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MOX Program Postponed - Nuclear Industry Hit Hard by Dishonesty

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MOX Program Postponed - Nuclear Industry Hit Hard by Dishonesty MOX Program Postponed - Nuclear Industry hit hard by dishonesty Plaintiffs for the case against Kansai Electric Power Co. (KEPCO) on using MOX fuel for Takahama 4 rejoice over their victory after KEPCO announced on Dec. 16 that it will cancil the use of the fuel for Takahama 4. An Ever-Growing Scandal of Takahama 3 fuel in October. Citizens’ groups It has been revealed by The Guardian and the considered the fuel data for Takahama 4 suspicious UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) that in ever since the scandal broke out over the fuel data addition to falsifying quality control data for mixed for Takahama 3. However, the company claimed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel for Taka- that no fabrication had taken place with the data for hama 3 plant, British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) Takahama 4 and tried to enforce the loading of the workers falsified quality control data for MOX fuel fuel. The release of a series of new information fol- for Takahama 4, which has already been shipped to Japan. NII had been investigating BNFL following CONTENTS the revelation of data fabrication in September MOX Program Postponed 1-3 1999. Following the reports of subsequent data 1999 SPENA Workshop Held In Thailand 4-6 fabrication, Kansai Electric Power Company JCO Criticality Accident 7-9 Conferenece on Transportaion in Malaysia 10-12 (KEPCO) canceled the use of the fuel for Takahama Data on Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste 13 4 and is attempting to have the fuel sent back to the Anti-Nuke Who's Who: Sanshiro Kume 14 UK. KEPCO had already ordered the reproduction News Watch 15-16 2 Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 Nuke Info Tokyo lowing the report by The Guardian finally forced However, this method of analysis is quite inade- KEPCO to admit that data fabrication had taken quate, since if, for example, the last part of the data place. It is regrettable that KEPCO’s admission for 200 random inspections had been brought to the took so long, but it was fortunate that they aban- top and then copied, data falsification would not doned their plans before the fuel was loaded. have been apparent. Wanting to put an end to the investigation, and Data Fabrication by BNFL to the political storm generated by the revelation of The revelations about BNFL’s data fabrication data manipulation, KEPCO and the Ministry of first surfaced on September 14, when The Indepen- International Trade and Industry (MITI) insisted dent newspaper (UK) published a major report that the data for the MOX fuel for Takahama 4 had based on inside information. The news was not been tampered with. MITI did not want to see received as quite a shock by the Japanese public any further delays to the MOX fuel program, and since a vessel carrying some of the MOX fuel man- was keen to use the Takahama 4 fuel which had ufactured by BNFL had already left Europe and already arrived in Japan. At this stage, the planned was on its way to Japan. The ship left England on loading of the fuel into Takahama 4 in April 1999 July 21, 1999, and was carrying eight fuel assem- had been postponed to November 1999. The origi- blies for Takahama 4. The ship waited as another nal plans for the MOX fuel program were to have a ship unloaded fuel in Fukushima prefecture on Sep- couple of nuclear plants using MOX fuel by the end tember 22, before arriving in Fukui prefecture on of the ‘90s. The plans were then adjusted to have October 1. It was thus shortly before the arrival of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the fuel that the scandal broke. KEPCO burn MOX fuel at one plant each by the BNFL falsified the quality control inspection end of 1999. The Government probably feared data by copying and pasting quality control data that a further delay to the program would affect from previous lots. Following the allegations, Japan’s plutonium program, based on the Long KEPCO and the Agency of Natural Resources and Term Program for the Development and Utilization Energy (ANRE) dispatched inspectors to the UK to of Nuclear Energy which has been under review investigate the matter. KEPCO put out a final since early 1999. Ironically, with the news of fur- report on the investigation on November 1, 1999, ther data fabrication, MOX fuel plans were post- and the following day the ANRE and the NSC poned at Fukushima prefecture and Fukui prefec- addressed the Fukui Prefecture Legislature and stat- ture in addition to Takahama 4. Thus all MOX fuel ed that the investigation by KEPCO was satisfacto- plans at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa (Niigata prefecture), ry. The final report concluded that data for 22 lots Takahama 3 and 4 (Fukui prefecture), Fukushima I- of Takahama 3 fuel was falsified and that the fuel 3 (Fukushima prefecture), and Tsuruga 2 (Fukui would have to be refabricated, but insisted that no prefecture) have been postponed for the time being. falsification had taken place with the quality control data for Takahama 4 fuel. Citizens’ Analysis of BNFL’s Data KEPCO received data on quality control inspec- KEPCO’s Investigation tions and fuel processing from BNFL and brought it One BNFL employee interviewed by BNFL tes- back to Japan in October. Fukui prefecture made tified that he had copied pellet diameter data from this data available to the public to relieve citizens’ previous lots and pasted it into subsequent lots. concerns. Instead of being reassured by the data, Thus KEPCO investigators limited their investiga- two citizens’ groups carried out a statistical analysis tion into putting data from separate lots side-by- of the inconsistencies in the random inspection data side and comparing then to see if there were any and the total pellet inspection data and found that in perfect matches. By this method they found 22 some lots the data distribution graphs for the quali- lots, all for Takahama 3, which looked suspicious. ty control inspection did not match the data distrib- Nuke Info Tokyo Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 3 ution graphs for the automatic inspection (see NIT facturer of MOX fuel for Fukushima I-3 which has 74). The two groups appealed to the residents of already arrived in Japan. The report released by Kansai, and on November 19, 212 plaintiffs asked TEPCO in September 1999 claimed that all data is the Osaka District Court to issue an order of provi- automatically put into the computer and that sional disposition to prohibit the use of MOX fuel employees wouldn’t have been able to tamper with in Takahama 4. In Japanese courts a provisional it. However, TEPCO refuses to release this data, disposition can only be obtained when there is an claiming that it needs permission from Belgonu- emergency, and then later the matter is officially claire. Meanwhile, Belgonuclaire claims that it reviewed. The court decision would have been cannot release the quality control data because it given on December 17. However, KEPCO held a needs permission from TEPCO. The subsequent press conference the day before the decision was to revelation of data fabrication by BNFL caused be given and admitted that data for Takahama 4 fuel TEPCO to postpone the introduction of the MOX had also been fabricated and that they no longer fuel program in Fukushima I-3 which was sched- intended to use the fuel. At last KEPCO and the uled to begin in February 2000. TEPCO was Government had admitted that data fabrication had ordered by MITI to reinvestigate the MOX fuel taken place. This admission was brought about manufactured for Fukushima I-3 and has sent an because of a series of new revelations following the investigative team to Belgium. An investigation by article by The Guardian featuring reports from the a third party is also planned. However, unless NII on data fabrication by BNFL. Such informa- TEPCO obtains specific quality control data and tion had created a favorable ground for the local releases the data to the public, citizens’ groups will residents’ court case. For example, from the ques- remain critical of any investigation carried out by tioning in the Diet by Diet member Sumiko TEPCO. Shimizu, it was learned that the MITI knew of the It is worth mentioning that data fabrication also data fabrication on November 8 through a letter took place with the MOX fuel transport cask that from the NII to the Japanese Embassy in the UK. contained the fuel for Takahama 4. Fuel with fabri- This letter was given to the court as evidence on cated data in a cask with fabricated data! In 1998, a December 16. At this juncture, KEPCO and MITI Japanese company fabricated quality assurance data realized that they were no longer able to brazen it for the transportation cask of MOX fuel to meet the out, and decided to admit that data fabrication had then existing quality standards (see NIT 68). This taken place and to cancel the use of the fuel. scandal was put to rest by lowering the safety stan- KEPCO has decided to bar BNFL from bidding for dards so that the original, undoctored data of the contracts for MOX fuel and is now asking BNFL to cask could pass safety requirements. Dishonesty ship the fuel back to the UK. Thus the fuel that was runs through the entire nuclear industry regardless shipped from the UK to Japan amid grave interna- of whether it is in the West or the East. tional concern will most likely be shipped from Compared to burning uranium fuel, the burning Japan back to the UK, once again posing enormous of MOX fuel increases the risk of accidents and risks to the environment, economy, and citizens of lowers the safety margin of light water reactors.
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