MOX Program Postponed - Nuclear Industry hit hard by dishonesty
Plaintiffs for the case against Kansai Electric Power Co. (KEPCO) on using MOX fuel for Takahama 4 rejoice over their victory after KEPCO announced on Dec. 16 that it will cancil the use of the fuel for Takahama 4. An Ever-Growing Scandal of Takahama 3 fuel in October. Citizens’ groups It has been revealed by The Guardian and the considered the fuel data for Takahama 4 suspicious UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) that in ever since the scandal broke out over the fuel data addition to falsifying quality control data for mixed for Takahama 3. However, the company claimed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel for Taka- that no fabrication had taken place with the data for hama 3 plant, British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) Takahama 4 and tried to enforce the loading of the workers falsified quality control data for MOX fuel fuel. The release of a series of new information fol- for Takahama 4, which has already been shipped to Japan. NII had been investigating BNFL following CONTENTS the revelation of data fabrication in September MOX Program Postponed 1-3 1999. Following the reports of subsequent data 1999 SPENA Workshop Held In Thailand 4-6 fabrication, Kansai Electric Power Company JCO Criticality Accident 7-9 Conferenece on Transportaion in Malaysia 10-12 (KEPCO) canceled the use of the fuel for Takahama Data on Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste 13 4 and is attempting to have the fuel sent back to the Anti-Nuke Who's Who: Sanshiro Kume 14 UK. KEPCO had already ordered the reproduction News Watch 15-16 2 Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 Nuke Info Tokyo lowing the report by The Guardian finally forced However, this method of analysis is quite inade- KEPCO to admit that data fabrication had taken quate, since if, for example, the last part of the data place. It is regrettable that KEPCO’s admission for 200 random inspections had been brought to the took so long, but it was fortunate that they aban- top and then copied, data falsification would not doned their plans before the fuel was loaded. have been apparent. Wanting to put an end to the investigation, and Data Fabrication by BNFL to the political storm generated by the revelation of The revelations about BNFL’s data fabrication data manipulation, KEPCO and the Ministry of first surfaced on September 14, when The Indepen- International Trade and Industry (MITI) insisted dent newspaper (UK) published a major report that the data for the MOX fuel for Takahama 4 had based on inside information. The news was not been tampered with. MITI did not want to see received as quite a shock by the Japanese public any further delays to the MOX fuel program, and since a vessel carrying some of the MOX fuel man- was keen to use the Takahama 4 fuel which had ufactured by BNFL had already left Europe and already arrived in Japan. At this stage, the planned was on its way to Japan. The ship left England on loading of the fuel into Takahama 4 in April 1999 July 21, 1999, and was carrying eight fuel assem- had been postponed to November 1999. The origi- blies for Takahama 4. The ship waited as another nal plans for the MOX fuel program were to have a ship unloaded fuel in Fukushima prefecture on Sep- couple of nuclear plants using MOX fuel by the end tember 22, before arriving in Fukui prefecture on of the ‘90s. The plans were then adjusted to have October 1. It was thus shortly before the arrival of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the fuel that the scandal broke. KEPCO burn MOX fuel at one plant each by the BNFL falsified the quality control inspection end of 1999. The Government probably feared data by copying and pasting quality control data that a further delay to the program would affect from previous lots. Following the allegations, Japan’s plutonium program, based on the Long KEPCO and the Agency of Natural Resources and Term Program for the Development and Utilization Energy (ANRE) dispatched inspectors to the UK to of Nuclear Energy which has been under review investigate the matter. KEPCO put out a final since early 1999. Ironically, with the news of fur- report on the investigation on November 1, 1999, ther data fabrication, MOX fuel plans were post- and the following day the ANRE and the NSC poned at Fukushima prefecture and Fukui prefec- addressed the Fukui Prefecture Legislature and stat- ture in addition to Takahama 4. Thus all MOX fuel ed that the investigation by KEPCO was satisfacto- plans at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa (Niigata prefecture), ry. The final report concluded that data for 22 lots Takahama 3 and 4 (Fukui prefecture), Fukushima I- of Takahama 3 fuel was falsified and that the fuel 3 (Fukushima prefecture), and Tsuruga 2 (Fukui would have to be refabricated, but insisted that no prefecture) have been postponed for the time being. falsification had taken place with the quality control data for Takahama 4 fuel. Citizens’ Analysis of BNFL’s Data KEPCO received data on quality control inspec- KEPCO’s Investigation tions and fuel processing from BNFL and brought it One BNFL employee interviewed by BNFL tes- back to Japan in October. Fukui prefecture made tified that he had copied pellet diameter data from this data available to the public to relieve citizens’ previous lots and pasted it into subsequent lots. concerns. Instead of being reassured