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JCO Criticality Accident Three Years On: Questions Still Unanswered

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JCO Criticality Accident Three Years On: Questions Still Unanswered TOKYOSep./Oct. 2002 NUKECitizens' Nuclear INFO Information Center No. 91 3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003, JAPAN URL: http://www.cnic.or.jp/ e-mail : [email protected] JCO Criticality A c c i d e n t T h r e e Ye a r s o n : Q u e s t i o n s S t i l l U n a n s w e r e d A survey assistant explains about a survey form of the effects of JCO criticality accident to the residents near JCO Co. on February 2002 (Naka-town, Ibaraki Prefecture. Photo by Noboru Kobayashi) Three years have passed since the JCO the Japan Congress Against the A- and H- criticality accident occurred on 30 September Bombs together organized the “JCO Criticality 1999. This article reviews results of the second Accident Comprehensive Assessment Com- field survey of Tokai-mura (Tokai Village) and mittee” in 1999 and issued a report in Septem- Naka-machi (Naka Town) residents, carried out by the JCO Criticality Accident Comprehensive CONTENTS Assessment Committee in February 2002, and JCO Criticality Accident Three Years on: summarizes the current status of trials concern- Questions Still Unanswered 1-3 The 14th International Summer Symposium on ing the JCO criticality accident that have not Science and the World Affairs 4-5 been covered since Nuke Info Tokyo 86. Data: - Japanese Pu stockpile 6 - Workers’ exposure 7 The JCO accident left deep scar TEPCO postponed Plu-thermal plan 8-9 Anti-Nuke Who’s who: Toshiko Baba 10 Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center and News Watch 11-12 Sep/Oct 00 No.91 Nuke Info Tokyo ber 2000 (See NIT 80). The Committee has been resolved, and 64 percent of them still had been supported by the TOYOTA foundation in concerns for the effect that the radiation may assessing the JCO accident since November still have on them. 2001. In February 2002, more than two years 76 percent of them indicated a negative atti- after the September ‘99 accident, the JCO tude toward the installation of additional nucle- Committee members carried out a second field ar facilities in Tokai Village. 46 percent of survey of Tokai Village and Naka Town resi- them opposed the hosting of the ITER (Inter- dents. national Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) The survey was carried out as a part of a in Naka Town, while 24 percent favors hosting series of research surveys begun in Febru- the ITER project. In addition, more than half ary 2000, and which have been led by Koichi of the participants replied negatively to the Hasegawa, a professor of environmental soci- question suggesting that they would rather not ology at the Graduate School of Arts and Let- talk about topics relating the JCO accident and ters, Tohoku University, and Yuko Takubo, an nuclear power. Although the JCO criticality assistant professor of sociology at the College accident left local residents with deep scars on of Environmental and Disaster Research, Fuji the one hand, the opinion survey enlightens on Tokoha University. The aim of the surveys is how the accident has affected them and in what to examine current health condition of the resi- way the community of this area has changed; dents, the effects of the accident on their daily i.e. it can be seen that they have begun an open activities, and their opinions regarding nuclear discussion regarding nuclear power among power. themselves. As a result of this survey, 1,008 question- naires were completed from 535 households. The ruling on the JCO trial will be The recovery rate of 77 percent from the sam- delivered next spring ple households indicates keen interests among local residents about this issue. Prof. Hasega- On April 23, 2001, the first JCO public trial wa reported on the results and analysis of the was held at Mito district court, where the pub- survey in Tokai Village in April and in Tokyo lic prosecutor described how the JCO relent- in May. lessly continued its operation, resulting in the The results of the survey show that those death of two of their staff. Since then several who have been suffering from mental and hearings have been held to question witnesses. physical complaints have Table 1. Correlation between distance from the JCO site and the awareness of increased as compared to physical abnormalities 2 years ago, whose results were more than antici- not changed not feeling well in bad health Total within 350m 27 12 4 43 pated, and it was found to 62.8% 27.9% 9.3% 100% be statistically significant 350-500m 138 12 2 152 that those living closer to 90.8% 7.9% 1.3% 100% 500-1000m 187 24 3 214 the accident site tended 87.4% 11.2% 1.4% 100% to claim higher rates of 1000-1500m 253 20 4 277 abnormalities (Table 1 91.3% 7.2% 1.4% 100% and 2). 