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Chinatown Subway: Name it After a Truly Great Hero, not Rose Pak

Dear SFMTA Board Members,

Congratulations on the new subway stop in Chinatown. That is a huge accomplishment, for which Rose Pak may deserve some credit, though not the high honor of having her name immortalized on a landmark. Naming a geographic feature after an individual deserves true greatness, and we can think of no better person than Liu Xiaobo, a philosopher, poet, and human rights activist who won a Nobel Peace prize. Alternatively, we would suggest naming the subway stop as simply Chinatown, which represents all the great diversity of the neighborhood over the many decades of its flourishing.

Rose Pak, unfortunately, has a history that makes her inappropriate as a true hero of the Chinese people, or of San Francisco. China uses influence tactics, especially through its United Front Work Department, to compromise U.S. democracy, and democracies around the world. The most horrendous examples of this are in East Turkistan, where 1-3 million minorities have been locked up due to their beliefs, in Tibet, where Buddhist monasteries are torn down, against the , who are subject to forced organ transplants, and in Hong Kong, where the hopes of over a million people who have marched to demand freedom and democracy from the Chinese Communist Party are being suppressed through police brutality. As discussed below, this is not the right time to honor someone who has been closely associated with China's dictatorship.

As many experts and members of the Chinese American community have observed, Rose Pak had very specific and demonstrable ties to China’s authoritarian regime. She has served as overseas Executive Director of the China Overseas Exchange Association (COEA), a foreign affairs organization that operates under the State Council’s Overseas China Affairs Office; she has twice attended the People’s Consultative Conference, reserved for Chinese Communist party loyalists and has demonstrable ties to the S.F., -area “peaceful reunification” organizations. To understand the breadth and depth of her association with China’s dictatorship and furthering of its anti-democratic policies on U.S. soil, it is helpful to understand how the Chinese Communist Party (the “Party”) seeks to encourage ethnic-Chinese communities and individuals overseas to support its interests, in democracies everywhere, including the United States.

In his book “Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese,” 1 James Jiann Hua To discusses how Chinese overseas associations exist in a complex set of relationships with the Chinese authorities and their policies for managing overseas populations, new immigrants, and established immigrant communities. As he explains, overseas Chinese work allows the Party to broadly “unify

1 To, James Jiann Hua. “Qiaowu: extra-territorial policies for the overseas Chinese,” Brill 2014.

1 the thinking” of diaspora Chinese, to ensure their continued support for the ruling party and to ensure that political or ideological rivals in the overseas Chinese community are marginalized. They operate as part of the regime’s modernization of propaganda and thought work in an interconnected world. Id. As such, these Beijing-controlled associations define what is normal, what is abnormal, and set down the categories of acceptable thought and behavior for all ethnically Chinese people overseas, regardless of their citizenship. 2

The United Front Work Department. The Communist Party Central Committee’s United Front Work Department has played a major role in this work, 3 with key goals emphasizing the need to convince overseas Chinese communities that the Party is the sole representative of China, to isolate diverse views that the Party perceives as adversarial, including Uyghurs and Tibetan Buddhists,4 and to change how democracies speak and think about China.5 Methods and strategies include emphasizing the historical connection and responsibilities of “overseas compatriots” as ‘sons and daughters of the Yellow Emperor;’”6 appointing hundreds of Chinese Americans to positions in United Front organizations with free trips to China as part of the package, and the providing of other honors to persuade Chinese Americans to pursue United Front objectives on U.S. soil, often times to the detriment of Uyghurs, pro-democracy advocates and other groups the Party seeks to marginalize and/or suppress.7

The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. Organizations such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) inside the Communist Party’s Central Committee’s United Front Department have furthered the United Front agenda, 8 through “people-to-people methods” and a “systematic approach of persuasion, influence, and manipulation” to guide and direct members of the overseas Chinese community. As James To writes, “No other government initiative can match qiaowu’s scale of operation or sophistication, nor profess to reach the level of success that China has enjoyed under a wide variety of specialist programs and activities.” 9 As a tool of social control, overseas Chinese work aims to “gain and secure the loyalty of the overseas Chinese community,” and then mobilize strategic diaspora groups for the Party’s political goals. Much of this work is not done overtly or using coercive or interventionist means. Instead it is carried out via incentives, disincentives, alliance building, marginalization, propaganda, psychological persuasion, and “win- win” benefits for all involved. Especially important to Overseas Chinese Affairs Office work is to “resolutely implement[] and execute[] the Party line, the Party's guiding principles, and the Party's