by the data, Thus KEPCO investigators limited their investiga- two citizens’ groups carried out a statistical analysis tion into putting data from separate lots side-by- of the inconsistencies in the random inspection data side and comparing then to see if there were any and the total pellet inspection data and found that in perfect matches. By this method they found 22 some lots the data distribution graphs for the quali- lots, all for Takahama 3, which looked suspicious. ty control inspection did not match the data distrib- Nuke Info Tokyo Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 3 ution graphs for the automatic inspection (see NIT facturer of MOX fuel for Fukushima I-3 which has 74). The two groups appealed to the residents of already arrived in Japan. The report released by Kansai, and on November 19, 212 plaintiffs asked TEPCO in September 1999 claimed that all data is the Osaka District Court to issue an order of provi- automatically put into the computer and that sional disposition to prohibit the use of MOX fuel employees wouldn’t have been able to tamper with in Takahama 4. In Japanese courts a provisional it. However, TEPCO refuses to release this data, disposition can only be obtained when there is an claiming that it needs permission from Belgonu- emergency, and then later the matter is officially claire. Meanwhile, Belgonuclaire claims that it reviewed. The court decision would have been cannot release the quality control data because it given on December 17. However, KEPCO held a needs permission from TEPCO. The subsequent press conference the day before the decision was to revelation of data fabrication by BNFL caused be given and admitted that data for Takahama 4 fuel TEPCO to postpone the introduction of the MOX had also been fabricated and that they no longer fuel program in Fukushima I-3 which was sched- intended to use the fuel. At last KEPCO and the uled to begin in February 2000. TEPCO was Government had admitted that data fabrication had ordered by MITI to reinvestigate the MOX fuel taken place. This admission was brought about manufactured for Fukushima I-3 and has sent an because of a series of new revelations following the investigative team to Belgium. An investigation by article by The Guardian featuring reports from the a third party is also planned. However, unless NII on data fabrication by BNFL. Such informa- TEPCO obtains specific quality control data and tion had created a favorable ground for the local releases the data to the public, citizens’ groups will residents’ court case. For example, from the ques- remain critical of any investigation carried out by tioning in the Diet by Diet member Sumiko TEPCO. Shimizu, it was learned that the MITI knew of the It is worth mentioning that data fabrication also data fabrication on November 8 through a letter took place with the MOX fuel transport cask that from the NII to the Japanese Embassy in the UK. contained the fuel for Takahama 4. Fuel with fabri- This letter was given to the court as evidence on cated data in a cask with fabricated data! In 1998, a December 16. At this juncture, KEPCO and MITI Japanese company fabricated quality assurance data realized that they were no longer able to brazen it for the transportation cask of MOX fuel to meet the out, and decided to admit that data fabrication had then existing quality standards (see NIT 68). This taken place and to cancel the use of the fuel. scandal was put to rest by lowering the safety stan- KEPCO has decided to bar BNFL from bidding for dards so that the original, undoctored data of the contracts for MOX fuel and is now asking BNFL to cask could pass safety requirements. Dishonesty ship the fuel back to the UK. Thus the fuel that was runs through the entire nuclear industry regardless shipped from the UK to Japan amid grave interna- of whether it is in the West or the East. tional concern will most likely be shipped from Compared to burning uranium fuel, the burning Japan back to the UK, once again posing enormous of MOX fuel increases the risk of accidents and risks to the environment, economy, and citizens of lowers the safety margin of light water reactors. In the en-route countries. addition, transportation of MOX fuel poses envi- ronmental, economic, and health risks to en-route Dishonesty Present Throughout Nuclear countries. These unnecessary risks are made all the Industry more worrying by the dishonesty of the nuclear The data fabrication by BNFL and the cover up industry. Representing all concerned people, CNIC of information by Government officials and will continue to approach the government and utili- KEPCO has led to a further decline in the credibili- ties to withdraw from the folly of the MOX fuel ty of the nuclear industry. Doubts naturally arise program. over the quality control of Belgonuclaire, the manu- By Hideyuki Ban 4 Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 Nuke Info Tokyo 1999 Workshop of Sustainable and Peaceful Energy Network Asia Held in Thailand
