GOD BEYOND KNOWING: CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA AND DISCOURSE ON GOD

Annewies van den Hoek*

In his great study on Methodius of Olympus, Lloyd Patterson often emphasized the influence of theologians such as Irenaeus of Lyons and Clement of Alexandria on later generations of Christian Greek authors. In his opinion, scholars had neglected to explore these influences ade- quately, and it was Clement who supplied Methodius with basic ele- ments for the interpretation of Christian life—ascetic life in particu- lar. Acknowledging that assessment and achievement, this contribution will explore some of Clement’s thoughts, not so much about human or ascetic life, but about God in relationship to human life. It is not intended to be a survey of everything Clement has written about the concept of God, but it will touch on a few basic themes, trying to put them in the context of Clement’s theology. It also aims to sketch out an emerging necessity for someone like Clement to compete with other traditions and to use common philosophical language, albeit for his own religious goals. The passages in which Clement speaks about God show a wide variety of subjects: the discussion may be about creation or creational power and might. It may refer to the positive and negative elements in the perception of God in language reflecting philosophical modes of speech. Clement frequently describes God as the One, and these dis- cussions about the unity or uniqueness of God have a complex back- ground. They may draw either directly or indirectly on a Platonic passage or a biblical text; they may also be inspired by a polemical discussion in which the author targets Marcionite or gnosticizing con- stituencies. The same holds true for his remarks on God’s wisdom and goodness; they can occur in their own right, often tied to a biblical pas- sage, but they also appear in an adversarial context, in which the reader

* Annewies van den Hoek lives in Dedham, Massachusetts and teaches Greek at Harvard Divinity School. 38 annewies van den hoek easily detects Clement’s polemical agenda. Another intrinsic part of Clement’s discourse about God has to do with the relationship to the Logos, the divine intellectual power, often identified by Clement as the Son or Christ. Related is the discussion about human assimilation to God and the search for knowledge of God. Finally there is the intrigu- ing aspect of the male and female elements in Clement’s perception of God. To illustrate the theme, this essay will translate a few passages from the works of Clement as starting points for discussion. Lloyd Patterson once said that translating a difficult ancient text (and which Greek text does not qualify as such?) was in his view one of the most demanding tasks of the trade. He did not consider it a technical skill or a mere practicality that one had to overcome quickly to arrive at higher the- ological ground. He thought that the core of all patristic work was to carefully balance words, detect subtle inflections, and give satisfactory interpretations, all through translation of texts.

Naming God

In a passage of the fifth book of the Stromateis, a book that contains most of the relevant material for the subject, Clement sums up the difficulties in speaking about God. The passage was characterized by Eric Osborn as Clement’s “most comprehensive philosophical state- ment about God.”1 “Indeed, in the discussion about God this is the most difficult question to tackle: for since it is hard to find out the principle of everything, it is even harder to prove the first and oldest principle, which is also the cause for all others to come into being and to exist thereafter. How can words express that which is neither a general kind nor a difference nor a distinct species nor an individual nor a number; it is not even something that occurs accidentally, nor is it subject to accident. One can not rightly call him “Whole,” for the whole belongs to the order of (quantifiable) magnitude, and God is the father of the whole universe. One should not speak about God’s parts either; for the One is indivisible and therefore also infinite; not understood in terms of space or time but as a continuum and without limit and, therefore, formless and nameless. If we should give it a name, improperly calling it either

1 Eric Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1957), 27.