MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA & ORS V RAJA SEGARAN A/L KRISHNAN

[2005] 1 MLJ 15 MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA & ORS v RAJA SEGARAN A/L KRISHNAN

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–75 OF 2000 RICHARD MALANJUM, HASHIM YUSOFF, TENGKU BAHARUDIN SHAH MAHMUD JJCA 24 SEPTEMBER 2004

Civil Procedure — Parties — Locus standi — Association of persons proposing a course of action — Individual arguing against that cause of action — Whether individual could seek injunction to prevent association from acting in breach of law — Whether special injury proven

Constitutional Law — Judiciary — Judicial misconduct — Allegation of judicial misconduct — Discussion on judicial misconduct — Whether ultra vires Federal Constitution — Federal Constitution arts 125 & 127

Legal Profession — Malaysian Bar — Powers — Resolution to appoint board to make inquiries and recommendations to restore confidence in judiciary — Whether amount to contempt of court and sedition — Whether ultra vires powers of Legal Profession Act 1976 — Whether Malaysian Bar be injuncted from holding meeting to discuss such resolutions — Legal Profession Act 1976 s 42(1) (d)

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Maker of statement — Whether statement contemptuous — Whether maker’s intention is relevant in deciding whether statement contemptuous

There are five appeals all filed by the appellants and they arose from two civil suits namely S2–23–93 of 1999 (‘the first suit’) and S2–23–33 of 2000 (‘the second suit’) both filed by the respondent which will be decided together. The first suit was triggered by the move of the Malaysian Bar to hold an Extraordinary General Meeting ‘EGM’ to discuss allegations of impropriety against the then Chief Justice. The respondent, a member of the Bar initiate the first suit seeking various declaration and injunction on the ground that the EGM, and the proposed resolution were ultra vires, contemptuous and seditious. Pending the trial of the first suit the respondent filed an application for an interlocutory injunction while the appellants applied for the suit to be struck out. The learned judge allowed the respondent’s

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 2 application and dismissed the appellants’ application. The appellants appeals against both the decisions were also dismissed. Subsequently, the respondent filed an application under O 33 r 2 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) for a preliminary issue to be tried and the learned judge allowed the respondent’s application. And on 10 November 2003 the learned judge allowed the various declarations sought by the respondent. Dissatisfied with the decisions the appellants filed three separate appeals inter alia, (a) Civil Appeal W–02–75 of 2004 (Appeal 75) which is against the ||Page 16>> judgment of the learned judge delivered on 10 November 2003; (b) Civil Appeal W–02–647 of 2000 (Appeal 647) which is against the ruling of the learned judge allowing the application by the respondent for the trial of a preliminary issue pursuant to O 33 r 2 of the RHC and (c) Civil Appeal W– 02–780 of 2000 (Appeal 780) which is against the dismissal by the learned judge of the preliminary objection on the issue of secrecy of proceedings conducted by the Bar Council. The second suit was filed as a result of two events, namely, the letter issued on or about 7 June 2000 and amended on 8 June 2000 by the then secretary of the Bar Council to all its members and the public statement purportedly released by the Chairman of the Bar Council in connection with a proposed general meeting of the Malaysian Bar. There were various declaration and injunctions sought by the respondent. An application for interlocutory injunction was also filed in relation to the second suit. It was heard by the same learned judge for the first suit. A preliminary objection was raised by the appellants but it was dismissed. The second suit still pending before the High Court. Dissatisfied with the decisions the appellants also filed two separate appeals inter alia, (a) Civil Appeal W–02–512 of 2000 (Appeal 512) which is against the dismissal of a preliminary objection and (b) Civil Appeal W–02–521 of 2000 (Appeal 521) which is against the granting of the interlocutory injunction. The issues for consideration were: (a) whether the actions of the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar in calling for the EGM and the proposed general meeting were ultra vires the Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘the LPA’); (b) whether the respondent had the locus standi to institute the suits; (c) whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to grant the relief sought for in the suits and/or the interlocutory applications vis-à-vis contempt of court and the offence of sedition; (d) whether the learned judge failed to observe any of the guidelines above before granting the interlocutory injunction; (e) whether it was correct for the learned judge not to disqualify himself from hearing the suits and applications related thereto; (f) whether the learned judge was correct in refusing to recognize s 76(2) of the LPA as providing the shield of secrecy of all proceedings conducted by the Bar Council and (g) whether O 33 r 2 the RHC properly invoked.

Held, dismissing all the appeals: (1) Being creatures of statute the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar must act and conduct their affairs within the framework of the LPA. Acts or conducts

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 3 beyond its parameters would be ultra vires. Hence, in convening the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting to discuss allegations of impropriety against the then Chief Justice, the Bar ||Page 17>> Council and the Malaysian Bar must be able to satisfy the court that they were acting within the ambit and the parameters of the LPA. The trial judge had correctly noted that this was not the case (see para 54). (2) There was no evidence adduced during the trial in respect of the first suit that there was a request from any quarters for the Bar Council or the Malaysian Bar as a statutory body to express their views or to act or conduct as they did. As such, the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar were not legally entitled to claim the right or even the privilege to act or conduct as they did notwithstanding the constraints in the LPA. As to who should request for their views is of course another issue but surely it has to come from a relevant and proper authority. At the same time, the appellants’ contention that the sub-s 42(1)(d) is ambiguous was also rejected (see para 56). (3) The act or conduct in convening the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting was contrary to or undermined Arts 125 and 127 of the Constitution. Such act or conduct of the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar was unconstitutional, and hence ultra vires the LPA (see para 58). (4) It is inconceivable to say that the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting would be upholding the cause of justice or to protect the public in matters touching or incidental to the law when the net effect is to ‘censure’ the Judiciary while permitting discussion on the conduct of His Majesty’s Judges in flagrant disregard to Arts 125 and 127 of the Constitution. There is much to say in support of the wisdom of art 127. And allowing an open discussion on conduct of His Majesty’s Judges could amount to questioning the wisdom of the King in his selection. Further the judiciary thrives on the public confidence in the system. Openly criticizing the judiciary could bring about public misunderstanding of the system and would then produce unwarranted public misgivings (see para 61). (5) The notice of 12 October 1999 and the proposed resolution of 12 October 1999 issued by the appellants were contemptuous particularly the language used in the notice of 12 October 1999 seems to suggest that it was a fact that serious allegations of impropriety have been made against certain members of the judiciary. By using the word ‘understands’ it was clear that the appellants, whilst insidiously suggesting a fact, yet are not taking responsibility for asserting such a fact. It is also to be noted that what amounts to contempt of court in this country is also very much a question of fact and guided by common law principles and the learned judge is correct in applying the facts and principles before him (see para 70). (6) The respondent could take out an injunction to restrain the appellants to protect his own interest and if the court is satisfied that the act ||Page 18>> complained of could give rise to the respondent facing criminal

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 4 prosecution, the respondent ought to be allowed to use injunctive measures to stop the appellants (see para 83). (7) The element of being a member of a statutory body is vital and as a member the respondent has the right to restrain a corporation from doing ultra vires acts. Since, the proposed resolution of 12 October 1999, the holding of the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting were ultra vires the LPA the question of locus standi of the respondent should not arise and the question of special damage in such situation plays only a minor role. It follows that there is no question of the civil court being asked to enforce any criminal law (see para 95). (8) As a member of the Malaysian Bar the respondent would definitely have been exposed to potential prosecution for sedition and contempt had the proposed EGM and the general meeting proceeded. The fact that he was only one of the many members should not negate his standing to sue on his own to ensure that he would not be exposed to unnecessary legal complexities. The test would be the ‘special damage’ test and the respondent had satisfied the test (see para 97). (9) There is no strict requirement in an application for injunction that the analysis must be systematic and perhaps erudite. Reading the judgment of the learned judge as a whole it can be said that there were serious issues to be tried such as whether the allegations were true or plain hearsay, whether there was any basis to call for the suspension of the then Chief Justice and the consequence of the acts of the appellants. Further, the learned judge did consider where the justice of the case should lie, public interest and balanced the damage that could arise if the proposed general meeting was held (see para 6–7). (10) In determining a recusal issue the primary questions to consider should be whether there was a real danger of bias on the part of the learned trial judge and whether the allegation and the factual circumstance could have caused a fair-minded and informed bystander to entertain a fear of real danger of bias. And it would be stretching too far the principles of law enunciated on when judges and arbiters should recuse from hearing cases which involves similar issues and points (see para 120). (11) There is no provision in the Evidence Act 1950 (‘the EA’) which allows a witness to rely on a statutory protection such as contained in s 76(2) of the LPA and also no expressed exclusion in s 76(2) of the LPA. Unless it is expressly excluded the provisions of the EA apply in any court proceedings as founded in s 2 of the EA. Sections 118 and 136 would have been the provisions in answer (if any objection raised) when Mr R Rajasingam former member of Bar Council was called as a witness to answer a specific question, that is, whether the motion proposed by ||Page 19>> the Bar Council was the same as the proposed resolution of 12 October 1999 to be tabled during the proposed EGM. However, this was not raised and the issue of secrecy fails (see paras 123 and 128).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 5 (12) In invoking O 33 r 2 of the RHC the issues in a case should be clear and not riddled with complexities and the facts should not be in dispute. Where the issues on point of law to be decided involve the consideration of facts, resort to O 33 r 2 of the RHC is inappropriate. It is undesirable to resolve such issues on a purely hypothetical state of facts. Further, in the court below the second appellant was conceding to the approach taken by the respondent in proceeding under O 33 r 2 of the RHC and in fact suggested the proposed question in determining the contempt and sedition issues. In addition thereto, since intention is not an element that has to be proved to establish the contempt and sedition, the appellants’ contention that they might call witnesses for the purpose of establishing intention or motive is irrelevant. As such the learned judge was right in allowing the invocation of O 33 r 2 of the RHC in determining the contempt and sedition issues (see paras 135, 136, 138, 139 and 140); Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321 (refd).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Terdapat lima rayuan yang kesemuanya difailkan oleh perayu dan rayuan-rayuan ini berbangkit daripada dua guaman sivil iaitu S2–23–93 tahun 1999 (guaman pertama tersebut) dan S2–23–33 tahun 2000 (guaman kedua tersebut) kedua-duanya difailkan oleh responden yang akan diputuskan secara bersama. Guaman pertama berbangkit menerusi tindakan oleh Majlis Peguam untuk mengadakan suatu EGM bagi membincangkan dakwaan salah laku terhadap Ketua Hakim Negara pada masa itu. Plaintif, seorang peguam dan ahli Majlis Peguam memulakan guaman pertama tersebut memohon pelbagai perintah deklarasi dan injunksi atas alasan bahawa EGM dan resolusi yang dicadangkan adalah ultra vires, menghina dan hasutan. Sementara menunggu perbicaraan guaman pertama tersebut responden telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk perintah injunksi manakala perayu-perayu memohon supaya permohonan tersebut dibatalkan. Hakim bijaksana membenarkan permohonan responden dan menolak permohonan perayu-perayu. Kedua-dua rayuan perayu-perayu kemudiannya telah ditolak. Seterusnya, responden memfailkan satu permohonan di bawah A 33 k 2 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) untuk satu isu utama dibicarakan dan hakim bijaksana telah membenarkan permohonan responden. Dan pada 10 November 2003 hakim bijaksana membenarkan deklarasi-deklarasi yang dipohon oleh responden. ||Page 20>> Tidak puas hati dengan keputusan-keputusan tersebut di atas perayu-perayu telah memfailkan tiga rayuan yang berasingan antara lain, (a) Rayuan sivil W– 02–75 tahun 2004 (Rayuan 75) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang bertarikh pada 10 November 2003; (b) Rayuan sivil W–02–647 tahun 2000 (Rayuan 647) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang membenarkan permohonan responden untuk membicarakan isu permulaan berdasarkan A 33 k 2 KMT dan (c) Rayuan sivil

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 6 W–02–780 tahun 2000 (Rayuan 780) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang menolak bantahan permulaan terhadap isu kerahsiaan prosiding yang telah dilaksanakan oleh Majlis Peguam. Guaman kedua telah difailkan akibat daripada dua peristiwa, iaitu, surat yang dikeluarkan pada atau 7 Jun 2000 dan kemudiannya dipinda pada 8 Jun 2000 oleh setiausaha Majlis Peguam pada masa itu kepada kesemua ahli-ahlinya dan pernyataan awam yang kononnya dikeluarkan oleh Pengerusi Majlis Peguam yang berkaitan dengan mesyuarat am Majlis Peguam yang telah dicadangkan. Responden memohon pelbagai deklarasi dan injunksi. Satu permohonan untuk injunksi turut difailkan oleh responden. Permohonan ini turut didengar oleh hakim bijaksana yang mendengar guaman pertama tersebut. Satu bantahan awalan dibangkitkan oleh perayu-perayu akan tetapi bantahan awalan tersebut telah ditolak oleh perayu. Guaman kedua masih menunggu untuk perbicaraan di Mahkamah Tinggi. Tidak puas hati dengan keputusan-keputusan tersebut perayu-perayu memfailkan dua rayuan yang berasingan antara lain, (a) Rayuan sivil W–02– 512–00 (Rayuan 512) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang menolak bantahan awalan dan (b) Rayuan Sivil W–02–521–00 (Rayuan 521) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang membenarkan permohonan injunksi interlokutori. Isu-isu untuk pertimbangan adalah: (a) sama ada tindakan Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam dalam memanggil EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang telah dicadangkan adalah ultra vires Akta Profesion Undang-Undang 1976 (“APU”); (b) sama ada responden mempunyai locus standi untuk memfailkan tindakan-tindakan ini; (c) sama ada Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membenarkan relif-relif yang dipohon dalam tindakan-tindakan ini dan/atau permohonan-permohonan interlokutori iaitu penghinaan mahkamah dan kesalahan hasutan; (d) sama ada hakim bijaksana gagal untuk memberi perhatian kepada mana-mana panduan di atas sebelum membenarkan permohonan injunksi interlokutori; (e) sama ada adalah betul untuk hakim bijaksana untuk tidak mengecualikan dirinya daripada mendengar guaman-guaman dan permohonan-permohonan yang berkaitan dengannya; (f) sama ada hakim bijaksana adalah betul apabila enggan mengiktiraf s 76(2) APU yang diperuntukkan sebagai perisai rahsia kepada segala prosiding yang dijalankan oleh Majlis Peguam dan (g) sama ada A 33 k 2 KMT tersebut adalah sesuai untuk diguna pakai. ||Page 21>>

Diputuskan, menolak kesemua rayuan: (1) Memandangkan Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam adalah diwujudkan oleh suatu Akta ia hendaklah bertindak dan menjalankan segala tindak-tanduknya di bawah lingkungan APU. Perbuatan dan tindakan di luar lingkungan adalah ultra vires. Maka, dalam mengadakan EGM yang dicadangkan dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan untuk membincangkan dakwaan salah laku terhadap Ketua Hakim Negara, Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam hendaklah memuaskan mahkamah bahawa mereka bertindak di bawah skop lingkungan APU. Hakim bicara dengan sememangnya betul dalam mengambil perhatian bahawa ini

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 7 bukanlah keadaannya (lihat perenggan 54). (2) Tidak terdapat sebarang keterangan telah dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan khususnya guaman pertama bahawa di dalam itu terdapat satu permintaan daripada mana-mana pihak di dalam Badan Peguam ataupun Majlis Peguam yang merupakan badan berkanun untuk menyatakan pandangan mereka atau bertindak atau berkelakuan seperti mereka. Oleh itu, Badan Peguam dan Majlis Peguam tidak berhak di bawah undang-undang untuk menyatakan bahawa mereka mempunyai hak atau mempunyai keistimewaan untuk bertindak atau berkelakuan sebagaimana yang dilakukan meskipun terdapat sekatan-sekatan di bawah APU. Berkaitan dengan siapa yang perlu memohon kepada pandangan-pandangan mereka adalah satu isu yang lain tetapi sebenarnya ia adalah terjatuh di bawah pihak yang sesuai dan relevan. Pada masa yang sama, pernyataan perayu-perayu bahawa sub-s 42(1)(d) adalah kabur juga hendaklah ditolak (lihat perenggan 56). (3) Tindakan atau kelakuan dalam mengadakan EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan adalah bertentangan kepada atau memperkecil-kecilkan Perkara 125 dan 127 Perlembagaan. Tindakan atau kelakuan Majlis Peguam dan badan Peguam sedemikian tidak berperlembagaan dan dengan itu adalah ultra vires APU (lihat perenggan 58). (4) Tidak dapat dibayangkan bahawa EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan akan mempertahankan keadilan atau melindungi orang awam dalam perkara-perkara tentang atau berkaitan dengan undang-undang sedangkan kesan akhirnya adalah untuk “mengecam” badan kehakiman di samping membenarkan perbincangan tentang kelakuan hakim-hakim Yang Dipertuan Agong secara ketara tidak menghormati Perkara 125 dan 127 Perlembagaan. Banyak boleh diperkatakan dalam menyokong kearifan Perkara 127. Dan membenarkan perbincangan terbuka kelakuan hakim-hakim Yang Dipertuan Agong boleh terjumlah kepada mempersoalkan kebijaksanaan Yang Dipertuan Agong dalam pemilihan baginda. Tambahan pula, badan kehakiman berkembang maju dalam sistemnya atas dasar kepercayaan orang awam. Mengkritik badan kehakiman secara terbuka akan menyebabkan orang awam salah ||Page 22>> sangka terhadap sistem keadilan dan akhirnya menghasilkan perasaan waswas di kalangan umum (lihat perenggan 61). (5) Notis bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999 dan resolusi yang dicadangkan yang bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999 yang dikeluarkan oleh perayu-perayu adalah menghina khususnya bahasa yang digunakan di dalam notis bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999 yang mencadangkan ia adalah satu fakta bahawa dakwaan salah laku yang serius telah dibuat terhadap segolongan ahli-ahli kehakiman. Dengan penggunaan perkataan ‘understands’ adalah jelas bahawa perayu-perayu, secara dari dalamnya mencadangkan fakta bahawa, walaupun enggan bertanggungjawab dalam menyatakan fakta sedemikian. Adalah perlu diambil kira bahawa apa yang terjumlah kepada penghinaan di negara ini adalah

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 8 persoalan fakta dan dibimbing oleh prinsip-prinsip common law dan hakim bijaksana adalah betul dalam menerima pakai fakta-fakta dan prinsip-prinsip di hadapannya (lihat perenggan 70). (6) Responden boleh memohon perintah injunksi untuk menghalang perayu-perayu demi menjaga kepentingannya dan sekiranya mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa tindakan yang diadu yang mana akan menyebabkan responden didakwa bagi kesalahan jenayah, responden seharusnya dibenarkan untuk mengguna langkah tahanan bagi menghalang perayu-perayu (lihat perenggan 83). (7) Menjadi ahli satu badan statutori adalah elemen yang penting dan sebagai ahli, responden mempunyai hak untuk menghalang satu perbadanan daripada melakukan tindakan yang ultra vires. Memandangkan resolusi yang bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999, mengadakan EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan adalah ultra vires APU maka persoalan locus standi responden tidak seharusnya timbul dan persoalan ganti rugi khas hanya memainkan fungsi kecil. Ia diikuti bahawa tiada persoalan yang mana mahkamah sivil diminta untuk menguatkuasakan undang-undang jenayah (lihat perenggan 95). (8) Sebagai ahli Badan Peguam responden pasti didedahkan kepada kemungkinan pendakwaan untuk hasutan dan penghinaan sekiranya EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan itu diteruskan. Fakta bahawa responden hanya seorang daripada banyak ahli yang lain tidak patut menyangkal kedudukannya untuk membawa tindakan secara sendiri untuk memastikan bahawa responden tidak didedahkan kepada kompleksiti undang-undang yang tidak wajar. Ujiannya adalah ujian ‘special damage’ dan responden telah memuaskan ujian tersebut (lihat perenggan 97). (9) Tidak terdapat keperluan yang ketat dalam permohonan untuk injunksi bahawa analisis hendaklah sistematik dan seharusnya berilmu. Pembacaan penghakiman hakim bijaksana secara keseluruhan adalah ||Page 23>> boleh dikatakan bahawa terdapat isu-isu serius patut dibicarakan seperti sama ada dakwaan-dakwaan adalah benar atau hanya dengar cakap, sama ada terdapat apa-apa asas dalam memanggil untuk penggantungan Ketua hakim Negara pada masa itu dan juga kesan tindakan perayu-perayu itu sendiri. Seterusnya, hakim bijaksana turut mengambil kira di mana keadilan kes tersebut patut wujud, kepentingan awam dan juga mengimbang ganti rugi yang akan timbul sekiranya mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan itu diteruskan (lihat perenggan 106–107). (10) Dalam menentukan isu penarikan diri hakim bijaksana persoalan utama yang harus diambil kira adalah sama ada terdapat ‘real danger of bias’ dipihak hakim perbicaraan yang bijaksana dan sama ada dakwaan fakta-fakta keadaan yang mana boleh menyebabkan seseorang yang berfikiran adil dan bijaksana akan menganggap wujudnya ‘real danger of bias’. Dan adalah meregangkan terlalu jauh prinsip undang-undang yang telah diperuntukkan bilamana hakim dan penimbang tara patut menarik diri daripada mendengar kes-kes yang melibatkan isu-isu dan butir-butir yang sama (lihat perenggan 120).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 9 (11) Tidak terdapat sebarang peruntukkan dalam Akta Keterangan 1950 (“Akta”) yang membenarkan saksi untuk bergantung kepada perlindungan statutori seperti yang terkandung di dalam s 76(2) APU dan juga tidak terdapat pengecualian yang nyata di dalam s 76(2) APU. Kecuali dengan nyata dikecualikan peruntukkan Akta Keterangan adalah terpakai di mana-mana prosiding mahkamah seperti yang diperuntukkan di dalam s 2 Akta. Seksyen-seksyen 118 dan 136 merupakan peruntukan yang akan menjadi jawapan (sekiranya bantahan dibuat) apabila En R Rajasingam ahli terdahulu Majlis Peguam yang telah dipanggil sebagai saksi untuk menjawab soalan spesifik, iaitu, sama ada usul yang dicadangkan oleh Majlis Peguam adalah sama dengan resolusi yang dicadangkan pada 12 Oktober 1999 yang akan dibentangkan semasa EGM yang dicadangkan. Walau bagaimanapun, ini tidak bangkitkan maka isu kerahsiaan adalah gagal (lihat perenggan 123 dan 128). (12) Dalam menerima pakai A 33 k 2 KMT isu-isu dalam kes hendaklah jelas dan tidak dipenuhi dengan kompleksiti dan fakta-fakta tidak boleh dipertikaikan. Di mana, persoalan perundangan yang diputuskan melibatkan pengambilan kira fakta-fakta, penggunaan A 33 k 2 KMT adalah tidak sesuai. Adalah susah untuk menyelesaikan isu-isu seumpama tersebut melalui fakta-fakta yang berdasarkan andaian. Malah, di Mahkamah Tinggi perayu kedua turut bersetuju kepada pendekatan yang diambil oleh responden di bawah A 33 k 2 KMT dan juga telah mencadangkan persoalan yang dapat menentukan isu-isu penghinaan dan hasutan. Di samping itu, memandangkan niat bukan merupakan elemen yang perlu dibuktikan di dalam kedua-dua ||Page 24>> penghinaan dan hasutan, pernyataan perayu-perayu bahawa mereka berkemungkinan akan memanggil saksi-saksi untuk membuktikan niat atau motif adalah tidak relevan. Maka, hakim bijaksana adalah betul dalam membenarkan pemakaian A 33 k 2 KMT dalam menentukan isu-isu penghinaan dan hasutan (lihat perenggan 135, 136, 138, 139 dan 140); Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321 (dirujuk).

Notes For cases on locus standi, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reisue) paras 3924– 3981. For cases on the judiciary, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1660. For cases on the powers of the Malaysian Bar, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) para 1585. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.

Cases referred to Advocate General v D Seshagiri Rao AIR [1966] Andhra Pradesh 167 (refd) Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [2002] 4 MLJ 327 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 10 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 504 (refd) Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Meridien International Credit Corporation Ltd London [1993] 3 MLJ 193 (refd) Attorney-General v Fred Zimmerman & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 89 (refd) Bateman’s Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council and Another v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd and Another 155 ALR 684 (refd) Beevis v Dawson [1956] 3 All E R 837 (refd) Bermuda Cablevision Ltd v Colica trust Co Ltd (PC) [1998] AC 198 (refd) Brahma Prakash v State of UP AIR [1954] SC 10 (refd) C Ravichandran lyer v Justice AM Bhattacherjee & Ors [1995] 5 SCC 457 (refd) Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90 (refd) Crown v A Rafique & Ors IR [37] 1950 Sind 1 (refd) DP Vijandran v Majlis Peguam [1995] 3 MLJ 576 (refd) Gallagher v Durack [1983] 57 ALJR 191 (refd) Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130; [1983] 2 All ER 770; [1983] 3 WLR 143 (refd) Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] LR 435 (distd) Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12 (refd) Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) Bhd v Yong Liuk Thin & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 213 (refd) Hoole v Great Western Railway (1867) 3 Ch App 262 (refd) Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-employed & Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 (refd) Jenkin v Phamaceutical Society of Great Britain (1921) 1 Ch D 392 (refd) Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 (refd) ||Page 25>> Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors & Other Appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 (refd) Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd & Anor [2000] 1 All ER 65 (refd) Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd v Kamala Devi a/p Ramadass & Anor And Another Appeal [2003] 2 MLJ 36 (refd) Malaysia Shipyard v Bank Rakyat [1985] 2 CLJ 427 (refd) Mohamed Ezam bin Mohd Nor & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2002] 1 MLJ 321 (refd) Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 241 (refd) Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321 (refd) Newacres Sdn Bhd v Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [1991] 3 MLJ 474 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 11 Oh Keng Seng v Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 244 (refd) Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse [1897] 2 QB 242 (refd) Public Prosecutor v Oh Keng Seng [1979] 2 MLJ 174 (refd) R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2004] 1 MLJ 34 (refd) Rondel v Worsley [1967] 1QB 443 (refd) Simpson v Westminster Palace Hotel Co (1860) 8 HL Cas 712 (refd) Tan Ah Chin & Sons Sdn Bhd v Ooi Bee Tat & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 633 (refd)

Legislation referred to Federal Constitution Arts 125, 127 Evidence Act 1950 ss 118, 123, 136, 162(2) Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 41(1)(a), (e), (g), 42(1)(d), 56, 57, 76(2) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33 Sedition Act 1948 ss 3(1)(c), 4(1) (a)

YM Raja Aziz Addruse (Christopher Leong, Leo Su Chang, Ambiga Sreenevasen, Ranjit Singh, Kalvin Seet, James Kong, Gopal Sreenevasen with him) (Chooi & Co and Sivananthan) for the appellants. DP Vijandran (DP Vijandran & Associates) for the respondent.

[2005] 1 MLJ 345 RUHIMIN ADZIM @ RUHIMIN BIN AJIM v TAN SRI BERNARD DOMPOK & ORS

HIGH COURT (KOTA K1NABALU) — ELECTION PETITION NO K26–01 OF 2004 CLEMENT SKINNER J 16 JULY 2004

Constitutional Law — Courts — Election petition — Whether election judge can exercise powers conferred by Rules of The High Court — Whether preliminary objection against

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 12 election petition can be made instead of making an application to strike off

Constitutional Law — Courts — Election petition — Whether petitioner must set out under which limb the petition is brought — Election Offences Act 1954 s 34 — Whether writing left by petitioner with the registrar must be left stamped, signed and together with petition — Whether two copies of petition left with registrar — Election Petition Rules 1954 rr3(2), 9

Constitutional Law — Courts — Election petition — Petitioner failed to state material facts and grounds — There are some vague allegations — Whether whole petition or only relevant paragraphs ought to be struck off

Constitutional Law — Courts — Election petition — Service — Whether must be served within 15 days — Affidavit of service — Whether sufficient if filed with all convenient speed

Constitutional law — Courts — Election petition — Whether petitioner must state how non-compliance of written law relating to conduct of election affected election result — Election Offences Act 1954 s32(b)

Statutory Interpretation — Construction of statutes — Interpretation Act — Computation of time — Whether non-working Saturday an excluded day — Interpretation Act 1948 and 1967 s 3

In the recently concluded general election for the parliamentary constituency of Ranau (P179), the first respondent was returned as the duly elected candidate. He defeated three other candidates, one of whom was the petitioner who seeks to have the first respondent’s election declared void for several violations allegedly committed by him against the provision of the Election Offences Act 1954 ('the Act’) and the Election Petition Rules (‘the Rules’). The petitioner also alleged certain improprieties against the second defendant in the conduct of the election. On being served the petition, the first respondent filed a motion to have it set aside on various grounds. The second respondent also gave notice that on the hearing of this petition several preliminary objections would be raised. Some of the objections raised by the first respondent are also raised by the second respondent. Amongst the objections or issues raised by the respondents are inter alia that the petitioner (1) failed to comply with the Rules and s 34 of the Act by failing to set out his right to present the election ||Page 346>> petition; (2) failed to comply with r 9 of the Rules by not leaving at the office of the registrar writing stamped with duty payable; (3) failed to state material facts and grounds relied on to sustain the prayers; (4) failed to state how the non-compliance of the provisions of the written law relating to the conduct of the election has affected the result of the same; (5) contravened s 9A of the Act by questioning the electoral rolls; (6) left at the office of the registrar writing without two copies of the petition, not signed by the petitioner himself and not duly stamped; (7) failed to file affidavit of service until search done by first respondent’s advocate; and

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 13 (8) failed to serve the petition to the first respondent within 15 days of the presentation of the same as required by r 15(1) of the Rules. The petitioner in turn stated that (1) the judge can exercise the original jurisdiction vested in the court by the Rules of the High Court to forgive and cure defects; and (2) the second respondent should have filed application under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court to raise the objection now taken instead of raising them as preliminary objection. This was the hearing of the motion and preliminary objections.

Held, dismissing the petition with costs: (1) A judge hearing matters connected to an election petition can have recourse to the Rules of the High Court 1980 only in matters not expressly provided for in the Election Petition Rules (see para 5). (2) Objections to an election petition are issues of law which should be disposed of as preliminary objections for which no notice is required (see para 6). (3) Once it can be ascertained that the right petitioner claims come within s 34 of the Act, the petitioner can be said to have complied with the Rules. So long as the petitioner can show that was right, it matters not whether it falls within the first, second or third limb of s 34 of the Act because the latter adds nothing to the right that is asserted (see para 10). (4) It has not been demonstrated by the second respondent that the writing referred to in r 9 of the Rules is chargeable with any stamp duty and therefore there was no merit in the objection and it was rejected (see para 16). (5) With regard to the allegation that the first respondent manipulated the results of the election, no material facts have been pleaded upon which such an allegation may be raised. It is clearly a bare allegation which does not disclose any cause of action and so the first part of para 6 which refers to the first respondent ought to be struck out. It follows that there is no reason to strike out the whole petition for the deficiency in pleadings of the petitioner (see para 33). (6) No where in r 4(1)(b) of the Rules stated that the petitioner must state how the non-compliance has affected the result of the election. In the ||Page 347>> second place, nothing in s 32(b) of the Act even suggests that the petitioner must state how the non-compliance with the provisions of any written law relating to the conduct of the election affected the result of the same (see para 36). (7) The petitioner is clearly questioning the contents and validity of the electoral rolls when he alleges that voters could not vote because their names could not be found on the electoral rolls or were unlawfully removed from the electoral rolls. However this transgression in pleading by the petitioner would not result in the whole petition being struck out. Only the offending allegation in the second part of para 7 ought to be struck out (see para 40). (8) The ‘writing’ which the second respondent complained about is actually the

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 14 notice filed at the registry by the advocate for the petitioner, giving notice that he has been appointed to act. The notice is filed pursuant to r 34 of the Rules. There is nothing stated in this rule that requires the notice to be to be signed by the petitioner himself, dully stamped and left together with the petition as alleged by the second respondent (see para 43). (9) The petitioner’s return of the two copies of the petition to the registry for posting up on the notice board by way of service, did not afford substantial compliance with r 3(2) of the Rules which is couched in peremptory language with the use of the word ‘shall’. The consequence of the non-compliance renders the petition defective by reason whereof it must be dismissed (see para 56). (10) Rule 15(4) of the Rules does not stipulate any time frame within which an affidavit of service must be filed. Section 54(2) of the Interpretation Act 1948 and 1967 states that where no time is prescribed within which anything shall be done, that thing shall be done with all convenient speed (see para 74). (11) 15 May 2004 was a third Saturday which is a non working day for the government and its agencies, but it is not an excluded day. The consequence of the petitioner’s failure to serve the petition in accordance with the mandatory provisions of r 15(1) of the Rules renders the petition a nullity which the court in the exercise of its inherent powers has dismissed (see para 95).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pada pilihan raya umum yang baru selesai di konstituen Ranau (P179), responden pertama kembali sebagai calon yang dipilih. Dia telah mengalahkan 3 orang calon yang lain, salah seorang dari mereka adalah pempetisyen yang mengehendaki pemilihan responden kedua dibatalkan kerana beberapa ||Page 348>> pelanggaran Akta Kesalahan Pilihan raya 1954 (‘Akta tersebut’) dan Kaedah-Kaedah Petisyen Pilihan Raya (Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut). Pempetisyen juga mendakwa terdapat beberapa ketidakaturan oleh defendan kedua dalam menjalankan pilihan raya. Selepas petisyen diserahkan, responden pertama telah memfailkan notis usul untuk mengenepikannya berdasarkan kepada beberapa sebab. Responden kedua juga memberi notis yang semasa bicara petisyen beberapa bantahan awal akan dikemukakan. Di antara bantahan atau isu-isu yang dibangkitkan adalah inter alia pempetisyen: (1) gagal mengikut Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut dan s 34 Akta tersebut kerana gagal menyatakan haknya untuk mengemukakan petisyen pilihan raya; (2) gagal mengikut kaedah 9 dengan tidak meninggalkan dengan pendaftar tulisan yang di setem dengan duti sudah dibayar; (3) gagal mengemukakan fakta yang material dan alasan yang disandari untuk menyokong tuntutannya; (4) gagal menyatakan bagaimana dengan tidak mengikut undang-undang bertulis mengenai pengendalian pilihan raya telah mengacau keputusannya; (5) bertindak bertentangan dengan s 9A Akta tersebut dengan menyoal senarai pilihan raya; (6) meninggalkan di pejabat pendaftar tulisan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 15 tanpa 2 salinan petisyen, tidak ditandatangani oleh pempetisyen dan tidak distem; (7) gagal memfailkan afidavit penyampaian sehingga carian dibuat oleh peguam responden pertama; dan (8) gagal menyerahkan petisyen kepada responden pertama dalam tempoh masa 15 hari seperti yang diperlukan oleh kaedah 15(1). Pempetisyen pula mengatakan: (1) hakim boleh menggunakan bidang kuasa asal yang diberi oleh Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi untuk memaafkan dan membetulkan kesilapan; dan (2) responden kedua sepatutnya membuat permohonan di bawah aturan 18 kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi untuk membangkitkan bantahan yang dikemukakan di sini dan tidak sepatutnya bangkitkannya sebagai bantahan awal. Ini adalah perbicaraan notis usul dan bantahan awal.]

Diputuskan, membatalkan petisyen dengan kos: (1) Hakim mendengar perkara berkaitan dengan petisyen pilihan raya boleh bersandar pada Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 hanya untuk perkara yang tidak diperuntukkan di dalam Kaedah-Kaedah Petisyen Pilihan raya (lihat perenggan 5). (2) Bantahan kepada petisyen pilihan raya adalah isu undang-undang yang harus diputuskan sebagai bantahan awal untuk yang mana tiada notis diperlukan (lihat perenggan 6). (3) Setelah boleh dipastikan hak yang pempetisyen tuntut adalah di bawah s 34 Akta tersebut, pempetisyen telah mengikut Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut. Sehingga pempetisyen dapat menunjukkan hak tersebut, dia tidak perlu menunjukkan sama ada dia jatuh di bahagian pertama, kedua atau ketiga s 34 Akta tersebut kerana ia tidak menambahkan apa-apa hak (lihat perenggan 10). ||Page 349>> (4) Responden kedua tidak menunjukkan bahawa tulisan yang dirujuk di dalam kaedah 9 Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut boleh dikenakan duti setem dan oleh demikian tiada merit dalam bantahannya dan ia ditolak (lihat perenggan 16). (5) Berkenaan dengan tuduhan responden pertama manipulasikan keputusan pilihan raya, tiada fakta material yang dinyatakan untuk membangkitkan tuduhan sebegitu. Ia adalah tuduhan semata-mata yang tidak membangkitkan sebarang kuasa tindakan, maka bahagian pertama perenggan 6 yang rujuk kepada responden pertama harus dibatalkan. Tiada sebab untuk membatalkan seluruh petisyen untuk kekurangan dalam pliding pempetisyen (lihat perenggan 33). (6) Tiada di mana-mana dalam kaedah 4(1)(b) Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut yang menyatakan pempetisyen harus menyatakan bagaimana ketidakpatuhannya telah mengacau keputusan pilihan raya (lihat perenggan 36). (7) Pempetisyen jelas sedang menyoal kandungan serta ‘kesahan’ senarai pilihan raya apabila dia mengatakan yang pengundi tidak boleh mengundi kerana nama mereka tidak terdapat dalam senarai pilihan raya atau dikeluarkan secara tidak adil. Walau bagaimanapun, ia tidak akan mengakibatkan keseluruhan petisyen

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 16 dibatalkan tetapi hanya tuduhan tersebut di bahagian kedua di dalam perenggan 7 harus dibatalkan (lihat perenggan 40). (8) ‘Tulisan’ yang responden kedua mengadu tentang sebenarnya ialah notis yang difailkan di pendaftaran oleh peguam pempetisyen, yang memberi notis bahawa dia dilantik untuk bertindak. Notis ini difailkan berdasarkan kepada kaedah 34 Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut. Tiada apa-apa yang dinyatakan dalam Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut yang kehendaki notis tersebut ditandatangani oleh pempetisyen, distem dan ditinggalkan dengan petisyen seperti yang dinyatakan oleh responden kedua (lihat perenggan 43). (9) Pemulangan pempetisyen dua salinan petisyen kepada pendaftaran untuk dikelipkan ke atas papan notis sebagai penyerahan, bukanlah patuhnya kaedah 3(2) Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut yang ditulis dengan perkataan ‘harus’. Maka ketidakpatuhan ini menjadikan petisyen tersebut cacat dan ia harus dibatalkan (lihat perenggan 56). (10) Kaedah 15(4) tidak menyatakan sebarang tempoh di mana afidavit penyampaian mesti difailkan. Seksyen 54(2) Akta Penterjemahan 1948 dan 1967 menyatakan sekiranya tiada tempoh masa yang ditetapkan, ia harus dilakukan dalam kelajuan yang selesa (lihat perenggan 74). (11) 15 Mei 2004 ialah hari Sabtu ketiga yang merupakan hari cuti kerajaan dan agensi-agensinya, tetapi bukan hari yang tidak diambilkira. Kegagalan pempetisyen untuk menyerahkan petisyen mengikut peruntukan mandatori ||Page 350>> kaedah 15(1) kaedah-kaedah tersebut menjadikan petisyen tersebut terbatal dan mahkamah membatalkannya (lihat perenggan 95).]

Notes For cases on service of election petition, see 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 1558–1559 For cases on election petition, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1909–1911 For cases on statutory interpretation, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1909–1911

Cases referred to Dr Lee Chong Meng v Abdul Rahman bin Hj Abdullah, Returning Officer & Ors (No 2) [2000] 3 MLJ 218 (folld) Hongkong Bank (M) Bhd v Nor Harizan bte Mohd Ali [1999] 5 MLJ 629 (refd) Howard v Bodington (1877) 10 2PD 203 (refd) Isahak Hamid v Mustapha [1965] 2 MLJ 18 (refd) Norbert Chong Kai Chong v Mohamed Idris bin Hj Ibrahim & Anor [1980] 1 MLJ 316 (folld)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 17 Patau Rubis v Patrick Uren & Anor [1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 345 (refd) Ramely bin Mansor v Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya Malaysia & Ors [2000] of MLJ 550 (refd) Re Dato’ Loh Fook Yen Ex Parte Malaysian United Finance Bhd [1988] 3 MLJ 499 (refd) Tengku Korish v Mohamed bin Jusoh & Anor [1970] 1 MLJ 6 (refd)

Legislation referred to Elections Act 1958 Election Offences Act 1954, ss 32(b), 34 Election Petition Rules 1954, rr 3(2), 4(1)(b), 9, 15(1), (4), 34 Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, ss 3, 54(2) Stamp Act 1949, ss 52, 53

Liew Hon Min (Liew Hon Min) for the petitioner. Douglas Primus (Lee & Thong) for the first respondent. Pretam Singh a/l Darshan Singh and Narkunavathy Sundareson (Senior Federal Counsel, Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the second respondent.

[2005] 1 MLJ 551 WONG CHIOU YONG (P) v PENDAFTAR BESAR/KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA

HIGH COURT (IPOH) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO 22–734 OF 2003 VT SINGHAM J 4 NOVEMBER 2004

Administrative Law — Remedies — Declaration — Gender status — Application to amend or correct gender status stated in Birth Certificate and National Registration Identity Card — Sexual re-assignment surgery — Identity of persons having undergone sexual reassignment surgery — Whether to be accorded recognition as per current gender — Whether current indication of gender wrongly stated in National Registration Identity Card — Whether relevant particulars could be corrected — Whether gender status be maintained as originally stated in birth certificate and National Registration Identity Card — Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957 s 27, National Registration Act 1959 s 6(2)(o), Specific Relief Act 1950 ss 41 and 44

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 18

Constitutional Law — Courts — Jurisdiction of High Court — Application to amend or correct gender status stated in Birth Certificate and National Registration Identity Card — Identity of persons having undergone sexual reassignment surgery — Whether to be accorded recognition as per current gender — Whether court seized with jurisdiction to grant application — Specific Relief Act 1950 ss 41 and 44

The applicant had undergone a sexual re-assignment surgery to change her gender from a female to male, the reason being that she had two sex organs. It is to be noted that her father had registered her as a female at the time of birth at the Registrar of Births. Subsequently, she applied to the Registrar-General of Births and Deaths to alter the birth register and the national registration identity card from female to male so as to indicate the post operative sex on the ground there was an error in the entry at the register book. When her application was refused, she applied to this court for declaration that she be accorded her current gender status, ie that of a male. The issues before this court were: (i) whether there was an error in the gender of the applicant as initially entered in the Birth Certificate and the National Registration Identity Card, and if so, what was the nature of the error; (ii) whether there was a mistake of fact as to the sex of the applicant and if it was made at birth and subsequently revealed by further medical examinations, or whether the change of organs was by medical or surgical means; (iii) whether a person who had undergone a sex change operation could be regarded as belonging to the sex for which the reassignment surgery was undertaken for the purpose of correcting the registration of gender of the applicant on the Register of Births and the National Registration Identity Card; (iv) whether the fact that the sex change operation was permitted, the change of particulars in the Birth Certificate and the National Registration Identity Card required the word “male” and “female” to be given the meaning and includes persons of reassigned sex although the original biological ||Page 552>> characteristics was female; (v) whether the reassignment surgery subsequent to the registration of the birth of the applicant and the issue of the National Registration Identity Card to the applicant based on the biological characteristics at the time of birth affects the true sex for the purpose of the Birth Certificate and the National Registration Identity Card; and (vi) whether the court has the power on the facts in the instant case to declare a female as male and consequently direct to alter or correct the Register of Births and the National Registration Identity Card on the ground that there was gender assignment surgery.

Held, dismissing the application: (1) There was no error in the sex of the applicant as initially entered in the Register of Births and the Birth Certificate, which was issued and accordingly in the National Registration Identity Card to come under sub-s 27(2) or (3) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957 (‘the 1957 Act’) or as envisaged under s 6(2)(o) of the National Registration Act 1959 (‘the 1959 Act’) (see

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 19 para 21). (2) There was no mistake of fact as to the sex when it was registered under the 1957 Act and when the National Registration Identity Card was issued and it did not reveal that further medical examination showed there was a mistake as to the fact or in the substance at the time of the registration of the birth. In fact the change of organs on the applicant is by medical or surgical means and this is supported by the applicant’s own evidence (see para 21). (3) The person who has undergone a sex change operation could not be regarded as belonging to the sex for which reassignment surgery was undertaken for the purpose of correcting the registration of sex of the applicant on the Register of Births or the National Registration Identity Card which was already issued (see para 21). (4) The fact that the sex change operation was permitted, the change of particulars in the Birth Certificate and National Registration Identity Card did not require the word “male” and “female” to be given the meaning and it did not include persons of reassigned sex and contrary to the biological characteristics when the applicant was born (see para 21). (5) The reassignment surgery subsequent to the registration of the birth of the applicant immediately after the applicant’s birth and the issue of the National Registration Identity Card to the applicant did not affect the true gender status for the purpose of the Birth Certificate and the National Registration Identity Card, as the registration of the applicant’s sex at the time the National Registration Identity Card was issued in accordance with the original identity of the applicant at the time of the birth which was female and accordingly registered in the Register of Births (see para 21). ||Page 553>> (6) Based on the facts, this court has no power to declare the applicant who was born as female as a “male” and consequently to direct the Registrar General to alter the Register of Births and the National Registration Identity Card pursuant to s 27(3) of the 1957 Act and s 6(2)(o) of the 1959 Act on the ground that there was gender reassignment surgery, in absence of sufficient supporting evidence. Accordingly, ss 41 and 44 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 did not assist the applicant (see para 21).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon telah menjalani pembedahan tukar jantina untuk menukar jantinanya dari perempuan ke lelaki, atas alasan dia mempunyai dua organ seksual. Harus diketahui bahawa bapanya telah mendaftarkannya sebagai perempuan pada masa kelahirannya kepada Pendaftar Kelahiran. Sejurus kemudian, dia telah memohon kepada Pendaftar Besar Kelahiran dan Kematian untuk mengubah daftar kelahiran dan kad pengenalannya daripada lelaki ke perempuan untuk menunjukkan jantina selepas

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 20 pembedahan atas alasan terdapat kesilapan pada kemasukan di dalam buku pendaftaran. Apabila permohonannya ditolak, dia memohon ke mahkamah ini untuk deklarasi bahawa dia diberikan status jantinanya sekarang, iaitu sebagai seorang lelaki. Isu-isu di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah: (i) sama ada terdapat kesilapan dalam jantina pemohon seperti yang dimasukkan pada asalnya dalam sijil kelahiran dan kad pengenalan, dan sekiranya begitu, apakah sifat kesilapan tersebut; (ii) sama ada terdapat kesilapan fakta berkenaan jantina pemohon dan ia dibuat pada waktu kelahirannya dan kemudiannya ditunjukkan oleh pemeriksaan perubatan yang selanjutnya, atau sama ada penukaran organ adalah melalui kaedah perubatan atau pembedahan; (iii) sama ada seseorang yang telah menjalani pembedahan tukar jantina boleh dianggapkan sebagai tergolong di bawah jantina bagi sebab pembedahan itu dilakukan untuk tujuan membetulkan pendaftaran jantina pemohon pada Pendaftaran Kelahiran dan Kad Pengenalan; (iv) sama ada fakta bahawa pembedahan tukar jantina itu dibenarkan, penukaran butir-butir di dalam sijil kelahiran dan kad pengenalan menghendaki perkataan “lelaki” atau “perempuan” diberikan makna dan ini termasuk orang-orang yang bertukar jantina walaupun sifat-sifat biologi asalnya adalah berupa perempuan; (v) sama ada pembedahan tukar jantina selepas pendaftaran kelahiran pemohon dan pengeluaran kad pengenalan kepadanya berasaskan sifat-sifat biologi pada masa kelahiran mempengaruhi jantina sebenar bagi tujuan sijil kelahiran dan kad pengenalan; dan (vi) sama ada mahkamah mempunyai kuasa berpandukan fakta-fakta kes semasa untuk mengisytiharkan seorang perempuan sebagai lelaki dan dengan itu memerintahkan untuk menukar atau membetulkan Daftar Kelahiran dan Kad Pengenalan atas alasan terdapat pembedahan tukar jantina. ||Page 554>>

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Tidak terdapat kesilapan dalam jantina pemohon seperti yang dimasukkan pada awalnya dalam Daftar Kelahiran dan Sijil Kelahiran tersebut, yang dikeluarkan dan berikutnya di dalam kad pengenalan untuk berada di bawah sub-s 27(2) dan (3) Akta Pendaftaran Kelahiran dan Kematian 1957 (‘Akta 1957’) atau seperti yang ternyata di bawah s 6(2)(o) Akta Pendaftaran Kebangsaan 1959 (‘Akta 1959’) (lihat perenggan 21). (2) Tidak terdapat kesilapan fakta mengenai jantina bila ia didaftarkan di bawah Akta 1957 dan apabila kad pengenalan dikeluarkan dan ia tidak memperlihatkan bahawa pemeriksaan perubatan yang selanjutnya menunjukkan bahawa terdapat kesilapan mengenai fakta atau pada amnya semasa pendaftaran kelahiran. Pada hakikatnya, penukaran organ ke atas pemohon adalah melalui kaedah perubatan dan pembedahan dan ini disokong oleh keterangan pemohon sendiri (lihat perenggan 21). (3) Seseorang yang telah menjalani pembedahan tukar jantina tidak boleh dianggapkan sebagai tergolong di bawah jantina atas sebab pembedahan itu dilakukan untuk tujuan membetulkan pendaftaran jantina pemohon pada Pendaftaran Kelahiran dan Kad Pengenalan yang telah pun dikeluarkan (lihat

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 21 perenggan 21). (4) Fakta bahawa pembedahan tukar jantina tersebut dibenarkan, penukaran butir-butir di dalam sijil kelahiran dan kad pengenalan tidak memerlukan perkataan “lelaki” atau “perempuan” diberikan makna dan ia tidak termasuk orang-orang yang bertukar jantina dan bertentangan dengan sifat-sifat biologi semasa dia dilahirkan (lihat perenggan 21). (5) Pembedahan tukar jantina selepas pendaftaran kelahiran pemohon yang dilakukan dengan segeranya selepas kelahiran pemohon dan pengeluaran kad pengenalan kepadanya tidak mempengaruhi status jantina sebenar bagi tujuan sijil kelahiran dan kad pengenalan, kerana pendaftaran jantina pemohon pada masa kad pengenalan dikeluarkan berpandukan identiti sebenar pemohon pada masa kelahiran yang mana adalah perempuan dan telah didaftarkan sebegitu di dalam Daftar Kelahiran (lihat perenggan 21). (6) Berdasarkan fakta-fakta, mahkamah ini tidak mempunyai kuasa untuk mengisytiharkan pemohon yang telah dilahirkan sebagai perempuan sebagai seorang “lelaki” dan dengan itu untuk memerintahkan Pendaftar Besar untuk menukar Daftar Kelahiran dan Kad Pengenalan di bawah s 27(3) Akta 1957 dan s 6(2)(o) Akta 1959 atas alasan terdapat pembedahan tukar jantina, dengan ketiadaan keterangan sokong yang mencukupi. Dengan itu, ss 41 dan 44 Akta Relif Spesifik tidak membantu pemohon (lihat perenggan 21).]

Notes For cases on declarations, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 420–486 ||Page 555>> For cases on jurisdiction of courts, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1684–1692 For jurisdiction of courts, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [20.066]– [20.073]

Cases referred to Attorney-General for the Commonwealth & “Kevin and Jennifer” & Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1991] 2 FLR 492; [1993] 2 FCR 97; [1991] Fam Law 362 (distd) Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 All ER 593 (folld) Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] 2 WLR 513 (refd) C and D, Re [1979] 28 ALR 524 (refd) Cartledge & Ors v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758 (refd) Corbette v Corbette [1970] 2 All ER 33 (folld)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 22 Corocraft Ltd & Anor v Pan American Airways Inc [1969] 1 QB 616 (refd) Government of Malaysia & Ors v Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33 (folld) Guaranty Trust Company of New York v Hannay and Company (1915) 2 KB 536 (refd) Harnett v Fisher [1927] 1 KB 402 (refd) Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan & Anor Appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (refd) Ikebife Ibeneweka & Ors v Peter Egbuna & Anor [1964] 1 WLR 219 (refd) In re S(Minors) (Careorder: Implementation Of Careplan) [2002] 2 AC 291 (refd) Julius v Bishop Of Oxford (1880) 5 App Cas 214 (refd) Karpal Singh & Anor v PP [1991] 2 MLJ 544 (refd) Koon Hoi Chow v Pretam Singh [1972] 1 MLJ 180 (folld) Kuala Lumpur, Klang & Port Swettenham Omnibus Co Bhd v Transport Workers’ Union [1971] 1 MLJ 102 (refd) Lee Boon Tuan v PP [1960] 26 MLJ 179 (refd) Letchumanan Nagappan v Nadarajah [1993] 4 CLJ 253 (refd) Lim Ying v Hiok Kian Ming Eric [1992] 1 SLR 184 (distd) Loh Wai Kong v Government Of Malaysia & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 175 (folld) Maryon-Wilson’s Will Trusts, Re [1968] Ch 268 (refd) Mohamed Noor Bin Othman & Ors v Mohamed Ismail Bin Haji Ibrahim & Ors [1998] 3 MLJ 82 (refd) MT v JT 355 A 2d 204 [1976] (refd) P and G (Transsexuals), Re [1996] 2 FLR 90 (refd) Padfield And Others v Minister Of Agriculture, Fisheries And Food And Others [1968] AC 997 (refd) R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court Of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (refd) R v Cogley [1989] 31 Crim R 198 (refd) R v Harris And Mcguiness [1988] 17 NSWLR 158 (refd) R v North West Lancashire Health Authority, ex parte A, D and G [2000] 1 WLR 977 (refd) Re T [1975] 2 NZLR 449 (refd) ||Page 556>> Rees v United Kingdom [1987] Family Law 157 (refd) Richardson v Bardenhagen Enterprise Pty Ltd [1971] Tas SR 307 (refd) Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA [1993] 118 ALR 467 (refd) Sheffield And Horsham v UK [1998] 2 FLR 928 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 23 Siskina (Cargo Owners) v Disstoss SA [1979] AC 210 (refd) Sundralingam v Ramanathan Chettiar [1967] 2 MLJ 211 (folld) Teh Hon Kam @ Teh Ywai Chong (P) Originating Summons No 24–595 of 2002 (distd) The Attorney-General for the Commonwealth & “Kevin and Jennifer” & Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2003] FamCA 94 (refd) The King v Banbury I AD & E 136 1159 (refd) Thein Tham Sang v United States Army Medical Research Unit & Anor [1983] 1 MLJ 97 (refd) W v W [1976] 2 SALR 310 (refd) Warburton v Loveland (1831) 2 D & CL (HL) 480 (refd) Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2003] All ER (D) 187 (refd) Workon Sdn Bhd v The Director Of Lands And Surveys, Sabah [1999] 4 MLJ 177 (folld)

Legislation referred to Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957 ss 7, 27, (1), (2), (3) Births and Deaths Regulation Rules 1958 r 3 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 [NSW] s 32B Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25 Family Law Act 1975 [Aust] s 113 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 [Aust] s 47(1) Marriage Act 1971 [Aust] National Registration Act 1959 (Revised 1972) s 6(2)(o) National Registration Regulations 1990 r 18 Sexual Reassignment Act 1988 [Aust] Specific Relief Act 1950 ss 41, 44

Mohamad Asri Othman (Asri Chek Ming & Co) for the applicant Mohamad Abazafree Mohd Abbas SFC (Ministry of Home Affairs) for the respondent

[2005] 2 MLJ 25 FATIMAH BTE SIHI & ORS v MEOR ATIQULRAHMAN BIN ISHAK & ORS (MINORS, SUING THROUGH SYED AHMAD JOHARI BIN SYED MOHD)

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COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 01–76 OF 1999 GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL AZIZ AND MOHD GHAZALI JJCA 11 DECEMBER 2004

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Freedom of religion — Right to wear serban in school — Whether an integral part of religion of Islam — Whether sufficient evidence adduced to justify such an act — Refusal by school principal to allow students to wear a serban in school — Students expelled after insisting to do so — Whether a violation of right to profess and practise religion of Islam — School uniform — Appropriateness — Whether a matter within discretion of educational institution —Federal Constitution Art 11

Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Disciplinary action — Refusal by school principal to allow students to wear a serban in school — Students expelled after insisting to do so — Whether a violation of right to profess and practise religion of Islam — School uniform — Appropriateness — Whether a matter within discretion of educational institution

The first appellant was the principal of a public school attended by the three respondents. She had disallowed the respondents from coming to school dressed in a serban. When the respondents insisted, she expelled them. Dissatisfied, the respondents commenced an action against the appellants, seeking to restore their status as pupils of the said school. They contended that as Muslims, their fundamental right of freedom of religion guaranteed by Art 11(1) of the Federal Constitution had been infringed because they had been prevented from entering school wearing a serban which is part of their religious right. The High Court judge allowed the respondents’ application. Hence, this appeal by the appellants. The main issue before this court was whether the right to wear a serban is an integral part of the religion of Islam.

Held, allowing the appeal: (1) Whether the wearing of a serban forms an integral part of the religion of Islam involves a question of evidence and it was for the respondents to adduce sufficient relevant admissible material to prove that the wearing of a serban was mandatory in Islam. This, they failed to do. However, it was in evidence that merely, it was permissible for a male Muslim to wear a serban (see paras 10–11). (2) At common law, every educational institution is entitled to prescribe the appropriate uniform that is to be worn by its pupils and maintain discipline. The court is ill-equipped to enter into such issues save where ||Page 26>> there is plainly a duty to act fairly and that duty is breached. Each

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 25 case depends on its own facts and it is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt to lay down any fixed principle that is meant to govern all cases. Where observances as to dress, food, ceremonies and modes of worship are regarded as integral parts of a religion, and these are denied by State action, then and then only could a complaint under Art 11(1) legitimately be made (see paras 12–14).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Perayu pertama merupakan pengetua sekolah kerajaan yang dihadiri oleh ketiga-tiga responden. Dia telah melarang responden-responden daripada hadir ke sekolah memakai serban. Bilamana responden-responden berkeras untuk berbuat begitu, mereka dibuang sekolah. Terkilan dengan keputusan tersebut, pihak responden telah memulakan tindakan terhadap pihak perayu, dalam usaha mereka untuk mendapatkan kembali status mereka sebagai pelajar sekolah tersebut. Mereka menghujah bahawa sebagai orang Muslim, hak asasi kebebasan agama mereka yang diperuntukkan oleh Art 11(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, telah dilanggar oleh sebab mereka telah dihalang daripada memasuki sekolah dengan memakai serban yang merupakan sebahagian daripada hak agama mereka. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan permohonan pihak responden. Maka, rayuan ini oleh pihak perayu. Isu utama di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah sama ada hak untuk memakai serban merupakan suatu keperluan di dalam agama Islam.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Sama ada pemakaian serban termasuk sebagai suatu aspek yang wajib di dalam agama Islam melibatkan persoalan keterangan dan pihak responden seharusnya memajukan material untuk membuktikan bahawa pemakaian serban adalah mandatori di sisi agama Islam. Ini tidak dibuat oleh mereka. Sebaliknya, terdapat bukti bahawa pemakaian serban oleh seorang lelaki Muslim bukan suatu perkara yang diwajibkan (lihat perenggan 10–11). (2) Di bawah common law, setiap institusi pengajian dibenarkan menentukan pakaian seragam yang sesuai dipakai oleh murid-muridnya dan mengekalkan disiplin. Mahkamah tidak berupaya untuk melibatkan diri di dalam isu-isu tersebut melainkan terdapat kewajipan untuk berlaku secara adil dan kewajipan tersebut dilanggar. Setiap kes bergantung pada faktanya sendiri dan adalah tidak munasabah atau dihasratkan untuk mencuba menetapkan apa-apa prinsip yang merangkumi semua keadaan. Di mana amalan berkenaan dengan pakaian, makanan, adat-istiadat dan cara-cara untuk bersembahyang dianggapkan sebagai keperluan asas sesuatu agama, dan ||Page 27>> ia telah dilarang oleh tindakan Kerajaan, maka pada ketika itulah suatu aduan boleh dibuat dengan sah di bawah Art 11(1) (lihat perenggan 12–14).]

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 26

Notes For cases involving expulsion of students from school, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 745–747 For cases on exercise of administrative powers, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 28–90 For cases on freedom of religion, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 1257–1263 For freedom of religion, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (1999) paras [20.189]– [20.191]

Cases referred to Commissioner of Police v Acharya Jagadishwaranada Avadhuta [2004] 2 LRI 39 (refd) Hajjah Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 (refd) Javed v State of Haryana AIR 2003 SC 3057 (refd) Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak & Lain-lain lwn Fatimah binti Sihi & Lain-lain [2000] 5 MLJ 375 (overd) Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 853 (refd) The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar AIR 1954 S C 282 (refd)

Legislation referred to Constitution of India [India] Arts 25, 26 Federal Constitution Art 11(1), (4)

Abdul Rahim bin Uda SFC (AG’s Chambers) for the appellants Mohd Hanipa Maidin (Abdullah Abd Karim with him) (Mohamed Hanipa & Associates) for the respondents

Appeal from: Civil Suit No 22–13 of 1998 High Court (Seremban)

[2005] 2 MLJ 542 HARMENDERPALL SINGH A/L JAGARA SINGH v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

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HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO (MT–1) 24–2828 OF 2002 SYED AHMAD HELMY JC 15 SEPTEMBER 2004

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Equality before the law — Test of reasonable classification founded on intelligible differentiation — Suspension of licence without hearing applicable only to reckless and dangerous driver who had caused death of third party — Whether factum of death of third party was unreasonable classification and had no relation to actual object of statute — Federal Constitution art 8(1) — Road Transport Act 1987 ss 41(5) & 42

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Right to fair hearing — Suspension of driving licence without hearing — Whether constitutional — Federal Constitution arts 5(1) & 8(1) — Road Transport Act 1987 ss 41(5) & 42

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Presumption of constitutionality — Burden on him who attacks to show clear transgression of constitutional principles

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Personal liberty — Whether extends to right to livelihood — Proof of violation must be specific, clear and unambiguous and must contain sufficient particulars — Federal Constitution art 5(1)

Road Traffic — Reckless driving — Causing death — Suspension of licence without hearing — Whether constitutional — Federal Constitution arts 5(1) & 8(1) — Road Transport Act 1987 ss 41(5) & 42

The applicant was charged for causing death by reckless and dangerous driving under s 41(5) of Road Transport Act 1987 (‘the RTA’). Pursuant to the section, the magistrate ordered suspension of the applicant’s driving licence until the court makes a final decision on the charge. The applicant claimed that s 41(5) of RTA contravened his fundamental rights under arts 5(1) and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution namely, the right to be heard before the suspension of licence and the right to livelihood.

Held, allowing the application with costs: (1) There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a particular piece of legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles (see para 7); Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155 and Public Prosecutor v Su Liang Yu [1976] 2 MLJ 128 followed. In the light of

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 28 the presumption of constitutionality the burden invariably rest on the applicant to show that s 41(5) of the RTA was unconstitutional and as it transgressed arts 5(1) and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution (see para 10). ||Page 543>> (2) On the issue of violation of art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution, the allegations on which the violation of a constitutional provision is based must be specific, clear and unambiguous and must contain sufficient particulars (see para 11). Thus the applicant’s affidavit must condescend to providing specific, clear and unambiguous particulars and basis to support the averment of unconstitutionality of s 41(5) RTA in violation of art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution, which upon a careful perusal, was lacking. In any event art 5(1) confers constitutional protection of life and personal liberty which does not extend to the applicant’s right to livelihood (see paras 12 and 13); Government of Malaysia & Ors v Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33 and Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v Sugumar Balakrishnan & another appeal [2002] 3 MLJ 72 followed. (3) Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution does permit reasonable classification if and only if it is founded on intelligible differentiation having a rational relation or nexus with the policy or object sought to be achieved by the statute or statutory provision in question (see para 27); Public Prosecutor v Su Liang Yu [1976] 2 MLJ 128 followed. (4) The sting of the object or social object sought to be achieved by the Act was to protect third parties against ‘risks’ (ie all risks) culminating from those who drive recklessly or dangerously (see paras 25, 37 and 38). Section 41(5) discriminates against reckless and dangerous drivers in cases where a third party died by subjecting such drivers to a deprivation of a right to be heard before their licences are suspended. However, such depravation of right to be heard was not applied where the third party was only seriously injured under s 42 (see para 38). The factor which the legislature adopted as constituting the dissimilarity in circumstances between s 41 and s 42 (ie death alone) was purely arbitrary and unreasonable in relation to the social object sought to be achieved by the Act which was to protect third parties from risks and not death alone in the case of reckless and dangerous driving (see para 39). Therefore, it cannot be denied that persons charged under s 42 of the RTA include those who drive recklessly and dangerously and cause serious risk and injury to third parties but these people, who form the very group from which the Act intends to protect third parties, were not discriminated against (see para 40). (5) This was a classic example of a situation where one class of persons who were similarly situated, namely those who drive dangerously and recklessly, but the applicant being in a category within the class was denied the privilege of being heard, before his licence was suspended because of the factum of death of the third party, whereas those who drive dangerously and recklessly but do not cause death by so doing do not suffer the same fate. This was unreasonable and

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 29 was of no relation to the actual object sought to be achieved by the RTA. In the circumstances it was the courts’ duty to strike down such provision which was discriminatory in nature (see para 43). ||Page 544>>

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon dituduh kerana menyebabkan kematian dengan memandu secara melulu dan berbahaya di bawah s 41(5) Akta Jalan Raya 1987 (‘AJR’). Berikutan seksyen ini, majistret memerintahkan penggantungan lesen memandu pemohon sehingga mahkamah membuat keputusan muktamad berhubung penuduhan tersebut. Pemohon mendakwa bahawa s 41(5) AJR bercanggah dengan hak asasi beliau di bawah per 5(1) dan 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan terutamanya, hak untuk didengar sebelum penggantungan lesen dan hak pencarian hidup.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan dengan kos: (1) Sememangnya terdapat andaian untuk berpihak kepada kesahihan perundangan tertentu dari segi perlembagaan dan beban terletak ke atas sesiapa yang terancam untuk membuktikan terdapat perlanggaran yang jelas berkaitan prinsip-prinsip perlembagaan (lihat perenggan 7); Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155 dan Public Prosecutor v Su Liang Yu [1976] 2 MLJ 128 diikut. Berdasarkan andaian menurut perlembagaan, beban selalunya terletak atas pemohon untuk menunjukkan bahawa s 41(5) AJR tidak berperlembagaan dan ianya berlanggaran dengan per 5(1) dan 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (lihat perenggan 10). (2) Berhubung isu perlanggaran per 5(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, dakwaan yang mana perlanggaran suatu peruntukan berperlembagaan diasaskan hendaklah spesifik, jelas dan taksa dan hendaklah mengandungi butiran yang mencukupi (lihat perenggan 11). Oleh itu afidavit pemohon hendaklah memenuhi butiran-butiran spesifik, jelas dan taksa dan mempunyai asas untuk menyokong penegasan tentang ketidak berperlembagaan s 41(5) AJR yang melanggar per 5(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, yang setelah diteliti secara rapi, tidak mencukupi. Dalam apa keadaan, per 5(1) memberikan perlindungan nyawa dan kebebasan peribadi menurut perlembagaan yang tidak termasuk hak pemohon untuk pencarian hidup (lihat perenggan 12 dan 13); Government of Malaysia & Ors v Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33 and Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v Sugumar Balakrishnan & another appeal [2002] 3 MLJ 72 diikut. (3) Perkara 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan membenarkan pengklasifikasian munasabah jika dan hanya jika didapati berdasarkan ‘intelligible differentiation’ (perbezaan yang rasional) yang mempunyai kaitan rasional dan hubung kait dengan polisi atau objektif yang ingin dicapai oleh statut atau peruntukan berkanun yang dipersoalkan (lihat perenggan 27); Public Prosecutor v Su

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 30 Liang Yu [1976] 2 MLJ 128 diikut. (4) Tujuan utama atau objektif sosial yang ingin dicapai oleh Akta adalah untuk melindungi pihak ketiga daripada ‘risiko-risiko’ (iaitu semua risiko) yang timbul daripada mereka yang memandu secara melulu dan berbahaya (lihat perenggan 25, 37 dan 38). Seksyen 41(5) diskriminasi terhadap ||Page 545>> pemandu-pemandu yang melulu dan berbahaya dalam kes-kes yang mana pihak ketiga meninggal dunia dengan menafikan pemandu sebegini hak untuk didengar sebelum lesen mereka digantung. Namun begitu, penafian hak untuk didengar tidak terpakai jika pihak ketiga hanya cedera teruk di bawah s 42 (lihat perenggan 38). Faktor yang penggubal perundangan ingin gunakan sebagai membentuk ketidaksamaan keadaan antara s 41 dan s 42 (iaitu faktor kematian sahaja) adalah bersifat ‘arbitrary’ semata-mata dan tidak munasabah berkaitan dengan objektif sosial yang ingin dicapai oleh Akta yang sepatutnya melindungi pihak ketiga daripada risiko-risiko dan bukan kematian sahaja dalam kes memandu secara melulu dan berbahaya (lihat perenggan 39). Oleh itu, tidak boleh dinafikan bahawa mereka yang dituduh di bawah s 42 AJR termasuklah mereka yang memandu secara melulu dan berbahaya dan menyebabkan pihak ketiga mengalami risiko dan kecederaan teruk tetapi mereka ini, yang membentuk kumpulan yang mana Akta berhasrat untuk melindungi pihak ketiga, tidak didiskriminasikan (lihat perenggan 40). (5) Ini adalah contoh terbaik menunjukkan keadaan di mana sekelas orang yang dalam keadaan yang sama, iaitu mereka yang memandu secara berbahaya dan melulu, tetapi pemohon yang dalam kategori lingkungan kelas ini telah dinafikan hak untuk didengar, sebelum lesennya digantung kerana menyebabkan kematian pihak ketiga, sedangkan mereka yang memandu secara berbahaya dan melulu tetapi tidak menyebabkan kematian tidak mengalami nasib yang sama. Ini tidak munasabah dan tiada kaitan dengan matlamat sebenar yang ingin dicapai oleh AJR. Dalam keadaan sedemikian ia adalah tanggungjawab mahkamah untuk memansuhkan peruntukan seperti ini yang bersifat diskriminasi (lihat perenggan 43).]

Notes For cases on equality before the law, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1768–1784. For cases on fundamental liberties generally, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1494–1653. For cases on personal liberty, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1584–1589. For cases on reckless driving, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 554–559. For equality before the law, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia para [20.175]– [20.176].

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 31

Cases referred to Asiatic Engineering Co v Achhru Ram AIR 1951 All 746 (refd) Bank of Baroda v R Nagachaya Devi AIR 1989 SC 2105 (refd) Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41 (refd) ||Page 546>> Che Ani bin Itam v Public Prosecutor [1984] 1 MLJ 113 (refd) Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd v Kekatong Sdn Bhd [2004] 4 MLJ 259 (refd) Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155 (folld) Government of Malaysia & Ors v Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33 (folld) Lindsley v National Carbonic Gas Co (1911) 220 US 61 (refd) Malaysian Bar & Anor v Government of Malaysia [1987] 2 MLJ 165 (refd) Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 64 (refd) Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v Sugumar Balakrishnan & another appeal [2002] 3 MLJ 72; [2002] 4 CLJ 105 (folld) Public Prosecutor v Su Liang Yu [1976] 2 MLJ 128 (folld) Ram Prasad v State of Bihar AIR 1953 SC 215 (refd) Sagir Ahmad v Government of UP AIR 1954 All 257 (refd) State of WB v Anwar Ali AIR 1952 SC 75 (refd)

Legislation referred to Civil Law Act 1956 s 3(1) Federal Constitution arts 5(1), 8(1) Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 ss 3(1), 72 Road Transport Act 1987 ss 32, 41(3), (5), 42

Gobind Singh Deo (Zamri Idrus with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the plaintiff. Alice Loke (Senior Federal Counsel) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the defendant.

[2005] 3 MLJ 681 BEATRICE A/P AT FERNANDEZ v SISTEM PENERBANGAN MALAYSIA & ORS

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 32 FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA) — APPLICATION NO 08–51 OF 2003(W) ABDUL MALEK AHMAD PCA, ALAUDDIN MOHD SHARIF FCJ AND NIK HASHIM JCA 11 MARCH 2005

Civil Procedure — Appeal — Leave to appeal — Federal Court — No further arguments to allow court to depart from established principles of law — Whether leave should be granted

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Equality before the law — Termination of employment of air stewardess upon pregnancy — Application of equal protection to persons in the same class — Whether unlawful discrimination — Federal Constitution art 8

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Equality before the law — Whether apply to collective agreement — Federal Constitution art 8

Labour Law — Employment — Collective agreement — Terms — Termination of air stewardess upon being pregnant — Whether discriminatory and offends Federal Constitution art 8 — Whether employer entitled to impose such condition — Whether implied term that employer will provide employee with other suitable work upon pregnancy — Whether employee bound by term requiring resignation upon pregnancy — Federal Constitution art 8 — Employment Act 1955 ss 40 & 37(1)

Labour Law — Employment — Termination — Compulsory termination of air stewardess upon being pregnant — Whether discriminatory and offends Federal Constitution art 8 — Whether employer entitled to impose such condition — Whether implied term that employer will provide employee with other suitable work upon pregnancy — Whether employee bound by term requiring resignation upon pregnancy — Federal Constitution art 8 — Employment Act 1955 ss 40 & 37(1)

Labour Law — Employment — Terms and conditions — Compulsory termination of air stewardess upon being pregnant — Whether discriminatory and offends Federal Constitution art 8 — Whether employer entitled to impose such condition — Whether implied term that employer will provide employee with other suitable work upon pregnancy — Whether employee bound by term requiring resignation upon pregnancy — Federal Constitution art 8 — Employment Act 1955 ss 40 & 37(1)

The applicant joined the first respondent as a Grade B flight stewardess and was bound by the terms and conditions of the relevant collective agreement (‘the collective agreement’). The collective agreement, inter alia required all stewardesses in the applicant’s category to resign on becoming pregnant and in the event she fails to resign, the first respondent shall have the right to terminate her services. The applicant became pregnant but she refused to resign. Therefore, the first respondent terminated

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 33 her services. This led to her commencing proceedings at the High Court submitting that the provisions of the collective agreement were discriminatory in nature and therefore contravened art 8 of ||Page 682>> the Federal Constitution rendering the collective agreement void. The High Court and Court of Appeal dismissed her application. The applicant then applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Court.

Held, dismissing the application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court: (1) It is not possible to expand the scope of art 8 of the Federal Constitution to cover the collective agreements. Constitutional law — which deals with the contravention of individual rights by the Legislature or the Executive or its agencies — does not extend its substantive or procedural provisions to infringements of an individual’s legal right by another individual. Further, the reference to the ‘law’ in art 8 of the Federal Constitution does not include a collective agreement (see para 13). (2) There were special conditions applicable peculiarly to the job of a flight stewardesses, which the first respondent as the employer was entitled to impose (see para 14). Furthermore, the court took judicial notice that the nature of the job was certainly not conducive for pregnant women (see para 15). Therefore, there was no definite special clause in the collective agreement that discriminated against the applicant for any reason which would justify judicial intervention (see para 16). (3) The equal protection in cl (1) of art 8 extends only to persons in the same class. It recognises that all persons by nature, attainment, circumstances and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. In this case, there was obviously no contravention (see para 18). In this case, the applicant chose to join the first respondent as a flight stewardess and agreed to be bound by the collective agreement. The applicant cannot compare herself with the ground staff or with the senior chief stewardesses or chief stewardesses as they were not employed in the same category of work (see para 19). (4) Section 40 of the Employment Act 1955 was of no assistance to the applicant. Unless and until the Employment Act 1955 is amended to expressly prohibit any term and condition of employment that requires flight stewardesses to resign upon becoming pregnant, such clauses are subject to the Contracts Act 1950 and continue to be valid and enforceable (see para 23). (5) In the applicant’s case, the collective agreement was obviously not an ‘agreement to negotiate’. It was an agreement binding on all women who agreed to be employed as flight stewardesses working for the first respondent (see para 25). (6) Section 37(1) of the Employment Act 1955 makes it mandatory for employers to pay maternity allowance to female employees on maternity leave. However,

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 34 it does not prohibit provisions requiring female employees in specialised occupations such as flight cabin crew to resign if they become ||Page 683>> pregnant, simply because they cannot be working till they are due to deliver (see para 26). (7) The evidence disclosed no implied term that will require the first respondent to provide her with a ground job while she was pregnant or on maternity leave (see para 28). (8) The applicant had no hope of success even if leave to appeal was granted. The applicant had not established any grounds for this court to consider the availability of any further arguments which might allow this court to depart from the established principles of law (see para 29).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon bekerja dengan responden pertama sebagai pramugari Gred B dan terikat kepada terma-terma dan syarat-syarat perjanjian kolektif yang berkaitan (‘perjanjian kolektif tersebut’). Perjanjian kolektif tersebut, antara lain, menghendaki semua pramugari di bawah kategori pemohon untuk berhenti kerja jika mengandung dan sekiranya gagal untuk berhenti kerja, responden pertama mempunyai hak untuk menamatkan perkhidmatannya. Pemohon mengandung tetapi enggan berhenti kerja. Oleh itu, responden pertama telah menamatkan perkhidmatan beliau. Ini mengakibatkan beliau memulakan prosiding di Mahkamah Tinggi dengan berhujah bahawa peruntukan perjanjian kolektif tersebut adalah bersifat diskriminasi dan oleh itu bercanggah dengan per 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan menyebabkan perjanjian kolektif tersebut tidak sah. Mahkamah Tinggi dan Mahkamah Rayuan telah menolak permohonan beliau. Pemohon kemudian memohon kebenaran untuk merayu ke Mahkamah Persekutuan.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan untuk kebenaran merayu ke Mahkamah Persekutuan: (1) Adalah tidak mungkin untuk meluaskan skop per 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan untuk meliputi perjanjian kolektif. Undang-undang Perlembagaan — yang membincangkan perlanggaran hak individu oleh badan perundangan atau eksekutif atau agensi-agensinya — tidak memperluaskan pemakaian peruntukan substantif atau prosedurnya ke atas perlanggaran hak individu dari segi undang-undang oleh individu lain. Tambahan pula, rujukan kepada ‘undang-undang’ dalam per 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan tidak meliputi satu perjanjian kolektif (lihat perenggan 13). (2) Terdapat syarat istimewa yang digunakan khususnya berkaitan tugas pramugari, yang responden pertama sebagai majikan berhak untuk kenakan (lihat perenggan 14). Tambahan pula, mahkamah mengambil notis kehakiman bahawa sifat tugas tersebut sememangnya tidak sesuai untuk wanita

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 35 mengandung (lihat perenggan 15). Oleh itu, tiada fasal khusus yang istimewa dalam perjanjian kolektif tersebut yang bersifat diskriminasi ||Page 684>> terhadap perayu untuk apa-apa alasan bagi menjustifikasikan campur tangan kehakiman (lihat perenggan 16). (3) Perlindungan saksama dalam fasal (1) kepada per 8 meliputi hanya kepada mereka dalam kelas yang sama. Ia membenarkan semua orang yang secara tabiat, keadaan dan keperluan berbeza dari kelas berbeza diberi layanan yang berbeza. Dalam kes ini, tidak terdapat percanggahan (lihat perenggan 18). Dalam kes ini, pemohon memilih untuk bekerja untuk responden pertama sebagai pramugari dan bersetuju untuk terikat dengan perjanjian kolektif tersebut. Pemohon tidak boleh membandingkan dirinya dengan staf lain atau dengan ketua pramugari kanan atau ketua pramugari kerana mereka bukan dilantik bekerja di bawah kategori kerja yang sama (lihat perenggan 19). (4) Seksyen 40 Akta Pekerjaan 1955 tidak membantu pemohon. Kecuali dan sehingga Akta Pekerjaan 1955 dipinda untuk menghalang dengan nyata apa-apa terma-terma dan syarat-syarat pekerjaan yang menghendaki pramugari berhenti kerja jika mengandung, fasal sedemikian tertakluk kepada Akta Kontrak 1950 dan akan terus sah dan berkuatkuasa (lihat perenggan 23). (5) Dalam kes pemohon, perjanjian kolektif tersebut bukan satu ‘agreement to negotiate’. Ia adalah satu perjanjian yang mengikat semua wanita yang bersetuju untuk bekerja sebagai pramugari untuk responden pertama (lihat perenggan 25). (6) Seksyen 37(1) Akta Pekerjaan 1955 menjadikannya mandatori untuk majikan membayar elaun bersalin kepada pekerja wanita yang mengambil cuti bersalin. Namun begitu, ia tidak menghalang peruntukan yang menghendaki pekerja wanita yang bertugas dalam pekerjaan yang khusus seperti krew kabin penerbangan untuk berhenti bekerja jika mereka mengandung, kerana mereka tidak boleh bekerja sehingga masa bersalin (lihat perenggan 26). (7) Keterangan tidak mendedahkan apa-apa terma tersirat yang menghendaki responden pertama menukar beliau dengan tugas di darat semasa beliau mengandung atau semasa cuti bersalin (lihat perenggan 28). (8) Pemohon tiada harapan untuk berjaya meskipun kebenaran untuk merayu diberikan. Pemohon tidak membuktikan apa-apa alasan untuk mahkamah ini menimbangkan apa-apa hujah selanjutnya yang mungkin akan membenarkan mahkamah ini menyimpang daripada prinsip-prinsip undang-undang yang tetap (lihat perenggan 29).]

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 36 ||Page 685>> For cases on collective agreements, see 8 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 756–758. For cases on terms and conditions, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1180–1183. For cases on termination of employment, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1070–1140. For cases on appeals to the Federal Court, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 599. For cases on leave to appeal, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 892–945.

Cases referred to Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155 (refd) Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed & Anor v The Board of Trustees of the Sabah Foundation & Ors and another application [1999] 1 MLJ 257 (refd) Kam Mah Theatre Sdn Bhd v Tan Lay Soon [1994] 1 MLJ 108 (refd) Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia v Yong Pau Ching [1997] 2 ILR 898 (refd)

Legislation referred to Contracts Act 1950 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 96(a) Employment Act 1955 ss 7, 7A, 37(1), 40, 43, Part IX Federal Constitution art 8, (1), (2) Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 14(3)

Appeal from Civil Appeal No W–02–186 of 1996 (Court of Appeal, Kuala Lumpur)

Gurubachan Singh Johal (Nashir Johal & Co) for the applicant. Vijayan Venugopal (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the first respondent. S Ravichandran (P Kuppusamy & Co) for the second respondent.