The 1999 workshop of Sustainable and (Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition, the Philip- Peaceful Energy Network Asia(SPENA), for pines) gave a report on “Community Experi- which CNIC is a secretariat, was held on Coral ences in the Quest for a Sustainable Energy Island in Thailand from November 26 to 28. Future in the Philippines,” relating examples of Thirty-six representatives from 11 different the introduction of renewable energy by NGO countries including India, Indonesia, Korea, groups in remote areas of the Philippines. Prof. Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines, Simblun weighed the success and implications Malaysia, Sweden, Denmark, and the United of these endeavors. Fabby Tumiwa of Yayasan States participated, and there was much lively Geni, Indonesia, told us that Yayasan Guni had discussion about the current situation regarding been manufacturing and utilizing solar panels energy, and people’s engagement with the issue in cooperation with the Japanese NGO, Solar in each country. Net, and had coordinated a biogas project using Session 1 on the first day was on “Global horse manure with local horse carriage labor- and Regional Environmental Situation and ers, contributing stable income for this work Trends.” Gurmit Singh (Center for Environ- force. During the Question and Answer period, ment, Technology, and Development, I asked about the current state of nuclear power Malaysia) gave a report on the present situation development in Indonesia. Anung Karyadi in Asia, titled “Asian Energy Situation and (WALHI, Indonesia) gave a promising answer, Trends: A Perspective.” Gurmit said that while saying that the new Indonesian government has construction of the Bakun dam in Malaysia and been delaying plans for nuclear development. new nuclear power plants in Korea is being K.R.Datye (Society for the Advancement of postponed, plans to build nuclear power plants Renewable Materials, India) showed us meth- have been advanced or are in progress in the ods for introducing renewable energy, based on Philippines, China, and Taiwan. He also point- quantitative analysis and abundant experience. ed out that it would be difficult for Asian coun- In the afternoon the host of this workshop, tries, being mostly developing nations, to Dr. Chirapol Sintunawa (Association for the develop sustainable energy policies unless Development of Environmental Quality industrialized countries pursue such policies as [ADEQ],/Mahidol University, Thailand) orga- well. nized a game called “Fish Game: Renewable Prof. John Byrne (Center for Energy and Resource Utilization and Management,” in Environmental Policy, the University of which players learn about the depletion of Delaware, US) could not attend the workshop resources. this time, but submitted a report, “Atmosphere In the evening, we had Session 4, “Energy for Sale: Democratic Failures in Climate Efficiency : Experiences and Prospects.” In Change Negotiation.” this session, Prof. Jorgen Norgard, of the Tech- Session 2 was about “The Present and Future nical University of Denmark, explained that of Renewable Energy.” Prof. Roland Simblun energy demand in Denmark had always been Nuke Info Tokyo Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 5
South Korea) gave a talk titled “A Sustain- able and Peaceful Energy Alternative in Developing Coun- tries.” He made some challenging sugges- tions regarding the ways to introduce sustainable and peaceful energy in developing countries: these countries should reorganize energy, environment,
JCO Criticality Accident The Victims and the Final Report
Victim of Tokai by radiation. His lymphocyte count dropped to zero, and white blood cells were drastical- Hisashi Ohuchi, one of the three seriously ly reduced. Due to the damage to his mar- exposed JCO employees in the criticality row, affecting his ability to produce blood accident at Tokai on September 30, died at cells, he underwent a transfusion of peripher- 11:21 p.m. on December 21 at the University al stem cells which were taken from the of Tokyo Hospital. He was only 35. Mr. peripheral blood of his brother on October 6 Ohuchi was the first casuality from acute and 7. His burnt-off skin could not regener- radiation injury since the dropping of the A- ate. His intestines were continually bleeding, bombs at Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Bikini and he was given more than 10 L of blood tests in which a Japanese crew member of and infusion solution every day. By mid- “Daigo Fukuryumaru” died. It is the first November the functioning of his liver and time in the history of nuclear power develop- kidney had deteriorated and breathing ment in Japan that a life was lost due to an became difficult. Drugs to boost blood pres- accident, and it is therefore a serious blow to sure were administered after his heart failed the industry. temporarily on November 27. His heart was Mr. Ohuchi was exposed to 16~20 Sv barely functioning by December 18. Death (equivalent) and died from multiple organ came 83 days after he was exposed. As for failure. His face, arms, and torso were burnt the two other employees, Mr. Masato Shino- hara, who was exposed to 6~10 Sv, is still receiving treatment at the Institute of Medical Science of the University of Tokyo. Mr. Yutaka Yokogawa, who was exposed to 1~ 4.5 Sv has reached a stable condition for the time being and left the National Institute of Radiological Sciences on December 20. Final Report Released by the JCO Accident Investigation Committee
