Russian Analytical Digest No 40: Russia and the "Frozen Conflicts" Of

No. 40 8 May 2008 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical ddigestigest www.res.ethz.ch www.laender-analysen.de/russland RUSSIA AND THE “FROZEN CONFLICTS” OF GEORGIA ■ ANALYSIS Georgia’s Secessionist De Facto States: From Frozen to Boiling 2 By Stacy Closson, Zurich ■ ANALYSIS A Russian Perspective: Forging Peace in the Caucasus 5 By Sergei Markedonov, Moscow ■ OPINION POLL Russian Popular Opinion Concerning the Frozen Confl icts on the Territory of the Former USSR 9 ■ ANALYSIS A Georgian Perspective: Towards “Unfreezing” the Georgian Confl icts 12 By Archil Gegeshidze, Tbilisi ■ ANALYSIS An Abkhaz Perspective: Abkhazia after Kosovo 14 By Viacheslav Chirikba, Sukhumi / Leiden Research Centre for East Center for Security Otto Wolff -Stiftung DGO European Studies, Bremen Studies, ETH Zurich rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 40/08 ddigestigest Analysis Georgia’s Secessionist De Facto States: From Frozen to Boiling By Stacy Closson, Zurich Abstract Relations between Russia and Georgia have reached a new low. At the center of their quarrel are Georgia’s secessionist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As Russia and Georgia accuse the other of troop move- ments in and around the secessionist territories, the UN, EU, OSCE, and NATO meet to determine their response. Critical to these deliberations are several underlying developments, which would benefi t from an independent review. Th ese include economic blockades of the secessionist territories, Russia’s military support for the secessionists, the issuance of Russian passports to secessionist residents, and declarations of independence by secessionist regimes. In these circumstances, it has become diffi cult to contain the confl icts without resolving them. However, as confl ict resolution has proven impracticable, it is time to consider al- tering present arrangements in order to prevent an escalation of violence. Boiling Point For South Ossetia, Georgia’s 2005 off er of autono- Several developments have brought the frozen confl icts my equivalent to North Ossetia’s in Russia, plus quo- to the present boiling point. First, relations between tas for representation in the national parliament, execu- Georgia and Russia have deteriorated since 2004, when tive branch, and judiciary went much further than pre- Georgia expelled alleged Russian spies, followed by a vious off ers. However, this proposal was preceded by Russian embargo on Georgian goods and transport, Georgia’s forced closure of the South Ossetians’ prin- and stricter visa regulations. Second, there have been cipal livelihood, Ergneti market, which came at the increasing calls for independence from the Abkhazian expense of dozens of casualties and a sustained low- and South Ossetian leaderships following Georgia’s intensity confl ict. Moreover, the off er was followed by May 2004 ousting of Aslan Abashidze from his 13-year Georgia’s support for the election of an alternative gov- hold on the “presidency” of the autonomous Ajara re- ernment led by a former secessionist offi cial, Dimitry gion. Th ird, confrontations have escalated between the Sanakoyev, representing the majority Georgian popu- United States/Europe and Russia over Kosovo’s uni- lated part of South Ossetia. Th e culmination of these lateral declaration of independence and promises of actions bolstered de facto president Eduard Kokoity’s NATO membership action plans (MAPs) for Georgia role as the guarantor of South Ossetians’ security. and Ukraine. Finally, in March the Russian govern- Similarly for Abkhazia, Georgia’s April 2008 off er ment revoked the 1996 Commonwealth of Independent was comprehensive: unlimited autonomy, the right to States (CIS) blockade of Georgia’s secessionist territo- veto amendments to the Georgian constitution and laws ries and announced a formalization of ties. regarding Abkhaz rights, and a free economic zone to redevelop areas destroyed by the war. However, after A Story of Miscues Georgian paramilitaries were relieved of their duties in Starting in 2004, newly elected President Mikheil regions along the de facto border, a government-in-ex- Saakashvili hoped that the confl icts would fi nally be ile accompanied by a nominal security force was estab- resolved in the wake of Georgia’s liberal economic re- lished in the only part of Abkhazia under Georgian con- forms and a vigorous anti-corruption campaign. His trol, the upper Kodori Gorge. Th is move was deemed by government believed that a reformed Georgia would the Abkhazians to be proof of an inevitable Georgian be a more attractive option for the Abkhazians and military off ensive. South Ossetians to rejoin. Moreover, the re-activation At the same time, the parties have employed dif- of a direct negotiation process, combined with car- ferent strategies, which are dangerously colliding. Th e rots of cultural protection, reparations for war-time Georgians have a two-pronged approach, international- losses, and economic subsidies would hasten a reso- izing the confl icts in order to expose the role of Russia lution. However, the challenge for the Georgian