[2005] 4 MLJ 506 DATO’ HARI MENON @ DATO’ T PURAHARAN A/L CP RAMAKRISHNAN (SUING AS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF DYMM TUANKU JA’AFAR IBNI ALMARHUM TUANKU

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 37 ABDUL RAHMAN, YANG DI PERTUAN BESAR NEGERI SEMBILAN DARUL KHUSUS) v TEXAS ENCORE LLC & ORS

HIGH COURT (SEREMBAN) — SUIT NO 22–205 OF 1999 LOW HOP BING J 18 APRIL 2005

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Striking out claims and action — Whether pleading disclosed triable issue — Whether issue res judicata

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Striking out writ and statement of claim — Application for — Application made after defendant had entered unconditional appearance — Whether application must be dismissed —Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19

Constitutional Law — Courts — Jurisdiction of High Court — Plaintiff filed action at High Court — Plaintiff commenced action pursuant to power of attorney conferred by principal that falls under category of ‘Ruler’ — Whether High Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate suit — Federal Constitution arts 181(1)

This was an appeal filed by the fourth defendant against the decision of the learned registrar who had dismissed the fourth defendant’s application in seeking to strike out the plaintiff’s writ and statement of claim, under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) or (d) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘RHC 1980’). The plaintiff had commenced this action pursuant to a power of attorney given to him as attorney for his principal, DYMM Tuanku Ja’afar Ibni Almarhum Tuanku Abdul Rahman, Yang Di Pertuan Besar Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus (‘the principal’) who had authorised the plaintiff to commence this action against all the four defendants. It was submitted that it was too late for the fourth defendant to invoke O 18 r 19 of the RHC 1980 as it had entered an unconditional appearance. It was also argued for the plaintiff that, at the hearing of the application filed by the plaintiff to continue an inter partes injunction, and the application filed by the defendants to set it aside, the fourth defendant had raised the issues on the plaintiff’s locus standi and the jurisdiction of the court, and that, Muhamad Ideres J had allowed the application of the plaintiff and dismissed the application by the defendants. The fourth defendant’s appeals are now pending in the Court of Appeal and that, in so far as the High Court was concerned, the issues viz locus standi and jurisdiction were res judicata and the fourth defendant was estopped from raising them in this case. Finally, it was argued that the plaintiff lacked locus standi as the action must be commenced in the principal’s name in the Special Court established under art 182(2) of the Federal Constitution.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 38 ||Page 507>>

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The fourth defendant having entered unconditional appearance had deprived itself of the right to invoke O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) or (d) of the RHC 1980 (see para 22); Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 followed. (2) It was clear that Muhamad Ideres J had considered and determined whether or not there was a bona fide triable issue or a bona fide serious issue to be tried, ie whether the plaintiff had the locus standi or whether the court had jurisdiction in this action. This was binding on all parties to this case until its reversal on appeal (see para 40). Since the issue whether the plaintiff had locus standi or whether the court had jurisdiction in this action had been dealt with and disposed of by Muhamad Ideres J, this issue was res judicata and the fourth defendant was estopped from reventilating it before this court in the exercise of co-ordinate jurisdiction (see para 42). (3) Article 181(1) of the Federal Consitution would include the Rulers’ prerogative in granting a power of attorney to any person of legal capacity in order to authorise the donee of the power of attorney to act as his lawful attorney to do all things in accordance with the law, eg in the instant case to commence legal proceedings for and on behalf of the principal. Had this action been commenced by the principal in this court in his personal capacity, there can be no doubt this court would have no jurisdiction at all and the suit ought to be struck out (see para 59).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Ini adalah rayuan yang difailkan oleh defendan keempat terhadap keputusan pendaftar yang bijaksana yang telah menolak permohonan defendan keempat yang memohon untuk membatalkan writ dan pernyataan tuntutan plaintif, di bawah A 18 k 19(1)(a), (b) atau (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’). Plaintif telah memulakan tindakan ini menurut satu surat kuasa wakil yang diberikan kepada beliau sebagai wakil untuk prinsipalnya, DYMM Tuanku Ja’afar Ibni Almarhum Tuanku Abdul Rahman, Yang Di Pertuan Besar Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus (‘prinsipal’) yang telah memberi kuasa kepada plaintif untuk memulakan tindakan ini terhadap kesemua empat defendan. Ia telah dihujahkan bahawa ia sudah terlambat untuk defendan keempat menggunakan A 18 k 19 KMT kerana ia telah memasuki kehadiran tanpa syarat. Ia juga dihujahkan bagi pihak plaintif bahawa, semasa perbicaraan permohonan tersebut difailkan oleh plaintif untuk menyambung injunksi inter partes, dan permohonan tersebut difailkan oleh defendan- defendan untuk mengetepikannya, defendan keempat telah menimbulkan persoalan-persoalan tentang locus standi plaintif dan bidang kuasa mahkamah, dan bahawa, Muhamad Ideres H telah membenarkan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 39 permohonan plaintif ||Page 508>> dan menolak permohonan oleh defendan-defendan. Rayuan-rayuan defendan sekarang masih belum selesai di Mahkamah Rayuan dan oleh itu, setakat Mahkamah Tinggi adalah berkaitan, persoalan-persoalan tersebut mengenai locus standi dan bidang kuasa tersebut adalah res judicata dan defendan keempat diestopkan daripada menimbulkan perkara-perkara berikut dalam kes ini. Akhirnya, ia telah dihujahkan bahawa plaintif tidak mempunyai locus standi kerana tindakan tersebut hendaklah dimulakan atas nama prinsipal di mahkamah khas yang ditubuhkan di bawah per 182(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Defendan keempat yang telah memasuki kehadiran tanpa syarat telah kehilangan haknya untuk menggunakan A 18 k 19(1)(a), (b) atau (d) KMT (lihat perenggan 22); Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 diikut. (2) Adalah jelas bahawa Muhamad Ideres H telah menimbang dan menentukan sama ada atau tidak terdapat persoalan bona fide yang serius yang perlu dibicarakan, iaitu sama ada plaintif mempunyai locus standi atau sama ada mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa dalam tindakan ini. Ini mengikat semua pihak dalam kes ini sehingga pengakasan kes ini semasa rayuan (lihat perenggan 40). Memandangkan persoalan sama ada plaintif mempunyai locus standi atau sama ada mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa dalam tindakan ini telah diteliti dan diputuskan oleh Muhamad Ideres H, persoalan ini adalah res judicata dan defendan keempat diestopkan daripada mengemukakannya di hadapan mahkamah dengan menggunakan bidang kuasa sama taraf (lihat perenggan 42). (3) Perkara 181(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan membenarkan hak Pemerintah memberi surat kuasa wakil kepada sesiapa yang mempunyai kapasiti sah bagi tujuan memberi kuasa kepada penerima surat kuasa wakil untuk bertindak sebagai wakil beliau yang sah di sisi undang- undang, contohnya dalam kes semasa untuk memulakan prosiding sah untuk dan bagi pihak prinsipal. Jika tindakan ini telah dimulakan oleh prinsipal dalam mahkamah ini dalam kapasiti peribadi beliau, maka tidak diragukan lagi bahawa mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa langsung dan guaman ini hendaklah dibatalkan (lihat perenggan 59).]

Notes For cases on jurisdiction of courts, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1684–1692. For a case on striking out claims and action, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 4744. ||Page 509>>

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 40 For cases on striking out writ and statement of claim, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 4859–4891. For jurisdiction of courts, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [20.066]– [20.073]. For striking out pleadings and actions, see 1 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2002 Reissue) paras [10.6-069]–[10.6-075].

Cases referred to ‘Avro International’, The; The ‘Avro Venture’ ‘Avro International’ (Owners of) v Arabian Marine Bunkers Sales Co Ltd & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 147 (refd) Adaikappa Chettiar v Thomas Cook & Son (Bankers) Ltd 1933 AIR PC 78 (refd) Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 (folld) Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti San Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (refd) Azhar Azizan Harun (as the absolute representative of Eleanor Dulcie Robinson), Re [1998] 7 MLJ 89 (refd) Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 (refd) Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027; [1972] 1 All ER 801; [1972] 2 WLR 645 (refd) Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 3 MLJ 352 (refd) Dalip Bhagwan Singh v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Dato’ Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato’ Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 (refd) DYTM Tengku Idris Shah Ibni Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah v Dikim Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 1 (refd) Faridah Begum bte Abdullah v Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Al Mustain Billah Ibni Almarhum Sultan Abu Bakar Ri’Ayatuddin Al Mu’Adzam Shah [1996] 1 MLJ 617 (refd) Government of Malaysia v Data Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74 (refd) Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57 Jones and Saldanha v Gurney [1913] WN 72 (refd) Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 (refd) Kewangan Utama Bhd v Cassells Sdn Bhd Anor [1998] MLJU 500 (refd) Kuantan Kuala Lumpur Express Omnibus Co Ltd v Utama Express Sdn Bhd [1986] 1 MLJ 192 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 41 Lee Sem Yoong v Leong Yoong [1967] 2 MLJ 86 (refd) Leong Peng Kheong & Anor v Dawntree Properties Sdn Bhd [2002] 2 MLJ 186 (refd) Malaysia Land Investment Co (Pte) Ltd v Sathask Realty Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] 1 MLJ 451 (refd) Middle East Tankers and Freighters v Owner of the Vessel and Other Interested Party in the Vessel of MV ‘IRA’ [1996] 4 MLJ 109 (refd) Mohamed Zainuddin bin Puteh v Yap Chee Seng [1978] 1 MLJ 40 (refd) Mothercare Ltd v Robson Books Ltd [1979] FSR 466 (refd) N Carrupaiya v MBf Property Services Sdn Bhd & Anor [2000] 4 MLJ 389 (refd) ||Page 510>> Perspective Management Services Sdn Bhd v Seganom Sdn Bhd [2004] 6 AMR 833 (refd) Perumahan Farlim (Pg) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Cheng Hang Guan & Ors [1989] 3 MLJ 223 (refd) Sarkawi bin Sadijo (t/a Jojo’s Musical and Promotion House) v BMO Music (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 515 (refd) Satyadhyan Ghosel & Ors v Sint Deorajin Dobi & Anor AIR 1960 SC 941 (refd) Si Rusa Beach Resort Sdn Bhd v Asia Pacific Hotels Management Pte Ltd [1985] 1 MLJ 132 (refd) Sundralingam v Ramanathan Chettiar [1967] 2 MLJ 211 (refd) Tan Yoke Kee v CIMB Securities Sdn Bhd & Ors [1997] MLJU 254 (refd) Tara Rajaratnam v Datuk Jaginder Singh & Ors [1981] MLJ 232 (refd) Tengku Razaleigh bin Tengku Mohd Hamzah v Election Judge For Election Petition No 33–6–1995 & Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 66 (refd) Tungku Abubakar & Ors v His Highness The Sultan of Johore [1949] MLJ 187 (refd) Tungku Abubakar & Ors v His Highness The Sultan of Johore [1952] AC 318 (refd) Wee Tiang Kheng & Ors v Ngu Nii Soon & Ors [1989] 1 MLJ 252 (refd) Wilkinson v Barking Corporation [1948] 1 KB 721 (refd) Wilkinson v Sibtey & Anor [1932] 1 KB 194 (refd) YAM Tengku Iskandar ibni Almarhum Tengku Ahmad lwn Majlis Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan & satu lagi [1997] 2 MLJ 555 (refd)

Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 181, (2), 182, (2), (3) Powers of Attorney Act 1949 s 3(2) Probate and Administration Act 1959 s 52 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), (d), O 71, O 72

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 42

Cyrus Das (K Mohan with him) (Shook Lin & Bok) for the plaintiff. RS Nathan (N Segaram with him) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the fourth defendant.

[2005] 4 MLJ 636 AHMAD YANI BIN ISMAIL & ANOR v INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE & ORS

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO 44–46 OF 2003 HELILIAH J 20 FEBRUARY 2004

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Freedom of religion — Whether absolute — Federal Constitution arts 11, 149

Constitutional Law — Jurisdiction — High Court — Source of jurisdiction and power of the High Court — Whether court may invovle some other sources to determine courts’ power apart from as may be conferred by and under federal law — Federal Constitution art 121(1)

Preventive Detention — Detention order — Detention under Internal Security Act — Grounds of detention — Threat to national security — Whether objective or subjective test applicable — Whether past activities were relevant consideration — Whether the authority must disclose facts although disclosure would be against national interest — Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8, 16 & 73

The applicants applied to this court for a writ of habeas corpus. The applicants were said to be associated with the activities of the Jemaah Islamiah, which teachings involve the use of armed violence. The applicants was arrested under s 73 of the Internal Security Act 1960 (‘the ISA’) and both the applicants were subsequently detained by orders made by the Minister pursuant to s 8 of the same Act. The issues in this case were: (a) whether the test applicable to the detention under s 73 of the ISA should be the objective test or subjective test; (b) whether the grounds of the detention of both the applicants were not within the scope of art 149 of the Federal Constitut ion (‘the FC’) and outside the purview of the ISA; (c) whether art 149 of the FC override art 11 of the FC; (d) whether the ISA was ultra vires art 11 of the FC; (e) whether the FC was capable of legitimising actions under the ISA; and (f) whether s 8B of the ISA was ultra vires the FC.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 43 Held, dismissing the application: (1) The recital or preamble provides merely a guide as to the object of the ISA. In invoking s 8 the Minister has to be satisfied that the association of the applicants to certain bodies have to be prevented in order to achieve the object of the Act, that is, to prevent subversion or conduct which would be prejudicial to the security of Malaysia. The preamble explained the objects and purposes of the ISA but does not entail the requirement that upon the Minister’s order is being challenged there must be forwarded to the court particulars that there has in fact been a substantial number of persons identified and ascertained with which the ||Page 637>> applicants have been identified in view to justify the detention. The applicable test will be the subjective test (see paras 12 and 16). (2) It would lead to absurdity that every time a detention is made it must be proven that there is a threat from a substantial body of persons taking action and which action is causing fear or organised violence. The long title to the Act states inter alia that the Act is to provide for ‘preventive detention’. It covers therefore not merely present activities of persons but also certain past activities (see para 18). (3) The executive, by virtue of its responsibilities, has to be the sole judge of what the national security requires. However, although the court will not question the executive’s decision as to what national security requires, the court will nevertheless examine whether the executive’s decision is in fact based on national security considerations and the test to be applied shall be subjective test (see para 23). (4) The grounds and allegation of facts disclosed that the association of the applicants with the activities of certain groups identified as the ‘Jemaah Islamiah’, which activities involve the teachings of the use of armed violence, are considered to be not only unlawful as being outside the limits of the FC but were also considered to be a threat to national security (see para 45). (5) The allegation of facts showed not a single act but the series of acts of the applicants. The question was whether the grounds and allegation of facts upon which the ground had been based could be said to be within the scope of the purpose for which the power of the Minister is to be exercised under s 8. The circumstances would therefore vary from case to case whether there had to be prevented the prejudicial activity which the persons are likely to commit in the future and surely the past activities are also really relevant to enable the Minister to ground his satisfaction (see para 47). (6) The activities that the applicants had been identified to be engaged in, namely activities which were described as militant activities with certain groups which had as its objective the establishment of an Islamic State which would encompass Malaysia, Indonesia and Southern Philippine through armed violence, would not reasonably envisage a situation which would involve only

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 44 peaceful means through the processes recognised within the framework of the constitution. The grounds refered to the applicants being actively involved in receiving instructions on armed warfare both in theory and through physical training from Indonesian islamic clerics were the grounds considered by the executive, and therefore those grounds were within the scope of s 8. Those grounds and allegation of facts refer to the movement of militant insurgents who may include activities such as the attempts to create unrest including the overthrowing of government through armed rebellion (see para 50). ||Page 638>> (7) Article 149 is part of the FC and despite the fact that art 11 of the FC is not mentioned alongside articles 5, 9, 10 or 13, art 11 of the FC does not prevail or override art 149 of the FC. In the present case the Minister must have formed the opinion that the activities of the applicants did not fall within the limits of professing and preaching of religion and that cl (4) by permitting federal law to control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam clearly evinced the intention that the right accorded under art 11 (1) of the FC was not absolute (see para 56). (8) Article 121(1) of the FC stipulated that the High Courts ‘...shall have jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by and under federal law’. It is wholly untenable that the words ‘as may be conferred’ which are simply qualified by the words ‘by and under federal law’ are to be construed without any limitation as to enable this court to extend the meaning that this court could invoke some other sources to determine the court’s power (see para 65). (9) Section 8B of the ISA has to be read with s 8C of the same Act of which expressly provides that judicial review includes ‘proceedings instituted by way of writ of habeas corpus’. However it is misleading to suggest that what has been termed ‘judicial review’ includes ‘habeas corpus’. Thus there seems to be a statutory definition of ‘judicial review’ which seems to have an infusion of the writ of habeas corpus with other forms of issue of the prerogative orders, namely, mandamus, prohibition or certiorari. The jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of prerogative writs emanate from Paragraph 1 in the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘the CJA’) which is to be read with s 25(2) of the CJA (see para 68). (10) The applicants were not merely applying for the writ of habeas corpus but averring that the court should make certain declaratory orders for the detention to be held a nullity. It was indeed a convoluted endeavour to combine proceedings in criminal jurisdiction and the processes of judicial review under O 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) which is questionable. This process was misleading and explained how arguments on an alleged infringement of art 5(3) had been brought forth. If the detention itself is legal and the alleged infringement of art 5 even if it is capable of being upheld, does not operate ex post facto to vitiate the detention (see para 75). (11) If it is the competence of Parliament that had to be challenged it is not by way

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 45 of declaratory relief and especially so when the FC has also provided for an alternative remedy by way of an advisory board and it is equally a question of policy whether or not the constitutional safeguard provided under art 151 is adequate or not adequate (see para 83). ||Page 639>> (12) The current schedule to the CJA undoubtedly refers, inter alia, to the writ of habeas corpus. But in the present proceedings the relief sought is not solely confined to the application for a writ of habeas corpus. There is here in addition the issue where s 8B is being assailed on the ground that it is ultra vires art 4(1), contrary to art 121 and not having gone through the processes of art 159 (see para 90). (13) There was a wrong choice of procedure if not a misuse. The application for the writ of habeas corpus still remain under the Criminal Procedure Code (‘CPC’) and until O 53 the RHC is otherwise amended the process of the judicial review of administrative decision making processes available under s 365 of the CPC remain restrictive (see para 93). (14) By attempting to assail the ISA 1960 through the process of judicial review on the ground that s 8B is ultra vires art 4(1), art 121(1) and art 128(1) together with the process of applying for the writ of habeas corpus have caused this court to embark on an unproductive process as the High Court is not a repository of the ‘inherent jurisdiction’ to declare a law (ie s 8B) made by Parliament ultra vires art 4(1). This court would in addition decline to derogate to itself the so called inherent powers to declare s 8B ultra vires as it would amount to rendering an advisory opinion which would tantamount to judicial vandalism (see para 94). (15) Preventive detention is anticipatory action to counteract activities which are apprehended to be prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof. Any person or classes of persons detained under s 8 of the ISA is not being charged for any offence leading to a criminal conviction in order to intercept certain activities which are considered prejudicial to security. Therefore, there is an intelligible differentia between persons who are detained under the ISA 1960 without trial as opposed to those who are arrested under the Criminal Procedure Code and charged for the commission of offences (see para 99). (16) The alleged violation of art 8 had not been supported by any indication of unreasonable or arbitrary action. The grounds as furnished to the applicants indicated that there was a reasonable nexus between the allegations of facts upon which the Minister has considered in forming his opinion and the purpose for which the power had been exercised. It can be reasonably seen that there is a proximate connection between the ground and allegation of facts upon which they are based and the object of the ISA, namely national security consideration (see para 102). (17) Article 151(3) is a general safeguard clause where the words are ‘This article does not require any authority to disclose facts whose disclosure would in its

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 46 opinion be against the national interest’. Therefore given its ordinary meaning the words are wide and embracing. In addition, the ||Page 640>> existence of s 16 of the ISA only seeks to emphasis that even in the context of Chapter II the rule against disclosure applies with equal force. In other words, the insertion of s 16 is not redundance, not even superfluous but inserted ex abundant cautela (see para 120). (18) To require the arresting officers or the officers who are acting in furtherance of s 73 to disclose certain matters or information which are classified or which in their opinion to be against national interest to do so, without certain changes being made to existing legislation would lead to uncertainties which are not feasible particularly in the field of criminal law. As such, the relevant legislation has to be changed or certain procedures be emplaced before the court could compel the disclosure of information where national security consideration is being specifically impleaded for non-disclosure of information (see para 121).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon-pemohon memohon kepada mahkamah ini untuk writ habeas corpus. Pemohon-pemohon dikatakan telah terlibat dengan aktiviti-aktiviti Jemaah Islamiah, yang menitikberatkan penggunaan kekerasan bersenjata. Pemohon- pemohon telah ditahan di bawah s 73 Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960 (‘AKDN’) dan pemohon-pemohon kemudiannya di tahan menerusi perintah yang dibuat oleh Menteri menurut s 8 Akta yang sama. Isu-isu dalam kes ini adalah: (a) sama ada ujian yang harus diterimapakai untuk tahanan di bawah s 73 AKDN seharusnya ujian objektif atau ujian subjektif; (b) sama ada tahanan pemohon-pemohon tidak merangkumi di bawah skop artikel 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘PP’) dan di luar skop AKDN; (c) sama ada artikel 149 PP mengatasi artikel 11 PP; (d) sama ada AKDN ultra vires artikel 11 PP; (e) sama ada PP berkebolehan dalam mengesahkan tindakan-tindakan di bawah AKDN; dan (f) sama ada s 8B AKDN ultra vires PP.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Mukadimah hanya membekalkan satu panduan berkenaan dengan objek AKDN. Dalam menerimapakai s 8 Menteri hendaklah berpuashati bahawa hubungan pemohon-pemohon dengan badan-badan tertentu hendaklah dihalang dalam mencapai objek Akta tersebut, iaitu untuk menghalang subversi atau tingkahlaku yang boleh memprejudiskan keselamatan negara. Mukadimah menjelaskan objek-objek dan tujuan- tujuan AKDN tetapi tidak melibatkan keperluan bahawa apabila perintah Menteri tersebut dicabar hendaklah dikemukakan kepada mahkamah butir-butir bahawa terdapatnya sejumlah besar orang telah dikenalpasti yang mana turut melibatkan pemohon-pemohon dalam menjustifikasikan tahanan itu. Ujian yang terpakai adalah ujian subjektif (lihat perenggan 12 dan 16).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 47 ||Page 641>> (2) Ia akan terjumlah kepada kemustahilan di mana pada setiap masa tahanan dibuat ia hendaklah dibuktikan bahawa terdapat ancaman daripada sekumpulan pihak-pihak yang mengambil tindakan yang mana mengakibatkan ketakutan atau kekejaman yang terancang. Tajuk utama Akta tersebut antara lain memperuntukkan ‘tahanan pencegahan’. Maka, ia merangkumi bukan sahaja aktiviti-aktiviti terkini tetapi juga melibatkan aktiviti-aktiviti terdahulu (lihat perenggan 18). (3) Eksekutif dalam melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya, hendaklah menjadi penentu utama dalam menentukan apa yang diperlukan oleh keselamatan negara. Namun demikian, sungguhpun mahkamah tidak menyoal keputusan eksekutif dalam menentukan apa yang diperlukan oleh keselamatan negara, akan tetapi mahkamah akan memeriksa sama ada keputusan eksekutif sememangnya berdasarkan fakta-fakta keselamatan Negara (lihat perenggan 23). (4) Alasan-alasan dan pengataan fakta-fakta mendedahkan bahawa hubungan pemohon-pemohon dengan aktiviti-aktiviti kumpulan yang dikenali sebagai Jemaah Islamiah, aktiviti-aktiviti yang mana melibatkan ajaran- ajaran yang menggunakan kekejaman senjata, adalah dianggap bukan sahaja menyalahi undang-undang kerana ia berada di luar had-had yang ditetapkan oleh PP tetapi juga dianggap sebagai ancaman terhadap keselamatan negara (lihat perenggan 45). (5) Alasan-alasan dan pengataan fakta-fakta bukan sahaja mendedahkan satu tindakan tetapi satu siri tindakan pemohon-pemohon. Persoalan yang timbul adalah sama ada alasan-alasan dan pengataan fakta-fakta yang mana alasan tahanan didasarkan boleh dikatakan dalam lingkungan kuasa Menteri yang harus dilaksanakan di bawah s 8. Keadaan-keadaan akan berbeza bagi setiap kes dalam menghalang aktiviti-aktiviti prejudis yang akan dilakukan pada masa hadapan dan sesungguhnya aktiviti-aktiviti terdahulu adalah juga relevan dalam membolehkan Menteri mencapai kepuashatiannya (lihat perenggan 47). (6) Aktiviti-aktiviti yang telah dikenalpasti di mana pemohon-pemohon terlibat, iaitu aktiviti-aktiviti yang boleh digambarkan sebagai aktiviti- aktiviti ketenteraan dengan segolongan kumpulan yang mempunyai objektif untuk menubuhkan Wilayah Islam yang merangkumi Malaysia, Indonesia dan Selatan Filipina menerusi keganasan senjata bukan dengan munasabahnya membayangkan satu keadaan yang aman melalui proses yang diiktiraf di bawah lingkungan perlembagaan. Alasan-alasan yang dirujuk menjelaskan bahawa kedua-dua pemohon dengan aktif menerima arahan mengenai peperangan senjata secara teori dan latihan fizikal daripada paderi-paderi Islam Indonesia dan ia merupakan alasan-alasan yang telahpun diambilkira oleh eksekutif, maka ia adalah alasan-alasan di bawah skop s 8. Alasan-alasan dan pengataan fakta itu merujuk kepada ||Page 642>> gerakan bersifat pemberontakan yang turut merangkumi aktiviti-aktiviti umpamanya percubaan kerusuhan termasuk penggulingan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 48 kerajaan melalui pemberontakan bersenjata (lihat perenggan 50). (7) Artikel 149 adalah sebahagian daripada PP dan meskipun bahawa artikel 11 PP tidak disebut bersama-sama artikel-artikel 5, 9, 10 atau 13, artikel 11 PP tidak mengatasi artikel 149 PP. Dalam kes ini Menteri telahpun mencapai pendapatnya bahawa aktiviti-aktiviti pemohon-pemohon tidak terjatuh di bawah had-had mengamal agama dan bahawa klausa (4) menerusi undang-undang persekutuan untuk mengawal atau menghalang penyebaran apa-apa doktrin keagamaan terhadap orang-orang yang mengamal agama Islam dengan jelasnya memperlihatkan niat bahawa hak yang diberikan di bawah artikel 11(1) PP bukanlah mutlak (lihat perenggan 56 dan 58). (8) Artikel 121(1) PP dengan jelasnya memperuntukkan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi ‘... shall have jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by and under federal law’. Perkataan-perkataan ‘as may be conferred’ yang dengan jelasnya dihadkan oleh perkataan-perkataan ‘by and under federal law’ tidak boleh ditafsir tanpa sebarang had sehingga membolehkan mahkamah ini melanjutkan maknanya dan boleh menggunakan sumber-sumber lain untuk menentukan kuasa mahkamah (lihat perenggan 65). (9) Seksyen 8B AKDN hendaklah dibaca bersama s 8C Akta yang sama yang dengan jelasnya memperuntukkan bahawa semakan kehakiman termasuk ‘prosiding yang dimulakan melalui writ habeas corpus’. Walabagaimanapun adalah pernyataan yang mengelirukan untuk menyatakan bahawa apa yang telah ditermakan sebagai ‘semakan kehakiman’ turut termasuk ‘ habeas corpus’. Maka terdapatnya definasi statutori untuk ‘semakan kehakiman’ yang nampaknya mencampuradukkan writ habeas corpus dengan perintah-perintah prerogatif yang lain antaranya, mandamus, larangan atau certiorari. Bidang kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi berkenaan dengan writ-writ prerogatif muncul dari Perenggan 1 Jadual kepada Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (‘AMK’) yang harus dibaca bersama s 25(2) AMK tersebut (lihat perenggan 68). (10) Pemohon-pemohon bukan hanya memohon untuk writ habeas corpus tetapi menegaskan bahawa mahkamah seharusnya membuat beberapa perintah deklarasi untuk menyatakan tahanan tersebut tidak sah. Ia sebenarnya merupakan usaha berpulas untuk menyatukan prosiding di dalam bidang kuasa jenayah dan proses semakan kehakiman di bawah A 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi (‘KMT’) yang mana boleh dipersoalkan. Proses ini adalah mengelirukan dan menerangkan bagaimana hujahan berkenaan dengan dakwaan perlanggaran artikel 5(3) telah dibawa ke hadapan mahkamah. Jika tahanan itu sendiri adalah sah dan dakwaan berkenaan dengan perlanggaran artikel 5 juga sekiranya mampu ||Page 643>> untuk disokong, ia tidak berfungsi sebagai ex post facto untuk mencacatkan tahanan tersebut (lihat perenggan 75). (11) Sekiranya pencabaran dibuat adalah terhadap kecekapan Parlimen, ia tidak seharusnya menerusi relif deklarasi dan khususnya apabila PP turut memperuntukkan remedi sampingan menerusi badan penasihat dan ia juga

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 49 adalah persoalan polisi sama ada perlindungan berperlembagaan di bawah artikel 151 adalah memadai ataupun tidak memadai (lihat perenggan 83) . (12) Jadual terkini kepada AMK tanpa keraguan merujuk kepada, antara lain, writ habeas corpus. Tetapi di dalam prosiding ini relif yang dipohon bukan sahaja terbatas kepada permohonan writ habeas corpus. Tetapi dalam kes ini terdapat isu tambahan di mana s 8B sedang dicabar atas alasan ultra vires artikel 4(1), bercanggah dengan artikel 121 dan tidak melalui proses artikel 159 (lihat perenggan 90). (13) Di sini terdapat pemilihan prosidur yang salah sekiranya ia bukan satu penyalahgunaan. Permohonan untuk writ habeas corpus masih berada di bawah Kanun Acara Jenayah (‘KAJ’) dan sehingga A 53 KMT dipinda proses semakan kehakiman keputusan badan pentadbir yang wujud di bawah s 365 KAJ kekal terhad (lihat perenggan 93). (14) Dalam percubaan mencabar AKDN menerusi proses semakan kehakiman atas alasan s 8B ultra vires artikel 4(1), artikel 121(1) dan artikel 128(1) bersama-sama dengan proses permohonan writ habeas corpus telah menyebabkan mahkamah ini memulakan satu proses yang tidak produktif memandangkan Mahkamah Tinggi bukan merupakan gedung ‘kuasa sedia ada’ untuk mengesahkan satu undang-undang (ie s 8B) yang digubal oleh Parlimen ultra vires artikel 4(1). Tambahan juga Mahkamah ini menolak untuk menggunakan sebarang kuasa sedia yang dikatakan itu dengan mengesahkan s 8B ultra vires yang mana terjumlah kepada pemberian pendapat berbentuk nasihat yang mana terjumlah kepada vandalism kehakiman (lihat perenggan 94). (15) Tahanan pencegahan merupakan satu tindakan jangkaan untuk bertindakbalas terhadap aktiviti-aktiviti yang dianggap sebagai prejudis kepada keselamatan Malaysia atau mana-mana bahagiannya. Mana-mana orang atau kelas orang yang ditahan di bawah s 8 AKDN yang tidak didakwa di bawah mana-mana kesalahan yang terjumlah kepada sabitan jenayah adalah bertujuan untuk mencegah aktiviti-aktiviti tertentu yang merupakan prejudis kepada keselamatan. Maka, terdapat perbezaan yang ketara di mana seseorang itu ditahan di bawah AKDN yang mana tidak merangkumi sebarang perbicaraan bertentangan dengan seseorang yang ditahan di bawah KAJ dan dituduh kerana melaksanakan kesalahan tersebut (lihat perenggan 99). ||Page 644>> (16) Dakwaan perlanggaran artikel 8 tidak disokong dengan sebarang tanda bahawa tindakan tersebut adalah tidak munasabah atau arbitrari. Alasan- alasan yang dibekalkan kepada pemohon-pemohon menunjukkan bahawa terdapatnya kaitan yang munasabah antara pengataan-pengataan fakta yang mana Menteri telah mempertimbangkan dalam mencapai pendapatnya dan tujuan kuasa tersebut digunakan. Ia dengan nyata dapat dilihat hubungan antara alasan dan pengataan fakta-fakta yang mana tahanan tersebut disandarkan dan tujuan AKDN adalah bertujuan untuk menjaga keselamatan negara (lihat perenggan 102).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 50 (17) Artikel 151(3) merupakan klausa perlindungan am di mana perkataan yang digunakan adalah ‘This article does not require any authority to disclose facts whose disclosure would in its opinion be against the national interest’. Pemberian makna biasa perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah luas. Tambahan pula dengan kewujudan s 16 AKDN hanya menekankan bahawa, malahan dalam konteks Bab II, kaedah berkenaan dengan pendedahan terpakai secara saksama. Dalam lain perkataan, penyelitan s 16 bukan berlebihan, malah bukan juga lebih daripada memerlukan tetapi penyelitan ex abundant cautela (lihat perenggan 120). (18) Untuk meminta pegawai-pegawai atau pegawai yang menahan yang bertindak mengikut s 73 untuk mengemukakan perkara-perkara tertentu atau maklumat yang diklasifikasikan atau pada pendapat mereka bertentangan dengan kepentingan Negara untuk dikemukakan, dan tanpa pindaan kepada undang-undang tertentu akan membawa kepada ketidaktentuan yang mana tidak boleh dilaksanakan khususnya di dalam lapangan undang-undang jenayah. Maka, undang-undang relevan perlu diubah atau prosedur-prosedur tertentu perlu ditukar sebelum mahkamah dapat memaksa pengemukaan maklumat di mana alasan keselamatan negara secara jelasnya diplidkan untuk tidak mengemukakan maklumat (lihat perenggan 121).]

Notes For cases on jurisdiction of High Court under Constitutional Law, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1920–1924. For cases on detention under Internal Security Act, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1316–1317. For cases on freedom of religion, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 1257–1263. For freedom of religion, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (1999) paras [20.189]–[20.191].

Cases referred to Abdillah bin Labo Khan v PP [2002] 3 MLJ 298 (refd) Charanjit Lai v Union of India AIR 1951 SC 1 (refd) ||Page 645>> Chief Constable of North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1160 (refd) Chng Suan Tse v The Minister of Home Affairs & Ors and other appeals [1989] 1 MLJ 69 (folld) Civil Service Unions, Re; ex p Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (refd) Dato’ Mohamed Hashim Shamsuddin v Attorney-General, Hongkong [1986] 2 MLJ 113 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 51 Gopalan v State of Madras 1950 AIR SC165 (refd) Harpers Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union of Commercial Workers [1991] 1 MLJ 417 (refd) Hoh Kiang Ngan v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 369 (refd) Kam Teck Soon v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors and other appeals [2003] 1 MLJ 321 (refd) Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 (refd) Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin bin Nasir [2003] 6 AMR 497 (refd) Kok Wah Kuan v Pengarah Penjara Kajang Selangor [2004] 5 MLJ 193 (refd) Lee Lee Cheng v Seow Peng Kwang [1960] MLJ 1 (refd) Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 188 (refd) Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789 (refd) Minister for Home Affairs Malaysia & Anor v Jamaluddin bin Othman [1989] 1 MLJ 418 (refd) Minister for Home Affairs Malaysia & Anor v Karpal Singh [1988] 3 MLJ 30 (refd) Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & other appeals [2002] 4 MLJ 449 (refd) Munusamy v Subramaniam & Ors [1969] 2 MLJ 108 (folld) Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v Sugumar Balakrishnan & another appeal [2002] 3 MLJ 72 (refd) R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Cheblak [1991] 1 WLR 890 (refd) R v Secretary of State of Home Affairs, ex p Hosenball [1977] 1 WLR 766 (refd) Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun, Re; Inspector of Police v Tan Sri Raja bin Raja Harun, Re [1988] 1 MLJ 293 (refd) Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 MLJ 50 (refd) Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police [1988] 1 MLJ 293 (refd) Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279 (refd)

Legislation referred to Constitution of India (42nd Amendment) Act 1976 [Ind] s 55 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25(2) Criminal Procedure Code s 365

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 52 Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 s 4(1) Federal Constitution arts 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 121(1), 128(1), 149, 151(1)(b), 151(3) Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960 r 81 ||Page 646>> Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8(1), 8B, 11(2)(b), 16, 73(1) Malaysia Act 1963 s 3(1) Official Secrets Act 1972 s 2C Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 Sabah Immigration (Amendment) Act 1997 s 59A Singapore Constitution of the Republic [Sing] arts 93, 149

Edmund Bon (Amer Hamzah bin Arshad, Edward Saw and Latheefah Koya with him) (Chooi & Co) for the applicants. Mohd Hanafiah bin Zakaria (Suhaimi bin Nik Sulaiman with him) (Senior Federal Counsel) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondents.

[2005] 6 MLJ 26 PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v DUIS AKIM & ORS

HIGH COURT (KOTA KINABALU) — CRIMINAL TRIAL NO K–47–03 OF 2001 SULONG MATJERAIE J 1 JUNE 2005

Constitutional Law — Public Prosecutor — Whether powers of Public Prosecutor usurped or curtailed — Whether s 177A of Criminal Procedure Code ultra vires the Federal Constitution — Criminal Procedure Code s 177A — Federal Constitution art 145(3)

Criminal Procedure — Charge — Framing or particulars of — Charge involves murder — Whether charge need to specify killing or object used for killing — Accused not called to plead charge before magistrate — Whether allowed in law — Whether charge was illegal — Penal Code s 302 —Criminal Procedure Code s 154 illustration (e)

Criminal Procedure — Consent or sanction — Consent — Whether prosecution instituted without consent of Public Prosecutor

Criminal Procedure — Police Investigation — Application for further detention order —

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 53 Extension of detention period — Duties of magistrate — Whether grounds as stated in application subjected to careful judicial scrutiny — Grounds and authority for grant of remand order — Whether accused constitutionally remanded — Criminal Procedure Code ss 117 & 259 — Federal Constitution art 5(4)

Criminal Procedure — Transfer of cases — Power of magistrate — Charge involves murder — Whether case legally transferred to the High Court — Penal Code s 302

The accused was arrested on 22 June 2001 and was produced before the magistrate on 4 July 2001 to face a charge for murder under s 302 of the Penal Code. The charge was read and explained to the accused but no plea was recorded. Immediately at the commencement of the hearing of the murder trial, the accused raised five preliminary objections as follows: (a) the accused was unconstitutionally remanded; (b) the case was illegally transferred to the High Court; (c) the prosecution was instituted without consent of the Public Prosecutor; (d) that s 177A of the Criminal Procedure Code (‘CPC’) was ultra vires the Federal Constitution; and (e) the charge against the accused was illegal.

Held, dismissing the preliminary objections: (1) Section 117 of the CPC specifically provided for the remand of a person arrested and detained in custody when it appeared that the investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours as fixed by s 28 of the CPC (see para 21). After the 15 days remand under the proviso of s 117 of the CPC, the police shall charge the accused and in the instant case the accused were charged on 4 July 2001. Therefore, from the date of arrest, ||Page 27>> which was 22 June 2001 to 4 July 2001, being the date of the charge being read, it were all done within the 15 days time frame allowed under the law. Hence, there was therefore nothing illegal or unconstitutional (see para 22). (2) Since the charge involves murder under s 302 of the Penal Code, the magistrate has no power to hear the case. Such case must therefore be transmitted to the High Court. This was governed by s 177A of the CPC (see para 23). Section 177A allowed for the accused to be produced before the magistrate’s court during which time the charge will be read. Although the charge must be explained to the accused, he was not called upon to plead thereto. Therefore, what was done on 4 July 2001 before the magistrate in not asking the accused to plead was allowed under the law (see para 26). (3) Before an instruction to the police to charge the accused could be made by the deputy public prosecutor, evaluation of the then available evidence must have been undertaken and after being satisfied, instruction was given to the police to frame the charge against the accused on 4 July 2001. It was obvious therefore that the charge preferred against the accused had the blessing and therefore the consent of the Public Prosecutor (see para 29).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 54 (4) Section 259 of the CPC provided for the power to postpone or adjourn. The expression ‘...postpone the commencement or adjourn any inquiry or trial’ was covered by the explanatory part of s 259 of the CPC which reads ‘If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand’. Therefore, it was proper for the lower court to remand the accused person under s 259 of the CPC (see para 36). (5) The powers of the Attorney General as enshrined in art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution was not usurped nor curtailed. The consent to prosecute under s 177A of the CPC laid solely with the Public Prosecutor and no one else. Article 5(4) of the Federal Constitution provides for a situation that an arrested person not released shall within 24 hours be produced before a magistrate and shall not be further detained in custody without the magistrate’s authority. The authority given to the magistrate was found in s 259 of the CPC. Such being the case, there was no question of s 177A of the CPC being ultra vires of the Federal Constitution (see para 38). (6) The charge before the court was for the purpose of the commencement of the trial where the accused was required to plead and it should not be confused with the charge before the magistrate where the accused was never called upon to plead thereto. There cannot be any confusion ||Page 28>> as the person alleged to have been murdered remained the same and no murder can happen twice. The charge before this court was as per the consent of the deputy public prosecutor after a thorough evaluation of the evidence had been done (see para 67). (7) In view of illustration (e) of s 154 of the CPC where it says as follows: ‘A is accused of the murder of B at a given time and place. The charge need not state the manner in which A murdered B’, there was no need for the prosecution to specify the killing or the object used for the killing in the charge. No injustice had been occasioned (see para 48).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Tertuduh ditangkap pada 22 Jun 2001 dan telah dihadapkan di hadapan majistret pada 4 Julai 2001 untuk menghadapi pertuduhan bunuh di bawah s 302 Kanun Keseksaan. Penuduhan itu dibaca dan diterangkan kepada tertuduh tetapi tiada pli direkodkan. Pada permulaan pendengaran pembicaraan bunuh itu, tertuduh membangkitkan lima bantahan awalan seperti berikut: (a) tertuduh ditahan tanpa mengikut perlembagaan; (b) kes dipindahkan ke Mahkamah Tinggi secara salah di sisi undang-undang; (c) dakwaan dimulakan tanpa kebenaran Pendakwa Raya; (d) bahawa s 177A Kanun Acara Jenayah (‘KAJ’) adalah ultra vires kepada Perlembagaan Persekutuan; dan (e) penuduhan terhadap tertuduh adalah salah di sisi undang-undang.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 55

Diputuskan, menolak bantahan-bantahan awalan itu: (1) Seksyen 117 KAJ adalah dikhaskan untuk reman bagi orang yang ditangkap dan ditahan dalam jagaan sekiranya siasatan tidak dapat diselesaikan dalam masa 24 jam seperti yang telah ditetapkan dalam s 28 KAJ (lihat perenggan 21). Selepas reman selama 15 hari di bawah proviso s 117 KAJ, polis sepatutnya membuat pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh dan di dalam kes ini tertuduh telah dituduh pada 4 Julai 2001. Oleh itu, daripada tarikh tangkapan, iaitu 22 Jun 2001 ke 4 Julai 2001, iaitu tarikh pertuduhan dibacakan, semuanya dilakukan dalam masa 15 hari yang dibenarkan di sisi undang-undang. Oleh itu, tiada apa-apa yang tidak sah atau tidak mengikut perlembagaan (lihat perenggan 22). (2) Oleh kerana pertuduhan ini melibatkan pembunuhan di bawah s 302 Kanun Keseksaan, majistret tiada kuasa untuk membicarakan kes ini. Kes seperti ini sepatutnya dipindahkan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Ini diperuntukkan di bawah s 177A KAJ (lihat perenggan 23). Seksyen 177A membenarkan tertuduh dibawa ke hadapan mahkamah majistret di mana pertuduhan akan dibaca. Walaupun pertuduhan itu mesti dijelaskan kepada tertuduh, tertuduh tidak dipanggil untuk membuat pli kepada pertuduhan itu. Oleh itu, apa yang berlaku para 4 Julai 2001 di hadapan majistret yang tidak mengarahkan tertuduh untuk membuat pli adalah dibenarkan oleh undang-undang (lihat perenggan 26). ||Page 29>> (3) Sebelum satu arahan kepada polis untuk menuduh tertuduh boleh dibuat oleh penolong pendakwa raya, penilaian keterangan yang sedia ada mesti dibuat dan setelah puas hati, arahan telah diberi kepada polis untuk menulis pertuduhan yang sesuai terhadap tertuduh pada 4 Julai 2001. Adalah jelas bahawa pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh mempunyai kebenaran Pendakwa Raya (lihat perenggan 29). (4) Seksyen 259 KAJ memberi kuasa untuk penangguhan. Ekspresi ‘...postpone the commencement or adjourn any inquiry or trial’ meliputi bahagian s 259 KAJ yang mengatakan ‘If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand.’ Oleh itu, adalah betul untuk mahkamah rendah menahan pihak teruduh di bawah s 259 KAJ (lihat perenggan 36). (5) Kuasa Peguam Negara seperti yand tertakluk di bawah per 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuaan tidak disekat. Kebenaran untuk mendakwa di bawah s 177A berada dengan Pendakwa Raya sahaja. Perkara 5(4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan memperuntukkan untuk situasi di mana orang yang ditahan tidak dilepaskan selepas 24 jam mesti dibawa ke hadapan majistret and tidak boleh ditahan dalam jagaan tanpa kebenaran majistret. Authoriti yang diberi kepada magistret adalah di bawah s 259 KAJ. Oleh itu, tiada persoalan berkenaan s 177A KAJ adalah ultra vires kepada Perlembagaan Persekutuan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 56 (lihat perenggan 38). (6) Pertuduhan di hadapan mahkamah adalah untuk tujuan memulakan perbicaraan di mana tertuduh dikehendaki membuat pli dan ia tidak sepatutnya disalah anggap sebagai sama dengan pertuduhan di hadapan majistret di mana tertuduh tidak dipanggil untuk membuat pli. Tidak boleh wujud sebarang kekeliruan kerana orang yang dibunuh adalah orang yang sama dan pembunuhan itu tidak boleh berlaku dua kali. Pertuduhan di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah seperti yang dipersetujui oleh Pendakwa Raya selepas membuat penilaian mendalam mengenai keterangan kes ini (lihat perenggan 67). (7) Mengikut ilustrasi (e) s 154 KAJ di mana ia mengatakan seperti berikut: ‘A is accused of the murder of B at a given time and place. The charge need not state the manner in which A murdered B’, pihak pendakwa tidak perlu menyatakan tindakan pembunuhan itu atau objek yang diguna untuk membunuh dalam pertuduhan itu. Tiada ketidakadilan yang telah berlaku (lihat perenggan 48).]

Notes For a case on Public Prosecutor generally, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 reissue) para 1989. ||Page 30>> For cases on application for further detention ubder s 117, see 5(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2004 reissue) paras 2575–2576. For cases on consent or sanction, see 5(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2004 reissue) paras 4187–4188. For cases on framing or particulars of, see 5(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2004 reissue) paras 1086–1185. For cases on power of magistrate, see 5(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2004 reissue) paras 1377–1389.

Cases referred to Hashim bin Saud v Yahya bin Hasim & Anor [1977] 1 MLJ 259 (refd) Hj Mohamed Paiman v PP [1966] 1 MLJ 58 (refd) PP v Chua Chor Kian [1998] 1 MLJ 167 (refd) PP v LKI Holidays Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 MLJ 315 (refd) PP v Oladatun Lukmaru & Ors [1991] 1 MLJ 187 (refd) PP v Then Mee Kom [1983] 2 MLJ 344 (refd) Tan Foo Su v PP [1967] 2 MLJ 19 (refd)

Legislation referred to Criminal Procedure Code [Sing] s 198

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 57 Criminal Procedure Code 1973 [Ind] ss 167, 309 Criminal Procedure Code ss 28, 34, 120, 154 illustration (e), 177, A, (1), (2), 259, (2), 376(iii), Chap XVII Federal Constitution art 5(4), 145(3) Penal Code s 302

Chau Chin Tang (Chau & Thien) for the third accused. Clarence Foo (Deputy Public Prosecutor) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the Public Prosecutor. Yunof E Maringking (Maringking & Co) for the first and second accused.

[2005] 6 MLJ 193 LINA JOY v MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN & ORS

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–01–29 OF 2001 GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL AZIZ MOHAMAD AND ARIFIN ZAKARIA JJCA 19 SEPTEMBER 2005

Administrative Law — Exercise of administrative powers — Decision or order of — National Registration Department — Refusal to delete word ‘Islam’ from national registration card without certificate or order from Syariah Court — Whether decision valid — National Registration Regulation 1990 reg 14

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Freedom of religion — Conversion out of Islam — Proof of amendment of national registration identity card to delete the word ‘Islam’ — Whether certificate or order from Syariah Court necessary — National Registration Regulations 1990 reg 14

The appellant was born a Muslim and her name originally was Azlina bte Jailani. In 1990 she claimed to have believed fully in Christianity and was subsequently baptised. She applied to the National Registration Department (‘the NRD’) to have her name changed at first to Lina Lelani and later to Lina Joy on the grounds of her change of religion. Her change of name was subsequently allowed, but the word ‘Islam’ was stated in her National Registration Identity Card (‘NRIC’). She submitted proof of her change of religion and applied to the NRD to have the word ‘Islam’ deleted from her NRIC. However, the NRD requested for the appellant to submit a certificate and/or

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 58 order from the Syariah Court. The issue was whether the NRD was right in law in rejecting the appellant’s application under reg 14 of the National Registration Regulations 1990 (‘the 1990 Regulations’) to have the statement of her religion as ‘Islam’ deleted from her NRIC and in requiring a certificate and/or order from the Syariah Court. The respondent relied on para (cc)(xiii) of reg 4 that the Director General is entitled to call for additional information from a person applying for a change of name under reg 14. Therefore, there was nothing illegal in the Director General requesting the appellant to produce a certificate and/or order from the Syariah Court. However, counsel for the appellant submitted that reg 4(cc)(xiii) only permits the Director General to request for information in respect of the particulars furnished by the appellant. So, in the present instance the Director General would have been entitled to ask the appellant to produce her baptismal certificate to show that she was in fact a Christian as stated in her application form. Accordingly, the request for the order from the Syariah Court was not a request authorised by reg 4(cc)(xiii). ||Page 194>>

Held, by majority dismissing the appeal: (1) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA, Arifin Zakaria JCA concuring) In the appellant’s application to NRD, she in effect stated that the error in her identity card was in the statement of her religion as ‘Islam’, which therefore she wanted removed. It amounted to her saying that she had renounced Islam. The NRD could therefore require her to produce documentary evidence to support the accuracy of her contention that she was no longer a Muslim (see para 31). (2) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA, Arifin Zakaria JCA concuring) The fact that whether a person had renounced Islam is a question of Islamic law that was not within the jurisdiction of the NRD and that the NRD was not equipped or qualified to decide. It was because renunciation of Islam was a matter of Islamic law on which the NRD was not an authority that it adopts the policy of requiring the determination of some Islamic religious authority before it could act to remove the word ‘Islam’ from a Muslim’s identity card. The policy was a perfectly reasonable one (see para 34). (3) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) An order from the Syariah Court would do nothing to support the accuracy of the particular that the appellant was a Christian. However the baptismal certificate dated 11 May 1998 produced by the appellant in evidence amply supported the accuracy of the particular that the appellant was a Christian. Regulation 14(2) requires an applicant to state in his or her statutory declaration the reason for the change of name. In the appellant’s case, she stated that her reason for the change of name was that she was now a Christian. Accordingly, there was nothing in reg 4(cc)(xiii) that supported the action of the Director General in this case (see para 58). It followed that an order or certificate from the Syariah Court was not a relevant

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 59 document for the processing of the appellant’s application. It was not a document prescribed by the 1990 Regulations. Nor was it a particular that a registration officer was entitled to call for as a particular under reg 4(cc)(xiii) (see para 59). By requiring the production of the said order/certificate, the Director General took into account an irrelevant consideration when deciding not to effect the amendment to the appellant’s NRIC. That, of course, vitiated the decision not to delete the word ‘Islam’ from the appellant’s NRIC (see para 60). (4) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) Where a public decision-maker takes extraneous matters into account his or her decision is null and void and of no effect. Therefore, the Director General’s decision in refusing to effect the amendment to the appellant’s NRIC without an order/certificate of the Syariah Court was null and void and of no effect (see para 64). ||Page 195>> (4) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) It was conceded on behalf of the Director General that before 1 October 1999 there was no provision in the 1990 Regulations that mandated the statement of a person’s religion in his or her NRIC. So, if the Director General had approved the appellant’s application as he was bound by law to do at the time the appellant’s application to the NRD was made, the present problem would never have arisen (see para 65).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Perayu dilahirkan sebagai seorang beragama Islam dan nama asalnya adalah Azlina bte Jailani. Pada 1990 beliau mendakwa telah mempercayai sepenuhnya agama Kristian dan telah kemudiannya dibaptiskan. Beliau memohon kepada Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara (‘JPN’) untuk menukar namanya pertama kali kepada Lina Lelani dan kemudiannya kepada Lina Joy atas dasar pertukaran agama. Pertukaran namanya kemudiannya telah dibenarkan, tetapi perkataan ‘Islam’ tertera pada Kad Pengenalan (‘KP’) beliau. Beliau telah mengemukakan bukti berkenaan pertukaran agamanya dan memohon kepada JPN untuk memadamkan perkataan ‘Islam’ daripada KP beliau. Walau bagaimanapun, JPN telah meminta perayu untuk mengemukakan sijil dan/atau perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah. Isunya adalah sama ada JPN betul dalam menolak permohonan perayu di bawah per 14 Peraturan Pendaftaran Kebangsaan 1990 (‘Peraturan 1990’) untuk kenyataan agamanya sebagai ‘Islam’ dipadamkan daripada KP beliau dan dalam meminta sijil dan/atau perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah. Pihak responden bergantung kepada perenggan (cc)(xiii) per 4 yang menyatakan Ketua Pengarah adalah berhak untuk meminta maklumat tambahan daripada seseorang yang memohon untuk pertukaran nama di bawah per 14. Oleh itu, tiada apa-apa yang menyalahi undang-undang bagi Ketua Pengarah untuk meminta perayu mengemukakan sijil dan/atau perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 60 Walau bagaimanapun, peguamcara bagi perayu menghujahkan bahawa per 4(cc)(xiii) hanya membenarkan Ketua Pengarah untuk meminta maklumat berkenaan dengan butir-butir yang telah dikemukakan oleh perayu. Oleh itu, dalam kes sekarang ini, Ketua Pengarah berhak meminta perayu untuk mengemukakan sijil pembaptisan beliau untuk menunjukkan bahawa beliau dengan sebenarnya adalah seorang beragama Kristian seperti yang dinyatakan dalam borang permohonannya. Berikutan dengan itu, permintaan bagi perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah bukanlah merupakan permintaan yang sah di bawah per 4(cc)(xiii). ||Page 196>>

Diputuskan, dengan majoriti menolak rayuan itu: (1) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR, Arifin Zakaria HMR bersetuju) Dalam permohonan perayu kepada JPN, beliau telah menyatakan bahawa kesilapan pada kad pengenalannya adalah berkenaan dengan kenyataan agamanya sebagai ‘Islam’, yang mana beliau mahu dipadamkan. Ini adalah sama seperti beliau menyatakan bahawa beliau telah keluar daripada Islam. JPN oleh itu boleh meminta beliau untuk mengemukakan keterangan dokumentari untuk menyokong ketepatan kenyataan beliau bahawa beliau bukan lagi beragama Islam (lihat perenggan 31). (2) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR, Arifin Zakaria HMR bersetuju) Fakta sama ada seseorang itu telah keluar daripada Islam adalah merupakan persoalan undang-undang Islam yang bukan di bawah bidangkuasa JPN dan JPN adalah tidak berkebolehan atau layak untuk memberi keputusan. Ini adalah kerana keluar Islam adalah merupakan hal ehwal undang-undang Islam yang mana JPN bukanlah pihak yang berkuasa yang membuatkannya mengamalkan polisi untuk meminta penetapan daripada pihak berkuasa agama Islam sebelum ia boleh bertindak untuk memadamkan perkataan ‘Islam’ daripada kad pengenalan seseorang yang beragama Islam. Polisi tersebut adalah sememangnya berpatutan (lihat perenggan 34). (3) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah tidak akan memberi apa-apa kesan untuk menyokong ketepatan berkenaan butir-butir bahawa perayu adalah seorang yang beragama Kristian. Walau bagaimanapun, sijil pembaptisan bertarikh 11 Mei 1998 yang dikemukakan oleh perayu dengan secukupnya telah menyokong ketepatan butir-butir bahawa perayu beragama Kristian. Peraturan 14(2) mengehendaki seseorang pemohon untuk menyatakan dalam akuan berkanunnya sebab bagi pertukaran nama tersebut. Dalam kes perayu, beliau telah menyatakan bahawa sebab pertukaran nama adalah kerana beliau sekarang adalah seorang Kristian. Berikutan dengan itu, tiada apa-apa dalam per 4(cc)(xiii) yang menyokong tindakan Ketua Pengarah dalam kes ini (lihat perenggan 58). Oleh itu arahan atau sijil daripada Mahkamah Syariah bukan merupakan dokumen yang relevan untuk memproses permohonan perayu. Ia bukanlah dokumen yang ditetapkan dalam Peraturan 1990. Ia juga bukan merupakan butir-butir yang boleh diminta oleh pegawai

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 61 pendaftar sebagai butir-butir di bawah per 4(cc)(xiii) (lihat perenggan 59). Dengan meminta perintah/sijil tersebut dikemukakan, Ketua Pengarah telah mengambil kira satu pertimbangan yang tidak relevan semasa membuat keputusan untuk tidak membuat pertukaran kepada KP perayu. Ini tentunya membuatkan keputusan untuk tidak memadamkan perkataan ‘Islam’ daripada KP perayu tidak sah (lihat perenggan 60). (4) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Di mana pembuat keputusan awam mengambil kira perkara yang tidak berkaitan keputusan beliau ||Page 197>> adalah tidak sah dan terbatal dan tidak mempunyai kesan. Oleh itu, keputusan Ketua Pengarah untuk menolak untuk membuat perubahan kepada KP perayu tanpa perintah/sijil daripada Mahkamah Syariah adalah tidak sah dan terbatal dan tidak mempunyai kesan (lihat perenggan 64). (5) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Adalah diakui bagi pihak Ketua Pengarah bahawa sebelum 1 Oktober 1999 tiada peruntukan dalam Peraturan 1990 yang memandatkan pernyataan agama seseorang di dalam kad pengenalannya. Jadi, sekiranya Ketua Pengarah telah meluluskan permohonan perayu sepertimana yang diwajibkan oleh undang-undang ke atas beliau semasa permohonan perayu kepada JPN dibuat, masalah sekarang ini tidak akan timbul (lihat perenggan 65).]

Notes For cases on exercise of administrative powers generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 28–90. For cases on freedom of religion, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1790–1800.

Cases referred to Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (refd) Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 (refd) Bharat Bank Ltd Delhi v The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd Delhi AIR 1950 SC 188 (refd) Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (refd) Ismail bin Suppiah v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara (R–1–24–31 of 1995) (refd) Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v State of Gujarat AIR 1995 SC 142 (refd) Marathei v JG Containers (JV) Sdn Bhd [2003] 2 MLJ 337 (refd) R v The War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; ex p Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 (refd) Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 62 Kedah [1999] 1 MLJ 489 (refd)

Legislation referred to Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territory) Act 1993 Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1978 s 141(2) Federal Constitution art 11 cl (1), art 160 cl (2), art 121 cl (1A) National Registration Regulations 1990 reg 4, (cc)(xiii), 5(2), 11(4), 14, (1), (2), (4), 28, First Schedule

Appeal from Originating Summons No R2–24–30 of 2000 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Cyrus Das (Benjamin John Dawson and Yapp Hock Swee with him) (Benjamin Dawson) for the appellant. ||Page 198>> Hj Sulaiman Abdullah (Halimatun Sa’diah Abu Ahmad with him) (Zain & Co) for the Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan. Umi Kalthum bte Abdul Majid (Azizah Hj Nawawi, Suzana Atan and Osman Affendi bin Mohd Shalleh with her) (Federal Counsels) for the Government of Malaysia and Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara. Malik Imtiaz Sarwar (Haris Ibrahim with him) on watching brief for the Bar Council Malaysia.

Arifin Zakaria JCA (concurring) [47] I have read the judgments of Gopal Sri Ram JCA and Abdul Aziz bin Mohammad JCA in draft, and I agree with Abdul Aziz bin Mohamad JCA that this appeal be dismissed with no order as to costs.

Gopal Sri Ram JCA (delivering dissenting judgment) [48] This case first came before us as a fully blown constitutional appeal. The gist of the appellant’s complaint was that her constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of religion had been infringed by the Government. However, on closer scrutiny, there appeared to be a much narrower issue of administrative law of immediate importance that was at stake. It is whether the National Registration Department (‘the NRD’) had acted in accordance with law when it rejected the appellant’s request to remove the word ‘Islam’ from her National Registration Identity Card (‘NRIC’). We therefore had to address this directly relevant issue and not the wider irrelevant one. We had also to give certain directions for that purpose. I will explain what we did. But first, it is necessary to set out in brief the factual matrix against which this appeal rests. [49] The appellant was born a Muslim. On 11 May 1998, she was baptised a Christian. Her

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 63 given name was Azalina bte Jailani. She wanted to change it at first to Lina Lelani and later to Lina Joy. That, of course, required the change of her name as it appeared in her NRIC. She therefore applied to the NRD to have that done. What actually transpired between her and the NRD in terms of chronology is set out in her affidavit dated 7 February 2005 and I find it unnecessary to go any further than to quote from the following portions that I have extracted from it:

7.1.1(a) — On 21 February 1997, I applied to the NRD for a change of name in my identity card from ‘Azlina bte Jailani’ to ‘Lina Lelani’ on the ground that I no longer profess Islam and have since embraced Christianity (‘the First Application’). The First Application was not approved by the Third Respondent. 7.1.2 — In an application dated 15 March 1999, I again applied to the NRD for a change of name in my identity card from ‘Azlina bte Jailani’ to ‘Lina Joy’ (the Second Application’). In support of the Second Application, I swore a statutory declaration on 15 March 1999 wherein I reiterated that I renounced the religion of Islam and have accepted the Christian faith. 7.1.3 — There was no response from the NRD is respect of the Second Application. On or around July 1999, I attended at the NRD at its branch in Petaling Jaya to inquire about the delay in the matter. 7.1.4 — The attending officer of the NRD, whose name I cannot recollect, advised me that since my application only relates to a change of name, I was requested by him, to avoid difficulty, not to mention in my statutory declaration the reason for the change of name being conversion of religion. He also requested me to resubmit the application form dated 15 March 1999 with a fresh statutory declaration. The ||Page 215>> aforesaid officer of the NRD informed me that if I did so, there would not be any difficulty in processing my application for a change of name in my identity card. 7.1.5 — Pursuant the aforesaid advice of the said officer, I accordingly swore a further statutory declaration on 2 August 1999 without any mention whatsoever of the reason of conversion of religion (the ‘new statutory declaration’). 7.1.6 — I did so because under the Regulations as it was in force at that time, there was no requirement to mention a person’s religion in the identity card including that of Muslims. 7.1.7 — I did not know that by this time, the Regulations will undergo a change and that there will be a requirement for an entry of religion in the identity card for persons of the Muslim faith. 7.1.8 — I am advised by my solicitors whose advice I believe to be true, that prior to 1.10.1999, there was no provision in the Regulations requiring the word ‘Islam’ to be stated on the identity card. 7.1.9 — On 2 August 1999, 1 resubmitted to the NRD, the application form dated 15 March 1999 together with the new statutory declaration. 8.1 — By a letter dated 22 October 1999 I was informed by the NRD that my application for change of name has been approved. By the said letter I was required to apply for a identity card with the approved new name. 8.2 — As requested by the NRD, I had on 25 October 1999, completed a form of application for an identity card to be issued to me. In the said form I stated that inter alia the name to be stated in my identity card is ‘Lina Joy’ and particular of religion ‘Kristian’. 8.3 — I am advised by my solicitors whose advice I verify believe to be true that an amendment was made to the Regulations by the insertion of regulation 4(c) (iva). [This is an error, later corrected to regulation 5(2)]. This amendment was brought into effect by PU(A) 70/2000 which came into force on 1.10.1999. 8.4 — Regulation 4(c)(iva) provides that in the case of a Muslim, the particular ‘Muslim’ is to be

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 64 stated in the identity card. 8.5 — It would appear that the Second Application dated 15 March 1999 and submitted on 2 August 1999 was only processed by the Third Respondent on 25 October 1999. 8.6 — On or around November 1999, I was issued with a new identity card (‘the new identity card’) a copy of which is found at p 207 of the Appeal Record. It will be seen that contrary to my stipulation in my application form dated 25 October 1999 that my religion is ‘Kristian’, the NRD had nevertheless inserted the word ‘Islam’ at the front of my identity card and my former name at the back of the identity card. … ||Page 216>> 10.0 — Shortly after receipt of the new identity card, I applied to the NRD to have the word ‘Islam’ deleted from it. The application form dated 3 January 2000 (the ‘Third Application’) and the supporting statutory declaration dated 3 January 2000 are found at pp 203 and 188 of the Appeal Record respectively. 10.1 — I attended the NRD at its Petaling Jay a branch on 3 January 2000 with my solicitor Kevin Chung Li Kien. I reiterate that the staff of the NRD, a female clerk, refused to accept my aforesaid application form which was submitted by me over the counter and gave the reason that the application is incomplete in that I was required to obtain an order from the Syariah Court. 10.2 — There was no reason for me not to have submitted to the NRD the aforesaid application form and the Statutory Declaration both dated 3 January 2000 which were already completed and prepared. Furthermore, I strongly desired to have the word ‘Islam’ deleted from my identity card to avoid being considered and treated as a Muslim when I am no longer one.

[50] As appears from her affidavit, the appellant was obviously dissatisfied with the position she found herself in. She took out an originating summons in which she claimed several interlocking declarations all based on the premise that her fundamental right to religious freedom enshrined in art 11(1) of the Federal Constitution had been infringed. The learned judge who heard the matter dismissed the summons for reasons that have since become academic. [51] After hearing the initial argument of learned counsel for the appellant it became patently clear that justice will best be achieved if this matter was treated as a complaint in the administrative law environment. With the consent of the parties, my learned brothers and I therefore formulated the following question which we considered to be the only issue which we have to decide in this appeal: Whether the NRD was right in law in rejecting the appellant’s application under reg 14 of the National Registration Regulations 1990 (‘the 1990 Regulations’) to have the statement of her religion as ‘Islam’ deleted from her NRIC and in requiring a certificate and/or order from the Syariah Court. With the parties consent we then gave the following directions for the further conduct of this appeal: (i) that the Director General of the National Registration Department (‘the Director General’) be added as a respondent to these proceedings; (ii) that the originating summons be amended accordingly; (iii) that service of the amended cause papers be dispensed with; (iv) that the parties be at liberty to exchange affidavits only upon the issue as framed. Our directions were complied with and this appeal came on for further hearing on 7 March 2005. At the conclusion of arguments we reserved judgment. I now produce the reasons for the decision I have reached in this case.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 65 [52] In the course of argument our attention was drawn to following provisions of the 1990 Regulations which are of immediate relevance to this case. First, reg 4. This regulation requires a person who applies for a replacement identity card under reg 13 (irrelevant for present purposes) or reg 14 to take certain steps and to give certain particulars to the registration officer. Paragraph (cc) of reg 4 ||Page 217>> sets out the particulars that are required to be given. And sub-para (xiii) of para (cc) goes on to say this:

any other documentary evidence as the registration officer may consider necessary to support the accuracy of any particulars submitted. (Emphasis added.)

[53] Next there is reg 14. This was amended in 2001. Before its amendment, that is to say, at all times material to the present case, the relevant parts of sub- regs (1) and (2) of that Regulation read as follows:

(1) A person registered under these Regulations who: (a) changes his name; (b) …; and (c) …. shall forthwith report the fact to the nearest registration office and apply for a replacement identity card with the correct particulars. (2) Any person registered under these Regulations who applies for a change of name under sub-reg (1) shall: furnish the registration officer with a statutory declaration to the effect that he has absolutely renounced and abandoned the use of his former name and in lieu thereof has assumed a new name and the reason for such change of name shall also be stated in the statutory declaration. (Emphasis added).

[54] It is common ground between the appellant and the Director General that the issue whether the latter acted in accordance with law turns upon the proper construction to be placed on the foregoing two Regulations. I agree that this is the correct approach to be adopted based on the facts of this case. So, this is yet another case which, to borrow the phraseology of Professor Taggart of the University of Auckland, has to be ‘thrown into the thicket or the bramble bush of statutory interpretation’. Whatever the expression used to describe the process, it is ultimately for the courts to grasp the nettle and to try and produce a just result according to law by interpreting the words used by the legislature or the subsidiary lawmaker. [55] I readily accept that there are no fixed rules for the interpretation of written law although the interpretive jurisdiction is that what is most exercised by the courts. That is why learned academics such as Professor Taggart find this area of the law to be a thicket. But I must say in defence that there are guidelines for statutory construction. And some of these guidelines have, over a period of time, acquired the force of principle. Some of them are quite easily identified. For example, it is a principle of statutory interpretation that Parliament is presumed not to legislate or empower the making of subordinate legislation that is not harmonious with the Constitution. This is also known as the presumption of constitutionality. See Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v State of Gujarat AIR 1995 SC 142. Another is the principle

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 66 that Parliament is presumed not to intend an unfair or an unjust result. See Marathei v JG Containers (JV) Sdn Bhd [2003] 2 MLJ 337 and the cases cited therein. ||Page 218>> [56] Now, I am entirely conscious that the written law that we have to interpret here is not an Act of Parliament but a piece of subsidiary legislation. But that does not mean that I am entitled to regard it as an inferior form of legislation. According to one of the leading texts on the subject, ‘ Statutory Interpretation in Australia’. (5th Ed) by Pearce & Geddes, para 1.2, broadly the same approach is to be adopted to the interpretation of both Acts of Parliament and to delegated legislation. In my judgment that is an entirely accurate view. It is with these matters in mind that I now turn to deal with the arguments of counsel, in particular as to the meaning to be given to regs 4 and 14 when they are read together. [57] The case for the Director General was admirably summed up by the learned senior federal counsel. She accepts that the 1990 Regulations in their unamended form do not require the appellant’s religion to be printed on the NRIC. However, she adds, relying on para (cc) (xiii) of reg 4, that the Director General is entitled to call for additional information from a person applying for a change of name under reg 14. Therefore, there was nothing illegal in the Director General requesting the appellant to produce a certificate and/or order from the Syariah Court. On the other side, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that reg 4 (cc) (xiii) only permits the Director General to request for information in respect of the particulars furnished by the appellant. So, in the present instance the Director General would have been entitled to ask the appellant to produce her baptismal certificate to show that she was in fact a Christian as stated in her application form. Accordingly, the request for the order from the Syariah Court was not a request authorised by reg 4 (cc) (xiii). [58] There is no necessity for much intellectual exercise to decide which of these two opposing arguments is correct. All I have to do is to look at the wording of reg 4(cc) (xiii) and see what it says. And it says that a request can be made ‘for any other documentary evidence as the registration officer may consider necessary to support the accuracy of any particulars submitted’. There can be no quarrel, I think, that the words ‘particulars submitted’ refer to the particulars contained in the application already submitted by the appellant to the NRD. In her statutory declaration dated 21 February 1997 stated, among other matters: (i) that she had never professed or practised Islam as her religion since birth; (ii) that she had embraced Christianity in 1990; and (iii) that she intended to marry a Christian. Her later statutory declaration dated 15 March 1999 affirmed in support of her application dated 3 January 2000 adds little to what she had previously declared. The form she attempted to submit on 3 January 2000 makes it clear in column 31 that she no longer wished to be a Muslim. In these circumstances, an order from the Syariah Court does nothing to support the accuracy of the particular that the appellant is a Christian. However the baptismal certificate dated 11 May 1998 produced by the appellant in evidence amply supports the accuracy of the particular that the appellant is a Christian. This conclusion is amply supported by examining the way in which reg 14(2) is constructed. That sub-reg requires an applicant to state in his or ||Page 219>> her statutory declaration the reason for the change of name. In the appellant’s case, she stated that her reason for the change of name was that she was now a Christian. Accordingly, there is nothing in reg 4 (cc) (xiii) that supports the action of the Director

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 67 General in this case. [59] It follows from what I have said thus far that an order or certificate from the Syariah Court is not a relevant document for the processing of the appellant’s application. It is not a document prescribed by the 1990 Regulations. Nor is it a particular that a registration officer is entitled to call for as a particular under reg 4 (cc) (xiii). I note that in the unreported case of Ismail bin Suppiah v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara (R–1–24–31 of 1995) Ahmad Fairuz J (now Chief Justice) after hearing argument of counsel granted an order the effect of which in substance was: (i) to declare that it was not necessary for the plaintiff in that case to obtain the consent of the Religious Department of Johor to convert out of Islam; and (ii) to strike down as ultra vires reg 14 of the 1990 Regulations, the Director General’s action in requiring the plaintiff to obtain the consent of the Religious Department of Johor for the purpose of processing his application to effect a change of his name. Of particular importance is the fact that that case was decided before the 1990 Regulations were amended in 1999. [60] Accordingly, it is my considered judgment, that by requiring the production of the said order/certificate, the Director General took into account an irrelevant consideration when deciding not to effect the amendment to the appellant’s NRIC. That, of course, vitiates the decision not to delete the word ‘Islam’ from the appellant’s NRIC. As far as authority for this conclusion is concerned you have to go no further than Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 where Lord Greene said:

It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word ‘unreasonable’ in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting ‘unreasonably’.

[61] In a case decided several years before Wednesbury the High Court of Australia in the joint judgment of Rich, Starke, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in R v The War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; ex p Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 expressed the same principle in slightly different words:

It may be shown that the members of the tribunal have not applied themselves to the question which the law prescribes, or that in purporting to decide it they have in truth been actuated by extraneous considerations, or that in some other respect they have so proceeded that the determination is nugatory and void. ||Page 220>>

[62] In Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, Lord Reid re-stated the law in language that has been oft quoted by courts throughout the Commonwealth:

(T)here are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the inquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the inquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 68 power to make. It may have failed in the course of the inquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. But if it decides a question remitted to it for decision without committing any of these errors it is as much entitled to decide that question wrongly as it is to decide it rightly.

[63] Mark you that some 19 years before Anisminic, Kania CJ propounded the same principle in the Bharat Bank Ltd Delhi v The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd Delhi AIR 1950 SC 188:

Where the discretion is committed to any body or a tribunal exercising quasi- judicial functions which are not fettered by ordinary rule of law, the tribunal should in the absence of any provision to the contrary be deemed to have the final authority in the exercise of that discretion. We cannot sit in appeal over their decision and substitute our own discretion for theirs. Questions, however, may and do arise where such quasi-judicial body, attempts to usurp jurisdiction which it does not. It may assume jurisdiction under a mistaken view of law or refuse to exercise jurisdiction properly by adoption of extraneous or irrelevant considerations: or there may be cases where in its proceedings the tribunal violates the principles of natural justice. In all such cases the most proper and adequate remedy would be by writ of certiorari or prohibition and the court having authority may direct that the decision of the body or tribunal might be brought up to be quashed for lack of jurisdiction or for mistakes apparent on the face of it. (Emphasis added.)

[64] The principle that is to be distilled from these cases is that where a public decision-maker takes extraneous matters into account his or her decision is null and void and of no effect. So here, the Director General’s decision in refusing to effect the amendment to the appellant’s NRIC without an order/certificate of the Syariah Court is null and void and of no effect. [65] There is a further point to be made in the appellant’s favour. It is to be found in para 7.18 of the appellant’s affidavit. The point was conceded on behalf of the Director General. Before 1 October 1999 there was no provision in the 1990 Regulations that mandated the statement of a person’s religion in his or her NRIC. So, if the Director General (acting of course through his subordinate, the registration officer) had approved the appellant’s application as he was bound by law to do the present problem would never have arisen. ||Page 221>> [66] To sum up, this is a simple and straightforward case calling for the application of well settled principles of administrative law. It is a case where a public decision-maker misconstrued the relevant law and took into account extraneous considerations. The appellant is entitled to have an NRIC in which the word ‘Islam’ does not appear. I would accordingly grant her a declaration in those terms and direct the Director General to forthwith comply with the terms of the said declaration. [67] A word about costs. This is a case which, if it had been presented in simple terms would have caused no difficulty to anyone. Least of all to the appellant. Unfortunately, she pursued a rather convoluted course as a result of which sight was lost of the core issue. In the circumstances of this case, although the appellant has succeeded, I would make no order for

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 69 costs here and in the court below in respect of all parties before us. [68] So far as the Majlis Agama Islam, Wilayah Perseketuan (the Islamic Religious Council of the Federal Territory) is concerned, in my view it was wrongly joined as a party and should be struck out as should the Government of Malaysia. Neither of these were necessary parties to the originating proceeding in the court below.

Appeal dismissed.

