believed in an age when there were so few important issues on which parties could divide that they had to hark back to the war to show the voters their differences. The parties existed for taking and keeping office by any means—and for little else. An aloof and issue-oriented politician like Coz was likely to have difficulty fitting into such a system. He felt politics should be an honorable occupation in which true leaders would take the people and country down a righteous path to a better life. The politics of his time had no true leaders except the party or the "machine," which only led its members into office and people into party loyalty. Politics had, Coz felt, truly taken a large step downward from the ante-bellum years. For that reason he was glad not to have become caught up in the "game" and not to have devoted himself to such an occupation. He simply did not fit. He was of another age of beliefs and politics, but one can s till wonder what would have happened if he had overcome his prejudice against the politics cf the Gilded Age. Perhaps Ccz could have been the i^53 intelligent and strong leader the period needed to lead it away from the politics of machines and bossism to a more honest government.

Coz did not let such thoughts trouble him, for he had condemned his age's politics too often ever to think of himself becoming its leader. He rather contented himself with "living very quietly and plainly as a College Professor should, taking yearly vacations to Ballast Island in Lake Eriel& and to the ocean off Massachusetts after 1891 on his son Dolson's yacht. He became interested again in politics when , "the most trustworthy man in public life" was president and downhearted when Harrison won in 1888, saying, "Now fox the deluge."1? He gave after dinner and dedication speeches at a great number of occasions,and wrote magazine articles on such subjects as "The Future in College Work" (in which he condemned the "democratic race fcr wealth which American society was based on" and called for a return to an

^^Coz to R. B. Hayes, December 1^, 1885, Hayes Papers, Frem ont. l^See his letters to G. F. Wright, the noted geologist, from 1886-94 in the G. F. Wright Papers, Oberlin College Archives, for ezamples of how, even on these vacations, he became interested in an academic concern and began discussing geclogy and earth fcrms of the island with Wright. l^Coz to Monroe, December 1, 1888, Monroe Papers, O b e rlin . no He gave, for ezample, the oration at the unveiling of the Soldier's monument in Fremont, Ohio on August 1885 with a speech which the Fremont Journal of August 7, p. 2, character­ ized as thrilling the audience with its vivacity. 454

emphasis on liberal education and the intellectual man).19 It was a full life, with a great many and varied activities and outlets, in keeping with his varied abilities and talents.

One of those talents was as a eulogist. In I890 the memorial to his old friend, James A. Garfield, was dedicated in Cleveland, Ohio. Cox*s friend Hayes, chairman of the Garfield Memorial Association, had chosen Coz as the orator for the occasion, and after convincing Coz (who did not want to give the speech because he had eulogized Garfield many times before^O) to do so, the plans were made to dedicate the building housing Garfield's tomb and memorializing his life on May 30, I890. On that day Coz spoke publicly of Garfield for the last time. He brought back memories of G arfield's childhood on the Western Reserve, his strong, vigorous, humorous character, his dedication to duty and his country. Garfield was a genial man, with a fertile imagination and a powerful speaking ability. He was a man of many fine qualities, and Coz hoped that his memorial would stimulate future generations "to that nobler manhood which he had and which shall develop our free institutions in all they ought to be."21

D. Coz., "The Future in College Work," Bibliotheca Sacra. XLVI, no. 184, (October, 1889), 577-98. 2®See Coz to B. B. Hayes, February 21, I889, Coz Papers. 21j. D. Coz, Dedicatory Speech of the Garfield Memorial, May 30, 1890, (Cleveland, I890). ^55

The death of Garfield and subsequently many more of

Cox*s contemporaries such as Grant, Sherman, and Hayes in the next few years probably made Cox think more and more about the possibility of his own death in the near future. Although in 1890 he was just sixty-two, he was already suffering some physical problems. Rheumatism had bothered him off and on since the war, while the grippe was also a constant problem. In 1896, while on the way to Franklin, Tennessee, to look over the battlefield where he had fought thirty-two years earlier, in preparation for a book he was writing, Cox had caught a cold which kept him from a ll but necessary work for a month and which kept recurring the rest of his life .22 Coz had come through the war in good health, and he had never had any serious illness. So he kept up all of his activities as if there were nothing wrong, although he found out from his family doctor sometime in the mid-l890’s that he had a heart condition.23

He was prepared for his own death at all times, but he also felt that if he were careful he could live to see the twentieth century. And so, planning for the future, beginning in the late 1880's he began investing all his available money in a real estate scheme begun in Lincoln, Nebraska, by his

22cox to Thomas Speed, February 5» I896, Coz Papers. ^^He kept this fact from his wife, who was very sickly all through these years, though she lived until 1912. Miss Mary Budd Cochran, who knew them then, explained this to the a u th o r. 456 former law student Charles G, Dawes. Buying up most of the side of an entire street there, Dawes set up the Dawes Block Company, renting the office space to legitimate businessmen.^^ By 1893

Dawes had invested #60,000 of Cox*s money (along with some of his own and that of other investors), and was proud that Cox had shown such confidence in him and satisfaction with his stewardship. Dawes gave Cox a guided tour of the holdings in 1893 and convinced the latter that the business was in fine shape and sure to msdce a large p ro fit.^5

But the Panic of 1893; like that of I873, had much to do with reversing that early optimism. Apparently the slacking off of business h it Nebraska also, and in 1895 Cox was in some financial trouble because of it, the failure of his Cincinnati bank in which he lost #2,000, and the lack of success and eventual failure of the Lincoln venture. The lengthening of the law school course to three years, moreover, had deprived him of much-needed income. But though it would be a lean year, he promised to pay a ll of his debts even if he had to dispose of some property to do it.^6 He paid them soon afterward and began recouping some of his losses by investing in Dawes's

Z^ln one building, which he had bought for Cox for $32,000, Dawes found gambling and prostitution. He soon ended that. See Bascom N. Timmons, Portrait of an American; Charles G. Dawes. (New York, 1953); 22. Z^oharles G. Dawes, A Jounaal of the McKinley Years. (Chicago, 1950), August 19-22, I893, 3É-9. Dawes admired Cox as a "great man and a most kind friend of mine." 2^Cox to Charles G. Dawes, December 3; 1895; Cox Papers. 457 newest and more successful venture, the North West General Light and Coke Company of Chicago. But this never paid enough to make up for the Nebraska losses, although after Cox's death Dawes bought back the shares from Cox's sons.

The year 1895» a bad one for Cox financially, was also in one sense a bad one politically too. Always a conservative and an isolationist, Cox was so unhappy at the "Hawaiian annexation scheme afoot" then and the jingoism which he found so rampant that he hesitated to write an article explaining Judge Hoar's resignation from Grant's Cabinet because it dealt with an earlier annexation scheme, San Domingo.^7 When President Cleveland came forth with a particularly bellicose announcement about the Venezuela-England border dispute later that year, Cox felt he had never seen "a more uncalled for act than the President's appeal to passion and excitement. It was an absolutely uncivilized act."28 "Cleveland," he felt,"had thought of nothing but capturing the Jingo support while being blind to the danger of financial embarrassments which would follow ."29 Cox was full of praise for Senator John Sherman's warning to Cleveland to go slow in this m atter,30 and he was probably overjoyed when the whole matter was seemingly cleared up in I896 without war.

^^Cox to H. E. Scudder, March I9, I895, Cox Papers. 28 Cox to E. B . McCogg, December 21, 1895» Cox P a p e rs . 2^Cox to Monroe, December 23, 1895, Cox Papers. 30 Cox to John Sherman, December 21, 895 I , Cox Papers. 458

He was also happy to see William McKinley elected President, in I896, not only "because it "lifted a great load of apprehension from the business community,"3^ but because he felt no annexation or war-provoking schemes would be forthcoming in the future. How wrong he was, he was soon to see. 1897 was a fateful year for Cox because of his last daughter's marriage and his wife, no longer wishing to take care of the large Mount

Auburn house, wanted to m o v e , 32 because of the union of the two Cincinnati Law Schools and his subsequent retirement, and because Cox did not know what to do with himself with this sudden retirement from active life. Accordingly, Cox wrote a long letter to Charles G. Dawes, now chairman of the Republican National Committee and an intimate adviser to President McKinley, detailing these facts and asking Dawes’s advice about keeping his Nebraska investments and his future. Cox was almost sixty- nine, too old, he feared, "to begin a struggle to build up a new law practice." His mind strongly inclined "to accept a retiracy a few years sooner than expected, go to some quiet college town, like Oberlin, put ^ is^ books in the College library, and settle down to" history work as his occupation. He had made the decision "to get into a quiet eddy of the stream" and take a more leisurely approach to life.^^

3^Cox to W. R. Dawes, November 1?» 1896, Cox Papers. 32cox to Alexander McDonald, May 29, 1897» Cox P a p e rs. 33cox to C h a rle s G. Dawes, May 29» 1897» Cox P a p e rs. Cox was in the process of finalizing the final chapters of his M ilitary Reminiscences of the Civil War, which was published posthumously in 1900. 459

To his great surprise, Dawes construed these facts as an opportunity for President McKinley to get out of his dilemma of not being able to find the proper man to be the minister to Spain during this heated time, which was just before the Spanlsh-Amerlcan War. Writing to McKinley on June 5, 1897, Dawes said that though Coz did not seek a political position, "In the hands of no other would the Interests of the country be safer than In those of this pure, fearless, and able man." McKinley replied on June 7: "Can you give me any assurance he would accept? Immediate action Important." Dawes then telephoned Coz long-distance from Chlcago34 to ask him about taking the post. Coz, surprised by this, told Dawes that he was doubtful that his acceptance of the post would be best for himself or for McKinley. He said he did not know Spanish and would not be able to do the Job well. He then asked for a personal Interview with Dawes to discuss the whole matter. Dawes felt that Coz*s objections were weak enough that he could be persuaded to take the position, and he so wired McKinley, adding, "You know his character—unless convinced Is best for all, his personal Interests won’t Influence hlm."^^

In reply McKinley told Dawes to te ll him the results of that conference Immediately. It took place on June 9, 1897,

^^Mlss Mary Budd Cochran personally gave the author an Interesting account of how she and the other nel^borhood children (she lived nezt door to the Cozes) followed Coz down to the comer drugstore idiere he received the call (the Cozes had no phone), thinking It all a great sport and novelty. ^^Thls account Is from Dawes, Journal. 120-2. 460 with Dawes spending two hours trying to get Coz to accept. Coz remained adamant, with his major objections being his lack of knowledge of the Spanish language and his poor health (he was in a state of nervous ezhaustion because of the law school merger in April and May). Hence, Dawes wired McKinleyj “Won't accept if offered. Hare been unable to dissuade." So Coz refused to re-enter government service again for the reasons he gave and for more personal ones which he did not trouble Dawes with. He felt, as he put it, that he was "too conservative in my ideas of our foreign policy to suit the public opinion in or out of Congress, and I might fail on that account...The social influences would have to be cultivated and the salary would be more adequate than e v e r . "36 in addition his "nervous condition was such that the burden of such duties at such a crisis seemed likely to break me down completely." Further "to become the official mouthpiece of current jingoism in regard to Cuba was repellent."37 He felt that a "mixture of all these had weight, and I concluded that such duties couldn't be undertaken. To many of my friends it seemed just the thins, but I couldn't regard it as the offer of a showy vacation, but of work of a very responsible and difficult sort."38 For these

^^Coz to James Ford Bhodes, July 19» I897, Coz Papers, Library of Congress, 87cox to Kenyon Cox (son), July 20, 1897, Kenyon Cox Papers, Columbia University.

