Iraq Displacement Crisis 2014–2017

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Iraq Displacement Crisis 2014–2017 IRAQ DISPLACEMENT CRISIS 2014–2017 IRAQ October 2018 IRAQ DISPLACEMENT CRISIS | 2014-2017 DISCLAIMER FOREWORD The opinions expressed in the report are or acceptance by IOM. The information in Since January 2014, Iraq’s war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has caused those of the authors and do not necessarily the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) the displacement of nearly six million Iraqis – around 15% of the entire population of the country. reflect the views of the International portal and in this report is the result of Four years later, on 9 December 2017, the end to the country’s war against ISIL was declared. Organization for Migration (IOM). data collected by IOM field teams and The war against ISIL has precipitated the worst displacement crisis in the history of Iraq. To better complements information provided and understand the overall impact of the crisis, this publication sets out to examine and explain the IOM is committed to the principle generated by governmental and other critical population movements in the last four years. that humane and orderly migration entities in Iraq. IOM Iraq endeavors to keep benefits migrants and society. As an this information as up to date and accurate First, the report provides a full overview of the population movements during the crisis using intergovernmental organization, IOM as possible, but makes no claim – expressed consolidated data gathered through the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). The DTM has acts with its partners in the international or implied – on the completeness, accuracy been tracking population movements since the start of the ISIL crisis by an extensive network of community to: assist in meeting the and suitability of the information provided 9,500 key informants across Iraq. Subsequently, the study uses in–depth information on identified operational challenges of migration; advance through this report. Challenges that should displacement hotspots to analyze specific geographical areas that have been affected by the crisis. understanding of migration issues; encourage be taken into account when using DTM data These area overviews depict the evolution in the number of hosted IDPs, intra–governorate social and economic development through in Iraq include the fluidity of the displaced displacement, and highlight the burden of displacement in specific areas as well as the priority migration; and uphold the human dignity and population movements along with repeated needs of the population. well–being of migrants. emergencies and limited access to large parts of the country. In no event will IOM It is my hope that this publication - Iraq Displacement Crisis 2014–2017 - will not only serve as The information contained in this report be liable for any loss or damage, whether a reminder of the impact of Iraq’s war against ISIL on population movements throughout the is for general information purposes only. direct, indirect or consequential, related to country, but also as a base to facilitate assistance to conflict-affected communities. Names and boundaries on DTM information the use of this report and the information products do not imply official endorsement provided herein. Gerard Waite Chief of Mission IOM Iraq ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IOM Iraq thanks the United States and Response Team (RART) members for Department of State, Bureau of Population, their work in collecting the data, often in Refugees and Migration (PRM) for its very difficult circumstances; their tireless continued support. IOM Iraq also expresses efforts are the groundwork of this report. its gratitude to IOM Iraq’s Rapid Assessment WHAT IS THE DTM? The International Organization for Migration The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is –composed of 123 field staff– present (Iraq Mission) Main Office in Baghdad IOM’s information management system to throughout the Iraqi territory, the DTM Office for Central Iraq UNAMI Compound track and monitor population displacement collects data on numbers and locations (Diwan 2) during crises. Composed of a variety of of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and International Zone, Baghdad, Iraq Email: [email protected] / [email protected] tools and processes, the DTM regularly returnees using an extended network of Website: www.iomiraq.net captures and