Reported by Loo Lai Mee

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[2005] 6 MLJ 289 KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR & ORS v SAGONG BIN TASI & ORS

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO B–02–419 OF 2002 GOPAL SRI RAM, ARIFIN ZAKARIA AND NIK HASHIM JJCA 19 SEPTEMBER 2005

Constitutional Law — Right to property — Aborginal peoples’ right over land — Acquisition of aborginal lands without adequate compensation — Whether pre-Merdeka legislation must be interpreted in a modified way to fit in with Federal Constitution — Federal Constitution art 13(2) — Aborgines Peoples Act 1954 ss 6, 7, 9 & 12

Constitutional Law — Right to property — Acquisition and compensation — Aborginal peoples’ right over land — Whether acquisiton of aborginal lands must be adequately compensated according to Land Acquistion Act 1960 — Federal Constitution art 8(5)(c)

Native Law and Custom — Land dispute — Customary rights over land — Acquisition by government — Whether customary rights over land existed and proved — Whether must be compensated under Aborgines Peoples Act 1954 or Land Acquisition Act 1960 — Aborgines Peoples Act 1954 ss 6, 7 & 9

Native Law and Custom — Land dispute — Customary rights over land — Acquisition by government — Land ungazetted as aboriginal land — Whether must be compensated

Native Law and Custom — Land dispute — Customary rights over land — Award of damages — Acquisition by government — Trespass and highhanded tactics to removed plaintiffs from land — Whether exemplary damages and damages for trespass should be awarded

Statutory Interpretation — Construction of statutes — Purposive approach — Nature of human rights statute — Protection of aborginal rights — Whether defeat purpose of statute to deny claim of customary rights against radical title of state — Liberal construction in favour of aborgines adopted — Aborgines Peoples Act 1954 ss 6, 7, 9 & 12

Statutory Interpretation — Construction of statutes — Purposive approach — Pre-Merdeka legislation — Whether must be interpreted in a modified way to fit in with Federal

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 71 Constitution — Federal Constitution art 13(2) — Aborgines Peoples Act 1954 ss 6, 7, 9 & 12

Tort — Breach of statutory duty — Duty to gazette land as aborginal land — Protection and welfare of aborgines — Whether breach of duty as fiduciaries for failure to gazette land

Tort — Trespass to land — Damages — Trespass over aborginal lands — Whether could claim compensation for trespass over ungazetted aborginal land — Highhanded tactics to removed plaintiffs from land — Whether exemplary damages and damages for trespass should be awarded

The plaintiffs were aboriginal peoples of the Temuan tribe, who by their custom and tradition, were settled peoples, in Bukit Tampoi (‘the land’). The first defendant was the State Government of Selangor. The second defendant was ||Page 290>> a public limited company in the business of road construction. The third defendant was the Malaysian Highway Authority. Part of the land settled upon by the plaintiffs was gazetted as Aboriginal land under the Aborigines Peoples Act 1954 (‘the 1954 Act’). A large strip across all this land was excised for the purpose of an expressway which the second defendant was to construct. The first defendant acquired the land and the defendants evicted the plaintiffs from the land. The High Court granted the plaintiffs compensation under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (‘the 1960 Act’) for loss of part of land which the judge found to have been held under customary title. The defendants appealed. Five issues were argued: (1) whether the plaintiffs as a matter of law hold the land in question under a customary communal title; (2) if they do, then whether upon deprivation of the land in question, they must be compensated under the 1954 Act or under the 1960 Act; (3) whether the plaintiffs were entitled to receive compensation for deprivation of the ungazetted land; (4) whether the plaintiffs or those whom they represent were entitled to recover damages for trespass from the defendants; (5) whether an award of exemplary damages should be made. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs had no rights in the land itself. All that the plaintiffs had at best was a right to occupation. The plaintiffs argued that although the first defendant may have the radical title to the Bukit Tampoi land, the plaintiffs had a customary community title at common law. The defendants argued that: (1) ss 6, 7 and 9 of the 1954 Act when read together did not permit the plaintiffs a customary title to the land in question as these sections enabled the Government to alienate land within an aboriginal area to aborigines and once this is done, the aborigine who is the alienee of the land cannot deal with it by transfer or charge etc, without the consent of the Director of Aboriginal Affairs; and (2) compensation ought to have been awarded in accordance with ss 11 and 12 of the 1954 Act, and not according to the 1960 Act. The trial judge also did not make an award of compensation in respect of the second and contiguous area of land on which some of the plaintiffs had settled which was not gazetted. The main argument advanced by the defendants in opposition to this claim

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 72 were: (1) the land in respect of which the claim for compensation was being made was not gazetted as an aboriginal reserve; (2) there was no duty on the part of the first or fourth defendants to gazette the land in question. As such no liability could attach to the first and the fourth defendants to pay compensation for depriving those aborigines settled on the ungazetted land. The learned judge refused to award damages against the first and fourth defendants on the ground that the concerned officers who committed the wrongdoing were not named as defendants. The trial judge also refused to award exemplary damages because the first and the fourth defendants were not liable for trespass and unlawful eviction. ||Page 291>>

Held, dismissing the defendants’ appeal: (1) The fact that the radical title to land is vested in the Sovereign or the State is not an ipse dixit answer to a claim of customary title. The precise nature of such a customary title depends on the practices and usages of each individual community. It is a question of fact to be decided by the primary trier of fact which an appellate court will only disagree with the trial judge in the rarest of cases (see para 12). (2) The purpose of the 1954 Act was to protect and uplift the First Peoples of this country. It is therefore fundamentally a human rights statute. It acquires a quasi constitutional status giving it pre-eminence over ordinary legislation. It must therefore receive a broad and liberal interpretation (see para 20). (3) The 1954 Act calls for a construction liberally in favour of the aborigines as enhancing their rights rather than curtailing them (see para 25). What s 6 does is to prohibit the alienation or dealing by the State of land in aboriginal area to a non-aborigine. It merely reflects the permanent nature of the title vested in the plaintiffs. And all that s 8 does is to enable the Government to create merely occupational rights not being higher than a tenancy at will (see para 31). If, in the absence of a specific alienation to him, an aborigine is to receive no interest in the land that he and generations of his forefathers have lived and worked upon, then the 1954 Act was a wasted piece of legislative action, since the purpose of the 1954 Act was to provide socio-economic upliftment of the aborigines. The defendants cannot now argue, in view of the Federal Court’s affirmation in toto of the judgment of this Court in Adong bin Kuwau & Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418, that the 1954 Act excludes the plaintiffs’ title at common law. There is also nothing in the National Land Code 1965 which strikes at the recognition of lands held under customary title (see para 32). (4) The fact that the plaintiffs enjoy a community title by custom is nothing out of the ordinary. The Privy Council in Amodu Tiiani v The Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399 recognised the existence of such title in other jurisdiction (see para 33). The evidence led in the court below and the findings

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 73 of fact made by the learned judge which were unchallenged left no room for doubt that the plaintiffs had ownership of the lands in question under a customary community title of a permanent nature (see para 34). (5) So far as s 11 of the 1954 Act is concerned, it deals only with any claims the plaintiffs may have to fruit or rubber trees on their land. It has nothing to do with the deprivation of their customary community title to the land. As regards s 12, it is a pre-Merdeka provision. It must therefore be interpreted in a modified way so that it fits in with the ||Page 292>> Federal Constitution (see para 37). The way in which s 12 is to be brought into conformity with the Constitution is to make it yield to Article 13(2) (see para 39). That is achieved by not reading the words ‘the State Authority may grant compensation therefor’ as conferring a discretion on the State Authority whether to grant compensation or not. For otherwise it would render s 12 of the 1954 Act violative of Article 13(2) and void because it will be a law that provides for the compulsory acquisition of property without adequate compensation. (see para 40). Therefore, the relevant the words ‘(State Authority) may (grant compensation)’ in s 12 should be read as ‘ shall’ and by introducing ‘adequate’ before compensation, the modification is complete (see para 41). (6) Adequate compensation should be done on the basis of the 1960 Act because the 1960 Act by definition applies to the plaintiffs’ case (see para 44). The learned judge by adopting a liberal interpretation was merely giving full effect to Article 8(5)(c) of the Federal Constitution which sanctions positive discrimination in favour of the aborigines (see 47). (7) The first and fourth defendants were fiduciaries in public law (see para 51). The learned judge was correct in holding against the first defendant in respect of the ungazetted portion of the land (see para 58). It was open to the judge to have made a finding that the failure or neglect of the first defendant to gazette the area in question also amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty. The welfare of the plaintiffs, on the particular facts of this case, was therefore not only not protected, but ignored and/or acted against by the first defendant and/or the fourth defendant in their failure to gazette the land. In that state of affairs, by leaving the plaintiffs exposed to serious losses in terms of their rights in the land, the first and/or fourth defendant committed a breach of fiduciary duty. While being in breach, it hardly now lies in their mouths to say that no compensation was payable because of non-gazettation which was their fault in the first place. For these reasons, the plaintiffs were plainly entitled to a declaration that they had customary title to the ungazetted area (see para 59). (8) Nowhere in their pleaded case have the plaintiffs claimed damages for trespass against the first and fourth defendants. That was the end of their complaint against the judge’s refusal to make a finding in their favour on this point (see para 61). So far as the second and third defendants were concerned, their complaint that they ought not to have been found guilty of trespass by the

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 74 judge was utterly devoid of any merit. The land they entered upon was not theirs. They had no title to it. If they were seeking to rely on any permission granted them by the first and/or fourth defendants, then that was equally worthless because these defendants were not the absolute owners of the land. They were only nominal owners of the radical title. The true beneficial owners were the plaintiffs and they had given no consent (see para 62). ||Page 293>> (9) Very highhanded tactics were employed against the plaintiffs in this case (see para 67). This was a case of deliberate trespass the sole purpose of which was to gain the plaintiffs’ land without paying them the full compensation due to them in accordance with the 1960 Act. This was a case where the third defendant with the positive assistance of the first and fourth defendants had gone onto and committed a deliberate act of trespass. The second defendant was a joint and several tortfeasor in the act of trespass. Accordingly, this was a proper case to award exemplary damages against both the second and third defendants (see para 68).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif-plaintif merupakan orang asli puak Temuan, yang mana melalui budaya dan tradisi mereka, adalah orang yang menetap, di Bukit Tampoi (‘tanah tersebut’). Defendan pertama adalah Kerajaan Negeri Selangor. Defendan kedua adalah sebuah syarikat awam berhad yang menjalankan perniagaan pembinaan jalan raya. Defendan ketiga adalah Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia. Sebahagian tanah yang diduduki oleh plaintif telah diwartakan sebagai tanah Orang Asli di bawah Akta Orang Asli 1954 (‘Akta 1954 itu’). Sejalur tanah tersebut telah diambil bagi tujuan untuk pembinaan jalan raya yang akan dibina oleh defendan kedua. Defendan pertama telah mengambil tanah tersebut dan defendan-defendan telah mengusir plaintif-plaintif dari tanah tersebut. Mahkamah Tinggi telah memberi pampasan kepada plaintif di bawah Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 (‘Akta 1960 tersebut’) atas kehilangan sebahagian daripada tanah tersebut yang mana hakim telah mendapati adalah tanah adat. Defendan merayu. Lima isu telah dihujahkan: (1) sama ada plaintif dari segi undang-undang memegang tanah tersebut di bawah hakmilik adat komunal; (2) sekiranya ya, sama ada dengan ketiadaan tanah tersebut, mereka perlu diberi pampasan di bawah Akta 1954 atau Akta 1960; (3) sama ada plaintif-plaintif berhak untuk menerima pampasan bagi pengambilan tanah yang tidak diwartakan; (4) sama ada plaintif-plaintif atau mereka yang plaintif wakili berhak untuk mendapatkan gantirugi bagi pencerobohan defendan-defendan; (5) sama ada award bagi ganti rugi teladan perlu diberikan. Menurut defendan-defendan, plaintif tidak mempunyai hak ke atas tanah tersebut. Apa yang dimiliki plaintif, hanyalah hak untuk menduduki. Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa walaupun defendan pertama mempunyai hakmilik radikal ke atas tanah di Bukit Tampoi itu, plaintif- plaintif memiliki hakmilik komuniti adat dalam common law.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 75 Defendan-defendan menghujahkan bahawa: (1) ss 6, 7 dan 9 Akta 1954 apabila dibaca bersama tidak memberikan kepada plaintif hakmilik adat ke atas tanah tersebut kerana seksyen-seksyen ini membolehkan Kerajaan untuk beri milik tanah orang asli kepada orang asli dan apabila perkara ini dilakukan, orang asli yang diberikan tanah tersebut tidak boleh membuat urusan ke atas tanah tersebut dengan cara pindahmilik atau cagaran dan lain-lain, tanpa kebenaran ||Page 294>> Pengarah Hal Ehwal Orang Asli; dan (2) pampasan perlu diberikan menurut ss 11 dan 12 Akta 1954, dan bukannya Akta 1960. Hakim bicara tidak membuat sebarang award bagi pampasan berkenaan dengan tanah kedua dan tanah yang bersambung dengannya yang mana sebahagian daripada plaintif telah duduki kerana tanah ini tidak diwartakan. Hujah utama yang dibentangkan oleh pihak defendan bagi menyangkal tuntutan ini adalah: (1) Tanah yang mana tuntutan bagi pampasan telah dibuat tidak diwartakan sebagai tanah rezab asli; (2) tiada tanggungjawab ke atas defendan pertama atau keempat untuk mewartakan tanah tersebut. Oleh itu, tiada liabiliti yang patut dikenakan ke atas defendan pertama dan keempat untuk membayar pampasan kerana telah mengusir orang asli tersebut yang menduduki tanah yang tidak diwartakan. Yang arif hakim enggan memberi award gantirugi kepada defendan pertama dan keempat atas alasan kerana pegawai yang berkenaan yang telah membuat kesalahan tidak dinamakan sebagai defendan. Hakim bicara juga menolak untuk memberi award bagi gantirugi teladan kerana defendan pertama dan keempat adalah tidak bertanggungjawab ke atas pencerobohan dan pengusiran yang tidak sah.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan defendan-defendan: (1) Fakta bahawa halmilik radikal ke atas tanah tersebut terletak pada Pemerintah atau pihak negeri bukan jawapan ipse dixit bagi tuntutan hakmilik adat. Sifat sebenar hakmilik adat adalah bergantung kepada amalan dan penggunaan setiap kominiti. Ia adalah soalan fakta yang perlu diputuskan oleh pembicara utama fakta yang mana mahkamah rayuan jarang akan tidak bersetuju denga hakim bicara (lihat perenggan 12). (2) Tujuan Akta 1954 adalah untuk melindungi dan menaiktarafkan Puak Pertama negara ini. Oleh itu, ia adalah secara asasnya merupakan statut hak asasi manusia. Ia mendapat status kuasi-perlembagaan, yang memberikannya taraf yang lebih tinggi daripada perundangan biasa. Oleh itu, ia perlu menerima interpretasi yang meluas dan liberal (lihat perenggan 20). (3) Akta 1954 memerlukan penafsiran liberal yang berpihak kepada orang asli bagi memperbaiki hak mereka dan bukannya membatasinya (lihat perenggan 25). Seksyen 6 melarang beri milik atau urusan oleh pihak berkuasa Negeri bagi tanah di kawasan orang asli kepada bukan orang asli. Ianya menggambarkan sifat kekal hakmilik yang diberikan kepada plaintif-plaintif. Dan s 8 membolehkan pihak Kerajaan mencipta hanya hak untuk menduduki yang tidak lebih daripada ‘tenancy at will’ (lihat perenggan 31). Sekiranya, tanpa beri milik

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 76 yang spesifik, seseorang asli itu tidak menerima sebarang kepentingan ke atas tanah yang dia dan generasi-generasi nenek-moyangnya telah duduki dan kerjakan, maka Akta 1954 adalah satu undang-undang yang telah dibazirkan, memandangkan ||Page 295>> tujuan Akta 1954 adalah untuk memberi peningkatan kepada sosio- ekonomi orang asli. Defendan-defendan tidak boleh menghujahkan, bertentangan pengesahan keputusan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan in toto ke atas keputusan mahkamah ini dalam Adong bin Kuwau & Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418, dengan menyatakan bahawa Akta 1954 menafikan hakmilik plaintif dalam common law. Juga, tiada apa-apa yang terkandung dalam Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 yang menentang pengiktirafan bagi tanah yang dipegang di bawah hakmilik adat (lihat perenggan 32). (4) Fakta bahawa plaintif memiliki hamilik komuniti bukanlah sesuatu yang luar biasa. Majlis Privi Council dalam Amodu Tiiani v The Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399 mengiktiraf kewujudan hakmilik sebegitu dalam bidangkuasa lain (lihat perenggan 33). Keterangan dalam mahkamah di bawah dan keputusan berkaitan fakta yang dibuat oleh yang arif hakim yang tidak dicabar tanpa ragu-ragu menunjukkan bahawa plaintif mempunyai milikan ke atas tanah tersebut di bawah hakmilik adat komuniti yang bersifat kekal (lihat perenggan 34). (5) Berkaitan dengan s 11 Akta 1954, ia hanyalah berkenaan dengan tuntutan daripada plaintif ke atas pokok buah-buahan dan pokok getah di atas tanah mereka. Ia tiada kaitan dengan kehilangan hakmilik adat komuniti mereka ke atas tanah tersebut. Berkenaan dengan s 12, ia merupakan peruntukan sebelum merdeka. Oleh itu ia perlu ditafsirkan dengan cara yang diubah agar bersesuaian dengan Perlembagaan Persekutuan (lihat perenggan 37). Cara s 12 diselarikan dengan Pelembagaan adalah dengan memberikan tempat kepada Art 13(2) (lihat perenggan 39). Ianya boleh dicapai dengan cara tidak membaca ‘the State Authority may grant compensation therefore’ sebagai memberi kuasa budi bicara kepada kerajaan Negeri sama ada untuk memberi pampasan atau tidak. Kalau tidak, ia akan membuatkan s 12 Akta 1954 melanggar Art 13(2) dan tidak sah kerana ia akan menjadi satu undang-undang yang memperuntukkan pemerolehan wajib tanah tanpa pampasan secukupnya (lihat perenggan 40). Oleh itu, perkataan yang berkaitan ‘(State Authority) may (grant compensation)’ dalam s 12 perlu dibaca sebagai ‘ shall’ dan dengan meletak ‘adequate’ (secukupnya) sebelum pampasan, perubahan itu adalah lengkap (lihat perenggan 41). (6) Pampasan secukupnya perlu dilakukan berdasarkan Akta 1960 kerana Akta 1960 tersebut melalui takrifannya terpakai ke atas kes plaintif (lihat perenggan 44). Hakim yang arif dengan menggunakan tafsiran yang liberal hanya memberikan kesan sepenuhnya kepada Art 8(5)(c) Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang memberi kuasa bagi diskriminasi positif yang berpihak kepada orang asli (lihat perenggan 47).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 77 (7) Defendan pertama dan keempat adalah fidusiari dalam undang-undang awam (lihat perenggan 51). Hakim yang arif adalah betul dalam membuat ||Page 296>> keputusan yang tidak menyebelahi defendan berkenaan dengan sebahagian tanah yang tidak diwartakan (lihat perenggan 58). Ianya adalah terpulang kepada hakim untuk membuat keputusan bahawa kegagalan atau pengabaian oleh defendan pertama untuk mewartakan kawasan tersebut juga sama seperti kemungkiran tanggungjawab fidusiari. Kebajikan plaintif, melalui fakta-fakta terperinci kes ini, bukan hanya tidak dilindungi, malah diabaikan dan/atau dilawan oleh defendan pertama dan/atau defendan keempat dalam kegagalan mereka untuk mewartakan tanah tersebut. Dalam hal sebegitu, dengan membiarkan plaintif terdedah kepada kerugian yang serius dalam hak-hak mereka ke atas tanah tersebut, defendan pertama dan/atau keempat telah membuat kemungkiran tanggungjawab fidusiari. Akibat kemungkiran itu, bukanlah hak mereka untuk berkata bahawa tiada pampasan patut diberi kerana ketiadaan warta yang dari awal merupakan kesilapan mereka. Atas sebab-sebab ini, plaintif-plaintif adalah berhak untuk mendapatkan deklarasi bahawa mereka mempunyai hakmilik adat ke atas kawasan yang tidak diwartakan tersebut (lihat perenggan 59). (8) Plaintif tidak menuntut gantirugi bagi pencerobohan terhadap defendan pertama dan keempat. Itu menjejaskan aduan mereka terhadap keengganan hakim untuk membuat keputusan yang berpihak kepada mereka berkenaan hal ini (lihat perenggan 61). Berkenaan dengan defendan kedua dan ketiga, aduan mereka yang menyatakan mereka tidak sepatutnya dikatakan bersalah kerana menceroboh oleh hakim adalah sememangnya tidak mempunyai merit. Tanah yang mereka masuki adalah bukan kepunyaan mereka. Mereka tidak mempunyai hakmilik ke atasnya. Jika mereka ingin bergantung kepada sebarang kebenaran yang diberikan kepada mereka oleh defendan pertama dan/atau keempat, maka ianya juga sama tiada nilainya kerana defendan-defendan ini bukanlah pemilik mutlak tanah tersebut. Mereka hanyalah pemilik nominal bagi hakmilik radikal itu. Pemilik benificial sebenar adalah plaintif-plaintif dan mereka tidak memberikan sebarang kebenaran (lihat perenggan 62). (9) Taktik menindas telah digunakan terhadap plaintif-plaintif dalam kes ini (lihat perenggan 67). Ini merupakan kes pencerobohan yang disengajakan yang bertujuan semata-mata untuk mendapatkan tanah plaintif tanpa perlu membayar kepada mereka jumlah penuh pampasan yang sepatutnya menurut Akta 1960. Ini adalah kes di mana defendan ketiga dengan secara positif menolong defendan pertama dan keempat telah melakukan perbuatan menceroboh dengan sengaja. Defendan kedua adalah pelaku tort yang bersesama dan berasingan. Sehubungan dengan itu, ini adalah kes yang bersesuaian untuk memberi award gantirugi teladan terhadap kedua-dua defendan kedua dan ketiga (lihat perenggan 68).]

Notes

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 78 For a case on acquisition and compensation, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) para 2044. ||Page 297>> For cases on aborginal peoples’ right over land, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 2044–2069. For cases on breach of statutory duty generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 22–25. For cases on customary rights over land, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 632–639. For cases on damages for trespass to land, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1469–1472. For cases on purposive approach, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed,2002 Reissue) paras 1820–1831.

Cases referred to Adong bin Kuwau & Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418 (refd) Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community (2003) 12 BCLR 130 (refd) Amodu Tijani v The Secretary Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399 (refd) Assa Singh v Menteri Besar Johor [1969] 2 MLJ 30 (refd) Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1971] 2 OB 354 (refd) Canadian National Railway Co v Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) [1987] 1 SCR 1114 (refd) Dickason v University of Alberta [1992] 2 SCR 1103 (refd) Haji Abdul Rahman v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 174 (refd) Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v Heerspink [1982] 2 SCR 145 (refd) Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169 (refd) Lai Seng & Co v Government of Malaysia & Ors [1973] 2 MLJ 36 (refd) Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Wilavah Persekutuan v Sri Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 135 (refd) Premachandra v Major Montague Jayawickrema [1994] 2 Sri LR 90 (refd) R v Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and the Regions, ex p Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349 (refd) Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (refd) Sagong bin Tasi & Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors [2002] 2 MLJ 591 (refd) State of Bihar & Ors v Bihar Distillery Ltd AIR 1997 SC 1511 (refd)

Legislation referred to Aborigines Peoples Act 1954 ss 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 79 Federal Constitution arts 5, 8(5)(c), 13(2), 162(6) Government Proceedings Act 1956 ss 5, 6(1), (4), 18 Land Acquisition Act 1960 National Land Code 1965

Appeal from Suit No MT1–21–314 of 1996 (High Court, Shah Alam)

Datin Paduka Hajah Badariah bte Hassan (Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor) for the appellant. Tan Sri Zaki Tun Azmi (Harjinder Kaur with him) (Sharizat Rashid & Lee) for the second appellant. ||Page 298>> Ramesh Sanghvi (Kassim, Tadin, Wai & Co) for the third appellant. Dato Abdul Rahim bin Uda (Pretam Singh a/l Darshan Singh, Mohd Taufik bin Mohd Yusoff, Norinna Bahadun and Syahrina Shahrir with him) (Federal Counsels) for the fourth appellant. Cyrus Das (Jerald Gomez, Abdul Rashid Ismail and Sarmila Sekaran with him) (Jerald Gomez & Associates) for the respondents.

[2005] 6 MLJ 745 PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v MOHD NOOR BIN JAAFAR

HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — CRIMINAL REVIEW NO MT1–43–2 OF 2004 LOW HOP BING J 5 AUGUST 2005

Constitutional Law — Courts — Jurisdiction — Whether offence under s 5(1) of the Islamic Religious Schools (Malacca) Enactment 2002 belong to category of offences against precepts of Islam — Whether subject matter excluded from jurisdiction of Syariah courts — Control of Islamic Religious Schools (Malacca) Enactment 2002 s 5(1) — Federal Constitution art 121(1) & (1A)

Constitutional Law — Legislature — State Enactment — Validity of state enactment — Control of Islamic Religious Schools (Malacca) Enactment 2002 ss 33 & 34

Constitutional Law — Public Prosecutor — Extent of power — Extent of power over authorisation of Syariah Officer of Islamic Religious Department Malacca to prosecute in a

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 80 magistrate’s court — Criminal Procedure Code ss 376(iii) & 377(b)

The accused was charged in the state of Malacca for maintaining a religious school which was not registered pursuant to s 5(1) of the Control of Islamic Religious Schools (Malacca) Enactment 2002 (‘the Enactment’). In the course of proceedings in the magistrate’s court Malacca, the learned magistrate had stayed the proceedings under s 30 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and referred some questions which arose as to the effect of some provisions of the Federal Constitution (‘Constitution’). The parties agreed that these questions were: (1) whether the letter of authorisation or consent issued by a deputy public prosecutor (‘DPP’) pursuant to ss 376(iii) and 377(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (‘CPC’) authorising a Syariah officer (Syarie Prosecutor) of the Islamic Religious Department Malacca to prosecute in a magistrate’s court, was constitutional; and (2) whether ss 33 and 34 of the Enactment which confered jurisdiction upon a first class magistrate to try an offence under the Enactment were constitutional.

Held: (1) The factual background showed that the letter of authorisation or consent was given by the learned DPP to a Syariah officer (Syarie Prosecutor) to conduct prosecution in the magistrate’s court and sessions court in Malacca. The officer was from the Islamic Religious Department which was a Government department as envisaged in s 377(b)(3) of the CPC, and the conduct of prosecution in relation to the charge was also subject to the control and direction of the Public Prosecutor (‘PP’) (see para 17). Pursuant to an amendment vide Enactment No 8 of 2003, the word ‘Director’ in s 34(1) and (2) of the Enactment had been substituted with the words ‘Public Prosecutor’ so that the PP’s power to give consent or authorisation to prosecute is vested in the PP in consonance with ||Page 746>> art 145(3) of the Constitution, and the expression ‘PP’ would include a DPP (see para 18). (2) The general words ‘rights and powers’ appearing in s 376(iii) of the CPC had been construed in Abdul Hamid v PP [1956] MLJ 231 that consent need not be given personally by the PP but a DPP was permitted to do so. The letter of authorisation or consent to authorise the officer from the Islamic Religious Department to conduct the prosecution in the magistrate’s court was valid and constitutional (see para 19). (3) Section 33 expressly provided that a magistrate should have jurisdiction to try any offence under the Enactment. The vesting of this jurisdiction in the magistrate’s court was consistent with federal law provided under s 85 of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 (see para 33). As the jurisdiction to try the offence as alleged in the charge herein had been expressly conferred upon a magistrate, it meant that it was not a matter in which a Syariah court enjoys exclusive jurisdiction, and so there could be no contravention of art 121(1A) of

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 81 the Constitution under which a civil court ceased to have jurisdiction if and only if a particular matter comes within the jurisdiction of the Syariah court (see para 34). (4) The nature of the offence under s 5(1) of the Enactment did not belong to the category of offences against the precepts of the religion of Islam and so it was clearly not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah courts (see para 38); The Islamic Council of Penang & Butterworth v Shaik Zolkaffily [2003] 4 AMR 501 followed. (5) Since the subject matter concerned the registration of an Islamic religious school and not the precepts of the religion of Islam, there could be no doubt that the Malacca State Legislature had clearly intended to exclude the subject matter from the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts and instead conferred the jurisdiction on a magistrate. In other words, it was not a matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. Sections 33 and 34 of the Enactment, when tested against art 121(1) and (1A) of the Constitution were valid and constitutional (see para 41).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Tertuduh telah didakwa dalam negeri Melaka kerana mengadakan sekolah agama yang tidak didaftarkan mengikut s 5(1) Enakmen Pengawalan Sekolah- sekolah Agama (Melaka) 2002 (‘Enakmen tersebut’). Semasa prosiding di mahkamah majistret Melaka, majistret telah menggantung prosiding di bawah s 30 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 dan telah merujuk beberapa soalan yang telah berbangkit berkenaan beberapa peruntukan dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan’). Pihak-pihak telah bersetuju bahawa soalan- soalannya adalah: (1) sama ada surat pemberikuasaan atau kebenaran yang dikeluarkan oleh timbalan pendakwaraya (‘DPP’) yang memberikuasa kepada ||Page 747>> pegawai Syariah (Pendakwa Syariah) dari Jabatan Agama Islam Melaka untuk mendakwa dalam mahkamah majistret, adalah mengikut perlembagaan; (2) sama ada ss 33 dan 34 Enakmen tersebut yang memberi bidangkuasa kepada majistret kelas pertama untuk membicarakan kesalahan tersebut adalah mengikut perlembagaan.

Diputuskan: (1) Fakta latarbelakang menunjukkan bahawa surat pemberikuasaan atau kebenaran tersebut telah diberikan kepada DPP yang arif jepada pegawai Syariah (Pendakwa Syarie) untuk melakukan pendakwaan dalam mahkamah majistret dan mahkamah sesyen di Melaka. Pegawai tersebut adalah daripada Jabatan Agama Islam iaitu jabatan Kerajaan seperti yang dinyatakan dalam s 337(b)(3) Kanun Acara Jenayah, dan kelakuan pendakwaan yang berkenaan dengan dakwaan tersebut juga tertakluk kepada kawalan dan arahan Pendakwaraya (‘PP’) (lihat perenggan 17). Menurut satu pindaan, Enakmen

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 82 No 8 tahun 2003, perkataan ‘Director’ dalam s 34(1) dan (2) Enakmen tersebut telah digantikan dengan perkataan ‘Public Prosecutor’ supaya kuasa PP untuk memberi kebenaran atau berikuasa untuk mendakwa terletak kepada PP bersesuaian dengan art 145(3) Perlembagaan, dan ungkapan ‘PP’ adalah termasuk DPP (lihat perenggan 18). (2) Perkataan-perkataan umum ‘rights and powers’ yang tertera dalam s 376(iii) KAJ telah ditafsirkan dalam Abdul Hamid v PP [1956] MLJ 231 sebagai kebenaran tidak perlu diberikan secara peribadi oleh PP tetapi DPP juga dibenarkan untuk berbuat demikian. Surat pemberikuasaan atau kebenaran yang memberikuasa kepada pegawai daripada Jabatan Agama Islam untuk melakukan pendakwaan dalam mahkamah majistret adalah sah dan menurut perlembagaan (lihat perenggan 19). (3) Seksyen 33 secara nyata memperuntukkan majistret bidangkuasa untuk mengadii sebarang kesalahan di bawah Enakmen tersebut. Letakhak bidangkuasa ini kepada mahkamah majistret adalah selaras dengan undang-undang persekutuan yang diperuntukkan di bawah s 85 Akta Mahkamah Rendah 1948 (lihat perenggan 33). Memandangkan bidangkuasa untuk mengadili kesalahan seperti yang dinyatakan dalam dakwaan di sini telah secara nyata diberikan kepada majistret, ini bermakna perkara ini bukanlah satu perkara yang mana mahkamah Syariah mempunyai bidangkuasa ekslusif, oleh itu tidak terdapat sebrang perlanggaran art 121(1A) Perlembagaan yang menyatakan bahawa mahkamah sivil tidak mempunyai bidangkuasa sekiranya dan hanya sekiranya sesuatu perkara itu termasuk dalam bidangkuasa mahkamah Syariah (lihat perenggan 34). (4) Sifat kesalahan di bawah s 5(1) Enakmen tersebut tidak tergolong dalam kategori kesalahan-kesalahan terhadap ajaran agama Islam dan oleh itu ||Page 748>> secara jelasnya ia bukanlah dalam bidangkuasa ekslusif mahkamah Syariah (lihat perenggan 38); The Islamic Council of Penang & Butterworth v Shaik Zolkaffily [2003] 4 AMR 501 diikut. (5) Memandangkan perkara subjek adalah berkenaan dengan sebuah sekolah agama Islam dan bukanlah ajaran agama Islam, tiada keraguan bahawa badan perundangan negeri Melaka telah secara jelas berniat untuk tidak memasukkan perkara subjek tersebut dalam bidangkuasa mahkamah Syariah, tetapi sebaliknya memberikan bidangkuasa kepada majistret. Dalam kata lain, ia bukanlah satu perkara yang berada dalam bidangkuasa mahkamah Syariah. Seksyen 33 dan 34 Enakmen tersebut, apabila diuji dengan art 121(1) dan (1A) Perlembagaan adalah sah dan mengikut perlembagaan (lihat perenggan 41).

Notes For a case on Public Prosecutor generally, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) para 1989. For cases on jurisdiction of courts, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 83 paras 1684–1692. For cases on legislature generally, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1933–1969.

Cases referred to Abdul Hamid v PP [1956] 22 MLJ 231 (folld) Ang Theam Choom v PP [2002] 4 MLJ 401 (refd) Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Dato’ Hari Menon @ Dato’ T Puraharan a/l CP Ramakrishnan (Suing as Legal Representative of DYMM Tuanku Ja’afar Ibni Almarhum Tuanku Abdul Rahman, Yang Di Pertuan Besar Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus) v Texas Encore LLC & Ors [2005] 4 MLJ 506 (refd) Dato’ Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato’ Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 (refd) Faridah Begum bte Abdullah v Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Al Mustain Billah Ibni Almarhum Sultan Abu Bakar Ri’ayatuddin Al Mu’adzam Shah [1996] 1 MLJ 617 (refd) Islamic Council of Penang & Butterworth, The v Shaik Zolkaffily [2003] 4 AMR 501 (folld) Mamat bin Daud & Ors v Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 119 (refd) Md Hakim Lee v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur [1998] I MLJ 681 (refd) Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1979] 3 All ER 21 (refd) Mohamed Habibullah bin Mahmood v Faridah bte Dato Talib [1992] 2 MLJ 793 (refd) Pai San & Ors v Pendakwa Raya [2002] 4 MLJ 538 (refd) Soon Singh a/l Bihar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489 (refd) Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 266 (refd) ||Page 749>>

Legislation referred to Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Malacca) Enactment 2002 s 66(2) Control of Islamic Religious Schools (Malacca) Enactment 2002 ss 33, 34, (1), (2) Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ss 30, (1), (2), 84(3) Criminal Procedure Code ss 68(ii), 376(i), (iii), (iv), 377(b), (3) Federal Constitution arts 74(1), 121, (1), (1A), 145(3)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 84 Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s 3 Penal Code ss 298A, 392, 457 Subordinate Courts Act 1948 s 85 Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 s 2 Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997

Abdul Rashid Hj Daud (state legal advisor). Mohamad Hanipa (Hj Muhamad Hj Burok, Abdullah Abd Karim, Khairuddin Othman and Firdaus Zakaria with him) (Muhamad & Co) for the accused.

[2005] 6 MLJ 768 SU YU MIN v KETUA POLIS NEGERI & ORS

HIGH COURT (KUCHING) — JUDICIAL REVIEW NO JR–44 OF 2004–I CLEMENT SKINNER J 3 JUNE 2005

Constitutional Law — Executive — Delegation of duties by Minister —Whether Deputy Minister had power to issue warrant of arrest and detention or order of restrict residence — Whether subjective function can be delegated — Whether subjective satisfaction subject to judicial review

Constitutional Law — Preventive detention — Restricted residence order — Delay — Calculation of period of delay — Whether delay unreasonable or inordinate — Whether there were breaches of order

The applicant filed an application for judicial review to quash an order of restricted residence dated 21 May 2004 (‘the said order’) issued against him by the Deputy Minister of Internal Security, Malaysia, pursuant to s 2(ii) of the Restrict Residence Act 1933 (‘the RRA’). The applicant also sought a declaration that a warrant of arrest and detention dated 20 March 2004 (‘the said warrant of arrest’) issued against him by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia, pursuant to s 2(i) of the RRA, was unlawful, ineffective, null and void. The applicant also sought a similar declaration in respect of the said order of 21 May 2004.

Held, dismissing the application with costs: (1) In assisting the Minister to discharge his duties and functions the Deputy

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 85 Minister clearly had all the powers which the Minister had under the RRA including inter alia, the full power to sign any warrant of arrest and detention or order of restrict residence under the RRA (see para 16). (2) By art 43A(2) of the Federal Constitution, the Deputy Minister was already authorised to assist the Minister in the discharge of his duties and functions and for that purpose ‘shall have all the powers of the Minister’ which, in the context of the RRA, would include the power to issue an order of restricted residence under s 2(ii) of the RRA. When the Deputy Minister did so, it was he and not the Minister who was exercising power under the section, thus it must necessarily follow that it was the Deputy Minister who must comply with the condition precedent to the exercise of that power, ie he must subjectively satisfy himself about the matters mentioned in the section (see para 26). (3) In cases of preventive detention the court would not question why or how the Minister arrived at his decision nor was the subjective satisfaction of the Minister subject to judicial review (see para 31). (4) The grounds of restricted residence in this case were within the scope, ambit and purview of the RRA. The grounds stated by the Deputy Minister were reasonable, in that, the applicant operating illegal gambling activities could not be conducive to peace and public order in Kuching City (see para 40). ||Page 769>> (5) The first 14 days after the date of the applicant’s arrest should not be taken into account when calculating the period of delay because the Deputy Minister must necessarily wait for 14 days to see if the applicant wished to exercise his right to appeal or make representation against his arrest and detention to the Minister. Accordingly the period of delay in the instant case was 22 days. The court of the view that the delay of 22 days to issue the said order of 21 May 2004 was reasonable under the circumstances disclosed and could not be considered as inordinate (see para 55). (6) Pursuant to s 3(ii) of the RRA, the applicant was required to be taken to his place of restriction ‘as soon as may be after action has been taken under sub-s (i). In the circumstances of the case, the lapse of 13 hours to get the procedures and documentation in order before putting the applicant on a flight to Kelantan could not be regarded as a breach of the said order of 21 May 2004 and neither did the placing of the applicant in a police cell and being handcuffed for security reasons as a breach of that order (see para 58).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon memfailkan satu permohonan untuk kajian semula untuk bagi membatalkan satu perintah penahanan terhad bertarikh 21 Mei 2004 (‘perintah tersebut’) yang dikeluarkan terhadapnya oleh Timbalan Menteri Keselamatan Dalam Negeri, Malaysia, di bawah s 2(ii) Akta Kediaman Terhad 1933 (‘RRA’). Pemohon juga memohon untuk

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 86 satu deklarasi bahawa waran tangkapan dan penahanan bertarikh 20 Mac 2004 (‘waran tangkapan tersebut’) yang dikeluarkan terhadapnya oleh Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia, di bawah s 2(i) RRA, tidak sah di sisi undang-undang, tidak berkesan dan terbatal. Pemohon juga memohon deklarasi yang serupa berhubung dengan perintah bertarikh 21 Mei 2004 itu.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan dengan kos: (1) Dalam membantu Menteri melaksanakan tugas-tugas dan tanggungjawabnya, Timbalan Menteri jelas mempunyai semua kuasa yang dimiliki oleh Menteri di bawah RRA termasuk inter alia, kuasa penuh untuk menandatangani sebarang waran tangkapan dan penahanan atau perintah penahanan terhad di bawah RRA (lihat perenggan 16). (2) Di bawah per 43A(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, Timbalan Menteri telah diberi kuasa untuk membantu Menteri dalam melaksanakan tugas dan tanggungjawabnya dan untuk tujuan tersebut ‘mempunyai semua kuasa- kuasa Menteri’ yang mana dalam konteks RRA, termasuklah kuasa mengeluarkan perintah penahanan terhad di bawah s 2(ii) RRA. Apabila Timbalan Menteri berbuat demikian, ianya beliau dan bukannya Menteri yang menggunapakai kuasa di bawah seksyen tersebut, maka dari itu ianya Timbalan Menteri yang mesti mematuhi prasyarat dalam menggunapakai kuasa tersebut iaitu beliau hendaklah secara subjektif memuaskan dirinya ||Page 770>> berhubung dengan perkara yang dinyatakan di dalam seksyen tersebut (lihat perenggan 26). (3) Dalam kes-kes penahanan preventif mahkamah tidak akan menyoal kenapa atau bagaimana Menteri mencapai keputusannya ataupun membuat kajian semula ke atas kepuasan subjektif Menteri (lihat perenggan 31). (4) Alasan-alasan penahanan terhad di dalam kes ini adalah di dalam skop dan lingkungan RRA. Alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan oleh Timbalan Menteri adalah munasabah iaitu kegiatan perjudian haram pemohon adalah tidak kondusif untuk keamanan dan ketenteraman awam di Bandar Kuching (lihat perenggan 40). (5) Empat belas hari pertama selepas penahanan pemohon tidak boleh diambil kira dalam mengira tempoh kelewatan kerana Timbalan Menteri mesti menunggu selama 14 hari untuk melihat sama ada pemohon berniat untuk merayu atau membuat representasi terhadap tangkapan dan penahanannya kepada Menteri. Dari itu tempoh kelewatan dalam kes semasa adalah 22 hari. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa kelewatan 22 hari untuk mengeluarkan perintah bertarikh 21 Mei 2004 adalah munasabah di dalam keadaan-keadaan kes ini dan ianya tidak boleh dikatakan terlampau (lihat perenggan 55). (6) Menurut s 3(ii) RRA, pemohon dikehendaki dibawa ke tempat penahanannya ‘secepat mungkin’ selepas tindakan diambil di bawah sub-s (i). Dalam keadaan-keadaan kes ini, jurang masa 13 jam untuk memenuhi prosedur-

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 87 prosedur dan memproses dokumentasi sebelum dapat menerbangkan pemohon ke Kelantan tidak boleh dianggap sebagai pengingkaran perintah bertarikh 21 Mei 2004 tersebut dan begitu juga, meletakkan pemohon di dalam sel polis dan menggari pemohon atas sebab keselamatan bukanlah satu pengingkaran perintah tersebut (see para 58).]

Notes For a case on delegation of duties by Minister, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) para 1734. For a case on restricted residence order, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) para 1986.

Cases referred to Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors v Chua Teck [1990] 1 CLJ Rep 179 (refd) Ng Chai Yang v Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia [1994] 2 MLJ 336 (refd) Phua Heng Lai & Ors v Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 238 (refd) The Minister of Home Affairs Malaysia & Anor v Karpal Singh [1988] 3 MLJ 29 (refd) Thor Kheng Chai v Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia [1994] MLJU 457 (refd) Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors v Cheaw Siong Chin [1988] 1 MLJ 432 (refd) ||Page 771>> Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia v Liau Nyun Fui [1991] 1 MLJ 350 (refd) Zakaria bin Hussain v Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [1994] MLJU 39 (refd)

Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25(2) Federal Constitution arts 5(4), 8(1), 9(2), 43A(2), 149, 11th Schedule s 3 Internal Security Act 1960 Interpretation Act 1948 s 54(2) Ministerial Functions Act 1969 s 2 Prison Regulation 2000 reg 233 Restrict Residence Act 1933 ss 2(ii), 3(ii)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 88 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53

Voon Lee Shan (Voon & Co) for the applicant. Fazillah Begum (State Legal Advisor) (Ministry of Internal Security) for the respondent.

[2004] 1 MLJ 34 RAJA SEGARAN A/L S KRISHNAN v BAR COUNCIL MALAYSIA & ORS

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–93 OF 1999 (5) KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 10 NOVEMBER 2003

Administrative Law — Remedies — Declaration —Whether applicant had locus standi to make application — Whether application was an attempt to avoid a penal sanction — Whether applicants suffered special injury

Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — Court — Civil courts — Criminal jurisdiction of civil courts — Whether civil courts could declare proposed action seditious

Civil Procedure — Locus standi — Association of persons proposing a course of action — Individual arguing that course of action seditious — Whether individual could seek injunction to prevent association from acting in breach of the law — Whether individual must have suffered special injury

Constitutional Law — Judiciary — Judicial Misconduct — Allegations of judicial misconduct — Discussion of judicial misconduct — Whether such discussion unconstitutional — Federal Constitution art 127

Legal Profession — Law Society/Malaysian Bar — Powers of the Bar — Allegations of judicial misconduct — EGM to discuss allegations of misconduct — Whether an attempt to by pass constitutional safeguard — Whether amounts to contempt of court and sedition — Whether ultra vires powers of the Bar — Legal Profession Act 1976 s 42(1)(d)

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Maker of statement — Whether statement contemptuous — Whether position and standing of maker of statement relevant in deciding whether statement contemptuous

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 89

The Malaysian Bar had resolved to hold an EGM to discuss allegations of impropriety against the then Chief Justice. The plaintiff, a member of the Bar, was concerned that the notice of the EGM, the resolution and the proposed meeting were ultra vires the powers and objects of the Malaysian Bar under the Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘the LPA’) on the grounds that they may be contemptuous, seditious and unconstitutional. The plaintiff argued that since he could be liable for any actions taken by the defendants. The plaintiff thus sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from holding the proposed EGM. Pending the disposal of the action, the court granted the plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction (see [2000] 1 MLJ 1). Since then the former Chief Justice, the subject of the Bar’s motion, retired and then Chief Justice, also since retired, had exhorted for better Bench/Bar relationship. Thus in reserving judgment in this case, the court urged the parties to settle their differences. Taking the advice of the court, the plaintiff sought leave to discontinue this action. The plaintiff’s application for leave to discontinue was allowed and the suit struck off and each party required to meet its own costs. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants’ appeal against this decision and directed that the court deliver its judgment on the substantive trial. The defendants argued, inter alia, that the mere fact that the plaintiff was a member of the Bar did not automatically confer any private law rights on him. In any event, the defendants argued that a civil court could not make a finding of contempt or sedition.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s application and granting the declarations sought: (1) In deciding whether a statement was contemptuous, the court may consider the position and standing of the person making the statement. The Malaysian Bar must accept the fact that it is a voice that is heard by the public. It acts as a regulator. It must also act as a moderator; Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 followed. If the impression is created in the minds of the public that the judges in the highest court in the land had acted on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, confidence in the administration of justice was bound to be undermined and no greater mischief than that could be imagined (see paras 33–34); Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 followed. (2) The Bar Council had asserted they were not concerned with the truth of the allegations as they did not have the power to investigate them. Such callous indifference to the truth of the allegations, coming from an august body, was totally unacceptable. It was a clear abrogation of its duty to the general public as its watchdog. This flagrant disregard to verify the truth of the allegations before calling for an EGM fell far short of the aspirations of a noble Bar (see paras 46–47). (3) Unlike countries like the UK, Australia, the USA and India, the Bar Council in Malaysia has been given statutory recognition. The LPA sets out the Bar as a corporate statutory body duly recognized by the Government. It is imperative

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 90 that the Bar recognizes this fact and, because of its unique position, acts with concern when making statements. Since the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar are creatures of statute, their conduct must be confined within the provisions of the LPA. While the Bar sought to rely on s 42(1)(a), (e) or (g) of the LPA, s 42(1)(d) strictly confines the Bar to expressing its views on matters affecting the administration of law only if requested so to do (emphasis added). Since the Bar has not been requested to give its views on the state of the judiciary, the resolution and the motion were clearly in breach of that section ( see paras 27–28, 51–54). (4) The constitutional scheme envisages removal of a judge on proved misbehaviour or incapacity and the conduct of a judge is prohibited from discussion in Parliament or the State Legislative Assemblies. The call for the resolution on admitted hearsay evidence was far from the requirement of ‘proved misbehaviour’. It is absolutely essential that people who hold high office be fair and just in their criticisms and not open themselves, and the organizations they represent, to criticisms. It is clear that the Bar has no power to discuss the conduct of the Judiciary and that any attempt to do so was contrary to art 127 of the Constitution. It must be seen to be manifest that no external pressure is exerted against the Judiciary, whether from the executive or from any other sources, including the Bar Council (see paras 57, 59, 63). (5) Where the plaintiff showed he has the locus to make the application, and where he further showed that the conduct of the defendants was such as to put the plaintiff, in peril of such prosecution as the defendants could face if the defendant was allowed to act, the plaintiff need not wait to see the outcome of the defendant’s actions before acting. To protect his own interest a plaintiff can take out an injunction to restrain the defendant from acting and, if the court is satisfied that the act complained of could give rise to the plaintiff facing criminal prosecution, the plaintiff ought to be allowed to use injunctive measures to stop the defendant. Therefore, the argument that if the plaintiff did not attend the meeting, he could not be sued or punished and that he could have chosen not to attend, is unacceptable (see paras 71, 82); Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors & Other Appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 distinguished, Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 followed. (6) In resolving the motion as spelt out, the public needed no legal advice, assistance or representations. Besides, the Bar Council have not been able to show which section of the public in particular they intend to protect. Their act of moving the resolution and having the meeting for that purpose were both ultra vires the LPA (see paras 81–82); Swain and another v The Law Society [1983] AC 598 and Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 3 All ER 70 referred.

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[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Badan Peguam Malaysia telah memutuskan supaya mengadakan suatu EGM bagi membincangkan dakwaan salahlaku terhadap Ketua Hakim Negara pada masa itu. Plaintif, seorang peguam, bimbang bahawa notis EGM, resolusi serta mesyuarat yang dicadangkan itu adalah ultra vires kuasa dan matlamat Badan Peguam di bawah Akta Profession Undang-Undang 1976 (‘APU’) di atas alasan bahawa ia adalah menghina, hasutan dan melanggar perlembagaan. Plaintif berhujah bahawa, memandangkan beliau mungkin bertanggungjawab dalam sebarang tindakan yang diambil defendant, beliau memohon suatu perintah injunksi menahan defendant daripada mengadakan mesyuarat tersebut. Sebelum diputuskan tindakan itu, mahkamah telah membenarkan permohonan plaintif bagi injunksi sementara (lihat [2000] 1 MLJ 1). Sejak itu bekas Hakim Negara, yang menjadi tajuk usul Badan Peguam itu, telah bersara dan penggantinya, yang juga telah bersara, telah menegur hubungan yang lebit erat antara pihak peguam dan penghakiman. Sebelum mengumumkan penghakiman dalam kes ini, mahkamah telah mendesak pihak-pihak menyelesaikan perbezaan antara mereka. Dalam mengikut nasihat mahkamah, plaintif memohon kebenaran memberhentikan tindakannya. Permohonan plaintif memberhentikan tindakan ini telah dibenarkan dan tindakan ini dibatalkan dengan kos ditanggung oleh pihak-pihak sendiri. Mahkamah Rayuan telah membenarkan rayuan defendan terhadap keputusan ini dan mengarahkan supaya Mahkamah Tinggi memberikan keputusannya ke atas perbicaraan substantif. Defendan-defendan telah berhujah, antara lain, bahawa hanya kerana plaintif merupakan seorang peguam tidak semestinya mengurniakan sebarang hak undang-undang peribadi ke atas plaintif. Malahan mahkamah sivil tidak dapat memutuskan mengenai penghinaan atau hasutan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan dan memberikan deklarasi yang dipohon: (1) Dalam memutuskan sama ada sesuatu pernyataan adalah menghina, mahkamah dapat mengambil kira kedudukan orang yang membuat pernyataan tersebut. Badan Peguam harus menerima fakta bahawa ia adalah suara yang didengar oleh orang awam. Ia bertindak sebagai pengawalselia. Ia seharusnya juga bertindak sebagai kuasa redaan; Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 diikut. Sekiranya tanggapan diberikan kepada orang awam bahawa hakim-hakim mahkamah teragung telah bertindak di atas pertimbangan yang tidak wajar, keyakinan dalam pentadbiran keadilan pasti dilemahkan dan tidak terdapat sebarang kecelakaan yang lebih berat (lihat perenggan-perenggan 33–34); Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 diikut. (2) Majlis Peguam telah menerangkan mereka tidak berminat ke atas kebenaran dakawaan memandangkan mereka tiada kuasa menyiasatnya. Sikap tidak ambil peduli ke atas kebenaran dakwaan seperti ini, yang datang dari badan guaman agung ini, tidak dapat diterima. Ia sememangnya suatu pembantutan kewajipannya sebagai pengawal bagi orang awam. Keengganannya

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 92 menentusahkan kebenaran dakwaan sebelum memanggil mesyuarat tidak memadai memandangkan aspirasi sebuah badan guaman seperti ini (lihat perenggan-perenggan 46–47). (3) Berbeza daripada negara-negara asing seperti UK, Australia, Amerika Syarikat and India, Majlis Peguam di Malaysia telah diberikan pengiktirafan statutori. APU mendirikan badan guaman sebagai suatu badan berkanun korporat yang diiktiraf kerajaan. Adalah wajar Badan Peguam mengenali fakta ini dan, memandangkan kedudukannya yang unik, bertindak wajar apabila membuat pernyataan. Memandangkan Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam adalah diwujudkan statut, maka tingkahlaku mereka harus dihadkan kepada peruntukan APU. Walaupun Badan Peguam ingin bergantung kepada s 42(1)(a), (e) atau (g) APU, s 42(1)(d) menghadkan Badan Peguam supaya menyuarakan pendapatnya ke atas perkara pentadbiran keadilan hanya sekiranya diminta berbuat demikian (penekanan ditambah). Memandangkan yang Badan Peguam tidak pernah diminta memberikan pendapatnya ke atas kedudukan badan kehakiman, maka resolusi dan usul jelas melanggar peruntukan itu (lihat perenggan-perenggan 27–28, 51–54). (4) Rancangan perlembagaan membayangkan penyingkiran seseorang hakim sekiranya salahlakunya yang dibuktikan atau disebabkan kurang upayanya dan tingkahlaku seseorang hakim dilarang dibincangkan di Parlimen atau Dewan Undangan Negeri. Permintaan bagi resolusi tersebut di atas keterangan dengar cakap jauh dari keperluan ‘proved misbehaviour’. Adalah mustahak orang yang memegang jawatan tinggi bertindak secara adil dan saksama dalam kritik mereka dan tidak menjadikan diri mereka, mahupun badan yang mereka wakil, terbuka kepada pengkritikan. Adalah jelas bahawa Badan Peguam tidak mempunyai kuasa bagi membincangkan tingkah laku Badan Kehakiman dan sebarang percubaan berbuat demikian melanggar perkara 127 Perlembagaan. Ia harus menjadi jelas bahawa tiada sebarang penekanan luar diberikan terhadap Badan Kehakiman, sama ada dari pihak exekutif mahupun daripada sumber lain, termasuk dari Majlis Peguam (lihat perenggan-perenggan 57, 59, 63). (5) Sekiranya seseorang plaintif dapat menunjukkan bahawa beliau mempunyai locus membuat sesuatu permohonan, dan jika beliau juga dapat menunjukkan bahawa tindakan yang diambil defendan akan membuka plaintif kepada pendakwaan yang mungkin dikenakan ke atas defendan sekiranya defendan dibenarkan terus bertindak, maka plaintif itu tidak perlu menunggu melihat akibat tindakan defendan sebelum bertindak. Bagi memelihara hak sendirinya seseorang plaintif dapat memohon perintah injunksi menahan defendan dari bertindak dan, sekiranya mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa tindakan yang diadu itu mungkin menyebabkan plaintif didakwa, maka plaintif harus dibenarkan menggunakan perintah injunksi bagi menahan defendan. Oleh yang demikian, hujah bahawa sekiranya plaintif tidak menghadiri mesyuarat itu, beliau tidak dapat didakwa atau hukum dan beliau dapat membuat keputusan tidak menghadiri mesyuarat itu, tidak dapat diterima (lihat perenggan-perenggan 71,

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 93 82); Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors & Other Appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 dibezakan, Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 diikut. (6) Dalam membuat ketetapan usul seperti dinyatakan, pihak awam tidak memerlukan sebarang nasihat, pertolongan atau representasi undang-undang. Lagipun Majlis Peguam gagal menunjukkan bahagian mana antara orang awam yang ingin mereka melindungi. Tindakan mereka mencadangkan resolusi itu dan memanggilkan mesyuarat baginya kedua-duanya ultra vires APU (lihat perenggan-perenggan 81–82); Swain & Anor v The Law Society [1983] AC 598 dirujuk, Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] LR 435 dirujuk.]

Notes For cases on the remedy of declaration, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 321–382. For cases on jurisdiction of courts, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 3670–3672. For cases on locus standi, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reisue) paras 3924–3981. For cases on the Judiciary, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1660. For cases on the powers of the Law Society/Malaysian Bar, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) para 1585. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.

Cases referred to Airport Restaurants, Ltd v Southend-On-Sea Corporation [1960] 2 All ER 888 (refd) Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 (folld) Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ 167 (refd) Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 (refd) Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman; Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman & Ors [1987] 2 MLJ 633 (refd) C Ravichandran Iyer v Justice AM Bhattacharjee & Ors [1995] 5 SCC 457 (refd) Crown, The v A Rafique & Others 1950 37 AIR 1 (refd) Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 (folld) Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 3 All ER 70 (refd) Keng Soon Finance Bhd v MK Retnam Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 1 MLJ 457 (refd) Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors and other appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 (dist) Land Executive Committee of Federal Territory v Syarikat Harper Gilfillan Bhd

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 94 [1981] 1 MLJ 234 (refd) Majlis Peguam Malaysia & 2 Lagi v Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan Rayuan Sivil No W–02–47–00 dan Rayuan Sivil No W–02–48–00 (refd) Majlis Peguam Malaysia & Ors v Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan [2002] 3 MLJ 155 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2001] 1 MLJ 472 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors (No 3) [2001] 5 MLJ 305 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors (No 4) [2001] 6 MLJ 166 (refd) Swain and another v The Law Society [1983] 1 AC 598 (refd) Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 (folld)

Legislation referred to Commissions of Enquiry Act [UK]1950 s 2(1)(d) Constitution [India] art 32 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 43 Evidence Act 1950 ss 123, 162(2) Federal Constitution arts 125(3), 127 Landlord and Tenant Act [UK] 1954 Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 32(d), 42(1), (a), (d), (e), (g), 46, 76(2) Post Office Act 1953 [UK] ss 38, 68 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33, r 2 Sedition Act 1948 ss 3(1)(a), (c), 4(1)(a) Solicitors Act 1974 [UK] s 37 Solicitors’ Indemnity Rules 1975 [UK] Telegraph Act 1863 [UK] s 45

DP Vijandran (Raja Segaran & Assoc) for the plaintiff. YM Raja Aziz Addruse (Malik Imtiaz Ahmed bin Ghulam Sarwar, Gopal Sreenevasan, D Bhaskaran, Karina Yong, M Mogan and Michele N Kaur with him) (Sivananthan) for the defendants. Ahmad Kamal bin Mohd Shahid holding a watching brief for Attorney General.

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[2004] 2 MLJ 119 LINA JOY v MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM WILAYAH & ANOR

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO R2–24–30 OF 2000 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 18 APRIL 2001

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Right to religious freedom — Converting out of Islam — Extent of religious freedom to profess a religion of choice — Article 11(1) of Federal Constitution — Whether art 11(1) takes precedence over art 3(1) — Whether a Muslim bound by the Syariah laws on issues relating to conversion out of Islam

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Right to religious freedom — Extent of religious freedom to profess a religion of choice — Article 11(1) of Federal Constitution — Whether to be read in isolation — Whether principle of harmonious construction applicable

Islamic Law — Syariah Court — Jurisdiction — Apostasy — Whether Syariah Court seized with jurisdiction to hear on renunciation of Islam — Whether right to affirm or declare faith in another religion subject to Syariah laws

Words and Phrases — ‘Malay’ — Definition of — Article 160(2) of Federal Constitution

The plaintiff was born as a Muslim, she was brought up as a Muslim or her upbringing was conducted on the basis that she was a Muslim, she lived as a Muslim with her family and is commonly reputed to be a Muslim. The plaintiff’s parents are both Malays. She had applied to the National Registration Department (NRD) to change her name from Azlina bte Jailani to Lina Lelani and in support stated, inter alia, that she intends to marry a person who is Christian. The application was however, rejected. By an originating summons, the plaintiff had applied to the High Court for various declaratory orders, namely, her rights to religious freedom under art 11(1) of the Federal Constitution (‘the FC’); that s 2 of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 (‘the 1993 Act’) and other related State Enactments were null and void as they were inconsistent with art 11(1) of the FC; that Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 (‘the 1997 Act’) and other related State Enactments were not applicable to the plaintiff who had (purportedly) professed the religion of Christianity; that any laws, whether State or Federal legislation, which forbid or imposed restrictions on conversion out of Islam, were null and void, being inconsistent with art 11(1) of the FC; and that the defendants enter the plaintiff’s name in the registry book as having converted out of Islam. In her affidavit, the plaintiff

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 96 averred that she has now purportedly converted into Christianity and was baptized in a church. The first and the second defendants applied to strike out the plaintiff’s application under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 on the following grounds, namely: (i) that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action; (ii) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; and (iii) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The application was based on the facts that the plaintiff was still a Muslim and therefore the issue of her conversion out of Islam was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. ||Page 120>>

Held, dismissing the application: (1) Article 11 of the FC speaks of freedom of religion but this did not mean that the plaintiff was to be given the freedom of choice to profess and practice the religion of her choice. The application of the first part of art 11(1) which provides that every person has the right to profess and practice his religion, is subject to the second part of art 11(1), and also to art 11(4) and art 11(5) of the FC because the issue of change of a person’s religion is directly connected to the rights and obligations of that person as a Muslim and this is an affair of Muslim falling under the first defendant’s jurisdiction provided by art 11(3)(a) of the FC read with s 7(1) of the 1993 Act (see paras7, 10). (2) Article 11(1) should not be read in isolation. It must be construed harmoniously with the other relevant provisions on Islam, namely, art 3(1), 12(2), 74(2), 121(1A) and 160 (where a Malay is defined as a person who professes the religion of Islam). The declaration in art 3(1) has the consequence of qualifying a Muslim’s absolute right to murtad in art 11(1) by requiring the compliance to the relevant syariah laws on apostasy enacted pursuant to art 74 List II (see paras 20, 27). (3) The plaintiff cannot hide behind the provision of art 11(1) of the FC without first settling the issue of renunciation of her religion (Islam) with the religious authority which has the right to manage its own religious affairs under art 11(3)(a) of the FC. Since the plaintiff was still a Muslim, art 121(1A) provides that the finality of her decision to convert out of Islam was within the competency of a Syariah Court, and not the civil courts (see paras 10–11). (4) There was no inconsistency between art 11(1) and s 2 of the 1993 Act, which provides the definition of a Muslim. Section 2 of the 1993 Act was enacted pursuant to art 74(2) of the FC. The enabling article 74(2) confers wide jurisdiction to the Federal Government to enact Syariah laws to the same extent as provided in item 1 in the State list (see para 6(e) list 1, Ninth Schedule). Section 2 of the 1993 Act is directly designed for the purpose of implementing Syariah laws on the Muslim and it is not in any way designed to curtail the freedom of religion under art 11(1). From the definition in s 2 of the 1993 Act, the plaintiff is still a Muslim until there is a declaration to the contrary by the Syariah Court (see paras 46–47, 49).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 97 (5) The plaintiff’s prayers for other declaratory orders to nullify certain State laws pertaining to the Syariah criminal laws and Syariah laws which restricts apostasy was struck out for being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court because they relate to hypothetical matters and there is no identification of specific provisions which are said to have infringed the rights of the plaintiff (see paras 50, 55).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif dilahirkan seorang Muslim, beliau dibesarkan sebagai seorang Muslim atau asuhan beliau dikendalikan berasaskan bahawa beliau seorang Muslim, beliau hidup sebagai seorang Muslim bersama keluarga beliau dan seringkali sikenali sebagai seorang Muslim. Ibubapa plaintif berbangsa Melayu. Beliau ||Page 121>> telah memohon kepada Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara (JPN) untuk menukar nama beliau daripada Azlina bte Jailani kepada Lina Lelani dan sebagai sokongan menyatakan, antara lain, bahawa beliau berhasrat untuk berkahwin seorang Kristian. Permohonan tersebut bagaimanapun, telah ditolak. Melalui saman pemula, plaintif telah memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk pelbagai perintah-perintah deklarasi, terutamanya, hak-hak beliau berhubung kebebasan beragam di bawah perkara 11(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘PP’); bahawa s 2 Akta Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam (Wilayah Persekutuan) 1993 (‘Akta 1993’) dan Enakmen-Enakmen Negeri adalah terbatal dan tidak sah kerana adalah tidak konsisiten dengan perkara 11(1) PP; bahawa Akta Kesalahan Jenayah Syariah (Wilayah Persekutuan) 1997 (‘Akta 1997’) dan Enakmen-Enakmen Negeri lain yang berkaitan yang tidak terpakai ke atas plaintif yang telah (dikatakan) menganut agama Kristian; bahawa apa-apa undang-undang, sama ada perundangan Negeri atau Persekutuan, yang menghalang atau mengenakan larangan berhubung pertukaran agama daripada Islam, adalah terbatal dan tidak sah, adalah konsisten dengan perkara 11(1) PP; dan bahawa defendan-defendan telah memasukkan nama plaintif ke dalam buku pendaftaran sebagai seorang yang telah keluar daripada Islam. Dalam afidavit beliau, plaintif telah menegaskan bahawa beliau sekarang dikatakan telah bertukar kepada agama Kristian dan dibaptiskan di sebuah gereja. Defendan-defendan pertama dan kedua telah memohon untuk membatalkan permohonan plaintif di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 berdasarkan alasan-alasan berikut, terutamanya: (i) bahawa ia tiadak mengemukakan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah; (ii) ia adalah berniat jahat, remeh atau menyusahkan; dan (iii) ia adalah sebaliknya satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. Permohonan tersebut berdasarkan fakta bahawa plaintif masih seorang Muslim dan oleh itu pertukaaran agama beliau daripada Islam adalah dalam bidang kuasa eksklusif Mahkamah Syariah.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Perkara 11 PP membicarakan tentang kebebasan beragama tetapi ini tidak

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 98 bermaksud bahawa plaintif patut diberikan kebebasan memilih untuk menganut dan mengamal agama pilihan beliau. Permohonan pada bahagian pertama perkara 11(1) yang memperuntukkan bahawa setiap orang mempunyai hak untuk menganut dan mengamal agama beliau, tertakluk kepada bahagian kedua perkara 11(1), dan juga kepada perkara 11(4) dan perkara 11(5) PP kerana persoalan tentang pertukaran agama seseorang itu adalah secara langsung berkaitan dengan hak-hak dan tanggungjawab seseorang itu sebagai seorang Muslim dan ini adalah satu urusan seorang Muslim yang jatuh di bawah bidang kuasa defendan yang diperuntukkan oleh perkara 11(3)(a) PP dibaca bersama s 7(1) Akta tersebut (lihat perenggan ). (2) Perkara 11(1) tidak sepatutnya dibaca secara berasingan. Ia hendaklah ditafsir bersama dengan peruntukan-peruntukan relevan lain berhubung Islam, terutamanya, perkara-perkara 3(1), 12(2), 74(2), 121(1A) dan 160 (di mana seorang bangsa Melayu ditafsirkan sebagai seorang yang menganut agama Islam). Deklarasi dalam perkara 3(1) mempunyai kesan yang melayakkan hak mutlak seorang Muslim untuk murtad dalam perkara 11(1) dengan menghendaki pematuhan undang-undang ||Page 122>> syariah yang berkaitan dengan kemurtadan yang digubal menurut perkara 74 Senarai II (lihat perenggan ). (3) Plaintif tidak boleh bersembunyi di belakang peruntukan perkara 11(1) PP tanpa terlebih dahulu menyelesaikan persoalan tentang beliau yang keluar daripada agama beliau (Islam) dengan pihak berkuasa agama yang mempunyai hak untuk mengendalikan urusan agama mereka sendiri di bawah perkara 11(3)(a) PP. Memandangkan plaintif masih seorang Muslim, perkara 121(1A) memperuntukkan bahawa kemuktamadan keputusan beliau untuk keluar daripada agama Islam adalah dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah, dan bukan mahkamah sivil (lihat perenggan ). (4) Tidak terdapat ketidakkonsistenan antara perkara 11(1) dan s 2 Akta 1993, yang memperuntukkan definisi seorang Muslim. Seksyen 2 Akta 1993 telah digubak menurut perkara 74(2) PP. Perkara 74(2) memberikan bidang kuasa luas kepada Kerajaan Persekutuan untuk menggubal undang-undang Syariah setakat mana yang sama diperuntukkan dalam butir 1 dalam Senarai Negeri (lihat perenggan 6(e) Senarai 1, Jadual Kesembilan). Seksyen 2 Akta 1993 secara langsung direka bagi tujuan melaksanakan undang-undang Syariah ke atas seseorang Muslim dan ia ia bukan dalam apa cara sekalipun direka untuk mengurangkan kebebasan beragama di bawah perkara 11(1). Berdasarkan definisi dalam s 2 Akta 1993, plaintif masih seorang Muslim sehingga terdapat satu deklarasi sebaliknya oleh Mahkamah Syariah (lihat perenggan ). (5) Permohonan-permohonan plaintif untuk perintah-perintah deklarasi lain untuk membatalkan undang-undang Negeri berkaitan undang-undang jenayah Syariah dan undang-undang Syariah yang menghalang kemurtadan telah dibatalkan kerana remeh, menyusahkan dan satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah kerana ia berkaitan perkara-perkara hipotesis dan tiada pengenalan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 99 peruntukan-peruntukan khusus yang dikatakan telah melanggar hak plaintif (lihat perenggan).

Notes For cases on right to religious freedom, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1907–1909. For cases on jurisdiction of Syariah Courts, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 615–619. For jurisdiction of Syariah Courts, see 14 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [250.022] – [250.026].

Cases referred to Che Omar bin Che Soh v PP [1988] 2 MLJ 55 (refd) Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Dato Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 (refd) Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 (refd) Hjh Halimatusaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v Public Services Commisssion, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 (refd) ||Page 123>> Imperial Tabacoo Ltd & Anor v Attorney General [1980] 1 All ER 866 (refd) Jeyaretnam JB v Attorney General [1990] 3 MLJ 211 (refd) Karpal Singh v Sultan of Selangor [1988] 1 MLJ 64 (refd) Lim Chan Seng v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Pulau Pinang & Anor [1996] 3 CLJ 231 (refd) Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 (refd) London Passengers Transport Board v Moscrop [1942) AC 332 (refd) Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Sembilan lwn Hun Mun Meng [1992] 2 MLJ 676 (refd) Majumder v Attorney General of Sarawak [1967] MLJ 101 (refd) Mamat bin Daud & Ors v Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 199 (refd) Md Hakim Lee v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur [1998] 1 MLJ 681 (refd) Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak dan lain-lain lwn Fatimah bte Sihi dan lain-lain [2000] 5 MLJ 375 (refd) Mohamed Habibullah bin Mahmood v Faridah bte Dato Talib [1992] 2 MLJ 793 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 100 Mohamed Said Nabi, Re, decd [1965] MLJ 21 (refd) Odhams Press Limited v London and Provincial Sporting News Agency (1929) Ltd (1936) Ch 357 (refd) Phang Chin Hock v PP [1980] 1 MLJ 70 (refd) PP v Pung Chen Choon [1994] 1 MLJ 566 (refd) Ramah bte Ta’at v Laton bte Malini Sultan (1927) 6 FMSLR 128 (refd) Soon Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1994] 1 MLJ 690 (refd) Sukma Dermawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara, Malaysia & Anor [1999] 2 MLJ 241 (refd) Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 (refd) Teoh Eng Huat v Kadhi, Pasir Mas & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 300 (refd)

Legislation referred to Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 ss 2, 7(1), 46(2)(b)(x) Court of Judicature Act 1964 s 23 Evidence Act 1950 s 45 Federal Constitution arts 3(1), (4), 11(1), (3)(a), (4), (5), 12(2), 74(2), 77, 121(1A), 160(2), Second List of the Ninth Schedule Government Proceeding Act 1956 s 22 Indian Constitution arts 11(1)–25 Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984 s 5 Penal Code s 298A Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19 Specific Relief Act 1950 s 42, Chapter VI Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997

Benjamin Dawson (Yapp Hock Swee with him) (Nik Hussain & Partners) for the plaintiff. Haji Sulaiman Abdull (Halimahtunsa’adiah with him) (Zain & Co) for the first respondent. Dato’ Azahar bin Mohamed (Azizah bte Hj Nawawi with him) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the second respondent. ||Page 124>>

[2004] 2 MLJ 257

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 101 DANAHARTA URUS SDN BHD v KEKATONG SDN BHD (BAR COUNCIL MALAYSIA, INTERVENER)

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 02–17 OF 2003(W) AHMAD FAIRUZ CHIEF JUSTICE, MOHD NOOR AHMAD, PS GILL, RAHMAH HUSSAIN FCJJ AND AUGUSTINE PAUL JCA 27 JANUARY 2004

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Equality before the law — Whether s 72 of the Danaharta Act which prohibited a court from granting an injunction against Danaharta unconstitutional — Federal Constitution art 8

The respondent (‘Kekatong’) was the registered proprietor of certain lands. These lands were charged by way of a third party charge to a bank, which had availed facilities to a borrower. The borrower had defaulted and judgment was entered against him. The bank commenced foreclosure proceedings and obtained an order for sale, which was subsequently, on appeal, set aside. Upon the implementation of the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Act 1998 (‘the Act’), the bank sold the loan and the securities to the respondent (‘Danaharta’), with whom, pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the land vested. Kekatong applied to the High Court seeking to restrain Danaharta from exercising any rights under the Act or under the vesting order and with particular regard to s 57 of the Act and para 5 of the 15th Schedule to the National Land Code (‘the NLC’). The High Court refused the injunction on the basis that there was no serious question to be tried and in any event it had no jurisdiction to grant an injunction by reason of s 72 of the Act. Kekatong appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held that s 72 is unconstitutional as it contravened art 8 of the Federal Constitution. The appellant appealed and the issue for consideration is whether s 72 is unconstitutional.

Held, allowing the appeal: (1) Parliament’s clear intention in enacting the Act was to ensure that the acquisition of non-performing loans by the appellant would ease the pressure upon banks and other financial institutions with the appellant being entrusted with the task, as the nation’s Asset Management Company, to take over these bad loans (together with securities, where available) with a view to maximize recovery values (see para 56). (2) In order to accomplish these objectives the appellant was given sufficiently wide and broad statutory powers to acquire loans and credit facilities by way of statutory vesting; to manage the affairs of corporate borrowers through special administrators appointed to formulate work-out plans in order to repay debts

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 102 owing to creditors, and finally to dispose of charged assets. Thus insofar as disposition of assets was concerned the appellant was given additional power to sell charged lands by private treaty, without securing the usual court order as banks and other secured lenders are obliged to do so under the NLC (see para 57). ||Page 258>> (3) That clearly is the purpose of s 72 which applies to all persons in the same position as the respondent. Thus it applied equally to all persons who were similarly circumstanced. This was a reference to all persons whose assets and liabilities had been acquired by the appellant pursuant to the Act. Surely it could not include the appellant itself for reasons which were too plain to state (see para 59). (4) The law that the Federal Court referred to thus far made it clear beyond doubt that there would be a violation of art 8(1) only if a legislation does not apply to a person who is similarly circumstanced as the other persons in the classification — and not to someone like the appellant outside it. The conclusion of the Court of Appeal was therefore wholly unsustainable as it was a total deviation from the law regulating art 8(1). It was therefore the Federal Court judges’ unanimous view that there was a rational basis between the classification in s 72 and its object in relation to the Act. Section 72 therefore satisfied the requirements of the reasonable classification test and is not unconstitutional (see para 59).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Responden (‘Kekatong’) adalah tuanpunya tanah berdaftar beberapa bidang tanah tertentu. Tanah-tanah tersebut telah dicagarkan melalui pihak ketiga kepada sebuah bank, yang telah memberi kemudahan-kemudahan kepada peminjam. Peminjam telah ingkar dan penghakiman telah dimasuki terhadap beliau. Bank telah memulakan prosiding haling tebus dan memperoleh satu perintah jualan, yang kemudiannya, telah dirayu, diketepikan. Selepas penggubalan Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Act 1998 (‘Akta tersebut’), bank telah menjual pinjaman dan sekuriti-sekuriti tersebut kepada responden (‘Danaharta’), bersamanya, menurut peruntukan-peruntukan Akta tersebut, tanah tersebut diletakhak. Kekatong memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk menghalang Danaharta daripada menggunakan apa-apa hak di bawah Akta tersebut atau di bawah perintah letakhak dan merujuk khususnya kepada s 57 Akta tersebut dan perenggan para 5 kepada Jadual ke-15 Kanun Tanah Negara (‘KTN’). Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak injunksi atas dasar bahawa tiada persoalan serius yang perlu dibicarakan dan dalam apa keadaan ia tidak mempunyai apa-apa bidang kuasa untuk memberi satu injunksi oleh sebab s 72 Akta tersebut. Kekatong telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan. Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan bahawa s 72 adalah tidak berperlembagaan kerana it bertentangan dengan perkara 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 103 Perayu telah merayu dan persoalan yang perlu dipertimbangkan adalah sama ada s 72 adalah tidak berperlembagaan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Niat nyata Parliamen dalam menggubal Akta tersebut adalah untuk memastikan bahawa perolehan pinjaman-pinjaman yang tidak dilaksanakan oleh perayu akan mengurangkan tekanan ke atas bank-bank dan institusi-institusi kewangan yang lain di mana perayu diberi kepercayaan untuk tugas, sebagai Syarikat Pengurusan Aset negara, untuk mengambil alih pinjaman-pinjaman yang tidak dijelaskan (bersama sekuriti-sekuriti, jika ada) dengan pandangan untuk memaksimakan nilai kembalian (lihat perenggan 56). ||Page 259>> (2) Bagi tujuan mencapai objektif-objektif tersebut, perayu telah diberi kuasa-kuasa statutori yang cukup luas untuk memperoleh kemudahan kredit melalui pemberian statut; untuk menguruskan urusan-urusan peminjam-peminjam korporat melalui pentadbir-pentadbir khas yang dilantik untuk membentuk pelan-pelan penyelesaian bagi tujuan membayar balik hutang yang perlu dijelaskan kepada pemiutang-pemiutang, dan akhirnya untuk menjual asset-aset yang dicagarkan. Oleh itu setakat mana ia berkaitan dengan penjualan aset-aset tersebut, perayu telah diberikan kuasa tambahan untuk menjual tanah-tanah yang dicagarkan oleh treati persendirian, tanpa memperoleh perintah mahkamah yang biasa sepertimana bank-bank dan peminjam-peminjam bercagar lain perlu patuh berbuat sedemikian di bawah KTN (lihat perenggan 57). (3) Itulah dengan jelas tujuan s 72 yang terpakai ke atas semua orang dalam kedudukan yang sama seperti responden. Oleh itu, ia juga terpakai ke atas sesiapa yang dalam keadaan yang sama. Ini adalah rujukan kepada semua orang yang mana aset-aset dan liabiliti-liabiliti telah diperoleh oleh perayu menurut Akta tersebut. Semestinya ia tidak bolehlah termasuk perayu sendiri oleh sebab jelas yang tidak perlu dinyatakan (lihat perenggan 59). (4) Undang-undang di mana mahkamah merujuk kepada adalah jelas tidak diragui bahawa mungkin akan berlaku perlanggaran kepada perkara 8(1) hanya jika suatu perundangan tidak digunakan ke atas seseorang dalam keadaan yang sama seperti mereka yang lain dalam klasifikasi tersebut — dan bukan kepada seseorang seperti perayu yang berada di luar klasifikasi tersebut. Keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan oleh demikian sememangnya tidak boleh dikekalkan kerana ia menyeleweng daripada undang-undang yang mengawal perkara 8(1). Oleh itu adalah pandangan sebulat suara hakim-hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan bahawa terdapat asas yang rasional antara klasifikasi dalam s 72 dan tujuannya berkaitan Akta tersebut. Seksyen 72 oleh itu memenuhi keperluan ujian klasifikasi dan adalah berpelembagaan (lihat perenggan 59).]

Notes

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 104

For cases on equality before the law, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1768–1784. For equality before the law, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia para [20.175]– [20.176].

Cases referred to Abdul Ghani bin Ali @ Ahmad & Ors v PP [2001] 3 MLJ 561 (refd) Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujid Sehravardi & Ors AIR 1981 SC 487 (refd) Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 (refd) Amato v The Queen (1982) 140 DLR (3d) 405 (refd) Ameerunnissa Begum v Mahboob Begum AIR 1953 SC 91 (refd) Asiatic Engineering Co v Achhru Ram AIR 1951 All 746 (refd) ||Page 260>> Bremer Vulken Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corp [1981] 1 All ER 289 (refd) Budhan Choudhry v State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 191 (refd) Charanjit Lal v Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41 (folld) Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 155 (refd) Debranjan Ray v Comptroller and Accountant-General of India AIR 1985 SC 307 (refd) Deepak Sibal v Punjab University AIR 1989 SC 903 (refd) Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 (refd) Dhirendra Kumar Mandal v Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs 1955 AIR 1954 SC 424 (refd) Doconers v Bidwell 82 (US) 244:45 L ed 1088 (refd) Dwarka Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 224 (refd) EP Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu & Anor AIR 1974 SC 555 (refd) Federation of Hotel and Restaurant v Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1637 (refd) Franky Construction Sdn Bhd v MEC Industrial Park Sdn Bhd [2002] 6 MLJ 212 (refd) Golder v United Kingdom A 18 (1975); 1 EHRR 524 (refd) Hinds v The Queen [1976] 1 All ER 353 (refd) Kathi Raning Rawat v The State of Saurashtra AIR 1952 SC 123 (refd) Kedar Nath Bajoria v State of West Bengal AIR 1953 SC 404 (refd) Kekatong Sdn Bhd v Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd [2003] 3 MLJ 1 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 105 John Vallamattom & Anor v Union of India (2003) 3 LRI 169 (refd) Jyoti Pershad & Ors v Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi & Ors AIR 1961 SC 1602 (refd) Lindsley v National Carbonic Gas Co (1911) 220 US 61 (refd) Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 (refd) Malaysian Bar & Anor v Government of Malaysia [1987] 2 MLJ 165 (refd) Maneka Gandhi v Union of India & Anor AIR 1978 SC 597 (refd) Marbury v Madison (1803) 1 Cranch 137 (refd) Mian Bashir Ahmad & Ors v The State AIR 1982 J & K 26 (refd) Moinuddin v State of UP AIR 1960 ALL 484 (refd) Mohamed Ezam bin Mohd Nor v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 1 MLJ 321 (refd) Myers v United States 272 US 52:71 L ed 60, 180 (refd) Old Wayne etc Association v McDonough SI L ed 345 Ong Ah Chuan v PP Koh Chai Cheng v PP [1981] 1 MLJ 64 (refd) Phang Chin Hock v PP [1980] 1 MLJ 70 (refd) Pierson v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] 3 All ER 577 (refd) PP v Khong Teng Khen & Anor [1976] 2 MLJ 166 (refd) PP v Su Liang Yu [1976] 2 MLJ 128 (refd) R v Lord Chancellor, ex p Witham [1997] 2 All ER 779 (refd) RC Cooper v Union of India AIR 1970 SC 564 (refd) RK Garg v Union of India AIR 1981 SC 2138 (folld) Ram Prasad v State of Bihar AIR 1953 SC 215 (refd) Ramprasad Narain Sahi v State of Bihar AIR 1963 SC 215 (refd) S v Ntesang (1995) 4 BCLR 426 (refd) S Kulasingham & Anor v Commissioner of Lands, Federal Territory & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 204 (refd) Sagir Ahmad v Government of UP AIR 1954 All 257 (refd) Saurabh Chaudri & Others v Union of India (2003) 4 LRI 532 (refd) Sheoshanker v State of MP AIR 1951 Nag 58 (refd) Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors v Shri Justice SR Tendolkar & Ors AIR 1958 SC 538 (refd) ||Page 261>> Smt Maneka Ghandi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC (refd) Special Courts Bill, Re AIR 1979 SC 478 (refd) Sri Inai (Pulau Pinang) Sdn Bhd v Yong Yit Swee [2003] 1 MLJ 273 (refd) State of MP v G C Mandawar 1955 SCR 599 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 106 State of Punjab v Ajaib Singh AIR 1953 SC 10 (refd) State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75 (refd) United States v Buffer 297 U SI: 80 L ed 477 (refd) VM Syed Mohammad & Company v State of Andhra AIR 1954 SC 314 (refd) Vide Southern Railway Co v Greene 216 US 400 (refd) Williams v United States 289 US 553:77 L ed 1372 (refd)

Legislation referred to Civil Law Act 1956 s 3(1) Federal Constitution arts 8(1), 160(2) National Land Code 1965 s 372, Form 16D Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 s 72

Appeal from Civil Appeal No W–02–221 of 2002 (Court of Appeal, Kuala Lumpur)

Tommy Thomas (Sitpah Selvaratnam with him) (Tommy Thomas) for the appellant. Dato’ Bastian Vendargon (T Gunaseelan and R Sarankapani with him) (Jayaraman, Ong & Co) for the respondent. Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail, Peguam Negara (Dato’ Azahar bin Mohamed, Dato’ Mary Lim, Encik Mohaji Selamat and Cik Anita Fernandez with him) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the intervener.

[2004] 2 MLJ 529 AZIZAH BTE SHAIK ISMAIL & ANOR v FATIMAH BTE SHAIK ISMAIL & ANOR

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 05–49 OF 2002(P) HAIDAR CJ (MALAYA), ABDUL MALEK AHMAD AND ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD FCJJ 16 SEPTEMBER 2003

Constitutional Law — Courts — Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction of High Court and Syariah Court — Determining jurisdiction of Syariah Court — Whether to adopt subject matter approach or remedy approach — Federal Constitution art 121(1A)

Criminal Procedure — Habeas corpus — Proper procedure — Custody of Muslim child —

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 107 Whether High Court had jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus application — Whether custody matter within exclusive jurisdiction of Syariah Court — Whether right to enforce syariah custody order through habeas corpus application before High Court

Islamic Law — Jurisdiction — Syariah Court — Application in respect of custody of Muslim child — Parties to application Muslims — Whether High Court had jurisdiction to hear application — Whether application should be made to Syariah Court — Federal Constitution art 121(1A)

The appellants were natural parents of Nazirah (‘the child’) who had been taken care of by the first respondent (first appellant’s sister) since birth due to the ill-health of the first appellant. The apellants had earlier obtained an order of custody of the child from the Syariah Subordinate Court. However, the child went back to live with the respondents who refused to returned the child to the appellants. The appellants then applied in the same Syariah Court for an order that the respondents be committed to prison for breaching the custody order. The Syariah Court judge, however, dismissed the application as he found that the respondents had shown reasonable cause why they should not be committed to prison. The appellants did not appeal this decision and the child continued to live with the respondents. Subsequently, the appellants filed a notice of motion in the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus against the respondents for them to hand over the child to the appellants. At the hearing, the respondents raised the preliminary objection that the application, being one for the custody of a Muslim child, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the syariah courts, and thus the civil courts, by reason of art 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. The judicial commissioner upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the application. Hence, the appellants appeal to the Federal Court.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) This appeal raised the question of jurisdiction of the Syariah Court and the High Court. By virtue of art 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, if the Syariah Court had jurisdiction over the matter, the High Court would not have jurisdiction over it. This calls for the determination of the approach that the court should take in determining the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. Therefore, in the instant case, the Federal Court ||Page 530>> had adopted the subject matter approach and not the remedy approach (see paras 5, 8–9); Abdul Shaik bin Md Ibrahim & Anor v Hussein bin Ibrahim & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 618 and Majlis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang dan Seberang Perai v Shaik Zolkaffily bin Shaik Natar & Ors [2003] 3 MLJ 705 followed. (2) Since the subject matter in question was the custody of the child and since that was clearly within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court, by virtue of the provisions of art 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, the High Court had no jurisdiction over the matter (see para 11).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 108 (3) The appellants had a right of appeal against the order of the Syariah Court but instead they went to the High Court to get their remedy which was not available to them. They had gone to the High Court to enforce an order of the Syariah Court by way of a writ of habeas corpus which clearly had no jurisdiction to entertain the application (see para 12).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Perayu-perayu adalah ibubapa kandung Nazirah (‘kanak-kanak tersebut’) yang telah dibela oleh responden pertama (kakak perayu pertama) sejak lahir disebabkan oleh masalah kesihatan perayu pertama. Perayu-perayu telah sebelum ini memperoleh perintah jagaan ke atas kanak-kanak tersebut daripada Mahkamah Rendah Syariah. Namun begitu, kanak-kanak tersebut telah kembali tinggal dengan responden-responden yang enggan memulangkan kanak-kanak tersebut kepada perayu-perayu. Perayu-perayu kemudian memohon di Mahkamah Syariah yang sama satu perintah agar responden-responden dipenjarakan kerana melanggar perintah jagaan tersebut. Hakim Mahkamah Syariah, bagaimanapun, menolak permohonan tersebut kerana beliau mendapati bahawa responden-responden telah menunjukkan sebab munasabah kenapa mereka tidak patut dipenjarakan. Perayu-perayu tidak merayu terhadap keputusan ini dan kanak-kanak tersebut terus menetap dengan responden-responden. Berikutan itu, perayu-perayu telah memfailkan satu notis usul di Mahkamah Tinggi untuk satu writ habeas corpus terhadap responden-responden agar mereka menyerahkan kanak-kanak tersebut kepada perayu-perayu. Semasa perbicaraan, responden-responden telah menimbulkan bantahan awal yang mana permohonan tersebut, yang merupakan suatu untuk penjagaan kanak-kanak Muslim, adalah dalam bidang kuasa mutlak mahkamah-mahkamah syariah, dan oleh itu mahkamah-mahkamah sivil, dengan alasan perkara 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk melayan yang sama. Pesuruhjaya kehakiman telah mengekalkan bantahan tersebut dan menolak permohonan tersebut. Justeru itu, perayu-perayu telah merayu ke Mahkamah Persekutuan.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Rayuan ini menimbulkan persoalan tentang bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah dan Mahkamah Tinggi. Menurut perkara 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, jika Mahkamah Syariah mempunyai bidang kuasa ke atas perkara tersebut, Mahkamah Tinggi tidak akan mempunyai bidang kuasa ||Page 531>> ke atasnya. Ini memerlukan penentuan tentang pendekatan yang mahkamah patut ambil dalam menentukan bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah. Oleh itu, dalam kes semasa, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menggunapakai pendekatan perkara pokok dan bukan pendekatan remedi (lihat perenggan-perenggan 5, 8– 9); Abdul Shaik bin Md Ibrahim & Anor v Hussein bin Ibrahim & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 618 dan Majlis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 109 dan Seberang Perai v Shaik Zolkaffily bin Shaik Natar & Ors [2003] 3 MLJ 705 diikut. (2) Memandangkan perkara pokok yang dipersoalkan adalah tentang penjagaan kanak-kanak tersebut dan memandangkan ia dengan jelas dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah, menurut perkara 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, Mahkamah Tinggi tiada bidang kuasa ke atas perkara tersebut (lihat perenggan 11). (3) Perayu-perayu mempunyai hak untuk merayu terhadap perintah Mahkamah Syariah tetapi sebaliknya mereka telah pergi ke Mahkamah Tinggi untuk mendapat remedi mereka yang tidak diperuntukkan untuk mereka. Mereka telah ke Mahkamah Tinggi untuk menguatkuasakan satu perintah Mahkamah Syariah melalui satu writ habeas corpus yang dengan jelas tiada bidang kuasa untuk melayan permohonan tersebut (lihat perenggan 12).]