88cox to James Ford Bhodes, July 19, I897, Cox Papers, Library of Congress. 4 6 l reasons he had to decline. It was probably best, as he said in the beginning, that he did so.

Once this final attempt to bring him into politics was over, Cox left for Huronla Beach, Michigan, with his wife for a vacation to recuperate from his enfeebled state and to make a final decision as to where to spend their retirement years. On the way to Michigan, the Coxes stopped at Oberlin for two weeks to see if it might be a suitable place. Before they arrived, Cox*s wife Helen, recalling vivid memories of the rundown condition of Oberlin when she lived there as a child, felt it would be an unsuitable place to live. But when they got there, they found Oberlin to have changed considerably since 1851» having become quite a charming and neat village. Helen immediately decided that Oberlin would be quite a satisfactory retirement home, and Cox agreed. They made arrangements to live in a local boarding house, the best in Oberlin,39 and headed for Huronia Beach. Returning to Oberlin in August, rested and near normal in health once again, the Coxes set up their final home and prepared for "retiracy."

One of Cox»s first acts in retirement was to give to Oberlin College Library his personal library of over 2,000 books collected over his lifetim e. He gave the college library

39jt was the best, but even in those days it was fairly shoddy. This was told to the author by Miss Mary Sudd Cochran, who was a student at Oberlin College from I899-I903 and who visited the Coxes at home quite often. 462 the right to catalogue the books and to use them as reference works. Among them were the m ilitary books Cox had been given by the Nation to review. These represented one of the richest sources not only of the most v^uable personal memoirs of the war, but also of Interesting commentary written In the pages by Coz diagnosing the strengths and weaknesses of each work. In return for the books Coz required only that he be given facilities to work with them ard on his own personal memoirs of the war.^® Thus It was that Coz finished his final and best m ilitary work at Oberlin College Library, where he had earlier spent many of his student days learning the ways of peace.

It was peace and the loss of It that concerned Coz soon after his move. In April, I898, the Spanlsh-Amerlcan War began. It ended but a short time later and Coz, who, he himself acknowledged, would have embarrassed President McKinley had he been minister to Spain because of his antl-lm perlalls views, took advantage of his position as book critic for the Nation to put his disgust for the war, jingoism, and the seizure of the Spanish colonies Into public view. In the July 14, I898, Issue Coz reviewed Captain A. T, Mahan's The Interest of America In Sea-Power. This work, published after Mahan's famous Influence of Sea-Power. was a clear call to this country to use her vast power m ilitary to become a force on the world scene. Coz, who felt the country's best foreign policy was

. ^®Thp contract for this transaction Is In the Coz Papers and Is dated January 1, I898. 463 to follow Washington's dictate of "a sedulous cultivation of peaceful relations, a careful avoidance of complication with European quarrels," felt Mahan was the "mouthpiece of the tendency toward aggression. He appeals to tendencies at war with modern ideas of Christian civilization. He labors to stir and arouse a passion for conquest. His real aspiration must be that ploughshares shall be beaten into swords."^1 Clearly Cox felt, with some justification, that Mahan was attempting to reverse a policy revered since the beginning of the republic, and he was angry and dismayed at the fact that many people, including the President, had accepted Mahan's doctrines. Cox had feared the effects of jingoism since 1895i and he now had seen its culmination in war and the resultant colonialism. It was not the way he earnestly believed was best for the nation, and he did all he could to stop this tendency. But thou^ this was a new time, and these were new conditions, the people reacted as they had almost always before: they did not listen to him .

Cox tried to make them listen once again when, early in

1900, he wrote a review of Captain Mahan's work. Lessons of the War With Spain. He began by mocking Mahan's rationale for colonialism by saying, "If you must have despotism by all means let it be bhe maternal despotism Captain Mahan describes for conquered peoples." Cox then tore at Mahan by writing, "As is

D. Cox, review of Captain A. T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, in Nation. (July 14, I 896) , LXVII, no. 1724, 34 - 6. 464 usTial in such self-deluding fallacies, having made an absurd definition of conscience, having divorced it from all criteria of right, the author forgets the common notion of conscience as a God-given judgment in real accord with unselfish ideals, If any of us," he went on sarcastially, "is so belated in progress as still to hold that the gradus ad Pamassum is found in peaceful education and standards of justice, we find here our deserved condemnation. Swords, not ideas, are the rungs of the ladder of human progress.In a review written two weeks before, he had expressed much the same feelings, but with a plea for sanity, saying, "Another war in the Phillipines is probably near its close, another chapter is added to a humiliating tale of incapacity to deal with weaker tribes of men...Ought we not to enter upon the duty of giving to the Filipinos an opportunity for free development and real self- government? "^3 By this time there were a great number of

Americans who felt as he did, but with President McKinley and, later, Roosevelt unwilling to reverse the policy of the new imperialism, even these people were not listened to. It was not a good time for those who called for peace and love of neighbor. Imperialism and war spoke too loudly in the inner circles of government. It was to be some years before the opposite was true, and Cox was not destined to see a change.

42 J. D. Cox, review of A, T. Mahan, Lessons of the War With Spain, in Nation, LXX, no. 1803 (Janua^ lb, I 9OO), 5 5 -b . ^3j. D, Cox, review of P. D. M illet, The Expedition to the Phillipines. in Nation. LXX, no. 1801 (January 4, 1900), 465

Coz spent his last years performing the large group of activities he had become used to doing, even in retirement. He told his son that he "had plenty of work of such a kind to keep me from idleness,His writing and book reviews took up

much of his day, and he gave periodical attention to his positions as a trustee for Oberlin College and the St, Louis and B ig Muddy Coal Company (a C h a rle s G, Dawes e n te r p r is e ) . In addition he occasionally acted as an arbitrator in legal disputes usually between railroad lines and litigants against 45 them. He also kept a close watch on his still unprofitable Nebraska holdings in letters to and from Charles G, Dawes (in the latter of vriiich he would te ll Dawes to te ll McKinley to reverse his unpopular foreign p o licy ), 46 on his vacations in

the 1890*s to the coast of Massachusetts, where he sailed along with his son Dolson, he met and made or strengthened friendships with a great number of eminent scholars, the most prominent of them being James F, Bhodes, the historian, with whom Cox often discussed the Civil War and who gave Cox credit for many of his insights into the war's history,4? it was, indeed, enough to keep him from idleness and make his life almost as active as it had been for the first seventy years,

44 Cox to Charles Norton Cox, November 1, 1899, Cox Papers, 45 Cox to John A. B ice, Ju n e 6, 1898, Cox P a p e rs, 46cox to Charles G, Dawes, March 15, 1900, Cox Papers, 47 'See James Ford Bhodes essay on "Jacob D, Cox" in his H istorical Essays (New York, 1909), a speech which he gave to the Massachusetts Historical Society in October, I900, Bhodes felt Cox was "an agreeable companion, an excellent talker, a scrupulously honest and truthful man, a gentleman," 466

On November 30, 1899, Helen and Jacob Cox celebrated their golden wedding anniversary at a large family gathering at their son Dolson*s large Euclid Avenue home in Cleveland, Ohio. It was a most pleasurable occasion, one which the Coxes would remember happily always. It was also their last anniversary together.on June 3, 1900, Cox telegraphed his son Kenyon, "Shall be off for the coast on Monday,. . .expect me for week September 3-10 as near as may be, wind and weather and the perils of the sea perm itting."^ Soon after that telegram Cox left for Magnolia, Massachusetts, and began his usual vacation. For a month he and his son had a wonderful time, probably enjoying, as he had in 1895» sailing into "the pretty little harbor in Folly Cove, near Halibut, pseein^ the house with the woods behind—the big dolphins for mooring, " a scene he had seen often and always remembered with pleasure.50

Then, on a cruise near Rockland, , on July 25, Cox was seized with a pain in his abdomen. He thought it was indigestion and so did nothing to treat it. But after a day or two, his pain became so great that the cruise was abandoned, and he and his son returned to Magnolia from Maine by train. On July 28 Cox commenced to sink rapidly and he was kept alive only with great difficulty. But then he rallied and for

See Cox's letter to his son Charles, December 2, 1899, for a description of the festivities. ^9cox to Kenyon Cox (son), June 30, 1900, Kenyon Cox Papers, Columbia University. 50cox to J. D. Cox III, March 30, 1895» Cox Papers. 467 several days seemed improved. But he died on August 4, 1900, at 1:00 p.m., the victim of a weakened heart and an attack of an g in a pectoris.Pour days later he was buried in in Cincinnati, Ohio, where his grave and those of most of his family lie under a stone obelisk on which is written "Jacob Dolson Cox, 1828-1900, Soldier, Statesman,

Scholar, Patriot."

There were a great many eulogies of this talented man, but none was more fitting or more heartfelt than one which no one knew of for many years. In his private journal, five days after Cox's death, Charles G. Dawes wrote, "On last Saturday my old friend General Cox died...I studied in the General's law office while attending law school. It was there that I first met him. He was beloved and respected by all of his pupils. To me. General Cox was one of the noblest of men and never in the long years of our acquaintance euad business association was the high ideal of his character, which I formed as a boy, in any way moved or lessened by time. As an instructor, public official, business man, lawyer, and soldier he achieved success. He was a great student and scholar, a man of rugged integrity and unswerving fidelity to high purposes and principles."^2

Cox led a busy life from 18?9 until his death. He was a good family man. His abiding interest in education had led him

^^Cinoinnati Commercial Tribune, August 6, 1900, 4. ^^Dawes, Journal. August 9» 1900, 244. 468 to become one of Its leaders In Cincinnati. He was a prominent citizen in that city and aided it in its times of distress. He refused to reenter politics because he could not agree with contemporary policy. He, like many others, speculated in businesses in the West and was hurt in the Panic of I893. He was a constant critic of all im perialistic ventures and helped set the tone for the reaction to that policy. He was a useful member of society even after he left politics, and he left his mark on history in a great number of fields. He was a man of his age in many ways while being very irrelevant to his times in others. He was a paradox and a paragon, a man of inflexible ideals and principles in an age which seemed to be forgetting b o th , a t l e a s t a s Cox saw them . CHAPTER XX

THE AUTHOR, THE CRITIC, THE MAN

At one time or another in his life Jacob D. Cor was a politician, a lawyer, a soldier, a railroad president, a law school dean, a university president, an arbiter for legal disputes, a microscopist, a school superintendent, and a trustee for several colleges. He had been called to or had come into each because his capabilities were well known. Yet, according to one of his friends, there was yet another position he held at which he did his best work. W, P. Garrison said of Cox: "His m ilitary career and his various writings will be the chief cause for his remembrance by posterity. After the death of John C, Ropes, he was the highest authority with reference to the events and strategy of the Civil War.

