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Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Court-Damage by British Ship To [Vol. 95 RECENT CASES Admiralty-Jurisdiction of High Court-Damage by British Ship to Foreign Wharf-Action in rem was brought against the owners of a British vessel for damage done to a wharf in South Africa through negli- gent navigation of the vessel. Vessel owners contended High Court I had no jurisdiction. Held, the High Court has jurisdiction. The Tolten [1946] P. 135. Though the factual situation of trespass on foreign land has been before the High Court on the propriety of a common law action 2 (in which jurisdiction was denied), there has been no similar case raised on the possibility of an admiralty action.3 The British rule of maritime jurisdic- tion is that the High Court shall have jurisdiction in any claim for damages by a ship,4 and this is directly opposed to the common law doctrine ex- pressed in the Mocacmbique5 case. This case, however, involved an in- vasion of land rights in which the owner was ejected from his property and sued in personam to recover for the trespass. Even if the application of the Mocambique case would bar a suit in personam, the very nature of admiralty law is so different from that of the common law that it would be incompatible with the general law of the sea and English admiralty statutes to bar an action in rem in the instant case. The American courts have reached the opposite conclusion, but for different reasons: since our maritime jurisdiction does not extend to damage by vessels to land struc- tures." This principle is well defined in the United States 7 and has been established by a long line of cases,8 all of which refuse to grant jurisdic- tion for damages to land structures, whether in the United States or abroad. The American rule, however, has been vigorously criticized as i. "This was a court which exercised jurisdiction in prize cases, and had general jurisdiction in maritime causes, on the instance side." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. I9io) 286. The present jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice in relation to ad- miralty matters is derived partly from statute, and partly from the inherent and stat- utory jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty. See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 15 & 16 GEO. V, c. 49, §22 (1925). 2. British South Africa v. Companhia de Mocambique [1893] A. C. 6o2, i0 The Times L. R 7. In this case, however, the House of Lords was concerned not with an admiralty action in rein against the ship, but with an ordinary common-law action for breaking and entering the plaintiff's lands, for ejecting the plaintiff therefrom and for damages for such trespass. Still less was it considering the application of this rule to maritime liens. 3. In The Moxham [1875] P. D. 43, io6, a similar situation arose but there was an agreement between the parties to determine liability in an English court, and the question of whether the foreign court had jurisdiction was eliminated. 4. See Admiralty Court Act, I861, 24 & 25 Vicr. c. 7, reenacted in the Judicature Act of 1925 (15 & i6 GEo. V, c. 22), which states, "The High Court shall have juris- diction in any claim for damage ly a ship." 5.British South Africa v. Companhia de Mocambique [1893] A. C. 602. 6. For limitations of admiralty jurisdiction in the United States, see (917) 65 U. oF PA. L. REv. 298. which deals with jurisdiction in tort cases; for matters of exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty courts, see (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REV. 288. Of value, also, are RoBINsoN, Ox ADMIRALTY (1939) 56; and I BENEDICr, TnE LAW OF AmERIcANADMIRALTY (6th ed. 1940) 349. 7. The Nootka Sound No. 305-G, 51 F. Supp. 54 (1943), where the court ex- presses the American view saying, "A Federal District Court is without admiralty jurisdiction of libel in rem against steamship for damage to libellant's dock as result of such vessel negligently colliding with the dock." 8. The general outline and American view was first set out in The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20 (1865). Here a vessel negligently caught fire and the fire spread to the adjacent wharf. Held, no admiralty jurisdiction since the consumation of the injury was on land. This was followed in Ex Parte Phenix Ins. Co., ii8 U. S. 61o (1866), (214) 1946] RECENT CASES unsatisfactory, and attempts have been made to change it by legislation. 