gov- in the secessionist territories, while positioning alter- ernment has been neither a lack of will, nor a lack of native regimes and security forces in the de facto bor- content, but rather one of forceful implementation, re- der areas. Th e Abkhazians and South Ossetians have sulting in miscues. increased their calls for independence from Georgia, 2 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 40/08 ddigestigest declining European off ers to fund and implement eco- opment on both sides of the de facto border. Second, nomic rehabilitation, refugee return, and confi dence- the participation of Georgian security services and building measures. Instead, they are increasing their paramilitaries fostered the perception among residents dependence on Russia for political, economic, and se- in the secessionist territories that ceding authority to curity assistance. the Georgian government would not guarantee securi- Domestic politics also complicate the process. Th e ty. Th ird, the criminalization of the transit routes was timing and content of confl ict resolution is tied to the accompanied by a rise in violence among competing regimes’ survival. Georgia and the de facto states, to a groups, which was often mistaken for ethnic confl ict certain degree, share common legacies that ail the post- or irredentism. Finally, illicit trade was so profi table for Soviet state-building process, including a lack of cohe- those working in political and security positions that sion between the state and society, the capture of the the incentive for confl ict resolution diminished. state by political-economic elites, a manipulated judi- Disrupting these informal networks, however, ap- ciary, indiscriminate violence by security forces, limit- pears to be equally harmful. In South Ossetia, there ed freedom of expression, and a rigged electoral process. was a thriving transport corridor from Russia through Th us, given disparate levels of socio-economic develop- the Roki Tunnel down to the Ergneti market. As a re- ment, combined with an irregular application of the sult of forced closure, much of South Ossetia is now rule of law, the leaders’ support base rests on fulfi lling almost fully dependent on Russia and movement be- their campaign promises to end the confl icts. tween the two communities is limited. Recent propos- As a result, the sides maintain their positions of in- als from the Saakashvili government to develop a new dependence versus wide autonomy, and there has been market have gone unanswered. Instead, Russia’s off er little interactive dialogue. Accordingly, four key issues to offi cially rescind the blockade and to increase assis- remain unresolved. tance is preferred. Blockade or No Blockade Mysterious Air Raids and Stray Missiles Th e fi rst unresolved issue is the blockades on the se- Th e second unresolved issue is Russia’s military support cessionist territories. Th e socio-economic conditions for the secessionists. Th ere have been fi ve major bomb- in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been worse than ing incidents in Georgia since 2001 and Russia has de- in the internationally recognized post-Soviet states be- nied them all. In March 2001, nine unidentifi ed jets cause of the destruction wrought by the war, the block- bombed areas of Kodori Gorge under Georgian con- ades on normal economic activity, sparse employment trol. In August 2002, Georgia accused Russia of bomb- opportunities, and the limitations placed on interna- ing its northern Pankisi Gorge. In March 2007, Mi-24 tional assistance. Th e maintenance of a “state budget” helicopters bombed upper Abkhazia, the Kodori and has been more for show than substance, as the live- Chkhalta Gorges, and the Chuberi Pass. Th at same year, lihoods of the citizens have been sustained by smug- there was an air strike on the village of Tsitelubani in gling, remittances, international aid, and Russian gov- Shida Kartli region near South Ossetia. Th is past April, ernment payments. In order to survive, the Abkhazians a MiG-29 fi ghter was videotaped downing an unarmed and South Ossetians have engaged in over a decade Georgian reconnaissance drone over the Gali region of of informal trading, accounting for more than half of Abkhazia. Only in the case of the missile in Shida Kartli their cash earnings. did an independent commission conclude and openly For Abkhazia, the 1996 CIS embargo permitted state that it came from Russia. the direct import only of food products, medical sup- Th us, either Russia gave the secessionists air com- plies, petroleum products, and household items. A li- bat and air defense forces, or Russian forces are con- cense from the Georgian government was required for ducting operations on their behalf. It is known that everything else. To circumvent these restrictions, the the secessionists have been trained by Russian forc- Abkhazians resorted to trade along undetected or ille- es or have served in the Russian army. Georgia claims gally sanctioned passageways, including the de facto that Russia periodically moves military equipment into borders, as well as at its seaports.

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