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A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities Nonbank Financials, Fintech, and Innovation
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities A Financial System That T OF EN TH M E A Financial System T T R R A E P A E S That Creates Economic Opportunities D U R E Y H T Nonbank Financials, Fintech, 1789 and Innovation Nonbank Financials, Fintech, and Innovation Nonbank Financials, Fintech, TREASURY JULY 2018 2018-04417 (Rev. 1) • Department of the Treasury • Departmental Offices • www.treasury.gov U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities Nonbank Financials, Fintech, and Innovation Report to President Donald J. Trump Executive Order 13772 on Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System Steven T. Mnuchin Secretary Craig S. Phillips Counselor to the Secretary T OF EN TH M E T T R R A E P A E S D U R E Y H T 1789 Staff Acknowledgments Secretary Mnuchin and Counselor Phillips would like to thank Treasury staff members for their contributions to this report. The staff’s work on the report was led by Jessica Renier and W. Moses Kim, and included contributions from Chloe Cabot, Dan Dorman, Alexan- dra Friedman, Eric Froman, Dan Greenland, Gerry Hughes, Alexander Jackson, Danielle Johnson-Kutch, Ben Lachmann, Natalia Li, Daniel McCarty, John McGrail, Amyn Moolji, Brian Morgenstern, Daren Small-Moyers, Mark Nelson, Peter Nickoloff, Bimal Patel, Brian Peretti, Scott Rembrandt, Ed Roback, Ranya Rotolo, Jared Sawyer, Steven Seitz, Brian Smith, Mark Uyeda, Anne Wallwork, and Christopher Weaver. ii A Financial System That Creates Economic -
The European Payments Union and the Origins of Triffin's Regional Approach Towards International Monetary Integration
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Maes, Ivo; Pasotti, Ilaria Working Paper The European Payments Union and the origins of Triffin's regional approach towards international monetary integration NBB Working Paper, No. 301 Provided in Cooperation with: National Bank of Belgium, Brussels Suggested Citation: Maes, Ivo; Pasotti, Ilaria (2016) : The European Payments Union and the origins of Triffin's regional approach towards international monetary integration, NBB Working Paper, No. 301, National Bank of Belgium, Brussels This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173757 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen -
Wall St. and the Law: Customer Fund Protections After the Collapse of MF Global and Peregrine -- What Regulatory Changes Are Taking Place
E TUT WALL ST. AND THE LAW: I CUSTOMER FUND PROTECTIONS ST AFTER THE COLLApsE OF MF N GLOBAL AND PEREGRINE – WHAT REGULATORY CHANGES ARE TAKING PLACE Prepared in connection with a Continuing Legal Education course presented at New York County Lawyers’ Association, 14 Vesey Street, New York, NY presented on Tuesday, June 18, 2013. P ROGR A M C O - S P O N SOR : New York Law (NYLS) School Financial Services Law Institute P ROGR A M M OD E R A TOR : Prof. Ronald H. Filler, NYLS Professor of Law and, Director, Financial Services Law Institute, NYLS P ROGR A M F ac U L T Y : Steven Lofchie, Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft; Robert L. Sichel, Pacific Global Advisors; Gary DeWaal , Gary DeWaal & Associates (former Group General Counsel of Newedge) NYCLA-CLE I 2 TRANSITIONAL & NON-TRANSITIONAL MCLE CREDITS: This course has been approved in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 2 Transitional & Non-Transitional credit hours: .5 Ethics; 1.5 PP This program has been approved by the Board of Continuing Legal Education of the Supreme Court of New Jersey for 2 hours of total CLE credit. Of these, 0 qualify as hours of credit for Ethics/Professionalism, and 0 qualify as hours of credit toward certification in civil trial law, criminal trial law, workers compensation law and/or matrimonial law. Information Regarding CLE Credits and Certification Wall Street and the Law June 18, 2013; 6:00 PM to 8:00 PM The New York State CLE Board Regulations require all accredited CLE providers to provide documentation that CLE course attendees are, in fact, present during the course. -
Institutional Design: Deliberations, Decisions, and Committee Dynamics Kevin M
CHAPTER FOUR Institutional Design: Deliberations, Decisions, and Committee Dynamics Kevin M. Warsh Monetary policy is conducted by individuals acting by legislative remit in an institutional setting. Great attention is paid to the individuals atop the largest cen- tral banks. Central bankers today are decidedly recognizable pub- lic fi gures. Some might even be called famous. Th eir newfound status, however, would make them thoroughly unrecognizable to their predecessors. Th e central banks’ responsibilities—the legislative remits with which they are charged—are also subject to considerable scru- tiny. Monetary policymakers are tasked with keeping fi delity to their legislated mandates. Some, like the European Central Bank (ECB), are granted a single mandate, namely