Ninth Oral History Interview
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Frank Mankiewicz Oral History Interview – RFK #9, 12/16/1969 Administrative Information Creator: Frank Mankiewicz Interviewer: Larry J. Hackman Date of Interview: December 16, 1969 Place of Interview: Bethesda, Maryland Length: 75 pp. Biographical Note Mankiewicz was director of the Peace Corps in Lima, Peru from 1962 to 1964, Latin America regional director from 1964 to 1966 and then press secretary to Senator Robert F. Kennedy from 1966 to 1968. This interview focuses on Senator Robert Kennedy’s 1968 campaign, his debate with Eugene McCarthy, and the California primary, among other issues. Access Restrictions No restrictions. Usage Restrictions According to the deed of gift signed March 1, 2000, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government. Copyright The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of “fair use,” that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff. Transcript of Oral History Interview These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings. Suggested Citation Frank Mankiewicz, recorded interview by Larry J. Hackman, December 16, 1969, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program. FRANK MANKIEWICZ RFK #9 Table of Contents Page Topic 1 The McNamara tapes 3 Robert Kennedy’s relationship with Sargent Shriver 8 Supporters of Robert Kennedy in Johnson’s cabinet 10 James Dunn’s radio campaign strategy 16 Support for McCarthy in California 20 Indianapolis newspaper coverage of campaign 23 Indiana campaign 29 Wabash Cannonball 36 Campaign staff 40 New York primary projections 41 McCarthy’s voting record 45 California campaign organization 47 Robert Kennedy – Eugene McCarthy debates 55 Guaranteed wage 57 Pierson column 64 Last conversations with Robert Kennedy 66 Voter turnout 70 Acceptance speeches 71 Robert Kennedy’s attitude toward his personal safety 72 Israel Ninth Oral History Interview With FRANK MANKIEWICZ December 16, 1969 Bethesda, Maryland By Larry J. Hackman For the John F. Kennedy Library HACKMAN: Let’s go back to a couple of things earlier in the campaign that we’d skipped over. One is – you may not have any involvement – the McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] tapes. What do you know about how those came about? Anything? MANKIEWICZ: I don’t really. I know only I came back – it wasn’t the Martin Luther King weekend, it was some weekend – it was the day they went to West Virginia and I didn’t go. I came back again to try to do a day’s work at campaign headquarters, to get some staff hired. Yes, that would be the weekend of April twelfth and thirteenth. And I think that night I started getting phone calls from people who had gotten the story [-1-] about the McNamara tapes from the people at the studio. Somebody had talked to the studio about the tapes. That was the first I’d heard about it. I talked to McNamara that night, and he filled me in and told me how they’d been done and what the tapes were. That was all I did really. I went in and told people what the story was, the press. It wasn’t that big a story, and then later they began to use the tapes. But I don’t know how it was decided to do them. They weren’t terribly good. HACKMAN: You never found out whether Robert Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] played a role in getting him to do them or whether it was just… MANKIEWICZ: No. I’d never worried about that. I don’t know, Ted Sorensen [Theodore C. Sorensen] was very big in those tapes. I mean he clearly had a lot to do with having them made, and then he was on them interviewing McNamara. But whether it was his idea or whether McNamara came forward and suggested it, I don’t know. But it wasn’t really a very major item as it turned out. We did use them though in Indiana a little bit, and I suppose they had a good effect. [-2-] HACKMAN: Okay. Do you know anything about the relationship between Robert Kennedy and Shriver in that period? Were there any efforts to bring Shriver into the campaign or to have him make any statements? MANKIEWICZ: Well, right at the beginning there was talk about getting Shriver [Robert Sargent Shriver, Jr.] in. He’d just been appointed ambassador to Paris, and I recall some conversation – I don’t remember with whom; it wasn’t with Robert Kennedy – about whether Shriver was going to be in the campaign or not. And then he decided, I think publicly, that he was going to stay as ambassador. But there wasn’t very much talk about it. HACKMAN: Anything back over the last several years that you could see obvious about it? MANKIEWICZ: I talked to him about Shriver a couple of times. I knew Sarge, of course, quite well. I was probably the only person who worked for both of them. And we’d talk every once in a while about the Peace Corps and about OEO and about how Shriver had sort of gotten in trouble with OEO because he didn’t understand the bureaucracy and how he was able to [-3-] make it in the Peace Corps because it was his own bureaucracy. But once he moved into OEO, he just didn’t understand how the government worked and that he had to live with it and that those people, of course, had no loyalty to him at all as the Peace Corps people did. In OEO you had people who counted their accumulated sick leave and worried about the fact that as between two GS-14s, one of them had a secretary who was a 7 and the other had a 9 and that was a very serious matter. Sarge never could understand all that, never wanted to cope with it. And also, I think, he felt that the same sort of emotional impetus would carry the OEO, and obviously it wouldn’t. I mean the Peace Corp didn’t cost any congressman any money, that is to say, it didn’t cost him anything in his district; it didn’t cost him any political problems; it didn’t cost him any contracts; he didn’t get any Job Corps centers or lose any. The OEO was quite a different matter. And suddenly I remember in the early days of OEO when I was working on that task force, they’d run in [-4-] Wilbur Cohen [Wilbur Joseph Cohen], or somebody would show up and point out to Sarge that you’d have to have an allocation formula, so much of this would have to be in each state. You could see what was happening then. And I think it did Sarge in. So I used to talk to Robert Kennedy about that, and he sort of agree that that was where the problem lay. And I got the impression that he was sort of troubled by Sarge, that he seemed to be playing much more the Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] game than he had to, particularly in ’67. A lot of those things on hunger and some of the other stuff he really didn’t play a very admirable role in by any means. But I remember one big blow up involving Bill Mullins [William Mullins]. Mullins was a kind of a bat man who…. I don’t know where he worked before, but he worked for Sarge for some time as a sort of kind of the fellow who’d get the airplane tickets and to be sure that Sarge would have a three by five card that would list the people at the head table, that sort of thing. He’s a nice fellow, and occasionally he’d come up with some good jokes. But he [-5-] never did very much and was rather cynical. And in the summer of ’67 Senator Kennedy started making those speeches about his legislation for jobs and housing. And he would make the point that existing programs had not produced and that, in many cases, the poor were worse off than they had been sever or eight years before, that schools were worse and their housing was worse and their unemployment rate was down. The newspapers tended usually to play this up as attacks on the Johnson poverty program. They weren’t really; they were attacks on the whole sort of New Deal welfare structure, included housing and welfare and everything else.