Report by the Government of Georgia on the Aggression by the Russian Federation Against Georgia
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REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GEORGIA ON THE AGGRESSION BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST GEORGIA Introduction In 2008, the Russian Federation launched a full-scale assault against a sovereign state—its immediate neighbor, Georgia. This incursion, systematically preceded by political and other provocations, was the violent climax of policies pursued by Russia against Georgia over many years. Rather than work to peacefully resolve the conflicts in Georgia, Russia systematically stoked them. Moscow interfered in Georgian politics, supplied separatist militias with arms, ignored its peacekeeping responsibilities, failed to prevent widespread ethnic cleansing of Georgians and, ultimately, sought to annex Georgian territories by means of military force. Russia’s main goals have been to annex Georgian territories, overthrow Georgia’s legitimate government, subvert Georgia’s independence, curtail Georgia’s sovereignty, and send a message to its neighbors and to the West that it is in control of what it calls its “sphere of privileged interest”. To date, the Russian Federation has only partially achieved its aims: since August 2008, inalienable parts of Georgia – namely, Abkhazia and the South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region – now exist under a state of full-scale Russian military occupation (note, however, that these areas had previously been controlled by Russian military and law enforcement forces, disguised as “peacekeepers”). This document represents the Georgian Government’s report to the public on the background and details of the August conflict. The purpose of this document is to provide the public with information on the political situation in Georgia, the changing nature of Georgia’s relationship with Russia, and Georgia’s efforts to secure a peaceful resolution to the ongoing conflict. It covers the current political situation in Georgia, presents the history behind the conflict, and describes the actions taken by the Georgian Government in response to Russia’s relentless provocations. This document aims to provide comprehensive and transparent information on these issues. This document will focus on the three main actors involved in the process: 1. The Russian Federation and its puppet regimes in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region and in Abkhazia; 2. The Georgian authorities and its various political structures; and, 3. The international community, including the main international organizations. The document covers the policies pursued by these three actors, the actions they have undertaken and the crucial decisions that were made throughout the process. Legal, political, and military documents are also attached as appendices to this report. Chapter 1: The Genesis of the Conflict 1989-1994 1.1. Disintegration of the USSR, Russia’s attempt to maintain its influence over the former Soviet Republics and the creation of the CIS. Towards the end of the 1980s, as the Soviet Union entered its final throes and began to disintegrate, a strong national liberation movement was born in Georgia. This national liberation movement was marked by intense anti-Soviet sentiments, which were exhibited via demonstrations and other forms of civil protest. The growth of the national liberation movement led to a repressive crack-down by both Georgia’s Communist Government and the Moscow- based central authorities. This was manifested in the violent break-up of peaceful meetings, the persecution of leaders of the national liberation movement, and attempts to stir up civic and ethnic confrontation. As a result of efforts to divert attention via ethnic politicization, there was a noticeable escalation in the degree of artificially generated internal conflict in Georgia. In particular, the situation in Abkhazia and the South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region became overtly tense and antagonistic. On 31 March 1991, as a result of a national referendum in Georgia (including the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic and former South Ossetia), Georgia adopted an Act of Independence and declared its independence from the Soviet Union. The nascent country’s borders followed the internationally recognized borders of 21 December 1921. On 8 December 1991, the former Soviet Republics signed a document that confirmed the disintegration of the USSR (the Belovezh Treaty). With the exception of Georgia and the three Baltic states, the former Soviet Republics joined together to establish the Russo-centric Commonwealth of Independent States. 1.2. Georgia’s attempt to pursue an independent policy In 1991, political processes in Georgia were defined by the country’s widely popular national- liberation movement. The aim of the movement was to restore Georgian independence. It saw the West as Georgia’s main ally. In light of this, Georgia began to follow a development path that differed from that of other former Soviet Republics. Simultaneously, post-Communist state institutions started to form in the country. The then- government—which was faced with a series of urgent political, economic, social, and military problems—had to institute a deep-rooted reform program. The orientation chosen by Georgia—including its path of strategic development—was based on a democratic mandate that for the first time saw its national interests rooted in public consensus. However, these interests quickly turned out to be incompatible with Russia’s own political and geostrategic goals. As a result, Russia, from the outset of the post-Soviet era, instituted policies aimed at undermining Georgian statehood. In policy terms, one of the first areas where this discord became apparent was in the field of ethnic manipulation. The Russian authorities—building upon tensions Moscow itself had stoked among “separatist elites” in Georgia’s autonomous regions—sought to further inflame the situation by dividing Georgia’s territory. In Abkhazia, for instance, the political elite remained totally dependent on Russia, to the extent that following independence they did not appreciate or respond to the Georgian national government offer of parity in the Abkhazian Supreme Council (parity that would have been achieved by reducing the number of Georgian representatives). While newly independent Georgia attempted to adjust its policies to accommodate these autonomous republics, Russian policies continued to foment political differences among the newly formed political elites in Georgia’s capital, with the aim of sparking internal confrontation. Russia’s efforts to sow discord resulted in a series of civil confrontations both in the autonomous areas of Georgia and in Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi. The deteriorating security situation, combined with the weak state of public institutions, opened the way for organized criminal groups and militias to gain substantial power. Rent-seeking opportunists seized this opportunity to gain power. This trend applied to the elites in the capital, as well as to local elites in Sukhumi and the South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region, both of which were encouraged by Russia. These groups, claiming to be driven by “national interests,” actively opposed each other, resulting in conflict, the destruction of property, the plunder of public and private assets, the terrorizing of local populations, theft, banditry, and the labeling of all of these violent and criminal activities as “ethnic confrontation.” It is noteworthy that the above-mentioned groups obtained weapons, bullets, and other forms of military materiel from Russian military bases located on the territory of Georgia and directly from Russia. This led to a marked increase in the amount of weaponry and ammunition at their disposal. In parallel to the deteriorating security situation, Russian military instructors also arrived in Georgia to train the separatists. At the beginning of this period of conflict, the separatists used mainly small-caliber pistols and automatic firearms; however, by the end, tanks, battleships, and mortars were widely available (for example, on 14 August 1992, the 643rd rocket-carrying air regiment of the Russian armed forces provided the Abkhaz separatists with 984 automatic guns, 267 pistols, 18 mortars, 600 flare pots, over 500 trench bombs, bullets, gun powder, military vehicles, uniforms, food, chemical weapons, and other engineering equipment). The plan to further inflame ethnic tensions was not limited to the local population. With the help of Russian Special Services, volunteer mobilization centers were formed in the North Caucasus. From those centers, “boeviks” (warriors) were sent in an organized fashion to different hot spots in Georgia. In this manner, Kazakhs, as well as Chechens, Ingush, Armenians, and other Caucasian nationals found themselves involved in the conflict in Georgia. At crucial points during the conflict, Russian military forces became directly involved in combat and directly participated in military operations. In addition to Special Servicemen and commandos, Russian artillery and aviation were also actively used. For example, in Abkhazia, Georgian military formations brought down a Russian SU-27 fighter jet flown by a Russian pilot. The Russian Minister of Defense reacted to this fact in a cynical manner, claiming that the Georgians had painted Russian Army identification markings on the plane. On 24 June 1992, the Sochi (Dagomis) Agreement was signed. This was a bilateral agreement between Georgia and Russia that established principles for regulating the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Unfortunately, the Abkhazian conflict continued despite several negotiated ceasefire agreements. These included the agreements