to ensure price sta- bility. Others, like the Federal Reserve, are tasked with a so-called dual mandate, which includes ensuring price stability and maxi- mum sustainable employment. Th e fi nancial crisis resurrected yet another objective: ensuring fi nancial stability. Considerably less attention, however, is paid to the institutional setting in which the policymakers meet, deliberate, and ultimately decide on policy. Th ese institutional dynamics alone are not deter- minative of the policy outcome. But I posit that the institutional dynamics infl uence policy decisions more than is commonly appreciated. In business, academia, and government, people and policy con- verge in institutional settings. Th ese settings matter considerably to H6930.indb 173 3/28/16 2:00:44 PM 174 Kevin M. Warsh the ultimate success—or failure—of an endeavor. An institution’s set- ting is a function, in part, of its institutional design; that is, the way in which the entity is originally composed and comprised. -
Banking Policy Issues in the 115Th Congress
Banking Policy Issues in the 115th Congress David W. Perkins Analyst in Macroeconomic Policy March 7, 2018 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44855 Banking Policy Issues in the 115th Congress Summary The financial crisis and the ensuing legislative and regulatory responses greatly affected the banking industry. Many new regulations—mandated or authorized by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) or promulgated under the authority of bank regulators—have been implemented in recent years. In addition, economic and technological trends continue to affect banks. As a result, Congress is faced with many issues related to the bank industry, including issues concerning prudential regulation, consumer protection, “too big to fail” (TBTF) banks, community banks, regulatory agency design and independence, and market and economic trends. For example, the Financial CHOICE Act (H.R. 10) and the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (S. 2155) propose wide ranging changes to the financial regulatory system, and include provisions related to many of these banking issues. Prudential Regulation. This type of regulation is designed to ensure banks are safely profitable and unlikely to fail. Regulatory ratio requirements agreed to in the international agreement known as the Basel III Accords and the Volcker Rule are examples. Ratio requirements require banks to hold a certain amount of capital on their balance sheets to better enable them to avoid failure. The Volcker Rule prohibits certain trading activities and affiliations at banks. Proponents argue the rules appropriately balance the need for safety and soundness with regulatory burden. -
The Clearing House Interbank Payments System: a Description of Its Operation and Risk Management
No. 8910 THE CLEARING HOUSE INTERBANK PAYMENTS SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION OF ITS OPERATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT by Robert T. Clair* Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas June 1989 Research Paper Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library ([email protected]) t No. 8910 THE CLEARIIIGHOUSE IIITERBAIIK PAYI,IEI{TS SYSTEII: A DTSCRIPTIOXOF ITS OPERATIOI{AND RISKI.IA}IAGEI{II{T by Robert T. Clair* Federal ReserveBank of Dallas Jurn 198!l * Theviews expressed .in this article are solely thoseof the authorand shouldnot be attributed to the FederalReserve Bank of Dallas. or the FederalReserve System. The Clearing HouseInterbank Payments System: Descriptionof Its 0perationsand Risk Manaqement 1. General0vervjew of the System The Clearing HouseInterbank Payment Systenr (CHIPS) is a high-speed message-s\4itchingnetwork owned and operatedby the Newyork Clearing House Assoc'iation(NYCHA) to clear jnternationaldollar payments.Based 'in Newyork Cit.y, CHIPSwas developed in the late 1960sas an e'lectronic replacementfor a paper-basedpayment system, the PaperExchange Payment System (PEPS), PEPSprovided an effective clearjng arrangementbut the paper-based strtrcturewas unable to handlethe rapidly growingvolume of paynentsthat neededto be cleared. Thegrowth in paymentvolume was partial'iy the resu'lt of the growthof the Eurodollarmarket.l Thechange in foreign exchangerate r For a discussionof the causesfor the surge in the Eurodollar market,see Sarkjs J. Khoury,Dynamics of I nternati ona'lBank ing, Praeger1980,p.24-6. regine from fjxed to floating rates jn lg73 also ljkely jncreasedthe volumeof internationa.l paymentsthat neededto be cleared. In responseto the growingvolurne of internationdl paymentsthe NYCHA developedthe ClearingHouse Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). -
The Political Economy of Argentina's Abandonment