2 Id. See also, Mattis, Peter. “An American Lens on China’s Interference and Influence-Building Abroad.” The Asan Forum. April 30, 2018; Eades, Mark. “China’s United Front seeks to Undermine US Support for Taiwan.” International Policy Digest. September 11, 2017; “Florence Fang’s ‘100,000 Strong Foundation’: Education or Indoctrination?” Foreign Policy Association. May 27, 2016. 3 See the United Front Department of the CCP Central Committee. www.zytzb.gov.cn/html/index.html. 4 For example, as part of a massive campaign to monitor, control, and intimidate China’s ethnic minorities, the Party has created a global registrar of Uyghurs who live outside of China by threatening to detain Uyghur relatives still in China if they do not provide personal information of their relatives living abroad to the Chinese police. Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “Chinese Cops Now Spying on American Soil.” The Daily Beast. August 14, 2018. 5 Parello-Plesnur. Ibid., at 4. 6 In his 2014 speech to the Seventh Conference of Overseas Associations, Xi Jinping described the “rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” as a “dream” shared by “all Chinese.” Perello-Plesnur, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Influence Operations,” Hudson Institute. June 2018, at 32. 7 Perello-Plesner. Ibid., at 32. Since March 2018, the OCAO has operated as a part of the United Front Work Department directly and not as a part of the State Council. 8 See the United Front Work Department of the Party’s Central Committee. www.zytzb.gov.cn/html/index.html. 9 To. Ibid, at 4.

2 policies," and thus "aggressively expand the struggle” against Taiwanese pro-democracy advocates, Tibetan and Uyghur ethnic separatists, Falun Gong believers, and all other “enemy forces.”10 “Implicit in these goals is the elimination of potential threats and rival discourses that may challenge the CCP and its hold on power [not only in China but overseas].”11

The Chinese Overseas Exchange Association. The Chinese Overseas Exchange Association operates under the direction of the Chinese Government’s State Council Overseas Affairs Office (OCAO) and comprises Chinese Communist Party officials that are among other things engaged in aggressive propaganda campaigns in the United States aimed at furthering Chinese Communist Party objectives abroad.12 The Chinese Overseas Exchange Association (COEA), which shares high-level officers with its parent, poses as a nongovernmental organization while acting in fact as a propaganda agent of Beijing, that is, of the OCAO.13 To implement China policies in the United States, the COEA bureaucracy collaborates with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, local Chinese consulates and embassies, Party diplomats, attaches and cadres.14

The People’s Consultative Conferences. The People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which is part of the government apparatus, is run by the Standing Committee of the powerful Politburo. Its ties to the Party and its ideology are beyond question; it is controlled, managed, and dominated by the Party. Members are expected to adhere to the discipline and goals of the Party and work to strengthen China and Party rule of China by, inter alia, the aligning of their activities with China’s interests.15 Those invited to participate directly in this prominent national body are those influential overseas individuals who are the closest to the Chinese Communist Party.16

The Peaceful Reunification Councils. In 1988, the United Front Work Department founded the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Unification with a branch office in Washington D.C.17 The San Francisco branch was opened soon thereafter, in 2001.18 By 2018, the council had established thirty-three offices in the United States. Over the years, the branch in San Francisco has actively cooperated with the local Chinese consulate to work against the independence of democratic Taiwan and for the subordination of the country to authoritarian China. See Chinese for Peaceful Reunification – Northern . http://www.cpu-nc.org.

Against this backdrop, and especially in light of Chinese American’s contributions and their important struggles for equal citizenship and recognition as Americans, Beijing’s insistence on

10 https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2008-annual-report 11 To. Ibid. at 47. 12 Eades, Mark. “Beijing-by-the Bay: China’s Hidden Influence in San Francisco.” This article is available at: https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/06/09/beijing-hidden-influence-san-francisco/. 13 Id., at 2. 14 Conversation with China expert Dr. Yiyang Xia, based on work in progress. 15 Parello-Plesnur, ibid., at 34-35. 16 Id.. at 34. 17 Id., at 33. 18 See, e.g., http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnwtch/bmz/mg/jjswq/201506/t20150626_10119787.html (This June 2015 report discusses the 14-year celebration of the establishment of San Francisco branch of the Peaceful Reunification Council.)

3 referring to ethnic Chinese communities in the U.S. as “overseas Chinese” or “overseas compatriots” rather than as Chinese Americans, its efforts to use Chinese American communities as instruments of PRC foreign policy, and related political manipulation, are viewed by many Chinese Americans and others in the Bay Area as a great disservice to the very communities Beijing claims “solidarity” with. Like the PRC government she served, Ms. Pak also referred to herself and the Chinese American community in San Francisco as “overseas Chinese,” despite the fact that she spent most of her life in the United States, presumably as a naturalized U.S. citizen.

Apart from this, Ms. Pak’s specific and demonstrable ties to China’s dictatorship provide further reasons to refrain from honoring Ms. Pak as proposed.

