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The INPR Journal. Volume I, Fall 2020 Crossing: The INPR Journal. Volume I, Fall 2020. Editor in chief Emmanuel Falque Editorial coordinators William L. Connelly Domenico Cambria Editorial committee Tamsin Jones Adam Graves Martin Koci William Woody S.J. Crossing: The INPR Journal. Volume I. November 2020. 26 Rue d’Assas 75006 Paris, France. ISSN (online): 2644-9242 DOI: 10.21428/8766eb43.b95a977c Web: https://inprjournal.pubpub.org/ http://www.network-inpr.org/ Email: [email protected] Crossing : une étape fondatrice de l’INPR (English Translation on Page III) L’international Network of Philosophy of Religion (INPR) est un réseau international de jeunes philosophes et théologiens (doctorants, post-doctorants, jeunes professeurs) réunis pour travailler ensemble autour de la question de Dieu et de sa pertinence dans un monde contemporain sécularisé. Essentiellement appuyé sur la philosophie continentale, mais pas exclusivement, il s’efforce d’être au service d’un renouveau de la philosophie et de la théologie chez les jeunes générations pour aujourd’hui. Loin de rester chacune sur leur pré-carré, philosophie et théologie sont appelées aujourd’hui à se croiser et à davantage se féconder mutuellement, dans le respect de la distinction des disciplines. Et les chercheurs de différents pays, en particulier ceux qui feront la pensée de demain, doivent eux aussi mieux dialoguer, sûrs que dans la confrontation des idées se fomente le terreau d’où naissent de nouvelles pensées. Inauguré en 2015, ce réseau international compte aujourd’hui plus d’une centaine de membres personnellement engagés, de plus de dix nationalités différentes, et venus en particulier d’Europe et des États-Unis. Les membres qui constituent ce réseau ont déjà fait la preuve par plusieurs séminaires (grands colloques ou séminaires doctoraux et post-doctoraux) du bien-fondé de leur démarche commune. Le sérieux dans la pensée et les liens d’amitié sont la condition de la confrontation des idées. Les nombreux exposés et débats qui se sont déjà déroulés au cœur de ce réseau ont permis à plus d’un d’orienter sa propre pensée. Aujourd’hui l’INPR passe à une étape supplémentaire, sous l’impulsion de ses membres qui le font progresser. L’idée d’une revue, capable non seulement de recueillir nos débats philosophiques et théologiques, mais aussi de les créer, a fait l’objet d’une longue maturation - dans son organisation d’abord (comité d’édition) et dans son contenu ensuite (Expositio, Disputatio, Nostri Libri). Ce premier numéro, d’automne 2020, témoigne de l’extraordinaire vitalité de ce réseau, de l’engagement de chacun, et de l’effort pour y tracer sa propre voie. Les discussions sont parfois âpres, ou à tout le moins décidées, mais toujours dans le I respect de l’altérité, dans la volonté affichée de nous comprendre les uns les autres, et dans le désir aussi de nous laisser transformer. Ce que nous vivons dans la créativité de nos rencontres, nous voulons maintenant le produire aussi par l’écriture. Crossing n’est pas que la trace de débats antérieurs, mais un véritable lieu d’échange où se fomente la pensée. La rigueur philosophie est de mise, et l’entente cordiale aussi. Ces deux ingrédients qui font le cœur de l’INPR, dans le souci du renouvellement des générations, y sont pleinement représentés. D’où la très haute qualité des textes et des discussions ici exposés. Rien de tout cela n’aurait été possible sans la directrice du comité éditorial (Tamsin Jones), et les deux coordinateurs éditoriaux (William Connelly et Domenico Cambria). Qu’ils soient profondément remerciés pour ce travail sans faille, ainsi que tout les membres du comité de rédaction (Martin Koci, William Woody, Adam Graves). C’est à donner sans compter que l’on récolte ce que l’on a semé. Ce qui est une loi de la spiritualité une est une aussi de la pensée. Longue vie à l’INPR, à Crossing, le dernier né donc de cette aventure intellectuelle, spirituelle et amicale, qui nous rassemble et ne cesse de nous dépasser. Puissions-nous chacun demeurer fidèle à nos idées et à nos propres intuitions, mais toujours dans le respect des autres et de leurs différences. C’est ainsi que nous « apprendrons d’eux aussi », sans demeurer ancré dans nos seules convictions en quête de vouloir s’imposer. Se confronter ensemble aux « enjeux philosophiques et théologiques » de notre monde contemporain est une tâche à accomplir, dont nous avons l’intime conviction que l’INPR est actuellement, en partie au moins, en train d’y participer. Traverser - « Crossing » - des montagnes, des océans, des frontières, fût-ce un simple Rubicon, est une manière d’inventer de nouvelles voies pour ne pas rester dans une philosophie faite de la répétition du passé. Frayer de nouveaux chemins mène aussi « quelque part » - mais Dieu seul sait où (?) -, et devient d’autant plus urgent que les nations elles-mêmes semblent se refermer sur leurs propres identités. Paris, le 13 Octobre 2020. Emmanuel Falque Éditeur en chef II Crossing: A Founding Stage of INPR The International Network of Philosophy of Religion (INPR) is an international network of young philosophers and theologians (doctoral students, post-doctoral students, researchers, and young professors) gathered to work together on the question of God and its relevance in a secularized contemporary world. Essentially based on continental philosophy, but not exclusively, it strives to be at the service of a renewal of philosophy and theology among the younger generations of today. Far from each remaining isolated in their own squared off domain, philosophy and theology are called upon today to cross paths and become more mutually fruitful, while still respecting the distinction between disciplines. And researchers from different countries, especially those who will be thinking about tomorrow, must also engage in better dialogue, confident that in the confrontation of ideas, the breeding ground for new thoughts is cultivated. Inaugurated in 2015, this international network now has more than a hundred personally committed members of more than ten different nationalities, particularly from Europe and the United States. The members who make up this network have already demonstrated through several seminars (major conferences or doctoral and post-doctoral seminars) the value of their common approach. Seriousness in thought and bonds of friendship are the condition for the confrontation of ideas. The numerous presentations and debates that have already taken place at the heart of this network have allowed many to orient their own thinking. Today, INPR is moving to a new stage, under the impetus of its members who are taking it forward. The idea of a journal, capable not only of collecting our philosophical and theological debates, but also of creating them, has undergone a long maturation - first in its organization (editorial committee) and then in its content (Expositio, Disputatio, Nostri Libri). This first issue, in the fall of 2020, bears witness to the extraordinary vitality of this network, the commitment of each and every one of us, and the effort to chart our own course. The discussions are sometimes bitter, or at least decisive, but always with respect for otherness, in the willingness to understand each other, and in the desire to be transformed. III What we experience in the creativity of our encounters, we now want to produce it also through writing. Crossing is not just the trace of previous debates, but a real place of exchange where thought is fomented. Rigorous philosophy is the order of the day, and so is cordial understanding. These two ingredients, which are at the heart of the INPR, are fully represented here, with a view to the renewal of generations. Hence the very high quality of the texts and discussions presented here. None of this would have been possible without the director of the editorial board (Tamsin Jones), and the two editorial coordinators (William Connelly and Domenico Cambria). Many thanks to them for their hard work, and to all the members of the editorial board (Martin Koci, William Woody, Adam Graves). It is in giving without counting the cost that we come to reap what has been sown. What is at once a law of spirituality is also one of thought. Long life to INPR, to Crossing, the latest addition to this intellectual, spiritual and friendly adventure, which brings us together and never ceases to surpass us. May we each remain faithful to our own ideas and intuitions, but always with respect for others and their differences. In this way, we will "learn from them too", without remaining anchored in our own convictions and seeking to impose ourselves on others. Confronting together the "philosophical and theological stakes" of our contemporary world is a task to be accomplished, in which we have the deep conviction that INPR is currently, at least in part, participating. Traversing - "Crossing" - mountains, oceans, borders, even a simple Rubicon, is a way of inventing new ways not to remain in a philosophy made of repetition of the past. Crossing new paths also leads "somewhere" - but to where God alone knows (?) - and becomes all the more urgent as the nation’s themselves seem to be closing in on their own identities. Paris, October 13, 2020. Emmanuel Falque Editor in chief IV Introduction to first edition of Crossing: The INPR Journal At the end of a very successful meeting of the INPR in Paris (June 2019), the Founding and Directing Committee began discussions about how to foster continued engagement within the network in between the large bi-annual seminars. As membership of the network continues to increase and not everyone can attend the larger conference, we also wanted to offer ways to share ideas at a distance. “The confrontation of ideas remains the condition for the blossoming of thinkers.” This statement, taken from the charter of the International Network in Philosophy of Religion (INPR), encapsulates the spirit of this journal, Crossing: The INPR Journal: its primary purpose is to promote a crossing—engagement, confrontation, debate, and dialogue—of ideas and thinkers in philosophy of religion.
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