Going through the labyrinth: the political economy of Argentina’s abandonment of the gold standard (1929-1933) Pablo Gerchunoff and José Luis Machinea ABSTRACT This article is the short but crucial history of four years of transition in a monetary and exchange-rate regime that culminated in 1933 with the final abandonment of the gold standard in Argentina. That process involved decisions made at critical junctures at which the government authorities had little time to deliberate and against which they had no analytical arsenal, no technical certainties and few political convictions. The objective of this study is to analyse those “decisions” at seven milestone moments, from the external shock of 1929 to the submission to Congress of a bill for the creation of the central bank and a currency control regime characterized by multiple exchange rates. The new regime that this reordering of the Argentine economy implied would remain in place, in one form or another, for at least a quarter of a century. KEYWORDS Monetary policy, gold standard, economic history, Argentina JEL CLASSIFICATION E42, F4, N1 AUTHORS Pablo Gerchunoff is a professor at the Department of History, Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires, Argentina. [email protected] José Luis Machinea is a professor at the Department of Economics, Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires, Argentina. [email protected] 104 CEPAL REVIEW 117 • DECEMBER 2015 I Introduction This is not a comprehensive history of the 1930s —of and, if they are, they might well be convinced that the economic policy regarding State functions and the entrance is the exit: in other words, that the way out is production apparatus— or of the resulting structural to return to the gold standard. -
Principles of Finance © Wikibooks
Principles of Finance © Wikibooks This work is licensed under a Creative Commons-ShareAlike 4.0 International License Original source: Principles of Finance, Wikibooks http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Principles_of_Finance Contents Chapter 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................1 1.1 What is Finance? ................................................................................................................1 1.2 History .................................................................................................................................1 1.2.1 Introduction to Finance ..........................................................................................1 1.2.1.1 Return on Investments ...............................................................................2 1.2.1.2 Debt Finance and Equity Finance - The Two Pillars of Modern Finance ....................................................................................................................................3 1.2.1.2.1 Debt Financing .................................................................................3 1.2.1.2.2 Equity Financing ...............................................................................3 1.2.1.3 Ratio Analysis ...............................................................................................4 1.2.1.3.1 Liquidity Ratios .................................................................................4 Chapter 2 The Basics ......................................................................................................6 -
Event Transcript: the Shift and the Shocks: What We've Learned
Unedited Rush Transcript Event The Shift and the Shocks: What We've Learned--and Have Still to Learn--from the Financial Crisis Martin Wolf, Financial Times Athanasios Orphanides, MIT Sloan School of Management Kevin Warsh, Hoover Institution, Stanford University Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC October 9, 2014 Adam Posen: Great man comes and that’s not me. Welcome everyone back to the Peterson Institute for International Economics. It’s a very pleasant evening. We’ve got some people here who are rarely here. We’ve got some people here who’ve been living here all week so it’s a good blend. We have one of the more festive occasions on our pre-meetings calendar, a good friend and a role model of communication Martin Wolf has agreed to premiere his Washington book and premiere his book, excuse me, do the Washington premiere for his book. It’s been a long week, I’m sorry. Do the Washington premiere for his book here at the Peterson Institute and we’re delighted to have him back on our stage. We had a great discussion with him about the Euro area with Jacob Kirkegaard and others a few months ago and tonight, we’re blessed to have two terrific policymakers who will now be able to discuss some of the implications of Martin’s book. But of course the main purpose of all this being economists is to sell. This is the book. The Shifts and the Shocks by Martin Wolf. This book is for sale outside. This book is not coming money to us; it’s money to Martin. -
Quantitative Easing: the Fed’S Tough Decision Around the World, Financial Markets Have Been Talking of Little Else for Weeks