Notes For cases on jurisdiction of courts, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1684–1692. For cases on jurisdiction of the Syariah Court, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 517–539. For cases on proper procedure for habeas corpus, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1803–1818. For custody of child under Islamic family law, see 14 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia para [250.393]. For jurisdiction of courts, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [20.066]– [20.073].

Cases referred to Abdul Shaik bin Md Ibrahim & Anor v Hussein bin Ibrahim & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 618 (folld) Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang lwn Isa Abdul Rahman dan satu yang lain [1992] 2 MLJ 244 (refd) Majlis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang dan Seberang Perai v Shaik Zolkaffily bin Shaik Natar & Ors [2003] 3 MLJ 705 (folld) Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 266 (refd)

Legislation referred to Federal Constitution art 121(1A)

Darshan Singh Khaira (Darshan Singh & Co) for the appellant.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 110 Ahmad Munawir Abd Aziz (Lim Kean Siew & Co) for the respondent. ||Page 532>>

[2004] 2 MLJ 629 NORLELA BTE MOHAMAD HABIBULLAH v YUSUF MALDONER

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO S8–24–3587 OF 2002 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 20 NOVEMBER 2003

Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — Matrimonial causes — Custody of child — Parties married and divorced abroad but marriage not registered in Malaysia — No intention to be bound by Syariah jurisdiction in Malaysia — Whether respondent should be estopped from registering marriage under Syariah jurisdiction in order to obtain custody of child — Whether respondent had locus under Enactment — Islamic Family Law Enactment (Selangor) 1984 ss 4, 24, 31(1),(2) — Federal Constitution art 121(1A)

Constitutional Law — Courts — Jurisdiction — Validity of custody order — Marriage abroad not registered in Malaysia — Whether civil court had competent jurisdiction to issue a valid custody order as parties were Muslims — Whether Syariah Court had inherent jurisdiction to hear matter — Islamic Family Law (Selangor) ss 4, 24, 31(1),(2) — Federal Constitution art 121(1A)

Family Law — Children — Guardianship — Jurisdiction of civil court to grant custody order as parties were Muslims — Marriage contracted and solemnized abroad but not registered in Malaysia — Whether applicant could resort to Enactment for return of her child — Whether Syariah Court had inherent jurisdiction to hear matter — Islamic Family Law Enactment (Selangor) 1984 ss 4, 24, 31(1),(2) — Federal Constitution art 121(1A)

The applicant and the respondent were married at the Islamic Centre St Gallen, Switzerland and thereupon registered their marriage in Austria. However, three months later, the parties went through a divorce at a civil court in Austria. The applicant was three months pregnant then and came back to Malaysia to give birth to Nurul Iman (‘the child’) and resumed her life and employment here. Subsequently, the

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 111 respondent kidnapped the child and took her out of Malaysia. The applicant, a Malaysian, obtained a custody order (‘the order’) of their child. This was an application by the respondent, a foreigner, to set aside the order by the applicant. The issue raised by the respondent was whether the civil High Court had jurisdiction to hear the application for guardianship of the child since both parties professed the religion of Islam.

Held, dismissing the application: (1) The order issued by the High Court was valid because that order was an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, and until and unless it was set aside, it remained. Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution does not overrule the general jurisdiction of the civil courts. Civil courts are courts of general jurisdiction and can hear cases commenced by Muslims and non-Muslims, and can try offences against Muslims and non-Muslims that are created by the laws of the land. Further, the Civil High Courts are courts of inherent jurisdiction whilst the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts are determined by the respective state laws. If the legislature does not confer on the Syariah ||Page 630>> Courts any jurisdiction to deal with any matter in the state list then the Syariah Court is precluded from dealing with that matter (see para 6); Mohd Hanif Farikullah v Bushra Chaudri [2001] 5 MLJ 533 followed. (2) The marriage between the applicant and the respondent was never registered in Malaysia as the parties had no intention of setting up home in Malaysia. They had intended to set up home in Austria. Clearly, the parties had no intention of submitting themselves or their marriage to the jurisdiction of the Malaysian Syariah Courts. Therefore, as the facts showed, s 24 of the Islamic Family Law Enactment (Selangor) 1984 (‘the Enactment’) which provides for the solemnization of marriage in Malaysian Embassies, High Commission or Consulate abroad, had no application in the instant case. Furthermore, pursuant to s 31(1) of the Enactment, the parties did not register their marriage within six months after the date of their marriage. Neither did the parties pursuant to s 31(2) of the Enactment register their marriage when they arrived in Malaysia during the first month of their marriage (see paras 7-8). (3) In the instant case, the respondent claimed that the marriage was valid and had been deemed registered. When the applicant and the respondent went through a divorce in the civil court, the parties did not make an attempt to register the said divorce in Malaysia with the Syariah Courts as they had no intention of being bound by the Syariah jurisdiction. Therefore, the respondent now, could not after getting married and thereafter going through the divorce, three years later, say that he is applying to have the marriage registered with the Syariah jurisdiction in Malaysia. It was clear that his motive was to have custody of the child. The respondent should be estopped from doing so. There was no marriage to register as the parties had gone through a divorce (see para 9). (4) Section 4 of the Enactment clearly states that the Enactment shall apply to all

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 112 Muslims living in the state of Selangor and to all Muslims resident in the state of Selangor who are living outside the state of Selangor. It was therefore clear from the foregoing that the respondent had no locus under the Enactment because he did not qualify under those sections of the Enactment as he was not living in the state of Selangor nor was he a resident in the state of Selangor who was living outside the state of Selangor (see para 10). (5) No proof was put forward by the respondent as to the existence of the Registrar of Muslim Marriages Divorce and Rujuk at the Islamic Centre St Gallen in Switzerland. In the circumstances, the court could not take into consideration the registration, if any, of the marriage at the Centre and deem it as to be registered under the Enactment. The requirement of a Registrar of Muslim marriage was not met. That the marriage was deemed registered under the Enactment by virtue of the civil registration of the marriage in Austria could also not be considered as then the applicant’s submission that the Civil High Court of Malaysia had jurisdiction to hear the matter should stand. ||Page 631>> It was clear that after their marriage in Austria, no steps were taken to register the marriage here (see para 10). (6) Since the Syariah Courts do not provide for inherent jurisdiction, there was no specific section which the applicant could resort to in the Enactment to get the return of her child. In the instant case, the child Nurul Iman was taken out of Malaysia by the respondent. The issue was not merely one of custody or guardianship but may be one that hinged on criminal actions as well. The Syariah Court had no jurisdiction to hear this matter. Thus, the applicant was unable to resort to specific section in the Enactment to provide her with a remedy (see para 14).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon dan responden telah berkahwin di Pusat Islam St Gallen, Switzerland dan kemudian telah mendaftarkan perkahwinan mereka di Austria. Namun begitu, tiga bulan kemudian, pihak-pihak telah melalui perceraian di mahkamah sivil di Austria. Pemohon pada masa itu tiga bulan mengandung dan kembali ke Malaysia untuk melahirkan Nurul Iman (‘kanak-kanak tersebut’) dan meneruskan hidup dan pekerjaan di sini. Berikutan itu, responden telah menculik kanak-kanak tersebut keluar daripada Malaysia. Pemohon, seorang warganegara Malaysia, telah memperoleh perintah penjagaan (‘perintah tersebut’) kanak-kanak tersebut. Ini adalah permohonan responden, seorang warga asing, untuk mengenepikan perintah tersebut. Persoalan yang ditimbulkan oleh pemohon adalah sama ada Mahkamah Tinggi Sivil mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar permohonan untuk penjagaan kanak-kanak tersebut memandangkan kedua-dua pihak menganut agama Islam.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut:

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 113 (1) Perintah tersebut yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi adalah sah kerana perintah tersebut adalah satu perintah mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa kompeten, dan kecuali dan sehingga ia diketepikan, ia kekal. Perkara 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan tidak menolak bidang kuasa am mahkamah sivil. Mahkamah sivil merupakan mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa am dan boleh mendengar kes-kes yang dimulakan oleh orang Muslim dan bukan Muslim, dan boleh membicarakan kesalahan-kesalahan terhadap orang Muslim dan bukan Muslim yang dibentuk oleh undang-undang negara tersebut. Tambahan pula, Mahkamah Tinggi sivil merupakan mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa sedia ada manakala bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah ditentukan oleh undang-undang negeri masing-masing. Sekiranya badan perundangan tidak memberikan Mahkamah Syariah apa-apa bidang kuasa untuk mengendalikan apa-apa perkara dalam senarai negeri maka Mahkamah Syariah dikecualikan daripada mendengar perkara tersebut (lihat perenggan 6); Mohd Hanif Farikullah v Bushra Chaudri [2001] 5 MLJ 533 diikut. ||Page 632>> (2) Perkahwinan antara pemohon dan responden tidak pernah didaftarkan di Malaysia kerana pihak-pihak tersebut tiada hasrat untuk menetap di Malaysia. Mereka berhasrat untuk menetap di Austria. Adalah jelas, pihak-pihak tersebut tiada hasrat untuk menyerahkan diri mereka atau perkahwinan mereka kepada bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah Malaysia. Oleh itu, berdasarkan fakta-fakta tersebut, s 24 Enakmen Undang-Undang Keluarga Islam (Selangor) 1984 (‘Enakmen’) yang memperuntukkan upacara perkahwinan di Kedutaan Malaysia, Pesuruhjaya Tinggi atau Konsulat luar negara, tidak digunapakai dalam kes semasa. Tambahan pula, menurut s 31(1) Enakmen tersebut, pihak-pihak tidak mendaftarkan perkahwinan mereka dalam tempoh enam bulan selepas tarikh perkahwinan mereka. Mereka juga tidak menurut s 31(2) Enakmen tersebut mendaftarkan perkahwinan mereka apabila mereka tiba di Malaysia dalam tempoh bulan pertama perkahwinan mereka (lihat perenggan-perenggan 7–8). (3) Dalam kes semasa, responden mendakwa perkahwinan mereka adalah sah dan telah dianggap didaftarkan. Semasa pemohon dan responden melalui perceraian di mahkamah sivil, pihak-pihak tersebut tidak cuba untuk mendaftarkan perceraian tersebut di Malaysia dengan Mahkamah Syariah kerana mereka tiada hasrat untuk terikat dengan bidang kuasa Syariah. Oleh itu, responden sekarang, tiadak boleh selepas berkahwin dan kemudian bercerai, tiga tahun kemudian, mengatakan bahawa beliau sedang memohon untuk mendaftarkan perkahwinan tersebut di bawah bidang kuasa Syariah di Malaysia. Adalah jelas bahawa motif beliau adalah untuk mendapat hak penjagaan kanak-kanak tersebut. Responden sepatutnya diestopkan daripada berbuat demikian. Tiada perkahwinan untuk didaftarkan kerana pihak-pihak telahpun melalui peceraian (lihat perenggan 9).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 114 (4) Seksyen 4 Enakmen tersebut dengan jelas menyatakan bahawa Enakmen tersebut hendaklah terpakai ke atas semua Muslim yang menetap di negeri Selangor dan kepada semua penduduk Muslim negeri Selangor yang menetap di luar negeri Selangor. Oleh itu ia adalah jelas bahawa responden tiada lokus di bawah Enakmen tersebut kerana beliau tidak layak di bawah seksyen-seksyen Enakmen tersebut kerana beliau tidak menetap di negeri Selangor maupun seorang penduduk di negeri Selangor yang menetap di luar negeri Selangor (lihat perenggan 10). (5) Tiada bukti telah dikemukakan oleh responden berhubung kewujudan Pejabat Daftar Perkahwinan dan Perceraian Muslim di Pusat Islam St Gallen di Switzerland. Dalam keadaan sedemikian, mahkamah tidak dapat mengambilkira pendaftaran, jika ada, apa-perkahwinan di Pusat tersebut dan menganggap ia telah didaftarkan di bawah Enakmen tersebut. Keperluan pendaftaran perkahwinan Muslim tidak dipenuhi. Di mana perkahwinan tersebut dianggap telah didaftarkan di bawah Enakmen tersebut menurut pendaftaran perkahwinan sivil di Austria juga tidak boleh diambilkira kerana jika begitu hujah pemohon bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi sivil mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar perkara tersebut hendaklah kekal. Ia ||Page 633>> adalah jelas bahawa selepas perkahwinan mereka di Austria, tiada langkah-langkah telah diambil untuk mendaftarkan perkahwinan tersebut di sini (lihat perenggan 10). (6) Memandangkan Mahkamah Syariah tidak memperuntukkan bidang kuasa sedia ada, tiada seksyen khusus yang mana pemohon boleh gunakan dalam Enakmen tersebut untuk mendapat kembali kanak-kanak tersebut. Dalam kes semasa, kanak-kanak tersebut telah dibawa ke luar Malaysia oleh responden. Persoalannya bukan hanya tentang hak penjagaan tetapi mungkin suatu yang melibatkan tindakan jenayah juga. Mahkamah Syariah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar perkara ini. Oleh itu, pemohon tidak dapat merujuk kepada seksyen khusus dalam Enakmen tersebut untuk memberinya remedi (lihat perenggan 14).]

Notes For cases on guardianship of children, see 7(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 2838–2851. For cases on jurisdiction of courts, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1684–1692. For cases on matrimonial causes, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 3838–3839. For guardianship and custody of children, see 8 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [140.007]–[140.106]

Cases referred to

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 115 Mohd Hanif bin Farikullah v Bushra Chaudri [2001] 5 MLJ 533 (folld)

Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 121(1A) Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984 (Selangor) ss 4, 24, 31(1), (2)

Yasmeen Hj Muhamad (Mahani Hamid & Yasmeen) for the applicant. Sharuddin (Boestamam Ahmad with him) (Zulkifli Yong Azmi & Co) for the respondent.

[2004] 2 MLJ 648 SHAMALA SATHIYASEELAN v DR JEYAGANESH C MOGARAJAH & ANOR

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO S8–24–1727 OF 2003 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 13 APRIL 2004

Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — Court — Application by Hindu wife against Muslim husband to declare conversion of minor children to Islam null and void — Whether civil court had jurisdiction to hear application — Whether consent of husband enough to validate conversion of children to Islam — Whether validity of conversion within jurisdiction of Syariah Court — Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 ss 90, 91, 92, 95(b); Federal Constitution arts 12(4), 121(1A); Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 s 5

Constitutional Law — Jurisdiction — Civil court — Application by Hindu wife against Muslim husband to declare conversion of minor children to Islam null and void — Whether civil court had jurisdiction to hear application — Whether consent of husband enough to validate conversion of children to Islam — Whether validity of conversion within jurisdiction of Syariah Court — Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 ss 90, 91, 92, 95(b); Federal Constitution arts 12(4), 121(1A); Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 s 5

Islamic Law — Conversion — Conversion of minor children to Islam — Whether consent of one parent enough to validate conversion of children to Islam — Whether validity of conversion within jurisdiction of Syariah Court — Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 ss 90, 91, 92, 95(b); Federal Constitution arts 12(4), 121(1A);

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 116 Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 s 5

This was an application by the plaintiff (‘the wife’) for a declaration that the conversions of her two children (‘the minors’) to Islam by the defendant (‘the husband’) without her consent was null and void. The wife and husband were married according to Hindu rites and registered under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (‘Act 1976’). The two children of the marriage, ie the minors were Hindus at the time of birth. The husband had converted to Islam and later converted the minors to Islam without the consent and knowledge of the wife. The wife contended by virtue of an interim order that she had an equal right to decide the religion of the minors. The husband had raised two preliminary objections, the second being of relevance. The issues for determination were: (i) whether this High Court being a civil court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s application; (ii) whether consent of a single parent enough to validate the conversion of a minor to Islam; and (iii) whether the capacity of the Muslim father to convert the minors was valid.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s application and allowing the defendant’s second preliminary objection: (1) The wife’s contention that her right to decide the religion of her two minors stemmed from art 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and s 5 of ||Page 649>> the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 (‘Act 351’) whereby s 5 of Act 351 gives equality of parental rights and art 12(4) provides that the religion of a person under the age of 18 shall be decided by his parent or guardian. She also referred to s 95(b) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 (‘Act 505’) whereby the phrase used is ‘his parent or guardian consents’. Therefore, the use of the singular word ‘parent’ in both art 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and s 95(b) of Act 505 were clear. The consent of a single parent was enough to validate the conversion of a minor to Islam. Further, s 5 of Act 351 did not apply to the husband in the present case as he was now a Muslim by virtue of s 1(3) of Act 351 (see para 6). (2) In the present case, the husband was the natural father of the two minors. He was also a Muslim — a muallaf. He had converted into Islam. The wife never questioned the validity of the husband’s conversion. Thus, on a construction of art 12(4) of the Federal Constitution read in conjunction with s 95(b) of Act 505, the husband as a natural parent — a Muslim father had the capacity to convert the two minors into Islam (see para 7); Teoh Eng Huat v Kadhi, Pasir Mas & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 300 followed. (3) The purpose and objective of art 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution is to oust the civil jurisdiction over persons of the Islamic faith. In the present case, the two minors were now Muslims. There were two temporary certificates of conversion issued in respect of them, albeit temporary, were conclusive proof of the facts stated therein (s 90 of Act 505). Section 91 of Act 505 refers to a person whose conversion to Islam has been registered in the Register of

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 117 Muallafs shall for the purposes of any Federal or State Law, and for all time, be treated as a Muslim. Section 92 of Act 505 is a written law made for the Syariah court for the Federal Territories to determine whether a non-registered person is a muallaf. In the present case, the minors were temporarily registered as muallafs but the wife was not a Muslim. Therefore, she could not take advantage of s 92 and the Syariah Court had no jurisdiction to hear her. It was not for this court to legislate and confer jurisdiction to the civil court but for Parliament to provide the remedy. Since the two minors were now ‘saudara baru’ or ‘muallaf’, the wife should take them to Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan for help and advice to resolve the said issue. By virtue of art 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, the Syariah Court was the qualified forum to determine the status of the two children, ie whether the conversion of the minors was valid or not. Only the Syariah Court had the competency and expertise to determine the said issue (see paras 12–14).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Ini adalah permohonan oleh plaintif (‘isteri’) untuk satu deklarasi bahawa penukaran agama kedua-dua anak beliau (‘anak-anak di bawah umur’) ||Page 650>> kepada Islam oleh defendan (‘suami’) tanpa persetujuan beliau adalah terbatal dan tidak sah. Isteri dan suami telah berkahwin menurut upacara Hindu dan didaftarkan di bawah Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang (Perkahwinan dan Perceraian) 1976 (‘Akta 176’). Kedua-dua anak hasil perkahwinan tersebut, iaitu anak-anak di bawah umur beragama Hindu semasa dilahirkan. Suami telah menukar agama Islam dan kemudian menukar agama anak-anak di bawah umur tersebut kepada Islam tanpa persetujuan dan pengetahuan isteri. Isteri telah berhujah berdasarkan perintah interim bahawa beliau mempunyai hak yang sama untuk menentukan agama anak-anak di bawah umur tersebut. Suami telah menimbulkan dua bantahan awal, yang keduanya lebih relevan. Persoalan-persoalan untuk ditentukan adalah: (i) sama ada Mahkamah Tinggi ini yang merupakan mahkamah sivil mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar permohonan plaintif; (ii) sama ada persetujuan salah seorang daripada ibu bapa mencukupi untuk mengesahkan penukaran agama seorang anak di bawah umur kepada agama Islam; dan (iii) sama ada kapasiti bapa Muslim untuk menukar agama anak-anak bawah umur adalah sah.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan plaintif dan membenarkan bantahan awal kedua defendan: (1) Hujah isteri bahawa beliau mempunyai hak untuk menentukan agama kedua-dua anak-anak di bawah umur beliau adalah berdasarkan perkara 12(4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan s 5 Akta Penjagaan Budak 1961 (‘Akta 351’) di mana s 5 Akta 351 memberikan kesaksamaan hak ibubapa dan perkara 12(4) memperuntukkan bahawa agama seseorang di bawah umur 18 tahun hendaklah

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 118 ditentukan oleh seorang ibu/bapa atau penjaga beliau. Beliau juga merujuk kepada s 95(b) Akta Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam (Wilayah-Wilayah Persekutuan) 1993 (‘Akta 505’) di mana ungkapan yang digunakan adalah ‘his parent or guardian consents’. Oleh itu, penggunaan perkataan mufrad ‘parent’ dalam kedua-dua perkara 12(4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan s 95(b) Akta 505 adalah jelas. Persetujuan seorang ibu/bapa adalah mencukupi untuk mengesahkan penukaran agama seorang yang di bawah umur kepada Islam. Tambahan pula, s 5 Akta 351 tidak terpakai ke atas suami dalam kes semasa kerana beliau sekarang seorang Muslim menurut s 1(3) Akta 351 (lihat perenggan 6). (2) Dalam kes semasa, suami merupakan bapa kandung kedua-dua anak-anak di bawah umur tersebut. Beliau juga seorang Muslim — seorang muallaf. Beliau telah bertukar ke agama Islam. Isteri tidak pernah menyoal tentang kesahihan penukaran agama suami. Oleh itu, berdasarkan pembentukan perkara 12(4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dibaca bersama s 95(b) Akta 505, suami sebagai seorang bapa kandung – seorang bapa Muslim mempunyai kapasiti untuk menukar agama kedua-dua anak-anak di bawah umur kepada Islam (lihat perenggan 7); Teoh Eng Huat v Kadhi, Pasir Mas & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 300 diikut. ||Page 651>> (3) Tujuan dan objektif perkara 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan adalah untuk menyingkirkan bidang kuasa sivil ke atas mereka yang beragama Islam. Dalam kes semasa, kedua-dua anak-anak di bawah umur sekarang adalah Muslim. Terdapat dua sijil sementara pengislaman yang dikeluarkan berkiatan mereka, walaupun sementara, adalah bukti kukuh tentang fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan (s 90 Akta 505). Seksyen 91 Akta 505 merujuk kepada seseorang yang mana penukaran agama kepada Islam telah didaftarkan di Pejabat Pendaftaran Mualaf hendaklah bagi tujuan mana-mana Undang-Undang Persekutuan atau Negeri, dan pada setiap masa, dianggap sebagai seorang Muslim. Seksyen 92 Akta 505 adalah undang-undang bertulis yang digubak untuk Mahkamah Syariah untuk Wilayah-Wilayah Persekutuan bagi menentukan sama ada seorang yang tidak didaftarkan adalah mualaf. Dalam kes semasa, anak-anak di bawah umur tersebut telah didaftarkan sementara sebagai mualaf tetapi isteri bukan seorang Muslim. Oleh itu, beliau tidak boleh menggunakan s 92 dan Mahkamah Syariah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar beliau. Ia bukan untuk mahkamah ini untuk menggubal dan memberikan bidang kuasa kepada mahkamah sivil tetapi untuk Parliamen memberikan remedi. Memandangkan kedua-dua anak-anak di bawah umur tersebut sekarang adalah ‘saudara baru’ atau ‘muallaf’, iateri sepatutnya membawa mereka ke Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan untuk mendapat bantuan dan nasihat bagi menyelesaikan persoalan ini. Menurut perkara 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, Mahkamah Syariah adalah korum yang berkelayakan untuk menentukan kedudukan kedua-dua kanak-kanak tersebut, iaitu sama ada penukaran agama anak-anak di bawah umur tersebut adalah sah atau tidak. Hanya Mahkamah

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 119 Syariah kompeten dan pakar untuk menentukan persoalan ini (lihat perenggan-perenggan 12–14).]

Notes For cases on conversion under Islamic Law generally, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 453–456. For cases on jurisdiction of courts under Constitutional Law, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1684–1692. For cases on jurisdiction of courts under Civil Procedure, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 3670–3681.

Cases referred to Azizah Shaik Ismail & Anor v Fatimah Shaik Ismail & Anor [2004] 2 MLJ 529 (refd) Chang Ah Mee v Jabatan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam, Majlis Ugama Islam Sabah & Ors [2003] 5 MLJ 106 (refd) Eeswari Visuvalingam v Government of Malaysia [1990] 1 MLJ 86 (refd) Lee Lee Cheng (f) v Seow Peng Kwang [1960] MLJ 1 (refd) Majlis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang dan Seberang Perai v Shaik Zolkaffily bin Shaik Natar & Ors [2003] 3 MLJ 705 (refd) ||Page 652>> Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang lwn Isa Abdul Rahman dan satu ang lain [1992] 2 MLJ 244 (refd) Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Sembilan lwn Hun Mun Meng [1992] 2 MLJ 676 (refd) Ng Wan Chan v Majlis Ugama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor (No 2) [1991] 3 MLJ 487 (refd) Pedley v Majlis Agama Islam, Pulau Pinang & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 307 (refd) Teoh Eng Huat v Kadhi, Pasir Mas & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 300 (folld)

Legislation referred to Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 ss 85, 90, 91, 92, 95(b) Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1992 (Sabah) s 68 Courts Ordinance s 47, Second Schedule Federal Constitution arts 3(1), 12(4), 74(2), 77, 121(1A) Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 s 5 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 ss 4, 8, 51

Revi Nekoo (Parameswary and R Sivarasa with him) (Nekoo Parames & Tung) for the plaintiff.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 120 M Menon (Jaffar & Menon) for the first defendant. Azmi Mohd Rais (Zulkifli Yong with him) (Zulkifli Yong Azmi & Co) for the second defendant.

[2004] 3 MLJ 301 NG KIM MOI (P) & ORS v PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH, SEREMBAN, NEGERI SEMBILAN DARUL KHUSUS (NEGERI SEMBILAN TOWNSHIP SDN BHD & ANOR, PROPOSED INTERVENORS)

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO N–01–34 OF 1996 GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL AZIZ MOHAMAD JJCA AND AZMEL J 7 MAY 2004

Constitutional Law — Right to property — Federal Constitition, art 13 — Appropriate remedies for invalid acquisition — Federal Constitution art 13

Land law — Acquisition of land — Validity of acquisition — Service of forms — Failure to comply with provisions concerning service of notices — Whether acquisition valid — Land Acquisition Act 1960 s 8

A piece of land in the Mukim of Labu (‘the land’) which belonged to the appellants was acquired by the State Government of Negeri Sembilan in the exercise of their powers under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (‘the Act’). The appellants’ complaint is that the acquisition was in violation of law in that forms A and B prescribed by the Act were never issued and that Forms D, E and F though issued were not served. The issues for consideration were in relation to the legality of the acquisition and the appropriate remedy.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) It is a fact that no Form B was issued, and Form F was not served on the appellants. But it is not mandatory that Form B be issued or that Form F be served. Form B is a written authority under s 5(1) of the Act by which the State Director of Lands and Mines ‘may ... authorize’ certain persons to enter upon certain lands and do certain work. There may not be any necessity to do such work, in which case no entry upon the land is necessary and no written authority need be issued. Form F is a form under s

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 121 11(2) by which the Land Administrator requires inter alia, the registered proprietor of any land to be acquired to furnish in writing certain information. But the Land Administrator need not require any of those persons to furnish any information because he does not need it or he has already got it. The words of the section are ‘may ... require’ (see para 83). (2) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) Form A comes under s 4. At this stage, there has been no decision that any land is needed. The words are ‘likely to be needed’. Sections 7 and 8 deal with the stage when it is certain that lands are needed. The lands have been specifically identified. Two consequences flow from the publication of the preliminary notification in Form A. One is that persons may be authorized by the State Director under s 5, using Form B, to enter any land affected by the notification to do certain work on it and the other concerns the market value of the land, that is the value on the basis of which compensation is to be paid. ||Page 302>> This affects the interests of the landowner. According to para 1(1)(a) of the First Schedule to the Act, the market value is the market value at the date of publication in the Gazette of the notification in Form A. But that is to be so only if within 12 months a declaration under s 8 follows. If there is no declaration under s 8 within 12 months, according to s 4(3) the Form A notification shall lapse. If so, in para 1(1)(b) of the First Schedule it says that ‘in other cases’ the market value is the market value at the date of the publication in the Gazette of the declaration under s 8. ‘Other cases’ are where the Form A notification is followed by a Form D declaration after 12 months. If land can be validly acquired in a situation in which the Form A notification is as good as if it had not been made, the Form A notification cannot be mandatory. Another situation is the situation where no notification in Form A was ever gazetted, and that therefore the Act itself, by implication, does not intend that a Form A notification be mandatory (see paras 84, 86, 88, 90, 91 and 92). (3) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) There is another angle from which the question may be approached — the wording of s 4(1). The requirement that ‘a notification in Form A shall be published in the Gazette’ is dependent on the State Authority being ‘satisfied that any land in any locality in the State is likely to be needed’. Until there is such satisfaction on the part of the State Authority, the notification is not required. ‘State Authority’ is defined in s 2(1) to mean ‘the Ruler or the Yang Di-Pertua Negeri of the State’. For the reasons that given, the publication of a notification in Form A under s 4(1) is not mandatory and that the failure to publish the notification in this case does not render the acquisition proceedings null and void (see paras 93 and 95). (4) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) The Assistant Land Administrator had effected personal service of Form E as in s 53(1) of the Act on the appellants by sending copies of Form E to the Land Administrator of another district. He had mistakenly sent the copies to the District of Kelang. The copies were returned to him and he directed the notice server to effect service by affixing a

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 122 copy of the form on fence of the house on the land to be acquired. If such alternative mode of service was intended to comply with sub-s (2) of s 53, it did not. In the first place, sub-s (2) did not apply because it was neither a case of unwillingness or inability to sign acknowledgement of service nor a case of inability to find a proper person on whom to effect service. There had been no attempt to effect service at the correct address in Jalan Klang Lama, Kuala Lumpur. Where sub-s (2) applies, the fixing of the form must be done on the outer door of the building in which the person to be served ordinarily dwells or carries on business or on a public noticeboard in the place in which he usually resides. In this case, the building must be the house in Jalan Klang Lama, Kuala Lumpur, and the public noticeboard must be one in the proper sector of Kuala Lumpur. Posting a notice on land as required by sub-s (3), is to be done when the person to be served is the occupier of the land. In this case, on the evidence, the only appellant that might occupy the land was the fifth appellant. But even ||Page 303>> if all the appellants were occupiers of the land, sub-s (3), by the word ‘also’, is an additional requirement for an occupier, that is, additional to sub-s (2) and clearly sub-s (2) had not been complied with (see paras 99 and 100). (5) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) There was failure to serve Form E on the appellants as required by s 11(1). The whole attempt at service was characterized by failure to notice that the address for service was in Kuala Lumpur and failure to understand sub-s (2) of s 53. The purported service by the notice server on the land is open to question. But there was no bad faith (see para 104). (6) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) The appellants attended the inquiry and obtained a postponement to obtain a valuation report. There was a second postponement. The inquiry proceeded on 20 June 1994. There was no intention to hold an inquiry without giving the appellants a right to be heard. The postponements prove the contrary. Neither did the failure to serve Form E prejudice the appellants or result in any form of injustice to them. The purpose of Form E and of the method of service provided by s 53 is to ensure that the persons concerned know of the inquiry and of the date so that they will have an opportunity to attend and be heard. In this case the appellants knew of the date, the fifth appellant represented the other appellants and counsel represented all the appellants, and the inquiry was conducted with the presence of the appellants (see para 104). (7) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) A mere failure to serve Form E is capable of rendering the inquiry and the decision made thereat null and void, but the court seriously doubted that it is capable of rendering the entire acquisition null and void. Failure to serve Form E here could not justify the holding that the proceedings for the acquisition of the appellants’ land are null and void. The failure did not prejudice the appellants in any way and therefore could not be

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 123 held to nullify the inquiry (see para 106). (8) (per Azmel J) The court was satisfied that no prejudices had been actually caused to the appellants. This was not a case where the landowners had been completely deprived from attending the hearing before the Assistant Land Administrator. They were present and/or represented by their counsel. They had been given the opportunity to submit their valuation report. However they chose not to produce it. Neither was this a case where the landowner had been deprived of any compensation by the Assistant Land Administrator. Nor was there any evidence shown that the compensation awarded to them was less favourable than those other neighbouring landowners. Their presence at the hearing had nullified any irregularities that might have existed before that. The award made by the Assistant Land Administrator was perfectly lawful and the amount appropriate (see para 111). (9) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) It may be accepted as settled beyond argument that the object or purpose of the Act in essence is to empower the State to deprive an owner of his immovable property in ||Page 304>> exchange for fair and reasonable compensation. There is no right vested in an owner to a pre-acquisition hearing. However, there is a right to be heard at an inquiry held by the Land Administrator with regard to the quantum of the compensation that is to be awarded. Since it is statute that is aimed at deprivation of property, courts require the acquiring authority to act strictly in accordance with the terms of the Act (see para 16). (10) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) When s 4(1) is read in the context of the Act as a whole, it is clear that the word ‘shall’ that appears in that subsection is mandatory and not merely directory in effect (see para 17). (11) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) Form A was admittedly not issued. This omission amounts to a clear violation of the mandatory provisions of s 4(1) of the Act. Form D which is issued pursuant to s 8 of the Act is a critical document because it is the declaration that the land in question is needed by the State. It seals the fate of the land. By virtue of s 10(1), Form E commences the acquisition process. When served, Form D must accompany Form E. The non-observance of the provisions of s 8 is a serious matter (see paras 21 and 23). (12) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) The facts here simply do not come within s 53(2). This was not a case in which there was a person (or were persons) to whom a document was – to use the opening words of s 53(2) – ‘delivered or tendered’ but was ‘unwilling or unable to sign the acknowledgement thereof’. Neither is this a case where ‘no proper person can be found on whom to effect service’. In the present case there was simply no service whatsoever. The appellants lived at an address along Jalan Kelang Lama. The forms in question were sent by the instant respondent to the Land Administrator at Kelang who returned them unserved. That is not a matter of surprise at all because Jalan Kelang Lama is not in Kelang, it is in Kuala

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 124 Lumpur. The pre-conditions set by s 53(2) are absent in this case (see para 27). (13) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) Since the summons here does not seek a declaration, the second limb of Lord Diplock’s dictum in Grunwick Processing Laboratories Ltd v Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service and another [1978] AC 655 came to the appellants’ rescue. Even if these were certiorari proceedings, a quashing order should not, in the court’s discretion have issued by reason of the facts here. This was a case where the land has been transferred to third parties who have bona fide acquired titles to the separate lots. It is common knowledge that Nilai New Town (Bandar Baru Nilai) has already been built and that third parties have in good faith purchased individual lots in it. It would therefore be practically unjust for a court to set aside the acquisition (see para 34) (14) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) The fact that a plaintiff claimed the wrong relief or did not claim the correct relief did not bar the court from granting the relief appropriate to the particular circumstances to prevent injustice by acting under the prayer for further or other relief. ||Page 305>> Further, this court has ample jurisdiction and power under s 69(4) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 to ‘make any order which ought to have been given or made, and make such further or other orders as the case requires’. These words which were adopted from O 41 r 33 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code 1908 empower this court to do complete justice between the parties (see paras 45 and 46). (15) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) The appellants were deprived of their land in violation of the provisions of the Act. The deprivation here was not in accordance with the provisions of written law and therefore contravenes art 13(1) of the Federal Constitution (see para 47). (16) (per Gopal Sri Ram, JCA dissenting) A fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is a value added right. Second, because it is a value added right, its breach is to be redressed by an award of compensation without proof of actual damage, ie, on the footing of strict liability. Third, the State is liable to compensate a citizen for a violation of his or her constitutional right by any arm of the State (see para 65); Cullen v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Northern Ireland) [2003] WLR 1763 followed. (17) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) That liability for the breach of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Pt II of the Federal Constitution is strict and not fault based. The appellants were therefore entitled to reasonable compensation for the violation of their fundamental right guaranteed by article 13(1) of the Federal Constitution (see paras 67 and 68). (18) (per Gopal Sri Ram JCA dissenting) For the reasons already given, the court would allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court dismissing the appellants’ summons and enter judgment for the appellants (see para 69).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 125

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Sebidang tanah di dalam Mukim Labu (‘tanah itu’) yang dipunyai oleh pihak perayu telah diambil oleh Kerajaan Negeri Negeri Sembilan di dalam pelaksanaan kuasa mereka di bawah Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 (‘Akta itu’). Aduan perayu-perayu adalah bahawa pengambilan itu melanggar undang-undang kerana Borang A dan B yang diperuntukkan oleh Akta itu tidak disampaikan dan bahawa Borang-Borang D, E dan F walaupun dikeluarkan, tidak disampaikan. Isu-isu untuk dipertimbangkan adalah berkait dengan kesahan pengambilan tersebut dan remedi yang sesuai.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan itu: (1) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Ia adalah fakta bahawa Borang B tidak dikeluarkan dan Borang F tidak disampaikan ke atas perayu-perayu. Tetapi ia tidak mandatori untuk Borang B dikeluarkan ataupun Borang F disampaikan. Borang B adalah kuasa bertulis di bawah s 5(1) Akta itu dan melalui itu Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Negeri ‘may ... authorize’ orang tertentu untuk memasuki tanah tertentu untuk ||Page 306>> menjalankan kerja-kerja. Kemungkinan tiada keperluan untuk menjalankan kerja-kerja, oleh itu tiada keperluan untuk memasukki tanah itu dan tiada keperluan untuk kebenaran bertulis dikeluarkan. Borang F adalah borang di bawah s 11(2) di mana Pentadbir Tanah memerlukan, antara lain, pemunya berdaftar sebarang tanah yang hendak diambil membekalkan secara bertulis maklumat tertentu. Tetapi Pentadbir Tanah tidak memerlukan orang itu membekalkan maklumat sebab beliau tidak memerlukan maklumat itu atau beliau sudah mempunyai maklumat itu. Perkataan-perkataan seksyen itu adalah ‘may ... require’ (lihat perenggan 83). (2) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Borang A adalah di bawah s 4. Pada tahap ini, belum terdapat keputusan sama ada tanah itu diperlukan. Perkataan-perkataan itu adalah ‘likely to be needed’. Seksyen-seksyen 7 dan 8 berkait dengan tahap apabila tanah itu diperlukan. Terdapat dua akibat daripada penerbitan pemberitahuan awal di dalam Borang A. Satunya adalah orang mungkin diberi kuasa oleh Pengarah Negeri di bawah s 5, mengunakan Borang B, untuk memasuki tanah yang dipengaruhi oleh pemberitahuan itu untuk menjalankan kerja-kerja pada tanah itu dan satu lagi melibatkan nilai pasaran tanah itu, iaitu nilai pada dasar pampasan akan dibayar. Ini melibatkan kepentingan pemunya tanah itu. Mengikut perenggan 1(1)(a) Jadual Pertama kepada Akta itu, nilai pasaran adalah nilai pasaran pada tarikh penerbitan pemberitahuan di dalam Borang A di dalam Gazet. Tetapi ini hanya jika dalam tempoh 12 bulan, terdapat perisytiharan di bawah s 8. Jika tiada perisytiharan di bawah s 8 di dalam tempoh 12 bulan, mengikut s 4(3), pemberitahuan di dalam Borang A akan luput. Jika begitu, perenggan 1(1)(a) Jadual Pertama berkata bahawa ‘in other cases’ nilai pasaran adalah nilai pada tarikh penerbitan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 126 perisytiharan di bawah s 8 di dalam Gazet. ‘Other cases’ adalah seperti apabila pemberitahuan di dalam Borang A diikuti dengan perisytiaharan Borang D selepas 12 bulan. Jika tanah dapat diambil secara sah di dalam keadaan di mana pemberitahuan di dalam Borang A sebaik seperti ia tidak dibuat,pemberitahuan di dalam Borang A tidak mandatori. Keadaan lain adalah di mana pemberitahuan di dalam Borang A tidak digazetkan, dan oleh itu, secara tersirat, Akta itu tidak berniat bahawa pemberitahuan di dalam Borang A mandatori (lihat perenggan 84, 86, 88, 90, 91 dan 92). (3) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Terdapat cara lain untuk menjawab persoalan ini — perkataan-perkataan s 4(1). Peruntukan bahawa ‘a notification in Form A shall be published in the Gazette’ bergantung kepada Kerajaan Negeri ‘satisfied that any land in any locality in the State is likely to be needed’. Sehingga terdapat penyelesaian pada pihak Kerajaan Negeri , pemberitahuan itu tidak diperlukan. ‘State Authority’ ditafsirkan di dalam s 2(1) sebagai ‘the Ruler or the Yang Di-Pertua Negeri of the State’. Untuk alasan-alasan itu, penerbitan pemberitahuan di dalam Borang A di bawah s 4(1) tidak mandatori dan kegagalan untuk menerbit pemberitahuan di dalam kes ini tidak menyebabkan prosiding pengambilan batal dan tak sah (lihat perenggan 93 dan 95). ||Page 307>> (4) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Penolong Pentadbir Tanah telah melaksanakan penyampaian ke diri Borang E seperti di dalam s 53(1) Akta itu ke atas perayu-perayu dengan menyampaikan salinan Borang E kepada Pentadbir Tanah daerah yang lain. Beliau tersalah sampaikan salinan itu ke Daerah Kelang. Salinan itu dikembalikan kepada beliau dan beliau mengarahkan penyampai notis untuk melaksanakan penyampaian dengan melekatkan satu salinan borang itu pada pagar rumah di atas tanah yang hendak diambil. Jika cara penyampaian alternatif ini dikehendaki mematuhi sub seksyen (2) s 53, ia gagal. Pertamanya, sub seksyen (2) tidak terpakai kerana ini bukan kes di mana terdapat keengganan atau ketidakmampuan untuk menandatangani pengakuan penyampaian ataupun kes di mana tiada orang yang sesuai boleh dicari untuk penyampaian. Tiada percubaan untuk melaksanakan penyampaian ke atas alamat yang betul di Jalan Klang Lama, Kuala Lumpur. Di mana sub seksyen (2) terpakai pelekatan borang itu mesti dibuat pada pintu luar bangunan berkenaan di mana orang yang hendak disampaikan kepada menghuni atau menjalankan perniagaannya ataupun pada papan notis di tempat beliau menghuni. Dalam kes ini, bangunan itu semestinya rumah di Jalan Klang Lama, Kuala Lumpur, dan papan notis mestilah di sektor sesuai di Kuala Lumpur. Melekatkan notis pada tanah seperti di dalam sub seksyen (3) patut dibuat apabila orang yang hendak disampaikan kepada adalah penghuni tanah itu. Dalam kes ini, perayu yang mungkin menghuni tanah itu adalah perayu kelima. Tetapi jikapun semua perayu adalah penghuni tanah itu, sub seksyen (3), melalui perkataan ‘also’, adalah peruntukan tambahan untuk seorang penghuni,

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 127 iaitu, tambahan kepada sub seksyen (2) dan jelas sub seksyen (2) tidak dipatuhi (lihat perenggan 99 dan 100). (5) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Terdapat kegagalan untuk menyampaikan Borang E ke atas perayu seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh s 11(1). Percubaan penyampaian disifatkan oleh kegagalan untuk melihat bahawa alamat untuk penyampaian adalah di Kuala Lumpur dan kegagalan untuk memahami sub seksyen (2) s 53. Penyampaian yang dikatakan oleh penyampai notis ke atas tanah itu terbuka untuk disoal. Tetapi tiada niat jahat (lihat perenggan 104). (6) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Perayu-perayu telah menghadiri siasatan dan memperolehi penangguhan untuk mendapatkan laporan penilaian. Terdapat satu lagi penangguhan. Siasatan itu diteruskan pada 20 Jun 1994. Tiada niat untuk mengadakan satu siasatan tanpa memberi perayu-perayu hak untuk didengar. Penangguhan-penangguhan menunjukkan sebaliknya. Kegagalan untuk menyampaikan Borang E tidak memprejudiskan perayu-perayu atau mengakibatkan sebarang ketidakadilan kepada mereka. Tujuan Borang E dan cara penyampaian seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh s 53 adalah untuk memastikan bahawa orang yang terlibat sedar akan siasatan itu dan tahu tarikh untuk membolehkan mereka hadir dan didengar. Di dalam kes ini, perayu-perayu sedar tarikh, perayu kelima mewakili perayu-perayu lain dan peguam telah mewakili semua perayu dan siatan itu diadakan di dalam kehadiran perayu-perayu (lihat perenggan 104). ||Page 308>> (7) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Kegagalan untuk menyampaikan Borang E mungkin menyebabkan siasatan itu dan keputusan siasatan itu batal dan tak sah, tetapi terdapat ragu sama ada ia dapat menyebabkan keseluruhan pengambilan itu batal dan tak sah. Kegagalan untuk menyampaikan Borang E di dalam kes ini tidak memberi justifikasi untuk memutuskan bahawa prosiding untuk pengambilan tanah perayu-perayu batal dan tak sah. Kegagalan itu tidak memprejudiskan perayu-perayu langsung dan dengan itu tidak membatalkan siasatan tersebut (lihat perenggan 106). (8) (oleh Azmel H) Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa tiada prejudis terhadap perayu-perayu. Ini bukan kes di mana pemunya tanah telah disebabkan tidak dapat menghadiri siasatan itu di hadapan Timbalan Pentadbir Tanah. Mereka hadir dan/atau telah diwakili oleh peguam mereka. Mereka telah diberi peluang untuk memberikan laporan penilaian mereka. Walau bagaimanapun mereka tidak memberikannya. Ini bukan kes di mana pemunya tanah tidak diberi pampasan oleh Timbalan Pentadbir Tanah. Tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa pampasan yang diawardkan kepada mereka kurang daripada apa yang diberi kepada pemunya tanah yang lain. Kehadiran mereka di siasatan itu telah membatalkan sebarang luar aturan sebelum itu. Award yang dibuat oleh Timbalan Pentadbir Tanah adalah sah di sisi undang-undang dan jumlah pampasan adalah sesuai (lihat perenggan 111). (9) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Ia dapat diterima sebagai diselesaikan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 128 bahawa objek atau tujuan Akta itu pada dasarnya adalah untuk memberi kuasa kepada Negeri untuk merampas harta tak alih pemunya tanah untuk ditukar dengan pampasan yang adil dan munasabah. Tiada hak pada pemunya untuk satu pendengaran pra-pengambilan. Walau bagaimanapun, terdapat hak untuk didengar di satu siasatan oleh Pentadbir Tanah berkait dengan kuantum pampasan yang perlu diawardkan. Memandangkan bahawa ia adalah undang-undang statut yang bertujuan mengambil hartanah, mahkamah-mahkamah memperuntukkan bahawa pihak berkuasa yang hendak mengambil tanah supaya bertindak mematuhi terma-terma Akta itu dengan ketat (lihat perenggan 16). (10) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Apabila s 4(1) dibaca di dalam konteks Akta itu secara keseluruhannya, ia jelas bahawa perkataan ‘shall’ d dalam sub seksyen adalah mandatori dan bukan panduan di dalam kesannya (lihat perenggan 17). (11) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Borang A diakui tidak dikeluarkan. Peninggalan ini merupakan pelanggaran yang jelas peruntukan mandatori s 4(1) Akta itu. Borang D yang dikeluarkan mengikut s 8 Akta itu adalah dokumen yang penting sebab ia adalah perisytiharan bahawa tanah yang dipersoalkan diperlukan oleh Negeri. Ia menentukan tanah itu. Apabila ia disampaikan, Borang D mesti disertakan dengan Borang E. Kegagalan mematuhi peruntukan s 8 adalah perkara yang serius (lihat perenggan 21 dan 23). (12) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Fakta-fakta di sini tidak termasuk s 53(2). Ini bukan satu kes di mana terdapat seorang (atau ||Page 309>> beberapa orang) kepada siapa dokumen telah — dengan menggunakan perkataan pembukaan s 53(2) — ‘delivered or tendered’ tetapi ‘unwilling or unable to sign the acknowlegment thereof’. Ini bukan kes di mana ‘no proper person can be found on whom to effect service’. Di dalam kes ini, tiada penyampaian langsung. Perayu-perayu menghuni di satu alamat di Jalan Klang Lama. Borang-borang itu telah dihantar oleh responden kepada Pentadbir Tanah Kelang yang telah mengembalikannya tanpa disampaikan. Itu tidak memeranjatkan kerana Jalan Klang Lama bukan di Kelang, ia di Kuala Lumpur. Pra syarat yang diperuntukkan oleh s 53(2) tiada di dalam kes ini (lihat perenggan 27). (13) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Memandangkan bahawa saman di sini tidak memohon perisytiharan, bahagian kedua pernyataan Lord Diplock di dalam Grunwick Processing Laboratories Ltd v Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service and another [1978] AC 655 telah menyelamatkan perayu-perayu. Jika ini adalah prosiding certiorari, satu perintah pembatalan tidak patut, di dalam bidangkuasa mahkamah dikeluarkan kerana fakta-fakta sini. Ini adalah satu kes di mana tanah itu telah dipindahmilik kepada parti-parti ketiga yang telah mendapatkan hakmilik kepada lot-lot itu secara bona fide. Ia adalah am bahawa Bandar Baru Nilai telah dibina dan bahawa parti-parti ketiga telah dengan suci hati membeli lot-lot di dalamnya. Ia akan menjadi tidak adil

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 129 untuk mahkamah mengetepikan pengambilan itu (lihat perenggan 34). (14) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Fakta bahawa plaintif telah menuntut relif yang salah atau tidak menuntut relif yang betul tidak menghalang mahkamah daripada memberikan relif yang sesuai kepada keadaan untuk mencegah ketidakadilan dengan bertindak di bawah permohonan untuk relif lain atau selanjutnya. Lagipun mahkamah ini mempunyai bidangkuasa dan kuasa di bawah s 69(4) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 untuk ‘make any order which ought to have been given or made, and make such further or other orders as the case requires’. Perkataan ini yang diterima pakai daripada A 41 k 33 Kanun Acara Sivil India 1908 memberi kuasa kepada mahkamah ini untuk melaksanakan keadilan sepenuhnya di antara parti-parti (lihat perenggan 45 dan 46). (15) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Tanah perayu-perayu yang telah dirampas melanggar peruntukan Akta itu. Rampasan ini tidak mengikut peruntukan undang-undang bertulis dan oleh itu melanggar perkara 13(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (lihat perenggan 47). (16) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Hak asasi yang dijamin oleh Perlembagaan adalah hak nilai tambahan. Kedua, oleh kerana ia adalah hak nilai tambahan, pelanggarannya mesti ditebus rugi oleh award pampasan tanpa bukti kerugian nyata, iaitu, pada dasar liabiliti ketat. Ketiga, Kerajaan Negeri bertanggungjawab memberi pampasan kepada seorang warganegara untuk pelanggaran hak perlembagaan beliau oleh cabang Kerajaan Negeri (lihat perenggan 65); Cullen v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Northern Ireland) [2003] WLR 1763 diikut. (17) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Liabiliti untuk pelanggaran sebarang hak asasi yang dijamin oleh Bahagian II Perlembagaan ||Page 310>> Persekutuan adalah ketat dan bukan berdasarkan kesalahan. Perayu-perayu berhak kepada pampasan munasabah untuk pelanggaran hak asasi yang dijamin oleh perkara 13(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (lihat perenggan 67 dan 68). (18) (oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR menentang) Untuk alasan-alasan yang telah diberikan, mahkamah akan membenarkan rayuan ini dan mengetepikan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi menolak saman dan memasukkan penghakiman untuk perayu-perayu (lihat perenggan 69).]

Notes For cases on Federal Consitution, art 13, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) para 2052–2054. For cases on validity of acquisition, see 8(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1716–1717. For right to property, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia, para [20.192].

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 130 Cases referred to Application of Tan Oon & Ors Tan Oon & 20 Ors, Re v Pemungut Hasil Tanah, Kuantan [1985] 1 MLJ 67 (refd) Bennett v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and others [1995] 1 WLR 488 (refd) Bourgoin SA and others v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1986] 1 QB 716 (refd) Brennan v Comcare [1994] 122 ALR 615 (refd) Byrne v Ireland (1972) IR 241 (refd) Carter v Bradbeer [1975] 3 All ER 158 (refd) Collector of Allahabad v Raja Ram Jaiswal AIR 1985 SC 1622 (refd) Cullen v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Northern Ireland) [2003] 1 WLR 1763 (folld) DK Basu v State of West Bengal AIR 1997 SC 617 (refd) Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158 (refd) Fose v Minister of Safety and Security [1996] 2 BCLR 232 (refd) Grunwick Processing Laboratories Ltd and others v Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service and another [1978] AC 655 (refd) Guan Seng Co Ltd, Taiping v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Larut dan Matang, Taiping [1994] 1 MLJ 4 (refd) Gulf Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Co v Ellis (1897) 165 US 150 (refd) Harris Solid State (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Bruno Gentil s/o Pereira & Ors [1996] 3 MLJ 489 (refd) Hong Lee Trading & Construction Sdn Bhd v Taut Hing Realty Sdn Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 250 (refd) Ketua Pengarah Kastam v Ho Kwan Seng [1977] 2 MLJ 152 (refd) Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v Zaid bin Hj Mohd Noh [1997] 1 MLJ 789 (refd) Lai Tai v The Collector of Land Revenue [1960] MLJ 82 (refd) Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar bin Mohamed Said [1982] 2 MLJ 156 (refd) Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago (No.2) [1979] AC 385 (refd) Nilabati Bahera v State of Orissa AIR 1993 SC 1960 (refd) Oag v R (1985) 22 CRR 171 (refd) Olive Casey Jaundoo v Attorney-General of Guyana [1971] AC 972 (refd) ||Page 311>> Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor Koh Chai Cheng v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 64 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 131 Othman & Anor v Mek [1972] 2 MLJ 158 (refd) Pemungut Hasil Tanah, Daerah Barat Daya, Pulau Pinang v Ong Gaik Kee [1983] 2 MLJ 35 (refd) R v Germain (1984) 10 CRR 232 (refd) R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (refd) S Kulasingham & Anor v Commissioner of Lands, Federal Territory & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 204 (refd) Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (refd) Societe United Docks and others v Government of Mauritius; Marine Workers Union and others v Mauritius Marine Authority [1985] AC 585 (refd) State (at the Prosecution of Philip Anthony Quinn) v Detective Inspector Matthew G Ryan and Deputy Commissioner WP Quinn (1965) IR 70 (refd) Superintendent of Lands And Surveys, Sarawak v Aik Hoe & Co Ltd [1966] 1 MLJ 243 (refd) Syed Omar bin Abdul Rahman Taha Alsagoff & Anor v Government of the State of Johore [1975] 1 MLJ 241 (refd) United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd v Ernest Cheong Yong Yin [2001] 1 MLJ 561 (refd) Wong Kee Sing Realty Sdn Bhd v The Collector of Land Revenue, District of Gombak [1995] MLJU 187 (refd)

Legislation referred to Civil Procedure Code 1908 [India] O 41 r 33 Constitution of Guyana art 8(1) Constitution of Mauritius Constitution of Trinidad & Tobago s 1(a) Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 69(4) Employment Protection Act 1975 [UK] s 14(1) Federal Constitution arts 5(1), 4(1), 8(1), 13(1), 160(2), Pt II Government Proceedings Act 1956 s 33(4) Land Acquisition Act 1960 ss 2(1), 4, (1), (2), (3), (4), 5(1), 7, 8, (1), 10, (1), (3), 11, (1), (2), 52, 53, (1), (2), (3), 56, First Sch paras 1(1)(a), 1(1)(b), Forms A, B, D, E, F Land Acquisition Act 1894 [India] s 4(1) National Land Code s 431, (1)(b)(c) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 132 Appeal from Originating Summons No. 24–235 of 1995 (High Court, Seremban)

K Ananthan (K Kirubakaran with him) (Kiru & Yong) for the appellants. Engku Nor Faizah bte Engku Atek (State Legal Advisor, Negeri Sembilan) for the respondent.

[2004] 3 MLJ 517 DATO’ SERI ANWAR BIN IBRAHIM v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

FEDERAL COURT (MALAYSIA) — CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 05–4 OF 2000 (W) ABDUL MALEK AHMAD PCA, SITI NORMA YAAKOB AND ALAUDDIN FCJJ 15 SEPTEMBER 2004

Constitutional Law — Courts — Federal Court — Inherent powers of court — Whether Federal Court has jurisdiction to reopen and review matter — Rules of the Federal Court 1995 r 137 — Effect of r 137

Criminal Procedure — Appeal — Evidence — New evidence not available at trial — Criteria of new evidence — When could new evidence be adduced — Whether exceptional circumstance or fraud or suppression exists — Whether tantamount to an attempt to relitigate issues which has been otherwise conclusively settled

Criminal Procedure — Judgment — Double judgment — Two separate judgments on two separate issues — Whether judgments represent judgment of court — Whether s 94(2) of Courts of Judicature Act 1964 an impingement to judicial independence — Effect of s 94

The applicant filed four motions. The first motion vide encl 80(a) was for an order that the court invoked its inherent powers under r 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995 (‘the RFC’) to set aside the convictions and sentences of the applicant that were confirmed and upheld by the Federal Court on 10 July 2002. The second motion at encl 89(a), the applicant prayed for an order that the court invoke its inherent powers under r 137 of the RFC to allow fresh or additional evidence affecting the trial to be adduced as such evidence was not available during the trial. The third and fourth motions by encls 97(a) and 124(a), was for an order that he be given leave to rely on additional grounds at the hearing of his encl 80(a). The additional grounds included the assertion that s 94(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘the CJA’) was unconstitutional and void, and of no effect as it impinged on the

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 133 judicial independence of judges. At the commencement of the proceedings, the respondent raised a preliminary objection on the first motion that the court did not have the necessary jurisdiction either in law or under common law to relitigate on such appeals.

Held, dismissing the applications: (1) (per Abdul Malek Ahmad PCA) The Federal Court has the jurisdiction to hear an application under r 137 of the RFC where it was found necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the court (see para 44). (2) (per Abdul Malek Ahmad PCA) Under r 137 of the RFC, the Federal Court has the jurisdiction and power to reopen and review any matter already decided by the court if there was allegation of injustice or abuse of the process of the court. Clause 2(c) of art 121 of the FC provides ‘such other jurisdiction as may be conferred by or under Federal law’. Consequently, para (b) of the definition of ‘Federal law’ at cl (2) of art 160 ||Page 518>> of the FC only applies to any Act of Parliament. This includes the RFC, being a subsidiary legislation of the relevant Act of Parliament, namely the Courts of Judicature Act. By virtue of ss 16 and 17 of the CJA, the rules could be made for the practice and procedure where the courts have jurisdiction (see paras 45 and 46). (3) (per Alauddin FCJ) On the facts, the new evidence submitted by the applicant in para 17 of encl 89(a) was not evidence that was not available at the trial. It was available at during the trial and the trial judge had dismissed the evidence as being irrelevant. As the evidence had no relevance to the charges faced by the applicant, it could not materially affect the result of the case. Therefore, the evidence did not qualify as new or additional evidence (see paras 82 and 83). (4) (per Alauddin FCJ) There was no exceptional circumstance, no fraud or suppression of evidence and neither was there new evidence before the court which merited the court to reopen or rehear the case (see para 88). (5) (per Alauddin FCJ) The contempt proceedings was a separate proceedings. There was no nexus between the allegation of fabrication and the corruption appeal. The findings and observations in the Federal Court pertaining to the contempt proceedings had no bearing at all on the corruption charges. By introducing new grounds, the applicant attempted relitigate the issues which had been conclusively settled (see paras 96 and 105). (6) (per Siti Norma Yaakob FCJ) Section 94(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘the CJA’) and its proviso do not have the effect of curtailing the judicial independence of any individual judge when the Chief Justice determines who should prepare and deliver separate judgments in a criminal appeal or matter. Thus, the applicant could not rely on his objection to s 94(2) of the CJA and its proviso to support his claim to have his appeals reviewed before another panel

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 134 of the court on the ground that the provision impinged on the independence of individual judge (see para 69). (7) (per Siti Norma Yaakob FCJ) Although the concurrence of the other two members was not expressly stated in the judgment, it made no difference if such concurrence had been more than adequately revealed in the language of the judgment (see para 66). (8) (per Siti Norma Yaakob FCJ) The two separate judgments delivered in the applicant’s appeals were adequately and unanimously decided on the main issues of conviction and sentence. Read together, the judgments represented the judgment of the court. The absence of a written judgment of the third member of the corum, did not affect the legality of the judgment and neither could it be taken to mean that he had dissented (see para 68).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon telah memfailkan empat usul. Usul pertama pada lampiran 80(a) adalah untuk satu perintah supaya mahkamah menggunakan kuasa-kuasa ||Page 519>> sedia adanya di bawah k 137 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Persekutuan 1995 (‘KMP’) bagi mengenepikan sabitan dan hukuman pemohon yang telah disah dan dikekalkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan pada 10 Julai 2002. Usul kedua pada lampiran 89(a), pemohon telah memohon untuk satu perintah bahawa mahkamah menggunakan kuasa-kuasa sedia adanya di bawah k 137 KMP untuk membenarkan keterangan baru atau tambahan yang memberi kesan kepada perbicaraan dikemukakan kerana keterangan tersebut tidak ada semasa perbicaraan. Usul ketiga dan keempat pada lampiran-lampiran 97(a) dan 124(a), adalah untuk perintah bahawa pemohon diberikan kebenaran untuk bergantung kepada alasan-alasan tambahan semasa pembicaraan lampiran 80(a). Alasan-alasan tambahan termasuklah pernyataan bahawa s 94(2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (‘AMK’) bercanggah dengan perlembagaan dan tidak sah, dan tidak mempunyai kesan kerana ianya mencerobohi kebebasan kehakiman para hakim. Pada permulaan prosiding, responden membangkitkan suatu bantahan awal berhubung dengan usul pertama bahawa mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa sama ada di bawah undang-undang atau common law untuk melitigasikan semula rayuan-rayuan tersebut.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan-permohonan tersebut: (1) (oleh Abdul Malek Ahmad PMR) Mahkamah Persekutuan mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar permohonan di bawah k 137 KMP apabila ia berpendapat ianya adalah perlu untuk menghalang ketidakadilan atau bagi menghalang penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah (lihat perenggan 44). (2) (oleh Abdul Malek Ahmad PMR) Di bawah k 137 KMP, Mahkamah

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 135 Persekutuan mempunyai bidang kuasa dan kuasa untuk membuka kembali dan mengkaji semula sebarang perkara yang telah diputuskan oleh mahkamah jika terdapat dakwaan ketidakadilan atau penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. Fasal 2(c) per 121 PP memperuntukkan ‘apa-apa bidang kuasa lain yang diberikan oleh atau di bawah undang-undang persekutuan.’ Maka dengan itu, maksud ‘undang-undang persekutuan’ para (b) pada fasal 2 per 160 PP hanya terpakai kepada mana-mana Akta Parlimen. Ini termasuk KMP, yang merupakan undang-undang subsidiari Akta Parlimen berkenaan, iaitu Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman. Di bawah ss 16 dan 17 AMK, peraturan boleh dibuat untuk amalan dan prosedur di mana mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa (lihat perenggan 45 dan 46). (3) (oleh Alauddin HMP) Pada fakta, keterangan baru yang dikatakan oleh pemohon dalam perenggan 17 lampiran 89(a) bukanlah satu keterangan yang tidak ada semasa perbicaraan. Ianya ada semasa perbicaraan dan hakim bicara telah memutuskan bahawa keterangan tersebut tidak relevan. Oleh kerana keterangan tersebut tidak relevan kepada pertuduhan yang dihadapi oleh pemohon, ianya tidak memberi kesan yang material kepada keputusan kes. Oleh yang demikian, ||Page 520>> keterangan tersebut bukanlah satu keterangan yang baru atau tambahan (lihat perenggan 82 dan 83). (4) (oleh Alauddin HMP) Tiada keadaan yang mengecualikan, tiada penipuan atau menyekat keterangan dan tiada keterangan baru di hadapan mahkamah yang memeritkan mahkamah untuk membuka semula atau mendengar semula kes tersebut (lihat perenggan 88). (5) (oleh Alauddin HMP) Prosiding penghinaan mahkamah adalah satu prosiding yang berasingan. Tidak terdapat sebarang kaitan di antara pertuduhan rekaan/pemalsuan dan rayuan rasuah. Keputusan dan pemerhatian Mahkamah Persekutuan berhubung dengan prosiding penghinaan mahkamah tidak mempunyai sebarang kesan langsung ke atas pertuduhan rasuah. Dengan memperkenalkan alasan-alasan baru, ianya satu percubaan oleh pemohon untuk cuba melitigasikan semula isu-isu yang telah diputuskan (lihat perenggan 96 dan 105). (6) (oleh Siti Norma Yaakob HMP) Seksyen 94(2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (‘AMK’) dan peruntukan-peruntukannya tidak memberi kesan menghalang kebebasan kehakiman seseorang hakim apabila Hakim Besar memutuskan siapa harus menyediakan dan memberi penghakiman yang berasingan di dalam satu rayuan atau perkara jenayah. Dari itu, pemohon tidak dapat bergantung pada bantahan yang s 94(2) AMK dan pertuntukan-peruntukannya menyokong permohonannya untuk kajian semula rayuannya di hadapan panel hakim yang lain atas alasan peruntukan tersebut menceroboh kebebasan kehakiman seseorang hakim (lihat perenggan 69). (7) (oleh Siti Norma Yaakob HMP) Walaupun persetujuan dua hakim yang lain tidak dinyatakan dengan nyata di dalam penghakiman, ianya tidak memberi

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 136 sebarang perbezaan kerana persetujuan para hakim tersurat dengan jelas dari bahasa yang digunakan didalam penghakiman tersebut (lihat perenggan 66). (8) (oleh Siti Norma Yaakob HMP) Dua penghakiman berasingan yang diberikan pada masa rayuan pemohon adalah mencukupi dan secara sebulat suara memutuskan isu utama berhubung dengan sabitan dan hukuman. Dibaca bersama, penghakiman-penghakiman tersebut mewakili penghakiman mahkamah. Ketiadaan penghakiman bertulis dari ahli ketiga korum, tidak memberi kesan kepada kesahihan penghakiman dan tidak juga bermakna beliau tidak bersetuju (lihat perenggan 68).]

Notes For cases on double judgment, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1886–1888. For cases on evidence in appeal, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 255–294. For cases on the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1677–1678. For cases on the power and duty of the appellate court, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 160–214. ||Page 521>>

Cases referred to Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v Kobchai Sosothikul (Federal Court Civil Appeal No 02-14-1997(P)) (refd) Allied Capital Sdn Bhd v Mohamed Latiff bin Shah Mohd and another application [2001] 2 MLJ 305 (refd) Asiatic Development Bhd & Anor v Balachandar a/l Palanysamy [1995] 3 MLJ 445 (refd) Attorney-General v Sillem (1864) 11 ER 1200 (refd) Auto Dunia Sdn Bhd v Wong Sai Fatt & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 549 (distd) British South Africa Co v Compania de Mocambique (1893) AC 602 (refd) Chia Yan Tek & Anor v Ng Swee Kiat & Anor [2001] 4 MLJ 1 (refd) Dato’ Mohamed Hashim Shamsuddin v Attorney-General, HongKong [1986] 2 MLJ 112 (refd) Dato’ Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v PP [1983] 2 MLJ 232 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v PP [2002] 3 MLJ 193 (refd) Juraimi bin Husin v PP; Mohd Affandi bin Abdul Rahman & Anor v PP [1998] 1 MLJ 537 (refd) Keshodass Wadhumal Advani v Syed Murtaza Ali Khan AIR 1952 All 318 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 137 Lau Foo Sun v Government of Malaysia [1970] 2 MLJ 70 (refd) Lo Fat Thjan & Ors v PP [1968] 1 MLJ 274 (refd) Lye Thai Sang & Anor v Faber Merlin (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 166 (refd) Megat Najmuddin bin Dato’ Seri Dr Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Sdn Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 (refd) MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2002] 2 MLJ 673 (refd) Mohamed bin Jamal v PP [1964] MLJ 254 (refd) Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd v United Engineers (Malaysia) Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 143 (refd) R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577 (refd) R v Parks [1961] 3 All ER 633 (refd) Re Zainur Zakaria [1999] 2 MLJ 577 (refd) Seray-Wurie v Hackney London Borough Council [2002] 3 All ER 448 (refd) Tai Chai Yu v The Chief Registrar of the Federal Court [1998] 2 MLJ 474 (refd) Taylor & Anor v Lawrence & Anor [2002] 1 All ER 353 (refd) Tunde Apatira & Ors v PP [2001] 1 MLJ 259 (refd) Wong Siew Choong Sdn Bhd v Anvest Corporation Sdn Bhd (Federal Court Civil Appeal No 02-5-2003(W) (refd) Zainur Zakaria v PP [2001] 3 MLJ 604 (refd)

Legislation referred to Constitution of India art 137 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ss 16(1), 17, 68(1)(a), 74(2), 78(1), 92(1), 94(2) Courts of Judicature Act No 7 of 1964 Courts Ordinance 1948 s 31(2) Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 1970 ss 2(1) Evidence Act 1950 s 167 Federal Constitution arts 121, (2)(c), 124(2), 128, 130, 160(2)(b) Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance 1948 Judges’ Code of Conduct 1994 r 3(1)(d) Rules of the Federal Court 1995 rr 63, 137 Supreme Court Rules 1966 [India] O 40 ||Page 522>>

Appeal from Criminal Appeal No W–05–25 of 1999 & W–05–27 of 1999 (Court of Appeal, Malaysia)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 138 Karpal Singh (SN Nair, Gobind Singh Deo, Kamar Ainiah Kamaruzaman, Pawancheek Marican, Zulkifli Noordin, Saiful Izham Ramli, Christopher Fernando and Marisa Regina with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant. Abdul Gani Patail AG (Mohd Yusof Hj Zainal Abiden, Abdul Majid Tun Hamzah and Ahmad Fairuz Zainol Abidin with him) (AG’s Chambers) for the respondent. Vernon Ong (Bar Council) watching brief.

Cur Adv Vult

[2004] 4 MLJ 466 BEATRICE A/P AT FERNANDEZ v SISTEM PENERBANGAN MALAYSIA & ANOR

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–186 OF 1996 ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD FCJ, ARIFIN ZAKARIA AND MOHD GHAZALI JJCA 5 OCTOBER 2004

Constitutional Law — Equal protection — Collective agreement similar to court order and not considered law in context of art 8 — Only binding on individual parties — Whether art 8 only protect and provide remedy to private individual and not public authority — Federal Constitution art 8

Labour Law — Employment — Termination of service — Terms and conditions of collective agreement — Right to terminate service if requirement to resign once pregnant not followed — Whether termination of service void — Whether contravene Federal Constitution and Employment Act 1955 — Federal Constitution art 8, Employment Act 1955 ss 37, 40

Labour Law — Employment — Damages — Loss of employment and benefits — Whether entitled to claim

The appellant was a flight stewardess with the first respondent, Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia. Her terms and conditions of service was governed by a collective agreement, whereby art 2(3) required the appellant to resign if she became pregnant. In event she failed to do so, the company shall have the right to terminate her services. The appellant became pregnant and refused to resign. Thus, the first respondent terminated her services. The appellant commenced proceedings in the High Court praying for a declaration that: (i) arts 2, 14 and 19 of the collective agreement contravened art 8 of the Federal Constitution and was therefore void and (ii) the appellant’s termination of

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 139 service was void as it contravened s 14(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 and ss 37 and 40 of the Employment Act 1955. This was her appeal to the Court of Appeal against the High Court judge’s decision in dismissing her application.

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: (1) A collective agreement, though taken cognizance of by the Industrial Court was only binding on the parties therein, though enforceable by the Industrial Court. The discrimination prohibited by art 8(2) of the Federal Constitution as at the date applicable to this case was on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of birth, none of which applied to this case. In any event, it can be argued that art 2(3) of the First Schedule of the collective agreement is discriminatory just as it cannot reasonably be argued that the provision of the law giving maternity leave only to women is discriminatory as against men. Thus, this ground had no merits. A case has to be decided on its facts. The appellant did not introduce any evidence that the first appellant is ‘a public authority’ to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional ||Page 467>> provision. A mere statement that the first appellant was a government agency was not sufficient (see paras 7–9, 14). (2) It was argued that art 2(3) of the First Schedule to the collective agreement contravened the provisions of s 37 of the Employment Act 1955. There was no relevance of that provision to the facts of this case. Similarly, the provision of s 40 of the Employment Act 1955 had no relevance in the instant case as it only requires a female employee who is leaving her employment to give four months notice to her employer about her pregnancy failing which she would not be entitled to any maternity allowance. Thus, no ‘purposive interpretation’ could be given to the provision to render the provisions of the collective agreement null and void (see paras 16–17).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Perayu seorang pramugari dengan responden pertama, Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia. Terma dan syarat perkhidmatan beliau dikawal oleh satu perjanjian kolektif, di mana perkara 2(3) menghendaki beliau berhenti kerja jika beliau mengandung. Sekiranya gagal berbuat demikian, syarikat berhak untuk menamatkan perkhidmatannya. Perayu mengandung dan enggan berhenti kerja. Oleh itu, responden pertama telah menamatkan perkhidmatan beliau. Perayu telah memulakan prosiding di Mahkamah Tinggi memohon satu deklarasi bahawa: (i) perkara-perkara 2, 14 dan 19 perjanjian kolektif bertentangan dengan perkara 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan oleh itu adalah tidak sah; dan (ii) penamatan perkhidmatan perayu adalah tidak sah kerana ia bertentangan dengan s 14(3) Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 dan ss 37 dan 40 Akta Pekerjaan 1955. Ini adalah rayuan beliau ke Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keputusan hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang menolak permohonan beliau.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 140

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: (1) Satu perjanjian kolektif, walaupun diketahui oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan hanya terikat ke atas pihak-pihak, meskipun boleh dikuatkuasakan oleh Mahkamah Perusahaan. Diskriminasi yang dihalang oleh perkara 8(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan seperti pada masa kes ini dibuat adalah hanya atas alasan agama, bangsa, keturunan atau tempat kelahiran, yang mana tiada berkaitan dalam kes ini. Dalam apa keadaan, ia boleh dihujah bahawa perkara 2(3) kepada Jadual Pertama perjanjian kolektif adalah bersifat diskriminasi sama seperti ia tidak boleh dihujahkan secara munasabah bahawa peruntukan undang-undang yang memberikan cuti bersalin kepada wanita adalah bersifat diskriminasi terhadap lelaki. Oleh itu, alasan ini tiada merit. Suatu kes hendaklah diputuskan berdasarkan faktanya. Perayu tidak memperkenalkan apa-apa keterangan bahawa perayu pertama adalah ‘a public authority’ untuk merangkumkannya di bawah peruntukan perlembagaan. Kenyataan bahawa perayu pertama adalah satu agensi kerajaan tidak memadai (see paras 7–9, 14). ||Page 468>> (2) Adalah dihujahkan bahawa perkara 2(3) kepada Jadual Pertama perjanjian kolektif bertentangan dengan peruntukan s 37 Akta Pekerjaan 1955. Tiada kaitan peruntukan tersebut dengan fakta kes ini. Tambahan pula, peruntukan s 40 Akta Pekerjaan 1955 tiada kaitan dalam kes semasa kerana ia hanya menghendaki pekerja wanita yang meninggalkan pekerjaannya untuk memberikan notis empat bulan kepada majikan tentang keadaan beliau yang mengandung di mana beliau tidak akan berhak kepada apa-apa elaun bersalin. Oleh itu, tiada ‘purposive interpretation’ akan diberikan kepada peruntukan tersebut untuk menyebabkan perjanjian kolektif tersebut terbatal dan tidak sah (lihat perenggan 16–17).]

Notes For cases on damages under employment, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 829–835. For cases on equal protection, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1760–1767. For cases on termination of service, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1141–1179.

Cases referred to Air India v Nergesh Meerza (1981) 68 AIR 1829 (refd)

Legislation referred to Employment Act 1955 ss 37, 40

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 141 Federal Constitution art 8(2) Industrial Relations Act 1967 s 14(3) Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s 17A Labour Act 1955 s 7

[2004] 5 MLJ 193 KOK WAH KUAN v PENGARAH PENJARA KAJANG, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO 44–62 OF 2003 HELILIAH J 12 JANUARY 2004

Constitutional Law — Legislature — Legislative competence — Competency of Parliament — Whether competency extended to conferring sentencing powers upon High Court — Child Act 2001 s 97; Federal Constitution art 4

Criminal Procedure — Habeas Corpus — Proper procedure — Application for habeas corpus — Whether an abuse of court process — Criminal Procedure Code s 365

This was an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The applicant was found guilty and convicted of an offence under s 302 of the Penal Code by the High Court. The High Court however invoked s 97 of the Child Act 2001 (‘the Child Act’) which provides for the power of the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong to determine the applicant’s measure and to detain such applicant at his Majesty’s pleasure. A preliminary objection was raised in that this application was an abuse of the process of court and that it was not available on an order of detention made by the High Court. The issue for consideration was whether Parliament was competent to confer upon the High Court the powers under s 97 of the Child Act, that is to pass such sentence.

Held, dismissing the application and upholding the preliminary objection: (1) The filing of the application for review on habeas corpus in this case appears to be a very pre-emptive process. In order for the High Court to arrive at a finding that the applicant had not been afforded a fair hearing by an independent and impartial court, it must necessarily precede with a finding that Parliament in legislating upon s 97 of the Child Act has caused an intrusion into judicial power and therefore was not competent to do so. Such an issue should

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 142 be brought by a process instituted under art 4(3) of the Federal Constitution (see para 85). (2) Furthermore, in this case, what was sought to be achieved was not necessarily confined to a review of the competence of Parliament. It appeared that the scope of review was being extended to the question of the death sentence. These were questions of policy that were not justifiable questions (see para 99). (3) Even if it was within the competence of the High Court to declare s 97(2) void, it would lead to an absurd situation that while the trial of the applicant before the High Court has been properly conducted in the lawful exercise of a judicial power to conduct trials, the sentence becomes void and thus resulting the court having to order the release of the applicant. This could not be intended to be the object of review on habeas corpus if the exercise resulted in a process running parallel to the appeal where a court of coordinate jurisdiction in effect reviews the decision of the another court of coordinate jurisdiction (see para 92). (4) The application therefore was not an abuse of the process of the court in the full sense but to the extent that it was a wrong use of the mode ||Page 194>> of the process to review the powers of Parliament. The High Court therefore would be acting in excess of its powers if it were to continue with the hearing on the merits of the application in violation of art 4(3) of the Federal Constitution (see para 99).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Ini merupakan satu permohonan untuk writ habeas corpus. Pemohon telah didapati bersalah dan telah disabitkan untuk satu kesalahan di bawah s 302 Kanun Keseksaan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Mahkamah Tinggi telah memakai s 97 Akta Kanak-Kanak 2001 (‘Akta Kanak-Kanak’) yang memperuntukkan untuk kuasa Yang Di-Pertuan Agong untuk menentukan langkah-langkah pemohon dan untuk menahan pemohon itu pada perkenan Yang Di-Pertuan Agong. Satu bantahan awal telah dibangkitkan bahawa permohonan ini adalah penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah dan ia tidak dapat diberikan untuk satu perintah tahanan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Isu untuk dipertimbangkan adalah sama ada Parlimen kompeten untuk memberi kepada Mahkamah Tinggi kuasa-kuasa di bawah s 97 Akta Kanak-Kanak, untuk menjatuhkan hukuman itu.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut dan mengekalkan bantahan awal: (1) Pemfailan permohonan untuk kajian semula penghakiman pada habeas corpus di dalam kes ini seakan proses terlebih dahulu. Untuk Mahkamah Tinggi membuat keputusan bahawa pemohon tidak diberikan pendengaran yang adil oleh mahkamah yang bebas dan saksama ia mesti mendahului dengan keputusan bahawa Parlimen di dalam menggubal s 97 Akta Kanak-Kanak telah campur

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 143 tangan di dalam kuasa kehakiman dan oleh itu tidak kompeten untuk berbuat sebegitu. Isu seperti itu patut dibawa oleh proses yang dimulakan di bawah perkara 4(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (lihat perenggan 85). (2) Tambahan pula di dalam kes ini, apa yang hendak dibuat tidak terbatas kepada satu kajian semula sama ada Parlimen kompeten. Ia seakan-akan bahawa skop kajian semula telah diluaskan kepada persoalan hukuman mati. Terdapat persoalan polisi yang bukan persoalan yang boleh diadili (lihat perenggan 99). (3) Walaupun jika Mahkamah Tinggi kompeten untuk mengisytiharkan s 97(2) tidak sah, ini akan membawa kepada satu keadaan yang tidak munasabah bahawa walaupun perbicaraan pemohon di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi dijalankan dengan betul di dalam penggunaan kuasa kehakiman untuk menjalankan perbicaraan yang betul, hukuman itu akan menjadi tidak sah dan ini mungkin mengakibatkan mahkamah memerintahkan pembebasan pemohon. Ini tidak mungkin tujuan kajian semula pada habeas corpus jika proses ini mengakibatkan satu proses yang sama dengan rayuan di mana satu mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa yang sama mengkaji semula keputusan mahkamah lain yang mempunyai bidang kuasa sama (lihat perenggan 92). (4) Permohonan ini bukan penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah sepenuhnya tetapi ke tahap bahawa ia adalah penggunaan yang salah proses untuk mengkaji semula kuasa-kuasa Parlimen. Mahkamah Tinggi akan bertindak ||Page 195>> melebihi kuasanya jika ia terus mendengar merit-merit permohonan melanggar perkara 4(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (lihat perenggan 99).]

Notes For cases on legislative competence, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1945–1951. For cases on the proper procedure for habeas corpus, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1803–1818.