processes multilayered data over 9,500 key informants. In addition to More information on: iraqdtm.iom.int and disseminates information products information collected from key informants, © International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2018 that facilitate a better understanding of the RARTs visit and assess identified locations evolving needs of the displaced population, hosting IDPs to collect more detailed and All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted whether on site or en route. Through IOM’s in–depth information on the displaced or in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, Rapid Assessment and Response Teams returned population. photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher. 1 1. INTRODUCTION IRAQ DISPLACEMENT CRISIS | 2014-2017 Since January 2014, Iraq’s war against the and targeted household surveys. Thus, the TABLE Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) body of data DTM has collected over the has caused the displacement of nearly six years is highly comprehensive. millions Iraqis – around 15% of the entire population of the country. Nearly four years This report aims at consolidating the current OF later, on 9 December 2017, Iraqi Prime DTM data in order to contextualize and Minister Haider Al-Abadi publicly declared explain the population movements that the end to the country’s war against ISIL. occurred as a result of the ISIL crisis as a The announcement followed the end of whole. As such, it will provide an overview of CONTENTS the intensive clearing operations in west the full crisis throughout its phases – since the Anbar to push ISIL militants out of their last beginning of the Iraq Civil War (ISIL crisis), stronghold in the country. starting in Anbar in December 2013 with the battle for Fallujah, to the end with Prime IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Minister Abadi declaring victory over ISIL in has been tracking population movements December 2017 – and detailed information caused by the conflict with ISIL since the on localized emergencies. It will also assess start of the crisis and through all its different main areas of displacement, analysing the 1. INTRODUCTION 9. POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN 2016 phases. Monitoring was carried out not only evolution in number of hosted internally • Chronology of main events though the DTM Master List, but also through displaced persons (IDPs), the changes in their 2. SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY • Displacement trends in 2016 different instruments, such as emergency sectorial needs and shelter arrangements. • Characteristics of IDPs: tracking mechanisms, which gathered precise 3. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS Origin and socio–demographic information information triggered by specific campaigns • Location of displacement 4. HIGHLIGHTS AND KEY FIGURES • Return trends in 2016 5. SETTING THE SCENE : • Characteristics of returns THE REPORT IS ARTICULATED AS FOLLOWS : Displacement overview before • Crisis Unfolded: The Anbar Offensive (Retaking Fallujah) the 2014–2017 crisis 1. ISIL crisis is contextualized: a brief overview 3. Focus is shifted to areas of displacement, Findings are illustrated in maps, info–graphics 10. POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN 2017 of the displacement history preceding the which have been affected differently by the and charts. All the data are available on the 6. CHRONOLOGICAL • Chronology of main events start of the 2014 – ISIL crisis is presented crisis – receiving fewer or more IDPs – DTM website, where the entire archive can FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS • Displacement trends in 2017 together with the displacement situation at and had different responses to the influx. be retrieved. • Characteristics of IDPs: the time the crisis began; To facilitate the analysis, Iraq is divided in 7. POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN 2014 Origin and socio–demographic information three regions: the Kurdistan Region of Iraq • Chronology of main events • Location of displacement 2. Displacement – and return – movements (KRI), which includes the governorates • Displacement trends in 2014 • Return trends in 2017 are analysed over time and space. For each of Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil; the • Characteristics of IDPs: • Characteristics of returns year – 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 – a brief South, which