FOMC PREVIEW QUANTITATIVE EASING: THE FED’s tOUGH DECISION Around the world, financial markets have been talking of little else for weeks. On Wednesday, the waiting game finally comes to an end. REUTERS/ KEVIN LAMARQUE BY PEDRO NICOLACI DA COstA Treasury bond buying from the Federal that, like its promise to keeping interest WASHINGTON, OCT 21 Reserve could ultimately rival the hefty first rates low, the second round of so-called round of asset purchases. quantitative easing will be around for an NE HUNDRED BILLION here, one With expectations of at least $500 billion “extended period” if needed. hundred billion there. Pretty soon already built into financial markets, the Fed The rationale for further monetary we’reO talking real money. may try to counter possible disappointment accommodation has been laid out by It may not be “shock and awe” at first by making its commitment open ended. Chairman Ben Bernanke, whose views on blush, but the ultimate sums involved in It will likely do so by setting parameters policy carry the day at the Federal Open a second, widely anticipated program of vague enough to convince the markets Market Committee. OCTOBER 2010 FOMC PREVIEW OCTOBER 2010 ”DepenDING ON EVOLVING ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS, QE2 HAS THE POTENTIAL TO GROW QUITE LARGE.” He has made clear that, with the 9.6 percent unemployment rate far above what might be seen as normal even in a post- recession context and inflation dangling at uncomfortably low levels, policymakers deem the risk of an outright deflationary rut significant enough to justify action. An incremental, flexible approach serves two purposes. -
The Federal Funds Rate in Extraordinary Times
For release on delivery 1:00 p.m. EDT May 21, 2008 The Federal Funds Rate in Extraordinary Times Remarks by Kevin Warsh Member Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at the Exchequer Club Washington, D.C. May 21, 2008 This may be the most pronounced time of testing for central banks in a generation.1 Let me recount just a few of our challenges: significant market turmoil, unsatisfactory economic growth, historic housing price declines, dramatic commodity price run-ups, risk of a secular reversal of global inflation trends, sharp changes in exchange rates, uneven and unprecedented contours of economic growth—and policy responses—across major trading partners, and significant domestic debate regarding optimal economic and regulatory policies. Mind you, my intention is not to declare, oh, woe is us. Thanks in no small measure to the scores of professionals long found in the four walls of the Federal Reserve System—and ample access to information—the Fed possesses both the commitment and resources to tackle these policy challenges. And, by virtue of the Fed's institutional credibility, bequeathed to today's Federal Open Market Committee by its predecessors, the policy response tends to be as highly anticipated as it is consequential. But in affirming our formidable assets, it is similarly not my intention to suggest that we have devised error-free policies to painlessly and smoothly achieve agreed-upon objectives. On Monetary Policy...Today The Fed is not omniscient. Neither are our tools uniquely and perfectly suited to ensure that the ills of yesterday do not recur. -
US Treasury Markets: Steps Toward Increased Resilience
U.S. Treasury Markets Steps Toward Increased Resilience DISCLAIMER This report is the product of the Group of Thirty’s Working Group on Treasury Market Liquidity and reflects broad agreement among its participants. This does not imply agreement with every specific observation or nuance. Members participated in their personal capacity, and their participation does not imply the support or agreement of their respective public or private institutions. The report does not represent the views of the membership of the Group of Thirty as a whole. ISBN 1-56708-184-3 How to cite this report: Group of Thirty Working Group on Treasury Market Liquidity. (2021). U.S. Treasury Markets: Steps Toward Increased Resilience. Group of Thirty. https://group30.org/publications/detail/4950. Copies of this paper are available for US$25 from: The Group of Thirty 1701 K Street, N.W., Suite 950 Washington, D.C. 20006 Telephone: (202) 331-2472 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.group30.org Twitter: @GroupofThirty U.S. Treasury Markets Steps Toward Increased Resilience Published by Group of Thirty Washington, D.C. July 2021 G30 Working Group on Treasury Market Liquidity CHAIR Timothy F. Geithner President, Warburg Pincus Former Secretary of the Treasury, United States PROJECT DIRECTOR Patrick Parkinson Senior Fellow, Bank Policy Institute PROJECT ADVISORS Darrell Duffie Jeremy Stein Adams Distinguished Professor of Management and Moise Y. Safra Professor of Economics, Professor of Finance, Stanford Graduate School of Harvard University Business WORKING GROUP MEMBERS William C. Dudley Masaaki Shirakawa Senior Research Scholar, Griswold Center for Economic Distinguished Guest Professor, Aoyama-Gakuin University Policy Studies at Princeton University Former Governor, Bank of Japan Former President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Lawrence H.