Three days after the death of Mr. Ohuchi, the eleventh meeting of the JCO Criticality Accident Investigation Committee was held and the final report on their investigation was released. Almost no criticisms or remarks were made about the final report by the com- A mother holds her feaverish child at the community center used for evacuation. (Photo By Kenji Higuchi) mittee members at the last meeting, and it 8 Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 Nuke Info Tokyo was clear that they had already settled the matter amongst themselves. Although the report is 170 pages long, many of its contra- dictory claims are left unresolved and it can hardly be called a product of an exhaustive debate. The report was put together in a mere three months, and it is hard to avoid the impression that it was patched up in great haste. It is quite clear that there was an implicit deadline. Following is an examina- tion of this hastily-produced and extremely problematic document. First of all, the report’s analysis of the accident is not based on sound scientific analysis. The estimation of the total number of fissions which occurred during the critical- ity reaction has not been changed from the estimation reported in the interim report, that 18 A figure of the process that led to the fatal accident on September is 2.5x10 . The estimated number corre- 30, 1999. The workers are pouring uranyl nitrate solution into the sponds to the fission of about 1mg of urani- precipitation tank in an attempt to homogenize the solution. um 235. However, the estimated contribu- responsibilities of the Japan Nuclear Cycle tions to the cumulative radiation dose from Development Institute (JNC), which ordered the initial burst and the succeeding plateau of JCO to provide them with homogenized ura- the criticality reaction given in the interim nium in the form of nitrate solution. The report -48% and 52% respectively- were accident occurred because JCO employees drastically altered to 11.4% and 88.6%. (Fis- were handling uranium enriched to a relative- sion reaction consists of an initial burst and a ly high concentration of 18.8% in an amount prolonged plateau.) The new figures derive far above the minimum critical mass. This from statistical analysis of data from the neu- came about because JNC (then known as tron monitor at the Japan Atomic Energy PNC or Donen), responding to strong con- Research Institute (JAERI)-Naka Research cerns from the US about the danger of the Institute. Then the radiation dose received by proliferation of nuclear materials, had local residents was estimated using the neu- ordered JCO to supply uranium solution for tron monitor data during the plateau period manufacturing mixed uranium-plutonium rather than calculating directly from the total oxide (MOX) fuel for the Joyo Fast Breeder number of fissions. However, this estimate Reactor. Originally, plutonium and uranium can vary dramatically according to how the were prepared separately as powder and then background count (naturally existing neutron mixed together to manufacture MOX fuel. dose from cosmic rays) is estimated and how However, to decrease the risk of plutonium the precision of the monitors is evaluated. theft/diversion, JNC had to switch to a Therefore, the results of the report still con- method where uranium and plutonium are tain significant uncertainties and it looks as mixed together in the form of solution before though the uncertainties were actually used to providing mixed uranium and plutonium the benefit of the Committee to minimize the powder. When providing uranium powder to estimated residents’ exposure. JNC, JCO refined the imported uranium pow- Secondly, the report does not address the der to purify the uranium by dissolving the Nuke Info Tokyo Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 9 powder and then making it into powder take the time to see if using the precipitation again. However, to provide JNC with urani- tank was definitely safe. Our analysis indi- um solution, JCO had to re-dissolve the cates that for uranium powder re-dissolution refined uranium powder. JCO did not equip to prepare the required 370g/ÜPuranyl nitrate itself with additional installations for this solution, JNC or JCO should have construct- new operation and thus had to come up with ed a separate re-dissolution and homogeniz- ways to do the job using the existing process ing facility, which they chose not to do. In line. In addition to ordering JCO to provide view of the fact that JNC is finally responsi- them with uranium solution, JNC demanded ble for the whole MOX fabrication procedure that the solution be completely homogenized. in a proliferation-resistant manner, JNC, not In order to homogenize the solution, JCO JCO, should have provided the uranium solu- began a process called “cross-blending.” In tion. If JCO was commissioned for the job, this method, 40 L of uranium solution was as was the actual case, JNC should have divided into ten 4 L stainless steel bottles. supervised the process. Instead of taking Then 1/10 of the solution from each bottle responsible measures, JNC had even rushed was put into a separate set of 10 bottles. This the delivery date for JCO to provide them method was eventually abandoned due to its with the uranium solution. CNIC believes troublesome nature, and the company began that the unreasonable demands of JNC had a to combine the solution in the buffer column very significant part to play in the circum- before transferring the solution into the 4 L stances leading to the events of September bottles. The buffer column was designed to 30. Why is it, then, that the extent of JNC’s prevent criticality and thus JCO employees responsibility is not examined at all in the were able to homogenize the solution without final report? Could this have something to causing an accident. However, for the do with the fact that two members of the