includes the Basrah, Missan, Origin and socio–demographic information • Crisis Unfolded: Retaking Mosul and chronology of key events is presented, Najaf, Thi–Qar, Qadissiya and Muthanna • Location of displacement Operations along the Mosul Corridor followed by the review of main trends governorates; and the North Central, which • Crisis Unfolded: Anbar January - May 2014 • Crisis Unfolded: Retaking Telafar according to the area of origin/return, includes Anbar, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, • Crisis Unfolded: Mosul June - July 2014 • Crisis Unfolded: West Anbar the socio–demographic characteristics of Kerbala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah al-Din and • Crisis Unfolded: Sinjar August 2014 IDPs / returnees and the direction of their Wassit governorates. The evolution in the 11. AREAS OF DISPLACEMENT • Crisis Unfolded: Heet October 2014 movements. Specific crises are discussed number of hosted IDPs, the relative burden • North Central Iraq in depth. of
Recommended publications
  • Iraq- Baghdad Governorate, Abu Ghraib District ( ( (
    ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( Iraq- Baghdad Governorate, Abu Ghraib District ( ( ( ( ( ( Idressi Hay Al Askari - ( - 505 Turkey hoor Al basha IQ-P08985 Hamamiyat IQ-P08409 IQ-P08406 Mosul! ! ( ( Erbil ( Syria Iran Margiaba Samadah (( ( ( Baghdad IQ-P08422 ( IQ-P00173 Ramadi! ( ( !\ Al Hay Al Qaryat Askary ( Hadeb Al-Ru'ood Jordan Najaf! IQ-P08381 IQ-P00125 IQ-P00169 ( ( ( ( ( Basrah! ( Arba'at AsSharudi Arabia Kuwait Alef Alf (14000) Albu Khanfar Al Arba' IQ-P08390 IQ-P08398 ( Alaaf ( ( IQ-P00075 ( Al Gray'at ( ( IQ-P08374 ( ( 336 IQ-P08241 Al Sit Alaaf ( (6000) Sabi' Al ( Sabi Al Bur IQ-P08387 Bur (13000) - 12000 ( ( Hasan Sab'at ( IQ-P08438 IQ-P08437 al Laji Alaaf Sabi' Al ( IQ-P00131 IQ-P08435 Bur (5000) ( ( IQ-P08439 ( Hay Al ( ( ( Thaman Alaaf ( Mirad IQ-P08411 Kadhimia District ( as Suki Albu Khalifa اﻟﻛﺎظﻣﯾﺔ Al jdawil IQ-P08424 IQ-P00074 Albu Soda ( Albo Ugla ( (qnatir) ( IQ-P00081 village ( IQ-P00033 Al-Rufa ( IQ-D040 IQ-P00062 IQ-P00105 Anbar Governorate ( ( ( اﻻﻧﺑﺎر Shimran al Muslo ( IQ-G01 Al-Rubaidha IQ-P00174 Dayrat IQ-P00104 ar Rih ( IQ-P00120 Al Rashad Al-Karagul ( Albu Awsaj IQ-P00042 IQ-P00095 IQ-P00065 ( ( ( Albo Awdah Bani Zaid Al-Zuwayiah ( Ad Dulaimiya ( Albu Jasim IQ-P00060 Hay Al Halabsa - IQ-P00117 IQ-P00114 ( IQ-P00022 Falluja District ( ( ( - Karma Uroba Al karma ( Ibraheem ( IQ-P00072 Al-Khaleel اﻟﻔﻠوﺟﺔ Al Husaiwat IQ-P00139 IQ-P00127 ) ( ( Halabsa Al-Shurtan IQ-P00154 IQ-P00031 Karma - Al ( ( ( ( ( ( village IQ-P00110 Ash Shaykh Somod ( ( IQ-D002 IQ-P00277 Hasan as Suhayl ( IQ-P00156 subihat Ibrahim ( IQ-P08189 Muhammad
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq SITREP 2015-5-22
    Iraq Situation Report: June 30 - July 01, 2015 1 On June 30, the Interior Ministry (MoI) Suqur [Falcons] Intelligence Cell directed an Iraqi 7 On June 29, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) stated that it “completely cleared” Baiji. airstrike against an ISIS position in Qa’im in western Anbar, killing 20 ISIS members and destroying e Baiji mayor stated that IA, Iraqi Police (IP), and the “Popular Mobilization” Suicide Vests (SVESTs) and a VBIED. Also on July 1, DoD announced one airstrike “near Qa’im.” recaptured south and central Baiji and were advancing toward Baiji Renery and had arrived at Albu Juwari, north of Baiji. On June 30, Federal Police (FP) commander Maj. Gen. Raed Shakir Jawdat claimed that Baiji was liberated by “our armed forces” 2 On June 30, the Baghdadi sub-district director stated that 16th Iraqi Army (IA) and Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) Deputy Chairman Abu Mahdi Division members recaptured Jubba sub-district, north of Baghdadi sub-district, with al-Muhandis stated that “security forces will begin operations to cleanse Baiji support from tribal ghters, IA Aviation, and the U.S.-led Coalition. Between June 30 Renery of [ISIS].” On July 1, the Iraqi government “Combat Media Cell” and July 1, DoD announced four airstrikes “near Baghdadi.” announced that a joint ISF and “Popular Mobilization” operation retook the housing complex but did not specify whether the complex was inside Baiji district or Dahuk on the district outskirts. e liberation of Baiji remains unconrmed. 3 Between June 30 and July 1 DoD announced two airstrikes targeting Meanwhile an SVBIED targeted an IA tank near the Riyashiyah gas ISIS vehicles “near Walid.” Mosul Dam station south of Baiji, injuring the tank’s crew.
