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The Future of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 7 Increased TOKYOJan./Feb. 2009 No. 128 NUKECitizens' Nuclear INFO Information Center Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5 Sumiyoshi-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-0065, JAPAN Phone: +81 3 3357 3800 Fax: +81 3 3357 3801 URL: http://cnic.jp/english/ e-mail : [email protected] The Future of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 7 increased. The Niigata Prefecture subcommittee which is looking into the earthquake and the ground condition held its first meeting in March 2008. As of mid-January 2009 it had met seventeen times. Strange as it may seem, and contrary to a statement by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a press release dated December 5, scientific opinion remains divided about the cause of the July 2007 Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake. Pro-nuclear academics say it was caused by the so-called F-B Fault (refer NIT 125). They base their assessment of potential future earthquakes and the design-basis earthquake ground motion ("Ss") Citizens challenge official results by carrying out on this fault. Back-checks (refer NIT 124) were their own boring around the KK-NPP site. carried out for all Japanese nuclear power plants n December 11, the Nuclear Safety to assess seismic safety in the light of new seismic Commission (NSC) announced its guidelines adopted in September 2006. In the case conclusion that, with a few provisos, of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, Ss was assessed on the Othe Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-7 Nuclear Power Plant basis that the F-B Fault was 36-kilometers long. (KK-7) is safe. NSC's conclusion was based on On the other hand, more critical scientists consideration of the results of the Nuclear and believe that the F-B Fault branches off from a Industrial Safety Agency's (NISA) inspection and shallow part of the Eastern Boundary Fault of assessment of the plant. However, moves towards the Sado Basin (see NIT 124), which they say is restarting the plant have not proceeded as NSC 50-70 kilometers long. They claim that this fault is planned. The reasons are as follows: more important for understanding the Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake and the type of earthquakes that could 1) The debate in two subcommittees established arise in future. If that is so, the magnitude predicted by Niigata Prefecture remains polarized on for future earthquakes would be larger than the fundamental issues; officially accepted estimate. Clearly, the design- 2) NSC and pro-nuclear academics were unable to answer questions posed by citizens during a Contents debate sponsored by the above two subcommittees (Kariwa, December 23) and a hearing for local Future of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 7 1,2 residents sponsored by NSC (Kashiwazaki, Replacement of Hamaoka Units 1 and 2 3,4 December 25); Rokkasho Vitrification Problems 5,6 3) In the course of work aimed at restarting the Maps of Nuclear Facilities in Asia 7-8 plants, there have been several fires and injuries, Book Review: JCO - A Slow Death 9 with the result that mistrust towards Tokyo Group Intro.: Saga's Next 100 Years 10 Electric Power Company (TEPCO) has if anything News Watch 11,12 Jan./Feb. 009 Nuke Info Tokyo No. 18 basis earthquake ground motion should also be set maintain that while there is a grey zone, it is not higher, contradicting the conclusion handed down relevant from the point of view of safety. This issue by NISA and NSC. relates to the question of whether to consider KK-7 The pro-nuclear academics justify their separately from the other units (see NIT 127). It position on the grounds that an ultra-sound survey will be very interesting to see how this debate conducted in August 2008 by NISA off the coast of develops. Kashiwazaki failed to detect the Eastern Boundary An issue relevant to the work of both sub- Fault of the Sado Basin. However, despite the committees is how to interpret the fact that the fact that the survey was carried out directly above reactor and turbine buildings have continued to the fault plain that gave rise to the Chuetsu-Oki move since the earthquake. TEPCO has measured Earthquake, it was unable to locate that fault plain. the elevation of the buildings on three occasions Hence, it is not possible to conclude that faults since the earthquake - immediately after the do not exist on the basis of off shore ultra-sound earthquake, in February 2008 and again in August surveys. The critical scientists make this point 2008. There are suspicions that the continued and state that it is necessary to carry out a proper movement could be because the bedrock has geomorphological assessment of the region. broken up, or for some other similar cause. The other sub-committee is looking into Alternatively, it could be related to the Madogasaka equipment