process that led to the accident, the company investigation committee are JNC employees? used the precipitation tank, which was not A final report lacking a solid scientific analy- designed to prevent criticality, to homogenize sis and a thorough examination of the events the solution. According to one of the three leading to the accident is far from convinc- employees directly involved with the process, ing. The final report presents no less than they had used the precipitation tank to cut 103 countermeasure plans and suggestions. time and to simplify the process since the However, the greater the number of sugges- structure of the buffer column made it diffi- tions, the greater are our concerns about acci- cult to transfer the solution from the column dents of a similar scale - or worse - happen- to the 4 L bottles. JCO employees did not ing in the future. By CNIC
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Citizens' Nuclear Information Center 3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003 JAPAN Tel: 81-3-5330-9520; Fax: 81-3-5330-9530 10 Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 Nuke Info Tokyo Conference on "Carriage of Ultra Hazardous Radioactive Cargo By Sea: Implications and Responses" By Tadao Ishibashi (Attorney At Law, Aomori Prefecture) Malaysia and the conference I myself was asked to speak on “Japan’s pol- I attended the Conference on “Carriage of icy and outlook regarding the marine trans- Ultra Hazardous Radioactive Cargo By Sea: portation of highly toxic substances.” I spoke Implications and Responses” held in Malaysia about the situation created by Japan’s present on October 18 and 19, 1999 as one of the nuclear policy: the fact that although the pluto- speakers. The conference was sponsored by nium policy is a virtual failure, the government the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) is working even harder to utilize MOX fuel in and was attended by a wide range of nationali- light water reactors; and how Japan has vast ties. Speakers ranged from University profes- and ever-growing stockpiles of plutonium and sors, NGO staff, to members of International radioactive waste in Europe which, under the Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Interna- reprocessing consignment contract, must be tional Maritime Organization (IMO). MIMA is returned to Japan. Since shipping these a policy research institute set up by the radioactive substances through international Malaysian Government. By virtue of an waters in secrecy would violate international extended Exclusive Economic Zone jurisdic- law, Japan should immediately cancel the tion, Malaysia has a sea area much larger than reprocessing contracts. As for the transporta- its land mass. More than 90% of Malaysia’s tion of Japanese plutonium, high level waste, exports are seaborne, and the maritime sphere and unprocessed used fuel already in Europe, holds great importance in economic and securi- Japan must pay proper respect to the en-route ty terms. MIMA’s role is to deal with national, countries by consulting them and sending them regional, and global maritime matters affecting adequate notice of the shipments. Malaysia and is expected to contribute towards During the Q&A session, I was asked why national maritime policies. Japan assigns reprocessing to Europe, and what kind of liability arrangements it has in case Transportation issue comes in focus there is an accident. In the first session of the conference, the The third session saw a heated discussion representative for the Scientific Technology between Edwin Lyman of Nuclear Control and Environment Minister gave a speech out- Institute in Washington and Ronald B. Pope, a lining the Malaysian Government’s deep con- member of IAEA’s nuclear safety division, who cerns about the marine transportation of is in charge of the safety of transportation radioactive substances. The second session casks. They spoke on the safety of transporta- focused on the issue of the September 30 criti- tion casks, especially the safety standard of cality accident at Tokai-mura. Shaun Burnie of IAEA’s type B cask. Pope explained that the Greenpeace International, who is in charge of IAEA standards are based on the results of fire, plutonium issues, explained the seriousness of sinking, collision, and falling experiments held the accident by presenting various photographs. in the U.K. and U.S., and showed video tapes Nuke Info Tokyo Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 11 taken in both countries. He added that all IAEA Law, and the International Court of Justice, he member countries have approved the standards. argued that even if these shipments of radioac- He also said that the concept of “safety” in tive substances are to go through international regard to transportation is not only about casks, waters, the obligation to explain and discuss but is a comprehensive idea relating to other the matter with the en-route nations still exists. factors such as crew and equipments. I was He explained in detail the various conditions very interested to learn about IAEA’s idea of which the consignor must meet in order to con- safety. duct the shipment, such as drawing up an Envi- In the fourth session, held on the second ronmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and mak- day, chief navigator Hartmat Hesse of the IMO ing proposals for dealing with the anticipated Marine Safety Division gave a detailed expla- effects. He also argued that in