    [Show full text]
  • Basrah Governorate Profile
    Basrah Governorate Profile Source map: JAPU Basrah at a Glance Fast Facts Area: 19,070 km2 Capital City: Basrah Average High Temperatures: 17,7°C Average Low Temperatures: 6,8°C (January) to 41,8°C (August) (January) to 27,4°C (July) Population: 2,403,301 Population Distribution Rural-Urban: 20,1%-79,9% Updated December 2015 Geography and Climate Basrah is the most southern governorate of Iraq and borders Iran, Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia. In the south, the governorate is made up of a vast desert plain, intersected by the Shatt Al-Arab waterway which is formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers at Al-Qurnah and empties into the Persian Gulf. Around Al-Qurnah and Al-Medina a number of lakes can be found, while marshland stretches from the north of the governorate into the neighboring governorates of Thi-Qar and Missan. The governorate is Iraq’s only access to the sea. Similar to the surrounding region, the governorate of Basrah has a hot and arid climate. The temperatures in summer are among the highest recorded in the world. Due to the vicinity of the Persian Gulf, humidity and rainfall are however relatively high. The governorate receives an average amount of 152mm of rainfall a year between the months of October and May. Population and Administrative Division The governorate of Basrah is subdivided into seven districts: Abu Al-Khaseeb, Al-Midaina, Al-Qurna, Al- Zubair, Basrah, Fao, and Shatt Al-Arab. The city of Basrah, the governorate’s capital, is Iraq’s third largest urban center.
    [Show full text]
  • Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq
    Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq MICHAEL KNIGHTS POLICY FOCUS 137 Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq MICHAEL KNIGHTS THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica- tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2015 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Design: 1000colors Photo: A Kurdish fighter keeps guard while overlooking positions of Islamic State mili- tants near Mosul, northern Iraq, August 2014. (REUTERS/Youssef Boudlal) CONTENTS Acknowledgments | v Acronyms | vi Executive Summary | viii 1 Introduction | 1 2 Federal Government Security Forces in Iraq | 6 3 Security Forces in Iraqi Kurdistan | 26 4 Optimizing U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq | 39 5 Issues and Options for U.S. Policymakers | 48 About the Author | 74 TABLES 1 Effective Combat Manpower of Iraq Security Forces | 8 2 Assessment of ISF and Kurdish Forces as Security Cooperation Partners | 43 FIGURES 1 ISF Brigade Order of Battle, January 2015 | 10 2 Kurdish Brigade Order of Battle, January 2015 | 28 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My thanks to a range of colleagues for their encouragement and assistance in the writing of this study.
    [Show full text]
  • Mosul Dam Break Inundation Modelling
    Mosul Dam Break Inundation Modelling An example of Scientific Support to DG-ECHO and UN A Annunziato, I. Andredakis, P. Probst Joint Research Centre European Commission 2nd Scientific Seminar of the Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre Rome 9-10 March 2017 - Italian Civil Protection Table of content • Background • Analysis objectives • Initial and boundary Conditions • Results of the dam break cases • Early Warning Systems • Future activities • Response to our analyses • Conclusions Mosul Dam, Irak 44 km 11 km3 of water 2 km dam width 110 m dam height Historical persepctives • The dam was constructed between 1981 and 1986 • It dams the river Tigris, forming an artificial lake that holds 11.1 km3 of water • It is located 40km NW of the city of Mosul and its primary function is to supply electricity to the city’s 1.7 million inhabitants and to support irrigation needs. • It is the largest dam in Iraq, measuring 2 km in length and 113 m in height. It is an earth-fill embankment-type dam with a clay core. The problems of the dam • Since the dam is built on a foundation of gypsum, anhydrite and limestone, water can seep under the dam and compromise its stability, posing the risk of catastrophic failure. • To avoid this, continuous maintenance has taken place since the dam’s opening, in the form of grouting: new leaks are plugged by injecting a cement mixture into the compromised spots. • The grouting stopped in 2014 with the arrival of ISIS. Even if the dam was back in the control of Peshmerga (North Kurdistan) late 2014, the machines for grouting were severely damaged.
