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ICPE Iraq .Pdf INDEPENDENT I Evaluation Office United Nations Development Programme INDEPENDENT COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION IRAQ HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectivenessCOORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsivenes COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness COORDINATINATION HUMAN effectivenessCOORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability COORDINATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsivenes HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness effectivenessCOORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS effectivenessCOORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsivenes HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsivenes COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness COORDINATINATION HUMAN effectivenessCOORDINATION efficiencyCOORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability COORDINATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsivenes HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness effectivenessCOORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness NATIONAL OWNERSHIP sustainability PARTNERSHIP INDEPENDENT COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION IRAQ HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectivenessCOORDINATION efficiency PARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsivenes COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness COORDINATINATION HUMAN effectivenessCOORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability COORDINATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsivenes HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness effectivenessCOORDINATION efficiencyPARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS effectivenessCOORDINATION efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsivenes HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness relevance sustainabilityMANAGING FOR RESULTS responsivenes COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT responsiveness COORDINATINATION HUMAN effectivenessCOORDINATION efficiencyCOORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustainability COORDINATION relevance sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsivenes HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness effectivenessCOORDINATION efficiencyPARTNERSHIP sustainability NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING REPORTS PUBLISHED UNDER THE ICPE SERIES Afghanistan Croatia Liberia Senegal Albania Cuba Libya Serbia Algeria Djibouti Malawi Seychelles Angola Dominican Republic Malaysia Sierra Leone Argentina Ecuador Maldives Somalia Armenia Equatorial Guinea Mauritania Sri Lanka Bangladesh Egypt Mexico Sudan Barbados and OECS El Salvador Moldova (Republic of) Syria Benin Ethiopia Mongolia Tajikistan Bhutan Gabon Montenegro Tanzania Bosnia and Herzegovina Georgia Morocco Thailand Botswana Ghana Mozambique Timor-Leste Brazil Guatemala Namibia Togo Bulgaria Guyana Nepal Tunisia Burkina Faso Honduras Nicaragua Turkey Cambodia India Niger Uganda Cameroon Indonesia Nigeria Ukraine Chile Iraq Pacific Islands United Arab Emirates China Jamaica Pakistan Uruguay Colombia Jordan Papua New Guinea Uzbekistan Congo (Democratic Kenya Paraguay Viet Nam Republic of) Kuwait Peru Yemen Congo (Republic of) Kyrgyzstan Philippines Zambia Costa Rica Lao People’s Democratic Rwanda Zimbabwe Côte d’Ivoire Republic Sao Tome and Principe INDEPENDENT COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION: IRAQ Copyright © UNDP October 2019 Manufactured in the United States of America. The analysis and recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or the United Nations Member States. This is an independent publication by the UNDP Independent Evaluation Office. Acknowledgements The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of UNDP would like to thank all those who have contributed to this evaluation. IEO TEAM Directorate: Indran Naidoo (Director) and Evaluation Advisory Panel member: Arild Hauge (Deputy Director) Daniel Weiner ICPE Section Chief: Fumika Ouchi Evaluation consultants: James Freedman, Hisham Khogali and Rajeev Pillay Lead Evaluator: Elisa Calcaterra National evaluation consultants: Research consultant: Gedeon Djissa Abbas Balesem and Hawar Ameen Publishing and outreach: Nicki Mokhtari and Sasha Jahic Administrative support: Sonam Choetsho IEO could not have completed the evaluation without the support of the following: STAKEHOLDERS AND PARTNERS UNDP Iraq staff: Gerardo Noto, Country Other stakeholders and partners: Director (Resident Representative a.i.), Representatives of the Government of Iraq, Vakhtang Svanidze, (Deputy Country Director- governorates and provincial representatives, Operations), Mohammed Siddig Mudawi (Head United Nations agencies, civil society, non- of Stabilization), Mahab Alkurkash (Head of governmental organizations and bilateral and Governance and Reconciliation Pillar), Ahmed multilateral development partners. Al Yassery (Programme Specialist, Head of Economic Diversification and Employment Pillar), Tarik Ul Islam (Technical Specialist), Farook Al Wakeel (Programme Management Specialist) and Amanthi Wickramasinghe (Head, Programme Support Unit). ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i Foreword It is my pleasure to present the Independent Country objectives and recovery in the immediate post- Programme Evaluation of the United Nations conflict space. UNDP Iraq has also demonstrated the Development Programme (UNDP) in Iraq, previously importance of retaining programming flexibility in called “Assessment of Development Results”. The the face of fluidity in the immediate post-conflict evaluation, which covered the period 2015-2018, setting and of adjusting the programme to address was conducted by the Independent Evaluation emerging needs. Office of UNDP, in close collaboration with the UNDP Iraq country office. The evaluation also found that limited attention has been paid to support the country’s priorities out- UNDP has been present in Iraq since 1976, when side of newly liberated areas. Although this is not the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement was unusual for a country office responding to an emer- signed. Since 2003, UNDP has operated as part of gency, a return to regular programming in support the United Nations assistance strategy coordinated of the country’s development priorities is now by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq required. The areas of governance, environment (UNAMI), which was established at the request of and economic reform have rightly been identified as the Government of Iraq via Security Council resolu- core areas of engagement for UNDP going forward tion 1500 (2003). and will benefit from the development of coherent and strategic programme which builds on the UNDP The evaluation reviewed the work of UNDP at a time comparative advantage. of crisis for Iraq. By mid-2015, 2.9 million people had fled their homes, reaching 5.8 million at the peak I trust this report will be of use to the readers seeking of the conflict with the Islamic State in Iraq and the to better understand the wide array of support pro- Levant (ISIL). Over 8.2 million people required imme- vided by UNDP, including what has worked and what diate humanitarian support as a direct consequence hasn’t, as well as the factors that have influenced of violence and conflict linked to the takeover of the performance and development contributions Iraqi territory by ISIL. The National Development of UNDP in Iraq. I hope that the results and recom- Plan, the United Nations Development Assistance mendations of this report provide a valuable input Framework and the UNDP country programme pri- for the formulation of the next UNDP engagement orities became of secondary importance compared strategy with the Government of Iraq. to the need to retake ISIL-occupied areas, address the humanitarian crisis and deliver immediate post-conflict stabilization. The evaluation found that UNDP in Iraq has suc- Indran Naidoo cessfully created a model of intervention under the Director, Independent Evaluation Office stabilization component to support key political FOREWORD iii Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations vii Evaluation Brief 1 CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 3 1.1 Purpose, objective and scope of the evaluation 4 1.2 Country context 5 1.3 UNDP programme under review 7 1.4 Methodology, process and limitations 8 CHAPTER 2. FINDINGS 10 2.1 Stabilization 11 2.2 Economic diversification and employment 28 2.3 Governance and reconciliation 28 2.4 Environment and energy 37 2.5 Cross-cutting issues 42 CHAPTER 3. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 48 3.1 Conclusions 49 3.2 Recommendations and management response 51 ANNEXES (AVAILABLE ONLINE) 66 v CONTENTS (cont’d) LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Donor contributions to the FFS and ICRRP as of February 2019 13 Table 2. ICRPP delivery by output, 2015-2018 22 Table 3. Governance area expenditures, 2016-2018 29 Table 4. Access to justice for displaced women in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 31 Table 5. Activities planned and completed under I-PSM, 2018 34 Table 6. Management efficiency over the period 2014-2018 46 Table 7. Funding allocated to the Emergency Livelihoods Cluster through the Iraq Humanitarian Fund 47 LIST OF FIGURES AND BOXES Figure 1. Evolution of programme budget and expenditure 7 Figure 2. Programme expenditure by source 8 Figure 3. Number of returnees by governorate as of March 2019 15 Figure 4. Total number of ongoing and
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