IAEA’s view, nation of the history of IMO and its duties up the sovereign rights of nations are limited to to now. He then spoke about how radioactive their own territorial waters, and that Japanese waste has been transported a number of times claims about the safety of the shipments are through the world’s waters and how, even with- limited to technical aspects. Based on the in IMO, there are opinions for and against pro- above arguments outlined in his paper, Prof. viding advance notice to the en-route countries. Van Dyke offered two proposals and He also suggested that IMO is still continuing announced a “protocol for preventing pollution to review the INF Code which controls the caused by the marine transportation of radioac- safety of transporting spent fuel, plutonium, tive substances.” and high-level radioactive waste. However, The last speaker, Doctor of Law Wafi Naslin during the fifth session, Hesse, speaking from Abdhul Hamid of Malaysia, spoke on the rights the floor, said that the IMO is in a kind of and obligations of the ship owner and consign- dilemma over the current situation, in which or involved in transporting radioactive sub- Japan’s shipments of radioactive substances are stances in respect to common law. He stated provoking international debate and creating that even under common law, transportation problems in regards to international law. without notice is not permitted, that the con- Following Hesse was Professor John Van signor holds “strict responsibility,” and that Dyke of the University of Hawaii Law School. damage to marine life is unlawful. The fifth Referring to precedents from the 1982 UN session was a panel discussion between five Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1989 speakers hosted by President Hamsa of MIMA. Basel Treaty, the International Environmental Many questions were raised from the floor dur- 12 Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 Nuke Info Tokyo ing this session, and the discussion became brings us back to the protocol proposed by very heated. Prof. Van Dyke. This protocol represents the highest level of modern international law, and The Japanese Government Must Be Polite my greatest hope is to have all the involved and Respectful nations adopt this in the form of a treaty. I feel The discussions during these two days all there is a real possibility that this protocol focused on the return of plutonium and high- could be our next major step in a new phase of level radioactive waste from Europe to Japan. efforts to deal with this crucial issue. Until now, both official and unofficial confer- The present situation is that Japan is left ences on this subject were held in Europe or with no choice but to ship the mixed plutoni- Japan, aside from a small number held else- um-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel and both mid- where, such as the South Pacific Nations con- and high-level radioactive wastes through ference. This was improper, however, because international waters for the next 20 to 30 years. the en-route countries who have so much at And it is no longer viable for Japan to try and stake in this matter were not consulted. Hold- do this by changing the route each time and ing the conference in Malaysia, which is right cloaking all other aspects of this dangerous at the center of all the island countries, was a transportation in secrecy. During the Second meaningful breakthrough in this respect, and I World War, Japan fought against the Southeast would like to take this opportunity to express Asian countries, including Malaysia, and ruled my deepest gratitude to the Malaysian Govern- over their land. In Kuala Lumpur, there is a ment and MIMA. monument commemorating the nation’s inde- As for the speakers and participants, I think pendence which features a statue of a we could not have had a better variety of Malaysian soldier marching over corpses with speakers. It was significant that IAEA and the national flag in his hand. The statue has IMO joined the conference, and MIMA’s repu- left a strong impression on me. The day of tation as a reliable organization was enhanced Japan’s defeat in August 1945 was also the day by the participation of those organizations. of independence for the Southeast Asian coun- The reports presented by IAEA and IMO were tries. Japan’s current stance on international of a high quality, and Dr. Lyman and Prof. Van cooperation, reflected in its constitution, was Dyke’s criticisms of them were also candid and founded upon its will to reconsider such hor- concrete. Participants came from Malaysia, rendous conducts. Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore. Most The Japanese Government’s plan to utilize of them were either government officials plutonium ignores the coastal nations’ con- involved in such fields as nuclear power, for- cerns. If the Government continues in its pre- eign affairs, transportation, and energy, or spe- sent course, it will damage its relationships cialists from universities and the marine force. with these countries, thereby harming its own Discussions were ardent but calm throughout national interests. the conference. Participants from Japan includ- There is no doubt that the conference was as ed members of the Japan Association for Pre- meaningful as it could be, and its impact is vention of Sea Disaster (Singapore liaison likely to be seen in various ways in the near office), and representatives of trading firms. future. For this reason too, the Japanese Gov- In the final session, opinions were ernment should rid itself of its tunnel vision exchanged as to what should be done in the and start putting some effort into showing future. The discussion was wound up after respect and understanding for the concerns of someone suggested that the important thing the countries that are affected by the shipment was for the coastal nations to unite, which of nuclear materials. Nuke NukeInfo Tokyo Info Tokyo Jan./Feb. Jan./Feb. 2000 No.752000 No.75 13 13 14 Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 Nuke Info Tokyo