I t was in 186? t h a t Cox f i r s t began h i s work a s a m ilitary historian and critic, although only in a minor sense. Cox pointed out, in a letter to Horace Greeley, errors about the that the future presidential candidate

^Wendell P. Garrison, "Jacob Dolson Cox," in Letters and Memorials. (Boston, 1909), p. 3.

469 470 had made in the second volume of his history of the war, American Conflict» He felt Greeley had erred in describing Cox*s movements at South Mountain and Antietam and in describing the order of the troops in the line and the chain of command there. In addition he told Greeley that the rebel "official reports" that he had used were totally unreliable as to the strength of the armies. Greeley accepted the criticism graciously and promised Cox he would change what he could in future editions.2 This was the only m ilitary criticism Cox was to do until 1874, but he already showed signs of his ability to estimate and criticize treatments and their sources which did not come up to acceptable standards.

Cox began his major work as a m ilitary critic for the

Nation^ in 1874 (See Chapter 1 6) through the influence of his friends E. L. Godkin and W. P. Garrison, who offered him the post early that year. They had known Cox for some years, and they had come to realize that not only would he be an able critic and writer, but also that his political, economic, social and intellectual viewpoints coincided with their own and that of their magazine. The Nation and its editor, Godkin,

^Cox to Greeley, April 22, 1867; Greeley to Cox, May 28, 18 6 7, Cox P a p e rs ,

%e thought highly of the Nation and what it stood for. He told his son, "I think you can*t have a better weekly paper for politics, art, literature, etc." Cox to J. D. Cox III, August 9» 1876, a letter in the possession of Mr. Arthur Armstrong, chairman of the board of the Cleveland Twist D rill Company, which J. D, Cox III founded. 471 were believers in Benthamite utilitarianism and Manchester liberalism. "It was their belief that utility should govern the means of attaining the values derived from the natural- rights school...They accepted the Bentham view that the essence of law was coercion...thus liberty starts where coercive law leaves off; and therefore they sought to keep the functions of government to a minimum.. .The assumption was that there could be no basic conflict between enli^tened self-interest and the

public interest...state intervention upset the balanced calculus of laissez faire. They favored a government run by "gentlemen," an unrestrained economy, and a low tariff. They shuddered at the "practical" turn politics took after the Civil War. They felt that men like Grant, Conkling, Blaine, and Butler represented the worst America had to offer in politics. They opposed all reforms except of the civil service. They were, in many ways, elitists yearning for a better world when their word and the natural and inflexible truths they advocated would bring, when accepted, "the greatest good for the greatest

number" in the United States.

It is obvious that Cox fit well into the image expected of a Nation staff member. He was an elitist and a believer in limited government, laissez faire economics, and a low tariff. He was disturbed about contemporary political reality and leadership. He often yearned for an assertion of the traditional and rigid laws which he felt should rule society

^Alan P. Grimes, American P olitical Thought, (New York, i 96 0), pp. 293-4. 472 and economics. Although in his role as a m ilitary book reviewer he had few chances to elucidate such beliefhe to o k full advantage of the opportunities he did have (witness his reviews of Mahan’s works, Chapter 19). When he did so, his views were completely characteristic of the Nation’s philosophy.

Although he had only three books to review from 1874 to 1877, many of the characteristics of his reviewing were already evident in them. When reviewing Joseph E, Johnston’s Narrative of M ilitary Operations, Coz told his readers that the book was "not an historic memoir, but a passionate defense of himself against the South’s charges of having caused their defeat."5 in his review of General W. T. Sherman’s Personal Memoirs, Coz said that Sherman had been wrong in failing to give civilian generals top commands because they were actuated by political ambition.6 In these two reviews Coz showed that he could analyze the difference between volumes of historical defense (a great number of these were published during these years) and true history, that he was not afraid to criticize even his friends if they were in the wrong, and that he would occasionally let hi.9 personal feelings enter into the review.7

% ation. May 21, 1874, no. 464, 333-4. See also his review of J. B. Hood’s Advance and Retreat for his remarks about this quite similar work. Nation, no. 7&9; (March 25» 1880), 236-7. ^Nation, no. 519» June 17, 1875» 411-2. 7He was more prone to do the latter two because the reviews were unsigned, and thus no one knew who did the writing for many years. w

Each of these characteristics, along with many others, were aspects of his critical writings.

Another characteristic, one which was later to cause him to write one of his books, was his displeasure at seeing "narration after narration of those events |The battle of Frankli^ printed without even a solitary mention of his part ir them." He felt it was the luck of men second in command to get ignored for much of their work, and it had happened to him several times during the war, especially at Franklin and Antietam.® It seemed to him that most histories then being written were done in the interest of one commander (or Army) or another, and as such little attention could be given to any others lest the "hero" lost some credit. Cox, whose concern in this regard in part came from his inherent egotism, hoped to remedy the situation someday with a book on Franklin so that the truth could be known.9

Not all of Cox*8 time as an author and critic was taken up with m ilitary matters. In 1879» Henry Adams asked him to help young Henry Cabot Lodge, editor of the International Review, by writing an article about the federal government's Indian policy. Cox bitterly assailed that policy in an article which appeared in the June, 1879 issue. He wrote that the

Q Cox to Emerson Opdycke, January 24, 1876, Cox Papers. 9cox to Comte de Paris, April 12, I876, Cox Papers. The result of this was Cox's The Battle of Franklin, Tennessee, November 30, 1864, A Monograph, published in I897. forefathers had taken Indian lands under the rationalization of "might makes right." The subsequent movement of whites into had been accompanied with even less consideration of their rights. The result had been the Indian warsy Indian subjection and starvation, and the near destruction of that minority race. One attempt, President Grant's (and Secretary Cox's) new Indian policy, had been made to reverse these effects, but it had not lasted long enough to be effective. The only solution, he felt, was to educate Indian children to be useful and equal citizens, arouse public remorse for past sufferings whites had caused, and formulate a new Congressional policy systematizing a ll relations with the Indians. AnytMng less would lead to another desperate Indian war and further national d i s g r a c e . 10 This was to be Cox's last public pronouncement on the Indian question, but it was adequate proof that he was still occasionally concerned for the

red man's welfare.

Early in 1880 Cox became involved in a long controversy which sprang from his m ilitary criticism . In February he wrote Garfield that the actions of a m ilitary board which had recently exonerated General Fitz-John Porter of any blame for General Pope's defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Bun, this after an earlier board (on which Garfield had sat) had court- martialed him for negligence at that battle, were surprising

lOj. D. Cox, "The Indian Question," The International Review. VI (June, 18?9), 6l?-34. — ------475 and eminently wrong. He went on to discuss Porter’s failings and his errors in strategy.When, a few days later, Garfield asked Cox for permission to use Cox’s letter as an argument against Porter in the new hearings in Congress being considered, Cox agreed as long as his name was not used and only the military criticism was. Unfortunately Garfield let the letter be seen by one of Porter’s friends who later read it to Porter. Porter immediately wrote Cox asking why he had written what he had on February 14 and why Cox had criticized him. Cox replied that he and Garfield had always written one another with complete freedom to say what each wished, with no worry about letting it out. Cox told Porter that he had no grudge against him, but had merely given Garfield his impartial and impersonal judgment of the matter. Further, he wanted no controversy over it because he was friendly with the new board members, and thus he refused to send Porter a copy of the l e t t e r . 12

But after he talked with Garfield, who had just been nominated for President, and learned from Porter that the letter was being used as an authority against him, Cox sent the letter to Porter. During the next few months the two spent much time exchanging letters, each giving his side of the matter. In addition Cox, now fully involved, discussed it in a series of letters to General Schofield, a member of the

llCox to Garfield, February l4, 1880, Cox Papers. l^Cox to Fitz-John Porter, June8, 1880, Cox P apers. 476 absolving board, explaining that he had nothing against the board but had only im partially judged it to have made the wrong decision.13 So the debate went, but it reached a climax in September, I88I when Garfield died, thus leaving the final decision as to Porter's regaining his rank with honors to the new President, Chester A. Arthur.

Cox, apparently feeling that Arthur would not judge the matter as Garfield would have, then prepared a paper on the entire matter "as a solemn duty to Garfield," He felt the letter's death had kept the President from disposing of the matter, and so he felt "bound to put his views on it in some permanent form so that it would go into the materials on which a final historical judgment w ill be made up."^^ Thus, on February 28, 1882, before the Cincinnati Society of ex-Army and Navy Officers, he gave a full summary of the entire case and the controversy among himself, Garfield, and Porter. The speech, idiich was later published, explained how he had become involved, why his feelings about the case had not changed (althou^ they should have, for he did not, as he should have, give enou#i credit to the veracity of Confederate sources, which exonerated Porter), and why he felt the judgment against Porter on sound m ilitary principles had to stand if the army was to keep its

^%hese letters are in the Cox Papers. ^^Cox to G eneral I . T. Wood, May 2, 1882, Cox P apers. 477 reputation and the nation's respect.But it did not stand» for on May 4 President Arthur overturned Porter's court- martial in part and left the matter to Congress for final action. A few years later Congress returned him to his former rank» but gave him none of the honors for which he had asked. So ended the Pitz-John Porter case, an interesting example of the way pride and an easily-hurt» overdeveloped sense of honor had made many men lose much of the friendship and even incur the enmity of their associates.

Besides his book on the Pitz-John Porter case Cox also published two other books in 1882. In August» 1880 he had accepted an offer from the Charles Scribner's Sons publishing company to write a small volume on the Atlanta campaign as part of their "Great Campaigns of the Civil War" series of tw elv e volumes.Using his field diary» field reports to General Schofield which he had kept» expert testimony from men like Schofield and Sherman who wrote him of their remembrances of Atlanta» and the sources then extant, Cox took a year to

^^J. D. Cox. The Second Battle of Bull Bun, As Connected With the FTlz-John Porter Case, a paper read before the Society of ex-Army and Navy Officers of Cincinnati » Pebruary 28» 1882» (Cincinnati, 1882). Most later m ilitary historians have felt that Cox was too harsh on Porter, whose rationalizations for his actions were quite adequate. Why Cox felt as he did when so many experts have felt he was wrong is unknown. Perhaps his friendship with Garfield and his "disposition to bear down upon the tendency of commanders not to act unless they have orders was enough" for him! At any rate, he felt he was right, and would not back down. (This quote is from his letter to General Schofield of December 23» 1880» Cox Papers.) ^^Cox to Charles Scribner's Sons, August 20, 1880» Cox P apers. 4?8 write this accurate account of that campaign, which was the test published up to that time.^? It was published early in

1882, just before Cox*s work on Porter.