Cases referred to Abed Hussein v United Kingdom [1996] 22 EHRR 1 (refd) Adegbenro v Akintola & Anor [1963] 3 All ER 544 (folld) Ah Thian v Government of Malaysia [1976] MLJ 112 (folld) BR Rao v State of Orissa [1971] SC 2197 (refd) Benjamin v UK [2002] 13 BHRC 287 (cit) Dato Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 (refd) Director of Public Prosecutors of Jamaica v Mollison [2003] 2 WLR 1160 (distd) Ex Parte Corke [1954] 2 All ER 440 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 144 Gurbachan Singh’s application, Re [1963] 1 MLJ 74 (refd) Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 195 (refd) James v Commonwealth of Australia [1936] AC 578 (cit) Kestle, Re [1980] 2 NZLR 337 (refd) Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 (folld) Merdeka University Berhad v Government of Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 356 (refd) Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981] 1 MLJ 64 (refd) PP v Dato’ Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311 (refd) PP v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris [1976] 2 MLJ 116 (refd) R (on the application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 4 All ER 1089 (distd) Stafford v UK [2002] 13 BHRC 260 (cit) State of Kelantan v The Government of the Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj [1963] MLJ 359 (refd) Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1991] 1 MLJ 266 (refd)

Legislation referred to Child Act 2001 s 97 Criminal Procedure Code ss 183, 365, 418A, Chapter XX Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ss 22, 84, Constitution (Jamaica) ss 2, 15, 20 European Convention on Human Rights art 6 Federal Constitution arts 4, 5, 39, 40, 44, 51, 74, 121, 125, 128 Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1972 s 4 Juvenile Courts Act 1951 [Jamaica] s 29 Human Rights Act 1998 [UK] ss 2, 4 Penal Code ss 82, 302 Penalty Act (Abolition of Death) [UK] 1965 Prisons Act 1995 s 64 United Convention on the Rights of the Child arts 6, 37

Karpal Singh (Karpal Singh & Co) for the applicant. Tun Abdul Majid Tun Hamzah (Mohd Hanafiah Zakaria and Sharyza Alis with him) for the respondent. ||Page 196>>

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 145

[2004] 7 MLJ 267 ABDUL RAZAK BIN BAHARUDIN & ORS v KETUA POLIS NEGARA & ORS

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO 44-66 OF 2003 ABDUL KADIR MUSA J 17 MAY 2004

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Habeas Corpus — Application for — Detention grounds referred to applicants as members of Jemaah Islamiah — Art 11(1) of Federal Constitution guarantees freedom of religion — Whether detention ground inconsistent with Art 11 — Federal Constitution Arts 11 & 149 — Internal Security Act 1960 s 8(1)

Constitutional Law — Preventive Detention — Grounds of arrest — Detention under Internal Security Act 1960 — Detention order under s 8(1) of the Internal Security Act 1960 — Detention grounds referred to applicants as members of Jemaah Islamiah — Art 11(1) of Federal Constitution guarantees freedom of religion — Whether applicants acted or are likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof — Internal Security Act 1960 s 8(1)

The applicants filed this application for an order, inter alia, that the arrest and detention of each one of them under the Internal Security Act 1960 was unlawful, illegal and a nullity; and for an issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for each one of them for their immediate release on the grounds that: (1) their arrest and detention were allegedly done mala fide; (2) their arrest and detention were against the freedom to practice Islam under Art 11 of the Federal Constitution; and (3) there is no establishment known as Jemaah Islamiah and that the applicants are members of the lawfully registerered ‘Pertubuhan Al-Ehsan’.

Held, dismissing the application: (1) The facts of this application are not of the ‘freedom of religion’ as of fact, but of activities which the Minister rightly concluded were ‘prejudicial to the security’ of the country and must be ‘prevented’ as required under s 8(1) of the Internal Security Act 1960 (see para 37). (2) The Minister did not just mechanically issue the detention order without considering relevant facts and material particulars pertaining to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof. The purpose of such issuance is ‘for the purpose of preventing the Applicants from [continuing] acting in any manner prejudicial

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 146 to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof in line with the spirit of section 8(1) of the ISA’ (see para 44).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon–pemohon memfailkan permohonan ini untuk antara lain satu perintah bahawa penangkapan dan tahanan mereka di bawah Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960 adalah tidak mengikut undang-undang, ||Page 268>> tidak sah dan terbatal; dan untuk mendapatkan writ habeas corpus untuk setiap seorang mereka untuk mereka dibebaskan serta-merta atas alasan: (1) tangkapan dan tahanan mereka kononnya dilakukan dengan niat jahat; (2) tangkapan dan tahanan mereka bertentangan dengan kebebasan untuk mengamalkan agama Islam di bawah Artikel 11 Perlembagaan Persekutuan; (3) tidak ada pertubuhan yang dikenali sebagai Jemaah Islamiah dan pemohon-pemohon adalah ahli pertubuhan yang didaftarkan mengikut undang-undang iaitu ‘Pertubuhan Al-Ehsan’.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Fakta permohonan ini bukanlah mengenai ‘kebebasan beragama’, tetapi mengenai tindakan menteri yang dengan betul membuat kesimpulan bahawa ‘prejudis kepada keselamatan’ negara dan harus dihalang seperti yang diperlukan di bawah s 8(1) Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960 (lihat perenggan 37). (2) Menteri tersebut tidak secara mekanikal mengeluarkan perintah tahanan tanpa mengira fakta yang relevan dengan butir-butir yang material mengenai keselamatan Malaysia atau sebahagianya. Tujuan pengeluaran perintah tersebut adalah untuk mengelak pemohon-pemohon dari [terus]bertindak dengan apa juga cara yang prejudis kepada keselamatan Malaysia atau sebahagianya sejajar dengar jiwa s 8(1) Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri (lihat perenggan 44).

Notes For cases on habeas corpus, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1820–1826 For cases on prevention of detention, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) para 1985

Cases referred to Jamaluddin bin Othman v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor [1989] 1 MLJ 368 (refd) Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & other appeals [2002] 4 MLJ 449 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 147 Yap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279

Legislation referred to Delegation of Powers Act 1956 s 6 Federal Constitution arts 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 149(1), 151(2) Internal Security Act 1960 ss 5(3), 8(1), 8B(1), 11(1), (2)(b)(i) and (ii), 73(1)

Edmund Don (Edward Saw, Amir Hamzah and Abdul Rashid with him) (Chooi &Co) for the applicants Ishak Yusof DPP (Mohd Hanafiah with him) for the respondents ||Page 269>>

[2003] 1 MLJ 321 Kam Teck Soon v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors and other appeals

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS 05–25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 AND 32 OF 2001(A) AHMAD FAIRUZ CJ (MALAYA), ABDUL MALEK AHMAD FCJ AND MOKHTAR SIDIN JCA 15 NOVEMBER 2002

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Arrest and subsequent detention by police — Rights of person arrested and detained — Validity of detention order — Whether detention order within the period of 60 days detention of the appellant — Whether the arrest and detention was improper — Whether the detention order was bad in law — Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 s 3(1) — Federal Constitution arts 5(3), 149 and 150(2)

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Detention — Rights of person arrested and detained — Right to be informed of power by virtue of which arrest and detention effected — Right to be informed of grounds of arrest — Whether the arrest and detention of the appellant under s 3(1) of the Ordinance violated art 5(3) of the Constitution — Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 s 3(1) — Federal Constitution arts 5(3), 149 and 150(2)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 148 Eight appeals were heard together as it was agreed that the decision in the first appeal would bind the other seven. The appellant in the first appeal was arrested on 8 July 1999 at the Kuala Lumpur Police Headquarters by Detective Sergeant Abdullah bin Awang who affirmed that on arresting the appellant, he had told the appellant that he was arrested under s 3(1) of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 (‘the Ordinance’) as there was reason to believe that there were grounds that would justify the appellant’s detention. However, he did not disclose to the appellant the information received that caused him to have the reason to believe that there were grounds justifying the detention. Having been arrested under s 3(1) of the Ordinance, the appellant was served with a detention order, signed on 1 September 1999 by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, on 2 September 1999. That detention order was to take effect on 5 September 1999. Learned counsel for the appellant raised two issues. The first, pertaining to counsel’s contention that the arrest and detention of the appellant under s 3(1) of the Ordinance violated art 5(3) of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’) and consequently the arrest and detention were improper. As such, the detention order should be set aside as the continued detention of the appellant was bad in law. The second issue was only confined to the first appeal and it concerned the signing by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs of the detention order on 1 September 1999 but to take effect on 5 September 1999. ||Page 322>>

Held, dismissing the appeals: (1) (per Ahmad Fairuz CJ (Malaya)) In the light of Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1989] 3 MLJ 121, it must be stressed that the Ordinance was promulgated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under art 150(2) of the Constitution before it was amended in 1981. Furthermore, the relevant art 150(6) (before it was amended) stated that ‘No provision of any law or ordinance ... promulgated in pursuance of this Article shall be invalid on the ground of any inconsistency with the provisions of Part II, and Article 79 shall not apply...’. Therefore, s 3(1) of the Ordinance could not be contended to be invalid just because it was inconsistent with art 5(3) of the Constitution (see pp 331F, H–I, 332A); Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1989] 3 MLJ 121 followed. (2) (per Ahmad Fairuz CJ (Malaya)) If s 3(1) was inconsistent with art 5(3) then s 3(1) must prevail. This would save the arrest and detention which would have been unlawful because of violation of art 5(3). That was the purpose of art 150(6). The appellant’s contention that the arrest and detention violated art 5(3) and thus unlawful would defeat the purpose and intention of art 150 (see p 332A–B). (3) (per Ahmad Fairuz CJ (Malaya)) Furthermore, s 3(1) only requires the arresting officer to have ‘reason to believe that there are grounds ...’. It does not require the grounds to be informed to the arrested person. Even if it is so required because of art 5(3), what the arresting officer had informed the

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 149 appellant was sufficient compliance with art 5(3) (see p 332C–D); Christie & Anor v Leachinsky [1947] 1 All ER 567 followed. If what had been communicated to the appellant by the arresting officer was not a sufficient compliance of art 5(3), then art 150(2) and (6) of the Constitution clearly show that the provisions of the Ordinance must prevail over the Constitution. Furthermore, s 3(5) of the Ordinance states in no uncertain terms that the appellant ‘shall be deemed to be in lawful custody’. As such, if art 5(3) applies to arrest and detention under the Ordinance, then s 3(5) makes the unlawful detention because of the breach of art 5(3) lawful (see pp 332C–E, 333A). (4) (per Ahmad Fairuz CJ (Malaya)) On the issue of the date of signing of the detention order, the case of Tan Hoon Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor and another appeal [1990] 1 MLJ 171 was referred. There it was held that since the Ordinance was silent on the date of commencement, ‘... the Minister may ... direct that a person be detained for a period not exceeding two years from a date as may be specified by the Minister.’ Furthermore, the period of 60 days detention of the appellant expired on 7 September 1999 and the detention order took effect from 5 September 1999, well before the ||Page 323>>expiry date (see pp 333D–E, 334D, F–G); Tan Hoon Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor and another appeal [1990] 1 MLJ 171 followed. (5) (per Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ dissenting) An arrest without warrant could be justified only if it was an arrest on a charge which was made known to the person arrested unless the circumstances were such that the person arrested must know the substance of the alleged offence, for example, where the alleged wrongdoer was caught red-handed. The circumstances of the present case were not covered by any such qualification; and therefore, the initial arrest and imprisonment were unlawful and constituted false imprisonment (see p 337H–I); Christie & Anor v Leachinsky [1947] 1 All ER 567 and Re Madhu Limaye AIR [1969] SC 1014 followed. (6) (per Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ dissenting) There was no express recital or provision in the Ordinance which permits a preventive detention in contravention of art 5(3) of the Constitution, and in the absence of such, it could not be lightly assumed that the legislature intended the curtailment of such fundamental safeguard entrenched in the Constitution. It was a basic and elementary right of a person to know the grounds of his arrest. There was no provision in the Ordinance which was contrary to art 149 of the Constitution (see pp 342C–D, 343H); Wong Fook Nyen v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & 2 Ors[1988] 2 CLJ 274 followed. (7) (per Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ dissenting) Section 4(1) of the Ordinance does not provide when the detention order is to begin. Since the relevant detention order in the instant appeal stated a commencemnet date which was after the date of the detention order but before the expiry of the 60 day

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 150 detention period in police custody, the submission on the second issue failed (see p 346F–G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Lapan rayuan telah didengar bersama kerana ia telah dipersetujui bahawa keputusan dalam rayuan pertama akan mengikat yang tujuh lagi. Perayu dalam rayuan pertama telah ditangkap pada 8 Julai 1999 di Ibu Pejabat Polis Kuala Lumpur oleh Detektif Sarjan Abdullah bin Awang yang mengesahkan bahawa semasa menangkap perayu, beliau telah memberitahu perayu bahawa beliau ditangkap di bawah s 3(1) Ordinan Darurat (Ketenteraman Awam dan Pencegahan Jenayah) 1969 (‘Ordinan tersebut’) kerana terdapat sebab untuk mempercayai bahawa wujud alasan-alasan yang akan menjustifikasikan penahanan perayu. Namun begitu, beliau tidak mendedahkan kepada perayu maklumat yang diterima yang menyebabkan beliau mempunyai sebab untuk mempercayai bahawa terdapat alasan-alasan menjustifikasikan penahanan tersebut. Setelah ditangkap di bawah s 3(1) Ordinan ||Page 324>>tersebut, perayu telah diserahkan satu perintah penahanan, yang ditandatangani pada 1 September 1999 oleh Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, pada 2 September 1999. Perintah penahanan tersebut mula berkuatkuasa pada 5 September 1999. Peguam yang bijaksana bagi pihak perayu telah menimbulkan dua persoalan. Yang pertama berhubung hujah peguam bahawa tangkapan dan penahanan perayu di bawah s 3(1) Ordinan telah melanggar perkara 5(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan tersebut’) dan oleh demikian tangkapan dan penahanan tersebut adalah tidak betul. Oleh demikian, perintah penahanan tersebut sepatutnya diketepikan kerana penahanan perayu yang berpanjangan adalah salah di sisi undang-undang. Persoalan kedua hanya terbatas kepada rayuan pertama dan ia berkaitan dengan Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri yang menandatangani perintah penahanan tersebut pada 1 September 1999 tetapi ianya mula berkuatkuasa pada 5 September 1999.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan-rayuan tersebut: (1) (oleh Ahmad Fairuz HB (Malaya)) Berdasarkan Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1989] 3 MLJ 121, harus ditekankan bahawa Ordinan tersebut telah diisytiharkan oleh Yang di-Pertuan Agong di bawah perkara 150(2) Perlembagaan tersebut sebelum ia dipinda pada tahun 1981. Tambahan lagi, perkara 150(6) yang relevan (sebelum ia dipinda) telah menyatakan bahawa ‘No provision of any law or ordinance ... promulgated in pursuance of this Article shall be invalid on the ground of any inconsistency with the provisions of Part II, and Article 79 shall not apply...’. Oleh itu, s 3(1) Ordinan tersebut tidak boleh dihujahkan sebagai tidak sah hanya kerana ia tidak konsisten dengan perkara 5(3) Perlembagaan tersebut (lihat ms 331F, H–I, 332A); Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 151 [1989] 3 MLJ 121 diikut. (2) (oleh Ahmad Fairuz HB (Malaya)) Jika s 3(1) adalah tidak konsisten dengan perkara 5(3) maka s 3(1) akan mengatasinya. Ini akan menghindarkan tangkapan dan penahanan tersebut daripada menyalahi undang-undang kerana perlanggaran perkara 5(3). Itulah tujuan perkara 150(6). Hujah perayu bahawa tangkapan dan penahanan tersebut telah melanggar perkara 5(3) dan oleh itu adalah menyalahi undang-undang, akan menggagalkan tujuan dan niat perkara 150 (lihat ms 332A–B). (3) (oleh Ahmad Fairuz HB (Malaya)) Tambahan lagi, s 3(1) hanya memerlukan pegawai tangkapan mempunyai ‘reason to believe that there are grounds ...’. Ia tidak memerlukan alasan-alasan yang perlu dimaklumkan kepada orang yang ditangkap. Jikapun ia dikehendaki berbuat sedemikian oleh sebab perkara ||Page 325>>5(3), apa yang telah pegawai tangkapan tersebut maklumkan kepada perayu adalah mencukupi untuk mematuhi perkara 5(3) (lihat ms 332C–D); Christie & Anor v Leachinsky [1947] 1 All ER 567 diikut. Jika apa yang dimaklumkan kepada perayu oleh pegawai tangkapan bukan satu pematuhan perkara 5(3) yang mencukupi, perkara 150(2) dan (6) Perlembagaan tersebut dengan nyata menunjukkan bahawa Ordinan tersebut mestilah mengatasi Perlembagaan tersebut. Tambahan pula, s 3(5) Ordinan tersebut menyatakan yang perayu ‘shall be deemed to be in lawful custody’. Oleh itu, jika perkara 5(3) terpakai untuk tangkapan dan penahanan di bawah Ordinan tersebut, maka s 3(5) menjadikan penahanan yang menyalahi undang-undang tersebut oleh kerana perlanggaran perkara 5(3) tersebut sah (lihat ms 332C–E, 333A). (4) (oleh Ahmad Fairuz HB (Malaya)) Berhubung persoalan tarikh tandatangan perintah penahanan tersebut, kes Tan Hoon Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor and another appeal [1990] 1 MLJ 171 adalah dirujuk. Di sini telah diputuskan bahawa memandangkan Ordinan tersebut tidak menyebut apa-apa tentang tarikh permulaan, ‘... the Minister may ... direct that a person be detained for a period not exceeding two years from a date as may be specified by the Minister.’ Tambahan pula, tempoh penahanan perayu selama 60 hari telah tamat pada 7 September 1999 dan perintah penahanan tersebut mula berkuatkuasa dari 5 September 1999, iaitu sebelum tarikh luput penahanan perayu (lihat ms 333D–E, 3334D, F–G); Tan Hoon Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor and another appeal [1990] 1 MLJ 171 diikut. (5) (oleh Abdul Malek Ahmad HMP menentang) Satu tangkapan tanpa waran boleh dijustifikasikan hanya jika ia satu tangkapan atas satu tuduhan yang telah dimaklumkan kepada orang yang ditangkap kecuali keadaannya adalah di mana orang yang ditangkap sudah tentu mengetahui tentang isi kesalahan yang dikatakan, sebagai contoh, di mana pesalah yang dikatakan telah ditangkap semasa melakukan kesalahan tersebut. Keadaan kes semasa tidak terangkum dalam mana-mana kelayakan; dan oleh itu, tangkapan dan pemenjaraan tersebut

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 152 adalah menyalahi undang-undang dan membentuk pemenjaraan yang salah (lihat ms 337H–I); Christie & Anor v Leachinsky [1947] 1 All ER 567 dan Re Madhu Limaye AIR [1969] SC 1014 diikut. (6) (oleh Abdul Malek Ahmad HMP menentang) Tiada sebutan permulaan atau peruntukan yang nyata dalam Ordinan tersebut yang membenarkan satu penahanan pencegahan yang bertentangan dengan perkara 5(3) Perlembagaan tersebut, dan dengan ketiadaan tersebut, ia tidak boleh diandaikan sewenang-wenangnya bahawa badan perundangan berniat untuk mencegah satu pelindungan yang penting yang termaktub dalam ||Page 326>>Perlembagaan. Ia adalah satu hak yang asas bagi seseorang untuk mengetahui alasan-alasan tangkapannya. Tiada peruntukan dalam Ordinan tersebut yang bertentangan dengan perkara 149 Perlembagaan tersebut (lihat ms 342C–D, 343H); Wong Fook Nyen v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & 2 Ors[1988] 2 CLJ 274 diikut. (7) (oleh Abdul Malek Ahmad HMP menentang) Seksyen 4(1) Ordinan tersebut tidak memperuntukkan bila perintah penahanan tersebut patut bermula. Memandangkan perintah penahanan yang relevan dalam rayuan semasa telah menyatakan satu tarikh permulaan iaitu selepas tarikh perintah penahanan tetapi sebelum tamat tempoh penahanan 60 hari dalam penahanan polis, hujah berhubung persoalan kedua gagal (lihat ms 346F–G).]

Notes For cases on arrest and subsequent detention by police, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1494. For cases on detention, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1501–1505.

Cases referred to Aminah v Superintendent of Prison, Pengkalan Chepa, Kelantan [1968] 1 MLJ 92 (refd) Assa Singh v Mentri Besar, Johore [1969] 2 MLJ 30 (refd) B Surrinder Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169 PC (refd) Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor [1989] 3 MLJ 121 (folld) Christie & Anor v Leachinsky [1947] 1 All ER 567 (folld) Inspector-General of Police & Anor v Lee Kim Hoong [1979] 2 MLJ 291 (refd) Madhu Limaye, re AIR 1969 SC 1014 (folld) Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Anor v Lee Gee Lam and another application [1993] 3 MLJ 673 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 153 Mohamad Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors v Inspector General of Police [2001] 2 MLJ 481 (refd) Tan Hoon Seng v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor and another appeal [1990] 1 MLJ 171 (folld) Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police [1988] 1 MLJ 293 (refd) Wong Fook Nyen v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & 2 Ors [1988] 2 CLJ 274 (folld) Yit Hon Kit v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor [1988] 2 MLJ 638 (refd) ||Page 327>>

Legislation referred to Act 26 of 1963 s 39(2) Act A514 s 15 Constitution of India Arts 22(1), (3) Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 ss 3(2), 6(1) Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 ss 3(1), (3), (5), 4(1) Federal Constitution Arts 5(3), (4), 149(1)(f), 150(2), (6), 162(1) Internal Security Act 1960

Appeal from: Criminal Application Nos 44–25, 27, 43, 62, 67 71 of 2000, 44–02 and 07 of 2001 (High Court, Taiping)

MM Athimulan (SP Raman with him) (Athimulan & Co) for the appellants. Noorbahri Baharuddin (Senior Federal Counsel) (Mahmud Abdullah and Mohamed Abazafree Mohd Abbas with him) (Senior Federal Counsel and Federal Counsel) for the respondent.

[2003] 2 MLJ 1 DYTM TENGKU IDRIS SHAH IBNI SULTAN SALAHUDDIN ABDUL AZIZ SHAH v DIKIM HOLDINGS SDN BHD & ANOR

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINAL JURISDICTION NO 1 OF 2002 AHMAD FAIRUZ (PCA), HAIDAR CJ (MALAYA) AND DENIS ONG JCA 30 JANUARY 2003

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 154 Constitutional Law — Courts — Jurisdiction of High Court — Plaintiff filed action at High Court — Plaintiff subsequently proclaimed the Sultan of Selangor — Whether High Court continued to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate on suit — Federal Constitution arts 181(2), 182(2) and (3)

Constitutional Law — Courts — Power to transfer cases — Plaintiff filed action at High Court — Plaintiff subsequently proclaimed the Sultan of Selangor — Whether High Court had jurisdiction or power to transfer suit to Special Court established under Part XV of Federal Constitution

Constitutional Law — Suit involving government or ruler — Immunity of sovereign — Plaintiff filed action at High Court — Plaintiff subsequently proclaimed the Sultan of Selangor — Whether term ‘Ruler’ in arts 181, 182 and 183 of the Federal Court should be construed to mean Ruler at the time when the cause of action arose — Maxim ‘rex nunquam moritur’ — Whether question of when cause of action arose was relevant to construction of term ‘Ruler’

On 6 May 1998, the plaintiff filed a writ of summons and statement of claim against the defendants at the High Court in Kuala Lumpur. On 3 July 1998, the defendants filed a defence and counterclaim. On 24 April 1999, the plaintiff was appointed the Regent of Selangor to exercise the functions as ‘Sultan’ when his father Al-Marhum DYMM Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Hisamuddin Alam Shah was appointed the 11th Yang di-Pertuan Agong. On 30 July 2001, the High Court in Kuala Lumpur, by consent of the parties, ordered to be referred to the Federal Court by way of a special case under s 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, the question of whether the plaintiff, who was appointed to exercise the functions as ‘Sultan’ was a ‘Ruler’ for the purposes of arts 181, 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution. The Federal Court answered the question in the negative. On 21 November 2001, Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah Al Haj passed away and on 22 November 2001, the plaintiff was proclaimed the Sultan of Selangor. This case came before the Federal Court in the same manner of a special case referred by the High Court in Kuala Lumpur for the Federal Court’s decision on seven questions. Essentially, the issues posed by the questions were whether: (a) having regard to the change of status of the plaintiff and to arts 181(2), 182(2) and (3) of the Federal Constitution, the High Court continued to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate on the suit which was commenced before such change of status (‘issue (a)’); and (b) the High Court had the jurisdiction or power to transfer the suit to the Special Court established under Part XV of the Federal ||Page 2>>Constitution (‘issue (b)’). Since the suit was brought in the High Court in Kuala Lumpur before 22 November 2001 and was pending trial there, the contention by the defendants’ counsel was that the suit should remain in the High Court to be tried there and that the term ‘Ruler’ in arts 181, 182 and 183 of the Federal Court should be construed to mean Ruler at the time when the cause of action arose. Both the plaintiff’s counsel and the senior federal counsel took the stand that the suit should

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 155 be tried in the Special Court because the plaintiff was now the Ruler of the State of Selangor regardless of when he became Ruler.

Held: (1) The fact that Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah Al Haj passed away on 21 November 2001 and that on 22 November 2001, the plaintiff was proclaimed the Sultan of Selangor meant that there was a change — both status wise and functionally of the plaintiff from a Crown Prince and Regent to a Sultan and Ruler of the State of Selangor. Therefore, from 21 November 2001, the plaintiff was thus a ‘Ruler’, like his father, in the full sense of that word in art 181(1) of the Federal Constitution and possessed the attributes of sovereignty, prerogatives, powers and jurisdiction in art 181(1) (see pp 8A, 12A–D). (2) The plaintiff, although a Ruler now, was liable to be sued in his personal capacity. As Ruler, the plaintiff may also sue in his personal capacity. Such proceedings whether by or against the plaintiff as a Ruler in his personal capacity must be brought in the Special Court (see p 13G–H). (3) In the instant case, the plaintiff was officially the Ruler of Selangor in the full sense of the word ‘Ruler’ in arts 181, 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution on and after 22 November 2001. It followed therefore that if the suit were brought on or after that date, it would have to be brought in and tried by the Special Court. Notwithstanding that the suit was brought by the plaintiff in the High Court in Kuala Lumpur before 22 November 2001 and was pending trial there, upon the plaintiff’s accession as a Ruler, the High Court ceased to have jurisdiction over the plaintiff and thus could no longer continue to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate on the suit (see pp 14E–G, 15A). (4) Having regard to the principles of law on accession, the Latin maxim rex nunquam moritur or ‘the King never dies’ and art 181(1) of the Federal Constitution, the question of when the cause of action arose was irrelevant to the construction of the term ‘Ruler’. As such, it was unnecessary to spell out ‘when’ the cause of action arose in art 182(3) of the Federal Constitution. The term ‘Ruler’ in arts 181, 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution was a Ruler for all time and included his successor in office (see pp 14H–15A). ||Page 3>> (5) Accordingly, this action would have to be commenced afresh by the plaintiff in the Special Court and pursuant to art 183 of the Federal Constitution, the consent of the Attorney General would have to be obtained by the defendants for the counterclaim against the plaintiff (see p 15F). (6) Article 121(1) of the Federal Constitution expressly provided that ‘the High Courts and inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law.’ Such powers of transfer were contained in the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 and did not extend to the Special Court. The jurisdiction of the Special Court was

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 156 both original and final, the decision of which cannot be challenged in any court, on any ground. Accordingly, the High Court had no powers to transfer the suit to the Special Court (see pp 15H–16A).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pada 6 Mei 1998, plaintif telah memfailkan satu writ saman dan pernyataan tuntutan terhadap defendan-defendan di Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur. Pada 3 Julai 1998, defendan-defendan telah memfailkan satu pembelaan dan tuntutan balas. Pada 24 April 1999, plaintif telah dilantik sebagai Raja Muda Selangor untuk melaksanakan fungsi-fungsi seorang ‘Sultan’ apabila ayahanda beliau Al-Marhum DYMM Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah ibni Al-Marhum Hisamuddin Alam Shah dilantik sebagai Yang di-Pertuan Agong ke-11. Pada 30 Julai 2001, Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur, dengan persetujuan pihak-pihak tersebut, diperintahkan untuk merujuk kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui satu kes khas di bawah s 84 Akta Kehakiman Mahkamah 1964, persoalan tentang sama ada plaintif, yang telah dilantik untuk melaksanakan fungsi-fungsi sebagai seorang ‘Sultan’ adalah seorang ‘Ruler’ bagi tujuan perkara-perkara 181, 182 dan 183 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Mahkamah Persekutuan menjawab persoalan tersebut secara negatif. Pada 21 November 2001, Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah Al Haj telah mangkat dan pada 22 November 2001, plaintif telah diisytiharkan sebagai Sultan Selangor. Kes ini dihadapkan ke Mahkamah Persekutuan sama seperti satu kes khas yang dirujuk oleh Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur untuk keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan berhubung tujuh persoalan. Pada dasarnya, isu-isu yang diutarakan oleh persoalan-persoalan tersebut adalah sama ada: (a) dengan mengambilkira pertukaran terhadap kedudukan plaintif dan terhadap perkara-perkara 181(2), 182(2) dan (3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, Mahkamah Tinggi masih boleh terus menggunakan bidang kuasa untuk mengadili guaman yang telah bermula sebelum pertukaran kedudukan tersebut (‘isu (a)’); dan (b) Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai bidang kuasa atau kuasa untuk memindahkan guaman tersebut ke Mahkamah Khas yang ditubuhkan di bawah Bahagian XV ||Page 4>> Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘isu (b)’). Memandangkan guaman tersebut telah dimulakan di Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur sebelum 22 November 2001 dan masih menunggu perbicaraan, hujah peguam defendan-defendan adalah bahawa guaman tersebut patut kekal di Mahkamah Tinggi untuk dibicarakan di situ dan bahawa terma ‘Ruler’ dalam perkara-perkara 181, 182 dan 183 Perlembagaan Persekutuan hendaklah ditafsirkan sebagai bermaksud Pemerintah pada masa apabila kausa tindakan wujud. Kedua-dua peguam plaintif dan peguam kanan persekutuan membuat pendirian bahawa guaman tersebut hendaklah dibicarakan di Mahkamah Khas kerana plaintif sekarang adalah Pemerintah Negeri Selangor dengan tidak mengira bila beliau menjadi Pemerintah.

Diputuskan:

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 157 (1) Hakikat bahawa Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah Al Haj telah mangkat pada 21 November 2001 dan bahawa pada 22 November 2001, plaintif telah diisytiharkan Sultan Selangor bermakna bahawa terdapat pertukaran — kepada kedua-dua kedudukan dan fungsi plaintif daripada seorang Raja Muda dan Pemangku Raja kepada Sultan dan Pemerintah Negeri Selangor. Oleh itu, dari 21 November 2001, plaintif adalah seorang ‘Ruler’, seperti ayahanda beliau, dalam erti kata sebenar perkataan dalam perkara 181(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan memiliki sifat-sifat kedaulatan, prerogatif, kuasa-kuasa dan bidang kuasa dalam perkara 181(1) (lihat ms 8A, 12A–D). (2) Plaintif walaupun seorang Pemerintah sekarang, boleh disaman dalam kapasiti peribadi beliau. Prosiding sedemikian sama ada oleh atau terhadap plaintif sebagai seorang Pemerintah dalam kapasiti peribadi beliau perlu dimulakan dalam Mahkamah Khas (lihat ms 13G–H). (3) Dalam kes semasa, plaintif secara sah adalah Pemerintah Negeri Selangor dalam erti kata sebenar perkataan ‘Ruler’ dalam perkara-perkara 181, 182 dan 183 Perlembagaan Persekutuan pada dan selepas 22 November 2001. Berikutan itu jika guaman tersebut dimulakan pada atau selepas tarikh tersebut, ia perlu dimulakan dan dibicarakan oleh Mahkamah Khas. Meskipun guaman tersebut telah dimulakan oleh plaintif di Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur sebelum 22 November 2001 dan masih menunggu perbicaraan, kenaikan takhta plaintif sebagai seorang Pemerintah, Mahkamah Tinggi tidak lagi mempunyai bidang kuasa ke atas plaintif dan oleh itu tidak boleh terus menggunakan bidang kuasa untuk mengadili guaman tersebut (lihat ms 14E–G, 15A). (4) Dengan mengambilkira prinsip-prinsip undang-undang berhubung kenaikan takhta, maxim Latin rex nunquam moritur atau ‘the King never dies’ dan perkara 181(1) Perlembagaan ||Page 5>> Persekutuan, persoalan bila kausa tindakan timbul adalah tidak relevan untuk membentuk terma ‘Ruler’. Oleh itu, adalah tidak perlu untuk menentukan ‘bila’ kausa tindakan timbul dalam perkara 182(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Terma ‘Ruler’ dalam perkara-perkara 181, 182 dan 183 Perlembagaan Persekutuan adalah seorang Pemerintah pada setiap masa dan termasuklah pengganti beliau (lihat ms 14H–15A). (5) Sewajarnya, tindakan ini perlu dimulakan semula oleh plaintif di Mahkamah Khas dan menurut perkara 183 Perlembagaan Persekutuan, persetujuan Peguam Negara perlu diperolehi oleh defendan-defendan untuk tuntutan balas terhadap plaintif (lihat ms 15F). (6) Perkara 121(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dengan nyata memperuntukkan bahawa ‘the High Courts and inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law.’ Kuasa-kuasa pemindahan sedemikian terkandung dalam Akta Kehakiman Mahkamah 1964 dan Akta Mahkamah Bawahan 1948 dan tidak meliputi Mahkamah Khas. Bidang kuasa Mahkamah Khas adalah kedua-duanya asli dan muktamad, keputusannya yang

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 158 tidak boleh dicabar dalam mana-mana mahkamah, atas apa-apa alasan. Sewajarnya, Mahkamah Tinggi tidak mempunyai apa-apa kuasa untuk memindahkan guaman tersebut ke Mahkamah has (lihat ms 15H–16A).]

Notes For cases on immunity of sovereign, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1824. For cases on jurisdiction of High Court, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1444–1445. For cases on power to transfer cases, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1453–1455.

Cases referred to DYTM Tengku Idris Shah ibni Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah v Dikim Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 11; [2002] 4 MLJ 289 (refd) Faridah Begum bte Abdullah v Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Al Mustain Billah Ibni Almarhum Sultan Abu Bakar Ri’Ayatuddin Al Mu’Adzam Shah [1996] 1 MLJ 617 (refd) Karpal Singh v Sultan of Selangor [1988] 1 MLJ 64 (refd) Dato Menteri Othman bin Baginda, Dato’ Menteri & Anor v Dato Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 (refd) Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 266 (refd) ||Page 6>>

Legislation referred to Constitution (Amendment) Act 1993 (Act A848) Constitution of the State of Selangor arts 6(1), (2) Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 84 Federal Constitution arts 38(4), 70(1), 71(1), 121(1), 159(5), 181(2), 182(2), (3), (4), (6), 183, Parts IX, XV Rules of the Special Court 1994 Subordinate Courts Act 1948

Suit No D1–22–1350 of 1998 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Lim Kian Leong ( Low Chi Cheng with him) ( Lim Kian Leong & Co) for the appellant. Bastian Vendargon ( Philip Chai Lip Keong and Dhayana Shila with him) ( Soo Thien

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 159 Ming & Nashrah) for the defendants. Dato’ Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman ( Syed Marzidy bin Syed Marzuki with him) (Senior Federal Counsel) watching brief.

[2003] 2 MLJ 302 PRIYATHASENY & ORS v PEGAWAI PENGUATKUASA AGAMA JABATAN HAL EHWAL AGAMA ISLAM PERAK & ORS

HIGH COURT (IPOH) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO 24–1041 OF 2001 ABDULL HAMID EMBONG J 24 MARCH 2003

Constitutional Law — Federal and state law — Matters of Islamic law — Renunciation of Islam — Whether subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court — Whether civil court ousted from dealing with matter

The first plaintiff, though ethnically a Malay and born a Muslim, renounced the religion of Islam about five years ago, and adopted Hinduism as her religion. She changed her name to a Hindu name, and married the second plaintiff, an ethnic Indian and a lifelong Hindu, and they have two infant children, the third and fourth plaintiffs. After the birth of her elder child and while carrying her second, the first plaintiff was arrested, charged for deriding the religion of Islam (for the actions she took to leave Islam) and for cohabitation outside of lawful Muslim wedlock with the second plaintiff until a child was born (to wit, the third plaintiff). The first plaintiff pleaded guilty, and was convicted and fined. The first plaintiff sought declarations from the court under the Federal Constitution that her continued treatment as a Muslim, and the criminal sanctions imposed or threatened to be imposed against her despite the fact that she no longer professed the religion of Islam, was unconstitutional. The second plaintiff went through a formal conversion to Islam that he said was done under a state of duress as he was advised that his wife would go to jail unless he went through the formal conversion to Islam. However, the second plaintiff professed Hinduism, and had never practised the rites and rituals of Islam. The second plaintiff also sought declaratory relief that he too was not subjected to Islamic law, as he did not profess the religion of Islam. The first and second plaintiffs had also decided for the third and fourth infant plaintiffs that their religion was Hinduism. At the outset, the defendants raised a preliminary objection on the question of this court’s jurisdiction to hear this matter.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 160 Held: This court was not seized with the jurisdiction to determine this matter. Although there were various declarations sought for by the plaintiffs including one on the interpretation of the word ‘profess’, the central and substantive issue was whether the first plaintiff remained a Muslim despite her so-called renunciation of the Islamic faith and professing now, the Hindu faith and practice. Pegged to this was also the issue of whether the second plaintiff, remained a Muslim in spite of the allegation that he was coerced into converting. This issue was the core subject matter of this application in spite of the various other ||Page 303>>declarations sought for. These matters were quite clearly matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. The jurisdiction of this court was ousted from determining the merits of this application (see p 308F–H); Soon Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489 followed.

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif pertama, walaupun mengikut keturunan adalah seorang Melayu dan dilahirkan sebagai seorang Muslim, telah meninggalkan agama Islam lebih kurang lima tahun yang lalu, dan menerima agama Hindu sebagai agama beliau. Beliau telah menukar namanya kepada nama Hindu, dan berkahwin dengan plaintif kedua, seorang yang berketurunan India dan merupakan seorang penganut agama Hindu sepanjang hayatnya, dan mereka mempunyai dua anak yang masih budak, plaintif-plaintif ketiga dan keempat. Selepas kelahiran anak beliau yang tua dan ketika mengandungkan anak yang kedua, plaintif pertama telah ditahan, dituduh memperkecil-kecilkan agama Islam (kerana tindakan yang diambil oleh beliau untuk meninggalkan agama Islam) dan kerana bersedudukan di luar undang-undang nikah Islam yang sah dengan plaintif kedua sehingga melahirkan seorang anak (iaitu, plaintif ketiga). Plaintif pertama telah mengaku bersalah, dan telah disabitkan dan didenda. Plaintif pertama kini memohon pengisytiharan dari mahkamah di bawah Perlembagaan Persekutuan bahawa layanan berterusan terhadap beliau sebagai seorang Muslim, dan hukuman jenayah yang dikenakan atau yang diugut untuk dikenakan terhadap beliau meskipun pada hakikatnya beliau tidak lagi memeluk agama Islam, adalah tidak berperlembagaan. Plaintif kedua telah menjalani penukaran agama secara rasmi kepada agama Islam yang mana beliau menyatakan telah dilakukan di bawah keadaan terpaksa kerana beliau telah dinasihatkan bahawa isteri beliau akan dipenjarakan melainkan beliau menjalani penukaran agama secara rasmi kepada agama Islam. Walau bagaimanapun, plaintif kedua menganut agama Hindu dan tidak pernah mengamalkan adat istiadat dan upacara agama Islam. Plaintif kedua juga memohon pengisytiharan relif yang beliau juga tidak tertakluk kepada undang-undang Islam, kerana beliau tidak menganut agama Islam. Plaintif-plaintif pertama dan kedua telah juga membuat keputusan untuk plaintif-plaintif ketiga dan keempat yang masih budak bahawa agama mereka adalah agama Hindu. Defendan-defendan telah membangkitkan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 161 bantahan awal atas persoalan bidang kuasa mahkamah ini untuk mendengar perkara ini.

Diputuskan: Mahkamah ini tidak ada bidang kuasa untuk menentukan perkara ini. Meskipun terdapat pelbagai pengisytiharan yang dipohon oleh plaintif-plaintif termasuk pengisytiharan mengenai pentafsiran perkataan ‘menganut’, isu yang terpenting dan substantif adalah sama ||Page 304>>ada plaintif pertama kekal sebagai seorang Muslim meskipun beliau telah melepaskan agama Islam yang dikatakan dan kini menganut, agama dan amalan Hindu. Bersampingan dengan ini adalah juga isu sama ada plaintif kedua, kekal sebagai seorang Muslim meskipun mendakwa bahawa beliau telah dipaksa untuk menukar agamanya. Isu ini adalah teras hal-perkara permohonan ini meskipun terdapatnya pelbagai pengisytiharan lain yang dipohon. Perkara-perkara ini adalah jelas merupakan perkara yang terlingkung di dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah. Bidang kuasa mahkamah ini telah disingkir daripada menentukan merit-merit permohonan ini (lihat ms 308F–H); Soon Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489 diikut.

Notes For cases on matters of Islamic law, see 3 Mallall’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1491–1492.

Cases referred to Abdul Shaik bin Md Ibrahim & Anor v Hussein Ibrahim & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 618 (refd) Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang lwn Isa Abdul Rahman dan satu yang lain [1992] 2 MLJ 244 (refd) Mohamed Habibullah bin Mahmood v Faridah bte Dato Talib [1992] 2 MLJ 793 (refd) Soon Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489 (folld)

Legislation referred to Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1992 of Perak ss 13, 104 Enakmen Jenayah (Syariah) 1992 s 13 Federal Constitution arts 3, 4(5), 5, 8, 11(1), (2), 12(3), 121(1A), 153(1), 160, Schedule 9, Part IX

K Shanmuga ( Kanesalingam & Co) for the plaintiffs

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 162 Jazamuddin Ahmad Nawawi (Penolong Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Perak) for the first and second defendants. Siti Malinda bte Hj Kamaludin ( Kamaluddin Maamor & Co) for the third defendant. Dato’ Abdul Aziz Rahim (Senior Federal Counsel) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the fourth defendant. Ramdas Tikamdas (Siva Ram & Associates) for the fifth defendant.

[2003] 2 MLJ 364 MOHAMAD EZAM BIN MOHD NOR & ORS v MENTERI DALAM NEGERI & ANOR

HIGH COURT (IPOH) — CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO 44–80 OF 2002 BALIA YUSOF JC 24 MARCH 2003

Civil Procedure — Declaration — Application for — Application for declaration that r 81(5) of the Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960 was ultra vires art 5(3) of Federal Constitution — Application for declaration that applicants entitled to consult their counsel in private without any interference — Whether O 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 applicable — Whether leave of court had to be obtained first

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Personal liberty — Numerous consultations accorded to the applicants with their respective counsels — Whether art 5(3) of Federal Constitution breached — Whether right to consult legal advisers had been made ineffective or illusory

Preventive Detention — Detention order — Detention under Internal Security Act — Application for declaration that r 81(5) of the Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960 was ultra vires art 5(3) of the Federal Constitution — Application for declaration that applicants entitled to consult their counsel in private without any interference — Whether r 81(5) of the Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960 was ultra vires art 5(3) of the Federal Constitution — Whether right to consult legal advisers had been made ineffective or illusory by presence of superintendent or officer

Statutory Interpretation — Construction of statutes — Literal approach — Plain meaning of words — Interpretation of r 81(5) of Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960 — Whether r 81(5) applicable to visits by legal advisers

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 163 The five applicants were arrested and charged for an offence under s 27(5)(a) of the Police Act 1967 (‘the Police Act’) at the Kuala Lumpur Magistrates’ Court. The applicants were then held under detention at the Tempat Tahanan Perlindungan Taiping under s 8 of the Internal Security Act 1960 (‘the Act’) through orders made by the Minister of Home Affairs. In this application, the applicants sought, inter alia: (a) a declaration that r 81(5) of the Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960 (‘the Rules’) was ultra vires art 5(3) of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’); and (b) a declaration that the applicants were entitled to consult their counsel in private without any restriction and/or interference. For such consultations to be effective, the applicants submitted that they must be free from any form of interference and the applicants’ contention was that the consultation with the presence and within the hearing of the officers from the detention center made such right illusory. At the commencement of the hearing of this application, the senior federal counsel, appearing for the respondents, put up a preliminary objection contending that since the reliefs prayed for were declaratory in nature, O 53 r 3 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) was applicable and leave of this court ought to be obtained first. ||Page 365>>

Held, dismissing the application: (1) This was a criminal application and as such, O 53 of the RHC did not apply. The High Court has the power and jurisdiction to hear this application and accordingly, the respondents’ preliminary objection was overruled (see p 371A, D). (2) Rule 81(5) of the Rules which stipulated, inter alia, that ‘a superintendent or an officer … shall … be in sight and hearing during the whole of any visit to a detained person unless the superintendent by an order in writing sees fit to dispense with any of the above requirements’ was applicable to visits by legal advisers. Considering the plain meaning of the words used in r 81(5), there was no justification to hold that r 81(5) of the Rules should be limited to only visits other than visits by legal advisers as to do so would be importing words into the statute, which the High Court was not competent to do (see p 372D–G). (3) Article 5(3) of the Constitution had not been breached as there were numerous consultations accorded to the applicants with their respective counsels. There was no justification in holding that the right to consult their legal advisers has been made ineffective or illusory. The numerous occasions of consultation that had been accorded to the applicants pointed to the fact that the applicants were actually pursuing their fundamental rights in accordance with the said art 5(3) of the Constitution (see pp 374B–C, 373D); Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 and Smt Maneka Ghandi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 followed. (4) The applicants were never denied of their right to consult a legal practitioner of their choice. The applicants has failed to show that the respondents had deliberately and in bad faith obstructed them from exercising their rights under

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 164 art 5(3) of the Constitution. On the contrary, the respondents by being present in sight and hearing during the visits to the detainee at the detention centre were merely exercising their statutory duty as provided for in the Rules (see p 374D–G). (5) The provisions of r 81(5) of the Rules were couched in the form of certain curtailment to the right to communicate confidentially with a legal adviser and they were fashioned in clear and express words. The right of a detainee under art 5(3) of the Constitution was not without restrictions and such restrictions were made and only deemed necessary in balancing between the interest of the detainee and the interest of justice and to the public. Justice did not mean only for the accused, it also meant the interest of the State (see p 376E–F); Hashim bin Saad v Yahya bin Hashim & Anor [1977] 2 MLJ 116 followed. (6) In construing r 81(5) of the Rules, it was outside the purview of the court’s power to consider the harshness or the unjustness of the provisions of r 81(5). Rule 81 was made under the provisions ||Page 366>>of s 8(4) of the Act ‘for the discipline and interest of persons detained therein’ and the Minister was empowered to make different rules for different places of detention (see p 376D–E); Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 followed. (7) Principle 18 in the ‘Body of Principles For the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment’, a document adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, was only declaratory in nature and was not legally binding on member States. In any event, principle 18(3) provided that certain suspension of rights may be imposed in certain circumstances to be specified by law or lawful regulations when it was considered indispensable by a judicial or other authority in order to maintain security and good order and r 81(5) of the Rules was in accord with this principle (see p 377F–G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Kelima-lima orang pemohon telah ditangkap dan dituduh kerana satu kesalahan di bawah s 27(5)(a) Akta Polis 1967 (‘Akta Polis tersebut’) di dalam Mahkamah Majistret Kuala Lumpur. Pemohon-pemohon kemudiannya ditahan di Tempat Tahanan Perlindungan Taiping di bawah s 8 Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960 (‘Akta tersebut’) melalui perintah-perintah yang dibuat oleh Menteri Dalam Negeri. Dalam permohonan ini, pemohon-pemohon telah memohon, antara lain: (a) satu deklarasi bahawa k 81(5) Kaedah-Kaedah Keselamatan Dalam Negeri (Orang Tahanan) 1960 (‘Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut’) adalah ultra vires perkara 5(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan tersebut’); dan (b) satu deklarasi bahawa pemohon-pemohon berhak untuk berunding dengan peguam mereka secara persendirian tanpa apa-apa sekatan dan/atau gangguan. Untuk perundingan tersebut berkesan, pemohon-pemohon menghujahkan bahawa mereka perlu bebas daripada apa-apa bentuk gangguan dan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 165 hujah pemohon-pemohon adalah bahawa perundingan dengan kehadiran dan dalam pendengaran pegawai-pegawai daripada pusat tahanan membuat hak sedemikian hanya satu ilusi. Pada permulaan perbicaraan permohonan ini, peguam kanan persekutuan, yang hadir bagi pihak responden-responden, telah membuat satu bantahan awal dengan menghujahkan bahawa memandangkan relif-relif yang dipohon bersifat deklaratori, A 53 k 3 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) adalah terpakai dan kebenaran mahkamah ini patut diperolehi terlebih dahulu.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Ini adalah satu permohonan jenayah dan oleh demikian, A 53 KMT tidak terpakai. Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai kuasa dan bidang kuasa untuk mendengar permohonan ini dan sewajarnya, bantahan awal responden-responden adalah ditolak (lihat ms 371A, D). ||Page 367>> (2) Kaedah 81(5) Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut yang menetapkan, anatara lain, bahawa ‘a superintendent or an officer … shall … be in sight and hearing during the whole of any visit to a detained person unless the superintendent by an order in writing sees fit to dispense with any of the above requirements’ adalah terpakai kepada lawatan-lawatan oleh penasihat-penasihat undang-undang. Dengan mengambilkira maksud biasa perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan dalam k 81(5), tiada justifikasi untuk memutuskan k 81(5) Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut patut terbatas hanya kepada pelawat-pelawat selain daripada penasihat-penasihat undang-undang kerana dengan berbuat demikian akan membawa masuk perkataan-perkataan tersebut ke dalam statut, yang mana Mahkamah Tinggi tidak kompeten untuk berbuat demikian (lihat ms 372D–G). (3) Perkara 5(3) Perlembagaan tersebut tidak dilanggar kerana terdapat pelbagai rundingan yang telah diperuntukkan untuk pemohon-pemohon tersebut dengan peguam-peguam masing-masing. Tiada bidang kuasa untuk memutuskan bahawa hak untuk berunding dengan penasihat-penasihat undang-undang mereka telah dibuat dengan tidak berkesan atau hanya secara ilusi. Beberapa masa rundingan yang telah diperuntukkan untuk pemohon-pemohon menunjukkan hakikat bahawa pemohon-pemohon sememangnya melaksanakan hak-hak asasi mereka menurut perkara 5(3) Perlembagaan tersebut (lihat ms 374B–C, 373D); Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 dan Smt Maneka Ghandi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 diikut. (4) Pemohon-pemohon tidak pernah dinafikan hak mereka untuk berunding dengan pengamal undang-undang pilihan mereka. Pemohon-pemohon telah gagal untuk menunjukkan bahawa responden-responden telah dengan sengaja dan berniat jahat menghalang mereka daripada melaksanakan hak-hak mereka di bawah perkara 5(3) Perlembagaan tersebut. Sebaliknya, respoden-responden dengan berada dalam pandangan dan pendengaran semasa lawatan-lawatan peguam-peguam ke pusat tahanan untuk bertemu dengan orang tahanan hanya

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 166 melaksanakan kewajipan statutori mereka sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan dalam Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut (lihat ms 374D–G). (5) Peruntukan k 81(5) Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut telah dibuat sebagai suatu sekatan terhadap hak untuk berbincang secara sulit dengan penasihat-penasihat undang-undang dan ianya telah digubal dengan perkataan-perkataan yang jelas dan nyata. Hak seorang tahanan di bawah perkara 5(3) Perlembagaan tersebut tidak tanpa batasan dan batasan-batasan tersebut telah dibuat dan hanya dianggap perlu untuk mengimbangkan antara kepentingan orang tahanan dan kepentingan keadilan dan awam. Keadilan tidak bermakna hanya untuk tertuduh, ia juga bermaksud kepentingan ||Page 368>>negara (lihat ms 375E–F); Hashim bin Saad v Yahya bin Hashim & Anor [1977] 2 MLJ 116 diikut. (6) Dalam 81(5) Kaedah-Kaedah tersebut, ia adalah di luar ruang lingkup kuasa mahkamah untuk menimbangkan ketegasan atau ketidakadilan peruntukan k 81(5). Kaedah 81 dibuat di bawah peruntukan s 8(4) Akta tersebut ‘for the discipline and interest of persons detained therein’ dan Menteri tersebut diberi kuasa untuk membuat peraturan-peraturan lain untuk tempat-tempat tahanan lain (lihat ms 376D–E); Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 diikut. (7) Prinsip 18 dalam ‘Body of Principles For the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment’, satu dokumen yang digunakan oleh Perhimpunan Agung Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu, adalah hanya bersifat deklaratori dan tidak mengikat negara-negara ahli di sisi undang-undang. Dalam apapun keadaan, prinsip 18(3) memperuntukkan bahawa penggantungan tertentu hak-hak boleh dikenakan dalam keadaan tertentu yang dispesifikasikan oleh undang-undang atau peraturan-peraturan yang sah jika ia dianggap amat diperlukan oleh satu pihak berkuasa keadilan atau mana-mana pihak berkuasa untuk menjamin keselamatan dan ketenteraman awam dan k 81(5) Kaedah-Kedah tersebut adalah bersesuaian dengan prinsip tersebut (lihat ms 377F–G).]

Notes For cases on application for declaration, see 2 Mallal’s Digest(4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1947–1963. For cases on detention under Internal Security Act, see 10 Mallal’s Digest(4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) paras 1245–1246. For cases on personal liberty, see 3 Mallal’s Digest(4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1584–1589. For cases on literal approach, see 11 Mallal’s Digest(4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 1477–1499.

Cases referred to

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 167 Assa Singh v Mentri Besar, Johore [1969] 2 MLJ 30 (refd) Chua Tian Chang v Ketua Polis Negara, Mahkamah Persekutuan (Bidang Kuasa Jenayah) Bil 05–10–2001 (W) (refd) Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 (folld) Hashim bin Saud v Yahaya bin Hashim & Anor [1977] 2 MLJ 116 (folld) Hishamudin bin Rais v Ketua Polis Negara, Mahkamah Persekutuan (Bidang Kuasa Jenayah) Bil 05–11–2001 (W) (refd) Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 (folld) Merdeka University Berhad v Government of Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 356 (refd) Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara, Mahkamah Persekutuan [2002] 4 MLJ 449 (refd) ||Page 369>> Moti Bai v The State AIR 1954 Rajasthan 241 (refd) Ooi Ah Phua v Officer-in-Charge Criminal Investigation, Kedah/Perlis [1975] 2 MLJ 198 (refd) PP v Zulkifflle bin Hassan [1990] 2 MLJ 215 (refd) R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [2001] 3 All ER 433 (refd) Ramli bin Salleh v Inspector Yahya bin Hashim [1973] 1 MLJ 54 (refd) Saari bin Sungib v Ketua Polis Negara, Mahkamah Persekutuan (Bidang Kuasa Jenayah) Bil 05–12–2001 (W) (refd) Smt Maneka Ghandi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 (folld) Sundar Singh v Emperor AIR 1930 Lahore 945 (refd) Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261 (refd) Teh Cheng Poh v PP [1978] 1 MLJ 30 (refd) Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police [1988] 1 MLJ 29 (refd) United Malayan Banking Corporation v Ernest Cheong Yong Yin [2001] 1 MLJ 561 (refd) Yap Peng Seng v Menteri Kementerian Sumber Manusia Malaysia [1998] 5 CLJ 804 (refd)

Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25 Federal Constitution art 5(3) Indian Constitution art 22(1) Internal Security Act 1960 s 8

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 168 Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960 r 81(5) Police Act 1967 s 27(5)(a) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 53 r 3

Malek Imtiaz Sarwar ( Malek Imtiaz Sarwar) and M Moganambal ( R Sivarasa with her) ( Daim & Gamany) for the applicants. Kamaluddin bin Mohd Said (Deputy Public Prosecutor) (Attorney General’s Chamber) for the respondent.

[2003] 3 MLJ 1 KEKATONG SDN BHD v DANAHARTA URUS SDN BHD

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–221 OF 2002 GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN AND ARIFIN ZAKARIA JJCA 18 JUNE 2003

Civil Procedure — Injunction — Application for interlocutory injunction — Whether serious questions of law and fact in existence — Whether serious questions to be tried in existence

Civil Procedure — Injunction — Balance of convenience — Plaintiff at risk of losing immovable property if injunction not granted — Defendant’s right to property in dispute merely postponed to after trial if injunction granted — Whether balance of convenience in plaintiff’s favor

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Access to justice — Whether access to justice guaranteed under Federal Constitution — Whether access to justice incorporated within art 8(1) of Federal Constitution

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Interpretation and construction of — Whether broad, liberal and purposive construction required

Constitutional Law — Legislature — Act of Parliament — Act of Parliament not to be inconsistent with Constitution

Constitutional Law — Legislature — Act of Parliament — Constitutionality of statutory provision called into question — Whether Parliamentary motive relevant

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 169 Constitutional Law — Legislature — Act of Parliament — Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 s 72 — Whether s 72 contrary to Federal Constitution art 8(1)

Constitutional Law — Legislature — Scope of legislative power — Constraints upon legislative power, whether political or legal — Whether every Act passed by Parliament must meet fairness test under Federal Constitution art 8(1)

Statutory Interpretation — Aids to construction — Preamble — Whether preamble of a statute may be used to interpret a clear and unambiguous provision in that statute

Statutory Interpretation — Constitution — Fundamental liberties — Whether broad, liberal and purposive construction required

Words & Phrases — ‘law’ — Federal Constitution art 8(1) — Whether includes common law

The plaintiff (appellant) created a charge over certain pieces of land in the first defendant’s (‘the bank’) favor to secure a loan to one Kredin Sdn Bhd (‘Kredin’). Kredin defaulted in repayment of the said loan. On 13 October 1998, the bank issued the Form 16D notice under the National Land Code 1965 against the plaintiff demanding payment of ||Page 2>>the sums due from Kredin to the Bank. On 7 May 1999, pursuant to the provisions of the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 (‘the Act’), the said loan and charge became vested in the second defendant (respondent) — a wholly owned subsidiary of the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd. On 31 January 2002 the plaintiff applied to the High Court for an interlocutory injunction against the second defendant (respondent) restraining it from exercising its rights pursuant to the Act. The High Court judge dismissed the application on the grounds that there was no serious question to be tried and that he had no jurisdiction to issue the injunction by virtue of s 72 of the Act. The plaintiff thus appealed to the Court of Appeal which had to determine two main issues, namely: (i) whether there was any serious question to be tried; and (ii) whether the High Court had power to grant the injunction in the terms sought by the plaintiff. The determination of the first issue involved questions of law and fact whereas the determination of the second issue brought into sharp focus the constitutionality of s 72 of the Act. Since the constitutional validity point of s 72 was never put before the High Court, both counsel were given leave to amend their pleadings to properly bring the point before the Court of Appeal. Also, in view of the constitutional challenge, the Attorney General was invited to proffer his views on the issues before the Court of Appeal. The Senior Federal Counsel (‘the SFC’) appeared on his behalf as amicus curiae. Arguing that s 72 of the Act should be upheld and not struck down as unconstitutional, the SFC: (i) submitted that the Act is a special law specifically enacted to meet an economic exigency; (ii) submitted that the Act was passed in the public interest and for the public good; (iii) invited the court to have

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 170 regard to the preamble to the Act which uses the phrase ‘public good’; (iv) urged that the Act was of a temporary nature and that this was an important consideration to bear in mind when determining constitutionality.

Held, allowing the appeal and holding that s 72 of the Act is unconstitutional being in contravention of art 8(1) of the Federal Constitution: (1) The determination of whether the plaintiff was an ‘obligor’ within the Act involved the interpretation of that word as defined in s 2 of the Act. This involved a serious question of law which did not merit summary disposal on the hearing of an application for injunction (see pp 13H–14A); Sri Rusa Beach Resort Sdn Bhd v Asia Pacific Hotels Management Pte Ltd [1985] 1 MLJ 132 followed. Counsel for the respondent (second defendant) also conceded that there were several hotly contested issues of fact on whether the plaintiff’s claim was barred by limitation. Thus on the facts there were both serious questions of law and fact in dispute between the parties (see pp 13G–H, 14E–F). (2) Where there are serious questions in dispute, the court should then consider the balance of convenience (see p 14F); American ||Page 3>>Cynamid v Ethicon [1979] 1 All ER 504 referred. On the facts, it was plain that the balance of convenience lay in the plaintiff’s favour. If the injunction was not granted, the plaintiff suffered the risk of losing its immovable property forever. By contrast, if the injunction was granted, the second defendant’s (respondent’s) right, if any, over the disputed property would merely be postponed to after trial. Accordingly, in the ordinary way an injunction should issue against the second defendant (respondent). The judge was therefore wrong in holding that there was no serious question to be tried and for refusing the injunction on that ground (see p 14F–H). (3) Whether the High Court had power to grant the injunction sought by the plaintiff depended upon the constitutionality of s 72 of the Act. In order to determine whether s 72 ran foul of the Federal Constitution, it was necessary as a first step to ascertain whether access to justice is a guaranteed fundamental liberty and if so, whether s 72 of the Act denies such access. If access to justice is to be a fundamental liberty then it must be accommodated within art 8(1) of the Federal Constitution. Article 8(1) is a codification of Dicey’s rule of law. Article 8(1) emphasizes that this is a country where Government is according to the rule of law. There must be fairness of state action of any sort, legislative, executive or judicial. No one is above the law. In Malaysia, it is not the law made by Parliament that is supreme, it is the Federal Constitution which is the supreme law. In Malaysia, the ultimate constraints upon legislative power are not political but legal, that is to say that any law passed by Parliament must meet the fairness test contained in art 8(1). In summing up this part of the case the Court of Appeal held: (i) the expression ‘law’ in art 8(1) refers to a system of law that incorporates the fundamental principles of natural justice of the common law; (ii) the doctrine of the Rule of Law which forms part of the

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 171 common law demands minimum standards of substantive and procedural fairness; (iii) access to justice is part and parcel of the common law; and (iv) the expression ‘law’ in art 8(1) by definition includes the common law. Therefore access to justice is an integral part of art 8(1) (see pp 14H–15B, G, 18D, H–19B); Pierson v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] 3 All ER 577; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Leech [1993] All ER 539 and Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 64 followed; S Kulasingam & Anor v Commissioner of Lands, Federal Territory & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 204 referred; R v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [1999] 3 All ER 400 distinguished. (4) The fundamental liberties guaranteed under Part II of the Federal Constitution, including art 8(1) should receive a broad, liberal and purposive construction (see p 19C); Government of Malaysia & Ors v Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33 not followed; Hinds v The ||Page 4>>Queen [1976] 1 All ER 353; Su Ah Ping v Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 MLJ 75 and Mian Bashir Ahmad & Ors v The State AIR 1982 J&K 26 referred; Dato Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato’ Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 and Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 followed. (5) Section 72 of the Act is contrary to the rule of law housed within art 8(1) of the Constitution in that it fails to meet the minimum standards of fairness both substantive and procedural by denying to an adversely affected litigant the right to obtain injunctive relief against the second defendant under any circumstances, including circumstances in which the Act may not apply (see p 22F–G). (6) All Acts of Parliament are passed in the public interest and for the public good. It is therefore a hollow suggestion that a particular Act be upheld as being constitutional based on this consideration purely because that purpose appears in the preamble. When the constitutionality of a statutory provision is called into question the courts are not concerned with the propriety or expediency of the impugned law. Parliamentary motive is irrelevant to the issue of constitutionality (see p 23C–E); Hinds v The Queen [1976] 1 All ER 353 followed and Loh Kooi Chen v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 referred. (7) A preamble may not be used as an aid to interpret a provision in a statute which is clear and unambiguous (see p 23G); Re Tan Boon Liat [1976] 2 MLJ 83 followed. Section 72 of the Act is clear and unambiguous in its terms. There is no doubt about what it means and its effect. Thus on the facts, the preamble of the Act could not be prayed in aid to interpret s 72. The preamble to the Act cannot save s 72 (see p 24B–C). (8) Whilst the court can take judicial notice of the fact that the Act was passed to meet an economic exigency, the Act is not a special law made pursuant to art

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 172 150 to meet a threat to the economic life of the nation. It is an ordinary Act of Parliament passed for a particular purpose, namely to deal with non-performing loans. Like any other Act its provisions must not be inconsistent with the Constitution. Section 72 however completely denies to a litigant the benefit of the minimum standards of fairness (see p 24D–F). (9) The Court of Appeal could not agree with the decision of Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2002] 5 MLJ 720, which in holding s 72 of the Act to be constitutional referred in passing to s 29 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 (‘GPA’) and to the Specific Relief Act 1950, for the following reasons: (i) the injunction sought in the instant case was temporary and not permanent. The reference to s 29 GPA was therefore not relevant since it does not, as does s 72, prohibit the grant of any injunction, temporary or ||Page 5>>permanent. Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act is directed at permanent and not temporary injunctions (see p 25C–D, G); Tengku Haji Jaafar & Anor v Government of the State of Pahang [1978] 2 MLJ 105; Tan Suan Choo v Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang [1983] 1 MLJ 323; Bina Satu Sdn Bhd v Tan Construction [1988] 1 MLJ 533 and Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 referred and Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2002] 5 MLJ 720 not followed; (ii) only the constitutionality of s 72 of the Act was relevant in the instant case. The constitutionality or otherwise of provisions in other statutes was not in issue in the instant case; (iii) the statement made in Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli to the effect that what statute gives, statute may take away is an oversimplification of the true constitutional position; (iv) there were fundamental misconceptions in Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli concerning the finding that the High Court’s power to grant an injunction is derived from statute (see pp 25H–I, 26D–F). (10) Section 72 of the Act fails to meet the minimum standards of fairness as encapsulated in art 8(1) of the Federal Constitution because it denies the plaintiff (appellant) an opportunity to protect its immovable property by means of a temporary injunction under any circumstances whilst not placing any fetter upon the power to grant the same relief in the second defendant’s (respondent’s) favour. Section 72 of the Act is therefore unconstitutional being in contravention of art 8(1) of the Federal Constitution (see p 27E–F, H).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif (perayu) telah menggadaikan tanahnya kepada pihak defendan pertama (‘bank tersebut’) sebagai jaminan pembayaran balik pinjaman yang dibuat kepada Kredin Sdn Bhd (‘Kredin’). Kredin gagal untuk membuat bayaran balik pinjaman tersebut. Pada 13 Oktober 1998, bank mengeluarkan notis dalam Borang 16D di bawah Kanun Tanah

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 173 Negara 1965 terhadap plaintif menuntut pembayaran balik hutang Kredin kepada Bank. Pada 7 Mei 1999, di bawah peruntukan Akta Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad 1998 (‘Akta tersebut’), pinjaman dan gadaian tersebut telah diletakhak kepada defendan kedua (responden) — sebuah anak syarikat yang dimiliki sepenuhya oleh Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad. Pada 31 Januari 2002 plaintif telah memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk satu injunksi interlokutori terhadap defendan kedua (responden) menghalangnya daripada menggunakan haknya di bawah Akta tersebut. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak permohonan plaintif itu di atas alasan bahawa tiada persoalan serius yang perlu dibicarakan dan bahawa ia tidak mempunyai bidangkuasa memberikan injunksi berasaskan s 72 Akta ||Page 6>> tersebut. Plaintif telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan yang perlu menyelesaikan dua isu utama, iaitu: (i) sama ada wujudnya persoalan serius untuk dibicarakan; dan (ii) sama ada Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai kuasa memberi injunksi atas terma yang dipohon oleh plaintif. Penyelesaian isu pertama melibatkan persoalan undang-undang dan fakta manakala penyelesaian isu kedua membawa perhatian kepada keperlembagaan s 72 Akta tersebut. Memandangkan persoalan kesahan keperlembagaan s 72 Akta tersebut tidak pernah dibicarakan di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi, maka kedua-dua peguamcara telah diberi kebebasan meminda pliding mereka supaya dapat membawa persoalan tersebut di hadapan Mahkamah Rayuan. Lebih-lebih lagi, memandangkan pertikaian keperlembagaan, Peguam Negara telah dipelawa untuk memberi pandangannya ke atas isu-isu di hadapan Mahkamah Rayuan. Peguamcara Kanan Persekutuan (‘PKP’) telah hadir bagi pihak Peguam Negara sebagai amicus curiae. Mengambil pendirian bahawa s 72 Akta tersebut harus dibenarkan dan tidak harus dibatalkan di atas alasan tidak keperlembagaan, PKP telah: (i) menghujah bahawa Akta tersebut adalah undang-undang yang digubal khas untuk menghadapi satu situasi ekonomi; (ii) menghujah bahawa Akta tersebut telah diluluskan demi kepentingan dan kebaikan awam; (iii) menjemput mahkamah untuk mengambil kira mukadimah Akta tersebut yang menggunakan frasa ‘kebaikan awam’; dan (iv) menekan bahawa Akta tersebut adalah sementara semata-mata dan ini merupakan pertimbangan yang penting yang perlu diambil kira dalam menentukan keperlembagaannya.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut dan memutuskan bahawa s 72 Akta tersebut tidak keperlembagaan memandangkan ia melanggar perkara 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan: (1) Penentuan sama ada plaintif seorang ‘penanggung obligasi’ (obligor) di bawah Akta tersebut melibatkan interpretasi perkataan tersebut seperti yang didefinasikan dalam s 2 Akta tersebut. Ini melibatkan satu persoalan undang-undang yang serius yang tidak harus ditolak terus pada pendengaran permohonan untuk injunksi (lihat ms 13H–14A). Sri Rusa Beach Resort Sdn Bhd lwn Asia Pacific Hotels Management Pte Ltd [1985] 1 MLJ 132 diikut. Kaunsel bagi pihak responden (defendan kedua) juga telah mengakui bahawa wujudnya beberapa isu-isu fakta yang dipertikaikan berkenaan sama ada tuntutan plaintif dibawa luar masa. Maka wujudnya persoalan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 174 undang-undang dan fakta yang serius yang perlu dibicarakan di antara pihak-pihak (lihat ms 13G–H, 14E–F). (2) Di mana wujudnya persoalan serius untuk dipertikaikan, maka mahkamah harus menimbangkan keseimbangan kemudahan (lihat ms 14F). American Cynamid lwn Ethicon [1979] 1 All ER 504 dirujuk. Memandangkan fakta-fakta kes ini, maka adalah jelas bahawa keseimbangan kemudahan berpihak kepada plaintif. ||Page 7>> Sekiranya injunksi tidak diberikan, maka plaintif menanggung risiko kelupusan harta tidak beralihnya. Secara perbandingan, sekiranya injunksi diberikan, hak defendan kedua (responden) ke atas harta yang dipertikaikan tersebut, jika ada, hanya ditangguhkan sehingga selepas perbicaraan. Memandangkan sedemikian, secara kebiasaan injunksi harus dikeluarkan ke atas defendan kedua (responden). Hakim tersebut telah melakukan kesilapan dalam memutuskan bahawa tiada persoalan yang serius yang perlu dibicarakan dan keengganannya untuk membenarkan injunksi di atas alasan tersebut (lihat ms 14F–H). (3) Sama ada Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai kuasa memberi injunksi yang dipohon plaintif terpulang kepada keperlembagaan s 72 Akta tersebut. Dalam menimbangkan sama ada s 72 Akta tersebut melanggar Perlembagaan Persekutuan, adalah perlu, sebagai langkah pertama, mengenal pasti sama ada akses kepada keadilan adalah suatu kebebasan yang asas, dan sekiranya ya, sama ada s 72 Akta tersebut menafikan akses tersebut. Sekiranya akses kepada keadilan harus dijadikan kebebasan asas, maka ia mesti wujud di bawah peruntukan perkara 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Perkara 8(1) merupakan kodifikasi prinsip kedaulatan undang-undang Dicey. Perkara 8(1) menekan bahawa ini adalah sebuah negara yang kerajaannya adalah menurut kedaulatan undang-undang. Keadilan perlu wujud dalam sebarang tindakan kerajaan, sama ada perundangan, eksekutif mahupun perhakiman. Tiada sesiapa yang kedudukannya yang lebih tinggi daripada undang-undang. Di Malaysia, undang-undang yang diluluskan Parlimen bukannya yang teragung tetapi Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang merupakan undang-undang teragung. Di Malaysia, had muktamad pada kuasa perundangan bukannya berpolitik tetapi berasaskan undang-undang, iaitu sebarang undang-undang yang diluluskan oleh Parlimen perlu mencapai tahap ujian keadilan yang terkandung dalam perkara 8(1). Dalam membuat kesimpulan bahagian ini dalam kes tersebut, Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan bahawa: (i) perkataan ‘undang-undang’ dalam perkara 8(1) merujuk kepada suatu sistem perundangan yang memperbadankan prinsip-prinsip asas keadilan semulajadi ‘common law’; (ii) doktrin kedaulatan undang-undang yang menjadi sebahagian daripada ‘common law’ mengkehendaki tahap-tahap yang minima bagi keadilan substantif serta prosedur; (iii) akses kepada keadilan menjadi sebahagian daripada ‘common law’; dan (iv) perkataan ‘undang-undang’ dalam perkara 8(1) secara definasinya merangkumi ‘common law’. Memandangkan sedemikian akses kepada keadilan manjadi suatu bahagian utama perkara 8(1) (lihat ms 14H–15B, G, 18D, H–19B). Pierson lwn Secretary of State for the

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 175 Home Department [1997] 3 All ER 577 diikut; Ong Ah Chuan lwn Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 64 diikut; S Kulasingam & dan lain-lain lwn Commissioner of Lands, ||Page 8>>Federal Territory & satu lagi [1982] 1 MLJ 204 dirujuk; R lwn Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Leech [1993] All ER 539 diikut; R lwn Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham dan R lwn Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [1999] 3 All ER 400 dibeza. (4) Kebebasan asasi yang dijamin di bawah Bahagian II Perlembagaan Persekutuan, termasuk perkara 8(1) harus diberikan satu konstruksi terbuka, liberal dan bertujuan (lihat ms 19C). Government of Malaysia & Ors lwn Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33 tidak diikut; Hinds lwn The Queen [1976] 1 All ER 353; Ping lwn Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 MLJ 75 dan Mian Bashir Ahmad & Ors lwn The State AIR 1982 J&K 26 dirujuk; Dato Menteri Othman bin Baginda & satu lagi lwn Dato’ Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 dan Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & satu lagi lwn Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 diikut. (5) Seksyen 72 Akta tersebut bercanggah dengan prinsip kedaulatan undang-undang yang termaktub dalam perkara 8(1) Perlembagaan tersebut kerana ia gagal untuk menegakkan tahap paling minima keadillan substantif dan prosedural kerana menolak hak litigan untuk mendapatkan relief injunksi terhadap defendan kedua dalam sebarang situasi jua, termasuk situasi-situasi yang mana Akta tersebut tidak diapplikasikan (lihat ms 22F–G). (6) Semua akta-akta parlimen adalah diluluskan demi kepentingan awam dan bagi kebaikan awam. Oleh itu adalah merupakan satu pengesyoran yang tidak berasas bahawa sesuatu Akta tertentu harus ditegakkan sebagai berperlembagaan berasaskan pertimbangan ini, semata-mata kerana tujuan tersebut wujud dalam mukadimah. Apabila persoalan keperlembagaan sesuatu peruntukan statutori dibangkitkan, mahkamah tidak mengambil kira tentang kesesuaian ataupun kewajaran undang-undang yang dipersoalkan itu. Motif parlimen adalah tidak relevan kepada isu keperlembagaan (lihat ms 23C–E). Hinds lwn The Queen [1976] 1 All ER 353 diikut; Loh Kooi Chen lwn Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 dirujuk. (7) Satu mukadimah tidak mungkin digunakan sebagai bantuan untuk menterjemah satu provisi dalam statut yang jelas dan tidak taksa (lihat ms 23G); Re Tan Boon Liat [1976] 2 MLJ 83 diikut dan Loh Kooi Chen lwn Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 dirujuk. Seksyen 72 Akta tersebut adalah jelas dan tidak taksa dalam termanya. Tidak ada sebarang keraguan tentang makna serta kesannya. Berasaskan ini, mukadimah Akta tersebut tidak boleh digunakan sebagai bantuan untuk menterjemah s 72. Mukadimah kepada Akta tersebut tidak boleh menyelamatkan s 72 (lihat ms 24B–C). ||Page 9>> (8) Sementara mahkamah boleh mengambil notis kehakiman berasaskan fakta bahawa Akta tersebut telah diluluskan untuk satu situasi ekonomi, Akta

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 176 tersebut bukan satu undang-undang khas yang dibuat di bawah perkara 150 untuk menangani ekonomi negara. Ia merupakan satu Akta Parlimen yang biasa yang diluluskan untuk satu tujuan tertentu, terutamanya untuk menangani pembayaran-pinjaman tidak aktif. Seperti mana-mana Akta yang lain provisinya tidak harus tidak seragam dengan Perlembagaan. Seksyen 72 menafikan litigan faedah tahap minima keadilan (lihat ms 24D–F). (9) Mahkamah Rayuan tidak dapat bersetuju dengan keputusan Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli lwn Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd dan Satu lagi [2002] 5 MLJ 720, yang dalam menegakkan keperlembagaan s 72 Akta tersebut telah mengimbas kepada s 29 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956 (‘APK’) dan kepada Akta Relief Spesifik 1950, bagi sebab-sebab berikut: (i) injunksi yang dipohan dalam kes ini adalah sementara dan tidak tetap. Oleh itu rujukan kepada s 29 APK adalah tidak relevan, memandangkan ia tidak menghalang, seperti mana di halang dalam s 72, pengurniaan sebarang injunksi, sementara ataupun tetap. Seksyen 54 Akta Relief 1950 adalah ditujukan kepada injunksi tetap dan bukan sementara (lihat ms 25C–D, G). ( Tengku Haji Jaafar & Satu lagi lwn Government of the State of Pahang [1978] 2 MLJ 105; Tan Suan Choo lwn Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang [1983] 1 MLJ 323; Bina Satu Sdn Bhd lwn Tan Construction [1988] 1 MLJ 533 dan Keet Gerald Francis Noel John lwn Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & lain-lain [1995] 1 MLJ 193 dirujuk; Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli lwn Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & lain-lain [2002] 5 MLJ 720 tidak diikut; (ii) hanya keperlembagaan s 72 Akta tersebut adalah relevan dalam kes ini. Keperlembagaan ataupun provisi dalam statut-statut lain tidak menjadi isu dalam kes ini; (iii) kenyataan yang dibuat dalam Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli yang membawa kesan, apa yang statut beri, statut boleh mengambil balik adalah tidak tepat dengan kedudukan sebenar perlembagaan; dan (iv) terdapat salah tanggapan yang asas dalam Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli berkaitan dengan keputusan bahawa kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi untuk memberikan injunksi adalah asal daripada statut (lihat ms 25H–I, 26D–F). (10) Seksyen 72 Akta tersebut gagal untuk mencapai tahap minima keadilan seperti yang terkandung dalam perkara 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan kerana ia menafikan plaintif (perayu) satu peluang untuk mengawal harta tak boleh alih dengan satu injunksi sementara dalam apa jua situasi, pada masa yang sama tidak menghadkan kuasa untuk memberikan relief yang sama kepada defendan kedua (responden). Seksyen 72 Akta tersebut adalah tidak berperlembagaan kerana bercanggah dengan perkara 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (lihat ms 27E–F, H). ||Page 10>>

Notes For cases on Acts of Parliament, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1675.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 177 For cases on applications for interlocutory injunctions see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 2472–2477. For cases on fundamental liberties generally, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1494–1653. For cases on statutory interpretation generally, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 1377–1658. For cases on scope of legislative power, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1706–1709.

Cases referred to American Cynamid v Ethicon [1979] 1 All ER 504 (refd) Bina Satu Sdn Bhd v Tan Construction [1988] 1 MLJ 533 (refd) Dato Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 (folld) Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 (folld) Government of Malaysia & Ors v Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33 (not folld) Hinds v The Queen [1976] 1 All ER 353 (folld) Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 (refd) Lee Lee Cheng v Seow Peng Kwang [1960] MLJ 1 (refd) Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 (refd) Marbury v Madison [1803] 1 Cranch 137 (refd) Mian Bashir Ahmad & Ors v The State AIR 1982 J & K 26 (refd) Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1979] 3 All ER 21 (refd) Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 64 (folld) Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd v United Engineers (Malaysia) Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 143 (refd) Pierson v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] 3 All ER 577 (folld) PP v Soon Seng Sia Heng [1979] 2 MLJ 170 R v Lord Chancellor, ex p Witham [1997] 2 All ER 779 (distd) R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Leech [1993] All ER 539 (folld) R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [1999] 3 All ER 400 (distd) S Kulasingam & Anor v Commissioner of Lands, Federal Territory & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 204 (refd) Si Rusa Beach Resort Sdn Bhd v Asia Pacific Hotels Management Pte Ltd [1985] 1 MLJ 132 (folld)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 178 Smith v Inner London Education Authority [1978] 1 All ER 411 (refd) Smt Maneka Ghandi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 (refd) Su Ah Ping v PP [1980] 1 MLJ 75 (refd) ||Page 11>> Tan Ah Chim v Ooi Bee Tat [1993] 3 MLJ 633 (refd) Tan Boon Liat, Re [1976] 2 MLJ 83 (refd) Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2002] 5 MLJ 720 (not folld) Tan Suan Choo v Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang [1983] 1 MLJ 323 (refd) Tengku Haji Jaafar & Anor v Government of the State of Pahang [1978] 2 MLJ 105 (refd)

Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 4(1), 8(1), 121, 130, 160(2) Government Proceedings Act 1956 s 29 National Land Code 1965 Form 16D Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 ss 2, 60, 72, Parts II, IV, V, VII, VIII, X Specific Relief Act 1950 s 54(d)

Civil Suit No S6–22–85 of 2002 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Dato’ Bastian Vendargon ( Jayaraman Ong & Co) for the appellant. Tommy Thomas ( Tommy Thomas) for the respondent. Dato’ Mary Lim(Senior Federal Counsel) for the Attorney-General.

[2002] 1 MLJ 7 Rajasingam a/l VS Rasiah v Government of Malaysia

HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 21–54 OF 1987 JEFFREY TAN J 28 SEPTEMBER 2001

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 179 Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Termination — Termination of service in public interest — Application to declare termination void — Whether officer had been dismissed — Whether officer had right to be heard

Constitutional Law — Public servants — Termination of service ‘in the public interest’ — Whether amounting to dismissal — Whether officer had right to be heard — Federal Constitution art 135(2)

Public Servants — Termination of service — Retirement from public service under s 10(5)(d) of Pensions Act 1980 on ground of public interest — Whether officer had been dismissed — Whether officer had right to be heard — Federal Constitution art 135(2)

This was the plaintiff’s action for a declaration that the defendant’s decision requiring the plaintiff to retire from public service under s 10(5)(d) of the Pensions Act 1980 (‘the Act’) was a nullity and of no effect in law. The plaintiff was a federal officer in the service of the defendant in its Immigration Department since 6 November 1964. In September 1982, the plaintiff was charged at the magistrate’s court with the commission of a criminal offence. The charges were however dismissed and the plaintiff was acquitted and discharged without his defence being called. After his acquittal on or about 20 December 1982, the plaintiff resumed full duty with the defendant. By a letter dated 27 July 1984, the plaintiff was informed that his service was terminated under O 44(3) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) General Orders 1980 (‘the General Orders’) and he was required by the Yang di Pertuan Agong to retire from the public service under s 10(5)(d) of the Act on the ground of public interest.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s application: (1) Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution provided that a public servant shall not be dismissed without being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard but by virtue of proviso (b) therein, the right to be heard was not applicable in the case where the service of the public servant was terminated in the public interest. Such termination did not constitute dismissal, whether or not the decision to terminate was connected with the misconduct or the unsatisfactory performance of duty by the public servant. Further, general order 44(3) of the General Orders provided that the officer ‘may not be given any opportunity of being heard’ where the officer’s services had been terminated in the public interest. It was an agreed fact that in the instant case, the plaintiff’s service ||Page 8>>was terminated under general order 44(3) of the General Orders and that the plaintiff was required by the Yang di Pertuan Agong to retire from the public service under s 10(5)(d) of the Act on the ground of public interest. As such, the plaintiff could not demand the opportunity of being heard (see pp 13D, 15F, 16D–E); Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 MLJ 261 followed.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 180 (2) General order 44 of the General Orders did not offend or circumvent the Federal Constitution. In fact, general order 44 of the General Orders merely echoed proviso (b) to art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution (see p 16F, I). (3) The proviso to s 10(5)(f) of the Act provided that retirement under s 10(5)(f) shall not be effected unless the officer had been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations thereon to the Yang di Pertuan Agong or the State Authority as the case may be. Here, the plaintiff was retired under s 10(5)(d) and not s 10(5)(f) of the Act. As for s 11 of the Act, the section provided that with the consent of the officer, the Yang di Pertuan Agong or the State Authority as the case may be, may require the officer to retire at any age on the ground of national interest or in the interest of the public service. Similarly, s 11 of the Act was not applicable, as the plaintiff was required by the Yang di Pertuan Agong to retire from the public service under s 10(5)(d) of the Act on the ground of public interest (see p 17B–D). (4) The plaintiff was a federal officer from 6 November 1964 to 16 August 1984 and his pension granted under s 13 of the Act could not exceed the amount calculated on that actual length of reckonable service. There was never any deduction of the plaintiff’s pension as alleged by the plaintiff’s counsel. In any event, since the plaintiff was retired under s 10(5)(d) of the Act, he was not entitled to demand for any pension for whatever amount because pursuant to s 13 of the Act, the matter regarding the plaintiff’s pension and the amount were in the hand of the Yang di Pertuan Agong (see pp 17H–18A). (5) Further, based on the decision in Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan, it followed that the doctrine of procedural fairness did not require that a public servant be afforded the right to make representations upon the issue of the pension in a case to which proviso (b) of art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution applied (see p 19A). (6) The court could not interfere with the punishment meted against the plaintiff, in that the court could not substitute the view of the defendant as to what was the appropriate penalty with its own view. In the instant case, the plaintiff had not shown that the termination was not done in compliance with the law in force. The result therefore, was that the termination must stand. Even if the decision of the disciplinary authority, if it had acted arbitrarily ||Page 9>>or unfairly or had imposed a punishment that was disproportionate to the misconduct, were liable to be quashed or set aside, there was no material or sufficient material for the court to review the decision (see p 20D, F, H); Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [198] 2 MLJ 153 followed.