Anti-Nuke Who's Who Sanshiro Kume An Instructor Inside and Outside School
On December 16, 1999, Kansai Electric Power Co. announced that data for the MOX fuel for Takahama 4 had been fabricated, and that it had therefore canceled the use of the fuel. Sanshiro Kume - a 74 year-old nuclear scientist who plays a leading part in Japan’s anti-nuke campaign - heard the news at Ayabe city in Kyoto, near the Takahama Plant, where he has lived for about ten years since retiring as a lecturer at Osaka University. Mr. Kume become popular among local res- idents through his efforts in writing letters to local newspapers and encouraging local discus- sions on nuclear power focusing on, but not limiting to, Takahama Plant. Mr. Kume entered the Department of Science of Osaka University in 1944. He worked for a medical sile base at Nose in the north of Osaka. He was company after graduation, but returned to an advisor for the nation’s first nuclear lawsuit, Osaka University in 1950 to work as a lecturer. served on Ikata 1 nuclear plant in 1973, and has Before long, Japan began developing also been involved in other cases, such as those nuclear power, and the budget for development against Monju and Takahama 2. He has always was formed in 1954 - the year of Bikini Expo- insisted, however, that the efforts of the citizens sure, which resulted in the death of a Japanese themselves are of utmost importance. crew member of the ship “Daigo Fukuryu- There are many groups in Kinki area maru”. The Bikini tests, like the Vietnam War, expressing concern over nuke plants in Wakasa affected Mr. Kume deeply and led him to which were formed at the suggestion of Mr. change his major from physical chemistry to Kume. These groups have provided a forum nuclear chemistry. for people to discuss the nuclear power indus- Problems in nuclear developments started to try, and have enabled citizens, whatever their be apparent in the 60s and 70s, and some scien- stance on nuclear power, to focus on the com- tists were seen among residents in anti-nuke mon ground of their justifiable anxiety about movements. Mr. Kume was also there. He accidents at nuclear plants. In addition to his made hundreds of trips around the country, par- involvement in the Monju case, the recent rush ticipating in local meetings and making numer- of news about the JCO accident and MOX fuel ous contributions to the rise of informed public scandals has kept him very busy. He will be 75 debate on nuclear power. He also led the suc- on March 22 - the very day on which the deci- cessful campaign in the 70s against the con- sion regarding the residents’ suit against Monju struction of the Self Defense Force Nike-Mis- is due to be given. By CNIC staff members Nuke Info Tokyo Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 15
Fifth Shipment of High-Level companies, which cited as their major reason the Waste current wave of liberalization sweeping the electric The ship “Pacific Swan,” carrying high-level power industry. These price-cutting demands were radioactive waste destined for Japan, left France on made not only to JCO but to all reactor manufactur- Dec. 29, 1999. This is the fifth shipment of high- ers and nuclear fuel makers, resulting in overall level waste, and the waste is planned to be loaded at price reductions of 20-30%. Rokkasho, Aomori prefecture. This shipment is Production work itself has been on the decline. highly controversial because of its contents and Orders received by Toshiba and Hitachi in the because of security issues due to the transfer of 1990s were only half of those received during the control of the Panama canal from the U.S. to the 70s and 80s. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries received government of Panama. no orders. As a consequence, the companies have The French Company COGEMA is returning accelerated staff reduction plans. (See the next arti- 104 canisters of vitrified waste. The waste was cle.) produced at COGEMA’s UP-2 plant. As all spent Cost reduction leaves less room for safety. Fol- fuel from Japan is processed at the UP-3 plant, this lowing are some of the comments made by employ- means that wastes from French gas-cooled reactors ees of manufacturers that reached the mass media. and Super Phoenix Reactor reprocessed at UP-2 are “The power companies used to demand that we coming to Japan. make products whose quality was far above safety The Panama Canal Authority (PCA) assumed standards, but now they tell us it’s okay if the prod- control of the canal at noon on Dec. 31, 1999. Con- ucts meet the basic standards.” “The power compa- cerns over terrorist attacks on the Pacific Swan nies used to tell us it’s time to change equipment, forced PCA to step up security. The ship passed but now they ask if we can use it a bit longer.” through the Panama Canal on Jan. 17, 2000 amid the tightest security operation since Panama took Sales Further