    [Show full text]
  • Weekly Explosive Incidents Flas
    iMMAP - Humanitarian Access Response Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News (26 MAR - 01 APR 2020) 79 24 26 13 2 INCIDENTS PEOPLE KILLED PEOPLE INJURED EXPLOSIONS AIRSTRIKES DIYALA GOVERNORATE ISIS 31/MAR/2020 An Armed Group 26/MAR/2020 Injured a Military Forces member in Al-Ba'oda village in Tuz Khurmatu district. Four farmers injured in an armed conflict on the outskirts of the Mandali subdistrict. Iraqi Military Forces 01/APR/2020 ISIS 27/MAR/2020 Launched an airstrike destroying several ISIS hideouts in the Al-Mayta area, between Injured a Popular Mobilization Forces member in a clash in the Naft-Khana area. Diyala and Salah Al-Din border. Security Forces 28/MAR/2020 Found two ISIS hideouts and an IED in the orchards of Shekhi village in the Abi Saida ANBAR GOVERNORATE subdistrict. Popular Mobilization Forces 26/MAR/2020 An Armed Group 28/MAR/2020 Found an ISIS hideout containing fuel tanks used for transportation purposes in the Four missiles hit the Al-Shakhura area in Al-Barra subdistrict, northeast of Baqubah Nasmiya area, between Anbar and Salah Al-Din. district. Security Forces 30/MAR/2020 Popular Mobilization Forces 28/MAR/2020 Found and cleared a cache of explosives inside an ISIS hideout containing 46 homemade Bombarded a group of ISIS insurgents using mortar shells in the Banamel area on the IEDs, 27 gallons of C4, and three missiles in Al-Asriya village in Ramadi district. outskirts of Khanaqin district. ISIS 30/MAR/2020 Popular Mobilization Forces 28/MAR/2020 launched an attack killing a Popular Mobilization Forces member and injured two Security Found and cleared an IED in an agricultural area in the Hamrin lake vicinity, 59km northeast Forces members in Akashat area, west of Anbar.
    [Show full text]
  • Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq
    HUMAN RIGHTS UNAMI Office of the United Nations United Nations Assistance Mission High Commissioner for for Iraq – Human Rights Office Human Rights Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 – 30 April 2015 “The United Nations has serious concerns about the thousands of civilians, including women and children, who remain captive by ISIL or remain in areas under the control of ISIL or where armed conflict is taking place. I am particularly concerned about the toll that acts of terrorism continue to take on ordinary Iraqi people. Iraq, and the international community must do more to ensure that the victims of these violations are given appropriate care and protection - and that any individual who has perpetrated crimes or violations is held accountable according to law.” − Mr. Ján Kubiš Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Iraq, 12 June 2015, Baghdad “Civilians continue to be the primary victims of the ongoing armed conflict in Iraq - and are being subjected to human rights violations and abuses on a daily basis, particularly at the hands of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Ensuring accountability for these crimes and violations will be paramount if the Government is to ensure justice for the victims and is to restore trust between communities. It is also important to send a clear message that crimes such as these will not go unpunished’’ - Mr. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 12 June 2015, Geneva Contents Summary ...................................................................................................................................... i Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 Methodology ..............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Wash Needs in Schools Iraq
    COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW WASH NEEDS IN SCHOOLS OF KEY INDICATORS Note: Findings derived from WFP data are December 2019 IRAQ presented in turquoise boxes. Methodology Water Hygiene Sanitation 1 3 2 REACH Number of HH surveys conducted by Number of schools assessed by WFP Drinking water from a water source is available Drinking water from a water source is available Drinking water comes from an improved water source The water quality is perceived to be acceptable The main water source is at the school's premises Has access to handwashing facilities Has access to handwashing facilities of which is having water and soap available of which is functional of which is having soap Has access to improved sanitation facilities number of Average functional student toilets per school building number of toilets Average for students number of Average students per toilet Has access to student toilets separated by gender Has access to student toilets separated by gender Has unusable toilets Is having a good structural condition of student toilets Is having a good hygienic condition of student toilets Al-Falluja 115 88% 100% 78% 93% 100% 97% 100% 9,1 82% 0% Al-Ramadi 80 83% 98% 81% 98% 100% 100% 100% 8,6 93% 0% Al-Anbar Ana 74 31 44% 65% 87% 49% 72% 94% 94% 64% 66% 62% 94% 5,8 5,4 36 90% 90% 23% 100% 71% Heet 87 72% 100% 60% 100% 93% 97% 100% 9,0 88% 0% Shat Al-Arab 98 12% 92% 83% 11% 7,2 91 77% 56% 46% Al-Basrah Al-Khidhir 70 50% 66% 76% 11% 5,8 69 79% 74% 32% Al-Muthanna Al-Kufa 120 21% 46% 71% 99% 100% 23% 99% 6.5 71% 27% Al-Najaf Al-Najaf 94 2% 95% 98%
    [Show full text]
  • 2014-11-17 Situation Report
    Iraq Situation Report: November 17, 2014 1 Local sources from southern and western Kirkuk province reported that ISIS gunmen 5 Unidentied gunmen reportedly targeted ISIS positions in the attempt to mobilize and recruit male students to ght alongside the organization. e areas of Islah al-Zerai and Refai of western Mosul. e gunmen used sources reported that the gunmen visited an unspecied number of schools urging the light and medium weapons in the clashes that lasted for half an hour. students to carry arms. Teachers in these schools rejected this step while dozens of families A causality gure was not reported. prevented their sons from attending their schools in fear of ISIS forcing them to ght. Meanwhile, local sources also reported that ISIS shifted power supplies from Zab sub-district to Abassi sub-district, southwestern Kirkuk province. is decision was, according to the sources, taken because Abassi has Dahuk 6 more residents supportive of ISIS than Zab, some of whom may A VBIED detonated in Amiriyah area, western Baghdad, have been relocated from other areas of ISIS control. killing at least four individuals and injuring 13 others. Also, a Mosul2 Dam VBIED detonated near a local market in the Mashtal area of 2 5 eastern Baghdad killing seven individuals and injuring 22 ISIS reportedly launched an attack on Peshmerga Mosul Arbil others. forces south of Mosul Dam. According to a Peshmerga source, coalition airstrikes and the Peshmerga repelled the attack resulting in As Sulaymaniyah unspecied number of casualties from ISIS side. ISIS also launched an attack on Zumar sub-district, west Kirkuk of the Mosul Dam.