In the midst of this work on Atlanta. Cox was asked to write a companion volume about the Franklin and Nashville campaigns. He had hoped General Schofield would write it, but when the latter could not find the time, Cox accepted the task. Working on it from October, 1881 to July, 1882, he used his same careful methods of research, this time asking for and receiving letters from almost all of the subordinate officers, including Emerson Opdycke,who were there so as to get as complete an overall picture as he could. In July he turned over the manuscript to Scribner's, and later that year it was published as volume ten of the series, entitled The March to the Sea; Franklin and Nashville.

^?See J. D. Cox, Atlanta. (New York, 1882). ^®He and Opdycke, friends since their days at Warren, had begun a running debate about Franklin in their correspond­ ence, with Opdycke accusing Cox of not giving him enough credit for winning that battle and claiming almost complete credit for it. Cox told him he must give others credit for their share and not imply that he (Opdycke) had done it all, for that was n o t t r u e . When Opdycke published an article in the New York Times which gave Cox little credit for his role there, criticized General Schofield, and claimed all credit for himself, Cox told him "you've had a false idea of the general scope of Franklin for many years." He thus ended the controversy with a tartness he was sorry to use, but which was necessary because of Opdycke's joining the ever-growing school of those who made themselves the perfect heroes while pulling everyone else down. These letters are in the Cox Papers. 479

In writing these Cox attempted to follow some preconceived notions that he had learned would be useful and necessary in his writing. He had seen the growth of Civil War literature become so entangled in controversy that the public was not getting an objective treatment of any part of the war's history. Every author, whether he was a participant or not, was taking sides for one general or army or another and against all others who had any claim on the glory for a victory. If such works as Thomas B. Van Home's Life of Major General George H. Thomas (1882), for example, were to be believed, Thomas was little short of a second coming of the Godhead, while such men as Schofield, Grant, and Sherman were so far below him in integrity, competency and overall worthiness as to be scarcely worth mentioning.Rivalries between leaders had done little more, then, than to becloud the issue of credit for victories, which each claimed only for himself and despite the failings of his rival. It was an age of proud and easily-insulted men, and their memoirs and histories unfortunately showed it.

Cox, who could see this better than most because of his post with the Nation, felt it was best for himself to "let nobody's assertion be the 'end all' of any point of fact." He did his test to get the true history—that is all." He felt that "no man can do more than approximate it and his errors w ill be corrected by someone else who may again err in a

19por Cox's view of this work, see his review in the Nation, no. 903» October 19, 1882, 335-6. 480 d i f f e r e n t way.He had, he insisted, no axes to grind, no great personal rivalries or dislikes, but only an historian's desire to present the facts as they were and let them stand as their own judges. He was inclined to be more kindly to his friends and to himself in his books, but only in a very small degree; and even then he did not attack those whom he did not like or who then or later had become his enemies. Nevertheless his books, when reviewed, were put on one side or the other of some rivalry for honors and were usually declared to be biased if only because they were not one-sided enough in favor of the reviewer's favorite.Cox found this to be true for each of his works, but he did not let it phase him because he knew that he had been as objective as a participant could be and that eventually the passions of the day would die down and a generation less directly committed to the events would come along and be able to see who had been fair, calm, judicious, and objective and who had not.

20cox to Emerson Opdycke, July 25* 1882, Cox Papers, ^^Witness the review of Cox's March to the Sea; Franklin and Nashville by General J. È. Wilson in the New York Sun. October 22. 1882. p. 2, which said Cox was biased against Thomas because he had said Thomas lacked natural aggressiveness and had delayed dealing with Hood at Nashville. Wilson also felt Cox was prejudiced against the Army of the Cumberland because he claimed some credit at Nashville for his own Army of th e O hio. 22 In this context Cox felt the passions of the day were so strong that when he gave his eulogy of Garfield to the Milwaukee reunion of the Army of the Cumberland, he spoke only of Garfield's youth because to speak of Garfield's career as a soldier he would have to bring up his relation with Thomas and discuss his generalship. Since his March to the Sea was soon 481

Cox*s next book was not to come out for fifteen years, so he was little troubled by such considerations until 1897. In the meantime he devoted his time to m ilitary history on his reviews and articles for the Nation. In 1884 he reviewed James B. Fry’s Operations of the Army Under Buell and defended much of Buell’s conduct, feeling he had received too much criticism , and E. D. Keyes’s Fifty Years Observation of Men and Events. Civil and M ilitary, in which he said that General McClellan had always tried to cover his own mistakes by putting the blame on o th e rs .O n July 30, 1885 the Nation contained Cox’s appraisal of the recently deceased General Grant. Cox showed that he still felt the hurt Grant had inflicted on him, but he recognized and wrote in h i^ praise of Grant’s great services during the war. In keeping with this political philosophy, he enumerated Grant’s failings as President but still he knew that the public saw Grant only as a pure and patriotic hero whose enemies criticized him only to hurt him. "As President," Cox wrote, "Grant disappointed many, but the memory of the war years were so strong that this was excused." to be published and it criticized Thomas in some places, he felt it would be best not to bring forth any more tensions, and so he ended his eulogy without dealing with the war. Cox to Monroe, October 14, 1882, Monroe Papers, Oberlin. Cox is regarded as one of the best historians of the war among the participants. His works have been quoted in numerous subsequent books, e.g. Harry Coles, Ohio Forms an Army. Bruce Catten, Mr. Lincoln’s Army. T. Harry Williams, Hayes of the 23rd, and many others.

/« a. , ^^The first was reviewed in the Nation, no. 1005, (October 2, 1884), 291-2, and the second In no. 1011, (November 13, 1884), 421-2. 482

While this obituary was not one of the laudatory type typical of the day, it was lAiat Cox would have called fair and objective, even for one who had known the man well and had become his e n e m y ,^4

He was not so kind to his first commander, General McClellan, whose McClellands Own Storv was, he felt, a compilation full of "blinding self-esteem*" in which "Everyone is a rogue and incapable except McClellan,Cox could not accept such an overwhelmingly biased work, as he had not been able to do with Johnston's or Hood's memoirs, which he believed were so slanted as to make them nearly worthless as history and useful only as means toward an insight into the author's character. In his review of A, L, Lang's compilation. Memoirs of Robert E, Lee. Cox was much more kindly toward Lee because Lee was not one to make excuses, to blame others for his defeats, or to take credit for something he had not done,^^

It was the last of these failings in character in one of his ex-comrades that was to embroil Cox in a controversy over the battle of Franklin in 1889• Early that year a letter appeared in Century magazine criticizing an article it had

24 Nation, no. 1084, July 30, 1885, 8?-9. Cox proved his objectivity even further by praising Grant's Memoirs, published soon after, as a good job done by a great leader, although with typical self-defensiveness. Nation, no, 1098. (Pebruary 25, 1886), 172-4, ------^% ation, no. 1125, (January 20, 188?), 57-8, ^%g,tio n , n o, 1137, (April l4, I 887) , 321-2, 483 printed in 1888 about Hood's Tennessee campaign because it had said General Cox was in command of the line at Franklin. The writer, General D. S. Stanley, "a man of captious disposition with a series of difficulties with other officers to his credit and who despised volunteer or political generals,felt Cox had only been in command temporarily and then only for gathering troops on the line, whereas he (Stanley) had been in charge of the Fourth Corps and was the senior officer there, and therefore in command. In retaliation Cox sent a letter to General Schofield which was published in the same issue of the Century (the editor had sent Stanley's letter to Cox and had asked for a reply before publication), Wiich stated that Cox had sent Stanley a letter in 1881, a copy of which was still in Cox's possession which stated Cox's idea of the battle, Stanley had then replied that Cox's letter was perfectly correct. It said that Stanley had been on the field only fifteen minutes when he was shot and had to leave, only one brigade of Stanley's Fourth Coips had done any fighting, and Cox had been given full command of the line,28 To all this Stanley had agreed in 1881, only to reverse himself in 1889,

Stanley did not wish to be denied, however, and tried to present a reply denying that he had left the field at all and asserting that he was the senior officer on the line printed

^^Smith, Garfield. Life and Letters. I, 358, 28cox to General Schofield, July 9» 1888, John M, Schofield Papers, Library of Congress, 484 in the Century again. When Cox replied to the editor of that journal, who had asked him for proof that Stanley was w r o n g ,^9 and proved his case all over again, the Century refused to print Stanley's reply. Stanley then asked a number of other journals to print it, but, finding no takers, he was forced to publish it in a newspaper notoriously unfriendly to Cox, the New York Sun, on September 22, 1889. By then he had changed his reply so many times that when it appeared it was a study in mud-slinging. Calling Cox "the notorious one-term man, a native Canadian, a m ilitary tramp, a miserable filcher of reputation," and other less edifying things, Stanley failed to give any evidence to back up his case.30 This attack was the real end of the controversy, for it was now clear that Stanley was at least partially unstable mentally and unable to discuss rationally the issue at hand. Cox made no further effort to continue the matter, but contented himself with allowing Stanley to drift off into unreality while ho asked for and received letters from many men who had been at Franklin which reasserted his stand and proved that Stanley was wrong.31

At the time of the Stanley matter Cox was involved in his fourth large-scale m ilitary writing, this the composing of five parts of the Scribner's volumes entitled Battles and

29a. W. Johnson to Cox, March 2, 1889, Cox Papers. 30New York Sun. September 22, 1889, 3.