Reduced for the over the waterway. The ship is expected to arrive Nuclear Industry in Japan in late February. On Dec. 18, 1999, the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) published its FY1998 survey report Nuclear Industry Accelerates on the state of the nuclear power industry. The Restructuring report was a compilation of responses to a question- Unreasonable cost-cutting decisions have been naire from 11 electric power companies, 376 com- cited as one of the factors leading to JCO’s criticali- panies in the manufacturing and mining industry, ty accident. During fiscal years 1995-1998, JCO’s and 32 trading companies. annual production decreased by 25%, and with According to the report, nuclear power-related price reductions added to this, the company’s sales sales in the manufacturing and mining industry fell by 50%. This led to a drastic reduction in per- were 1.34 trillion yen, a 19% decrease from the pre- sonnel while workload per worker nearly doubled. vious fiscal year. Since the previous year also saw a Such price reductions were demanded by power 12% decrease, sales fell two years in a row. Sales 16 Jan./Feb. 2000 No.75 Nuke Info Tokyo from power enterprises was 980 billion yen, or 73% This significant increase in staff by the Government of the total sales. This amount is almost half of that was made possible by the criticality accident at in FY1993, which was 1.74 trillion yen. JCO. But there are still some very fundamental There are 56,000 workers in the field of nuclear questions remaining. Will an increase in staff power. This includes 10,000 in the power enterprise members make Japan’s nuclear safety administra- and 46,000 in the manufacturing and mining sector. tion, which has overlooked various accidents and This figure represents a 2% rise from the previous incidents of data forging, more effective? Will the fiscal year, but 5,000 fewer as compared to that of autonomy of the NSC really be secured? five years earlier. There are 2,000 researchers, 300 people less than the previous year and 1,200 less Formal Contract Signed than that of five years earlier. between KEDO and KEPCO A question in the survey asked whether or not it is Construction work on the main body of the two possible to construct 20 additional power reactors pressurized water reactors (PWRs, 1050MW each), by 2010. Those who said “possible” accounted for which the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 8.5% of the answers. Those who thought it was Organization (KEDO) is planning to build in North “possible to build 16-19 reactors” were 0.4% of Korea, is finally about to begin. The foundation those surveyed. The rest broke down as follows: work began in Aug. 1997, but construction has “11-15 reactors,” 11.7%; “6-10 reactors,” 57.1% been delayed. The formal contract was signed on and “1-5 reactors,” 22.3%. Dec.15, 1999, between KEDO and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). KEPCO, the main Advanced Move for NSC’s contractor, also concluded project contracts with Autonomy Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Toshiba and Hitachi, The autonomy of the Nuclear Safety Commis- which will take part in the construction. sion (NSC) remains in doubt. The Commission The construction cost amounts to about $4.6 bil- does not have an independent secretariat. Instead, lion: The South Korean side will apparently finance administrative responsibilities are lodged with the $3.22 billion, Japan $1 billion, and the U.S. is Science and Technology Agency (STA). Plans expected to take responsibility for raising funds were originally in place to move the secretariat to domesticly and from abroad for the remainder. the new Cabinet Office as part of Government Although Japan lifted sanctions against North restructuring scheduled for implementation in Jan. Korea’s launching of the Tepodon missile in Aug. 2001. However, it was announced on Dec. 22, 1998, and while the Diet approved the funding for 1999, that the secretariat would move in April 2000 the project in June 1999, South Korea has been to the current Prime Minister’s Office, which will having difficulty in raising funds. The exact costs later be absorbed into the Cabinet Office. to be covered by the U.S. has also not been decided. With this move the number of staff members of The future of this construction project thus remains the secretariat will significantly increase from the unclear. current number of 20 to 92. There will be 51 staff from the Prime Minister’s Office, plus 41 part-time CORRECTIONS (NIT No.74) p. = page P = paragraph L=line experts. The NSC members will remain at five. On p.3 P1 L1 Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute the same day, another plan was announced to (JAERI) staff(f) -> Science and Technology Agency increase the number of nuclear-related staff mem- (STA) and JCO staff(t), p.5 Table of Terms L2 JkgE- 1(f) -> J/kg(t), L3 Bequarel(f) -> Bequerel(t), p. 12 P4 bers: 60 for the Ministry of International Trade and L11 UP-8(f) -> UP-3(t), p.14 L8 later(f) -> larger(t) Industry (MITI) and 23 for the STA. The increase at MITI includes 30 nuclear safety inspectors and Translators: Akiko Fukami, Gaia Hoerner, Taeko Miwa, Kumiko Tanaka, Junko Yamaka 16 specialists on nuclear accident prevention. At Proof-readers: Michael Donnelly, Antony Moore STA an additional 16 safety inspectors and 7 spe- Scientific Advisor: Jinzaburo Takagi cialists on accident prevention will be appointed. Editor: Gaia Hoerner