    [Show full text]
  • Mosul Dam Emergen Preparedness Progr Mosul
    MOSUL DAM EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMME QUARTERLY REPORT (JAN-MAR 2020) Saving Lives, Alleviate Human Suffering, and Reducing the Social and Economic Impact of Disasters Contents ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................................. 3 THE MDEPP IN BRIEF ........................................................................................................................... 4 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 5 SITUATION ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................... 5 PROGRESS ACHIEVED .......................................................................................................................... 6 1. RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF PREPAREDNESS TRAINING AND PROVISION OF TOOLS TO OPERATIONALIZE THE GOVERNORATE PREPAREDNESS PLANS ............................................................................................................ 6 2. RISKS ADVOCACY AT THE VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES EXPANDED AND STRENGTHENED ALONG THE MOSUL DAM FLOOD PATH ............................................................................................................................................ 10 3. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND SAFETY MEASURES OF MAJOR DAMS STRENGTHENED. ................................ 13 4. PROTECTION OF MAJOR FACILITIES ALONG THE TIGRIS FLOOD PLAIN
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq Humanitarian Fund (IHF) 1St Standard Allocation 2020 Allocation Strategy (As of 13 May 2020)
    Iraq Humanitarian Fund (IHF) 1st Standard Allocation 2020 Allocation Strategy (as of 13 May 2020) Summary Overview o This Allocation Strategy is issued by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), in consultation with the Clusters and Advisory Board (AB), to set the IHF funding priorities for the 1st Standard Allocation 2020. o A total amount of up to US$ 12 million is available for this allocation. This allocation strategy paper outlines the allocation priorities and rationale for the prioritization. o This allocation paper also provides strategic direction and a timeline for the allocation process. o The HC in discussion with the AB has set the Allocation criteria as follows; ✓ Only Out-of-camp and other underserved locations ✓ Focus on ICCG priority HRP activities to support COVID-19 Response ✓ Focus on areas of response facing marked resource mobilization challenges Allocation strategy and rationale Situation Overview As of 10 May 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) has confirmed 2,676 cases of COVID-19 in Iraq; 107 fatalities; and 1,702 patients who have recovered from the virus. The Government of Iraq (GOI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have generally relaxed enforcement of the stringent curfews and movement restrictions which have been in place for several weeks, although they are nominally still applicable. Partial lockdowns are currently in force in federal Iraq until 22 May, and in Kurdistan Region of Iraq until 18 May. The WHO and the Ministry of Health recommend maintenance of strict protective measures for all citizens to prevent a resurgence of new cases in the country. The humanitarian community in Iraq is committed to both act now to stem the impact of COVID-19 by protecting those most at risk in already vulnerable humanitarian contexts and continue to support existing humanitarian response plans, in increasingly challenging environments.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq Protection Cluster
    Iraq Protection Cluster: Anbar Returnee Profile - March 2017 24 April 2017 Amiriyat Al- Protection Concerns Ramadi Heet Falluja/Garma Haditha Rutba Khaldiyah High Fallujah Reported Violations of principles relating to return movements (including non-discrimination in the right of return, as well as voluntariness, safety and dignity of return movements) Medium Security incidents resulting in death/injury in return area (including assault, murder, conflict-related casualties) Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)/ Improvised Explosive Device (IED) contamination in return area by District by Low Reported Rights violations by state or non-state military/security actors (including abduction, arbitrary arrest/detention, disproportionate restrictions on freedom of movement) Protection Risk Matrix Risk Protection Concerns relating to inter-communal relations and social cohesion MODM Returnee Figures Returnee Families (Registered and non-registered) District Families Falluja 53,218 Ramadi 82,242 Ramadi 51,293 Falluja/Garma 48,557 Ru'ua Heet 11,321 Heet 19,101 Haditha Haditha 3,936 Rutba 2,356 Ka'im Haditha 2,147 Heet 35,600 Baghdad 18,056 Rutba 1,825 Ana 31,299 Anbar 79,211 22,640 Anbar Displacements Erbil Ramadi 14,331 and Returns Falluja 13,341 Total Families Still Kirkuk 8,729 Displaced 12,472 Sulaymaniyah Total Families Rutba 6,500 Returned 4,440 Other 283 759 Babylon 474 IDP Information Center: 22% of calls received from Anbar were from returnees. The most popular issues flagged: 43% Governmental issues (grants, compensation on damaged properties, ..etc) 29% Cash assistance Data Sources: Disclaimer: 14% Other issues * IOM-DTM as of 30 March 2017 The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map * MoDM 18 April 2017 do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
    [Show full text]