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Ini adalah tindakan plaintif untuk satu pengisytiharan bahawa keputusan defendan yang menghendaki plaintif bersara daripada perkhidmatan awam di bawah s 10(5)(d) Akta

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 181 Pencen 1980 (‘Akta tersebut’) adalah suatu pembatalan dan tidak berkesan di sisi undang-undang. Plaintif adalah seorang pegawai persekutuan di dalam perkhidmatan defendan dalam Jabatan Imigresen sejak 6 November 1964. Dalam bulan September 1982, plaintif telah dipertuduh di mahkamah majistret atas melakukan satu kesalahan jenayah. Pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut walau bagaimanapun telah dibatalkan dan plaintif dilepaskan dan dibebaskan tanpa pembelaannya dipanggil. Selepas pembebasan beliau pada atau lebihkurang pada 20 Disember 1982, plaintif telah memulakan semula tugas sepenuhnya dengan defendan. Melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 27 Julai 1984, plaintif telah dimaklumkan bahawa perkhidmatan beliau telah ditamatkan di bawah A 44(3) Perintah-perintah Am Pegawai-Pegawai Awam (Perlakuan dan Disiplin) 1980 (‘Perintah Am tersebut’) dan beliau telah dikehendaki oleh Yang di Pertuan Agong untuk bersara daripada perkhidmatan awam di bawah s 10(5)(d) Akta tersebut atas alasan kepentingan awam.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan plaintif: (1) Perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan tersebut’) memperuntukkan bahawa seseorang pegawai perkhidmatan awam tidak akan diberhentikan tanpa diberikan peluang untuk didengar dengan sewajarnya tetapi menurut peruntukan (b) perkara tersebut, hak untuk didengar tidak terpakai dalam kes di mana perkhidmatan sebarang pegawai perkhidmatan awam ditamatkan demi kepentingan awam. Penamatan yang sedemikian tidak membentuk pemecatan, sama ada keputusan untuk memberhentikan dikaitkan dengan salah laku tersebut atau prestasi tugas yang tidak memuaskan oleh pegawai perkhidmatan awam itu atau pun tidak. Selanjutnya, perintah am 44(3) Perintah Am tersebut memperuntukkan bahawa pegawai tersebut ‘tidak diberikan sebarang peluang didengar’ di mana perkhidmatan pegawai tersebut telah diberhentikan demi kepentingan awam. Adalah fakta yang dipersetujui bahawa dalam kes semasa, perkhidmatan plaintif telah ditamat di bawah perintah am 44(3) Perintah Am tersebut dan bahawa plaintif telah dikehendaki oleh Yang di Pertuan ||Page 10>>Agong untuk bersara daripada perkhidmatan awam di bawah s 10(5)(d) Akta tersebut demi kepentingan awam. Oleh yang demikian, plaintif tidak boleh menuntut untuk didengar (lihat ms 13D, 15F, 16D–E); Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 MLJ 261 diikut. (2) Perintah Am 44 Perintah Am tidak menyalahkan atau memintas Perlembagaan tersebut. Pada hakikatnya, perintah am 44 Perintah Am hanya mengulangi peruntukan (b) kepada perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan tersebut (lihat ms 16F, I). (3) Peruntukan kepada s 10(5)(f) Akta tersebut memperuntukan bahawa persaraan di bawah s 10(5)(f) tidak akan dikuatkuasakan melainkan pegawai tersebut telah diberikan peluang yang sempurna untuk membuat representasi ke atasnya kepada Yang di Pertuan Agong atau Pihak Berkuasa Negeri seperti mana keadaannya. Di sini, plaintif telah diberhentikan di bawah s 10(5)(d) dan bukan s 10(5)(f) Akta tersebut. Berhubung s 11 Akta tersebut, seksyen tersebut

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 182 memperuntukan bahawa dengan kebenaran pegawai tersebut, Yang di Pertuan Agong atau Pihak Berkuasa Negeri seperti mana keadaannya, mungkin akan menghendaki pegawai tersebut untuk bersara pada sebarang umur atas alasan kepentingan negara atau demi kepentingan perkhidmatan awam. Begitu juga, s 11 Akta tersebut tidak boleh dipakai, kerana plaintif telah dikehendaki oleh Yang di Pertuan Agong untuk bersara daripada perkhidmatan awam di bawah s 10(5)(d) Akta tersebut demi kepentingan awam (lihat ms 17B–D). (4) Plaintif telah menjadi pegawai persekutuan daripada 6 November 1964 hingga 16 Ogos 1984 dan pencen beliau yang diberikan di bawah s 13 Akta tersebut tidak boleh melebihi jumlah yang dikira pada jangka tempoh perkhidmatan yang boleh diambilkira. Tidak pernah terdapat sebarang penolakan akan pencen plaintif seperti mana yang didakwa oleh peguam plaintif. Dalam sebarang keadaan, oleh kerana plaintif telah diberhentikan di bawah s 10(5)(d) Akta tersebut, beliau tidak berhak kepada tuntutan bagi sebarang pencen untuk apa jumlah sekalipun kerana selaras dengan s 13 Akta tersebut, perkara berhubung pencen plaintif dan jumlah tersebut terletak dalam tangan Yang di Pertuan Agong (lihat ms 17H–18A). (5) Selanjutnya, berdasarkan keputusan di dalam Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan, didapati bahawa keadilan doktrin prosedur tidak menghendaki seorang pegawai awam diberi hak untuk membuat representasi atas isu pencen dalam kes kepada di mana peruntukan (b) perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan tersebut dipakai (lihat ms 19A). (6) Mahkamah tidak boleh campur tangan dengan hukuman yang dijatuhkan terhadap plaintif, iaitu mahkamah tidak boleh menggantikan pandangan defendan berhubung dengan apakah ||Page 11>>penalti yang wajar dengan pandangannya sendiri. Dalam kes semasa, plaintif telah tidak menunjukkan bahawa penamatan tersebut telah tidak dilakukan dalam pematuhan undang-undang yang berkuatkuasa. Keputusannya adalah dengan itu, bahawa penamatan tersebut semestinya kekal. Walaupun jika keputusan pihak berkuasa disiplin — sekiranya ia telah bertindak secara sewenang-wenangnya atau secara tidak adil atau telah menjatuhkan hukuman yang tidak wajar kepada salah laku tersebut — haruslah dibatalkan atau diketepikan, tidak terdapat bahan atau bahan yang mencukupi untuk mahkamah mengkaji semula keputusan tersebut (lihat ms 20D, F, H); Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [1998] 2 MLJ 153 diikut.]

Notes For cases on termination of public servants generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 554–556.For cases on termination of service ‘in the public interest’, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1772–1773.For cases on termination of service, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) paras 1777–1778.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 183 Cases referred to Hong Leong Equipment v Liew Fook Chan [1996] 1 MLJ 481 (refd) Mahan Singh v Government of Malaysia [1978] 2 MLJ 133 (refd) Merdeka University Bhd v Government of Malaysia [1982] 2 MLJ 243 (refd) Mohd Yusof Mohamad v Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 286 (refd) Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [1998] 2 MLJ 153 (folld) R Rama Chandran v Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 (refd) Rajikishore v State of UP AIR 1954 All 343 (refd) Tan Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 MLJ 261 (folld)

Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 5(1), 8(1), 135(2) Pensions Act 1980 ss 3(2), 9, 10, 10(5)(d), 11, 13 Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Cap D) General Orders 1980 general order 44(1), (2), (3), (4)

V Sithambaram (Kumar & Co) for the plaintiff. Mazni Buang for the defendant.

[2002] 2 MLJ 11 DYTM Tengku Idris Shah Ibni Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah v Dikim Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SPECIAL CASE NO 02 OF 2001 AHMAD FAIRUZ CJ (MALAYA), HAIDAR FCJ AND DENIS ONG JCA 6 FEBRUARY 2002

Constitutional Law — Constitution — Federal Constitution — Commencement of action by plaintiff in High Court — Plaintiff subsequently appointed as Regent of State of Selangor to exercise functions as Sultan — Whether plaintiff was Ruler for purposes of arts 181, 182 and 183 of Federal Constitution — Definition of Ruler in art 160 of Federal Constitution

Statutory Interpretation — Construction of statutes — Purposive approach — Ambiguity — Literal approach to interpretation gave rise to different interpretations of Ruler for art 181(2) and arts 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution — Whether purposive approach to be

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 184 taken — Interpretations Acts 1948 and 1967 s 17A

Words and Phrases — ‘Ruler’ — Federal Constitution art 160

On 6 May 1998, the plaintiff, the Regent of the State of Selangor, filed a writ of summons and statement of claim at the High Court against the defendants. The defendants then filed their defence and counterclaim. Subsequently, the plaintiff was appointed Regent of Selangor to exercise the functions as ‘Sultan’ when the Regent’s father, DYMM Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah Ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Hisamuddin Alam Shah was appointed to the throne as the 11th Yang di-Pertuan Agong. This was a reference to the Federal Court by the High Court pursuant to s 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 in respect of the constitutional question of whether the plaintiff was a ‘Ruler’ for the purposes of arts 181, 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution, having regard to the definition of the word ‘Ruler’ in art 160 of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’).

Held: (1) The plaintiff who was appointed to exercise the functions as ‘Sultan’ was not a ‘Ruler’ for the purposes of arts 181, 182 and 183 of the Constitution (see p 18B). (2) ‘Ruler’ was defined under art 160(2) of the Constitution as including, ‘… except in cl (2) of art 181 and the Third and Fifth Schedules, any person who in accordance with the Constitution of that State exercises the functions of the Ruler’. The original cl (2) of art 181 provided that: ‘No proceedings whatsoever shall be brought in any court against the Ruler of a State in his personal capacity’. By the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1993, cl 2 of art 181 was amended by the insertion of the words ‘except in the special court established under Part XV’ after the word ‘capacity’ (see p 18F–I); Dato Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 followed. ||Page 12>> (3) Therefore, although the definition of ‘Ruler’ in art 160(2) included ‘a person who in accordance with the Constitution of that state exercises the functions of the Ruler’, it excluded such person from being a Ruler for the purpose of art 181(2) in regard to judicial immunity. Such exclusion was effected by the words ‘except in art 181(2)’ (see p 19G–H). (4) Even with the meaning of ‘Ruler’ in art 160(2) of the Constitution remaining intact, if a literal approach to interpretation were taken, the same would give rise to different interpretations of ‘Ruler’ for art 181(2) on the one hand and arts 182 and 183 on the other. A Regent exercising the functions of the Ruler was not a Ruler for the purpose of art 181(2), the Third and the Fifth Schedules and hence could be sued in the ordinary courts because the

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 185 establishment of the special court was exclusively reserved to the Rulers personally in respect of actions in their personal capacity. However, for the purposes of arts 182 and 183, the Regent exercising the functions of the Ruler was a Ruler and could sue or be sued in the special court (see p 23C–F). (5) In order to resolve the ambiguity caused by the interpretation, it was necessary to consider the purpose or object of establishing the special courts, that is, whether the exclusive jurisdiction of the special court to try offences committed by the Ruler and all civil cases by or against the Ruler was extended to a person exercising the functions of the Ruler as in the case of the plaintiff here (see p 24C). (6) A purposive approach had been given statutory recognition by the Parliament in enacting s 17A of the Interpretations Acts 1948 and 1967, which provided that: ‘in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object was expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object’. In view of the statutory recognition, the court could and should adopt a purposive approach in the interpretation of ‘Ruler’ for the purposes of arts 181, 182 and 183 of the Constitution. In pursuing the purposive approach, one of the matters that could assist the court in interpreting the amended arts 181(2), 182 and 183 of the Constitution was to refer to the Parliamentary reports or Hansard (see p 21A–D); United Hokkien Cemeteries, Penang v Majlis Bandaran, Pulau Pinang [1979] 2 MLJ 121 and Lam Kong Co Ltd v Thong Guan Co Ptd Ltd [2000] 4 MLJ 1 followed. (7) Based on the original Bill to amend the Constitution, it was clear that the intention of the legislature was to remove altogether the legal immunity hitherto given to the Ruler of a State. This meant that any legal proceedings by or against the Ruler in his personal capacity would be within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts just like the ordinary citizen. That Bill was accordingly passed by ||Page 13>>Parliament but when it was sent to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for His Highness’s assent, the Conference of Rulers, through the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, gave the reasons why no assent could be given and suggested amendments for the consideration of Parliament. Subsequently, taking into consideration the proposals of the Conference of Rulers, the Prime Minister moved in Parliament for art 181(2) of the Federal Constitution to be amended and arts 182 and 183 to be added. The proposed amendments and additions were subsequently passed by Parliament (see pp 25G–26A). (8) From a perusal of the Prime Minister’s speech, it was clear that no mention was made at all that the exclusive jurisdiction given to the special court to the exclusion of the ordinary courts in respect of the Ruler was to include a person exercising the functions of the Ruler (see p 26C).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 186

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pada 6 Mei 1998, plaintif, Pemangku Raja Negeri Selangor, telah memfailkan satu writ saman dan pernyataan tuntutan di Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap defendan-defendan. Defendan-defendan kemudian-nya memfailkan pembelaan dan tuntutan balas mereka. Berikutan itu, plaintif telah dilantik Pemangku Raja Selangor untuk melaksanakan fungsi-fungsi sebagai ‘Sultan’ ketika bapa Pemangku Raja tersebut, DYMM Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah Ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Hisamuddin Alam Shah dilantik ke takhta sebagai Yang di Pertuan Agong ke-11. Ini merupakan satu rujukan kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi selaras dengan s 84 Akta Mahkamah-Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 berhubung persoalan perlembagaan sama ada plaintif yang merupakan ‘Raja’ bagi tujuan artikel-artikel 181, 182 dan 183 Perlembagaan Persekutuan, dengan menimbangkan definisi perkataan ‘Raja dalam artikel 160 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Diputuskan: (1) Plaintif yang telah dilantik untuk melanksanakan fungsi-fungsi sebagai ‘Sultan’ bukannya seorang ‘Raja’ bagi tujuan artikel-artikel 181, 182 dan 183 Perlembagaan Persekutuan (lihat ms 18B). (2) ‘Raja’ telah ditakrifkan di bawah artikel 160(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan sebagai termasuk, ‘… kecuali di dalam fasal (2) artikel 181 dan Jadual-Jadual Ketiga dan Kelima, mana-mana orang yang menurut Perlembagaan Negeri itu melaksanakan fungsi-fungsi ‘Raja’. Peruntukan asal fasal (2) artikel 181 memperuntukkan bahawa: ‘Prosiding apa sekalipun tidak boleh dimulakan dalam mana-mana mahkamah terhadap Raja sesebuah Negeri dalam kedudukan peribadinya’. Melalui Akta ||Page 14>>Perlembagaan (Pindaan) 1993, fasal 2 artikel 181 telah dipinda dengan memasukkan perkataan-perkataan ‘kecuali di dalam Mahkamah Khas yang ditetapkan di bawah Bahagian Part XV’ selepas perkataan ‘keupayaan’ (lihat ms 18F–I). (3) Oleh itu, walaupun definisi ‘Raja’ dalam artikel 160(2) termasuk ‘seseorang yang menurut Perlembagaan Negeri itu melaksanakan fungsi-fungsi Raja’, ia mengecualikan orang yang sedemikian daripada menjadi Raja bagi tujuan artikel 181(2) berhubung dengan kekebalan kehakiman. Kekecualian yang sedemikian dikuatkuasakan oleh perkataan-perkataan ‘kecuali dalam artikel 181(2)’ (lihat ms 19G–H). (4) Meskipun makna ‘Raja’ di dalam artikel 160(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan kekal, jika ditafsirkan secara harafiah, perkara yang sama akan membangkitkan pentafsiran berlainan bagi ‘Raja’ untuk artikel 181(2) di satu bahagian dan artikel-artikel 182 dan 183 di bahagian yang lain. Seseorang Pemangku raja yang melaksanakan fungsi-fungsi Raja bukannya merupakan seorang Raja bagi tujuan artikel 181(2), Jadual-Jadual Ketiga dan Kelima dan oleh itu boleh

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 187 didakwa di mahkamah biasa kerana penubuhan Mahkamah Khas telah secara eksklusifnya dihadkan kepada Raja-Raja secara peribadi berhubung tindakan-tindakan menurut keupayaan peribadi mereka. Walau bagaimanapun, bagi tujuan artikel-artikel 182 dan 183, Pemangku Raja tersebut yang melaksanakan fungsi-fungsi Raja adalah seorang Raja dan boleh mendakwa atau didakwa dalam Mahkamah Khas (lihat ms 23C–F). (5) Demi untuk menyelesaikan kekaburan yang disebabkan oleh pentafsiran tersebut, adalah perlu untuk menimbangkan tujuan atau matlamat menubuhkan Mahkamah-Mahkamah Khas tersebut, iaitu, sama ada bidang kuasa eksklusif Mahkamah Khas untuk membicarakan kesalahan-kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh Raja dan semua kes sivil oleh atau terhadap Raja telah dilanjutkan kepada seseorang yang melaksanakan fungsi-fungsi Raja seperti mana dalam kes plaintif di sini (lihat ms 24C). (6) Pendekatan yang menitikberatkan tujuan statut tersebut telah diberikan pengiktirafan berkanun oleh Parlimen dalam menggubalkan s 17A Akta-Akta Pentafsiran 1948 dan 1967, yang memperuntukkan bahawa: ‘dalam pentafsiran sesuatu peruntukan suatu Akta, pembentukan yang akan memajukan tujuan atau matlamat di sebalik Akta tersebut (sama ada tujuan atau matlamat itu telah dinyatakan dengan nyatanya dalam Akta tersebut atau tidak) akan lebih diutamakan berbanding suatu pembentukan yang tidak akan memajukan tujuan atau matlamat itu’. Memandangkan pengiktirafan berkanun tersebut, mahkamah boleh dan haruslah menerima-pakai pendekatan yang menitikberatkan tujuan dalam pentafsiran ‘Raja’ bagi tujuan artikel-artikel 181, 182 dan 183 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. ||Page 15>>Dalam meneruskan pendekatan yang menitikberatkan tujuan itu, salah satu perkara yang boleh membantu mahkamah mentafsirkan artikel-artikel 181(2), 182 dan 183 Perlembagaan Persekutuan adalah merujuk kepada laporan-laporan Parlimen atau Hansard (lihat ms 21A–D). (7) Berdasarkan Bil asal untuk meminda Perlembagaan Persekutuan tersebut, jelas bahawa niat perundangan tersebut adalah untuk membatalkan sama sekali kekebalan undang-undang sehingga kini yang telah diberikan kepada Raja sesebuah Negeri. Ini bermakna bahawa apa-apa prosiding undang-undang oleh atau terhadap Raja dalam kedudukan peribadinya adalah di dalam lingkungan bidang kuasa mahkamah biasa sama seperti rakyat biasa. Bil itu telah sehubungan itu diluluskan oleh Parlimen tetapi apabila dihantar kepada Yang di-Pertuan Agong untuk diperkenankan oleh Duli Yang Maha Mulia, Majlis Raja-Raja, melalui Yang di-Pertuan Agong, memberi alasan-alasan mengapa ia tidak boleh diperkenankan dan mencadangkan pindaan-pindaan untuk pertimbangan Parlimen. Berikutan itu, mengambilkira cadangan-cadangan Majlis Raja-Raja, Perdana Menteri telah mengusulkan di Parlimen supaya artikel 181(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dipinda dan artikel-artikel 182 dan 183 dimasukkan. Pindaan-pindaan dan tambahan-tambahan yang dicadangkan telah kemudiannya diluluskan oleh Parliamen (lihat ms 25G–26A).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 188 (8) Dari penelitian ucapan Perdana Menteri, adalah jelas bahawa tiada sebutan sama sekali dibuat bahawa bidang kuasa eksklusif yang diberikan kepada Mahkamah Khas dengan mengecualikan mahkamah-mahkamah biasa berhubung Raja hendaklah termasuk seseorang yang melaksanakan fungsi-fungsi Raja (lihat ms 26C).]

Notes For cases on the Federal Constitution generally, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1397–1403 and 1493.For cases on the purposive approach, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 1538–1563.

Cases referred to Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 345 (refd) Dato Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 (folld) Lam Kong Co Ltd v Thong Guan Co Ptd Ltd [2000] 4 MLJ 1 (folld) Northman v Barnet Council [1978] 1 WLR 221 (refd) Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 All ER 42 (refd) United Hokkien Cemeteries, Penang v Majlis Bandaran, Pulau Pinang [1979] 2 MLJ 121 (folld) ||Page 16>>

Legislation referred toConstitution (Amendment) Act 1993Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ss 68(1)(a), 84(2)Federal Constitution arts 160, 181,182, 183Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1993 [Sing] s 2Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s 17ALaws of the Constitution of Selangor 1959 art 21(4)

Appeal from: Suit No D1–22–1350 of 1998 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Low Chi Cheng (Wong Yoke Ping with her) (Lim Kian Leong & Co) for the appellant. Bastian Vendargon (Philip Chai and Dhayana Shila with him) (Soo Thien Ming & Nashran) for the defendants. Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahim (Syed Marzidy bin Syed Marzuki with him) (Senior Federal Counsels) watching brief for the Attorney General.

[2002] 2 MLJ 591 Sagong bin Tasi & Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors

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HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) — CIVIL NO MTI–21–314–1996 MOHD NOOR AHMAD J 12 APRIL 2002

Constitutional Law — Right to property — Aboriginal peoples’ right over land — Compulsory acquisition of ancestral land by government — Whether proprietary interest of aboriginal people in their customary land was an interest in and to the land — Whether aboriginal peoples’ right under common law extinguished by Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 — Adequate compensation — Meaning of ‘land occupied under customary right’ — Land Acquisition Act 1960 s 2 — Federal Constitution art 13(2)

Native Law and Custom — Land dispute — Customary rights over land — Aboriginal peoples’ right over land — Compulsory acquisition of ancestral land by government — Whether proprietary interest of aboriginal people in their customary land was an interest in and to the land — Whether aboriginal peoples’ right under common law extinguished by Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 — Adequate compensation — Meaning of ‘land occupied under customary right’ — Land Acquisition Act 1960 s 2 — Federal Constitution art 13(2)

The plaintiffs were orang asli of the Temuan tribe. Pursuant to an acquisition of land, on 13 February 1996, the Sepang Land Administrator gave written notices to the plaintiffs to vacate the land they were occupying within 14 days failing which enforcement action would be taken (‘the notices’). The plaintiff did not comply for obvious reason that they were not happy with the amount of compensation. The first defendant claimed that the land was state land and the defendants had refused to recognize that the plaintiffs had any proprietary interest in the land or any interest therein at all. Hence, the defendants had refused to compensate the plaintiffs for the value of the land lost except for the loss of their crops and fruit trees and the loss of their homes, ie the building structure only. On 21 March 1996, the plaintiffs were asked by the Sepang police to report at the Dengkil police station to collect their compensation cheques. Only the third and seventh plaintiffs collected the cheques. On 22 and 27 March 1996, the plaintiffs were evicted from the land by a police operation with support from the FRU in the presence of the officials from the Sepang District Office, the officials of the second and third defendants and of the Jabatan Hal Ehwal Orang Asli. The fruit trees and the crops on the land were destroyed, the houses, the Balai Raya and the Balai Adat of the Temuan community thereat were demolished. On 14 June 1996, the plaintiffs received their cheques for the limited compensation under protest and without prejudice to their legal rights.

Held:

(1) In principle, oral histories of the aboriginal societies relating to their practices,

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 190 customs and traditions and on their relationship with land should be admitted subject to the confines of the ||Page 592>>Evidence Act 1950, in particular s 32(d) and (e), that is to say: (i) they must be of public or general nature or of public or general interest; (ii) the statement must be made by a competent person, ie one who ‘would have been likely to be aware’ of the existence of the right, customs or matter; and (iii) the statement must be made before the controversy as to the right, customs or matter had arisen (see pp 623G–624A). (2) The land had been occupied by the Temuans including the plaintiffs for at least 210 years and the occupation was continuous up to the time of the acquisition. The land were customary and ancestral lands belonging to the Temuans including the plaintiffs and occupied by them for generations (see p 610D–F). (3) The proprietary interest of the orang asli in their customary and ancestral lands was an interest in and to the land. However, this conclusion was limited only to the area that formed their settlement but not to the jungles at large where they used to roam to forage for their livelihood in accordance with their tradition. As to the area of the settlement and its size, it was a question of fact in each case. In this case as the land was clearly within their settlement, the plaintiffs’ proprietary interest in it was an interest in and to the land (see p 615F–G). (4) In order to determine the extent of the aboriginal peoples’ full rights under the law, their rights under the common law and the statute had to be looked at conjunctively, for both the rights were complementary, and the Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 (‘the Act’) did not extinguish the rights enjoyed by the aboriginal people under the common law (see p 615H–I); Adong bin Kuwau & Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418 followed. (5) The defendants purported to compensate the plaintiffs only for what had been provided for under the Act. Such compensation was not adequate within the meaning of arts 13(2) of the Federal Constitution, although the Act was a special Act relating to the aboriginal people. The deprivation of the plaintiffs’ proprietary rights was unlawful (see p 617H–I). (6) As the land was continuously occupied and maintained by the plaintiffs to the exclusion of others in pursuance of their culture and inherited by them from generation to generation in accordance with their customs, it fell within the ambit of ‘land occupied under customary right’ within the meaning of the definition of s 2 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (‘the LAA’). Therefore, the plaintiffs must be compensated in accordance with the LAA (see p 618A–B, H). (7) The first and fourth defendants owed fiduciary duties towards the plaintiffs, which had been breached and therefore, the plaintiffs would be entitled to be compensated for the loss suffered which was the value of the land. However no order was made for the breach of fiduciary duties since it was not specifically prayed for ||Page 593>>and to avoid duplicity in view of the award of compensation made

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 191 in accordance with the LAA (see p 621B, E–F). (8) The eviction of the plaintiffs from the land was unlawful because the 14 day notice given was unreasonable and insufficient (see p 620D). (9) Trespass had been committed against the possession of the land by the plaintiffs. The second and third defendants were liable for it (see p 621C).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif-plaintif adalah orang asli daripada puak Temuan. Berikutan suatu pengambilan tanah, pada 13 Februari 1996, Pentadbir Tanah Sepang telah memberikan notis-notis bertulis kepada plaintif-plaintif untuk mengosongkan tanah tersebut dalam masa 14 hari, jika gagal maka tindakan penguatkuasaan akan bermula (‘notis-notis tersebut’). Plaintif-plaintif telah tidak mematuhi notis-notis tersebut kerana sebab yang nyata bahawa mereka tidak puas hati dengan jumlah pampasan tersebut. Defendan pertama mendakwa bahawa tanah tersebut adalah tanah kerajaan dan defendan-defendan telah enggan mengakui bahawa plaintif-plaintif mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan keempunyaan atas tanah tersebut atau apa-apa kepentingan apa sekalipun. Justeru itu, defendan-defendan telah enggan untuk memberikan pampasan untuk nilai kehilangan tanah tersebut kepada plaintif-plaintif kecuali untuk kerugian hasil tanaman dan pokok-pokok buah-buahan mereka dan kehilangan tempat tinggal mereka, iaitu struktur bangunan sahaja. Pada 21 Mac 1996, plaintif-plaintif telah diminta oleh pihak polis Sepang untuk membuat laporan di balai polis Dengkil untuk mengambil cek-cek pampasan mereka. Hanya plaintif-plaintif ketiga dan ketujuh telah mengambil cek-cek tersebut. Pada 22 dan 27 Mac 1996, plaintif-plaintif telah diusir daripada tanah tersebut oleh satu operasi polis dengan bantuan FRU dengan kehadiran pegawai-pegawai daripada Pejabat Daerah Sepang, pegawai-pegawai defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga dan Jabatan Hal Ehwal Orang Asli. Pokok-pokok buah-buahan dan tanaman atas tanah tersebut telah dimusnahkan, rumah-rumah, Balai Raya dan Balai Adat masyarakat Temuan juga telah diruntuhkan. Pada 14 Jun 1996, plaintif-plaintif telah menerima cek-cek mereka atas protes sebagai pampasan yang terhad dan tanpa prejudis terhadap hak-hak mereka di sisi undang-undang.

Diputuskan:

(1) Secara prinsipnya, sejarah secara lisan tentang masyarakat orang asli berhubung amalan, budaya dan adat mereka dan tentang hubungan mereka dengan tanah hendaklah dimasukkan tertakluk kepada batasan Akta Keterangan 1950, khususnya s 32(d) dan (e), iaitu: (i) ia mestilah bersifat awam atau umum atau ||Page 594>>mempunyai kepentingan awam atau umum; (ii) pernyataan tersebut mesti dibuat oleh seorang yang kompeten, iaitu seorang yang ‘berkemungkinan menyedari’ tentang kewujudan hak, budaya dan perkara

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 192 tersebut, dan (iii) pernyataan tersebut mesti dibuat sebelum kontroversi berhubung hak, budaya atau perkara itu timbul (lihat ms 623G–624A). (2) Tanah tersebut telah didiami oleh puak Temuan termasuk plaintif-plaintif sekurang-kurangnya 210 tahun dan pendudukan tersebut berterusan sehingga waktu pengambilan tersebut. Tanah tersebut adalah tanah-tanah adat dan pusaka milik puak Temuan termasuk plaintif-plaintif dan telah didiami oleh mereka sejak bergenerasi lamanya (lihat ms 610D–F). (3) Kepentingan keempunyaan orang asli ke atas tanah-tanah adat dan pusaka mereka adalah satu kepentingan ke atas dan terhadap tanah tersebut. Namun begitu, kesimpulan ini adalah terhad hanya kepada bidang yang membentuk penempatan mereka dan bukan hutan secara keseluruhan di mana mereka selalunya merayau untuk mencari makanan untuk hidup menurut tradisi mereka. Berhubung penempatan dan saiznya, ini adalah satu persoalan fakta dalam setiap kes. Dalam kes ini, memandangkan tanah tersebut dengan nyata terlingkung dalam penempatan mereka, kepentingan keempunyaan plaintif-plaintif adalah satu kepentingan ke atas dan terhadap tanah tersebut (lihat ms 615F–G). (4) Bagi menentukan sejauh mana hak-hak sepenuhnya orang-orang asli di bawah undang-undang, hak-hak mereka di bawah common law dan statut perlu dilihat secara bersama, kerana kedua-dua hak-hak ini adalah saling melengkapi, dan Akta Orang Asli 1954 (‘Akta tersebut’) tidak melenyapkan hak-hak yang dinikmati oleh orang asli di bawah common law (lihat ms 615H–I); Adong bin Kuwau & Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418 diikut. (5) Defendant-defendan bertujuan untuk memberikan pampasan kepada plaintif-plaintif hanya untuk apa yang diperuntukkan di bawah Akta tersebut. Pampasan sedemikian tidak mencukupi dalam maksud perkara 13(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, walaupun Akta tersebut adalah satu Akta yang khas berkaitan dengan orang asli. Perampasan hak-hak keempunyaan plaintif-plaintif adalah menyalahi undang-undang (lihat ms 617H–I). (6) Memandangkan tanah tersebut masih diduduki dan diselenggarakan oleh plaintif-plaintif sehingga mengenepikan yang lain dalam meneruskan budaya dan diwarisi oleh mereka daripada generasi ke generasi menurut adat-adat mereka, ia terlingkung di bawah ‘tanah yang didiami di bawah hak-hak adat’ dalam maksud tafsiran s 2 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 (‘APT’). Oleh itu, plaintif-plaintif mestilah diberikan pampasan menurut APT (lihat ms 618A–B, H). ||Page 595>> (7) Defendan-defendan pertama dan keempat mempunyai kewajipan-kewajipan fidusiari kepada plaintif-plaintif, yang telah dilanggari dan oleh itu, plaintif-palintif akan berhak untuk mendapatkan pampasan untuk kehilangan yang dialami iaitu nilai tanah tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun, tiada perintah dibuat untuk perlanggaran kewajipan fiduisari ini kerana perlanggaran ini tidak dipohon secara spesifik dan untuk menghindari kependuaan memandangkan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 193 award pampasan yang telah dibuat di bawah APT (lihat ms 621B, E–F). (8) Pengusiran plaintif-plaintif daripada tanah tersebut adalah menyalahi undang-undang kerana notis 14 hari yang diberikan adalah tidak munasabah dan tidak mencukupi (lihat ms 620D). (9) Pencerobohan telah dilakukan terhadap milikan tanah tersebut oleh plaintif-plaintif. Defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga adalah bertanggungjawab terhadapnya (lihat ms 621C).]

Notes For cases on aboriginal peoples’ rights over land, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1784–1785.For cases on customary rights over land, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) paras 620–623.

Cases referred to Adong bin Kuwau & Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418 (folld) Amodu Tijani v The Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399 (refd) Bukit Melita Sdn Bhd v Lam Geok Hee & Ors [1996] MLJU 227 (refd) Bullock v London General Omnibus Co [1907] 1 KB 264 (refd) Calder v A-G of British Colombia (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145 (refd) Canadian Pacific Ltd v Paul et al; Attorney General of Ontario, intervener (1988) 53 DLR (4th) 487 (refd) Delgamuukw v The Queen in right of British Columbia et al; First Nations Summit et al, Interveners (1997) 153 DLR (4th) 193 (refd) Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan v Nordin bin Salleh [1992] 1 MLJ 697 (refd) Haji Abdul Rahman v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 174 (refd) Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v William M’Intosh (1823) 21 US 681 (refd) Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor v Adong bin Kuwau & Ors [1998] 2 MLJ 158 (refd) Lai Yoke Ngan v Chin Teck Kwee [1997] 2 MLJ 565 (refd) Lembaga Arkitek Malaysia v Cheah Kim Fah & Ors [1999] 1 MLJ 669 (refd) Mabo & Ors v State of Queensland & Anor (1986) 64 ALR 1 (refd) ||Page 596>> Mabo v Queensland (1991–1992) 175 CLR 1 (refd) Miriuwung and Gajerrong People & Ors v State of Western Australia & Ors (1998) 159 ALR 483 (refd) Muniandy & Anor v Muhammad Abdul Kader & Ors [1989] 2 MLJ 416 (refd) Nor Anak Nyawai & Ors v Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] 6 MLJ 241 (refd) Pareroultja & Ors v Tickner & Ors (1993) 117 ALR 206 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 194 Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd v Chang Ching Chuen [1998] 1 MLJ 503 (refd) R v Abadom [1983] 1 All ER 364 (refd) Siew Kong Engineering Works v Kian Yit Engineering Sdn Bhd & Anor [1993] 2 SLR 505 (refd) Stamford Holdings Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 607 (refd) Steven Phao Cheng Loon v Highland Properties Sdn Bhd [2000] 4 MLJ 200 (refd) Wik Peoples, The v The State of Queensland & Ors (1996) 187 CLR 1 (refd) Wong See Leng v C Sarawasthy Ammal [1954] MLJ 141 (refd) Yee Seng Plantation Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 699 (refd) Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152 (refd)

Legislation referred toAboriginal Peoples Act 1954 ss 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11Civil Law Act 1956Evidence Act 1950 ss 32(d), (e), 45, 48, 49, 50Federal Constitution arts 4, 8(5), 13, 89(1), (6), 161A(6), 162Federated Malay States Government Gazette Notification (NMB Selangor PU 1649/1935)Government Proceedings Act 1956 ss 2, 3, 5, 6(1), (4), 11, 12, 18Land Acquisition Act 1960 ss 2, 11, 12National Land Code 1965 ss 4(2), 16(2), 447(1)National Land Code (Penang and Malacca Titles) Act 1963Rules of the High Court 1980 O 15 r 6(1)

Cyrus V Das (Jerald Gomez, Abdul Rashid Ismail, Shamila and Leena Ghosh with him) (Jerald Gomez & Associates) for the plaintiffs. Mohd Zawawi bin Hj Salleh (Kamarolzaman bin Abidin with him) (Selangor State Legal Adviser) for the first defendant. Zaki bin Tun Azmi (Harjinder Kaur and Tan Siok Hui with him) (Rashid & Lee) for the second defendant. Ramesh Sanghvi (Harmeet Singh with him) (Kassim Tadin Wai & Co) for the third defendant. Pretam Singh a/l Darshan Singh (Lailawati Husin with him) (Senior Federal Counsel) for the fourth defendant. ||Page 597>>

[2002] 3 MLJ 193 Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL APPEALS NO W–05–26 OF 1999 & W–05–27 OF 1999

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 195 MOHAMED DZAIDDIN CHIEF JUSTICE, STEVE SHIM CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK) AND HAIDAR FCJ 10 JULY 2002

Constitutional Law — Attorney General — Power to institute, conduct or discontinue proceedings — Prosecution instituted under Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 — Ordinance pending annulment but not yet annulled — Whether institution of such prosecution amounted to oppression or vexatiousness on part of Attorney General — Federal Constitution art 145(3)

Constitutional Law — Legislature — Emergency legislation — Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 — Ordinance promulgated under art 150 of the Federal Constitution — Whether courts had jurisdiction to entertain or determine any question regarding the validity of the continuation in force of such Ordinance — Federal Constitution art 150(8)(b)

Constitutional Law — Legislature — Emergency legislation — Resolution to annul the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 passed by Dewan Rakyat — Such resolution not yet passed by Dewan Negara — Whether resolutions by both Houses of Parliament annulling such legislation necessary before such legislation ceases to have effect — Whether courts may act on the speculation that such resolution would be passed by the Dewan Negara as a matter of course — Federal Constitution art 150(3)

Criminal Law — Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 —s 2(1) & (2) — Corrupt practice — Definition of corrupt practice

Criminal Law — Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 —s 2(1) & (2) — ‘Pecuniary or other advantage’, definition of — Whether advantage obtained by appellant was obtained in his personal capacity

Criminal Law — Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 —s 2(1) & (2) — Submission that there was no case for appellant to answer anxiously considered by trial judge — Defence considered in detail by trial judge — Whether trial judge correct in calling for the defence — Whether trial judge correct in convicting appellant

Criminal Procedure — Charge — Alteration or amendment of — Amendment to charges to avoid duplicity — Truth or falsity of allegations referred to in charges not relevant after amendment to charges — Whether trial judge could expunge from record all evidence relating to truth or falsity of allegations — Whether with such expunction any possibility of accused being prejudiced

Criminal Procedure — Charge — Alteration or amendment of — Amendment to charges to

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 196 avoid duplicity — Whether trial judge correct in allowing amendment — Whether substantial miscarriage of justice would be caused to the defence

Criminal Procedure — Fact, finding of — Concurrent finding of facts — Whether appellate court may interfere with such finding ||Page 194>>

Criminal Procedure — Judge — Conduct of trial judge — Whether trial judge inclined towards prosecution in main trial — Whether trial judge prejudiced towards defence — Whether conduct of trial judge amounted to a miscarriage of justice warranting interference by Federal Court — Whether errors complained of occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice thereby entitling appellant to an acquittal

Criminal Procedure — Trial — Duty of judge — Duty to ensure irrelevant and inadmissible evidence not admitted — Evidence Act 1950 s 136

Criminal Procedure — Sentence — Appeal against sentence — Sentence imposed by trial judge not occasioning an error of principle or law — Whether appellate court should interfere with sentencing discretion of trial judge

Evidence — Expunction of evidence — Prejudicial effect of evidence on record far outweighing its probative value — Whether trial judge may expunge such evidence — Whether injustice would be caused to accused by such expunction

Evidence — Expunction of evidence — Trial judge failing to enumerate expunged evidence, effect of — Whether trial judge had inherent power to expunge prejudicial evidence

Evidence — Witness — Credibility — Whether evidence of prosecution witnesses to be tested against objective facts in form of documents — Documents obtained from ‘turning-over’ process — Whether documents could serve as objective facts — Trial judge had benefit of first-hand impression of prosecution witnesses who gave evidence before him — Trial judge finding evidence of prosecution witnesses credible — Whether trial judge’s finding correct

The appellant — the former Deputy Prime Minister — had been convicted on four amended charges of corrupt practice under s 2(1) of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 (‘the Ordinance’). He was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment in respect of each of the four charges, the sentences running concurrently from the date of conviction (see [1999] 2 MLJ 1). He appealed to the Court of Appeal against conviction and sentence but his appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence (see [2000] 2 MLJ 486). He appealed to the Federal Court against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, citing 33

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 197 grounds of appeal in his petition of appeal. At the Federal Court counsel for the appellant, inter alia: (i) submitted that it would be invidious and oppressive to subject the appellant to prosecution under a law that ceased to have effect. Counsel argued that since the Dewan Rakyat had passed a resolution to annul the Ordinance on 8 January 1998, it would only be a matter of time for a second resolution to be laid before and passed by the Dewan Negara; (ii) questioned whether the trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion to amend the charges. Counsel complained about the prejudicial effect of the amendments, which amendments, said counsel, were prompted by the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had committed sexual misconduct and sodomy; (iii) submitted that the trial judge failed to allow the defence to address the court before ||Page 195>>expunging evidence relating to the commission of sexual misconduct and sodomy, and such expunction occasioned an injustice to the defence; (iv) submitted that the trial judge failed to enumerate what evidence was expunged. Counsel also questioned the power of the learned judge to expunge the prejudicial evidence; (v) submitted that inspite of the amendment to the charges, there was still no case for the appellant to answer. Counsel submitted that the prosecution had not proved ‘corrupt practice’; (vi) submitted that the trial judge had erred in assessing the credibility of witnesses for the prosecution. Counsel complained that the trial judge did not consider exh D25, produced by the defence vis-à-vis PW1’s credibility; (vii) contended that the words ‘other advantage’ in s 2(2) of the Ordinance must be read ejusdem generis with the word ‘pecuniary’ so that the advantage must be capable of having some monetary value; (viii) complained of unfair conduct by the trial judge throughout the entire trial. Counsel complained that the trial judge had abused his powers under the Evidence Act 1950, frequently interrupted the trial and exhibited lack of objectivity. Counsel referred to the conduct of the trial judge in dealing with contempt proceedings against Zainur Zakaria, one of the appellant’s counsel, which the Federal Court in Zainur Zakaria v Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 MLJ 604 said was confrontational towards the defence and prosecution prone. Counsel also submitted that there were threats of contempt proceedings against other counsel; and (ix) submitted that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was excessive.

Held: (1) (per Haidar FCJ) Until a resolution is passed by Dewan Negara pursuant to art 150(3) of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’), the Ordinance remains in force. It was not for the Federal Court to speculate whether a resolution would be passed in the Dewan Negara as a matter of course as submitted by counsel. Since the Ordinance remains in force, the question of oppression or vexatiousness on the part of the Attorney General by mounting a prosecution against the appellant under the Ordinance did not arise. The Attorney General has the discretion under art 145(3) of the Constitution to prefer any charges for offences under any law he deems fit depending on the facts of the case and taking into account the public interest element into consideration (see pp 207E, I–208B).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 198 (2) (per Haidar FCJ) Counsel was in effect questioning the validity of the continuation in force of the Ordinance. The Ordinance was promulgated under art 150 of the Constitution. Under the overriding provision of cl (8)(b) to art 150 of the Constitution, no court has the jurisdiction to entertain or determine any application, question or proceeding, in whatever form, on any ground, regarding the validity of, inter alia, the continuation in force of the Ordinance. The argument that such provision is ||Page 196>>harsh and unjust should be addressed to the legislature and not the courts. The remedy was at the ballot box (see pp 207F, 208E–F). (3) (per Haidar FCJ) The trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion in amending the charges on the ground of duplicity in the charges. From the opening address of the prosecution (exh P13), it also seemed clear that the prosecution did not at all state that it intended to prove that sexual misconduct and sodomy were committed by the appellant. Thus, the ground of duplicity and the contents of the opening address (exh P13) fortified the view that the trial judge had exercised his discretion correctly in amending the charges. Since the trial judge only ordered the amendment of charges after hearing both prosecution and defence, there was no substantial miscarriage of justice caused to the defence (see pp 209F–G, 210G–H). (4) (per Haidar FCJ) No injustice was caused to the appellant by the trial judge’s expunction of evidence as the prejudicial effect of the evidence far outweighed its probative value. If the evidence relating to the sexual misconduct and sodomy allegedly committed by the appellant was allowed to remain on record, it would have a prejudicial effect on the defence because what the prosecution needed to prove on the amended charges were only allegations of sexual misconduct and sodomy and not their commission (see p 211C). (5) (per Haidar FCJ) Although the trial judge failed to enumerate what evidence was expunged, the evidence as to the truth or falsity of the allegations of sexual misconduct and sodomy was no longer the issue and such evidence was not to be allowed. The parties were also sufficiently put to notice by the learned trial judge of what was expected of the prosecution and the defence in the trial. The trial judge had the inherent power to expunge the prejudicial evidence so as to prevent the prejudicial effect on the defence case. Such order was necessary for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, and if such order was not made, it would be a good ground for appeal and the conviction would in all probability be quashed by the appellate court (see pp 211E, H, I–212A). (6) (per Haidar FCJ) The trial judge had considered in detail the law relating to the meaning of ‘corrupt practice’. The Federal Court would agree with his definition of ‘corrupt practice’ under s 2(2) of the Ordinance and its application to the facts of the case (see p 212H–213D). (7) (per Haidar FCJ) The trial judge considered the evidence given by the witnesses in considerable detail with reasons for his finding. An appellate court

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 199 should be slow to disturb the finding of facts of the lower court especially where there are concurrent findings of facts by two courts, as was the situation in the instant ||Page 197>>case. Unless it could be shown that the finding of facts was not supported by the evidence or was against the weight of evidence or was a perverse finding, it was not for the Federal Court to disagree. The Federal Court would also be slow to disturb the trial judge’s assessment and finding on the demeanour of the witnesses for the simple reason that he was the best person to have observed their demeanour (see p 215B–D). (8) (per Haidar FCJ) Although the trial judge did not make a specific finding in respect of exh D25 vis-à-vis the credibility of PW1, the trial judge did touch on the evidence of PW1 in respect of exh D25. Exhibit D25 should not be considered in isolation for the purpose of attacking the credibility of PW1. The Federal Court would agree with the Court of Appeal as to its reasons why exh D25 could not constitute a document serving as ‘objective facts’ (see pp 215G, I, 216D). (9) (per Haidar FCJ) The words ‘other advantage’ in s 2(2) of the Ordinance are not to be read ejusdem generis with the word ‘pecuniary’. There was evidence on record to show that the appellant had obtained an advantage in respect of all four charges against him. The evidence was also clear that the advantage obtained by the appellant was in respect of the use of his public position as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and not in his personal capacity (see pp 217D, 219C). (10) (per Haidar FCJ) The trial judge had considered the defence in detail, citing excerpts of the relevant and material evidence of the witnesses in his judgment. He also anxiously considered some of the arguments raised in the submission that there was no case for the appellant (accused at first instance) to answer. The trial judge came to the right conclusion in calling the appellant to answer on the amended charges. Considering the totality of the evidence, the learned judge did not err in his appraisal of the evidence and he was correct to find the appellant guilty as charged (see pp 219H, 220D–E, 221B). (11) (per Haidar FCJ) It is the statutory duty of a judge in conducting a trial to see that irrelevant evidence and inadmissible evidence is not admitted. Section 136 of the Evidence Act 1950 is drafted widely for the trial judge to exercise his discretion, and it even extends to the power to set aside a subpoena issued against a witness. In the instant case, the record showed that the trial judge did not wrongly exercise his power or abuse his power (see p 221D, G–H). (12) (per Haidar FCJ) The facts and circumstances in Zainur Zakaria v Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 MLJ 604 could not be equated to the facts of the instant case. The conduct of the trial judge in Zainur Zakaria v Public Prosecutor was not really relevant to the amended charges faced by the appellant. The trial judge may have appeared to lean towards the prosecution as indicated ||Page 198>>by the Federal Court, but it could not be said that he showed the

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 200 same inclination on the evidence in the trial against the appellant. Indeed, the trial judge considered the appellant’s case at length (see pp 222G–223A). (13) (per Haidar FCJ) With regard to the complaints of threats of contempt against counsel, the trial judge, because of wide publicity given to the case, had to exercise a lot of restraint in controlling the proceedings. In doing so, he may have uttered harsh words or even threatened counsel with contempt. It was not so much a case of the trial judge leaning towards the prosecution or being prejudiced towards the defence. The trial judge had the statutory duty to see that irrelevant and inadmissible evidence was not allowed to creep in and to stop counsel from challenging his rulings. In the instant case, it was obvious that the trial judge had to exert his authority to see the proper conduct of the trial. There were occasions when the defence team challenged his rulings which they should not have done as it amounted to challenging his authority. They had the avenue to challenge such rulings on appeal (see p 223A–C, 224C–D). (14) (per Haidar FCJ) The conduct of the trial judge did not amount to a miscarriage of justice for the Federal Court to interfere. The Privy Council case of Barry Victor Randall v The Queen (Privy Council Appeal No 22 of 2001) cited by counsel did not apply to the instant case. However, the Federal Court would endorse the statement of principles with regard to what should be the standard of fairness and the responsibility of a trial judge to ensure that proceedings are conducted in an orderly manner in a trial under the adversarial system. The errors complained of did not also occasion a substantial miscarriage of justice entitling the appellant (accused at first instance) to an acquittal (see p 224D–E, G, 226E, F). (15) (per Mohamed Dzaiddin Chief Justice) The appellate court will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence passed by the lower court is manifestly inadequate, excessive, or illegal, or otherwise not a proper sentence having regard to all the facts disclosed or that the court clearly erred in applying the correct principles in the assessment of sentence. In the instant case, the imposition of six years’ imprisonment to commence from the date of conviction had not occassioned an error of principle or law (see pp 228C–D, I–229A).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Perayu — bekas Timbalan Perdana Menteri— telah disabit kesalahan atas empat pertuduhan terpinda amalan korup di bawah s 2(1) Ordinan Darurat (Kuasa-Kuasa Perlu) No 22 Tahun 1970 (Ordinan tersebut). Beliau telah dihukum enam tahun pemenjaraan bagi setiap ||Page 199>>satu dari empat pertuduhan tersebut, hukuman-hukuman itu berjalan serentak daripada tarikh pensabitan (lihat [1999] 2 MLJ 1). Beliau merayu kepada

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 201 Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap pensabitan dan hukuman tetapi rayuannya ditolak. Mahkamah Rayuan mengesahkan pensabitan dan hukuman itu (lihat [2000] 2 MLJ 486). Beliau telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan terhadap penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan itu, menyebut 33 alasan rayuan di dalam petisyen rayuan beliau. Di Mahkamah Persekutuan, peguam bagi pihak perayu antara lainnya: (i) berhujah bahawa ianya adalah tidak menyenangkan dan bersifat menindas untuk mendakwa perayu di bawah satu undang-undang yang tidak lagi berkesan. Peguam berhujah bahawa oleh kerana Dewan Rakyat telah meluluskan satu resolusi untuk membatalkan Ordinan tersebut pada 8 Januari 1998, ianya hanya menunggu masa untuk suatu resolusi kedua dibentangkan di hadapan dan diluluskan oleh Dewan Negara; (ii) menyoal sama ada hakim perbicaraan telah dengan betulnya melaksanakan budibicara untuk meminda pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut. Peguam mengadu mengenai kesan kemudaratan pindaan-pindaan tersebut, pindaan-pindaan yang mana diperkatakan oleh peguam telah didorong oleh kegagalan pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan di luar keraguan bahawa perayu telah melakukan salah laku seks dan liwat; (iii) berhujah bahawa hakim perbicaraan gagal membenarkan pihak pembelaan berucap di mahkamah sebelum menghapuskan keterangan berhubung perlaksanaan salah laku seks dan liwat dan penghapusan yang sedemikian menyebabkan ketidak-adilan kepada pembelaan; (iv) berhujah bahawa hakim perbicaraan gagal untuk menyebut satu per satu keterangan apa yang telah dihapuskan. Peguam juga mempersoalkan kuasa hakim yang bijaksana untuk menghapuskan keterangan yang memudaratkan ini; (v) berhujah bahawa meskipun pindaan telah dibuat kepada pertuduhan, masih tidak terdapat sebarang kes untuk dijawab oleh perayu. Peguam berhujah bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah tidak membuktikan ‘corrupt practice’; (vi) berhujah bahawa hakim perbicaraan telah tersalah dalam menilaikan kebolehpercayaan saksi-saksi pihak pendakwaan. Peguam mengadu bahawa hakim perbicaraan tidak menimbangkan eksh D25, yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan berbanding kebolehpercayaan PW1; (vii) menegaskan bahawa perkataan-perkataan ‘other advantage’ di dalam s 2(2) Ordinan tersebut mestilah dibaca ejusdem generis dengan perkataan ‘pecuniary’ supaya kelebihan semestinya boleh mempunyai nilai kewangan; (viii) mengadu mengenai perlakuan tidak adil oleh hakim perbicaraan sepanjang perbicaraan. Peguam mengadu bahawa hakim perbicaraan telah menyalahgunakan kuasanya di bawah Akta Keterangan 1950, kerap mengganggui perbicaraan dan menonjolkan ketiadaan sifat keobjektifan. Peguam merujuk kepada kelakuan hakim dalam menguruskan prosiding penghinaan terhadap Zainur Zakaria, salah satu peguam perayu, yang mana Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Zainur Zakaria v Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 MLJ 604 menyatakan bersifat konfrontasi terhadap pihak pembelaan dan banyak memihak kepada pihak pendakwaan. Peguam juga berhujah bahawa terdapat ugutan prosiding penghinaan terhadap peguam lain; (ix) berhujah bahawa hukuman yang dikenakan oleh hakim perbicaraan adalah terlalu keterlaluan.

Diputuskan : (1) (oleh Haidar HMP) Sehingga satu resolusi diluluskan oleh Dewan Negara selaras dengan perkara 150(3) Perlembagaan, Ordinan tersebut kekal

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 202 berkuatkuasa. Ianya bukan terletak pada Mahkamah Persekutuan untuk menspekulasikan sama ada satu resolusi akan diluluskan dalam Dewan Negara menurut keadaannya sebagaimana yang biasa seperti yang dihujahkan oleh peguam. Oleh kerana Ordinan tersebut kekal berkuatkuasa, persoalan penindasan atau keremehan di pihak Peguam Negara dengan membuatkan pendakwaan terhadap perayu di bawah Ordinan tersebut tidak berbangkit. Peguam Negara mempunyai budi bicara di bawah perkara 145(3) Perlembagaan untuk mengutarakan sebarang pertuduhan bagi kesalahan-kesalahan di bawah sebarang undang-undang yang beliau fikirkan sesuai bergantung pada fakta-fakta kes itu dan mengambilkira unsur kepentingan awam yang harus dipertimbangkan (lihat ms 207E, I–208B). (2) (oleh Haidar HMP) Peguam pada hakikatnya menyoal keesahan penerusan berkuatkuasanya Ordinan tersebut. Ordinan tersebut telah disebarluas di bawah perkara 150 Perlembagaan. Di bawah peruntukan utama fasal (8)(b) kepada perkara 150 Perlembagaan, tiada mahkamah mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk melayan atau menentukan sebarang permohonan persoalan atau prosiding dalam apa bentuk sekalipun, atau sebarang alasan, mengenai kesahihan, antara lainnya, penerusan penguatkuasaan Ordinan tersebut. Hujahan bahawa peruntukan sedemikian adalah keterlaluan dan tidak adil haruslah dinyatakan pada badan perundangan dan bukan kepada mahkamah. Remedi adalah pada peti undi (lihat ms 207F, 208E–F). (3) (oleh Haidar HMP) Hakim perbicaraan telah secara betul melaksanakan budibicaranya dan meminda pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut atas alasan kependuaan dalam pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut. Daripada ucapan pembukaan pihak pendakwaan (eksh P13), ianya juga kelihatan amat jelas bahawa pihak pendakwaan tidak sama sekali menyatakan bahawa ianya berniat untuk membuktikan bahawa salah laku seks dan liwat telah dilakukan oleh perayu. Oleh itu alasan kependuaan dan kandungan ucapan pembukaan (eksh P13) merumuskan pandangan bahawa hakim perbicaraan telah melaksanakan budibicaranya dengan betul dalam meminda pertuduhan tersebut. Oleh kerana hakim perbicaraan hanya memerintahkan pindaan pertuduhan selepas mendengar kedua-duanya pihak pendakwaan ||Page 200>>dan pembelaan, tiada pelaksanaan ketidakadilan substansial telah disebabkan pada pihak pembelaan (lihat ms 209F–G, 210G–H). (4) (oleh Haidar HMP) Tiada ketidakadilan telah disebabkan kepada perayu dengan penghapusan keterangan oleh hakim perbicaraan kerana kesan kemudaratan keterangan jauh melebihi nilai probatifnya. Jika keterangan berhubung dengan salah laku seks dan liwat yang didakwa telah dilakukan oleh perayu dibenarkan untuk kekal berada dalam catatan, ianya akan mempunyai kesan yang memudaratkan ke atas pihak pembelaan kerana apa yang pihak pendakwaan perlu buktikan ke atas pertuduhan-pertuduhan terpinda adalah hanya dakwaan-dakwaan salah laku seks dan liwat dan bukan perbuatannya (lihat ms 211C).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 203 (5) (oleh Haidar HMP) Meskipun hakim perbicaraan gagal untuk menyatakan satu per satu keterangan apa yang telah dihapuskan, keterangan berhubung dengan kebenaran atau kepalsuan dakwaan-dakwaan salah laku seks dan liwat tidak lagi menjadi isu dan keterangan yang sedemikian tidak dibenarkan. Pihak-pihak tersebut juga diberikan notis yang secukupnya oleh hakim perbicaraan yang bijaksana mengenai apa yang diharapkan dari pihak pendakwaan dan pembelaan dalam perbicaraan. Hakim perbicaraan mempunyai kuasa sedia ada untuk menghapuskan keterangan yang memudaratkan supaya menghalang kesan kemudaratan ke atas kes pembelaan. Perintah yang sedemikian adalah perlu bagi tujuan menjamin kesudahan keadilan dan jika perintah sedemikian tidak dibuat, ianya adakan menjadi alasan yang baik untuk rayuan dan pensabitan tersebut akan dalam segala kebarangkalian dibatalkan oleh mahkamah rayuan (lihat ms 211E, H, I–212A). (6) (oleh Haidar HMP) Hakim perbicaraan telah menimbangkan secara terperinci undang-undang berkaitan dengan makna ‘corrupt practice’. Mahkamah Persekutuan akan bersetuju dengan definisi beliau mengenai ‘corrupt practice’ di bawah s 2(2) Ordinan tersebut dan pemakaiannya kepada fakta-fakta kes (lihat ms 212H–213D). (7) (oleh Haidar HMP) Hakim perbicaraan menimbangkan keterangan yang telah diberikan oleh saksi-saksi secara amat terperinci dengan alasan-alasan bagi keputusan beliau. Sesebuah mahkamah rayuan seharusnya bertindak perlahan dalam mengganggui keputusan fakta-fakta mahkamah rendah khususnya di mana terdapatnya keputusan serentak mengenai fakta-fakta oleh dua buah mahkamah, sepertimana keadaannya dalam kes semasa ini. Melainkan dapat ditunjukkan bahawa keputusan fakta-fakta tidak disokong oleh keterangan atau bertentangan dengan penekanan keterangan atau adalah keputusan yang bertentangan, ianya bukan untuk Mahkamah Persekutuan untuk tidak bersetuju. Mahkamah Persekutuan juga ||Page 201>>bertindak perlahan untuk mengganggui taksiran dan keputusan hakim perbicaraan ke atas tingkahlaku saksi-saksi atas alasan yang mudah bahawa beliau adalah orang yang terbaik untuk memerhati tingkahlaku mereka (lihat ms 215B–D). (8) (oleh Haidar HMP) Meskipun hakim perbicaraan tidak membuat keputusan spesifik berhubung eksh D25 berbanding dengan kebolehpercayaan PW1, hakim perbicaraan telah menyentuh keterangan PW1 berhubung eksh D25. Ekshibit D25 tidak seharusnya dipertimbangkan secara berasingan bagi tujuan menyerang kebolehpercayaan PW1. Mahkamah Persekutuan akan bersetuju dengan Mahkamah Rayuan berhubung alasan-alasannya mengapa eksh D25 tidak boleh membentuk satu dokumen yang bertindak sebagai ‘objective facts’ (lihat ms 215G, I, 216D). (9) (oleh Haidar HMP) Perkataan-perkataan ‘other advantage’ di dalam s 2(2) Ordinan tersebut tidak boleh dibaca ejusdem generis dengan perkataan ‘pecuniary’. Terdapat keterangan yang dicatatkan bagi menunjukkan bahawa

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 204 perayu telah mendapat kelebihan berhubung dengan semua empat pertuduhan terhadap beliau. Keterangan tersebut adalah juga jelas bahawa kelebihan yang diperolehi oleh perayu adalah berhubung dengan pengunaan kedudukan awam beliau sebagai Timbalan Perdana Menteri dan Menteri Kewangan dan bukan dalam kedudukan peribadi beliau (lihat ms 217D, 219C). (10) (oleh Haidar HMP) Hakim perbicaraan telah menimbangkan pembelaan secara terperinci dengan menyebut ungkapan-ungkapan keterangan yang relevan dan penting saksi-saksi di dalam penghakiman beliau. Beliau juga dengan khuatirnya telah menimbangkan sebilangan daripada hujahan-hujahan yang dibangkitkan di dalam penghujahan bahawa tidak terdapat sebarang kes bagi perayu (tertuduh pada mulanya) untuk dijawab. Hakim perbicaraan mencapai kesimpulan yang betul dalam memanggil perayu supaya menjawab atas pertuduhan-pertuduhan terpinda. Menimbangkan keseluruhan keterangan tersebut, hakim yang bijaksana tidak tersalah di dalam penilaian beliau akan keterangan tersebut dan betul dalam mendapati perayu bersalah seperti yang dituduh (lihat ms 219H, 220D–E, 221B). (11) (oleh Haidar HMP) Ianya merupakan tugas berkanun seseorang hakim dalam mengendalikan sesuatu perbicaraan untuk memastikan bahawa keterangan tidak relevan dan keterangan yang tidak boleh diterima masuk tidak dimasukkan. Seksyen 136 Akta Keterangan 1950 dideraf dengan luasnya untuk hakim perbicaraan melaksanakan budi bicaranya, dan ianya juga dilanjutkan kepada kuasa untuk mengenepikan sesuatu sapina yang telah dikeluarkan terhadap seseorang saksi. Dalam kes semasa, catatan menunjukkan bahawa hakim perbicaraan tidak secara salah melaksanakan kuasa beliau atau menyalahgunakan kuasanya (lihat ms 221D, G–H). ||Page 202>> (12) (oleh Haidar HMP) Fakta-fakta dan keadaan-keadaan di dalam Zainur Zakaria v PP [2001] 3 MLJ 604 tidak boleh disamakan dengan fakta-fakta kes semasa. Perlakuan hakim perbicaraan adalah tidak sesungguhnya relevan dengan pertuduhan-pertuduhan terpinda yang dihadapi oleh perayu. Hakim perbicaraan mungkin nampaknya memihak kepada pendakwaan sepertimana yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan, tetapi ianya tidak boleh diperkatakan bahawa beliau menunjukkan kecenderongan yang sama pada keterangan di dalam perbicaraan tersebut terhadap perayu. Sesungguhnya, hakim perbicaraan telah menimbangkan kes perayu dengan teliti (lihat ms 222G–223A). (13) (oleh Haidar HMP) Berhubung aduan ugutan penghinaan, hakim perbicaraan disebabkan oleh publisiti luas yang diberikan kepada kes tersebut terpaksa melaksanakan banyak halangan bagi mengawal; prosiding tersebut. Dalam melakukan sedemikian beliau mungkin telah menyebut perkataan-perkataan yang kesat atau pun mengugut peguam dengan penghinaan. Ianya bukan suatu kes di mana hakim perbicaraan memihak kepada pihak pendakwaan atau pun bertindak prejudis terhadap pihak pembelaan. Hakim perbicaraan mempunyai

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 205 tugas berkanun untuk memastikan bahawa keterangan tidak relevan dan yang tidak boleh diterima masuk tidak dibenarkan mencuri masuk dan untuk menghentikan peguam daripada mencabar keputusdan-keputusan beliau. Dalam kes semasa ianya adalah jelas bahawa hakim perbicaraan terpaksa menegaskan kuasa beliau untuk memastikan pengendalian sempurna perbicaraan tersebut. Terdapat beberapa ketika di mana kumpulan pihak pembelaan telah mencabar keputusan beliau yang mana tidak sepatutnya dilakukan oleh mereka kerana ianya adalah sama seperti mencabar kuasa beliau. Mereka mempunyai jalan untuk mencabar keputusan-keputusan sedemikian ketika rayuan (lihat ms 223A–C, 224C–D). (14) (oleh Haidar HMP) Perbuatan hakim perbicaraan tidak membentuk satu pelaksanaan ketidakadilan untuk Mahkamah Persekutuan campur tangan. Kes Majlis Privy Barry Victor Randall v The Queen (Privy Council Appeal No 22 of 2001) yang dipetik oleh peguam tidak diterapkan dalam kes ini. Namun begitu, Mahkamah Persekutuan akan menindorskan pernyataan prinsip-prinsip berhubung dengan apa yang sepatutnya piawai keadilan dan tanggungjawab seorang hakim perbicaraan untuk memastikan agar prosiding dikendalikan dengan teratur dalam satu perbicaraan di bawah sistem adversarial. Kekhilatan yang diadukan juga tidak menyebabkan satu perlaksanaan ketidakadilan substansial yang melayakkan perayu (tertuduh pada permulaannya) kepada satu pembebasan (lihat ms 224D–E, G, 226E, F). (15) (oleh Mohamed Dzaiddin Ketua Hakim Negara) Mahkamah rayuan selalunya tidak akan menukar hukuman melainnya ianya ||Page 203>>berpuashati bahawa hukuman yang dijatuhkan oleh mahkamah rendah adalah sesungguhnya amat tidak memadai, atau tidak sah, atau sebaliknya bukan merupakan hukuman yang wajar memandangkan kesemua fakta-fakta yang didedahkan, atau bahawa mahkamah tersebut jelas tersalah di dalam memakai prinsipal yang betul dalam penilaian hukuman. Di dalam kes semasa, pengenaan pemenjaraan enam tahun supaya bermula daripada tarikh pensabitan telah tidak menyebabkan suatu kesilapan prinsip undang-undang (lihat ms 228C–D, I–229A).]

Notes For cases on alteration or amendment of, charge, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 792–856. For cases on duty of judge, trial, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 4006. For cases on Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance s 2(1) and (2), see 4 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 407–411. For cases on emergency legislation, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1682. For cases on power to institute, conduct or discontinue proceedings, see 3 Mallal’s

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 206 Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1373–1376. For cases on credibility, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 2405–2410.

Cases referred to Barry Victor Randall v The Queen Privy Council Appeal No 22 of 2001 (refd) Bhandulananda Jayatilake v PP [1982] 1 MLJ 83 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor [2000] 2 MLJ 486 (refd) Grace Shipping Inc & Anor v CF Sharp & Co (Malaya) Pte Ltd [1987] 1 MLJ 257 (refd) Haji Abdul Ghani bin Ishak & Anor v PP [1981] 2 MLJ 230 (refd) Hui Chi-Ming v R [1991] 3 All ER 897 (PC) (refd) Ismail v Hasnul; Abdul Ghafar v Hasnul [1968] 1 MLJ 108 (refd) Juraimi bin Husin v PP and Mohd Affandi bin Abdul Rahman & Anor v PP [1998] 1 MLJ 537 (refd) Karpal Singh & Anor v PP [1991] 2 MLJ 544 (refd) Lok Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 (refd) Mohamad Kassan bin Hassan v PP [1950] MLJ 295 (refd) Nunis v PP [1982] 2 MLJ 114 (refd) PP v Dato Haji Mohamed Muslim bin Haji Othman [1983] 1 MLJ 245 (refd) PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1 (refd) PP v Datuk Tan Cheng Swee & Ors [1979] 1 MLJ 166 (refd) PP v Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256 (refd) ||Page 204>> Ratten v R (1974) 131 CLR 510 (refd) Teng Boon How v PR [1993] 3 MLJ 553 (refd) Wong Kok Keong v R [1955] MLJ 13 (refd) Zainur Zakaria v PP [2001] 3 MLJ 604 (refd)

Legislation referred to Anti-Corruption Agency Act 1982 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 92(1) Criminal Procedure Code ss 165, 282(d) Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 s 39B(1)(a) Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 ss 2(1), (2) Evidence Act 1950 s 136(1), 167 Federal Constitution arts 150(3), (8), (b)(iv), 160(2)

Appeal from: Criminal Appeals No W–05–26–99 and W–05–27–99 (Court of Appeal, Kuala Lumpur)

YM Raja Aziz Addruse (Hj Sulaiman Abdullah, Christopher Fernando, Pawancheek Merican, Zulkifli Noordin, Sankara Narayanan Nair, Gurcharan Singh, Kamar Ainiah and Merisa Regina with him) (Messrs SN Nair & Partners) for the appellant. Dato’ Gani Patail (Dato’ Azahar Mohamed, Mohd Yusof Zainal Abidin, Tun Abdul Majid Tun Hamzah, Nordin Hassan and Shamsul Sulaiman with him) (Attorney General) for the respondent.

[2002] 4 MLJ 289 DYTM Tengku Idris Shah Ibni Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah v Dikim Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SPECIAL CASE NO 02 OF 2001 AHMAD FAIRUZ CJ (MALAYA), HAIDAR FCJ AND DENIS ONG JCA 6 FEBRUARY 2002

Constitutional Law — Constitution — Federal Constitution — Commencement of action by plaintiff in High Court — Plaintiff subsequently appointed as Regent of State of Selangor to exercise functions as Sultan — Whether plaintiff was Ruler for purposes of arts 181, 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution — Definition of ‘Ruler’ in art 160 of Federal Constitution — Federal Constitution arts 160, 181, 182, 183

Statutory Interpretation — Construction of statutes — Purposive approach — Ambiguity — Literal approach to interpretation gave rise to different interpretations of ‘Ruler’ for art 181(2) and arts 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution — Whether purposive approach to be taken — Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s 17A

Words and Phrases — ‘Ruler’ — Federal Constitution art 160

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 208 appointed Regent of Selangor to exercise the functions as ‘Sultan’ when the Regent’s father, DYMM Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah Ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Hisamuddin Alam Shah was appointed to the throne as the 11th Yang di-Pertuan Agong. This was a reference to the Federal Court by the High Court pursuant to s 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 in respect of the constitutional question of whether the plaintiff was a ‘Ruler’ for the purposes of arts 181, 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’), having regard to the definition of the word ‘Ruler’ in art 160 of the Constitution.

Held: (1) The amendment to art 181(2) and for that matter the introduction of arts 182 and 183 into the Constitution by the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1993 (Act A848) in no way altered the construction or meaning of ‘Ruler’ determined by the Federal Court in Dato’ Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato Ombi Syed Aiwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 2. The amendment to art 181(2) altered the consequence by taking away the immunity of the Ruler from being sued or charged and stipulates that such proceedings shall only be brought in the ||Page 290>>Special Court established under Part XV of the Constitution (see p 299C–D). (2) The Regent’s appointment was for the Sultan and as the representative of the Sultan ‘and in accordance with the laws of the Constitution to do, exercise and perform all acts, rights and duties falling to be done, exercised and performed by the Ruler of the State’. Further, such appointment took effect from 24 April 1999 and for the duration that the Sultan was holding the office of Yang Di-Pertuan Agong. In such representative capacity the Regent, like the Sultan exercises the functions of the Sultan under the state constitution or any state law in accordance with and on the advice of the State Executive Council (the Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri (‘MMKN’)) or a member thereof, which advice the Regent is bound to accept and act in accordance therewith. In his official capacity the Regent like the Sultan can be sued in name only, not in the Special Court, but in the courts established under art 121 of the Constitution as the act of the Regent like that of the Sultan is deemed to be the act of the state government. More appropriately, the state government is the party to any such proceeding in those courts and not the Sultan or Regent. It will thus be seen that ‘Ruler’ in the sense defined in limb (b) of art 160(2) really means the Ruler (and likewise the Regent) acting not personally but on the advice of the MMKN that is, the state government (see pp 299F–300A). (3) It was a fact agreed between the parties that the said suit commenced well before the appointment of the plaintiff as Regent. It follows from this that they were commenced in his personal and not in his official capacity acting in accordance with or on the advice of the MMKN of Selangor or a member thereof. Thus, there was no question of the application of art 160(2) of the

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 209 Constitution to the facts of this case. Otherwise, the said suit would have been in the name of the state government of Selangor in accordance with the Government Contracts Act 1949 and the institution of civil proceedings could only have been in the High Court, taking into account the value of the subject matter, and governed by the Government Proceedings Act 1956 (see p 300A–D).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pada 6 Mei 1998, plaintif, Pemangku Raja Negeri Selangor, telah memfailkan satu writ saman dan pernyataan tuntutan di Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap defendan-defendan. Defendan-defendan kemudiannya telah memfailkan pembelaan dan tuntutan balas mereka. Berikutan itu, plaintif telah dilantik sebagai Pemangku Raja Negeri Selangor untuk melaksanakan tanggungjawab-tanggungjawab sebagai ‘Sultan’ apabila bapa Pemangku Raja, DYMM Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah Ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Hisamuddin ||Page 291>>Alam Shah dinaikkan takhta sebagai Yang di-Pertuan Agong ke-11. Ini adalah satu rujukan kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi menurut s 84 Akta Kehakiman Mahkamah 1964 berhubung persoalan perlembagaan tentang sama ada plaintif adalah seorang ‘Ruler’ bagi tujuan perkara-perkara 181, 182 and 183 Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan’), sehubungan dengan tafsiran ‘Ruler’ dalam perkara 160 Perlembagaan.

Diputuskan: (1) Pindaaan kepada perkara 181(2) dan bagi maksud tersebut pengenalan-pengenalan kepada perkara-perkara 182 dan 183 dalam Perlembagaan melalui Akta A848 tidak dalam apa carapun mengubah pembentukan atau maksud ‘Ruler’ yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam Dato’ Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato Ombi Syed Aiwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 2. Pindaaan kepada perkara 181(2) telah mengubah keputusan tersebut dengan mengambil balik kekebalan Pemangku Raja daripada disaman atau dituduh dan memperuntukkan bahawa prosiding sedemikian hanya boleh dimulakan dalam Mahkamah Khas yang dibentuk di bawah Bahagian XV Perlembagaan (lihat ms 299C–D). (2) Perlantikan Pemangku Raja adalah bagi pihak Sultan dan sebagai wakil Sultan ‘and in accordance with the laws of the Constitution to do, exercise and perform all acts, rights and duties falling to be done, exercised and performed by the Ruler of the State’. Tambahan pula, perlantikan tersebut mula berkuatkuasa mulai 24 April 1999 dan untuk tempoh di mana Sultan memegang takhta sebagai Yang Di-Pertuan Agong. Dalam kapasiti sebagai wakil Pemangku Raja, seperti Sultan, melaksanakan tanggungjawab-tanggungjawab Sultan di bawah perlembagaan negeri atau

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 210 apa-apa undang-undang negeri menurut atau atas nasihat Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri (‘MMKN’) atau seorang ahli, yang menasihati Pemangku Raja adalah terikat untuk menerima dan bertindak sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan. Dalam kapasiti rasmi beliau, Pemangku Raja seperti Sultan boleh disaman atas nama sahaja, bukan dalam Mahkamah Khas, tetapi dalam mahkamah-mahkamah yang ditubuhkan di bawah perkara 121 Perlembagaan kerana tindakan Pemangku Raja seperti Sultan boleh dianggap sebagai tindakan kerajaan negeri. Lebih tepat lagi, kerajaan negeri adalah pihak kepada mana-mana prosiding demikian dalam mahkamah dan bukan Sultan atau Pemangku Raja. Oleh itu, bolehlah dilihat bahawa ‘Ruler’ seperti yang ditafsirkan dalam cabang (b) perkara 160(2) sebenarnya bermaksud Sultan (dan begitu juga Pemangku Raja) bertindak bukan secara peribadi tetapi atas nasihat MMKN iaitu, kerajaan negeri (lihat ms 299F–300A)). ||Page 292>> (3) Ia adalah fakta yang dipersetujui antara pihak-pihak bahawa guaman tersebut telah bermula lama sebelum perlantikan plaintif sebagai Pemangku Raja. Berikutan itu ia telah dimulakan dalam kapasiti peribadi beliau dan bukan kapasiti rasmi beliau yang bertindak menurut atau atas nasihat MMKN Selangor atau seorang ahli. Oleh itu, tidak ada persoalan tentang pemakaian perkara 160(2) Perlembagaan kepada fakta-fakta kes ini. Sebaliknya, guaman tersebut adalah di atas nama kerajaan negeri Selangor menurut Akta Kontrak Kerajaan 1949 dan prosiding sivil tersebut hanya boleh dimulakan di Mahkamah Tinggi, dengan mengambilkira kepentingan perkara pokok, dan dikawal oleh Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956 (lihat ms 300A–D).]

Notes For cases on the Federal Constitution, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1404–1405. For cases on the purposive approach, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 1538–1563.

Cases referred to Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 345 (refd) Dato’ Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 (folld) Faridah Begum bte Abdullah v Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Al Mustain Billah Ibni Almarhum Sultan Abu Bakar Ri’Ayatuddin Al Mu’Adzam Shah [1996] 1 MLJ 617 (refd) Lam Kong Co Ltd v Thong Guan Co Ptd Ltd [2000] 4 MLJ 1 (folld) Northman v Barnet Council [1978] 1 WLR 221 (refd) Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 All ER 42 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 211 Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Tun Abang Hj Openg & Tawi Sli [1967] 1 MLJ 46 (refd) Teh Cheng Poh v PP [1979] 1 MLJ 50 (refd) United Hokkien Cemeteries, Penang v Majlis Bandaran, Pulau Pinang [1979] 2 MLJ 121 (folld)

Legislation referred to Constituion of State of Selangor 1959 arts 21(4), 55(1), (1A) Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ss 68(1)(a), 84(2) Federal Constitution arts 3, 34, 121, 160(1), (2), 181, 182, 183 Government Contracts Act 1949 Government Proceedings Act 1956 Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1993 [Sing] s 2 Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s 17A

Appeal from: Suit No D1–22–1350 of 1998 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur) ||Page 293>>

Low Chi Cheng (Wong Yoke Ping with her) (Lim Kian Leong & Co) for the plaintiff. Dato’ Bastian Vendargon (Philip Chai and Dhayana Shila with him) (Soo Thien Ming & Nashrah) for the defendants. Dato’ Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahim (Syed Marzidy bin Syed Marzuki with him) (Senior Federal Counsel) watching brief for the Attorney General.

[2002] 4 MLJ 449 Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & other appeals

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL JURISDICTION NOS 05-8 OF 2001(W), 05-9 OF 2001(W), 05-10 OF 2001(W), 05-11 OF 2001(W) AND 05-12 OF 2001(W) MOHAMED DZAIDDIN CHIEF JUSTICE, WAN ADNAN ISMAIL PCA, STEVE SHIM CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK), ABDUL MALEK AHMAD AND SITI NORMA YAAKOB FCJJ 6 SEPTEMBER 2002

Constitutional Law — Right to counsel — Right of arrested person to counsel under art 5(3)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 212 of the Federal Constitution — Appellants detained under s 73 of the Internal Security Act 1960 — Appellants only allowed access to legal representation after expiry of detention period — Whether this amounted to unreasonable conduct — Whether this was a violation of art 5(3) of the Federal Constitution

Preventive Detention — Detention order — Detention under Internal Security Act — Appellants detained under s 73 of the Internal Security Act 1960 — Whether detention order was mala fide — Whether detention order was made for a collateral or ulterior purpose — Whether appellants discharged onus of proving mala fide on the part of the detaining authority

Preventive Detention — Detention order — Detention under Internal Security Act — Appellants detained under s 73 of the Internal Security Act 1960 — Whether test for s 73 of the Internal Security Act 1960 was an objective test — Whether judge could enquire into arresting officers' `reason to believe' when appellants were arrested — Whether court could examine affidavits for the purpose of determining mala fide

Preventive Detention — Detention order — Detention under Internal Security Act — Appellants detained under s 73 of the Internal Security Act 1960 — Whether there were grounds to justify detention — Whether detainees had acted or were about to act or were likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof — Whether the jurisdictional threshold requisite to the exercise of arrest and detention under s 73(1)(a) and (b) of the Internal Security Act 1960 had been discharged by the respondent

Statutory Interpretation — Construction of statutes — Purposive approach — Intention of Parliament — Purpose and intent of the Internal Security Act 1960 — Whether Internal Security Act 1960 was for all forms of subversion or for communist activities only

The appellants appealed against the decision of the High Court judge in refusing to grant the writ of habeas corpus for their release. The appellants, who were `reformasi' activists, were arrested and detained under s 73 of the Internal Security Act 1960 (`the ISA'). The reason for the detention as stated in the respondent's affidavit was that the appellants were planning a street demonstration in Kuala Lumpur on 14 April 2001 involving some 50,000 people. The learned High Court judge in dismissing their applications held that the appellants had been arrested and detained in the exercise of a valid power and that ||Page 450>>the appellants had not discharged the burden on them to show that the respondent had acted mala fide in their arrest and detention. The thrust of the appellants' contention in this case was that the exercise of the powers of detention by the respondent under s 73(1) of the ISA was mala fide and improper because from the evidence and circumstances of the case, their arrest and detention were not for the dominant purpose of s 73, that is, to enable the police to conduct further investigation regarding the appellants' acts and conduct which were prejudicial to the security of

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 213 Malaysia, but merely for intelligence gathering which was unconnected with national security.