25 percent of the 1500-2000m 282 16 5 303 93.1% 5.3% 1.7% 100% participants who have Total 887 84 18 989 received medical diagnosis 89.7% 8.5% 1.8% 100% check-ups by Ibaraki Pre- upper: number of responses fecture reported that their lower: % χ2=43.217, d.f.=8, p<0.0012 anxiety and fear have not Nuke Info Tokyo Sep/Oct 00 No.91 Mr. Yokokawa, one of the workers Table 2. Correlation between distance from the JCO site and the num- at the scene, testified in February ber of cases who have physical abnormalities and the testimony of five defen- 0 1 to to 9 10 Total dants’ were followed. The hear- within 350m 29 2 7 5 1 44 ings were completed in June. It 65.9% 4.5% 15.9% 11.4% 2.3% 100% is expected that the prosecutor’ 350-500m 115 12 19 4 3 153 75.2% 7.8% 12.4% 2.6% 2.0% 100% s as well as the defendants’ final 500-1000m 169 25 15 5 4 218 speech and recommendation for 77.5% 11.5% 6.9% 2.3% 1.8% 100% punishment for the accused will 1000-1500m 221 21 34 7 0 283 be made at Mito district court 78.1% 7.4% 12.0% 2.5% 0.0% 100% 1500-2000m 254 26 22 6 2 310 on September 2 and October 21 81.9% 8.4% 7.1% 1.9% 0.6% 100% respectively. A ruling in this case Total 788 86 97 27 10 1,008 is expected to be handed down at 78.2% 8.5% 9.6% 2.7% 1.0% 100% upper: number of cases the end of this fiscal year (next lower: % 2=33.728, d.f.=16, spring). χ The trial of the JCO case was taken place after each defendant tion of Nuclear Accident and Failures in the confirmed and agreed to the basic facts of the NSC and during the criminal trial. indictment. Defendants claimed that various It was extremely regrettable that human factors, along with an error made by the JCO, relationships between the PNC and the NSC, were involved in the cause of the accident. It is and a detailed account of how and why a “pre- known that the JCO conversion building where cipitation tank” was used in the JCO factory, the incident took place passed a safety inspec- have never been uncovered. tion in 1984, fifteen years before the accident. With regard to the economic damage caused However, the inspection was very superfi- by the accident, a fermented soybean produc- cial, and this is thought to be one element in tion company has filed a suit, seeking 18 bil- the cause of the accident. It was revealed for lion yen compensation against JCO. A fish the first time in the course of the trial that the retailing company and a marine products com- appointed safety inspector from the Science pany have brought cases to seek reparations of and Technology Agency (STA) had been con- 56 million yen and 80 million yen respectively. tracted out from Japan Nuclear Cycle Devel- In September 3 of 2002, three local residents opment Institute (JNC), formerly the Power appealed to a court for compensation for dam- Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Cor- age to their health. All the trials are currently poration (PNC), which had submitted an order ongoing. for uranium processing from JCO. It was also The JCO Criticality Accident Comprehen- stated during the trial that the PNC repeatedly sive Assessment Committee is planning to demanded that the JCO should carry out rush issue an interim report (in Japanese) in Sep- jobs for them. tember 2002. (The final report is expected to Since the PNC and the STA have not been be issued in the autumn of 2003). The interim charged with any crime for this trial, their report will include the committee members’ responsibilities have not been fully unveiled. reports on the status of the trials mentioned In particular, there has never been any official above, the results of the field survey of local investigation of the members of the Commit- residents, and problems associated with disas- tee on Examination of Nuclear Fuel Safety in ter prevention measures. By Satoshi Fujino the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), which approved JCO’s safety inspection, during the session of the Special Committee on Investiga- Sep/Oct. 00 No.91 Nuke Info Tokyo Attending the 14th International Summer Symposium on Science and the World Affairs I had an opportunity to attend an interna- However, their specialties were not limited to tional symposium entitled the “14th Interna- only nuclear engineering but to other special- tional Summer Symposium on Science and the izations such as laser physics and space engi- World Affairs,” which was held at the Univer- neering.
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