integrity and earthquake resistance and Fault, which NSC claims is not active. safety. It held its twelfth meeting on January 13 During the December 23 meeting in Kariwa this year. However, the committee members still do Village hosted by the Niigata Prefecture sub- not agree about whether or not KK-7 is safe. committees, the chair of the subcommittee into TEPCO's assessment of the plant's integrity equipment integrity and earthquake resistance and is based on visual inspections of equipment and safety, Haruo Yamazaki, responded to a question computer calculations. Cross-checks by the Japan with an example of a nuclear power plant floating Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) found on a cup of starch. When construction of the locations where the stress incurred was near the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant was first permitted limit. JNES confirmed the integrity planned, people said it was like building a nuclear of these locations after repeating the checks. In power plant on tofu. Now we find that the ground regard to locations which cannot be accessed due on which the plant is built is no more solid than a to high levels of radiation and locations where the cup of starch. confined space makes it impossible to insert testing On January 7, the mayor of Kashiwazaki equipment, judgments were made on the basis of stated in his New Year press conference that local calculations, or checks on similar parts elsewhere approval is required on two occasions, before and in the plant. after start-up tests of KK-7. His statement suggests However, as a result of the far greater than that the bureaucratic processes are in motion. The predicted ground motion, it is possible that plastic Japanese fiscal year ends on March 31. We expect deformation (refer NIT 125) could have occurred, there will be lots of maneuvering until then. even though there is no visible deformation. Unless pieces are cut out and metallurgical tests are carried Yukio Yamaguchi (CNIC Co-Director) out, there is no way of checking this with certainty. Haiku for the season The only method that the pro-nuclear side has come up with is "hardness testing", but this method a camellia is not accurate enough to detect strain in the key dropped quietly 0.2% ~ 2.0% range. Consequently, a grey zone no one noticed but me remains where any judgment is mere guess work. The sub-committee members do not necessarily by Sachiko Kondoh agree about this grey zone. At the January 13 Comment meeting TEPCO claimed that there is no grey Japanese are spooked by the falling of camellia zone. It says that the computer calculations are flowers. The flowers do not drop petal by petal. sufficiently conservative and that it knows from Rather, the whole flower falls at once. Japanese vast accumulated experience whether equipment say it reminds them of the falling of a human is damaged or not. Some sub-committee members head when a person has been beheaded. Nuke Info Tokyo No. 18 Jan./Feb. 009 Replacement of Hamaoka Reactors 1 and n December 22, the Board of Directors of Chubu Electric Power Company decided that it would terminate operations at OHamaoka Reactors No. 1 (540 MW, BWR) and No. 2 (840 MW, BWR) and replace them with a new Reactor No. 6 (1,400 MW, ABWR). (Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant is located in Omaezaki City in Shizuoka Prefecture.) This is the first ever replacement plan in Japan. The Board also decided that the spent fuel from the spent fuel pools of Units 1 and 2 should be removed and placed in a common dry storage facility to be built onsite for Cartoon by Shoji Takagi all the plants. On the same day, Chubu Electric informed the same time anyway. Besides which, the extra the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry 1,400 MW will not be needed for the next 10 years of its plan to close down Units 1 and 2, or so. requested Omaezaki City and the six local However, Chubu Electric's emphasis on fishing cooperatives to allow construction of a economic rationality and its refusal to admit that sixth reactor, and sought the cooperation of the safety is an issue only increased the distrust of the neighboring two cities and Shizuoka Prefecture. local people. The fact that it went ahead with work In its press release Chubu Electric emphasized to increase the seismic resistance of Units 3 to 5, that rationalization on economic grounds was the while postponing work on Units 1 and 2 suggests reason. It denies strongly that it is closing down that at the time it was already thinking of closing the reactors because of aging. Chubu Electric Units 1 and 2. emphasizes this point because it has been telling At the time when it made its decision on the local governments and others that, given a life seismic resistance work, Unit 1 had already been span for nuclear reactors of 60 years, these shut down for four years since an explosion in reactors are in the prime of life.
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