Held, allowing the appeal: (1) (per Mohamed Dzaiddin Chief Justice) `An order of detention was mala fide if it was made for a "collateral" or "ulterior" purpose, that is, a purpose other than what the legislature had in view in passing the law of preventive detention' (see Basu's Commentary on the Constitution of India (15th Ed) Vol 2 at p 153). The onus was on the appellants to prove mala fide on the part of the detaining authority. Where an order of detention was challenged on the ground of mala fide, what had to be made out were the want of bona fide as well as the non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority (see p 469B-C, E-F); Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister for Home Affairs Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279 followed. (2) (per Mohamed Dzaiddin Chief Justice) The question for decision here was whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the appellants had discharged the burden of showing that the respondent had acted mala fide in their arrest and detention. Despite the press statement of the respondent that the appellants were detained because they were a threat to national security, the appellants were not interrogated on the militant actions and neither were they questioned about getting explosive materials and weapons. The appellants were asked more on their political activities and for intelligence gathering. The court found that there was much force in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the detentions were for the ulterior purpose and unconnected with national security (see pp 469G-H, 470A-B). (3) (per Mohamed Dzaiddin Chief Justice) `Mala fide does not mean at all a malicious intention. It normally means that a power is exercised for a collateral or ulterior purpose, ie for a purpose other than the purpose for which it is professed to have been exercised' per Peh Swee Chin J in Karpal Singh s/o Ram Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 468. It was in this context that the appellants had discharged the burden of proving mala fide on the part of the respondent (see p 470F-G); Karpal Singh s/o Ram Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 468 followed. ||Page 451>> (4) (per Steve Shim CJ (Sabah and Sarawak)) `Inextricably connected' would mean that ss 73(1) and 8 are wholly dependant on each other. In the court's view, such a proposition would have the effect of inhibiting or restricting the unfettered discretion of the minister. It would mean that the minister could not, on his own and independent of the police, conduct any investigation or take into consideration factors extraneous to those arising from police investigation under s 73. What matters of national interest are infinitely varied. So are matters of national security of the State. These are the concerns of the minister.

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 214 In the exercise of his discretion, he need not necessarily have to consider and rely on police investigation. This is implicit in the very nature of an unfettered discretion. Furthermore, police investigation under s 73 may stop short of submission or reference to the minister where circumstances reveal insufficient evidence to warrant the continued detention of the detainee. Clearly, if it was the intention of Parliament to impose a mandatory obligation on the part of the minister to consider the police investigation under s 73 before he could issue a detention order under s 8, Parliament would have expressly provided for it, but such express provisions are absent in ss 8 or 73 of the ISA, thus although ss 73(1) and 8 are connected, they can nevertheless operate quite independently of each other under certain circumstances. In the circumstances, it cannot therefore be said that they are `inextricably connected' (see pp 473G-474H); Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police [1988] 1 MLJ 293, Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun; Inspector General of Police v Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun [1988] 1 MLJ 182 not followed. (5) (per Steve Shim CJ (Sabah and Sarawak)) The learned High Court judge took the view that the right of non-disclosure under s 16 makes the test under s 73(1) a subjective one. Here, it is important to note the actual wording in s 16. It is expressly stated to be applicable only in relation to Ch II, Pt II of the ISA. To read it as applying to s 73 which falls under Pt IV would clearly be contradicting the expressed intention of Parliament. Given the enormous powers conferred upon police officers including minor officials such as guards and watchmen and the potentially devastating effect or effects arising from any misuse thereof, it could not have been a matter of accident that Parliament had thought it fit that the right of non-disclosure under s 16 should only be confined to those personalities and circumstances falling within the ambit of Ch II of the ISA and not beyond. It therefore makes sense that the subjective judgment accorded to the minister under s 8 cannot be extended to the police in the exercise of their discretion under s 73(1) (see pp 475A-B, 476E-F). (6) (per Steve Shim CJ (Sabah and Sarawak)) In Theresa Lim, the Federal Court also relied on the provisions of art 151(3) of the Federal Constitution (`the Constitution') as a factor in restraining ||Page 452>>the court's power of judicial review concerning the exercise of discretion by the detaining authority under s 73(1) of the ISA. Article 151(3) of the Constitution merely barred information concerning matters of national security from being disclosed to the detainee but not to the court as such. However, there was nothing to indicate any such prohibition from disclosure to the courts for the purpose of judicial review (see pp 476G-H, 479A). (7) (per Steve Shim CJ (Sabah and Sarawak)) The burden was on the police officer to satisfy the court that: (a) pursuant to s 73(1)(a) of the ISA, there were grounds to justify detention of the detainee under s 8 of the ISA; and (b) pursuant to s 73(1)(b) of the ISA, the detainee had acted or was about to act or was likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 215 part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof. Only if the jurisdictional threshold requisite to the exercise of arrest and detention had been complied with can the police officer be said to have the rights flowing from the section. In this case, the affidavits filed by the respondent did indicate that at the time of their arrest, they were told that they were arrested and detained for having acted in a manner likely to prejudice the security of the country. As such, s 73(1)(a) of the ISA had been complied with. In respect of s 73(1)(b), the respondent had to satisfy the court by way of material evidence that the detaining authority had reason to believe that the appellants had acted or were about to act or were likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia. However, no particulars had been disclosed in the respondent's affidavits to show that the appellants had acted or were about to act or were likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia. In the circumstances, s 73(1)(b) of the ISA had not been discharged by the respondent (see p 479C-H). (8) (per Steve Shim CJ (Sabah and Sarawak)) The executive, by virtue of its responsibilities, had to be the sole judge of what national security required. Although a court would not question the executive's decision as to what national security required, the court would nevertheless examine whether the executive's decision was in fact based on national security considerations. Here, the court was entitled to inquire into the basis for the detaining authority's reasons to believe that the appellants had acted or were about to act or were likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia. On the basis of the affidavits filed by the respondent, there was nothing to indicate the existence of any evidence in support of the detaining authority's reason to believe that the appellants had acted or were about to act or were likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia (see p p 480D-E, H-481A). (9) (per Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ) The purpose and intent of the ISA was for all forms of subversion although it was more directed ||Page 453>>to communist activities which prevailed at the time the ISA was enacted. The long title and the preamble indicated however that the ISA was not confined to communist activities alone (see p 493E-F). (10) (per Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ) The test for s 73 of the ISA was an objective test and the court could enquire into the arresting officers' `reason to believe' when the appellants' arrests were effected by relying on the affidavits and the affidavits in reply. In the instant case, the appellants were never told of the grounds of their arrest and the arresting officers had not really explained the reasons for their belief. Further, all the evidence in relation to the arrests and the interrogation after the arrests had no connection with the respondent's press statement, and since all the appellants had been denied access to legal representation throughout the whole period of the detention, this was a proper case to hold the detention of the appellants to be unlawful (see pp 508I-509C). (11) (per Siti Norma Yaakob FCJ) Notwithstanding s 4(4) of the Human Rights

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 216 Commission of Malaysia Act 1999, reference to international standards set by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (`the 1948 Declaration') and several other United Nations documents on the right of access cannot be accepted as such documents were not legally binding on the Malaysian courts. The use of the words `regard shall be had' in s 4(4) of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act can only mean an invitation to look at the 1948 Declaration if one was disposed to do so and to consider the principles stated therein and be persuaded by them if need be. Beyond that, one was not obliged or compelled to adhere to the 1948 Declaration. This was further emphasized by the qualifying provisions of s 4(4) of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act which provided that regard to the 1948 Declaration was subject to the extent that it was not inconsistent with the Constitution (see pp 513H-I, 514D-F). (12) (per Siti Norma Yaakob FCJ) Section 73(3) of the ISA allows the appellants to be detained for a period not exceeding 60 days without orders of detention being made against them under s 8. This implied that a detainee may be issued with a s 8 detention order or released altogether before the expiry of the 60 day period. Although a balance must be drawn between the interests of the State on one hand and the interests of the detainees on the other, it was not unreasonable to expect the police to give priority to their investigations so that the rights of the detainees to seek legal representation would not be unnecessarily denied. The question that the court should ask itself was whether the State action directly affected the fundamental rights such that it made their exercise ineffective or illusory. In the instant case, allowing access to legal representation only after the expiry of the appellants' detentions was conduct unreasonable and a clear violation of art 5(3) of the Constitution relating to the right of an arrested ||Page 454>>person to be consulted and defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. It also supported the contention that denial amounted to mala fide on the part of the police that the ISA was used for a collateral purpose (see p 515B-H). (13) (per Siti Norma Yaakob FCJ) The finding of the learned trial judge that art 149 of the Constitution validated the denial of access by the police could not be correct. All that art 149 did was to make provisions that the ISA is valid even though it contains provisions contrary to or inconsistent with arts 5 (relating to personal liberty), 9 (relating to prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement), 10 (relating to freedom of speech, assembly and association) and 13 (relating to rights to property) of the Constitution. The ISA makes no provision for denial of access to legal representation which would be inconsistent with art 5(3). As such, the ISA is still subject to the rights entrenched in art 5(3) and art 149 cannot be used to remove such a right (see p 516C-F).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Perayu-perayu merayu terhadap keputusan hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dalam menolak writ habeas corpus untuk pelepasan mereka. Perayu-perayu, yang merupakan aktivis-aktivis `reformasi', ditangkap dan ditahan di bawah s 73 Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960 (`AKDN'). Alasan untuk tahanan seperti yang dinyatakan dalam afidavit responden adalah bahawa perayu-perayu sedang merancang demonstrasi di Kuala Lumpur pada 14 April 2001 yang melibatkan kira-kira 50,000 orang. Dalam menolak permohonan-permohonan tersebut, hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang arif memutuskan bahawa perayu-perayu telah ditangkap dan ditahan dalam pelaksanaan kuasa yang sah dan bahawa perayu-perayu telah gagal melepaskan beban atas mereka untuk menunjukkan bahawa responden telah bertindak secara mala fide dalam tangkapan dan penahanan mereka. Teras hujah perayu-perayu dalam kes ini adalah bahawa pelaksanaan kuasa tahanan oleh responden di bawah s 73(1) AKDN adalah mala fide dan tidak wajar kerana, menurut keterangan dan keadaan kes, tangkapan dan tahanan mereka bukan untuk tujuan utama s 73, iaitu, untuk membolehkan pihak polis menjalankan siasatan lanjut mengenai tindakan dan kelakuan perayu-perayu yang memudaratkan keselamatan Malaysia, tetapi semata-mata untuk mengumpul maklumat yang tidak berkait dengan keselamatan negara.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan: (1) (oleh Mohamed Dzaiddin Ketua Hakim Negara) `An order of detention was mala fide if it was made for a "collateral" or "ulterior" purpose, that is, a purpose other than what the legislature had in view in passing the law of preventive detention' (lihat Basu's Commentary on the Constitution of India (15th Ed) ||Page 455>>Vol 2 di ms 153). Beban terletak pada perayu-perayu untuk membuktikan mala fide pada pihak berkuasa yang menahan. Di mana satu perintah tahanan dicabar atas alasan mala fide, apa yang perlu dibuktikan adalah kekurangan bona fide serta ketidakpakaian minda pada pihak-pihak berkuasa yang menahan (lihat ms 469B-C, E-F); Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister of Home Affairs Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279 diikut. (2) (oleh Mohamed Dzaiddin Ketua Hakim Negara) Persoalan untuk diputuskan di sini adalah sama ada berdasarkan fakta dan keadaan kes, perayu-perayu telah melepaskan beban untuk menunjukkan bahawa responden bertindak secara mala fide dalam tangkapan dan tahanan mereka. Walaupun pernyataan akhbar responden menyatakan bahawa perayu-perayu ditahan kerana mereka merupakan satu ancaman kepada keselamatan negara, perayu-perayu tidak disoal siasat mengenai tindakan ganas dan perayu-perayu juga tidak disoal mengenai bahan-bahan letupan dan senjata. Perayu-perayu lebih ditanya tentang kegiatan politik mereka dan untuk mengumpul maklumat. Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pernyataan peguam yang arif bagi pihak

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 218 perayu-perayu bahawa tahanan adalah untuk sebab yang berlainan dan tidak berkait dengan keselamatan negara boleh diterima (lihat ms 469G-H, 470A-B). (3) (oleh Mohamed Dzaiddin Ketua Hakim Negara) `Mala fide does not mean at all a malicious intention. It normally means that a power is exercised for a collateral purpose, ie for a purpose other than the purpose for which it is professed to have been exercised' oleh Peh Swee Chin H dalam Karpal Singh s/o Ram Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 468. Perayu-perayu telah melepaskan beban membuktikan mala fide pada responden dalam konteks ini (lihat ms 470F-G); Karpal Singh s/o Ram Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 468 diikut. (4) (oleh Steve Shim HB (Sabah dan Sarawak)) `Inextricably connected' bermaksud ss 73(1) dan 8 saling bergantung antara satu sama lain. Mahkamah memandang bahawa proposisi sebegitu akan membawa akibat membataskan budibicara menteri yang tidak terlepas daripada belenggu. Ia bermakna bahawa menteri tidak dibenarkan, dengan sendiri dan bebas daripada polis, daripada menjalankan sebarang penyiasatan ataupun menimbangkan faktor-faktor selain daripada yang berbangkit daripada penyiasatan polis di bawah s 73. Perkara-perkara berkenaan dengan kepentingan negara adalah pelbagai. Begitu juga dengan perkara-perkara berkenaan dengan keselamatan negara. Ini merupakan urusan menteri. Dalam menggunakan budibicaranya, beliau tidak perlu menimbangkan dan bergantung kepada penyiasatan polis. Ini adalah tersirat dalam unsur budibicara yang tidak terlepas daripada belenggu. Lagipun, penyiasatan polis di bawah s 73 boleh dihentikan ||Page 456>>daripada dirujuk kepada menteri di mana tiada keterangan yang mencukupi untuk membolehkan tahanan lanjut orang yang ditahan. Jelasnya, jika Parlimen mempunyai niat untuk mengenakan obligasi terhadap menteri supaya memberi pertimbangan kepada penyiasatan di bawah s 73 sebelum beliau boleh mengeluarkan perintah tahanan di bawah s 8, Parlimen sudah tentu akan membuat peruntukan tersebut, tetapi tiada peruntukan sedemikian di dalam ss 8 dan 73 AKDN. Oleh itu, walaupun ss 73(1) dan 8 berkait, seksyen-seksyen tersebut boleh digunakan bebas daripada yang lain di bawah keadaan-keadaan tertentu. Di dalam keadaan ini, tidak boleh dikatakan bahawa seksyen-seksyen tersebut adalah `inextricably connected' (lihat ms 473G-474H) Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police [1988] 1 MLJ 293, Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun; Inspector General of Police v Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun [1988] 1 MLJ 182 tidak diikut. (5) (oleh Steve Shim HB (Sabah dan Sarawak)) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang arif berpendapat bahawa hak untuk tidak mendedahkan maklumat di bawah s 16 menjadikan ujian di bawah s 73(1) ujian subjektif. Di sini, ia adalah penting untuk mengambil perhatian perkataan-perkataan sebenarnya di dalam s 16. Ia jelas memperuntukkan bahawa ia hanya digunakan untuk Bab II, Bhg II AKDN. Jikalau ia dibaca supaya dapat digunakan dengan s 73 yang jatuh di bawah Bhg IV, ini jelas menyangkal niat tersurat Parlimen. Memandangkan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 219 kuasa luas yang diberi kepada polis, termasuk pegawai-pegawai kecil seperti pengawal dan penjaga dan kesan-kesan mengejutkan yang mungkin timbul daripada penyalahgunaan kuasa tersebut, ia tidak mungkin suatu kebetulan bahawa Parlimen berpendapat bahawa hak untuk tidak mendedahkan maklumat di bawah s 16 patut hanya terbatas kepada pihak-pihak dan keadaan-keadaan yang termasuk lingkungan Bab II AKDN sahaja. Ia dapat difahami bahawa keputusan subjektif yang diberi kepada menteri di bawah s 8 tidak dapat dilanjutkan kepada polis di dalam penggunaan budibicara tersebut di bawah s 73(1) (lihat ms 475A-B, 476E-F). (6) (oleh Steve Shim HB (Sabah dan Sarawak)) Dalam Theresa Lim, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah bergantung pada peruntukan perkara 151(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (`Perlembagaan tersebut') sebagai satu faktor dalam mencegah kuasa mahkamah untuk membuat kajian semula kehakiman mengenai pelaksanaan budi bicara oleh pihak berkuasa yang menahan di bawah s 73(1) AKDN. Perkara 151(3) Perlembagaan tersebut cuma menghalang maklumat tentang keselamatan negara daripada didedahkan kepada orang tahanan tetapi bukan kepada mahkamah. Walau bagaimanapun, tiada apa-apa yang menunjukkan sebarang larangan daripada pendedahan sebegitu kepada mahkamah untuk tujuan kajian semula kehakiman (lihat ms 476G-H, 479A). ||Page 457>> (7) (oleh Steve Shim HB (Sabah dan Sarawak)) Beban terletak pada pegawai polis untu memuaskan mahkamah bahawa: (a) menurut s 73(1)(a) AKDN, wujudnya alasan untuk menjustifikasikan tahanan orang tahanan di bawah s 8 AKDN; dan (b) menurut s 73(1)(b) AKDN, orang tahanan bertindak atau berniat bertindak atau mungkin bertindak dalam cara yang memudaratkan keselamatan Malaysia atau mana-mana bahagiannya atau penyelenggaraan perkhidmatan perlu dalamnya atau kepada ekonomi. Hanya jika ambang bidang kuasa yang diperlukan untuk pelaksanaan tangkapan dan tahanan telah dipatuhi barulah pegawai polis boleh dikatakan mempunyai hak yang diberikan oleh seksyen tersebut. Dalam kes ini, afidavit yang difailkan oleh responden memang menunjukkan bahawa pada masa tangkapan mereka, perayu-perayu telah diberitahu bahawa mereka ditangkap dan ditahan kerana telah bertindak dalam cara yang mungkin menjejaskan keselamatan negara. Oleh itu, s 73(1)(a) AKDN telah dipatuhi. Berhubung dengan s 73(1)(b), responden harus memuaskan mahkamah melalui bukti material bahawa pihak berkuasa yang menahan mempunyai sebab untuk percaya bahawa perayu-perayu telah bertindak atau berniat bertindak atau mungkin bertindak dalam cara yang memudaratkan keselamatan Malaysia. Walau bagaimanapun, tiada butir telah didedahkan dalam afidavit responden untuk menunjukkan bahawa perayu-perayu telah bertindak atau berniat bertindak atau mungkin bertindak dalam apa-apa cara yang memudaratkan keselamatan Malaysia. Dalam keadaan ini, s 73(1)(b) AKDN tidak dilepaskan oleh responden (lihat ms 479C-H). (8) (oleh Steve Shim HB (Sabah dan Sarawak)) Disebabkan tanggungjawabnya,

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 220 badan eksekutif haruslah menjadi hakim tunggal kepada apa yang diperlukan untuk keselamatan negara. Walaupun mahkamah tidak akan mempersoalkan keputusan badan eksekutif tentang apa yang diperlukan untuk keselamatan negara, mahkamah tetap akan memeriksa sama ada keputusan badan eksekutif memang berdasarkan pertimbangan keselamatan negara. Di sini, mahkamah berhak menyiasat dasar alasan-alasan pihak berkuasa yang menahan untuk percaya bahawa perayu-perayu telah bertindak atau berniat bertindak atau mungkin bertindak dalam cara yang memudaratkan keselamatan Malaysia. Berdasarkan afidavit yang difailkan oleh responden, tiada apa yang menunjukkan kewujudan bukti yang boleh menyokong sebab pihak berkuasa yang menahan untuk percaya bahawa perayu-perayu telah bertindak atau berniat hendak atau mungkin bertindak dalam cara yang memudaratkan keselamatan Malaysia (lihat ms 480D-E, H-481A). (9) (oleh Abdul Malek Ahmad HMP) Tujuan dan hasrat AKDN adalah untuk semua bentuk subversi walaupun ia lebih ditujukan kepada kegiatan komunis yang tersebar luas pada masa AKDN ||Page 458>>digubalkan. Namun demikian, tajuk panjang dan mukadimah menandakan bahawa AKDN tidak terbatas kepada kegiatan-kegiatan komunis sahaja (lihat ms 493E-F). (10) (oleh Abdul Malek Ahmad HMP) Ujian untuk s 73 AKDN merupakan ujian objektif dan mahkamah boleh menyiasat `reason to believe' pegawai yang menangkap apabila tangkapan perayu-perayu dikuatkuasakan dengan bergantung kepada afidavit dan afidavit jawapan. Dalam kes ini, perayu-perayu tidak diberitahu alasan tangkapan mereka dan pegawai-pegawai yang menangkap tidak menjelaskan secara terang sebab-sebab untuk kepercayaan mereka. Tambahan pula, semua keterangan berhubung dengan tangkapan dan soal siasat selepas tangkapan tidak berkait dengan pernyataan akhbar responden, dan memandangkan bahawa perayu-perayu telah dinafikan hak mendapat perwakilan undang-undang sepanjang tempoh tahanan, ini merupakan kes yang wajar untuk memutuskan bahawa tahanan perayu-perayu menyalahi undang-undang (lihat ms 508I-509C). (11) (oleh Siti Norma Yaakob HMP) Tanpa mempedulikan s 4(4) Akta Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia 1999, rujukan kepada piawaian antarabangsa yang ditetapkan oleh Perisytiharan Sejagat Hak Asasi Manusia 1948 (`Perisytiharan 1948') dan pelbagai dokumen lain Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu mengenai hak akses tidak boleh diterima kerana dokumen sedemikian tidak mengikat mahkamah Malaysia di sisi undang-undang. Penggunaan perkataan-perkataan `regard shall be had' dalam s 4(4) Akta Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia hanya boleh bermaksud jemputan untuk meneliti Perisytiharan 1948 sekiranya seseorang dikehendaki berbuat demikian dan untuk menimbang prinsip yang dinyatakan dalamnya dan diyakinkan olehnya sekiranya perlu. Melampaui itu, seseorang tidak wajib atau dipaksa mematuhi Perisytiharan 1948. Ini seterusnya dititikberatkan oleh

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 221 peruntukan bersyarat s 4(4) Akta Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia yang memperuntukkan bahawa perhatian kepada Perisytiharan 1948 adalah tertakluk sejauh mana ia serasi dengan Perlembagaan tersebut (lihat ms 513H-I, 514D-F).] (12) (oleh Siti Norma Yaakob HMP) Seksyen 73(3) AKDN membenarkan perayu-perayu ditahan untuk jangkamasa tidak melebihi 60 hari tanpa perintah tahanan dibuat terhadap mereka di bawah s 8. Ini menyatakan secara tidak langsung bahawa orang tahanan boleh dikenakan perintah tahanan di bawah s 8 atau dibebaskan sama sekali sebelum tempoh 60 hari luput. Walaupun satu imbangan mesti dicapai di antara kepentingan Negeri dan kepentingan orang tahanan, adalah munasabah untuk menjangka polis memberi keutamaan kepada siasatan mereka supaya hak orang tahanan untuk mendapat perwakilan undang-undang tidak dinafikan secara keterlaluan. Persoalan yang mahkamah harus bertanya kepada dirinya sendiri adalah sama ada tindakan Negeri ||Page 459>>menjejaskan hak asasi secara langsung sehingga ia menyebabkan pelaksanaan mereka tidak berkesan atau hanya illusi. Dalam kes ini, membenarkan hak mendapat perwakilan undang-undang hanya selepas luputnya tahanan perayu-perayu merupakan kelakuan yang tidak munasabah dan jelas melanggar perkara 5(3) Perlembagaan tersebut berhubung dengan hak seorang yang ditangkap untuk berunding dan dibela oleh peguam pilihannya. Ini juga menyokong pernyataan bahawa penafian tersebut merupakan mala fide pada pihak polis bahawa AKDN digunakan untuk sebab yang berlainan (lihat ms 515B-H). (13) (oleh Siti Norma Yaakob HMP) Keputusan hakim yang arif tersebut bahawa perkara 149 Perlembagaan tersebut mensahkan penghalangan akses oleh polis tidak betul. Perkara 149 hanya membuat peruntukan bahawa AKDN adalah sah walaupun ia mengandungi peruntukan yang bercanggah dengan perkara 5 (yang berkait dengan kebebasan peribadi), perkara 9 (yang berkait dengan larangan buang negeri dan kebebasan bergerak), perkara 10 (yang berkait dengan kebebasan bersuara, berhimpun dan membuat persatuan) dan perkara 13 (berkait dengan hak-hak hartanah) Perlembagaan tersebut. AKDN tidak membuat peruntukan untuk penghalangan akses kepada perwakilan undang-undang yang bercanggah dengan perkara 5(3). Oleh itu, AKDN masih tertakluk kepada hak-hak yang diperuntukkan di dalam perkara 5(3) dan perkara 149 tidak boleh digunakan untuk mengambil balik hak tersebut (lihat ms 516C-F).

Notes For cases on right to counsel, see 3 Mallal's Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1783. For cases on detention under Internal Security Act, see 10 Mallal's Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) paras 1245-1246. For cases on the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, see 11 Mallal's Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 1538-1563.

Cases referred to Aminah v Superintendent of Prison, Pengkalan Chepa, Kelantan [1968] 1 MLJ 92 (refd) Assa Singh v Menteri Besar, Johore [1969] 2 MLJ 30 (refd) Castorina v Chief Constable of Surrey (1988) (unreported); Archbold's Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (1993), Vol 1, paras 15-144 (refd) Chng Suan Tze v The Minister of Home Affairs & Ors and other appeals [1989] 1 MLJ 69 (folld) Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995 [1995] 2 SLR 201 (refd) Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister For The Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (refd) Dalip Bhagwan Singh v PP [1998] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) ||Page 460>> Dato Menteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v Dato Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus [1981] 1 MLJ 29 (refd) Datuk James Wong Kim Min, Re; Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors, v Datuk James Wong Kim Min [1976] 2 MLJ 245 (refd) Detention of R Sivarasa & Ors, Re The [1996] 3 MLJ 611 (refd) Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 (refd) Dixon & Anor v British Broadcasting Corp [1979] 2 All ER 112 (refd) Fifita & Anor v Fakafanua (2000) 5 LRC 733 (refd) Hamdard Dawakhana v Union of India 1960 AIR 554 (refd) Hashim bin Saud v Yahaya bin Hashim & Anor [1977] 2 MLJ 116 (refd) Honey & Anor v Minister of Police & Ors (1980) (3) SA Tk Sc 800 (refd) Inspector-General Of Police & Anor v Lee Kim Hoong [1979] 2 MLJ 291 (refd) Irtelli v Squatriti & Ors [1993] QB 83 (refd) Juma'at bin Samad v PP [1993] 3 SLR 338 (refd) Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [Minister of Home Affairs], Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 (refd) Karpal Singh s/o Ram Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 468 (refd) Katofa v Administrator-General For SW Africa (1985) 4 SA 211 (SWA) (refd) Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745 (refd) Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker (1984) 9 DLR (4th) 161 (refd) Lee Mau Seng v Minister for Home Affairs, Singapore & Anor [1971] 2 MLJ 137 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 223 Liversidge v Sir John Anderson & Anor [1942] AC 206 (refd) Matanzima v Minister of Police, Transkei & Ors (1992)(2) SA 401 Tk GD (refd) Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors v Karpal Singh [1992] 1 MLJ 147 (refd) Merdeka University Bhd v Government of Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 356 (refd) Minister of Home Affairs & Anor v Austin & Anor (1987) LRC (Const) 567 (refd) Minister of Law and Order & Ors v Hurley & Anor (1986)(3) SA 568 (refd) Minister of Law and Order & Ors v Pavlicevic (1989) SA 679 (refd) Moti Bai v State AIR 1954 Rajasthan 241 (refd) Ong Ah Chuan v PP Koh Chai Cheng v PP [1981] 1 MLJ 64 (refd) Ooi Ah Phua v Officer-in-Charge Criminal Investigation, Kedah/Perlis [1975] 2 MLJ 198 (refd) PE Long @ Jimmy & Ors, Re, PE Long & Ors v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 133 (refd) PP v Lau Kee Hoo [1983] 1 MLJ 157 (refd) ||Page 461>> PP v Yee Kim Seng [1983] 1 MLJ 252 (refd) Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and related appeals [1993] 1 All ER 42 (refd) R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App Rep 152 (refd) R v Stafford (1969) 53 Cr App Rep 1 (refd) Rahman v Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs (Bangladesh) & Anor (2000) 2 LRC 1 (refd) Ramli bin Salleh v Inspector Yahya bin Hashim [1973] 1 MLJ 54 (refd) Regina v Parks [1961] 1 WLR 1484 (refd) Smt Manecha Ghandi v Union AIR 1979 SC 597 (refd) Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 266 (refd) Sundar Singh v Emperor 1930 AIR Lahore 945 (refd) Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun, Re, Inspector General of Police v Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun [1988] 1 MLJ 182 (not folld) Teh Cheng Poh v PP [1979] 1 MLJ 50 (refd) Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police [1988] 1 MLJ 293 (not folld) Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister for Home Affairs Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279 (folld)

Legislation referred to

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 224 Bill of Rights s 1, art 9 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ss 48, 78, 93(1) Criminal Appeal Act 1907 [Eng] s 9 Criminal Procedure Code s 117 Dangerous Drugs (Forfeiture of Property) Act 1988 Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 ss 3(1), 6(1) Emergency (Public Order & Prevention Of Crime) Ordinance 1969 s 3(1) Federal Constitution arts 5, (1), (2), (3), (4), 8, (1), 9, 10, 13, 121(1), 149, (a)-(f), 151(3), Pt XI Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 s 4(4) Indian Constitution art 22(1) Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8, (1), 8A, 8b, 14, 16-73, (1), (a), (b), (3), (a), (b), (6), Ch II, Pts II, IV Internal Security Act (Cap 143) [Sing] ss 8, 10 Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 ss 28(1)(a), 29(1), 54, (1), (a)-(d), (2) Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960 r 81 Interpretation Act (Cap 1) [Sing] s 9A Police Act [Zimbabwe] s 21 Public Security Act 30 of 1977 [Tk] s 47 Restrictive Residence Ordinance (Cap 39) Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 [Eng] Pt II, Sch 1 ||Page 462>>

Appeal from: Criminal Application Nos 44-15 of 2001, 44-16 of 2001, 44-17 of 2001, 44-18 of 2001 and 44-19 of 2001 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Hj Sulaiman Abdullah (Sivarasa Rasiah, Christopher Leong, Malik Imtiaz Sarwar and Moganambal Murugappan with him) (Daim & Gamany) for the appellants. Dato' Seri Ainum bte Mohd Saaid and Dato' Abdul Gani Patail (Attorney Generals) (Dato' Azahar bin Hj Mohamed, Mohd Yusof bin Hj Zainal Abiden, Dato' Mary Lim Thiam Suan, Tun Abdul Majid Tun Hamzah and Kamaludin bin Mohd Said (Senior Deputy Public Prosecutors) with them) (Attorney General's Chambers) for the respondent. Roy Rajasingham (Bar Council Malaysia) watching brief.

[2002] 4 MLJ 529 Juraimi bin Husin v Pardons Board, State of Pahang & Ors

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 1 OF 2001(W) WAN ADNAN PCA, AHMAD FAIRUZ CJ (MALAYA), SITI NORMA YAAKOB, HAIDAR FCJJ AND DENIS ONG JCA 4 FEBRUARY 2002

Administrative Law — Judicial remedies — Judicial review — Plaintiff’s petition for clemency to the Sultan of Pahang rejected — Whether decision making process of the decision by the Sultan of Pahang justiciable — Whether making decision making process justiciable would have the same effect as having the decision itself justiciable — Federal Constitution art 42, Laws of the Constitution of Pahang art 15

Constitutional Law — Remedies — Prerogative of mercy — Judicial review — Plaintiff’s petition for clemency to the Sultan of Pahang rejected — Whether decision making process of the decision by the Sultan of Pahang justiciable — Whether making decision making process justiciable would have the same effect as having the decision itself justiciable — Federal Constitution art 42, Laws of the Constitution of Pahang art 15

The plaintiff, together with two others, had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the High Court at Temerloh. His appeal to the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court had been dismissed. On 30 June 1999, he petitioned for clemency to the Sultan of Pahang. His petition was rejected on 4 April 2001. By way of an originating summons filed in the High Court at Kuala Lumpur, the plaintiff applied for several declaratory orders pertaining to the rejection of the clemency petition. Meanwhile, the defendants applied under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 for the originating summons to be dismissed on the ground that the decision of the Pardons Board was not justiciable. During the hearing of the defendants’ application, the plaintiff’s counsel urged the court to remit the matter to the Federal Court under s 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘the CJA’) for the Federal Court to decide on the constitutional issues raised. The High Court, however, dismissed the plaintiff’s application. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff’s appeal and ordered the hearing of the originating summons in the High Court to be stayed and directed the High Court to remit to the Federal Court the question of whether the decision making process of the decision by the Sultan of Pahang under art 15 of the Laws of the Constitution of Pahang, read together with art 42 of the Federal Constitution, was justiciable. Counsel for the plaintiff stated that although there could be no judicial review or justiciability of the decision of the Pardons Board on the merits, the decision making process resorted to by the Board could be examined to consider whether it was in line with the spirit of the relevant constitutional provisions. According to counsel for the plaintiff, the inordinate delay between the presentation of the clemency petition and the decision making process leading to the rejection of the said

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 226 ||Page 530>>petition amounted to a contravention of arts 5(1), 42(4)(b) and (8) and s 38 in the 11th Sch of the Federal Constitution.

Held: (1) In stating that the power under art 42 of the Federal Constitution was not susceptible or amenable to judicial review, the Supreme Court in Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385 was then relying on the decision of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935. The Supreme Court and the House of Lords had referred to this power under art 42 as the prerogative of mercy. The prerogative of mercy was amongst the powers that was not susceptible to judicial review because its nature and subject matter was such as not to be amenable to the judicial process (see p 537A–B); Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 and Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385 followed. (2) The effect of making the decision making process justiciable would have the same effect as having the decision itself justiciable. Consequently, any attempt to make the decision making process justiciable would indirectly make the decision itself justiciable. Accordingly, the decision making process of the decision by the Sultan of Pahang under art 15 of the Laws of the Constitution of Pahang, read together with art 42 of the Federal Constitution, was not justiciable (see pp 533D, 537F–G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif, bersama dua orang lain, telah disabit atas kesalahan membunuh dan dan dijatuhkan hukuman mati oleh Mahkamah Tinggi di Temerloh. Rayuan beliau kepada Mahkamah Rayuan dan Mahkamah Persekutuan telah ditolak. Pada 30 Jun 1999, plaintif telah mengemukakan rayuan memohon belas kasihan kepada Sultan Pahang. Petisyen beliau ditolak pada 4 April 2001. Melalui satu saman pemula yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur, plaintif memohon pelbagai perintah perisytiharan berkaitan penolakan petisyen memohon belas kasihan. Sementara itu, defendan-defendan memohon di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 agar saman pemula ditolak atas alasan bahawa keputusan Lembaga Pengampunan tidak boleh diadili. Semasa pembicaraan permohonan defendan-defendan, peguam plaintif menyeru mahkamah supaya meremit perkara tersebut ke Mahkamah Persekutuan di bawah s 84 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (‘AMK’) untuk Mahkamah Persekutuan membuat keputusan atas isu-isu berkenaan perlembagaan yang dibangkitkan. Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah Tinggi menolak permohonan plaintif. ||Page 531>>Atas rayuan kepada Mahkamah Rayuan, Mahkamah Rayuan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 227 membenarkan rayuan plaintif dan memerintah supaya pembicaraan saman pemula di Mahkamah Tinggi digantung dan mengarah Mahkamah Tinggi meremit ke Mahkamah Persekutuan persoalan sama ada proses membuat keputusan berhubung dengan keputusan oleh Sultan Pahang di bawah perkara 15 Undang-Undang Perlembagaan Pahang, dibaca bersama perkara 42 Perlembagaan Persekutuan, boleh diadili. Peguam bagi pihak plaintif menyatakan bahawa sungguhpun tiada persoalan tentang kajian semula kehakiman atau kebolehadilan berhubung dengan keputusan Lembaga Pengampunan di atas merit, proses membuat keputusan yang digunakan oleh Lembaga tersebut boleh diteliti untuk menimbang sama ada ia selaras dengan hasrat peruntukan perlembagaan yang relevan. Menurut peguam bagi plaintif, kelewatan melampau di antara pengemukaan petisyen memohon belas kasihan dan proses membuat keputusan yang membawa kepada penolakan petisyen tersebut merupakan perlanggaran perkara-perkara 5(1), 42(4)(b) dan (8) dan s 38 dalam Jadual 11 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Diputuskan: (1) Dalam menyatakan bahawa kuasa di bawah perkara 42 Perlembagaan Persekutuan tidak mudah terpengaruh oleh atau tertakluk kepada kajian semula kehakiman, Mahkamah Agung dalam Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385 pada ketika itu bergantung kepada keputusan House of Lords dalam Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935. Mahkamah Agung dan House of Lords telah merujuk kepada kuasa ini di bawah perkara 42 sebagai prerogatif belas kasihan. Prerogatif belas kasihan adalah di antara kuasa-kuasa yang tidak mudah terpengaruh oleh kajian semula kehakiman kerana sifat dan isinya adalah sedemikian hinggakan tidak tertakluk kepada proses kehakiman (lihat ms 537A–B); Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 dan Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385 diikut. (2) Kesan menjadikan proses membuat keputusan boleh diadili akan mempunyai kesan yang sama seolah-olah keputusan itu sendiri boleh diadili. Akibatnya, sebarang usaha untuk menjadikan proses membuat keputusan boleh diadili akan menjadikan keputusan itu sendiri boleh diadili secara tidak langsung. Oleh itu, proses membuat keputusan berkaitan keputusan oleh Duli Yang Maha Mulia Sultan Pahang di bawah perkara 15 Undang-Undang Perlembagaan Pahang, dibaca bersama perkara 42 Perlembagaan Persekutuan, tidak boleh diadili (lihat ms 533D, 537F–G).] ||Page 532>>

Notes For cases on judicial review under judicial remedies, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 130–132. For cases on judicial review under the prerogative of pardon, see 3 Mallal’s Digest

Cases referred to Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (folld) Karpal Singh v Sultan of Selangor [1988] 1 MLJ 64 (refd) Kehar Singh v Union of India AIR 1989 SC 653 (refd) PP v Soon Seng Sia Heng & Ors [1979] 2 MLJ 170 (refd) Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385 (folld) Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors v Sim Kie Chon [1986] 1 MLJ 494 (refd) Tan Boon Liat @ Allen & Anor et al, Re; Tan Boon Liat v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Ors; Chuah Han Mow v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Ors; Subramaniam v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Ors [1977] 2 MLJ 108 (refd)

Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 84, (1) Federal Constitution arts 5(1), 42, (4)(b), (8), s 38 of the 11th Schedule Indian Constitution art 72(1) Laws of the Constitution of Pahang art 15 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19

Reference from: Originating Summons No R2–24–26–01 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur) Karpal Singh (Jagdeep Singh Deo, Gobind Singh Deo & Ram Karpal Singh with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant/plaintiff. Dato’ Azhar Mohamad (Mohd Yusof Zainal Abiden, Dato’ Mary Lim, Tun Abd Majid Tun Hamzah & Dato’ Halim Aman with him) (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondents/defendants.

[2002] 5 MLJ 22 Noor Ashid bin Sakib v Ketua Polis Negara

HIGH COURT (MUAR) — CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO 44–6 OF 2001 JEFFREY TAN J 9 SEPTEMBER 2001

Constitutional Law — Preventive detention — Application for habeas corpus — Detention under Internal Security Act 1960 — Detaining authority to comply with procedural requirements under s 73 — Refusal to allow visitation by relatives and counsel pending investigation, whether bad faith and denial of right to counsel — Distinction between preventive detention and detention pending investigation under s 117 Criminal Procedure Code, whether allegations must be supported by evidence — Federal Constitution art 5

The applicant was a religious teacher at the Madrasah Al-Masriyah Simpang Rengam and a member of Parti Islam Malaysia who had been arrested and detained under s 73 of the Internal Security Act 1960 (‘the ISA’) pending enquiries. An order of detention under s 8 of the ISA had not been made against the applicant. The applicant was detained for more than 30 days but less than 60 days. The police had refused the applicant visitation by relatives and counsel pending investigations. The applicant filed a motion for an order that a writ of habeas corpus be issued to the Inspector General of Police to release the applicant before this court.

Held, refusing the application for a writ of habeas corpus: (1) In accordance with art 5(1) and (3) of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’), whenever a person deprived of his liberty challenges his detention, it is incumbent upon the authority who detains him to show that the detention is in the exercise of a valid legal power and that the detentive power had been exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions of the relevant law (see p 29D–F). However, it is not for the court to investigate into the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds relied on by the detaining authority for arrest and detention. Whether there is reasonable cause to detain is a matter of opinion and policy which can only be taken by the executive. The subjective satisfaction of the Minister is not subject to judicial review and the fairness of the Minister’s decision is subjective and that the court is only concerned with the procedural aspect of the exercise of executive discretion (see pp 29H–30B). Therefore, the only issue for judicial determination was whether the detaining authority has complied with all the procedural requirements for each period of detention leading up to the present moment (see p 31H–I). (2) The procedural requirements for an arrest and detention under s 73 of the ISA was set out in the same said section of the ISA. It was clearly shown from the facts that the detention of the applicant over several periods were made in accordance with the requirements under s 73 and therefore in the exercise of valid legal ||Page 23>>power and according to procedure. The detention exceeding 30 days was also in order with regard to both legal authority and procedures (see pp 30I, 33B, E). (3) To show breach of art 5(3) of the Constitution, an applicant has to show that the police had deliberately and with bad faith obstructed the applicant from

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 230 exercising his right under the article and this had not been shown. What appeared rather was that the police had refused visitation by relatives and counsel pending ongoing but yet unfinished investigations. That was not any denial of the right to counsel (see p 34F–G). (4) Counsel contended that the allegations against the applicant could be tried in a court of law. The applicant was being detained ‘pending enquiries’, much the same as in the position of a person being detained pending investigations under s 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code except that a detention under the ISA is an anticipatory measure which may not relate to an offence. Furthermore, there is power under the ISA to detain up to 60 days pending enquiries. The applicant could not insist that the detaining authority must act only under ordinary criminal laws. The making of an order under s 8 of the ISA, even if it should come to that, would not be the result of a trial, and it was futile to argue before a court without jurisdiction to consider the material if any against the applicant, that the allegations must be supported by evidence (see pp 35E–F, H–I, 36A–B). (5) The right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus is enshrined in art 5(2) of the Constitution and such right is not illusionary. For the applicant to be released, unlawful detention and mala fide must be shown. Both, however, have not been shown and for that reason, habeas corpus was refused (see p 36B–C).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon adalah seorang ustaz di Madrasah Al-Masriyah Simpang Rengam dan seorang ahli Parti Islam Malaysia yang telah ditangkap dan ditahan di bawah s 73 Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960 (‘ISA’) sementara menantikan siasatan. Satu perintah penahahan di bawah s 8 ISA masih belum dibuat terhadap pemohon. Pemohon telah ditahan selama lebih daripada 30 hari tetapi kurang daripada 60 hari. Polis telah menolak sebarang hak melawat pemohon oleh saudara-mara dan peguam sementara menantikan penyiasatan. Pemohon telah memfailkan satu usul untuk mendapatkan perintah bahawa satu writ habeas corpus dikeluarkan kepada Ketua Inspektor Polis untuk melepaskan pemohon di hadapan mahkamah ini.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan untuk satu writ habeas corpus: (1) Menurut perkara 5(1) dan (3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan tersebut’), apabila seseorang yang terlucut hak ||Page 24>>kebebasannya mencabar penanahannya, adalah wajib ke atas pihak berkuasa yang menahan beliau untuk menunjukkan bahawa penahanan tersebut adalah bagi melaksanakan kuasa undang-undang yang sah dan bahawa kuasa penahanan tersebut telah dilaksanakan dengan ketat menurut peruntukan undang-undang yang relevan (lihat ms 29D–F). Walau bagaimanapun, bukan bagi mahkamah menyiasat memandainya alasan-alasan atau sebab-sebab

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 231 terhadap mana pihak berkuasa penahanan tersebut telah bergantung untuk penangkapan dan penahanan tersebut. Sama ada terdapatnya sebab yang berpatutan untuk menahan adalah suatu perkara pendapat dan dasar yang hanya boleh diambil tindakan oleh pihak berkuasa tersebut. Kepuasan subjektif Menteri tidak tertakluk kepada kajian semula kehakiman dan keadilan keputusan Menteri adalah subjektif dan mahkamah hanya mengambil berat akan aspek prosedur perlaksanaan budi bicara eksekutif (lihat ms 29H–30B). Oleh itu, satu-satunya isu untuk penentuan kehakiman adalah sama ada pihak berkuasa penahanan telah mematuhi semua kehendak prosedur bagi setiap tempoh penahanan sehingga kepada masa dan ketika ini (lihat ms 31H–I). (2) Syarat-syarat prosedur untuk suatu penangkapan dan penahanan di bawah s 73 ISA telah dibentangkan di dalam seksyen ISA yang sama. Telah ditunjukkan dengan jelas daripada fakta-fakta tersebut bahawa penahanan pemohon selama beberapa jangka tempoh telah dibuat menurut syarat-syarat di bawah s 73 dan dengan itu dalam melaksanakan kuasa undang-undang yang sah dan menurut prosedur. Penahahan yang melebihi 30 hari adalah juga menurut kedua-dua kuasa undang-undang yang sah dan juga prosedur (lihat ms 30I, 33B, E). (3) Untuk menunjukkan keingkaran terhadap perkara 5(3) Perlembagaan tersebut, seseorang pemohon haruslah menunjukkan bahawa pihak polis telah dengan sengaja dan dengan niat jahat menghalang pemohon daripada melaksanakan haknya di bawah perkara tersebut dan ini telah tidak ditunjukkan. Apa yang dapat dilihat adalah bahawa pihak polis telah enggan memberikan hak lawatan oleh saudara-mara dan peguam sementara menantikan penyiasatan yang sedang berjalan dan yang masih belum selesai. Itu bukannya sebarang penafian akan hak kepada perkhidmatan peguam (lihat ms 35E–F, H–I, 36A–B). (4) Peguam menegaskan bahawa dakwaan-dakwaan terhadap pemohon boleh dibicarakan dalam mahkamah undang-undang. Pemohon yang telah ditahan ‘sementara menunggu siasatan’, adalah dalam kedudukan yang sama seperti seseorang yang sedang ditahan sementara menantikan penyiasatan di bawah s 117 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah kecuali penanahan di bawah ISA adalah suatu langkah jangkaan yang mungkin tiada kaitan dengan sesuatu kesalahan. Lagipun, terdapat kuasa di bawah ISA untuk ||Page 25>>menahan sehingga kepada 60 hari sementara menantikan penyiasatan. Pemohon tidak boleh mendesak pihak berkuasa penahanan semestinya bertindak hanya di bawah undang-undang jenayah biasa. Pembuatan perintah di bawah s 8 ISA, meskipun sehingga ke tahap itu, bukan hasil sesuatu perbicaraan, dan adalah sia-sia untuk berhujah di hadapan mahkamah tanpa bidang kuasa untuk mempertimbangkan perkara penting tersebut jika ada terhadap pemohon, bahawa dakwaan-dakwaan tersebut haruslah disokong oleh keterangan (lihat ms 35E–F, 36A–B). (5) Hak untuk memohon bagi mendapatkan satu writ habeas corpus termaktub di dalam perkara 5(2) Perlembagaan tersebut dan hak yang sedemikian bukannya ilusi sahaja. Untuk pemohon dilepaskan, penahahan yang salah di sisi

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 232 undang-undang dan mala fide mestilah ditunjukkan. Kedua-duanya, walau bagaimanapun, masih belum ditunjukkan dan atas alasan itu, habeas corpus telah ditolak (lihat ms 36B–C).]

Notes For cases on application for habeas corpus, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1725–1726.

Cases referred to Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1989] 3 MLJ 121 (refd) Chng Suan Tze v The Minister of Home Affairs & Ors and other appeals [1989] 1 MLJ 69 (refd) Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 (refd) Ketua Polis Negara v Abdul Ghani Haroon and another appeal (Permohonan Jenayah 07–1–2001(B) & 07–2–2001(B)) (refd) Lee Guan Seng v Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor and another application [1992] 2 MLJ 878 (refd) Liew Sai Wah v PP [1968] 2 MLJ 1 (refd) Lock Wee Kock v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 691 (refd) Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors v Chua Teck [1990] 1 MLJ 104 (refd) Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor v Karpal Singh [1988] 3 MLJ 29 (refd) Ooi Ah Phua v Office in Charge Criminal Investigations, Kedah/Perlis [1975] 2 MLJ 198 (refd) Ooi Cheng Aun v Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri & Ors [1990] 3 MLJ 108 (refd) Puvaneswaran v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Anor [1991] 3 MLJ 28 (refd) Saul Hamid bin Fakir Mohamad v Inspector Abdul Fatah bin Abdul Rahman [1999] 6 MLJ 800 (refd) ||Page 26>> Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun, Re, Inspector General of Police v Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun [1988] 1 MLJ 182 (refd) Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police [1988] 3 MLJ 293 (refd) Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors v Cheow Siong Chin [1988] 1 MLJ 432 (refd) Wong Fook Nyen v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 274 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 233 Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia [1975] 2 MLJ 279 (refd)

Legislation referred to Criminal Procedure Code s 117 Federal Constitution arts 5(1), (2), (3), 149 Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8, 8A, 8B(1), (2), 8C, 73(1)(a), (b), (3)(a), (b) , (c)

Hanifah bin Maidin (Baharauddin bin Mohd Salleh with him) (Baharuddin & Partners) for the applicant. Abdul Karim bin Abdul Jalil (Kamaruddin Mohd Said and Abasafree with him) (Senior Federal Counsels) for the respondent.

[2002] 5 MLJ 720 Tan Sri Dato’ Tajuddin Ramli v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO D1–24–66 OF 2002 VINCENT NG J 18 APRIL 2002

Civil Procedure — Injunction — Interim injunction — Whether application for interim injunction against defendants from enforcing their rights under settlement agreement allowed — Whether existed serious or cogent prima facie triable issue to justify granting of interim order

Civil Procedure — Interest — Commencement date of interest — Interpretation of settlement agreement with regard to interest payment — Whether payment of interest deferred when repayment towards capital was deferred — Whether agreement and affidavit evidence presented sufficient proof with regard to when actual date of interest due and payable

Constitutional Law — Constitution — Infringement — Whether Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd Act 1998 s 72 ultra vires Federal Constitution arts 5(i) and 13(1)

The plaintiff had entered into a facility agreement (‘the facility agreement’) with various financial institutions. Upon the plaintiff’s default under the loan, the defendants

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 234 acquired the plaintiff’s non-performing loans and the securities from the financial institutions by way of statutory vestings certificates under the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd Act 1998 (‘the Act’). The defendants then pursued a loan restructuring strategy with the plaintiff of its indebtedness. The plaintiff was to, inter alia, repay a reduced amount of RM942m (‘the settlement sum’) provided the plaintiff met his obligations with interest to be paid quarterly at the fixed rate of 8.5%pa and an upfront payment of RM300m to be payable by the plaintiff by 31 December 2001. The time of the upfront payment of RM300m was extended from 31 December 2001 to 30 June 2002 provided that proof of funding of this upfront payment were forwarded and interest remained due and owing on a quarterly basis. A settlement agreement to this effect (‘the settlement agreement’) was executed on 8 October 2001 (‘the settlement date’). The plaintiff failed to pay the interest. A letter of demand was issued by the defendants’ solicitors. Hence, the current application for an injunction by a summons in chambers coupled with the filing of an originating summons. The issues were: (i) whether the interest payment was due and payable on 31 December 2001 and not on 30 June 2002 as it was a separate and independent obligation from that requiring the plaintiff to pay the upfront payment of RM300m on 30 June 2002; (ii) whether thereby existed prima facie serious triable issues to grant the plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction; and (iii) whether the Act and especially s 72, a provision to be an absolute statutory bar to the ||Page 721>>issuance of an injunction against Danaharta or its subsidiaries, was unconstitutional by virtue of arts 5(1) and 13(1) of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’) with regards to deprivation of life or personal liberty and property.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s application with costs: (1) The controversy revolved around the interpretation of cl 2.4 of the settlement agreement with regard to interest payment. The import of cl 2.4 was somewhat equivocal and appeared to be crafted with lack of focus or application of mind. The exchange of correspondence between the parties indicated that the first quarterly interest was indeed due and outstanding on 31 December 2001 and the court was more inclined to this view (see pp 729E, 730C, 731A–B). (2) There was not a single letter or note which stated that the first quarterly interest was not due or need not be paid until 30 June 2002. It stood to reason that the plaintiff would have promptly written such a letter had such agreement on the due date of interest been arrived at. Further, there was no pointed denial in a reply written on his instructions (exh ‘TR–9’), save to repeat that the interest was not due. Upon the affidavit evidence presented, it was held that though an issue pertaining to interest had arisen, the plaintiff had not discharged the onus on him to make out a serious or cogent prima facie triable issue to justify the granting of an interim injunction (see pp 730E, 731C, 733F–G). (3) The plaintiff would be unable to make good the damages that the defendants would suffer in the event an injunctive order was made, as the plaintiff was

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 235 unable to satisfy his existing debts. This was based on his own admission in his statutory declaration that his assets were insufficient to meet his existing liabilities. Hence, the plaintiff’s undertaking to court as to damages was inadequate (see p 734D–E). (4) In the teeth of such cogent evidential material presented, the court could not rationally hold that the balance of convenience would lie in favour of the plaintiff, especially as the defendants were only exercising their statutory duties in their dealings with the plaintiff, to ensure due recovery of a huge debt pursuant to an Act of Parliament passed in the national interest. The plaintiff, in contrast, was a borrower who, as alleged by the defendants, had been in default in his obligations as aforesaid. Further, the plaintiff had sought to move this court with unclean hands, and equity should not assist a plaintiff who had come to court with unclean hands (see pp 736H–737A). (5) The court could not accept the argument that the Act was ultra vires arts 5(1) and 13(1) of the Constitution; and by the same token and upon the further consideration that s 72 of the Act appeared to be an essential provision necessary for the ||Page 722>>achievement of its expressed objective, the court held that the provision did not infringe the two articles of the Constitution. It was pertinent to bear in mind that s 72 was introduced perforce much later as an imperative measure to counter a litigant’s proclivity or propensity — in the present day Malaysian litigation culture — to reach out for injunctive reliefs at every turn at the drop of the hat. On the above assumptions, it would follow that s 72 was not at all at odds with any article of the Constitution (see p 738F–H). (6) No injunctions could be ordered against any of the defendants. Section 72, though quite unprecedented in its scope, was not wholly without parallel in the law. Section 29 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 also protected the government and its officers from injunctive orders (see p***); Tengku Haji Jaafar v Government of the State of Pahang [1978] 2 MLJ 105 and Nanthakumaran v Jaffnese Co-operative Housing Society Ltd [1980] 1 MLJ 114 followed (see p 741D). Obiter: The settlement agreement in the instant case was a commercial contract and by adopting a purposive construction of the same, this court could also took judicial notice of the common practice in commercial banking arrangements that when repayment towards capital was deferred, payment against interest would normally be ongoing and not deferred (see p 741A–B).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah memasuki satu perjanjian kemudahan (‘perjanjian kemudahan tersebut’) dengan beberapa institusi kewangan. Akibat kegagalan plaintif di bawah pinjaman

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 236 tersebut, defendan-defendan telah mengambil alih pinjaman-pinjaman tidak terlaksana dan sekuriti-sekuriti plaintif daripada institusi-institusi kewangan tersebut melalui sijil-sijil statutori di bawah Akta Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd 1998 (‘Akta tersebut’). Defendan-defendan kemudian telah membuat satu strategi penyusunan semula pinjaman dengan plaintif berhubung keberhutangannya. Plaintif dikehendaki, antara lain, membayar balik jumlah yang telah dikurangkan iaitu RM942 juta (‘jumlah penyelesaian tersebut’) dengan syarat plaintif memenuhi tanggungjawab-tanggungjawab beliau berserta faedah yang perlu dibayar setiap suku tahun pada kadar tetap 8.5% setahun dan bayaran pendahuluan sebanyak RM300 juta yang perlu dibayar oleh plaintif sebelum atau pada 31 Disember 2001. Masa untuk membuat bayaran pendahuluan RM300 juta tersebut telah dilanjutkan daripada 31 Disember 2001 kepada 30 Jun 2002 dengan syarat bukti pembiayaian bayaran pendahuluan tersebut dikemukakan dan faedah kekal perlu dibayar dan terakru berasaskan bayaran suku ||Page 723>>tahunan. Satu perjanjian penyelesaian (‘perjanjian penyelesaian tersebut’) telah disempurnakan pada 8 Oktober 2001 (‘tarikh penyelesaian tersebut’). Plaintif telah gagal membayar faedah tersebut. Satu surat tuntutan telah dikeluarkan oleh peguamcara defendan-defendan. Justeru itu, wujud permohonan ini untuk satu injunksi melalui satu saman dalam kamar bersama pemfailan satu saman pemula. Persoalan-persoalannya adalah: (i) sama ada pembayaran faedah perlu dibayar pada 31 Disember 2001 dan bukan pada 30 Jun 2002 kerana ia adalah satu tanggungjawab yang berasingan daripada yang menghendaki plaintif membayar bayaran pendahuluan RM300 juta pada 30 Jun 2002; (ii) sama ada oleh demikian wujud persoalan-persoalan prima facie serius yang boleh dibicarakan untuk membenarkan permohonan plaintif untuk satu injunksi interim; dan (iii) sama ada Akta tersebut dan s 72, satu peruntukan yang merupakan satu rintangan statutori yang mutlak untuk membenarkan satu injunksi terhadap Danaharta atau subsidiari-subsidiarinya, adalah tidak berperlembagaan menurut perkara-perkara 5(1) dan 13(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan tersebut’) berhubung kehilangan kebebasan hidup dan harta.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Kontroversi ini adalah berkisar tentang tafsiran kl 2.4 perjanjian penyelesaian tersebut berhubung bayaran faedah. Maksud kl 2.4 adalah kabur dan telah diolah dengan fokus dan penerapan minda yang kurang. Pertukaran surat-menyurat antara pihak-pihak tersebut menandakan bahawa faedah pertama daripada bayaran suku tahunan tersebut sememangnya perlu dibayar pada 31 Disember 2001 dan mahkamah lebih cenderung kepada pandangan ini (lihat ms 729E, 730C, 731A–B). (2) Tiada sepucuk surat atau notis yang menyatakan faedah pertama daripada bayaran suku tahunan tersebut tidak perlu dibayar sehingga 30 Jun 2002. Ia sewajarnya menunjukkan bahawa plaintif pasti akan menulis dengan segera surat sedemikian rupa jika satu persetujuan tentang tarikh faedah tersebut yang perlu dicapai telah ditetapkan. Tambahan pula, tiada penafian nyata dalam

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 237 balasan bertulis plaintif tentang arahan beliau ini (eksh ‘TR-9’), kecuali hanya mengulangi bahawa faedah tersebut tidak perlu dibayar. Berdasarkan keterangan afidavit yang dikemukakan, adalah diputuskan bahawa walaupun satu persoalan berhubung faedah telah timbul, plaintif gagal melepaskan beban atas beliau untuk membuktikan satu persoalan yang serius atau meyakinkan yang perlu dibicarakan untuk menjustifikasikan pemberian satu injunksi interim (lihat ms 730E, 731C, 733F–G). (3) Plaintif tidak mampu untuk membayar ganti rugi yang defendan-defendan akan alami sekiranya satu perintah injunksi dibuat, kerana plaintif tidak mampu untuk membayar hutang-hutang ||Page 724>>beliau yang sedia ada. Ini berdasarkan pengakuan beliau sendiri dalam deklarasi statutori beliau bahawa aset-aset beliau tidak mencukupi untuk menampung liabiliti beliau yang sedia ada. Justeru itu, akujanji plaintif kepada mahkamah tentang ganti rugi tidak mencukupi (lihat ms 734D–E). (4) Dengan kehadiran keterangan material yang meyakinkan yang telah dikemukakan, mahkamah tidak boleh secara rasional memutuskan bahawa imbangan kesesuaian adalah menyebelahi plaintif, terutamanya apabila defendan-defendan nyata hanya menjalankan kewajipan statutori mereka dalam urusan mereka dengan plaintif, bagi memastikan pengembalian sejumlah besar hutang yang perlu dibayar menurut satu Akta Parlimen yang diluluskan demi kepentingan awam. Plaintif sebaliknya adalah seorang peminjam yang, seperti yang dikatakan oleh defendan-defendan, telah gagal dalam obligasi beliau. Tambahan pula, plaintif telah memohon kepada mahkamah dengan tangan yang kotor, dan ekuiti tidak sepatutnya membantu seorang plaintif yang datang ke mahkamah dengan tangan yang kotor (lihat ms 736H–737A). (5) Mahkamah tidak menerima hujah bahawa Akta tersebut adalah ultra vires perkara-perkara 5(1) dan 13(1) Perlembagaan tersebut; dan dengan sebab yang sama dan setelah pertimbangan selanjutnya bahawa s 72 Akta tersebut kelihatan sebagai satu peruntukan yang perlu untuk memperoleh objektif yang dinyatakan, mahkamah memutuskan bahawa peruntukan tersebut tidak melanggar kedua-dua perkara Perlembagaan tersebut. Adalah penting untuk dipertimbangkan bahawa s 72 telah diperkenalkan penguatkuasaannya kemudian sebagai satu langkah imperatif bagi membanteras kecondongan dan kecenderungan seorang litigan — dalam budaya litigasi Malaysia hari ini — yang memohon relif-relif injunksi pada setiap peluang yang ada. Berdasarkan andaian-andaian di atas, adalah diikut bahawa s 72 sememangnya tidak langsung bercanggah dengan mana-mana perkara Perlembagaan tersebut (lihat ms 738F–H). (6) Tiada injunksi yang boleh diperintahkan terhadap mana-mana defendan. Seksyen 72, walaupun tiada duluan dalam skopnya, tidak keseluruhannya tidak selari dengan undang-undang. Seksyen 29 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956 juga melindungi kerajaan dan pegawai-pegawainya daripada perintah injunksi (lihat ms 741D); Tengku Haji Jaafar v Government of the State of Pahang [1978]

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 238 2 MLJ 105 dan Nanthakumaran v Jaffnese Co-operative Housing Society Ltd [1980] 1 MLJ 114 diikut. Obiter: Perjanjian penyelesaian tersebut dalam kes ini adalah satu kontrak komersial dan dengan menerapkan satu pendekatan mengikut tujuan kontrak itu, mahkamah ini juga boleh mengambil ||Page 725>>pengiktirafan kehakiman tentang amalan biasa dalam urusan perbankan komersial bahawa apabila pembayaran balik terhadap modal telah ditunda, pembayaran terhadap faedah biasanya berterusan dan tidak ditunda (lihat ms 741A–B).]

Notes For cases on interim injunction generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 2625–2706. For cases on commencement date of interest, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 3011–3013. For a case on infringement against the constitution, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 146.

Cases referred to Antaios Cia Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB, The Antaios [1984] 3 All ER 229 (refd) Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 (refd) Dai-Ichi Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd v Tenage Nasional Bhd [1996] 4 MLJ 506 (refd) E Gopal & Anor v Awang bin Mona [1978] 2 MLJ 251 (refd) Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd (Appointed receiver and manager) (In liquidation) v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 805 (refd) Nanthakumaran v Jaffnese Co-operative Housing Society Ltd & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 114 (folld) Ooi Meng Sua v Aetna Universal Insurance Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 AMR 467 (refd) Petaling Tin Bhd v Lee Kian Chan & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 657 (refd) Repco Holdings Sdn Bhd & Ors v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors (No 2) [2000] 5 MLJ 637 (refd) Sugumar Balakrishnan v Pengarah Imigresen Negeri Sabah [1998] 3 MLJ 289 (refd) Tengku Haji Jaafar & Anor v Government of the State of Pahang [1978] 2 MLJ 105 (folld) WJ Alan & Co Ltd v El Nasr Export & Import Co [1972] 2 All ER 127 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 239 Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 25, Schedule para 6 Federal Constitution arts 5(1), 13(1) Government Proceedings Act 1956 s 29 Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd Act 1998 ss 57(1)(a), 60(1), 72 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 38 r 2(3) Specific Relief Act 1950 ss 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 ||Page 726>>

Ong Chee Kuan (Gopal Sreenevasan, Danny Yap, Lee Hock Chye and Shahnaaz Omar with him) (Lee Ong & Kandiah) for the plaintiff. Tommy Thomas (Sitpah Selvaratnam and Chow Siew Wai with him) (Lee Choon Wan & Co) for the defendants.

[2001] 1 MLJ 315 Leftenan-Kolonel Harbajan Singh a/l Jagat Singh & Ors v Azmi bin Abdul Rahman

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–01–79 OF 1999 SHAIK DAUD, DENIS ONG AND HAIDAR JJCA 24 NOVEMBER 2000

Constitutional Law — Courts — Courts-martial — Procedure — Duty of judge-advocate under r 103 of Armed Forces (Court-Martial) Rules of Procedure 1976 — Court-martial bound to accept advice of judge-advocate on questions of law and procedure — Power to convict on lesser charge — Whether sufficient to merely advise court-martial to consider again for lesser charge and convict — Whether judge-advocate must stipulate what other offences accused could be convicted

Three charges were originally preferred in the court-martial against Captain Ramly bin Abdul Manaf (‘Capt Ramly’) under the Armed Forces Act 1972 (‘the Act’), who raised an objection against two of the charges on ground of duplicity. It was noted accordingly that the second charge should be an alternative to the first charge and the third charge should then be the second charge. As against the respondent, two charges were preferred; the first charge being a charge of abetting Capt Ramly in the commission of the offence in the latter’s first charge (‘the abetment charge’). The court-martial found Capt Ramly guilty on the alternative charge and the second charge

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 240 while the respondent was found guilty on the abetment charge. The judge-advocate disagreed that if Capt Ramly was not convicted on the first charge, the court could not convict the respondent for abetment charge. The judge-advocate then invoked his power under r 103(5) of the Armed Forces (Court-Martial) Rules of Procedure 1976 (‘the rules’) and advise the court-martial to reconsider their findings and for the latter to invoke its inherent power to convict on any lesser charge. The court-martial took the advice of the judge-advocate and re-deliberated. The court-martial found the respondent not guilty on the abetment charge, but guilty on the charge under s 87 of the Armed Forces Act 1972 (‘the Act’) in line with the alternative charge found against Capt Ramly. Subsequently, the court-martial made an order dismissing the respondent from His Majesty’s service. The respondent complained that the judge-advocate had failed to direct the court-martial ‘what findings are, in his opinion, open to them’, as provided in r 103(5). Counsel for the respondent conceded that the above issue was not canvassed before, but argued that he could do so before this court as it involved a question of law.

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: (1) There is a discretion in the appellate court to allow a point of law to be raised on appeal when the point raised relates to jurisdiction or illegality and is not merely technical. As the point raised relates to jurisdiction and the facts are not in dispute, the court ||Page 316>>accordingly exercised its discretion and allowed the point to be argued (see p 320C–E). (2) Unless the court-martial has weighty reasons for differing with the judge-advocate, a court-martial is bound to accept the advice of the judge-advocate on all questions of law and procedure. The proceedings in a court-martial is akin to the proceedings in jury trials where r 103(4) imposes a duty on the judge-advocate to sum up the evidence and advise the court-martial upon the law relating to the case before the court-martial close to deliberate on their finding (see pp 322H–323A). (3) The judge-advocate had correctly advised the court-martial that it has the power under r 47 to convict the respondent on a lesser charge. Just like a jury trial, it is the duty of a judge-advocate to advise that on the evidence presented the respondent has committed an offence involving a lesser degree of punishment although he was not charged with it and what are the lesser offences open for the court-martial to consider. It is not sufficient to merely advise the court-martial to consider again for any lesser charge and to convict the respondent on the lesser charge (see p 323B–D). (4) The scheme of the armed forces legislation clearly demarcates the role of the court-martial as judges of fact and the role of the judge-advocate as judge of law. The judge-advocate acting under r 103(5) in advising the court-martial of its powers under r 47 to convict the respondent on a lesser charge without mentioning what other offences the respondent could have been convicted of

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 241 was clearly a misdirection by way of non-direction (see p 323F–G). The court however agreed with the order made by the judge-advocate, though not with his reasoning (see p 323H). Per curiam: It was wrong for the court-martial to call on Capt Ramly to answer on both the first charge and the alternative charge. It should either be the first charge or the alternative charge. As Capt Ramly was found guilty on the alternative charge, then the abetment charge against the respondent could not stand as his charge is for abetment of the first charge against Capt Ramly (see p 321A–B). Although Capt Ramly was actually found guilty on the alternative charge, the respondent would in all probability fail in his action since r 47(2) clearly gives the power to the court-martial to convict the respondent on any lesser charge (see p 322E).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Tiga pertuduhan telah pada asalnya dikemukakan dalam mahkamah tentera terhadap Kaptain Ramly bin Abdul Manaf (‘Kapt Ramly’) di bawah Akta Pasukan Bersenjata 1972 (‘Akta tersebut’), yang telah ||Page 317>>membangkitkan bantahan terhadap dua daripada pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut atas alasan penggandaan. Diperhatikan sehubungan itu bahawa pertuduhan kedua seharusnya menjadi suatu alternatif kepada pertuduhan pertama dan pertuduhan ketiga seharusnya dengan itu menjadi pertuduhan kedua. Terhadap responden pula, dua pertuduhan telah dikemukakan; pertuduhan pertama beliau merupakan pertuduhan bersubahat dengan Kapt Ramly dalam melaksanakan kesalahan dalam pertuduhan pertama terhadap Kapt Ramly (‘pertuduhan bersubahat’). Mahkamah tentera mendapati Kapt Ramly bersalah atas pertuduhan bersubahat tersebut. Hakim tentera tidak bersetuju bahawa jika Kapt Ramly tidak disabitkan atas pertuduhan yang pertama, mahkamah tidak boleh mensabitkan responden atas pertubuhan bersubahat. Hakim tentera kemudian menggunakan kuasanya di bawah k 103(5) Kaedah-Kaedah Prosedur Pasukan Bersenjata (Mahkamah Tentera) 1976 (‘kaedah-kaedah tersebut’) dan menasihatkan mahkamah tentera supaya mempertimbangkan semula keputusan mereka dan untuk mahkamah tentera menggunakan kuasa sedia adanya ke atas mana-mana pertuduhan yang lebih ringan. Mahkamah tentera telah menerima nasihat hakim tentera dan mempertimbangkan semula. Mahkamah tentera telah mendapati responden tidak bersalah atas pertuduhan bersubahat, tetapi bersalah atas pertuduhan di bawah s 87 Akta Pasukan Bersenjata 1972 (‘Akta tersebut’) sejajar dengan pertuduhan alternatif yang diputuskan terhadap Kapt Ramly. Berikutan itu, mahkamah tentera telah membuat satu perintah memecat responden daripada perkhidmatan Duli Yang Maha Mulia Yang Di-Pertuan Agong. Responden mengadu bahawa hakim tentera telah gagal untuk mengarahkan mahkamah tentera ‘apakah keputusan, menurut pendapatnya, terbuka kepada mereka’, seperti mana yang diperuntukkan dalam k

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 242 103(5). Peguam bagi pihak responden telah bersetuju bahawa isu yang tersebut di atas telah tidak dikemukan dahulu, tetapi berhujah bahawa beliau boleh melakukan sedemikian di hadapan mahkamah ini kerana ia melibatkan persoalan undang-undang.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut dengan kos: (1) Terdapat budi bicara dalam mahkamah rayuan untuk membenarkan sesuatu perkara undang-undang dibangkitkan ketika rayuan apabila perkara yang dibangkitkan itu berkaitan dengan bidang kuasa atau kepenyalahan undang-undang dan bukan hanya bersifat teknikal. Oleh kerana perkara yang dibangkitkan berkaitan bidang kuasa dan fakta-faktanya tidak dipertikaikan, mahkamah sehubungan itu melaksanakan budi bicaranya dan membenarkan perkara itu dihujahkan (lihat ms 320C–E). (2) Kecuali mahkamah tentera memberikan alasan-alasan yang kuat kerana tidak bersetuju dengan hakim tentera, mahkamah tentera dikehendaki menerima nasihat hakim tentera mengenai semua ||Page 318>>persoalan undang-undang dan prosedur. Prosiding dalam mahkamah tentera sama seperti prosiding dalam perbicaraan-perbicaraan juri di mana k 103(3) mengenakan tugas ke atas hakim tentera untuk membuat kesimpulan mengenai keterangan dan menasihatkan mahkamah tentera mengenai undang-undang berkaitan dengan kes tersebut sebelum mahkamah tentera memutuskan untuk mempertimbangkan keputusan mereka (lihat ms 322H–323A). (3) Hakim tentera telah menasihatkan mahkamah tentera dengan betul bahawa ia mempunyai kuasa di bawah k 47 untuk mensabitkan responden atas pertuduhan yang lebih ringan. Seperti perbicaraan juri, adalah tugas hakim tentera untuk menasihatkan bahawa berdasarkan keterangan yang dikemukakan, responden telah melakukan kesalahan yang melibatkan tahap hukuman yang lebih rendah walaupun beliau tidak dituduh dengannya dan apakah kesalahan-kesalahan yang lebih ringan yang terbuka untuk dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah tentera. Adalah tidak memadai untuk hanya menasihatkan mahkamah tentera untuk mempertimbangkan sekali lagi sebarang pertuduhan yang lebih ringan dan untuk mensabitkan responden atas pertuduhan yang lebih ringan itu (lihat ms 323B–D). (4) Skim perundangan pasukan bersenjata jelas membataskan peranan mahkamah tentera sebagai hakim-hakim fakta dan peranan hakim tentera sebagai hakim undang-undang. Tindakan hakim tentera di bawah k 103(5) dalam menasihatkan mahkamah tentera mengenai kuasanya di bawah k 47 untuk mensabitkan responden atas pertuduhan yang lebih ringan tanpa menyebut apakah kesalahan-kesalahan lain yang responden mungkin telah disabitkan adalah jelas merupakan satu salah-arahan melalui ketiadaan-arahan (lihat ms 323F–G). Mahkamah walau bagaimanapun bersetuju dengan perintah yang dibuat oleh hakim tentera, walaupun tidak dengan alasannya (lihat ms 323H). Per curiam:

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 243 Adalah salah bagi mahkamah tentera untuk memanggil Kapt Ramly untuk menjawab bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan pertama dan pertuduhan alternatif. Oleh kerana Kapt Ramly telah didapati bersalah atas pertuduhan alternatif, maka pertuduhan bersubahat terhadap responden tidak boleh dipertahankan kerana pertuduhan beliau adalah kerana bersubahat terhadap pertuduhan pertama terhadap Kapt Ramly (lihat ms 321A–B). Walaupun Kapt Ramly didapati bersalah atas pertuduhan alternatif, responden akan dalam semua kebarangkalian gagal dalam tindakan beliau kerana k 47(2) dengan jelas memberikan kuasa kepada mahkamah tentera untuk mensabitkan responden atas sebarang pertuduhan yang lebih ringan (lihat ms 322E).] ||Page 319>>

Notes For a case on courts-martial, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1426.

Cases referred to A-G for the Straits Settlement v Pang Ah Yew [1934] MLJ 184 (refd) Central Bank of India, Ltd v Guardian Assurance Co Ltd [1936] MLJ 131 (refd) Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45 (refd) Mejar Ali Zaman bin Ali Hassan v Capt Abdul Kadir & Anor [1989] 3 MLJ 32 (refd) Mejar Sundaraj v Lt Kol Abdul Aziz bin Hanafi & Anor [1987] 2 MLJ 474 (refd) S Mariappan v Government of Malaysia [1983] 2 MLJ 340 (refd)

Legislation referred to Armed Forces Act 1972 ss 61(a), 77(a), 87, 88, 105, 120(2) Armed Forces (Court-Martial) Rules of Procedure 1976 rr 47(2), 103(3), (4), (5)

Appeal from: Civil Suit No S1–21–08 of 1991 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Ahmad Kamal bin Mohd Shahid (Senior Federal Counsel, Attorney General’s Chambers) for the appellants. Karpal Singh (Karpal Singh & Co) for the respondent.

[2001] 2 MLJ 129 Nguang Chan Sdn Bhd v Public Prosecutor

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL APPEALS NO W–05–28 OF

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 244 2000 AND W–05–29 OF 2000 LAMIN PCA, ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD AND ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN JJCA 8 MARCH 2001

Constitutional Law — Constitution — Infringement of — Whether s 28B(3) of the Trade Description Act 1972 was ultra vires art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and was void to that extent

Criminal Procedure — Prosecution — Conduct of prosecution under the Trade Description Act 1972 — Whether assistant controller of trade descriptions lawfully empowered to conduct prosecution — Federal Constitution art 145(3) — Trade Description Act 1972 s 28(3)

The appellant was charged with two offences under s 3(1)(b) of the Trade Description Act 1972 (‘the Act’) in the magistrate court. An assistant controller of trade descriptions appeared in court to conduct the prosecution of the case. Before the trial concluded, the magistrate transmitted the record of proceedings to the High Court and placed before it for determination the following questions, namely: (i) whether s 28B(3) of the Act which allows proceedings to be conducted by an assistant controller of trade descriptions is ultra vires art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution (‘FC’); (ii) whether the institution by the assistant controller of trade descriptions of proceedings under the Act contravenes art 145(3) of the FC. The issues for determination in this appeal were the same as those that came up for deliberation before the High Court judge.

Held, dismissing the appeal by the respondent and allowing the cross-appeal by the appellant: (1) Section 380(ii)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (‘CPC’) (prior to the amendment in 1998) is unconstitutional as it sought to oust the powers of the Attorney General under s 376(1) of the CPC to control and direct all criminal prosecutions and it stands in the face of his general powers under art 145(3) of the FC (see pp 134H–135A–B). (2) There was no avenue for a presumption to arise in that since the complaint was made by a public officer in his official capacity, it would be presumed that the complaint was made by an officer under ‘the control and direction’ of the federal attorney general acting as a public prosecutor consonant with art 145 of the FC and s 376(1) of the CPC. By lodging a complaint as was done by the assistant controller, it could be said that he did institute the proceeding. Whatever action he took he would still be under under the ‘supervision’ of the controller which would be ‘subject ||Page 130>>to the general direction and control of the minister’ and therefore in direct conflict with art 145(3) of the FC (see p 141E–F, H–I). (3) In the present case, it was clear that the prosecution was conducted by an

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 245 assistant controller of trade descriptions and he had his purported authority to do so under s 28B(3) of the Act, which was clearly in contravention of art 145(3) of the FC. There was no way that he could hide under or get the protection of s 376(1) of the CPC in view of what was said of the effect of s 380 of the CPC before the 1998 amendment. In the circumstances, s 28(3) of the Act is ultra vires art 145(3) of the FC and the prosecution conducted is null and void (see pp 141E–G, 142A).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Perayu telah dituduh kerana dua kesalahan di bawah s 3(1)(b) Akta Perihal Dagangan 1972 (‘Akta tersebut’) di mahkamah majistret. Seorang penolong pengawal perihal dagangan telah hadir di mahkamah untuk mengendalikan pendakwaan kes. Sebelum perbicaraan selesai, majistret telah menghantar laporan prosiding ke Mahkamah Tinggi dan meletakkannya untuk ditentukan persoalan-persoalan berikut, terutamanya: (i) sama ada s 28B(3) Akta tersebut yang membenarkan prosiding dikendalikan oleh seorang penolong pengawal adalah ultra vires perkara 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘PP’); (ii) sama ada permulaan oleh penolong pengawal perihal dagangan terhadap prosiding di bawah Akta tersebut bertentangan dengan perkara 145(3) PP. Persoalan-persoalan untuk ditentukan di dalam rayuan ini adalah sama dengan yang timbul untuk pertimbangan hakim Mahkamah Tinggi.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan responden dan membenarkan rayuan balas perayu: (1) Seksyen 380(ii)(b) Kanun Acara Jenayah (‘KAJ’) (sebelum pindaan 1998) adalah tidak menurut perlembagaan kerana ia mencuba untuk menyingkir kuasa penolong pengawal di bawah s 376(1) KAJ untuk mengawal dan mengarah semua pendakwaan jenayah dan ia menghalang kuasa amnya di bawah perkara 145(3) PP (lihat ms 134H–135A–B). (2) Tiada ruang untuk menimbulkan satu andaian di mana memandangkan aduan tersebut telah dibuat oleh seorang pegawai awam di dalam kuasa tugas rasmi beliau, ia akan dianggap bahawa aduan tersebut telah dibuat oleh seorang pegawai di bawah ‘kawalan dan arahan’ Peguam Negara Persekutuan yang bertindak sebagai seorang Pendakwa Raya yang sejajar dengan perkara 145 PP dan s 376(1) KAJ. Dengan membuat satu aduan sepertimana yang telah dibuat oleh penolong pengawal, boleh dikatakan bahawa beliau telah memulakan prosiding tersebut. Apapun tindakan yang beliau telah ambil beliau masih di bawah ||Page 131>>‘pengawasan’ pengawal tersebut yang akan ‘tertakluk kepada arahan dan kawalan am menteri’ dan oleh itu bertentangan secara langsung dengan perkara 145(3) PP (lihat ms 141E–F, H–I). (3) Di dalam kes ini, adalah jelas bahawa pendakwaan tersebut telah dikendalikan oleh seorang penolong pengawal perihal dagangan dan beliau di dalam kuasa

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 246 beliau yang dimaksudkan itu telah berbuat demikian di bawah s 28B(3) Akta tersebut, yang dengan jelas bertentangan dengan perkara 145(3) PP. Tiada cara apapun yang dapat beliau bersembunyi atau berselindung di bawah s 376(1) KAJ berdasarkan apa yang dinyatakan terhadap keberkesanan s 380 KAJ sebelum pindaan 1998. Di dalam keadaan ini, s 28(3) Akta tersebut adalah ultra vires perkara 145(3) PP dan pendakwaan yang telah dikendalikan adalah batal dan tak sah (lihat ms 141E–G, 142A).]

Notes For a case on infringement of Constitution, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1406. For a case on the right to conduct criminal prosecution, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) para 2277.

Cases referred to Johnson Tan Han Seng v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 66 (refd) Kyohei Hosol v PP [1998] 1 CLJ 1063 (refd) Long bin Samat & Ors v PP [1974] 2 MLJ 152 (refd) Perumal v PP [1970] 2 MLJ 265 (refd) PP v Datuk Harun bin Hj Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116 (refd) PP v Jamil bin Jilap [2000] 5 MLJ 317 (refd) PP v Lee Ming & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 113 (refd) PP v Manager MBf Building Services Sdn Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 690 (refd) Repco Holdings Bhd v PP [1997] 3 MLJ 681 (refd)

Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 30(1) Criminal Procedure Code ss 3, 133(1), 376(i), 380(ii)(b) Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 1967 (Act 25/67) s 18 Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 1998 (Act A1015) ss 18, 377, 380, 381, Employees Provident Fund Act 1951 s 18(1) Federal Constitution arts 4(1), 145(3) Forest Ordinance (Sarawak Cap 126) s 92A Immigration Act 1959/1963 ss 55B(1)(3), 58(2) Immigration Rules 1963 ss 39(b) Securities Commission Act 1993 ss 39, (1), (2), 86 Securities Industry Act 1983 ss 126, (2) ||Page 132>>

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 247 Trade Descriptions Act 1972 ss 3(1)(b), 18(2), 26, (2), (2)(j) (3), 28B(3) Wild Life Protection Ordinance (Sarawak) s 39

Appeal from: Criminal Application No 44–7 of 1998 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Cyrus Das (K Mohan with him) (Shook Lin & Bok) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No W–05–28 of 2000 and for the respondent in Criminal Appeal No W–05–29 of 2000. Vong Poh Fah (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondent in Criminal Appeal No W–05–28 of 2000 and for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No W–05–29 of 2000.