1889 an fllfe 485

Leaders of the Civil War, a four volume compilation of expert testimony, maps, source material, and narration about the entire war. Cox's five articles, which stretched over seventy-five pages in the first two volumes, concerned such topics as the battle of Antietam, forcing Pox's and Turner's Gaps, West Virginia operations under Fremont, McClellan in West Virginia, and war preparations in the North, with all of which he was intimately acquainted. They served a double purpose for C o x .32 Not only did he have more of his valuable work published, but he also got a start on. publishing his reminiscences. Ever since 1880 he had conceived the idea of someday writing his complete memoirs of the war. From then on he had worked on them whenever he had a chance, and when the offer from Scribner's came he used the opportunity to finish these five parts of his memoirs and a few others. The memoirs would not be finished for twelve years, but they got a fine start in 1888.33

After these works were published, Cox once again confined his work to reviewing. In the next few years he discussed such works as Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America (1888), Leo Tolstoi, The Physiology of War—

32Bichard V. Johnson and Clarence C. Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. (New York, 1887-8), four vols. 3^80 did another section of his memoirs, one which he first discussed at a meeting of the Cincinnati Loyal Legion in a speech entitled, "The Surrender of Johnston's Army and the Closing Scenes of the War in North Carolina." It was published in Sketches of War History. (Cincinnati, 1888), II, 247-76. 486

Napoleon and the Russian Campaign (1888), the Personal Memoirs of P. E. Sheridan (I889), John G* Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln (I89I), and James Ford Bhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, volumes 1 and 2 (1892). He also wrote the obituaries of leading m ilitary and political figures such as Sheridan, Jefferson Davis, W. T. Sherman, and Johnston, and showed In them his growing appreciation of the fact that his old generation was dying out and a new one was taking over.3^

It was In 1895 that Cox decided that he would like to publish a more complete account of the battle of Franklin than he had In 1882. As he said In the Introduction to the new book, he wrote it because "It was a turning point In a decisive campaign. It justified Sherman’s strategy," and because for thirty years he had been urged by his comrades to write It so that a con^lete understanding of It could be had. Also, he wrote, "the matter has been treated Incorrectly for many years and many errors have crept In ,"35 What he meant was, he had not been given due credit for his role In the battle, and the Stanley controversy had only stirred up more anti-Cox sentiment among the Army of the Cumberland veterans.

l4 As of 1893 Cox was the highest ranking officer left from the Civil War, clear proof that most of his friends and superiors were dead or nearing death. ^^J. D. Cox, The Battle of Franklin. Tennessee. November 30, 1864. alRonograph. (New York. 1897). 1. 18. 487

He now meant to set the record straight and to assure that he got his due credit. Going throu^ such complicated procedures as asking the owner of the Carter House, which was in 1865 and still was in 1895 situated in the middle of the Union line at Franklin, to note when the sun set on November 30 so he could know when night began on the same date in 1864, getting testimony from the surgeon who had treated General Stanley at the battle, and using the many letters he had received on the subject since 1881, Coz wrote a thorough account of the battle.3^ All of its circumstances, leading characters, background, and results were carefully recreated. He took care to give everyone, including Opdycke and even Stanley a fitting share of the credit, and his own name as commandant on the line appeared often enough to assure the reader who the commander at Franklin really was. The book was published late in I897, and though it did not sell well because of its limited appeal and the excitement over the Spanish-American War, it was a valuable contribution to the literature concerning that inq)ortant campaign of the war.^^

Coz was also making valuable contributions to the historiography of the nineteenth century in another way during

3^Coz to M. B. Carter, November 20, 1895, Coz Papers. ^^Coz, Battle of Franklin. The last chapter was a summary of the Stanley controversy, and the appendix contained six letters, four, from the days immediately following Franklin, all of which backed Cox*s stand. One of them was Stanley's own report of February 25, I865. 488 the 1890*8. He had met James Ford Bhodes, the industrialist turned historian, in the l870*s, but the two had not become friends until the 90*s when Cox’s sailing during his summer vacation gave him an opportunity to meet a great number of the leading men of Massachusetts. Prom their summer meeting Cox and Bhodes became friends, and they proceeded to correspond with each other concerning historical topics they were both working on at the time. These letters and Cox’s reviews in the Nation were used by Bhodes as important source m aterial for the later volumes of his History in which he discussed the Civil War. As Cox put it, "Bhodes’s volumes already show he was aided in his judgment of men by some of my papers in the Nation, and what more can one wish for such contributions to historical criticism than that they should have a mark in the permanent and more formal works which are w ritten afterward. There is nothing I take more comfort in than in putting a bit of leaven into the lump of history.

Cox proceeded to do that in subsequent years by writing Bhodes over twenty letters concerning war history and his relations with President Andrew Johnson and also by giving Bhodes parts of the manuscript of his reminiscences which he had been working on for many years and which had reached five hundred pages by 1896.39 The evidence of the value of these

3^Cox to Monroe, January 15i 1894, Monroe Papers, O b e rlin . 39cox to James F. Bhodes, September 22, I896, Cox Papers. 489 letters and writings was shown when Volumes 4 and 5 of Bhodes's history came out. In Volume Four Bhodes quoted freely from Cox’s manuscripts, praised Cox’s actions at Antietam, and noted that he jlpiode^ had arrived at the correct number of Confederate and Union troops at Antietam from the "fair and accurate collation and analysis of Confederate field returns by General Cox in his reviews. In Volume Five Bhodes showed his trust in Cox’s estimate of the men at Atlanta in a series of references to letters from and articles by him concerning this topic which he quoted. In addition, Bhodes admitted that his discussion of the Army’s lack of knowledge in the arts of war and their lack of equipment and weapons was owed to "conversations with General Jacob D. Cox. His familiar talk concerning this defect in our administration was fuller than his treatment of it in his Beminisconces and his arguments drawn from long experience and constant observation was impressive."^1 In these ways Cox lent a hand to his younger friend and helped to increase his reputation as one of the first and best historians of general scope of the nation, Cox was happy to do this, for, as he would have put it, his leaven had smoothed some of history’s lumps and that was enough credit for him.

^®In order, these are on pages 133, 152, and 153 of Bhodes’s History of the United States From the Compromise of 1690. IV (New York. 1899). ^^Bhodes, History. V 19 ( OI), 36, 242. 490

After his vacation in the summer of 1897, Coz settled down in Oberlin to write his most famous and greatest contribution to history, his m ilitary reminiscences. This work was to be the major task of his retirement and he hoped to finish it within two years. Having taken up a residence near the college library, he spent long hours in research and writing there, and the work was progressing well when he was forced to de-emphasize it for a while to help Manning P. Force, his wartime friend and a former professor at the Cincinnati Law School, who had begun a life of General Sherman, but had been taken ill and had had to retire from active work. He asked Cox to help him finish the work, and Cox had reluctantly agreed. He devoted part of every day to this task, with Cox's authorship of the section on Atlanta and everything subsequent noted only in the text, for Cox wanted Force to have full credit for it,^2

In addition to this task and the writing of his reminiscences, Cox had still other Jobs, He was still reviewing for the Nation and occasionally the American Historical Review, In fact he was reviewing more books than he had ever done before; from 1897 to 1900 he read and reviewed over twenty-five. He was offered the chance to finish the Comte de Paris's history of the Civil War, but he was forced to refuse because of a lack of time,^3 yet, he did

^^See Manning F, F o rc e, G eneral Sherman. (New York, I 899) , ^^Cox to H, W, Coates, February 2, 1899» Cox Papers, 491 take the time to perform two other less involved tasks: the writing of the article on General Sherman for the 1900 edition of the Encyclopedia Brittanica and the writing of the introduction to and the compiling of the list of entries for the section on the bibliography of the Civil War period for Josephus N. Lamed*s compilation, The Literature of American Hi story : A Bibli ography. Cox finished both tasks early in 1900, shortly before he died, and they remain today as fine examples of his knowledge of the war and its leaders and his ability to judge both capably,

Cox's reviews over these last years of his life were significant because they touched not only on the Civil War (and some of his old friends), but also on many other contemporary events, such as the Spanish-American War and the Boer War, Cox was at his best, of course, when he reviewed such works as General Schofield's Forty-Six Years with the Army (I898), Richard M, Bache's Life of General George C, Meade (1898), G. F, R, Henderson's and the (I898), Rhodes's Volume Four of his History of the United States (1899), and John Fiske's The M ississippi Valley in the Civil War (I900), all of idiich he was able to

^^e was asked to do this by Lamed who knew "no other prominent survivor of the Civil War, having an experience of its realities equal to his, who knew the literature of its history so extensively as he did, and could appraise so much of that literature so Judiciously," J, N. Lamed, editor. The Literature of American History: A Bibliographical Guide, (Boston, 1902), p. 213, 492

discuss in a personal way because of his direct involvement in or personal knowledge of the events described. But he also gave expert testimony about other m ilitary events, such as in his review of the work of a young B ritish correspondent, Winston Churchill, London to Ladysmith via Pretoria concerning the Boer War, the review showing Cox's sympathy with the B ritis h a n d the Spanish-American War and imperialism in his reviews of A. T, Mahan's work (see Chapter 19), which showed his hatred for colonialism and the subjugation of minority p e o p le s .

In all of these reviews, of which the Churchill work was the last he did, he did his best to be fair and to follow the guidelines he had formulated over the twenty-six years he had spent in this position. Throughout his career as a military-book critic Cox showed an appreciation of all good writing and good history, a critical eye for the failings of the authors, and a deeply-imbedded desire to be fair and objective, although he sometimes failed to do so when a matter in which he was involved was discussed. He had a solid knowledge not only of m ilitary and Civil War history, but of all history, and he put this to great use by constantly comparing the events of one time with comparable ones in other periods of history. He had a full understanding of strategy, topography, and the other m ilitary arts, and he often could spot errors in the treatments of any of these in a moment.

^^Nation. no. 1826, June 28, 1900, 501. 493

A fine, easy style, at times a biting wit, at all times a sense of objectivity, a great concern for morality and dislike for corruption and evil, a feeling of appreciation for the men who he felt had done their jobs well: all these characterized

Coz's reviewing.

Coz's reputation as one of the most able memoir-writers of the war was assured when his M ilitary Reminiscences was published in 1900. Late in 1899 he had finished most of this work, and at that time he offered it to Charles Scribner's Sons, who had published all of his previous bo o k s.B u t th e poor sale of Coz's book on Franklin made the company hesitate to publish such a large book (it numbered 1400 pages in manuscript). Then, when Coz showed them that the work covered his entire war career and was of more general interest because of the subjects and men involved than Franklin was, the company consented to publish the work. Coz then began proofreading the whole, and by the time he left for his vacation in Massachusetts in July, 1900, he had completed over 400 pages of this task, all of which Scribner's printed ezactly as he had given it to them because it was so perfectly prepared.4? But he was to do no more proofreading, for on August 4, 1900, he was dead. His stepson, William Cochran, took up the task for him, proofreading the rest of the two volumes and compiling the

^^Coz to Charles Scribner's Sons, September l6, 1899» Coz P apers. 47scribner's to Coz, June 28, 1900, CozPapers. 494

Index for the book. It was published late in 1900, a fitting ho memorial to Cox the soldier and the m ilitary historian.

