National Security in the Obama Administration “The Bush Doctrine is more condemned than understood, let alone defended. Stanley Renshon not only defends the Doctrine but makes it clear that most of the critics have failed to come to grips with the real and pressing problems that will confront the Obama administration. With strong arguments and a penetrating view of the world, this is a stimulating and important book.” Robert Jervis, Columbia University “National Security in the Obama Administration is a serious, fascinating, and timely account of the Bush Doctrine, its legacy, and its implications for the Obama administration's unfolding foreign policy.” Robert Kagan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “Stanley Renshon’s book transcends the bitterly polarized and all too often unedi- fying foreign policy debates that characterized much of the presidency of George W. Bush. In this important new work, he not only provides a welcome reassess- ment of the Bush Doctrine, but explains how external threats and pressing foreign policy challenges shape the choices of the Obama administration. While major alterations of style and method are evident in Obama’s foreign policy, changes in substance and doctrine appear to be far less pronounced. Renshon’s important new book illuminates the reasons why.” Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University Many observers claim the Bush Doctrine is dead. At least that’s what critics hope. But while new U.S. national security challenges emerge, many post-9/11 threats still persist and the policies of George W. Bush offer one set of strategic answers for how President Obama can confront those dangers. Neither a polemic nor a white- wash, this book provides a careful analysis of the Bush Doctrine—its development, application, and rationale—and assesses its legacy: How will Obama respond to the many foreign policy challenges that await him? Through an examination of psychology as much as policy, Renshon, in the first comparative analysis of the Bush Doctrine and the developing Obama Doctrine, analyzes the range of national security issues Obama will face and the political divisions that permeate U.S. national security debates. It is essential reading for anyone looking to understand how presidents assess security risks generally and how Obama specifically is likely to adapt the Bush Doctrine to his own worldview. Stanley A. Renshon is a Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York Graduate Center. He is the author of over ninety articles and fourteen books and is a certified psychoanalyst. National Security in the Obama Administration Reassessing the Bush Doctrine Stanley A. Renshon First published 2010 by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2010 Stanley A. Renshon All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Renshon, Stanley Allen. National security in the Obama administration : reassessing the Bush doctrine / Stanley A. Renshon. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. 1. National security–United States. 2. United States–Military policy. 3. United States–Foreign relations–2009- I. Title. UA23.R443 2009 3550.033073–dc22 2009011811 ISBN 0-203-87451-X Master e-book ISBN ISBN 10: 0-415-80406-X (hbk) ISBN 10: 0-415-80405-1 (pbk) ISBN 10: 0-203-87451-X (ebk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-80406-6 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-80405-9 (pbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-203-87451-6 (ebk) For Alexander L. George [1920–2006] Mentor, Political Psychology Colleague and, above all, Friend Contents Preface ix Acknowledgments xiii 1 The Obama Presidency and the World he Inherits 1 PART I The Bush Doctrine Reconsidered 25 2 The Evolution of a Post-9/11 National Secutity Perspective 27 3 The Real Bush Doctrine 38 4 The Bush Doctrine: Myths and Criticisms 57 PART II The Strategic World after 9/11 81 5 The New Calculus of Risk 83 6 Deterrence, Containment and Adversarial Bargaining Post-9/11: North Korea and Iran 104 7 Dangerous Threats and the Use of Force 124 8 Strategic Options and the Future of the Bush Doctrine 146 PART III The Politics of Post-9/11 National Security 165 9 The Politics of Risk Assessment 167 viii Contents 10 The Politics of Post-9/11 National Security: A Profound Worldview Divide 183 11 Obama’s National Security Tasks: Worldview, Leadership and Judgment 199 Notes 224 Bibliography 266 Index 283 Preface The focus of this book lies at the intersection of post-9/11 national security dilemmas that face the United States and its allies, the development and application of the strategic doctrines and policies that respond to those circum- stances, and the presidential leadership and judgment that are brought to bear, for better or worse, on these issues. This book is an analysis of two presidencies and the doctrine that both connects and separates them. The Bush Doctrine grew out of the 9/11 attacks and represented President Bush’s response to what he and his advisors saw as the key issues and lessons to emerge from those attacks. Those attacks reframed the Bush Administration’s view of the most serious problems it faced and what to do about them. The potential for the linkage between catastrophic terrorism and the leakage of knowledge or weapons of mass destruction material, either inad- vertent or deliberate, raised the national security stakes enormously for the United States. Or at least so the Bush Administration thought, and acted accordingly. For a brief moment after 9/11 the country and many in the world were united in their rhetorical support of this country and many allies, even those who had not been America’s friend, offered various kinds of help, whether out of fear or solidarity, to bring the perpetrators to justice. But Mr. Bush had more serious concerns than revenge. A sophisticated, ruthless, and deadly enemy had pulled off a stunning and severely damaging attack on American soil against major national icons. Either the White House or Congress barely escaped the devastation because of the heroic acts of Americans who gave their lives so that one hijacked plane could not complete its mission. The next time America might not escape catastrophic and irreversible harm. The Bush Administration put into place a large set of policies designed to prevent another, more deadly attack. These policies were controversial both domestically and abroad. And it is partially on the basis of those disagreements that Barack Obama ran for and was elected to the presidency. A first question that arises then is: what will he do with the national security architecture that he has inherited from the Bush Administration? This has understandably been a focus of attention as the new president takes office and begins to address his responsibilities and exercise his judgment on the many national security matters he will face. x Preface However, those instances—and no president can fully escape from them regardless of the preferred focus of his attention—raise an equally important question for the new Obama Administration: how will he respond to the many other foreign policy challenges that await him? The answers to that second critical question are also to be found in a series of overlapping layers, each level of which becomes progressively closer to the president’s basic operational worldview and set of strategic assumptions. At the first level are those questions of concrete policy. Here the new president will face many national security questions for which the Bush Doctrine cannot and was not developed to give answers. What does one do about a resurgent Russia? What should the president do about the loose alliance of dictatorships that is gathering momentum linking South America, parts of Eastern Europe, East Asia, and South East Asia? What policies are best suited to handle “revisionist” powers? Should the United States intervene in actual or potentially genocidal wars like Darfur, and if so, in what circumstances? Underlying these and similarly concrete issues is a second level of inference and analysis that raises some very basic questions for the president. What is the proper role of American power and leadership in the post-9/11 world? How does one relate to our competitors and enemies? How much can he expect from our allies and what do they have a right to expect from us? And of course, the most basic national security question of all: under what circum- stances should the United States consider and then use military force? The Bush Doctrine provides answers to some of these questions, but Pre- sident Obama will have to see his way clear to his own views. Beneath the Bush Doctrine and whatever doctrine Obama may decide to develop and implement lie a series of strategic assumptions, resting on the foundation of the president’s worldview and those of his advisors. That is the third and most basic operational level at which the president and his advisors’ thinking operate.