First, Ms. Pak served as the Executive Director of the China Overseas Exchange Association,19 which as noted, is a foreign affairs organization that operates under the auspices of the Chinese government’s State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (the OCEA).20 In this capacity, she has had close ties with several high-ranking OCEA officials, including OCEA Director Qiu Yuanping and Deputy Director Tan Tianxing.21 For example, Rose Pak met with OCEA Director, Qiu Yuanping, on a visit by Qiu to San Francisco in February 2014, and then appeared again in a featured spot with Qui the following month at an assembly that focused squarely on China’s national interests including their plan to force the now democratic Taiwan to become a part of China’s dictatorial rule.22 Earlier in 2010, Pak appeared in Beijing to attend the “Fifth World Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations,” an event led by Party officials and similarly dedicated to China’s so called “national” interests abroad including the subordination of Taiwan to the government in Beijing.23

Ms. Pak’s open opposition to those Chinese Americans Beijing brands and marginalizes as “Party enemies,” including her refusal to allow so called “branded” Chinese Americans to participate in the annual Chinese New Year parade she controlled as “de facto” head of the City’s Chamber of Commerce, similarly aligns her with the overall Beijing playbook – the only genuine Chinese Americans are those Party loyalists who can be counted on to further Beijing defined- interests on U.S. soil. 24

In addition, China’s use of its own overseas ties to secure its reunification with Taiwan – at the expense of Taiwan’s democracy – has garnered the support of the People’s Consultative Council work. As noted, those influential Chinese Americans invited to attend such meetings in Beijing are among those closest to the Chinese Communist Party. As such, Rose Pak’s attendance as an “overseas Chinese representative” at the second session of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 2014 illustrates well the trust placed in her by Beijing as an influential member of the Chinese American community able and willing to

19 The COEA webpage listing Rose Pak as a COEA “overseas director” (“白兰(女)，美国旧金山中华总商会顾问”) is no longer available at the original web address, but is still available via web archive (Archive Today, Internet Archive). Ms. Pak was also named as a COEA “executive director” in an Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Report, See OCAO, Mar. 11, 2014 [Archive Today, Internet Archive]). 20 Eades. Ibid., at 2. 21 Id. 22 Id. See also OCAO, Mar. 11, 2014 [Archive Today, Internet Archive]) that depicts her meeting with OCAO director Qiu Yuanping and deputy director Tan Tianxing. 23 Eades. Ibid., at 2. 24 Id., at 1.

4 further the PRC’s agenda in the Bay Area.25 Her special ties with the San Francisco area “peaceful reunification” council is similarly instructive.26 As noted, the national and branch offices are similarly devoted to the PRC reunification policy, which is at odds with democratic rule in Taiwan and arguably, by implication, rule of law principles that undergird and inform democratic rule in the U.S.

Indeed, as experts observe, to name a subway stop after Ms. Pak would serve to reinforce what Mark Eades calls China’s perception of San Francisco as “a quaint little Beijing-by-the-Bay, with clean air, cable cars, and walk-away crab cocktails for the pleasure of corrupt Chinese Communist Party Officials.”27 San Francisco should name its new subway stop after someone truly great, like Liu Xiaobo, or it should name it simply “Chinatown.” That says it all.

Respectfully yours,

/s Terri E. Marsh /s Anders Corr Terri E. Marsh, Esq. Anders Corr Executive Director Publisher Human Rights Law Foundation Journal of Political Risk

/s Mark Eades Mark Eades Asia-based Educator, Independent researcher

/s Arthur Waldron Arthur Waldron Lauder Professor of International Relations Department of History University of Pennsylvania

25 Pak’s attendance was reported, inter alia, by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO, Mar. 11, 2014 [Archive Today, Internet Archive]). Here she is named as COEA “Executive Director” and herself says that she “was invited to return to China to participate in the ‘two sessions’ and moved by the warm reception of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.” Her attendance at the event was also reported at the COOCC website (March. 6, 2014) [Archive Today, Internet Archive]), by the Central United Front Work Department (unavailable at original web address, but available at Archive Today) and by Beijing Municipal OCAO (March 13, 2014 [Archive Today, Internet Archive]). Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) “special representatives” or “two-party observers” and Rose Pak’s status as such are discussed at length at Baike. “作为海外华侨华人的代表，旧金山中华总商会顾问白兰、法国华侨华人 会执行主席王加清等已经抵达驻地... 徐光华说,邀请海外侨胞列席全国政协会议时，会综合考虑到多方面因 素，包括受邀侨胞在其所在国的影响力，以及在华侨华人当中的影响力等等.” 26 See, e.g., U.S.-China Press (July 19, 2016 [Archive Today, Internet Archive] and OCAE (Sept. 25, 2006 [Archive Today, Internet Archive]. 27 Eades. Ibid., at 4.

5 s/ William Stanton William Stanton Former Director of the American Institute of Taiwan

/s Demetrius Cox Demetrius Cox Retired Naval Officer

/s Joseph Bosco Joseph Bosco Georgetown University (retired) Department of Defense (retired)

/s Matthew Robertson Matthew Robertson China Studies Research Fellow, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation

/s Teng Biao Teng Biao Visiting Professor, NYU(China) Human Rights Lawyer

/s Emmet Dignan Emmet Dignan 3245 Wagon Road # 358 Borrego Springs, CA 92004

/s Roger Canfield Roger Canfield Americong.com WFH.org.

/s Warren Rothman Warren Rothman Independent author and researcher

/s Kyle Obert Kyle Obert Human Rights Activist

/s Yana Way Yana Way Independent Writer, Researcher, Educator

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