Cox wrote his M ilitary Reminisoences to reproduce his "own experience in our Civil War and to help the reader to understand just how the duties and problems presented themselves" to him.He djdso by giving the reader a well-written, sprightly account of his career. The book is full of description not only of battles and troop movements, but also of the leaders, conditions, army organization, attitudes of the men, topography, and strategy. Cox's relations with other officers, personal anecdotes, criticism s of the worst features of army life and leadership, and many other interesting facets of the war were all presented in his easy literary style. His reminiscences have few of the self-glorifying aspects which have ruined so mariy other memoirs but rather concentrated on the life Cox lived during the war rather than on the man himself. It is as objective an account as could be expected from a participant, and it gave both credit and blame to those tdio deserved it because Cox, as always, had written the truth as he saw it. As even his avowed enemy, H. V. Boynton (because of a critical review Cox wrote of one of his books), was obliged to write in his review of it: "Pew if any volumes

D. Cox, M ilitary Reminiscences of the Civil War. (New York, 1900), 2 v o ls .

^ I b i d . . V. 495 pertaining to the Civil War equal these in interest...No part of the book should be overlooked by any student of our war h istory.It was a fitting climax to Cox's career as a military historian and critic.

In addition to that career and his many others, he was pursuing another in his leisure time during the same period when he was working on m ilitary criticism and history. As was mentioned before, Cox first became interested in microscopy in Toledo in 1874, and that interest had blossomed in the next few years into an active role as one of the leading amateurs in the field. By 1881, he had written eight articles on such subjects as "M ultiplication by Fission in Stentor Nuclei," (The American N aturalist. X (May 18?6), 275-8)5 "Isthmia Nervosa," (American Journal of Microscopy and Popular Science. Ill (June, 1878), 445-8); and "The Motion of Diatoms," (American Monthly Microscope «^oumal, II (April, 1881), 66-9). By then his work had attracted attention in microscope circles all over the world, and in that year he was elected a Fellow of the Hoyal Microscopical Society.

In 1883 he read a paper on "A New Form of Microscope Stand with Concentric Movement," which he and another Cincinnati microscopist had invented, at the annual meeting of the American Microscopical Society, of which he was a member beginning in

V. Boynton, review of Cox,.M ilitary Reminiscences, in the American H istorical Review. VI (April,"190ITV P02-6.— 496

1882. At that meeting Cox was also elected President of the Society, In 1884 he gave the President's Address to the annual meeting, discussing the controversy between Robert Tolies and another leading microscopist over the best aperture opening in a microscope. He also gave a talk on microphotography (his major interest) by lamplight there which opened up a controversy that lasted for three years. In 1885- 6, he a ls o presented expositions on related topics, while continuing in the next few years to write a great number of articles for the growing number of microscopical journals. In I892 he was once again selected as President of the American Microscopical Society, and he took the opportunity to give a presidential address in 1893 discussing the need for systematic instruction in the technique of the microscope in American universities as a necessary adjunct to a full scientific education,This was his last contribution to microscope literature, for from 1893 on the vision in his right eye, weakened by the use of a spy­ glass at the seaside in Massachusetts, was too blurry for him to do such minute work for fear of ruining the other eye as well.32 Nevertheless he continued his interest in the subject and kept an active contact with all of his associates in order to keep up with the latest developments in the field,

^^This entire account is taken from C, M, Vorce, “Memoir of Jacob D, Cox,“ Tryisactions of the American Microscopical Society. XXII (I900), 1Ô7-202.

^^Cox to Charles P, Cox, March l4, 1893, Cox Papers, 497

Coz was most active as a microscopist from I878 to 1893. During that time he wrote and received hundreds of letters concerning this work from other active microscopists. Although Cox always underrated his own work, feeling he was but an amateur dabbler who was only laying a foundation for real scientists, he always showed in his letters a full understanding of the techniques of the instrument, the lenses, and the subjects he s t u d i e d , 53 His major topic for study was the diatom, a class of minute, unicellular plankton whose skeletons were formed so as to make "vertebrae" on both sides, and the means by which they were photographed through microscopes. Even though he belittled the importance of his work (which resulted in thirty-two articles in microscopy journals from l8?6-93),54 his contemporaries recognized his contributions by twice electing him to the presidency of the American Microscopical Society and, in I89I, giving him the gold medal of honor at the Antwerp Exposition of Microscope Work for excellence in microphotography.

His contemporaries recognized him as a leader in many fields, W, T, Sherman felt that, in 1866, there was no young man equal in politics or in the presentation of able and influential public papers on political t o p i c s , 55 C olonel

53iphese l e t t e r s a r e in th e Cox P a p e rs ,

54a list of these articles can be found in the Cox P apers, ^^W. T, Sherman to Cox, February 13, I866, Cox Papers, 498

Charles W hittlesey, m ilitary engineer for the Department of the Ohio during the war, said of Cox, "As far as practicable he avoided display and applied himself assiduously.. .He had, without pretense, an abiding confidence of success and an ability to do his duty. His demeanor always won his men’s respect where more pretension would not.”^^ After Cox’s death

W. P. Garrison felt sorely the loss of "one who, in a time of decadence, threw all his weight in the scale of that elder Americanism which has undergone so woeful a substitution."^? Cox’s friend Garfield, so different from him, still recognized the intellectual strength and depth of character in Cox. He wrote, "His ^ox’^ mind is of the philosophic cast, he is full of good strong thoughts, though I wish he had more enthusiasm." After a visit with Cox, Garfield said, "He introduced me into a world of new and beautiful things brought out by his microscope...! never visit him without feeling a new impulse in the way of culture and the pleasure is heightened by the fact that the impulse is not from one side alone. His nature and mine are in singular contrast, and yet with so many points in common as to make and keep us f r i e n d s . "58 William Spear,

Cox’s former law partner and later Justice of the Ohio Supreme

5&Colonel Charles W hittlesey, War Memoranda. (Cleveland, 1884), 78-9. 5?Garrison, Letters and Memorials. 4. ^®Garfield said the first on November^4. I876 and the second on October 15» I875, and both are quoted in Smith, Garfield. II, 905. 499

Court, wrote, "His excellence of character was marked and distinguished. At all times, he had an interest and a desire to help young people and to no single person am I so much indebted for assistance and encouragement as to General Cox.

Whitelaw Held, one of his worst enemies because of Cox's stand in favor of President Andrew Johnson and Reid's siding with the Radicals, still wrote in 186?» at the height of that conflict, "He never displayed the inspiration of war, but he generally followed sound rules of war...so correct and prudent was he that on the day of his muster-out he stood higher in the esteem of the Government and the country than he had on any previous day. Without a spark of genius, he was still, perhaps th e m ost m any-sided man in th e arm y. He n e v e r ceased to command respect, and his m ilitary services, beginning with the first troops enlisted in Ohio and continuing until the last were discharged, will never cease to deserve gratitude."^0

Such were the tributes of his friends and enemies, the men who had known and loved (or disliked) him most intensely. They all recognized Cox's talents, his cultured nature, his wide-knowledge, his innate conservatism, his characteristic independence, his manifold abilities in many different fields, and his strong understanding of most contemporary public

^^William Spear to William Cochran, ______1901, Robert Fletcher Papers, Oberlin College Archives. ^®Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War. (Columbus, 1867. 1893), I, 770-7. ------500 problems. They all recognized that this aloof, mannered, cool, scholarly puritan was a man who exuded confidence and strength of character. Because of inability to compromise his beliefs, he lost the fine chance he might have had for reaching the pinaecle of political success, but he was philosophical enough to understand that to have done so would have required him to bend, and he refused to do so. He achieved success in so many other fields that he could afford not to pay much attention to his loss of political stature. He led a full and active life in which he carried out his many occupations with his characteristic verve for work and for doing a job well up until the day he died. And when he died the world lost not only a fine and upstanding man, but also an admirable one.

Cox was a man who b e lie v e d t h a t h i s id e a s and b e l i e f s were above compromise. Prom his earliest years he had been taught to have a strong sense of duty and an uncompromising nature against what he believed was wrong. His experiences at Oberlin College reinforced this concept, and the coming of the Civil War put him inalterably on the side of union, order, and the status quo. It is in this context that his later political career must be analyzed. For when he became, respectively. Governor of Ohio, Secretary of the Interior, a Liberal Republican, and a Congressman, he entered each office with preconceived notions of how he should fill the position, of how the political system should work, and of his role as a leader within the system. In each and every case his views 501 and positions eventually came to be ones with which the majority of the others involved in the system disagreed, Cox, too inflexible, stubborn, and dutiful to his ideals, refused to bend in any of these instances. The obvious result was his departure from each position with a distaste for politics. Thus here is the case of a man with many of the qualities of leadership-intelligence, experience, an ability to get along with others, and, most importantly, an assumption that he should be a leader—whose rigidity in a system which worked on the basis of give and take and flexibility ended any chances he had for political leadership.

In the many non-political roles which Cox played during his life, the elements of non-deviation from his ideals played a much less important part. This in part explains why Cox was much more influential and free from conflict in them. As a railroad president, law school dean, university president, university trustee, school superintendent, and general, his authority was almost completely unquestioned. His ideas about how to perform the required tasks were usually accepted completely. He could act freely (within the confines of certain specific rules and bounds—a comfortable position for a believer in authority), and he did not have to placate anyone by revising his policies. In the other two positions Cox held, as a microscopist and a m ilitary historian and critic, he again was free from any compunction to act other than as he pleased. He was, thus, obviously more comfortable and 502 successful in these positions. Their rules and guidelines were ones in idiich an inflexible believer in his own righteousness could act almost completely as he saw fit—a sine qua non for his participation, longevity, and success.

But whether or not he was a "success” in these positions, Cox did have an enduring effect on the lives of his contempor­ aries and the America of his day in each. As a state Senator he helped to bring Ohio's legislature and people to accept a more radical stand so that they were better prepared to meet the Southern challenge. His aid in preparing Ohio for the war effort and then leading its troops in the early days helped to assure that it would have an adequate and well-trained force. During the war his services as a trustworthy and able officer and his leadership at the battles of Antietam, Franklin, and Wilmington were incalculable aids to the Northern war effort. Because of that work he emerged from the war as a potent political force.

The next phase of his career was important because, first, of his role in defining a stand on the question of the freedman for the returning soliders. His "Oberlin Letter” caused much political debate and added a new dimension to that discussion. But it also deprived Cox of a large constituency, and when he became an outright supporter of Andrew Johnson, much of the rest of his support was lost also, Cox had taken part in the debate on the entire Southern question and had caused much rethinking, but in the end he suffered from his 503 intellectual honesty. His political exile, while self-imposed, was in part a result of the formation of an ideology on Reconstruction radically opposed to his own. The triumph and eventual abandonment of that position was the key to the entire Reconstruction era.

With Cox’s accession to the job as Secretary of the Interior, a new era in that office was begun. A more humane and innovative Indian policy, the first near-complete civil service examination system in an executive department, and a close watch over public land disbursement were started. But Cox was once again out of step with his contemporaries, and his leaving office came in protest to President Grant’s failure to support him. The subsequent uproar over the reasons for Cox’s resignation in part laid the groundwork for the eventual opposition to Grant, the Liberal Republican party.