9 In England, where the scope of maritime jurisdiction is much broader than that of the United States, it covers all damages done by a ship.'0 Had the damage been done to a foreign ship in foreign waters 11 or had the land structure been on English soil,'2 there is no question but that the High Court would have had jurisdiction. The chief problem here is whether the accident occurring on foreign soil removes it from the scope of the admiralty courts. If jurisdiction must be limited to Nigeria, plain- tiff loses his remedy once the ship has left that country. The principle underlying the general law of the sea has been to protect maritime com- merce.' 3 In order to secure prudent navigation, persons whose property is damaged by the negligent navigation of a vessel should not be deprived of the security of the vessel. The American rule fails since owners of "land structures" often find their property damaged by vessels, yet no means of recovery except in civil courts. Damages to piers and other waterfront property by ships occur frequently, yet the suit in rem, making the offending ship a security for the damage, is closed to these property owners. If the vessel is under a compulsory pilot, as is the custom when docking or sailing, there can not even be a recovery in personam against where the same conclusion was reached for damage to shore property caused by sparks from a steamer. Since then, this doctrine has 'been rigidly followed, being relaxed only to the extent of allowing maritime jurisdiction in cases of damage to aids to navi- gation, such as beacons fixed in the ground but standing in the water. The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361 (1904). The strict rule of refusing jurisdiction has been followed in Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co.. ii9 U. S. 388 (i886) (jib boom of schooner punching hole in warehouse wall causing corn to flow out into water) ; The Troy, 2o8 U. S. 321 (i9O8) ; and Cleveland Terminal and Valley R. Co. v. Cleveland Steamship Co., 208 U. S. 316 (i9o8), where ship damaged railroad bridge. See also Phoenix Construction Co. v. Steamer Poughkeepsie, 212 U. S.558 (igo8) (damage to pipe on bottom of the river) ; United States v. Panoil, 266 U. S. 433 (925) (dam- age to dike extending from shore) ; The Vizcaya, 38 F. Supp. 1020 (941) (damage to pier attached to land), in all of which cases maritime jurisdiction was refused. 9.BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AmnicAN ADMIRALTY 353, makes the following com- ment, "There has been much discontent with the American rule and bills approved by the American Bar Association (Resolution of American Bar Assoc. at Kansas City, 1937) and the Maritime Law Association (Resolution of the Maritime Law Assoc., May, 1938) have been presented to Congress with the idea of extending the admiralty jurisdiction to all damage done on land by ships." See also Franum, Am- phibiots Torts (933) 43 YALE L. J.34. io.The language of the statute (15 & 16 GEo. V, c. 49) has been expressed in many cases, including those where the wrong doing ship is not herself in collision, The Dunlossit, [1897] A. C. 97; "The gist of the matter seems to be a tort done by the ship." The Sarah, [1862] Lush 549. It has been held to apply to damage to an oyster bed, The Swift, [I9OI] P. 168; to a landing stage, The Veritas, [igoi] P. 3o4. The records of the High Court of Admiralty show that suits have been entertained for col- lisions with a house, a wharf, a bridge, and a dredger. See RoscoE AND ROBERTSON, MARSDEN'S COLLISION AT SEA (6th ed. I9IO) 77. ii. The Griefswald [1859] Sw. 43o; The Russia, 21 L. T. 44o (1869). For a case in which jurisdiction was allowed even when the collision was between foreign vessels in foreign waters, see the Courier, [1862] Lush 541. Even where proceedings in the same matter are pending before a forign tribunal, the court may still exercise its jurisdiction. The Charlotte, 23 T. L. R. 750 (1907). 12. The Veritas, [1901] P. 304; River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, 26 W. R. 217 (H. L. 1877); G. W. Ry. v. S. S. Mostyn, [1928] A. C. 57. By the Harbors, Docks and Piers Act, 1847 (io Vicr. 27), the owner of every vessel was made answer- able for damage done by that vessel to the dock pier. 13. An American case, The Wildwood, 41 F. Supp. 956 (1946) (affirmed in 133 F. (2d) 765) points this out when judge Neterer traced admiralty law "as being predi- cated on the law of merchants." 216 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 the ship's owner.1 4 Nor are suits against the pilots fruitful. The British rule goes further in allowing admiralty recovery in all these cases, and this positive principle of automatic attachment to the ship by the creditor has become a substantive rule of admiralty, more so than the negative principle of common law on which the Mocambique rule rests. Adoption-Parent and Child-Definition of Parent-Plaintiff married visibly-pregnant woman two days after her divorce from former husband.
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