[2001] 2 MLJ 390 Daud bin Mamat & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam & Anor

HIGH COURT (KOTA BHARU) — ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO 24–319, 320, 321 AND 322 OF 2000 SURIYADI J 25 FEBRUARY 2001

Civil Procedure — Declaration — Application for — Declaration for right to profess and practise religion of choice

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Freedom of religion — Plaintiffs voluntarily declared themselves as having left the Islamic faith — Whether the act of exiting from a religion may be equated with the right ‘to profess and practise’ one’s religion — Federal Constitution art 11(1)

Islamic Law — Apotasy — Jurisdiction of Syariah Court — Whether State’s administration of Islamic Law Enactment conferred jurisdiction on Syariah Court to deal with conversion out of Islam — Whether matters affecting the plaintiff’s right fell within the jurisdiction of the High Court or Syariah Court

The plaintiffs who are of Kelantanese descent, of Malay parentage were at the initial stages convicted and sentenced to jail for heresay. Appeals were filed but to no avail, except that the Religious Court of Appeal (Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah) had modified the sentences, in that the imprisonment orders were set aside and the plaintiffs were required to appear at the kadi’s office every month for three years, whereupon they were required to declare their regrets in line with Islamic tenets. The plaintiffs had

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 248 failed to adhere to these new instructions, resulting in fresh charges being preferred against them (‘the first charges’). The matter culminated in their convictions and imprisonment. The plaintiffs did not file any appeals. On 12 November 2000, the plaintiffs informed the court that with effect from 16 August 1998, they had already apostatized. Founded upon this confession, they were charged for offences pursuant to s 102(3) of the Enakmen Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan 1994 (‘the second charges’). The second charges were still pending. The plaintiffs then filed four originating summons in the High Court of Malaya at Kelantan praying for several declarations, inter alia, the right to profess and practise their religion of choice. The premise of their prayers, inter alia, was art 11(1) of the Federal Constitution. They also alleged that as they had apostatized, the Enakmen Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan 1994 which provided the powers for the Syariah Court, to decide whether they had indeed left the religion of Islam, was henceforth inapplicable to them. The issues for determination were whether: (i) the plaintiffs or the matter affecting the rights of the plaintiffs fell within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Malaya or the Syariah Court; (ii) art 11(1) of the Federal Constitution, adverted to was applicable in the circumstances of the case; and (iii) in the circumstances of the case, even though the court has the discretionary powers pursuant to s 41 of the Specific ||Page 391>>Relief Act 1950, the declaratory orders sought ought to be entertained.

Held, dismissing the originating summons were with costs: (1) The plaintiffs lacked actual ‘grievances’ upon which to found the declaration applications. It would have been improbable that the grievances could have been connected to the conviction and imprisonment orders of the first charges as no appeals were filed against them. Similarly, the second charges could not have been the basis either, as those charges were and are still awaiting trial. To advert to the second charges would be unacceptably premature. The relevant question that really need to be answered beforehand, for the purpose of this case, is whether at the time of filing the orginating summons the plaintiffs were muslims or not? This is a question of fact and law. As the plaintiffs had alleged that they had renounced their Muslim faith, from their point of view they had expected themselves to be safely outside the ambit of the Syariah Court and the relevant religious enactments. To answer this pertinent question of their religious status, an appreciation of the relevant laws, read together with the above facts is unavoidable (see pp 399C–E, 400G–H). (2) The correct approach in the face of a challenge to jurisdiction, is to look at the State Enactments to see whether or not the Syariah Courts have been expressly conferred jurisdiction on a given matter; Soon Singh Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489 followed. The said s 102(1) of the Enakmen Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan 1994 provides for a finding of fact exercise, for purposes of ascertaining whether a Muslim respondent, and in this case, the plaintiffs, had indeed apostatized. Section 102(2) provides that a person is still deemed a

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 249 Muslim until confirmed by the Syariah Court as having apostatized. The matter of apostasy has been dealt with by the Enakmen Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan 1994. As the plaintiffs were yet to be found guilty of the second charges of apostasy, what with the deeming provision available, for all intents and purposes, the plaintiffs were still Muslims. That being so, the plaintiffs being legally Muslims would still remain within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court, and thus outside the High Court jurisdictional purview (see p 401A–C, E, 401I–402A). (3) The issue of the plaintiffs having been prevented from practising their religion of choice, really did not exist here. In fact the complaints actually revolved around the issue of their right to apostate. It was undisputed that the plaintiffs had voluntarily declared themselves as having left the Islamic faith. How could their constitutional rights to profess and practise their supposed religion of choice have been compromised or infringed, when their actions indicated otherwise? The act of exiting from a ||Page 392>>religion was certainly not a religion, or could be equated with the right ‘to profess and practise’ their religion. To seriously accept that exiting from a religion may be equated to the latter two interpretations, would stretch the scope of art 11(1) of the Federal Constitution to ridiculous heights, and rebel against the cannon of construction. Hence, the contention of the plaintiffs that their rights pursuant to art 11(1) of the Federal Constitution had been infringed was rejected (see p 402C–E).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif-plaintif adalah keturunan Kelantan, beribubapakan orang Melayu telah pada peringkat awal disabitkan dan dihukum penjara kerana dengar cakap. Rayuan-rayuan telah difailkan tetapi sia-sia sahaja, kecuali di mana Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah telah mengubah hukuman-hukuman tersebut, di mana perintah-perintah pemenjaraan diketepikan dan plaintif-plaintif dikehendaki hadir di pejabat kadi setiap bulan selama tiga tahun, di mana mereka dikehendaki membuat pengakuan tentang rasa sesal mereka sejajar dengan rukun Islam. Plaintif-plaintif telah gagal mematuhi arahan-arahan baru ini, akibatnya tuduhan-tuduhan baru dibuat terhadap mereka (‘tuduhan-tuduhan tersebut’). Perkara tersebut berakhir dengan sabitan-sabitan dan pemenjaraan mereka. Plaintif-plaintif tidak memfailkan apa-apa rayuan. Pada 12 November 2000, plaintif-plaintif memberitahu mahkamah bahawa mula berkuat kuasa daripada 16 Ogos 1998, mereka telahpun murtad. Berdasarkan pengakuan ini, mereka telah dituduh kerana kesalahan-kesalahan menurut s 102(3) Enakmen Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan 1994 (‘tuduhan-tuduhan kedua’). Tuduhan-tuduhan kedua tersebut masih belum selesai. Plaintif-plaintif kemudiannya telah memfailkan saman-saman pemula mereka di Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kelantan memohon beberapa deklarasi, antara lain, hak untuk menganut dan mengamal agama pilihan mereka. Permohonan-permohonan mereka adalah berdasarkan, antara lain, perkara

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 250 11(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Mereka juga mendakwa bahawa memandangkan mereka telah murtad, Enakmen Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan 1994 yang memperuntukkan kuasa-kuasa bagi Mahkamah Syariah, untuk memutuskan sama ada mereka telah sememangnya keluar daripada agama Islam, adalah mulai dari saat itu tidak terpakai ke atas mereka. Persoalan-persoalan untuk ditentukan adalah sama ada: (i) plaintif-plaintif atau perkara yang menjejaskan hak-hak plaintif-plaintif jatuh di dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya atau Mahkamah Syariah; (ii) perkara 11(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, yang telah dirujuk adalah terpakai di dalam keadaan-keadaan kes ini; dan (iii) di dalam keadaan-keadaan kes ini, walaupun mahkamah mempunyai kuasa budi bicara menurut s 41 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950, perintah-perintah deklarasi tersebut yang dipohon sepatutnya dilayan. ||Page 393>>

Diputuskan, menolak saman-saman pemula tersebut dengan kos: (1) Plaintif-plaintif kekurangan ‘kekilanan’ yang sebenar di mana ditemui pada permohonan-permohonan deklarasi tersebut. Ia tidak berapa munasabah jika kekilanan tersebut dikaitkan dengan sabitan dan perintah-perintah pemenjaraan tuduhan-tuduhan pertama kerana tiada rayuan difailkan terhadap mereka. Begitu juga, tuduhan-tuduhan kedua tidak boleh menjadi dasar juga, kerana tuduhan-tuduhan tersebut sedang dan measih menunggu perbicaraan. Di dalam merujuk tuduhan-tuduhan kedua ia tidak boleh diterima pra masa. Persoalan relevan yang perlu dijawab terlebih dahulu, bagi tujuan kes ini, adalah sama ada pada masa pemfailan saman pemula plaintif-plaintif masih muslim atau tidak? Ini merupakan persoalan fakta dan undang-undang. Memandangkan plaintif-plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa mereka telah meninggalkan kepercayaan muslim mereka, daripada pandangan mereka, mereka menjangkakan mereka telah selamat di luar bidang Mahkamah Syariah dan enakmen-enakmen agama berkaitan. Bagi menjawab persoalan penting ini tentang status agama mereka, satu kesedaran berhubung undang-undang berkaitan, dibaca bersama dengan fakta-fakta di atas tidak boleh dielakkan (lihat ms 399C–E, 400G–H). (2) Pendekatan yang betul apabila berhadapan dengan cabaran keadilan, adalah untuk melihat Enakmen-enakmen Negeri untuk melihat sama ada Mahkamah Syariah dengan jelas mempunyai bidang kuasa ke atas perkara tersebut; Soon Singh Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489 diikut. Seksyen 102(1) Enakmen Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan 1994 memperuntukkan satu ujian penemuan fakta, bagi tujuan menentukan sama ada seorang responden Muslim, dan di dalam kes ini, plaintif-plaintif, sememangnya murtad. Seksyen 102(2) memperuntukkan bahawa seseorang masih dianggap seorang Muslim sehingga disahkan oleh Mahkamah Syariah sebagai telah murtad. Perkara murtad telahpun dinyatakan di dalam Enakmen Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan 1994. Memandangkan plaintif-plaintif masih belum didapati

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 251 bersalah terhadap tuduhan-tuduhan kedua mengenai murtad tersebut, apa lagi dengan peruntukan yang ada, bagi semua niat dan tujuan, plaintif-plaintif masih Muslim. Jika begitu, plaintif-plaintif yang masih secara sah Muslim akan kekal berada dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah, dan oleh itu di luar skop bidang kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi (lihat ms 401A–C, E, 401I–402A). (3) Tiada isu bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak dibenarkan menganuti agama pilihan mereka. Aduan mereka sebenarnya adalah mengenai isu hak mereka untuk meninggalkan agama mereka. Ia tidak dipertikaikan bahawa plaintif-plaintif telah mengisytiharkan yang mereka telah meninggalkan agama Islam. Bagaimanakah hak-hak perlembagaan mereka untuk menganuti dan mengamal ||Page 394>>agama pilihan mereka boleh dijejaskan ataupun dilanggar sedangkan tindakan mereka menunjukkan sebaliknya? Peninggalan sesuatu agama bukan merupakan suatu agama ataupun boleh disamakan dengan hak ‘untuk menganuti dan mengamalkan’ agama mereka. Untuk menerima bahawa meninggalkan sesuatu agama adalah sama dengan tafsiran-tafsiran tersebut akan terlalu meluaskan skop perkara 11(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan menyalahgunakan undang-undang. Dengan itu, perbalahan plaintif-plaintif bahawa hak-hak mereka mengikut perkara 11(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan telah dilanggar telah ditolak (lihat ms 402C–E).]

Notes For cases on declaration generally, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 1497–1536. For a case on apotasy, see 8 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) para 380. For cases on freedom of religion, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1536-1544.

Cases referred to Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1992] 2 MLJ 425 (refd) Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers and Ors [1977] 3 All ER 70 (refd) Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] MLJ 12 (refd) Kuluwante v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1978)]1 MLJ 92 (refd) Ng Siew Pian v Abd Wahid bin Abu Hassan, Kadi Daerah Bukit Mertajam & satu yang lain [1992] 2 MLJ 425 (refd) Mohamed Habibullah bin Mahmood v Faridah bte Dato’ Talib [1992] 2 MLJ 793 (refd) Pedley v Majlis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 307 (refd) Ramah bte Taat v Laton bte Malim Sutan [1927] 6 FMSLR 128 (refd) Soon Singh Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah &

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 252 Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489 (folld) Tan Sri Othman Saat v Mohamed bin Ismail [1982] MLJ 177 (refd)

Legislation referred to Enakmen Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan 1994 s 102(1), (2) Enakmen Majlis Ugama dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan 1966 s 69 Enakmen Prosedur Jenayah Syariah 1983 s 132(5) Federal Constitution arts 4, 11(1), 74, 95B(1)(a), 121(1A) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 15 r l6 Specific Relief Act 1950 s 41 ||Page 395>> Undang-Undang Majlis Ugama Islam Kelantan dan Adat Istiadat Melayu bil 2/66

Haris bin Mohamed Ibrahim (Jahaberdeen bin Mohd Yunus and Mohana Kumar with him) for the plaintiffs. Jalaldin bin Hussain (Nik Ahmad Marzuki bin Nik Mohamed, Azhar bin Mohamed, Abdul Rasid bin Sudin and Wan Abdullah Thani bin Wan Yusof with him) for the respondents.

[2001] 3 MLJ 385 Zakaria bin Abdul Rahman v Ketua Polis Negara Malaysia & Anor

HIGH COURT (ALOR SETAR) — CIVIL SUIT NO 21–04 OF 1997 ARIFIN ZAKARIA J 22 APRIL 2001

Administrative Law — Exercise of judicial functions — Judicial review — Power of court to interfere with punishment meted out — Police officer dismissed from service — Whether court may judicially review order of dismissal

Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Dismissal — Disciplinary proceedings — Application of principle of autrefois convict and acquit to disciplinary proceedings — Whether disciplinary action could be taken against police officer for the second time based on same facts after he had been convicted or acquitted in earlier disciplinary proceedings — Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap D) General Orders 1980

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Freedom of religion — Requirement of permission for superior officer prior to second marriage — Whether unconstitutional for disciplinary authority to require member of police force to obtain prior permission from his superior officer before entering into a polygamous marriage

The plaintiff prior to his dismissal was a police officer with the rank of Chief Inspector. On 1 June 1991, the plaintiff wrote to the first defendant seeking permission to marry one Cik Puziah bte Ariffin as his second wife. The first defendant rejected the said application and by a letter dated 17 August 1991 the plaintiff was strongly advised to terminate his relation with Cik Puziah. In para 3 of the said letter a warning was sounded that, in the event the plaintiff failed to do so, disciplinary action would be taken against him. Subsequently, disciplinary action was taken against him (‘the first proceedings’) wherein he was charged under general order 4(2)(i) Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap D) General Orders 1980 for insubordination. The plaintiff was found guilty and fined and reprimanded. The plaintiff proceeded to marry Cik Puziah on 3 September 1991. This led to further disciplinary action being taken against him (‘the second proceedings’). The plaintiff was charged with two breaches of discipline, namely for conducting himself in such a manner as to bring the public service into disrepute under general order 4(2)(d) and for insubordination by committing polygamy under general order 4(2)(i). The plaintiff was found guilty of both charges and was dismissed from the police with effect from 4 May 1993. The plaintiff was dissatisfied with the said disciplinary action in the second proceedings and hence this action for inter alia a declaration that his dismissal was invalid and that he be reinstated to his original position and costs. The issues for determination were: (i) whether disciplinary action could be taken against any one for the second time based on the same facts after he had been convicted or acquitted in the earlier disciplinary proceedings, and whether the holding that one of the ||Page 386>>charges in the second proceedings was invalid would not vitiate the punishment imposed on the plaintiff since the punishment was in respect of two separate charges; (ii) whether the second charge in the second proceedings was unsustainable as it goes against the plaintiff’s right to practice his religious belief as enshrined in art 11 of the Federal Constitution; and (iii) whether the sentence imposed by the first defendant in the circumstances of the case was excessive.

Held, allowing plaintiff’s application in part: (1) The plaintiff was, in the first and the second proceedings, charged with breaches of discipline under the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap D) General Orders 1980 which is a statutory code of conduct governing public services in Malaysia, a code enacted under cl (2) of art 132 of the Federal Constitution. In the circumstances, the principle sets out in the case of Harry Lee Wee v Law Society of Singapore [1985] 1 MLJ 1 which held that the doctrine of autrefois convict and acquit is applicable to disciplinary proceedings

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 254 under a statutory code by which a profession is governed, was apt to apply to the present case (see pp 394B, 395C–D). (2) The court agreed with the plaintiff that in substance the two charges, ie the charge brought in the first proceedings and the first charge in the second proceedings, were in respect of the same conduct of the plaintiff in relation to Cik Puziah. Therefore, in all fairness there should have been only one charge as far as that was concerned. To charge the plaintiff twice for the same conduct clearly goes against the principle as stated by the Privy Council in Harry Lee Wee’s case. Therefore, on that score the first charge in the second proceedings ought to be set aside (see p 396A–B). (3) It was not open to speculate as to the likely punishment that the first defendant would impose had there been only one charge before him. Once the first charge was found to be unsustainable in law, then the punishment needs to be set aside. There is no procedure for the court to remit the case to the disciplinary authority nor is there any power vested in the court to substitute its own punishment. It was the court’s finding that the order of dismissal made against the plaintiff was wrong in law and accordingly, ordered to be set aside (see p 396D–E). (4) Polygamous marriage is merely permissible in Islam. A Muslim is therefore not required as a matter of religious obligation to take upon more than one wife. On that premise it is not fundamentally wrong for the disciplinary authority to require any member of the police force to obtain prior permission from his superior officer before entering into a polygamous marriage. Such a condition could not be construed as infringing the constitutional guarantee to profess and practice his religion as contained in art 11(1) of the ||Page 387>>Federal Constitution. The plaintiff had clearly acted contrary to good discipline in marrying his second wife after his request for permission to do so was turned down by his superior officer (see p 397A–C). (5) It is not open to the court to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority as the disciplining of a public officer by his department head is part of the function of the executive branch of the government and any usurpation by a court will be viewed with something very much more than disfavour. A court intervenes only on the nature and manner of accusation against a public officer as distinct from a consequential punishment (see p 397H–398A); Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 405 followed. Obiter dictum: Article 7(2) of the Federal Constitution, which protects any person from being placed in ‘double jeopardy’, has no application to disciplinary matter. This is clear from the wordings of the said article (see p 392B–C).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif sebelum pemecatannya merupakan seorang pegawai polis dengan pangkat Ketua Inspektor. Pada 1 Jun 1991, plaintif telah menulis kepada defendan pertama memohon kebenaran untuk mengahwini seorang bernama Cik Puziah bte Ariffin sebagai isteri keduanya. Defendan pertama telah menolak permohonan tersebut dan dengan sepucuk surat bertarikh 17 Ogos 1991, plaintif telah dengan tegasnya dinasihatkan supaya menamatkan perhubungan beliau dengan Cik Puziah. Dalam perenggan 3 surat tersebut, suatu amaran telah diberi bahawa, sekiranya plaintif gagal berbuat sedemikian tindakan tatatertib akan diambil terhadap beliau. Berikutan itu tindakan tatatertib telah diambil terhadap beliau (‘prosiding pertama’) di mana beliau telah dituduh di bawah perintah am 4(2)(i) Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Disiplin) (Bab D) Perintah-Perintah Am 1980 kerana pengingkaran. Plaintif telah didapati bersalah dan didenda serta ditegur. Plaintif telah meneruskan untuk berkahwin dengan Cik Puziah pada 3 September 1991. Ini telah membawa kepada tindakan tatatertib diambil terhadap beliau (‘prosiding kedua’). Plaintif telah dituduh dengan dua kemungkiran disiplin, iaitu kerana berkelakuan sedemikian dengan membawa nama buruk kepada perkhidmatan awam di bawah perintah am 4(2)(d) dan kerana keingkaran dengan melakukan poligami di bawah perintah am 4(2)(i). Plaintif telah didapati bersalah atas kedua-dua pertuduhan dan telah dipecat daripada pasukan polis yang berkuatkuasa pada 4 Mei 1993. Plaintif tidak berpuashati dengan tindakan tatatertib dalam prosiding kedua dan dengan itu ||Page 388>>mengakibatkan tindakan ini untuk antara lainnya, satu pengisytiharan bahawa pemecatan beliau adalah tidak sah dan bahawa beliau hendaklah ditempatkan semula ke jawatan asal beliau dan kos. Isu-isu untuk ditentukan adalah: (i) sama ada tindakan tatatertib seharusnya diambil terhadap sesiapa buat kali keduanya berdasarkan fakta-fakta yang sama selepas beliau telah disabitkan atau dilepaskan dalam prosiding tatatertib yang lebih awal dan sama ada keputusan bahawa salah satu pertuduhan dalam prosiding kedua adalah tidak sah akan tidak menjadikan tidak sah hukuman yang dikenakan ke atas plaintif oleh kerana hukuman tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan dua pertuduhan yang berasingan; (ii) sama ada pertuduhan kedua dalam prosiding kedua tidak boleh dipertahankan kerana ianya bertentangan dengan hak plaintif untuk mengamalkan kepercayaan agamanya seperti yang termaktub di dalam perkara 11 Perlembagaan Persekutuan; dan (iii) sama ada hukuman yang dikenakan oleh defendan pertama dalam keadaan tersebut adalah melampau.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan plaintif sebahagiannya: (1) Plaintif telah, dalam prosiding pertama dan kedua, dituduh dengan melanggar tatatertib di bawah Perintah-Perintah Am Pegawai Awam (Tingkah Laku dan Tatatertib) (Bab D) 1980 yang mana adalah kanun mengawal tingkah laku pegawai awam statutori di Malaysia, suatu kanun yang digubalkan di bawah fasal (2) perkara 132 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Dalam keadaan tersebut,

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 256 prinsip-prinsip yang dibentangkan dalam kes Harry Lee Wee v Society of Singapore [1985] 1 MLJ 1 yang memutuskan bahawa doktrin autrefois pensabitan dan pembebasan boleh digunakan pada prosiding tatatertib di bawah sesuatu kanun statutori melalui yang mana sesuatu profesyen itu dikuasai, tepat sekali dipakai kepada kes semasa (lihat ms 394B, 395C–D). (2) Mahkamah bersetuju dengan plaintif bahawa menurut substans, kedua-dua pertuduhan tersebut iaitu pertuduhan yang dimulakan dalam prosiding semasa dan pertuduhan kedua dalam prosiding kedua, adalah berhubung dengan tingkah laku plaintif berkaitan dengan Cik Puziah. Oleh itu, demi keadilan, haruslah hanya terdapat satu pertuduhan sejauh mana ia berkaitan dengan perkara tersebut. Untuk menuduhkan plaintif dua kali bagi tingkah laku yang sama jelas menunjukkan bahawa ia bertentangan dengan prinsip sepertimana yang dinyatakan oleh Majlis Privi dalam kes Harry Lee Wee. Oleh itu, atas perkara itu pertuduhan kedua dalam prosiding kedua haruslah diketepikan (lihat ms 396A–B). (3) Ia tidak terbuka untuk dispekulasikan berhubung dengan hukuman yang berkemungkinan akan dilaksanakan oleh defendan pertama jika hanya terdapat satu pertuduhan di hadapnya. Sebaik sahaja pertuduhan pertama didapati tidak boleh dipertahankan di sisi undang-undang, maka hukuman ||Page 389>>tersebut perlu diketepikan. Tidak terdapat sebarang prosedur untuk mahkamah kemukakan kes tersebut kepada pihak berkuasa tatatertib dan tidak terdapat sebarang kuasa yang diletakhak dalam mahkamah untuk menggantikan hukumannya yang tersendiri. Ianya merupakan keputusan mahkamah bahawa perintah pemecatan yang dibuat terhadap plaintif adalah salah di sisi undang-undang dan sehubungan itu, diperintahkan supaya diketepikan (lihat ms 396D–E). (4) Perkahwinan berpoligami adalah hanya dibenarkan dalam Islam. Seseorang muslim adalah dengan itu tidak diperlukan demi kewajipan agama untuk berkahwin lebih dari seorang isteri. Atas premis itu, adalah secara asasnya tidak salah bagi pihak berkuasa tatatertib untuk mempersyaratkan mana-mana daripada ahli pasukan polis untuk mendapatkan kebenaran daripada pegawai kanannya sebelum memasuki perkahwinan berpoligami. Keadaan yang sedemikian tidak boleh ditafsirkan sebagai melanggari jaminan perlembagaan untuk menganut dan mengamalkan agamanya sepertimana yang terkandung di dalam perkara 11(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Plaintif telah dengan jelasnya bertindak secara bertentangan dengan tatatertib yang baik dengan mengahwini isteri keduanya selepas permohonan beliau untuk kebenaran ditolak oleh pegawai kanan beliau (lihat ms 397A–C). (5) Tidak terletak kepada mahkamah untuk menggangu hukuman yang dikenakan oleh pihak berkuasa-tatatertib kerana mendisiplinkan seseorang pegawai awam oleh ketua jabatannya adalah merupakan sebahagian daripada fungsi bahagian eksekutif kerajaan dan sebarang rampasan fungsi ini oleh mahkamah akan dipandang dengan serong. Mahkamah akan mencelah hanya atas sifat dan cara

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 257 tuduhan terhadap seseorang pegawai awam dan bukannya atas hukuman yang diakibatkan (lihat ms 397H–398A); Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & yang lain [1998] 1 MLJ 405 diikut. Obiter diktum: Atrikel 7(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan, yang melindungi sebarang orang daripada diletakkan dalam ‘double jeopardy’, tidak terpakai kepada perkara-perkara tatatertib. Ini jelas daripada perkataan artikel tersebut (lihat ms 392B–C).]

Notes For cases on judicial review, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 76–83.For cases on dismissal, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 519–543. For cases on freedom of religion, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1536–1544. ||Page 390>>

Cases referred to Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 (refd) Ekambaram a/l Savarimuthu v Ketua Polis Daerah Melaka Tengah [1997] 2 MLJ 454 (refd) Harry Lee Wee v Law Society of Singapore [1985] 1 MLJ 1 (folld) Mohamed Yusoff bin Samadi v Attorney General [1975] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 405 (folld) R v Hogan; R v Tompkins [1960] 2 QB 513 (refd) Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261 (refd)

Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 7(2), 11(1), 132(2) Penal Code s 213 Prison Rules 1949 rr 42(13), 44 Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap ‘D’) General Orders 1980 general orders 4(2)(d), (i) Public Service (Disciplinary Proceeding) Regulations 1970 reg 11

Mohd Ismail bin Mohamed (Ismail Khoo & Associates) for the plaintiff. Azman bin Abdullah (Senior Federal Counsel, Attorney General’s Chambers) for the defendant.

[2001] 3 MLJ 561 Abdul Ghani bin Ali @ Ahmad & Ors v Public Prosecutor

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL APPEALS NO 05–10 OF 2000(W) AND NO 05–11 OF 2000(W) MOHAMED DZAIDDIN CHIEF JUSTICE, WAN ADNAN CJ (MALAYA), STEVE SHIM CJ (SABAH & SARAWAK), ABDUL MALEK AHMAD AND AHMAD FAIRUZ FCJJ 19 JULY 2001

Constitutional Law — Emergency proclamation — Validity of — Whether Proclamation of Emergency by Yang di-Pertuan Agong on 15 May 1969 invalid — Whether Yang di-Pertuan Agong acted on advice of Cabinet as required by art 40(1) of the Federal Constitution in making the Proclamation — Whether Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 which arose from Proclamation invalid — Whether Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 retrospectively validated by Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 invalid and unconstitutional — Federal Constitution art 40(1) — Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 — Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975

Criminal Procedure — Trial — Security offences — Issue of certificate declaring security case — Attorney General issued certificate under reg 2(2) of Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 declaring appellants’ case as security case — Whether Attorney General’s decision to issue certificate in absence of de facto emergency unlawful — Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 reg 2(2)

Constitutional Law — Equal protection of the law — Validity of legislation — Whether Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 when used against ordinary citizens violated arts 5 and 8 of Federal Constitution — Whether trial under Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 invalid and unconstitutional — Meaning of art 8 of Federal Constitution — Federal Constitution arts 5, 8 — Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 regs 2(2), 26

Criminal Procedure — Trial — Security offences — Failure to supply record of proceedings — Appellants committed for trial under Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 — Provision in reg 6(2) for right of accused to be supplied with record of proceedings — Non-compliance with reg 6(2) before trial — Whether non-compliance rendered committal of appellants unlawful and trial under Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 invalid — Whether injustice occasioned to appellants as result of non-compliance — Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 reg 6(2)

These two appeals were from the decision of the trial judge dismissing the preliminary objections raised by the appellants in the High Court below, where they were charged with waging war against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, an offence punishable under s 121 of the Penal Code. The first appeal raised the following issues: (i) whether the Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 (‘ESCAR’) was invalid and unconstitutional, thereby resulting in the trial under ESCAR being invalid and unconstitutional; (ii) whether the decision of the Attorney General to issue a certificate under reg 2(2) of ESCAR (declaring the appellants’ case as a security case) in the absence of a ||Page 562>>de facto emergency was unlawful and, hence, void; and (iii) whether the trial under ESCAR was invalid for non-compliance with reg 6(2) of ESCAR, in the failure to supply the record of proceedings to the appellants before the trial. The second appeal raised the issue of whether the Proclamation of Emergency by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on 15 May 1969 was invalid on the ground that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong did not act on the advice of the Cabinet as required by art 40(1) of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’), which would have resulted in the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979, enacted by virtue of the Proclamation and which resurrected ESCAR, being unconstitutional and invalid, thus rendering ESCAR invalid and unconstitutional, leading to the trial of the appellants under ESCAR being a nullity.

Held, dismissing the appeals: (1) (Per Mohamed Dzaiddin Chief Justice, Abdul Malek Ahmad and Ahmad Fairuz FCJJ concurring) With regard to non-compliance with reg 6(2) of ESCAR, although reg 6(2) provided for the right of the accused to be supplied with the record of proceedings, non-compliance with that provision should not, in itself, be taken to nullify the whole trial having regard to the justice of the case. In this case, no injustice had been occasioned because from the notes of evidence, the trial judge had, in fact, ordered that the record of proceedings of the committing magistrate be given to counsel before the commencement of the trial before him (see p 569A–B). (2) (Per Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ, Mohamed Dzaiddin Chief Justice and Ahmad Fairuz FCJ concurring) The decision of the Attorney General to issue a certificate under reg 2(2) of ESCAR was based on the pure judgment of the Attorney General which could not be subjected to an objective test and was not accordingly amenable to judicial review, as held by the Federal Court in Mohamed Nordin bin Johan v Attorney General, Malaysia [1983] 1 MLJ 68. Although that case involved a motion for an order of certiorari, the same principle was applicable in this case, irrespective of whether there was a de facto emergency or otherwise (see p 581G–I); Mohamed Nordin bin Johan v Attorney General, Malaysia [1983] 1 MLJ 68 followed. (3) (Per Ahmad Fairuz FCJ, Mohamed Dzaiddin Chief Justice and Abdul

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 260 Malek Ahmad FCJ concurring) The contention of counsel for the appellants in the first appeal that ESCAR, when used against ordinary citizens, infringed arts 5 and 8 of the Constitution and was discriminatory and, therefore, unconstitutional, was in relation to art 8, without merit. The senior deputy public prosecutor’s arguments that art 8’s equality provision was not absolute, that ESCAR was applicable to all persons who committed security offences and that even if it was discriminatory it was nonetheless lawful being based on ||Page 563>>classification, were supported by the case of Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji ldris v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 155, where the Federal Court held that art 8 did not mean that all laws had to ‘apply uniformly to all persons in all circumstances everywhere’. Thus, as ESCAR operated alike on all persons under like circumstances (ie people who committed security offences), reg 2(2) of ESCAR clearly provided the guideline as to the class of cases in which ESCAR was to be resorted to and reg 26 of ESCAR provided for appeals to a higher authority so that trial court decisions are always open for review, ESCAR could not, in the circumstances, be unconstitutional and invalid (see pp 593I–594B, 596E); Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji ldris v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 155 followed. As for ESCAR’s purported infringement of art 5 of the Constitution, the parties did not address the issue of how it was infringed and, in the circumstances of the appeals, ESCAR could not have been said to have infringed that article (see pp 596G). (4) Counsel for the appellants in the second appeal had conceded that the promulgation of the Proclamation of Emergency on 15 May 1969 was made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong after acting on the advice of the Cabinet (see p 599B). This concession, along with the reasonings set out in the Indian cases cited (Indian Supreme Court judgments being of persuasive value in Malaysia, particularly on the Constitution), was indicative of the fact that, contrary to counsel’s prior contention, a caretaker government could exist under the Constitution and did, in fact, exist on 15 May 1969. In the circumstances, the 15 May 1969 Proclamation of Emergency could not have been unconstitutional and invalid (see p 600F–H); Madan Murari v Choudhuri Charan Singh AIR 1980 Cal 95 and UNR Rao v Indira Ghandi AIR 1971 SC 1002 followed. (5) The Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 was enacted by Parliament with retrospective effect and s 9(1) clearly validated ESCAR, as held by the Federal Court in Teh Cheng Poh v PP [1979] 2 MLJ 238. In the circumstances, the contention that ESCAR was not valid and unconstitutional did not have any merit (see pp 601H–I, 602B).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Kedua-dua rayuan ini adalah daripada keputusan hakim perbicaraan yang menolak

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 261 bantahan-bantahan awal yang ditimbulkan oleh perayu-perayu di Mahkamah Tinggi, di mana mereka telah dituduh melancarkan perang terhadap Yang di-Pertuan Agong, satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah s 121 Kanun Keseksaan. Rayuan pertama menimbulkan persoalan-persoalan berikut: (i) sama ada Peraturan-Peraturan Perlu (Kes-kes Keselamatan) (Pindaan) 1975 (‘ESCAR’) adalah tidak sah dan tidak berperlembagaan; (ii) sama ada keputusan Peguam Negara untuk mengeluarkan sijil di bawah ||Page 564>>peraturan 2(2) ESCAR (mengisytiharkan kes perayu-perayu sebagai satu kes keselamatan) dengan ketidakhadiran satu darurat de facto adalah salah di sisi undang-undang dan, oleh itu, batal; dan (iii) sama ada perbicaraan di bawah ESCAR adalah tidak sah kerana ketidakpatuhan dengan peraturan 6(2) ESCAR, kerana kegagalan untuk menyediakan rekod prosiding kepada perayu-perayu sebelum perbicaraan. Rayuan kedua menimbulkan persoalan sama ada Pengisytiharan Darurat oleh Yang di-Pertuan Agong pada 15 Mei 1969 adalah tidak sah atas alasan bahawa Yang di-Pertuan Agong tidak bertindak atas nasihat Kabinet sebagaimana yang dikehendaki oleh perkara 40(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan tersebut’), yang mungkin telah mengakibatkan Akta Darurat (Kuasa-kuasa Perlu) 1979, yang digubal menurut Pengisytiharan tersebut dan yang telah menghidupkan semula ESCAR, menjadi tidak berperlembagaan dan tidak sah, oleh itu menjadikan ESCAR tidak sah dan tidak berperlembagaan, yang menyebabkan perbicaraan perayu-perayu di bawah ESCAR satu pembatalan.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan-rayuan tersebut: (1) (oleh Mohamed Dzaiddin Ketua Hakim Negara, Abdul Malek Ahmad dan Ahmad Fairuz HHMP bersetuju) Berhubung ketidakpatuhan peraturan 6(2) ESCAR, walaupun peraturan 6(2) memperuntukkan hak tertuduh diberikan rekod prosiding, ketidakpatuhan peruntukan tersebut tidak sepatutnya, dengan sendirinya, diambil untuk membatalkan keseluruhan perbicaraan dengan mengambilkira keadilan kes. Di dalam kes ini, tiada keadilan telah dilaksanakan kerana daripada nota-nota keterangan, hakim perbicaraan telah, pada hakikatnya, memerintahkan agar rekod prosiding majistret tersebut diberikan kepada peguam sebelum bermulanya perbicaraan dihadapkan kepada beliau (lihat ms 569A–B). (2) (oleh Abdul Malek Ahmad HMP, Mohamed Dzaiddin Ketua Hakim Negara dan Ahmad Fairuz HMP bersetuju) Keputusan Peguam Negara untuk mengeluarkan sijil di bawah peraturan 2(2) ESCAR adalah berdasarkan semata-mata atas penghakiman Peguam Negara yang tidak boleh tertakluk kepada satu ujian objektif dan tidak sewajarnya tertakluk kepada kajian semula, sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Mohamed Nordin bin Johan v Attorney General, Malaysia [1983] 1 MLJ 68. Walaupun kes tersebut melibatkan satu usul untuk satu perintah certiorari, prinsip yang sama terpakai di dalam kes ini, tidak kira sama ada terdapat satu darurat de facto atau sebaliknya (lihat ms 581G–I); Mohamed Nordin bin

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 262 Johan v Attorney General, Malaysia [1983] 1 MLJ 68 diikut. (3) (oleh Ahmad Fairuz HMP, Mohamed Dzaiddin Ketua Hakim Negara dan Abdul Malek Ahmad HMP bersetuju) ||Page 565>>Hujah peguam bagi pihak perayu-perayu di dalam rayuan pertama yang ESCAR, apabila digunakan terhadap warganegara biasa, telah melanggar perkara-perkara 5 dan 8 Perlembagaan tersebut dan adalah bersifat diskriminasi dan, oleh itu, tidak berperlembagaan adalah, berhubung perkara 8, tanpa merit. Hujah-hujah penolong kanan pendakwa raya bahawa peruntukan saksama perkara 8 adalah tidak muktamad, bahawa ESCAR adalah terpakai ke atas semua orang yang telah melakukan kesalahan keselamatan dan bahawa walaupun ia adalah bersifat diskrimasi ia sama sekali sah berdasarkan pengelasan, telah disokong oleh kes Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji ldris v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 155, di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan bahawa perkara 8 tidak bermaksud yang semua undang-undang perlu ‘menggunakan keseragaman ke atas semua orang dalam semua keadaan di mana-mana’. Oleh itu, memandangkan ESCAR beroperasi dengan serupa ke atas semua orang dalam keadaan yang sama (iaitu mereka yang telah melakukan kesalahan keselamatan), peraturan 2(2) ESCAR dengan jelas memperuntukkan panduan untuk mengelaskan kes-kes di mana ESCAR telah digunakan dan peraturan 26 ESCAR memperuntukkan rayuan-rayuan ke pihak berkuasa yang lebih tinggi supaya keputusan-keputusan mahkamah perbicaraan sentiasa terbuka untuk kajian semula, ESCAR tidak boleh, di dalam keadaan ini, tidak berperlembagaan dan tidak sah (lihat ms 593I–594B, 596E); Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji ldris v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 155 diikut. Berhubung dakwaan pelanggaran ESCAR terhadap perkara 5 Perlembagaan tersebut, pihak-pihak tersebut tidak mengutarakan persoalan bagaimana ia telah dilanggari dan, di dalam keadaan rayuan-rayuan tersebut, ESCAR tidak boleh dikatakan telah melanggar perkara tersebut (lihat ms 596G). (4) Peguam bagi pihak perayu-perayu di dalam rayuan kedua telah bersetuju bahawa pengisytiharan Pengisytiharan Darurat pada 15 Mei 1969 telah dibuat oleh Yang di-Pertuan Agong setelah bertindak atas nasihat Kabinet (lihat ms 599B). Konsesi ini, bersama sebab-sebab yang dinyatakan dalam kes-kes India yang dipetik (penghakiman-penghakiamn Mahkamah Agong India mempunyai nilai berpengaruh di Malaysia, terutamanya atas Perlembagaan), menunjukkan hakikat bahawa, berbeza daripada hujah peguam yang terdahulu, penjaga kerajaan boleh wujud di bawah Perlembagaan dan ini sememangnya, pada hakikatnya, wujud pada 15 Mei 1969. Dalam keadaan ini, Pengisytiharan Darurat pada 15 Mei 1969 tidak mungkin tidak berperlembagaan dan tidak sah (lihat ms 600F–H); Madan Murari v Choudhuri Charan Singh AIR 1980 Cal 95 and UNR Rao v Indira Ghandi AIR 1971 SC 1002 diikut. (5) Akta Darurat (Kuasa-kuasa Perlu) 1979 telah digubal oleh Parlimen dengan kesan retrospektif dan s 9(1) dengan jelas mengesahkan ESCAR, sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 263 ||Page 566>>Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam Teh Cheng Poh v PP [1979] 2 MLJ 238. Dalam keadaan ini, hujah bahawa ESCAR tidak sah dan tidak berperlembagaan tidak mempunyai apa-apa merit (lihat ms 601H–I, 602B).]

Notes For cases on emergency proclamation, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 1471–1473. For cases on equal protection of the law, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 1474–1478. For cases on security cases, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 3529–3531.

Cases referred to Bhagat Singh v King Emperor (1931) LR 58 IA 169 (refd) Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (distd) Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji ldris v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 155 (folld) Eng Keock Cheng v PP [1966] 1 MLJ 18 (refd) JP Berthelsen v Director-General of Immigration, Malaysia & Ors [1987] 1 MLJ 134 (refd) Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 12 (folld) Madan Murari v Choudhuri Charan Singh AIR 1980 Cal 95 (folld) Mahan Singh v Government of Malaysia [1978] 2 MLJ 133 (refd) Mohamed Nordin bin Johan v Attorney General, Malaysia [1983] 1 MLJ 68 (folld) N Madhavan Nair v Government of Malaysia [1975] 2 MLJ 286 (refd) Osman & Anor v PP [1968] 2 MLJ 137 (refd) Phang Chi Hock v PP [1980] 1 MLJ 70 (refd) PP v Dato’ Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311 (refd) PP v Mohd Ami bin Mohd Razali [2000] 4 MLJ 679 (refd) PP v Shihabduin & Anor [1980] 2 MLJ 273 (refd) Samsher Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192 (refd) Savrimuthu v PP [1987] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Government of Malaysia [1968] 1 MLJ 119 (refd) Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Tun Abang Haji Openg and Tawi Sli [1966] 2 MLJ 187 (refd) Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Tun Abang Haji Openg & Tawi Sli (No 2) [1967] 1 MLJ 46 (refd) Sugumar Balakrishnan v Pengarah Imigresen Negeri Sabah & Anor [1998] 3 MLJ

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 264 289 (refd) Tan Boon Liat @ Alien, Re [1977] 2 MLJ 108 (refd) Teh Cheng Poh v PP [1979] 1 MLJ 50 (refd) Teh Cheng Poh v PP [1979] 2 MLJ 23 (folld) Teh Cheng Poh v PP [1980] AC 458 (folld) UNR Rao v Indira Ghandi AIR 1971 SC 1002 (folld)

Legislation referred to Emergency (Criminal Trials) Regulations 1964 Schedule Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 1 of 1969 s 2(1) Emergency (Federal Constitution and Constitution of Sarawak) Act 1966 ss 3, 4, 5 Emergency (Public Order & Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 s 6(1), (2) Essential (Community Self-Reliance) Regulations 1975 Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 regs 5, 6(1), (2), 11(1), 17, 27 Federal Constitution arts 5, 8, 40(1), (2), 43(2), 44, 150(1)(b), (5), (6), 161E(2) Internal Security Act 1960 s 57(1)(a), (b) Malaysian Act 1963 Sarawak Constitution 1963 art 41 ||Page 567>>

Appeal from: Criminal Trial No 45–34 of 2000 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur) and Criminal Trial No 62–29 of 2000 (Sessions Court, Taiping)

Kamarul Hisham (Surina Suhaimi and M Moganambal with him) (Daim & Gamany) for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No 05–10 of 2000(W). Karpal Singh (Ramkarpal Singh with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No 05–11 of 2000(W). Mohd Yusof Hj Zainal Abiden (Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor) (Salehudin Saidin, Deputy Public Prosecutor with him) for the respondent in Criminal Appeals No 05–10 of 2000(W) and No 05–11 of 2000(W).

[2001] 4 MLJ 11 Ketua Polis Negara v Abdul Ghani Haroon

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 265 FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CRIMINAL APPLICATIONS NO 07–1 OF 2001(B) AND 07–2 OF 2001(B) STEVE SHIM CJ (SABAH & SARAWAK), ABDUL MALEK AHMAD AND HAIDAR FCJJ 6 AUGUST 2001

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Preventive detention — Right to be present at hearing of habeas corpus proceedings — Applicants arrested under s 73(1) of Internal Security Act 1960 — Judge below held constitutional right of applicants to be present at hearing of their habeas corpus applications by virtue of art 5(2) of Federal Constitution — Whether judge correct in ruling on applicants’ constitutional right to be present at hearing of habeas corpus applications — Federal Constitution art 5(2) — Internal Security Act 1960 s 73(1)

The applicants, officers of a political party, were arrested separately on 10 and 11 April 2001 under s 73(1) of the Internal Security Act 1960 (‘the ISA’). The High Court, Shah Alam, served on the respondent a ‘notice to produce’ the applicants in respect of their habeas corpus proceedings. The respondent did not comply with the order, being of the view that the applicants had no right to be present at the hearing of their applications. The judge took it upon himself to decide the preliminary issue of whether, in law, the applicants had the legal right to be present at the hearing of their applications. The judge ruled that by virtue of art 5(2) of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’), it was implicit that the right to apply to the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus was not merely a legal right but also a constitutional right available to any person who believed that he had been unlawfully detained. It followed that the right being a constitutional right, a detainee had every right to be present in court at the hearing of his habeas corpus application. The issue in this appeal was whether the judge at the High Court, Shah Alam, was right in ruling that the applicants had the constitutional right to be present at the hearing of their habeas corpus applications.

Held, allowing the appeals: (1) The construction to be given to art 5(2) of the Constitution had to be interpreted and applied according to the wording of the Constitution as a whole and its meaning had to be found by legal reasoning. The wording in art 5(2) of the Constitution, given their natural and ordinary meaning, seemed to show clearly that the High Court or any judge should order a detainee to be produced in court and release him after being satisfied that the detention was unlawful. In other words, art 5(2) of the Constitution did not envisage the production of a detainee at the hearing of his habeas corpus application (see p 17D–E). (2) A detainee’s constitutional right had to be considered in the context of the relevant law applicable to the detainee. In this case,

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 266 ||Page 12>>the applicants were arrested under s 73(1) of the ISA. The so-called constitutional right to be present in court in respect of habeas corpus proceedings challenging the arrest made under the ISA is a limited one, as detention under the ISA is a preventive detention, where a person is detained without trial, as opposed to a criminal prosecution, the object of which is to punish a person for an offence committed by him (see pp 17G, H–18A). In the present case, the arrest of the applicants under s 73(1) of the ISA was the prelude to an order under s8 of the ISA by the Minister. It was at the investigation stage. There would not have been any possible punishment for an alleged offence in the court against the applicants (see p 18E). (3) Even in a s 8 of the ISA situation, the right of a detained person to be present at the habeas corpus proceeding was not a constitutional right but at the discretion of the court and, hence, the judge’s ruling that it was the constitutional right of the applicants to be present at their habeas corpus proceedings for an arrest under s 73(1) of the ISA could not be supported (see p 19A); Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor v Lim Guan Eng [1989] 1 MLJ 420 followed. (4) Apart from the constitutional right point, even if the judge had been minded to exercise his judicial discretion for the production of the applicants, on the record, there was no sufficient material before him to exercise such a discretion (see p 19G–H).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon-pemohon, pegawai-pegawai satu parti politik, telah ditangkap secara berasingan pada 10 dan 11 April 2001 di bawah s 73(1) Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960 (‘AKDN’). Mahkamah Tinggi, Shah Alam, telah menyampaikan ke atas responden satu ‘notis untuk mengemukakan’ pemohon-pemohon berhubung prosiding habeas corpus mereka. Responden tidak mematuhi perintah tersebut, kerana berpendapat bahawa pemohon-pemohon tidak mempunyai hak untuk menghadirkan diri di perbicaraan permohonan-permohonan mereka. Hakim dengan sendirinya membuat keputusan tentang persoalan penting sama ada, mengikut undang-undang, pemohon-pemohon mempunyai hak di sisi undang-undang untuk hadir di perbicaraan permohonan-permohonan mereka. Hakim telah memerintahkan bahawa menurut perkara 5(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (Perlembagaan tersebut’), adalah tersirat bahawa hak untuk memohon ke Mahkamah Tinggi untuk satu writ habeas corpus bukan hanya satu hak di sisi undang-undang tetapi juga satu hak perlembagaan yang sedia ada kepada sesiapa yang mempercayai bahawa beliau telah ditahan secara tidak sah. Ini diikuti bahawa hak tersebut yang merupakan satu hak perlembagaan, seorang yang ditahan mempunyai hak sepenuhnya untuk hadir di mahkamah semasa perbicaraan permohonan habeas ||Page 13>>corpus beliau. Persoalan dalam rayuan ini adalah sama ada hakim di

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 267 Mahkamah Tinggi, Shah Alam, telah dengan betul memerintahkan bahawa pemohon-pemohon tersebut mempunyai hak perlembagaan untuk hadir di perbicaraan permohonan-permohonan habeas corpus mereka.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Perkataan-perkataan yang diberikan kepada perkara 5(2) Perlembagaan tersebut perlu ditafsirkan dan diterapkan menurut susunan perkataan Perlembagaan tersebut secara menyeluruh dan maksudnya perlu berdasarkan pertimbangan di sisi undang-undang. Susunan kata dalam perkara 5(2) Perlembagaan tersebut, berdasarkan maksud asal dan biasanya, kelihatan menunjukkan dengan jelas bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi atau mana-mana hakim sepatutnya memerintahkan seorang yang ditahan untuk dikemukakan ke mahkamah dan membebaskan beliau selepas berpuas hati bahawa penahanan tersebut tidak sah di sisi- undang-undang. Dalam erti kata lain, perkara 5(2) Perlembagaan tersebut tidak membayangkan pengemukaan seorang yang ditahan di perbicaraan permohonan habeas corpus beliau (lihat ms 17D–E). (2) Hak perlembagaan seorang yang ditahan perlu dipertimbangkan dalam konteks undang-undang berkaitan yang terpakai kepada beliau. Dalam kes ini, pemohon-pemohon telah ditangkap di bawah s 73(1) AKDN. Hak perlembagaan yang dikatakan untuk hadir di mahkamah berhubung prosiding habeas corpus untuk mencabar penangkapan yang dibuat di bawah AKDN adalah suatu yang terhad, kerana penahanan di bawah AKDN adalah satu penahanan pencegahan, di mana seseorang ditahan tanpa perbicaraan, berbeza dengan pendakwaan jenayah, yang bertujuan untuk menghukum seseorang kerana kesalahan yang telah dilakukan oleh beliau (lihat ms 17G, H–18A). Dalam kes sekarang ini, penangkapan pemohon-pemohon di bawah s 73(1) AKDN merupakan permulaan satu perintah di bawah s 8 AKDN oleh Menteri. Ia adalah di peringkat siasatan. Tidak mungkin terdapat apa-apa hukuman untuk satu kesalahan yang didakwa di mahkamah terhadap pemohon-pemohon (lihat ms 18E). (3) Walaupun dalam keadaan s 8 AKDN, hak seorang yang ditahan untuk hadir di prosiding habeas corpus bukan satu hak perlembagaan tetapi adalah atas budi bicara mahkamah dan, oleh demikian, perintah hakim bahawa ia adalah hak perlembagaan pemohon-pemohon untuk hadir di prosiding habeas corpus mereka untuk satu tangkapan di bawah s 73(1) AKDN tidak boleh disokong (lihat ms 19A); Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor v Lim Guan Eng [1989] 1 MLJ 420 diikut. (4) Selain daripada perkara mengenai hak perlembagaan, walaupun hakim cenderung untuk menggunakan budi bicara beliau untuk ||Page 14>>pengemukaan pemohon-pemohon tersebut, di atas rekod, tidak terdapat bahan yang mencukupi di hadapan beliau untuk menggunakan budi bicara sedemikian (lihat ms 19G–H).]

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 268 Notes For cases on fundamental liberties applicable in preventive detention cases, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1592–1612.

Cases referred to Attorney General of the Commonwealth, ex relatione Me Kinley v The Commonwealth of Australia (1975) 135 CLR 7 (refd) Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697 (refd) Greene, Re (1941) 57 TLR 533 (refd) Kanu Sanyal v District Magistrate, Darjeeling & Ors AIR 1973 SC 2684 (refd) Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 (folld) Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor v Lim Guan Eng [1989] 1 MLJ 420 (folld) Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319 (refd) Minister of Home Affairs &Anor v Karpal Singh (No 2) [1988] 3 MLJ 85 (refd) Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun, Re; Inspector General of Police v Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun [1988] 1 MLJ 182 (folld)

Legislation referred to Criminal Procedure Code ss 365(a), 366, 367, 374 Federal Constitution arts 5(2), 9, 10 Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8, 73(1) Internal Security (Detained Persons) Rules 1960 r 93(1)

Abdul Ghani Patail (Mohd Yusof Zainal Abiden and Abd Karim Abd Jalil with him) (Senior Federal Counsels, Attorney General’s Chambers) for the appellant. Sulaiman Abdullah (R Sivarasa, Malik Imtiaz, Kamarul Hisham Kamaruddin and P Kandasamy with him) (Selvam Shanmugam & Partners) for the respondent.

[2001] 4 MLJ 598 Nik Adli bin Nik Abdul Aziz v Ketua Polis Negara

HIGH COURT (KOTA BHARU) — CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO 44–7 OF 2001 SURIYADI J

Constitutional Law — Fundamental liberties — Internal Security Act — Detention — Application for habeas corpus — Infringement of detainee’s rights prior to issuance of detention order will taint order — Presumption as to lawfulness of detention, whether rebutted — Right to apply for habeas corpus during pre-detention order stage — Non-disclosure of facts by authorities, whether deprivation of grounds of arrest — Whether Internal Security Act merely to stamp out communism — Whether mala fide proved — Denial to normal criminal trial, whether bar to detention under s 73 — Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8, 16 & 73

Criminal Procedure — Habeas corpus — Proper procedure — Infringement of detainee’s rights prior to issuance of detention order will taint order — Presumption as to lawfulness of detention, whether rebutted — Right to apply for habeas corpus during pre-detention order stage — Non-disclosure of facts by authorities, whether deprivation of grounds of arrest — Whether Internal Security Act merely to stamp out communism — Whether mala fide proved — Denial to normal criminal trial, whether bar to detention under s 73 — Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8, 16 & 73

The applicant was detained under the Internal Security Act 1960 (‘the Act’). He filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus praying for his release. At the time of the filing of the application, the grounds relied upon related to the enquiry and processing stage, ie prior to the signing of the detention order by the Minister of Home Affairs. A day before the hearing of the aplication, the applicant had been served with a detention order pursuant to s 8 of the Act. The appellant alleged that: (i) he was not informed of the grounds of his arrest and there was lack of transparency when the authorities sought refuge behind s 16 of the Act and art 151(3) of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’); and (ii) the Act was legislated purely to stamp out communism in Malaysia and with the current facts being outside the preamble of the Act, a wrong law had been alluded to and the act of the authorities stamped of mala fide. The Public Prosecutor raised a preliminary objection that with the issuance of the detention order, the application had became frivolous and the court had ceased to have jurisdiction.

Held, dismissing the application: (1) The detention order must have been substantially founded on the preliminary acts undertaken by the police before its issuance and as there was no evidence of any interfering factors in the like of a rearrest of the detainee, it followed that the end product could not be disassociated with those earlier acts. Therefore, any constitutional infringement of the rights of the detainee prior to the issuance of the detention order will certainly taint the ||Page 599>>subsequent impugned detention order. To grant the preliminary objection would have meant that the court had prejudged the detention order as being unblemished, without even sifting through the evidence beforehand. Thus, the court dismissed the preliminary objection (see p 603D–F).

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 270 (2) The applicant can file for a writ of habeas corpus based on the acts and process prior to the issuance of the detention order. There is no provision in the Act which deny the detainee the right to apply for a habeas corpus writ during the 60 days detention period (pre-detention order stage). Even though s 73(7) of the Act promulgates that the said detention shall be deemed to be lawful, the detainee is at liberty to rebut that presumption (see p 604B–C). (3) Any non-disclosure of facts covered by s 16 of the Act or art 151(3) of the Constitution does not affect the quality or the requirement of the authorities to inform the grounds of the arrest to the detainee. Having perused the affidavits, the court found that the authorities did inform the detainee of the grounds of his arrest. The court was unable to identify any specific allegation in the affidavits stating that the detainee had not been informed of the grounds of his arrest, let alone that he had been deprived of sufficient legal representation (see pp 606I–607C). (4) Under s 73(7) of the Act any person detained under the powers conferred by s 73 of the Act shall be deemed to be in lawful custody. This deeming provision also covers the scenario of the pre-detention order stage and not merely after the detention order has been perfected. The court was satisfied that the applicant had failed to rebut this deeming provision (see p 607C–D). (5) There are sufficient authorities to reject the allegation that the Act was legislated purely to stamp out communism in Malaysia. That being so, the allegation that the invocation of the Act smacked of mala fide cannot stand (see p 607F). (6) The detainee not only had not been acquitted but also had yet to be charged in a criminal court. The denial of the detainee’s rights to go through the processes of a normal criminal trial is no bar to the current exercise of detaining him under s 73 of the Act, prior to the issuance of the s 8 detention order (see p 608F).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon telah ditahan di bawah Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri 1960 (‘Akta tersebut’). Beliau telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk satu writ habeas corpus bagi memohon pembebasan beliau. Pada masa pemefailan permohonan tersebut, alasan-alasan yang digunakan adalah berkaitan dengan peringkat penyiasatan dan pemprosesan, iaitu sebelum Menteri Dalam Negeri menandatangani perintah penahanan tersebut. Sehari sebelum pembicaraan permohonan tersebut, pemohon telah disampaikan dengan satu ||Page 600>>perintah penahanan di bawah s 8 Akta tersebut. Perayu mendakwa bahawa: (i) beliau tidak dimaklumkan tentang alasan-alasan penangkapan beliau dan terdapat kekaburan apabila pihak berkuasa meminta perlindungan di bawah s 16 Akta tersebut dan perkara 151(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan’); dan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 271 (ii) Akta tersebut telah semata-mata digubal untuk menghapuskan komunisme di Malaysia dan dengan fakta-fakta terkini yang di luar prakata Akta tersebut, perkara ini telah secara tidak langsung melibatkan undang-undang yang salah dan tindakan pihak berkuasa telah meninggalkan kesan mala fide. Pendakwa Raya telah menimbulkan satu bantahan awal bahawa dengan pengeluaran perintah penahanan tersebut, permohonan tersebut telah menjadi remeh dan mahkamah tidak lagi mempunyai bidang kuasa.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Perintah penahanan mestilah diasaskan secara substantif atas tindakan-tindakan awal oleh pihak polis sebelum ia dikeluarkan dan memandangkan tiada keterangan tentang apa-apa faktor campur tangan seperti satu penangkapan semula orang yang ditahan, maka hasil pada akhirnya tidak boleh tidak dikaitkan dengan tindakan-tindakan sebelumnya. Oleh demikian, apa-apa pelanggaran hak-hak perlembagaan orang yang ditahan sebelum perintah penahanan dikeluarkan sememangnya akan mencacatkan perintah penahanan yang dipersoalkan. Untuk membenarkan bantahan awal tersebut akan bermakna bahawa mahkamah telah membuat keputusan terlebih dahulu bahawa perintah penahanan tersebut adalah tidak cacat, tanpa sedikitpun melihat keterangan sebelumnya. Oleh itu, mahkamah menolak bantahan awal tersebut (lihat ms 603D–F). (2) Pemohon boleh memfailkan satu writ habeas corpus berdasarkan tindakan-tindakan dan proses sebelum pengeluaran perintah penahanan tersebut. Tiada peruntukan di dalam Akta tersebut yang menafikan orang yang ditahan hak untuk memohon untuk satu writ habeas corpus sepanjang tempoh 60 hari penahanan tersebut (peringkat perintah pra-penahanan). Walaupun s 73(7) Akta tersebut mengisytiharkan bahawa penahanan tersebut hendaklah dianggap sah, orang yang ditahan mempunyai kebebasan untuk mematahkan anggapan tersebut (lihat ms 604B–C). (3) Apa-apa ketidakdedahan fakta-fakta yang diliputi oleh s 16 Akta tersebut atau perkara 151(3) Perlembagaan tidak menjejaskan kualiti atau keperluan pihak-pihak berkuasa daripada memaklumkan alasan-alasan tangkapan kepada orang yang ditahan. Setelah meneliti afidavit-afidavit, mahkamah mendapati bahwa pihak-pihak berkuasa telahpun memaklumkan orang yang ditahan tentang alasan-alasan tangkapan beliau. Mahkamah tidak dapat mengenalpasti apa-apa dakwaaan khusus dalam afidavit- ||Page 601>>afidavit tersebut yang menyatakan bahawa orang yang ditahan tidak dimaklumkan tentang alasan-alasan tangkapannya, apalagi bahawa beliau telah tidak mendapat bantuan guaman yang mencukupi (lihat ms 606I–607C). (4) Di bawah s 73(7) Akta tersebut, sesiapa yang ditahan di bawah kuasa yang diberikan oleh s 73 Akta tersebut hendaklah dianggap berada dalam tahanan yang sah. Peruntukan ini juga meliputi senario peringkat perintah pra-penahanan dan bukan hanya selepas perintah penahanan telah diperbaiki. Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa permohonan tersebut telah gagal untuk

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 272 mematahkan peruntukan ini (lihat ms 607C–D). (5) Terdapat autoriti-autoriti yang mencukupi untuk menolak dakwaan bahawa Akta tersebut telah semata-mata digubal untuk menghapuskan komunisme di Malaysia. Oleh itu, dakwaan bahawa penggunaan Akta tersebut yang berunsur mala fide tidak boleh kekal (lihat ms 607F). (6) Orang yang ditahan bukan hanya tidak dibebaskan tetapi belum juga dituduhkan dalam satu mahkamah jenayah. Penafian hak-hak orang yang ditahan untuk melalui proses-proses satu perbicaraan jenayah yang biasa tidak menghalang amalan sekarang untuk menahankan beliau di bawah s 73 Akta tersebut, sebelum perintah penahanan s 8 dikeluarkan (lihat ms 608F).]

Notes For cases on Internal Security Act, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digests (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 1571–1572.For cases on procedure governing habeas corpus, see 5 Mallal’s Digests (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 1554–1566.

Cases referred to Athappen a/l Arumugam v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 67 (refd) Bombay v Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya [1951] SCR 167 (refd) Cheow Siong Chin v Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 95 (refd) Daud bin Salleh v The Superintendent, Sembawang Drug Rehabilitation Centre [1981] 1 MLJ 191 (refd) Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 (refd) Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors v Karpal Singh [1992] 1 MLJ 147 (refd) Musa bin Salleh v PP [1973] 1 MLJ 167 (refd) Ooi Ah Phua v Officer-In-Charge of Criminal Investigation, Kedah/Perlis [1975] 2 MLJ 198 (refd) PE Long @ Jimmy & Ors, Re; PE Long & Ors v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 133 (refd) ||Page 602>> Tan Boon Liat, Re [1976] 2 MLJ 83 (refd) Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun, Re [1988] 1 MLJ 182 (refd) Thakur Prasad Bania v State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 631 (refd) Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police [1988] 1 MLJ 293 (refd) Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 279 (refd)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 273 Legislation referred to Federal Constitution arts 5(1), (3), 151(3) Internal Security Act 1960 ss 8, 16, 73, (1), (3), (7)

Zamani bin Ibrahim (Zamani Ibrahim Tarmizan & Co) (Tuan Haji Sulaiman bin Abdullah with him) (Zain & Co) for the applicant. Zainal Abidin bin Yusof (Tun Majid bin Tun Hamzah with him) (Deputy Public Prosecutors) for the respondent.

[2001] 5 MLJ 533 Mohd Hanif bin Farikullah v Bushra Chaudri

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO R2–11–9 OF 2000 FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J 4 DECEMBER 2000

Constitutional Law — Jurisdiction — Civil Court — Whether magistrate’s court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the respondent’s application for maintenance where both parties were Muslims and no provisions were made by the state legislature to make them come within the purview of the Syariah Court — Federal Constitution art 121(1A)

Family Law — Financial obligation — Maintenance order — Provisions of maintenance for children — Whether adjudication of maintenance of an illegitimate Muslim child came within the jurisdiction of the civil court — Whether any provisions within the state enactments to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court — Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 — Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952 (State of Selangor No 3 of 1952) s 138 — Administration of Islamic Religious Affairs Enactment 1986 (State of Terengganu)

The respondent is a Pakistani citizen and the appellant lives and works originally in Kuala Terengganu. The appellant was married to the respondent and a son was born to both of them. A divorce order was granted to the appellant on 23 October 1990 wherein the appellant was ordered to pay maintenance for the son in the sum of RM50 per month. After the divorce, the respondent gave birth to a baby girl on 6 October 1996 (‘the said baby girl’). After the birth of the said baby girl, the respondent filed an application for maintenance of the said baby girl at the magistrate’s court claiming maintenance for the sum of RM1,050 per month. In the absence of the appellant, the court entered judgment against the appellant on 20 March 1997 (‘the said judgment’) for the sum of RM1,050 and ordered an attachment of salary dated 20 March 1997

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 274 against the appellant’s employer for deduction of the appellant’s salary. The appellant attempted to set aside the said judgment vide a notice of application dated 24 November 1998 but the said judgment was upheld by the magistrate on 12 July 1999. The appellant had appealed against the order dated 12 July 1999 vide Appeal No R2–11–99–1999. Subsequently, the appellant made an application to reduce the maintenance sum of RM1,050 and for a stay of execution of the said judgment vide a notice of application dated 7 September 1999, which was dismissed on 31 January 2000. The appellant had appealed against the order dated 31 January 2000 vide Appeal No R2–11–9–2000. By consent, these appeals were heard together. The issues for determination were: (i) whether the magistrate court had the jurisdiction to hear the respondent’s application for maintenance of the said baby girl, having regard to the fact that both parties profess the religion of Islam; and (ii) if the court found that the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 (‘the 1950 Act’) applied in the case, whether the magistrate court had the jurisdiction to make an order giving maintenance to the said baby girl in a sum exceeding RM50 a month. ||Page 534>>

Held, dismissing the appeals with costs: (1) Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution does not overrule the general jurisdiction of the civil courts. The main point to note is that the civil courts are courts of general jurisdiction and can hear cases brought about by Muslims as well as by non-Muslims and can try offences against Muslims and non-Muslims that are created by the law of the land. Moreover the civil High Courts are also courts of inherent jurisdiction while the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts is determined by the state law and if the legislature does not confer on the Syariah Court any jurisdiction to deal with any matter in the state list the Syariah Court is precluded from dealing with that matter. Consequently once a decision is made that the civil court has jurisdiction to hear a matter the court can decide the matter or issue which arises. As to whether the civil judge is competent to hear and decide the matter has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court (see p 544E–G). (2) Since there is no clear provision for maintenance of an illegitimate child from her father in the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984 (‘the 1984 Act’), as could be seen from the facts disclosed before the court, the 1984 Act does not contain a provision which could be applied to the facts of the instant case and as such the respondent had rightly brought the action under the 1950 Act. Furthermore, the 1950 Act is appropriately applicable to the case in issue, as it is a federal legislation and provides an inherent jurisdiction. The Syariah Court do not provide for inherent jurisdiction, therefore the respondent is unable to turn to the Syariah Court for a remedy, especially since there is no one particular section the respondent can resort to in the 1984 Act (see pp 545D–E, 546D–E). (3) The parties should not be subjected to the application of s 138 of the

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 275 Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952 (State of Selangor Enactment No 3 of 1952) (‘the 1952 Enactment’) because the respondent is a foreign divorced wife, and is without her husband’s domicile and the husband in the meantime works in the state of Terengganu. The Terengganu Administration of Islamic Religious Affairs Enactment 1986 (‘the 1986 Enactment’) has application in these circumstances and not s 138 of the 1952 Enactment. Section 135 of the 1986 Enactment does not reject the application of the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950. Further s 79(2) of the Administration of Islamic Family Law Enactment (Terengganu) allows application such as in the instant case to be brought in the magistrate’s court (see p 546F–H).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Responden merupakan seorang warganegara Pakistan dan perayu menetap dan berkerja pada asalnya di Kuala Terengganu. Perayu ||Page 535>>berkahwin dengan responden dan mereka dikurniakan seorang anak lelaki. Satu perintah penceraian diberikan kepada perayu pada 23 Oktober 1990 di mana perayu diperintahkan memberi nafkah kepada anak lelakinya pada jumlah RM50 sebulan. Selepas penceraian itu, responden melahirkan seorang anak perempuan pada 6 Oktober 1996 (‘anak perempuan tersebut’). Selepas kelahiran anak perempuan tersebut, responden memfailkan satu permohonan untuk nafkah anak perempuan tersebut di mahkamah majistret menuntut nafkah pada jumlah RM1,050 sebulan. Dalam ketidakhadiran perayu, mahkamah mencatat penghakiman terhadap perayu pada 20 Mac 1997 (‘penghakiman tersebut’) bagi jumlah RM1,050 dan memerintahkan satu lampiran gaji bertarikh 20 Mac 1997 terhadap majikan perayu untuk potongan daripada gaji perayu. Perayu berusaha mengenepikan penghakiman tersebut melalui satu notis permohonan bertarikh 24 November 1998 tetapi penghakiman tersebut dipertahankan oleh majistret pada 12 Julai 1999. Perayu telah merayu menentang perintah bertarikh 12 Julai 1999 tersebut melalui Rayuan No R2–11–99–1999. Kemudian, perayu membuat permohonan untuk mengurangkan jumlah nafkah RM1,050 dan untuk penangguhan pelaksanaan penghakiman tersebut melalui notis permohonan bertarikh 7 September 1999, yang ditolak pada 31 Januari 2000. Perayu telah merayu menentang perintah yang bertarikh 31 Januari 2000 tersebut melalui Rayuan No R2–11–9–2000. Dengan kebenaran, rayuan-rayuan ini dibicarakan bersama. Perkara-perkara untuk diputuskan ialah: (i) sama ada mahkamah majistret mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk membicarakan permohonan responden untuk nafkah anak perempuan tersebut, setelah mempertimbangkan bahawa kedua-dua pihak menuntut diri mereka sebagai penganut agama Islam; dan (ii) jika mahkamah mendapati bahawa Akta Perempuan Bersuami dan Anak-Anak (Nafkah) 1950 boleh dipakai dalam kes ini, sama ada mahkamah majistret mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk membuat perintah memberi nafkah yang melebihi RM50 sebulan kepada anak perempuan tersebut.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan-rayuan tersebut dengan kos: (1) Artikel 121(1A) Perlembagaan Persekutuan tidak menolak bidangkuasa umum mahkamah sivil. Perkara utama yang perlu diketahui adalah bahawa mahkamah sivil adalah mahkamah bidangkuasa umum dan boleh membicarakan kes yang dikemukakan oleh penganut agama Islam dan bukan Islam dan boleh membicarakan kesalahan penganut agama Islam dan bukan Islam yang diwujudkan oleh undang-undang negara. Selain itu, Mahkamah-mahkamah Tinggi Sivil juga merupakan mahkamah dengan bidangkuasa sedia ada manakala bidangkuasa Mahkamah Syariah diputuskan oleh undang-undang negeri dan jika perundangan tidak memberikan Mahkamah Syariah apa-apa bidangkuasa untuk menngendalikan apa-apa perkara dalam senarai negeri, Mahkamah Syariah dikecualikan dari ||Page 536>>membicarakan perkara tersebut. Oleh itu, sebaik sahaja satu keputusan dibuat bahawa mahkamah sivil mempunyai bidangkuasa membicarakan sesuatu perkara, mahkamah boleh memutuskan perkara atau isu yang dikemukakan. Persoalan sama ada hakim sivil cukup kompeten untuk membicarakan dan memutuskan perkara tersebut tiada kaitan dengan bidangkuasa mahkamah (lihat ms 544E–G). (2) Oleh kerana tiada peruntukan yang jelas mengenai nafkah seorang anak luar nikah dari ayahnya dalam Akta Undang-Undang Keluarga Islam (Wilayah-Wilayah Persekutuan) 1984 (‘Akta 1984 tersebut’), seperti yang dapat dilihat di dalam fakta yang dikemukakan di hadapan mahkamah, Akta 1984 tersebut tidak mempunyai peruntukan yang boleh dipakai pada fakta-fakta kes ini dan kerana ini, responden bertindak betul dengan membawa tindakan tersebut di bawah Akta 1950 tersebut. Lagipun, Akta 1950 tersebut memang sesuai dipakai pada kes ini kerana ia merupakan undang-undang persekutuan dan memberi bidangkuasa sedia ada. Mahkamah Syariah tidak mempunyai bidangkuasa sedia ada, oleh itu, responden tidak boleh mendapatkan bantuan dari Mahkamah Syariah untuk memperolehi remedi, terutamanya kerana tiada seksyen khusus yang boleh dirujuk oleh responden dalam Akta 1984 tersebut (lihat ms 545D–E, 546D–E). (3) Pihak-pihak tidak harus diwajibkan memakai s 138 Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam 1952 (Enakmen Negeri Selangor No 3, 1952) (‘Enakmen 1952 tersebut’) kerana responden adalah seorang isteri dicerai asing, dan tidak mempunyai domisil suaminya dan suaminya buat masa itu berkerja di Terengganu. Enakmen Pentadbiran Hal Ehwal Agama Islam Terengganu 1986 (‘Enakmen 1986 tersebut’) boleh dipakai dalam semua hal keadaan berikut dan bukannya s 138 Enakmen 1952. Seksyen 135 Enakmen 1986 tidak menolak penggunaan Akta Perempuan Bersuami dan Anak-Anak (Nafkah) 1950. Selain itu, s 79(2) Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Keluarga Islam (Terengganu) membenarkan permohonan seperti dalam kes ini dikemukakan di mahkamah majistret (lihat ms 546F–H).]

Notes For a case on the jurisdiction of the civil court, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1661. For cases on maintenance order, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 2562–2567.

Cases referred to Abdul Shaik bin Md Ibrahim & Anor v Hussein bin Ibrahim & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 618 (refd) ||Page 537>> Commissioner for Religious Affairs, Terengganu & Ors v Tengku Mariam [1969] 1 MLJ 110 (refd) Lim Chan Seng lwn Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Pulau Pinang & satu kes yang lain [1996] 3 CLJ 231 (refd) Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang lwn Isa Abdul Rahman & satu yang lain [1992] 2 MLJ 244 (refd) Md Hakim Lee v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur [1998] 1 MLJ 681 (refd) Mohamed Habibullah bin Mahmood v Faridah bte Dato’ Talib [1992] 2 MLJ 793 (refd) Myriam v Mohamed Ariff [1971] 1 MLJ 265 (refd) Shahamin Faizul Kung bin Abddulah v Asma bte Hj Junus [1991] 3 MLJ 327 (refd) Soon Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1994] 1 MLJ 690 (refd) Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Ano [1999] 1 MLJ 489 (refd) Sukma Darmarwan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 266 (refd)

Legislation referred to Administration of Islamic Religious Affairs Enactment 1986 (State of Terengganu) s 79(2), 135 Administration of Muslim Enactment 1952 (State of Selangor Enactment No 3 of 1952) s 138(1)Evidence Act 1950 s 45 Federal Constitution arts 74, 121, 121(1A) Federal Territories (Modification of Administration of Muslim Law Enactment) Order 1974 Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984 s 111, 80(1), (2)

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 278 Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 s 3(2), (3), 13, 135

Appeal from: Maintenance Case No 78–1 of 1997 (Magistrate’s Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Norlidah Abu Bakar (Hisham Sobri & Kadir) for the appellant. Yasmeen Sharif (Mahani Hamid & Yasmeen) for the respondent.

[2001] 6 MLJ 750 Mohd Daud bin Mahmood v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia & Anor

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2(S8)–21–152 OF 1996 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 29 AUGUST 2001

Administrative Law — Rights and liabilities of public servants — Dismissal — Failure to give grounds for dismissal — Whether disciplinary board required to make finding of guilt

Constitutional Law — Public servants — Dismissal — Failure to hear mitigation upon punishment — Whether infringement of Federal Constitution art 135(2) — Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap ‘D’) General Orders 1980 general order 23

The plaintiff was at all material times the Assistant Cultural Officer of the Culture, Arts and Tourism Centre of Kelantan. The first defendant was at all material times the disciplinary authority of the plaintiff and was acting as the servant and/or agent of the second defendant, namely, the government of Malaysia. The plaintiff was informed by the first defendant that pursuant to O 26 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap ‘D’) General Orders 1980 (‘the General Orders’), the first defendant had to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff with a view to dismissing him from service. The plaintiff then duly made his representations. The first defendant then informed the plaintiff that upon considering the plaintiff’s case in its entirety, the first defendant had decided to dismiss him from service. The plaintiff contended, inter alia, that there has been an infringement of the provisions of art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’) and O 23 of the General Orders in that the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to mitigate, the defendant did not give any grounds or reasons for the dismissal and that the plaintiff’s dismissal was null and void and of no effect and therefore prayed for a declaration that the dismissal was wrong in law, an

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 279 order that all arrears of salaries, etc, be calculated and paid to the plaintiff, and for damages, interest on the adjudged sum, costs and any further relief deemed fit and proper by the court. The defendants maintained that the dismissal was in order and prayed for the suit to be dismissed with costs.

Held, dismissing the suit with costs: (1) The Federal Court had held that the General Orders, in detailing the procedures therein, had sufficiently complied with art 135(2) of the Constitution and, in the process, were in accord with the concept of natural justice and procedural fairness. There was certainly no separate right to make representations upon the punishment that ought to be meted out to the officer to be dismissed or reduced in rank. Therefore there was no injustice by the failure of the first defendant to hear the plaintiff’s mitigation ||Page 751>>separately (see p 756C–E); Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 followed. In the circumstances, bound as the court was by this decision, it must find against the plaintiff on this ground (see p 756F). (2) The case before the court was not one that was decided on appeal. There was no reason, therefore, for the defendants to give their reasons. In fact, as found by the Federal Court in Utra Badi, under general order 26(4), the disciplinary board was not even required to make a finding of guilt. The board was only required to decide whether the plaintiff’s explanation had exculpated him to the satisfaction of the board (see p 757C–E); Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 and Hajah Halimatussaadiah bte Haji Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 followed. In any case, so long as there was no requirement to even make a finding of guilt, there was therefore no requirement to give reasons (see p 757F); Selvaraju a/l Ponniah v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam, Malaysia & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 678 and Minister of Human Resources & Ors v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers, Semenanjung Malaysia and another appeal [1997] 3 MLJ 377 followed.

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif pada setiap masa matan adalah Pegawai Penolong Kebudayaan, Pusat Kebudayaan, Seni dan Pelancongan Kelantan. Defendan pertama pada setiap masa matan adalah pihak berkuasa tatatertib plaintif dan bertindak sebagai pekerja dan/atau ejen kepada defendan kedua, iaitu, kerajaan Malaysia. Plaintif telah dimaklumkan oleh defendan pertama bahawa menurut A 26 Peintah Am Pegawai-Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Bab ‘D’) 1980 (‘Perintah Am’), defendan pertama telah mengambil tindakan tatatertib terhadap plaintif dengan tujuan untuk memecat beliau

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 280 daripada perkhidmatan. Plaintif kemudiannya telah membuat representasi beliau. Defendan pertama kemudiannya telah memaklumkan kepada plaintif bahawa setelah mempertimbangkan kes plaintif keseluruhannya, defendan pertama telah memutuskan untuk memecat beliau daripada perkhidmatan. Plaintif menghujahkan, antara lain, bahawa terdapat perlanggaran peruntukan-peruntukan perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan’) dan A 23 Perintah Am tersebut di mana plaintif tidak diberikan peluang untuk mitigasi, defendan tidak memberikan apa-apa alasan atau sebab untuk pemecatan tersebut dan pemecatan plaintif tersebut adalah batal dan tidak sah dan tidak berkuatkuasa dan oleh itu memohon untuk satu deklarasi bahawa pemecatan tersebut adalah salah di sisi undang-undang, satu perintah agar semua tunggakan gaji, dan lain- ||Page 752>>lain, dikira dan dibayar kepada plaintif, dan untuk ganti rugi, faedah atas jumlah, kos yang diadili dan apa-apa relif lain yang difikirkan sesuai dan betul oleh mahkamah. Defendan-defendan telah mengekalkan bahawa pemecatan tersebut adalah betul dan memohon agar guaman tersebut ditolak dengan kos.

Diputuskan, menolak guaman tersebut dengan kos: (1) Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan bahawa Perintah Am tersebut, di dalam mengamati prosedur di dalamnya, telah mematuhi secukupnya dengan perkara 135(2) Perlembagaan dan, dalam pada itu, telah menepati konsep keadilan asasi dan keadilan prosedur. Sememangnya tiada hak berasingan untuk membuat representasi terhadap hukuman yang sepatutnya dilaksanakan ke atas pegawai yang dipecat atau diturunkan pangkat. Oleh itu, tidak berlaku ketidakadilan dengan kegagalan defendan pertama untuk mendengar mitigasi plaintif secara berasingan (lihat ms 756C–E); Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 diikut. Dalam keadaan ini, mahkamah terikat dengan keputusan ini, dan mesti berpihak terhadap plaintif atas alasan ini (lihat ms 756F). (2) Kes di hadapan mahkamah bukan satu yang diputuskan atas rayuan. Tiada sebab, oleh itu, untuk defendan-defendan memberikan sebab-sebab mereka. Bahkan, sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam Utra Badi, di bawah perintah am 26(4), lembaga tatatertib tidakpun dikehendaki untuk membuat satu penemuan bersalah. Lembaga hanya dikehendaki untuk memutuskan sama ada penjelasan plaintif telah membebaskan beliau dan telah memuaskan hati lembaga tersebut (lihat ms 757C–E); Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 dan Hajah Halimatussaadiah bte Haji Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 diikut. Dalam apa-apa keadaan, selagi tiada apa-apa keperluan untuk membuat satu penemuan bersalah, tiada akan terdapat keperluan untuk memberikan sebab (lihat ms 757F); Selvaraju a/l Ponniah v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam, Malaysia & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 678 dan

For full ruling contact Marcel Jude by whats app © +60128030778. 281 Minister of Human Resources & Ors v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers, Semenanjung Malaysia and another appeal [1997] 3 MLJ 377 diikut.]

Notes For cases on dismissal of a public servant, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 519–543 and 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1739–1748. ||Page 753>>

Cases referred to Hajah Halimatussaadiah bte Haji Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61 (folld) Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2000] 3 MLJ 281 (refd) Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 (folld) Minister of Human Resources & Ors v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers, Semenanjung Malaysia and another appeal [1997] 3 MLJ 377 (refd) Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 (refd) Selvaraju a/l Ponniah v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam, Malaysia & Anor [1999] 5 MLJ 678 (folld) Utra Badi a/l K Perumal v Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam & Anor [1998] 3 MLJ 676 (distd)

Legislation referred to Federal Constitution art 135(2) Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chap ‘D’) General Orders 1980 general orders 23, 26, (4), (5)

Karpal Singh (Ramkarpal Singh with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the plaintiff. Ahmad Kamal bin Md Shahid (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the defendants.