It was in that group that Cox, acting as a representative of a set of beliefs, both political and moral, which were in some ways outdated, reactionary, and idealistic, worked for the election of a more honest, intelligent, and politically knowledgeable president. When the party, after warnings by Cox against such a move coming about, nominated Horace Greeley, Cox was once again forced by his conscience to leave a political organization. Like many of the other so-called "best men" of his day, he felt contemporary politics and politicians were now to be condemned and left to their own devices. His fight against them had been fruitless, and so Cox became politically inactive 504

(with one exception), supporting the Mugwumps in 1884, but becoming more disillusioned as the years went on.

As a railroad president Cox had little influence on his age. Like many other railroad executives at this time, he fought the effects of panic as well as he could, but to no avail. When the chance to run for Congress presented itself, he accepted with the hope of reversing his past failures with the aid of President Hayes. But once again he was disillusioned, both with Hayes and the system, and, stubbornly refusing to compromise, he left again, never to return. His role in assuring a moderate Bland-Allison Act acceptable to both parties was not enough to make him change his mind.

The]ast years of Cox's life were filled with a large number of activities. As an educator Cox oversaw the education of many Cincinnatians, restored the city's respect for the University of Cincinnati, and made a reputation for himself as a hard-working and safe administrator and a respectable citizen. During that same time he also authored many articles on microscopy and was twice president of the American Microscopical Society at a time when that area of scientific inquiry was making rapid strides toward recognition as a separate and unique academic discipline. Cox also authored a number of monographs on the Civil War, and they, along with his M ilitary Beminiscences and his m ilitary book reviews for the Nation solidified his reputation as the most prolific and 505 active participant-writer concerning that conflict. As such he helped to orient the historiography of the war toward objectivity and to give his contemporaries valuable first hand accounts of the war.

It was in his position as reviewer and eulogist for the Nation that Cox had a strong ideological influence on the nation. A staunch believer in the philosophy represented by the Nation and E. L. Godkin, Cox was to use his position to strongly condemn such contemporary political activities and theories as "Grantism", imperialism, the Spanish-American War, and political corruption. Innately conservative and a student of John Stuart Mill in many ways, Cox acted as a spokesman for political trends and beliefs which he and his readers felt had been abandoned and should be renewed. While it was a losing battle, the Nation staff fought it with some of the best journalism of the day, and Cox added much to that effort.

Such were the effects of Cox’s life on contemporary America. They were not, in general, on the scale of immensity of achievement and influence of his contemporaries and friends like Hayes, Garfield, Dawes, and Godkin, but they were such on th e s c a le o f d i v e r s if i e d a c t i v i t y . Pew men d id so many jo b s so well, and few played so large a role in defining the alignment of political debates on current issues. In the non- political realm his influence was much more positive, and for the same reasons—he acted to assert his leadership in aligning policy of taking stands, but in these situations he went almost 506 unchallenged and was able to act according to his own lights.

Thus Cox always remained his own man—at times to his detriment, at others to his credit. In the process he became one of the most respected and potentially-powerful political leaders of his age and also one of the most disliked and disillusioned. He reached the heights of position in many fields, and the depths of exile in others. He introduced many new and important ideas, practices, and policies into American life, but saw most of them opposed and rebuffed during his lifetim e. His life was in many ways a paradox of achievement and rejection, of success and failure, of power and the lack thereof. It was the life of a leading man of his age—complex, diversified, and influential. It was the life of an inflexible, innovative, interesting, and characteristically- Victorian ideologue. It was a life well-spent. BIBLIOGEAPHY

Personal Interviews, Letters, Family Records Family Record, Cochran and Allen family, in the possession of Miss Mary Rudd Cochran, Monroe, Ohio. Personal interview by the author with Miss Mary Rudd Cochran, March 25, 19&9, Monroe, Ohio. Personal letters from Miss Mary Rudd Cochran to the author, December 14, 1968 to April 6, I 969, i n possession of the author.

II. Unpublished Letters and Papers 1. Cincinnati Historical Society Jacob Dolson Coz Papers, Cincinnati H istorical Society, Cincinnati, Ohio. Oran Follett Papers, Cincinnati Historical Society, C in c in n a ti, Ohi o . Republican Party of Ohio Records, 1864-5, Cincinnati Historical Society, Cincinnati, Ohio. 2. Columbia University Kenyon Cox Papers, Avery Library, Columbia University, New York City.

3 . Congressional Library Jacob Dolson Cox Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. James A. Garfield Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Lucretia Garfield Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Andrew Johnson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress Abraham Lincoln Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress

507 508

William McKinley Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. John M. Schofield Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Carl Schurz Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. John Sherman Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Hayes Presidential Library Ulysses S. Grant Papers, Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Library, Fremont, Ohio. Rutherford B. Hayes Papers, Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Library, Fremont, Ohio.

5 . National Archives Department of the Interior Records, 1869-70, National Archives. House of Representatives, 45th Congress, Committee on Elections Hearings. House of Representatives Library, Room 13-E, National Archives. 6. Oberlin College Library William Cox Cochran Papers, Oberlin College Archives, Oberlin, Ohio "Why General Cox Left Grant’s Cabinet," unpublished manuscript, Oberlin College A rc h iv e s. Jacob Dolson Cox Papers, Oberlin College Archives, Oberlin, Ohio. James H. Fairchild Papers, Oberlin College Archives, Oberlin, Ohio. Robert S. Fletcher Papers, Oberlin College Archives, Oberlin, Ohio James Monroe Papers, Oberlin College Archives, Oberlin, Ohio. Oberlin College Alumni Records Files, Oberlin, Ohio, 509

I«Iinutes of the Meetings of the Trustees of Oberlin C o lle g e , 1876- 1901, Oberlin College Treasurer's Office, Oberlin, Ohio. Treasurer's Office, Oberlin College, Correspondence, 1832- 1907, Oberlin College Archives, Oberlin, O hio, 7. Ohio Historical Society Friedrich Hassaurek Papers, Collection 113, Box 2, Manuscript Department, Ohio H istorical Society, Columbus, Ohio. Ohio Governors Papers, 1866-8, Manuscript Department, Ohio H istorical Society, Columbus, Ohio. William H. Smith Papers, Collection 2, Box l4 and 20, Manuscript Department, Ohio H istorical Society.: Columbus, Ohio. 8. University of Cincinnati Minutes of the Board of Trustees of the Cincinnati College, 1880-97, College of Law Library, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio. Records of the Minutes of the Board of Directors, University of Cincinnati, 1885-9? University of Cincinnati Legal Adviser's Office, Cincinnati, O hio. University of Cincinnati President's letterpress copybook, 1885-9» Assistant to the President's Office, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, O hio.

9. West Virginia University Library Roy Bird Cook Collection, West Virginia University Library Collection, Morgantown, West Virginia. Francis H. Pierpont Papers, West Virginia University Library Collection, Morgantown, West Virginia. 10. Western Reserve University Library

Jacob Dolson Cox Papers, Western Reserve H istorical Society Library, Cleveland, Ohio. 510

HT. Unpublished Theses and Dissertations Ewing, James Rees, "Public Services of Jacob Dolson Cox," unpublished dissertation, John Hopkins University, I 8 9 9. Falk, Patrick, "‘Our Prank»; the Congressional Career of Frank H. Hurd, 1872-1886," unpublished M.A. thesis. University of Toledo, I 9 6 8, Jaering, Margaret M., "Jacob Dolson Cox, His Political C areer I 865-I 8 7 2," u n p u b lish ed M.A. T h e sis, University of Cincinnati, 1 9 6 2. Pry, George Louis, "Jacob D. Cox; His Career in the Legislature and as Governor of Ohio," unpublished M.A. Thesis, Ohio State University, 1950.

IV. Published O fficial Documents 1. United States Congressional Globe. 4lst Congress. Congressional Record. 45th Congress. House of Representatives, 56th Congress, 2nd Session, House document no. 510, A History and Legal Digest of all the Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives from 17&9 to Î 9Ô1I , (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1 9 0 1). House of Representatives, 4lst Congress, 3rd Session, House Report no. 24, "William McGarrahan," parts 1 and 2, (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1871). Journal of the House of Representatives, 45th Congress, (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1877-9). Official Records; The War of the Rebellion; a Compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies, (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1880-97), 70 vols. Report of the Secretary of the Interior, House of Representatives, Executive Documents, 4lst Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1869). 511

Report of the Secretary of the Interior, Rouse of Representatives, ExecuWve Documents, 4lst Congress, 3rd Session, part 4, (Washington: Government Printing Office, I 8 7 0).

2. Ohio Executive Documents, State of Ohio, 1866 and I 8 6 7, (Columbus ; lT D. Myers and Bro,, State Printers, 1867 and 1868). Ohio Senate, Journal of the Senate of the State of Ohio of the 54th General Assembly, LVI, (Columbus : Richard Nevins, State Printer, I 860 and 1861). V. Newspapers Ashtabula (Ohio) Sentinel Augusta (Georgia) Daily Constitutional Cincinnati Commercial Cincinnati Commercial Tribune Cincinnati Enquirer Cincinnati Gazette Cincinnati Volksblatt Cleveland Herald Cleveland Leader Cleveland Plain Dealer National Republican (Washington) New York Sun New York Times New York Tribune Ohio State Journal (Columbus) Painesville (Ohio) Telegraph Raleigh Progress 512

Richmond Sentinel Richmond Whig Toledo Blade Trumbull ( county; Ohio) Democrat Washington Dally Momlng Chronicle Western Reserve (Ohio) Chronicle Western Reserve Transcript Western Reserve Transcript and Whig VI. Published Letters, Diaries, and Memoirs Adams, Henry, The Education of Henry Adams. (New York: The Book League of America, 192Ô). Bancroft, Frederic,, ed.. Speeches. Correspondence, and Political Papers of Carl Schurz. (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, The Knickerbocker Press, 1913)# 6 v o ls , Blaine, James G,, Twenty Years of Congress, (Norwich, Connecticut: The Henry Gill Publishing Company, 1 8 8 6) , 2 v o ls , Brlnkerhoff, Roellff, Recollections of a Lifetime. (Cincinnati : The Robert Clarke Co., 1900). Brown, Harry James and Fred B. William, eds., The Diary of James A. Garfield, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, I 9 6 7) , 2 v o ls . Carter, Harold Dean, Henry Adams and His Friends. A Collection of His Unpublished Letters^ (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 19^7). Cox III, Jacob Dolson, Building an American Industry: The Story of the Cleveland Twist D rill Co, and Its Founder. an Autoblography. (Cleveland: Cleveland Twist D rill Co,, 1 9 5 1), Dawes, Charles G,, A Journal of the McKinley Years, ed. by Bascom Timmons, (Chicago: The Lakeside Press, R. R, Donnelly and Sons Co., 1950), Ford, Worthington C,, ed,. Letters of Henry Adams. (Boston: Houghton M ifflin & Co,, 1930), I (1858-1891), 513

Garrison, W. P., Letters and Memorials. (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1909). Grant, Ulysses S., Personal Memoirs. (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 109^). Hood, J, B,; Advance and Retreat. (New Orleans: G. T. B eauregard, 1880). Resolutions Adopted by the Board of Trustees of Oberlin College, March 6, 1901, in Oberlin College Archives. Schurz, Carl, The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz, (New York: The McClure Co., 1908), III. Sherman, William T., Personal Memoirs. (New York: Charles L. Webster & C o., I 89 1) , 2 v o ls , Sherman, John, Recollections of Forty Years in the House. Senate, and Cabinet. (Chicago; The Werner Co., 1895), 2 vols. Testimonial of the Board of Trustees of the Cincinnati College in honor of Hon. Jacob D. Cox, November 3 0 , I 89 7, Oberlin College Archives. Thorndike, Rachel Sherman, ed., The Sherman L etters. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1894). University of Cincinnati, Report of Committee on the University as to Plan of Organization, etc., J. D. Cox, Chairman, (Cincinnati: Black & Co., Printers, 1872). Vorce, C, M., "Memoir of Jacob D. Cox," Transactions of the American Microscopical Society. XXII (1900). 197- 2 0 2. Watterson, Henry, "Marse Henry." an Autobiography, (New York: George Doran Co., 1919), 2 vols. William, Charles Richard, ed.. Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes. (Columbus; Ohio Archeological and Historical Society, 1922-6), 5 v o ls . VII. The Writings of Jacob D. Cox 1. Addresses, Speeches, Interviews Address before the Grand Army of the West Reunion at Chicago, December 1 5 , 1868, copy in Cox P a p e rs . 51^

Campaign Speech at Mt. Gilead, Ohio, opening of Campaign, August 21, 186?, printed copy in Oberlin College Archives. "The Currency." Speech at Cleveland, S^tember 24, 18671 Copy in Cox P a p e rs, Campaign Speech, August 28, I 8 7 6, Toledo Opera House, Toledo, Ohio, printed copy in Oberlin College Archives. "Common Schools; Their Relation to the State and the Colleges," before the convention of Teachers at Springfield, Ohio, July 2, I 867, copy in Cox P a p e rs. "The Democratic Party; Its Dissolution the Condition of Political Progress and Reform," Speech at Hamilton, Ohio, August 23, I 88O, copy in Cox P a p e rs. Dedicatory Speech of the Garfield Memorial, Cleveland, May 30t 1890, (Cleveland: Garfield Memorial Association, I 890). "The Emancipation of Science," address to the Columbiana Co., Teachers Association, Salem, Ohio, October 26, 1853» (Salem; John Hudson Printers, 1853). "Fairs," address before the Agricultural Society of Trumbull County, Ohio, September 15» 1853» copy in Cox P a p e rs. "H istorical Maxims for Troubled Times," address before the Law Department of Yale College at Commencement, June 27* 1877» (Toledo: Blade Printing and Paper Co., 1877). Inaugural Address of Jacob D. Cox, Governor of Ohio, delivered before the Senate and House of Representatives, January 8, 1866, (Columbus; Richard Nevins, State Printer, 1866). "Music," address before the band convention, Warren, Ohio, May 19» 1853» copy in Cox Papers. "George Ward Nichols," address before the Cincinnati College of Music, March 4, I 8 8 7, copy in Cox P a p e rs. Oration at the Unveiling of the Soldier’s Monument, Fremont, Ohio, The Fremont Journal, August 7, 1885» 2. 515

”Our Country’s New Era," address to the Society of Alumni of Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, June 25, 1873, published by the Society, 1873. "President Lincoln at Antietam," speech to the M ilitary Order of the Loyal Legion of the U, S., Cincinnati, May 21, 18?4, copy in Cox P a p e rs. "Public Life of James Monroe," Memorial of Hon. James Monroe, October 30, 1898, (Oberlin C o lleg e, 1 8 9 8). "The Republicanism of the English Government," address to the Association of Alumni of Cincinnati Law School, May l4, I 8 7 9, (Cincinnati: A. H. Pugh, Printer, I 8 7 9). "Washington, the Citizens Example," address on Washington’s birthday. Union League Club of Chicago, Exercises in Commemoration of Washington’s birthday, (Chicago: P. P. Petibone & Co., printers,1889. "The Youth and Early Manhood of Gen. James A. Garfield," oration, reunion of the Army of the Cumberland, Milwaukee, 1882, copy in Cox P a p e rs. 2. Historical, Political, and General Writings Circular Address to the Citizens of Cincinnati, (? , 1885 (?) ), copy in Cox P a p e rs. "The Civil Service Reform," North American Review, LXII (January, I 87I ) , 8I-II 3 . "The Future in College Work," Bibliotheca Sacra, XLVI (October, I 889) , 577^W T "Growth of the History of the Rebellion,"manuscript in Cox P a p e rs. "The Hayes Administration," A tlantic Monthly. June, 1893, 818-32. "How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney General," Atlantic Monthly, August, I 895, 162-73. "The Indian Question," The International Review, VI (June, 1879), 6l7-3%il 516

Letter to Century Magazine, LIII (February, 1897)i 6 3 3, "Why the Confederacy Failed,"

Letter, February 26, I 86 6, to General George B. Wright, Chairman, Ohio Union Central Committee, Columbus, Ohio, read to Republican representatives of Ohio containing the report of a conversation with President Andrew Johnson upon his veto m essage, copy in Cox P a p e rs, "A Model Soldier," The Bugle, I, no, 3i 1.

N a tio n , 161 articles, reviews, obituaries, etc, from 1874- 1900, "Period of the Civil War, I 86O-I8 6 5,” J. N, Lamed, ed,, The Literature of American History; A Bibliographical Guide, (Boston: Houghton, M ifflin, & Co,, 1902), 213-60. "Philosophical Notes," 3 vols,, Oberlin College L ib ra ry , "Reforming Our English," Bibliotheca Sacra. XLI, no, l64 (October, 1884), 761- 8 6,

"&ifu8 King," The Green Bag. (May, I 891), copy in Cox P a p e rs , "The Surrender of Johnston’s Army and Closing Scenes of the War in North Carolina," Sketches of War History. (Cincinnati, I 888), II, 247-76, University of Cincinnati, Special Report of Jacob D, Cox, President, presented to the ^oard of Directors, December 17, 1888, printed by resolution of the Board, copy in Cox Papers, "Why the Men of ’6l Fou^t for the Union," Atlantic Monthly. LXIX (March, 1892), 22-35, parTT: 3 . Books A tlanta. ("‘■'‘ew York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1882), IX, The B attle of Franklin, Tennessee. November 30. 1864, a Monograph, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 189 7). Concluding chapters of Manning F, Force, General Sherman. (New York: D, Appleton & Co., 1899), 517

The March to the Sea; Franklin and Nashville, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 18Ô2), X. M ilitary Reminiscences of the Civil War, (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1 9 0 0), 2 v o ls . The Second Battle of Bull Run as Connected with the Fltz-John Porter Case"; a paper read before the Society of ex-Army and Navy Officers of Cincinnati, February 28, 1882, (Cincinnati: Peter G, Thompson Co., 1882). "War Preparations In the North,” pt. 1, 84-98; "McClellan In West Virginia," I, pt. 1, 126-48; "West Virginia Operations under Fremont," II, p t , 1, 270- 8 1; "Forcing Fox's Gap and Turner's Gap," II, pt. 2, 583-90; and "The Battle of Antietam," II, pt. 2, 583-90; In E. V. Johnson and C. C. Buel, eds.. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1807-8), 4 vols. 4. Microscope A rticles and Speeches (In chronological o rd e r) "M ultiplicity by Fission In Stentor Nuclei," The American N aturalist. I (May, I 8 7 6), 275-8. "Isthmia Nervosa," American Journal of Microscopy and Popular Science, III (June. 1878). 126-30. "^he Smallest Insect Known (Pteratomus Putnaml)," American Journal of Microscopy and Popular Science. II (July. 1Ô7Ô). 446-8.

Translation of Breblssonla, Eevue Mansuella Illustrée, "D'apo]:gle et de Micrographie Botanique," American, Journal of Microscopy and Popular Science. Ill (August. 1Ô78). 13-14. Translation of Prof. Abbe of Jena, "Angular Aperture," American Journal of Microscopy and Popular Science. Ill (September. 1878). 209-10. "Professor Abbe on the Defining and Eesolvlng Powers of the Microscope," Amerlcan Joumal of Microscopy and Popular Science. Ill (ôôtober, 187Ü), 223- 4 . "Sulcrella Cratlcula, an Abnormal Form of Navlcula Cusplda," American Journal of Microscopy and Popular Science, IV (May. 1879). 97-100. 518

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"The Actinic and Visioal Forms in Photo-Micrography with H i^ Powers," American Monthly Microscope Journal, VI (October, 1885/, 193-5» "Some Diatom Hoops," Proceedings of the American Society of Microscopists, 18^5» 1-5. "Microphotography," Proceedings of the American Society of MicroscopistsT 1&86, 1-12, "Diatoms: Their N utrition and Locomotion,'* The Microscope, (July, I 89O), 196-202. "New Apochromatic Objectives," The Microscope. (June, I 8 9 0) , 1 6 4 -8 . "Deformed Diatoms," Proceedings of the American Society of MicroscopistsT 1890, 1 -6 . "Diatom Structure-The Interpretation of Microscopic Images," Journal of the New York Microscopical Society, VII (April, 1 8 9 1) , 73-87. "A Plea for the Systematic Instruction in the Technique of the Microscope at the University," presidential address, American Microscopical Society, Proceedings of the American Microscopical Society, 1093, 1-21. VIII. Books Ambler, Charles H.., Francis H. Pierpont; Union War Governor of Virginia and Father of West Virginia, (^hapel H ill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1937). Archer, W. B ., Memorandum History of the Department of the Interior, (Washington: Government Printing O ffic e , 1 9 1 3). Auer, J, Jeffrey, "Jacob D. Cox, I 866- 8," in The Governors of Ohio, (Columbus, The Ohio H istorical Society, 19 5 4 ). Badeau, Adam, Grant in Peace; From Appamatox to Mount McGregor, (Philadelphia: Hubbard Bros., 1888). Balles, Clarice Lorene, "Jacob Dolson Cox in West Virginia," West Virginia History, a Quarterly Magazine, VI (O ctob er^ 1944 ) , 5 -5 8 . 520

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