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Immigration to Russia: Inevitability and Prospective Inflows1 Immigration to Russia: Inevitability and Prospective Inflows1 Grigory Ioffe and Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya2 Abstract: A U.S.-based geographer joins a senior Russian demographer in an effort to ­explore­the­potential­flows­of­immigrants­to­Russia­(principally­from­the­Commonwealth­of­ ­Independent­States­and­to­a­lesser­extent­from­China)­to­stem­the­country’s­recent­population­ decline­and­compensate­for­looming­decreases­in­the­country’s­working-age­inhabitants.­More­ specifically,­they­examine­the­demand­for­immigration­to­Russia­and­assess­the­likelihood­ of­three­possible­scenarios­(high,­medium,­and­low)­to­meet­that­demand­by­2026. Particu- lar­attention­is­paid­to­the­likely­interplay­of­immigration­and­domestic­migration­in­terms­ of­its­effects­on­the­future­distribution­of­migrants­among­Russia’s­federal­districts.­Journal of Economic Literature,­Classification­Numbers:­F220,­J110,­J210,­J610.­6­figures,­4­tables,­ 33­ references.­ Key­ words:­ Russia,­ CIS,­ Moscow,­ immigration,­ natural­ population­ dynam- ics,­working-age­population,­labor­supply,­negative­natural­increase,­regional­population­loss,­ ­interregional­migration,­migration­policy,­job­creation. etween­1992­and­2008,­Russia’s­population­shrank­by­6.6­million­people,­a­result­of­ Bdeaths­exceeding­births­by­12.6­million­and­immigration­exceeding­emigration­by­6.0­ million­(Chislennost’,­2009).­Having­reached­a­peak­of­almost­1­million­people­in­1994,­net­ immigration­subsided­to­119,000­people­in­2004,­but­“negative­natural­increase”3 continued­ and­is­not­likely­to­be­reversed­in­the­foreseeable­future.­Since­the­early­1990s,­a­number­ of­specialists,­most­recently­Murray­Feshbach­(2008)­and­Timothy­Heleniak­(2009),­have­ commented­on­different­aspects­of­Russia’s­demographic­dilemma.­Whereas­Feshbach’s­pri- marily­ emphasizes­ Russia’s­ health­ crisis,­ he­ also­ weighs­ in­ on­ the­ poor­ prospects­ for­ an­ upswing­in­births­in­Russia:­the­number­of­females­aged­20­to­29­is­expected­to­peak­at­ about 13 million around 2012–2013 and then plummet to some 7 or 8 million in the next decade.­Anatoliy­­Vishnevskiy­(2009),­ a­ leading­Russian­ demographer,­ echoed­ Feshbach’s­ observation­in­a­recent­interview,­suggesting­that­“when­population­is­not­growing­it­is­los- ing­drive”­(ibid.).­In­addition­to­examining­Russia’s­exceedingly­low­birth­rate,­Heleniak’s­ (2009)­­survey­of­­Russia’s­demographic­parameters­calls­attention­to­the­exceptionally­high­ ­mortality­of­­working-age­men,­and­highlights­the­fact­that­Russia­already­has­the­world’s­ 1The­research­on­which­this­paper­is­based­was­supported­by­a­grant­from­the­National­­Council­for­Eurasian­and­ East­European­Research,­made­available­by­the­U.S.­Department­of­State­under­Title­VIII.­The­analysis­and­interpre- tations­contained­herein­are­those­of­the­authors.­­ 2Respectively,­Professor­of­Geography,­Radford­University,­Radford,­VA­24142­(gioffe@­radford.edu)­and­Chair,­ Migration­Laboratory,­Institute­for­Economic­Forecasting,­Russian­Academy­of­Sciences­and­Co-director,­Center­for­ Migration­Research,­47­Nakhiomovskiy­Prospekt,­117418­Moscow,­Russia­([email protected]). 3Population­specialists­in­English-speaking­countries­do­not­seem­to­favor­the­term­“natural­decrease,”­instead­ preferring­“negative­natural­increase.”­The­situation­is­different­in­Russia,­where­the­terms­yestestvennyy prirost and yestestvennaya ubyl’­are­deemed­equally­­acceptable. 104 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2010, 51, No. 1, pp. 104–125. DOI: 10.2747/1539-7216.51.1.104 Copyright © 2010 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. IOFFE AND ZAYONCHKOVSKAYA 105 ­­­second-­largest­stock­of­international­migrants­(mostly­from­the­post-Soviet­countries).4 Hele- niak­also­reviews­the­evolution­of­Russia’s­post-Soviet­immigration­policy,­invokes­the­UN’s­ 2001­projections­of­the­level­of­immigration­to­Russia­required­to­compensate­for­the­upcom- ing­decline­of­its­working-age­population5­(WAP),­and­characterizes­the­reversal­of­centuries- old­domestic­migrations­to­the­Far­North­and­East.­ Taking­Heleniak’s­survey­as­a­point­of­departure,­this­paper­addresses­four­questions:­ What­causes­and­sustains­the­demand­for­immigration­to­Russia?­What­are­the­legal,­illegal,­ and­semi-legal­elements­of­current­immigration?­What­are­the­possible­scenarios­of­immigra- tion­to­Russia­until­2026,­the­year­for­which­the­Russian­­Federal­Bureau­of­Statistics­(Rosstat)­ is­currently­making­its­own­projections?­And­what­is­the­likely­interplay­of­immigration­and­ domestic­migration,­and­the­consequent­distribution­of­domestic­and­international­migrants­ among­Russia’s­federal­districts­(Okrugs)­in­2026? WHY DOES RUSSIA NEED IMMIGRANTS?6 Thus­far,­only­one­of­several­turning­points­in­the­dynamics­of­Russia’s­population­has­ been­publicized;­namely,­that­it­began­to­decline­in­1992.­From­1992­to­2008,­immigration­ compensated­ for­ a­ little­ less­ than­ half­ (47.7­ percent)­ of­ the­ excess­ of­ deaths­ over­ births.­ Indeed,­in­the­1990s,­Russia­received­an­unprecedented­influx­of­4.5­million­migrants­from­ the­former­Soviet­republics­(Fig.­1).­The­inflows­during­both­the­following­(2000–2008)­and­ the­preceding­(1980s)­periods­were­much­smaller—1.5­million­and­1.9­million,­respectively.­ Most­analysts­do­not­think­that­Russia’s­depopulation­will­end­before­the­middle­of­the­21st­ century,­although­one­of­Rosstat’s­scenarios­(referred­to­as­high­in­Table­1­and­matching­ the­official­demographic­policy­document)­does­postulate­an­earlier­reversal­of­population­ decline.­However,­Russian­demographers­consider­this­scenario­overly­optimistic­(UNDP,­ 2009),­primarily­because­of­its­excessive­assumption­about­rising­fertility­(see­Table­1,­com- piled by the authors from Demograficheskiy, 2008, pp. 532–540). In­2007,­Russia’s­population­change­reached­a­second­turning­point­that­thus­far­has­ not­received­much­attention.­Prior­to­2007,­Russia’s­WAP­continued­to­grow­as­the­balance­ between­those­entering­the­working­age­group­and­those­exiting­it­remained­positive.­In­2007,­ retirements­and­ premature­ deaths­were­for­ the­ first­ time­ ever­ not­compensated­ by­ people­ entering­the­WAP—a­delayed­effect­of­the­consistently­low­birth­rate.­While­in­that­year,­the­ net­decline­of­working-age­Russians­amounted­to­just­300,000,­this­decline­was­twice­as­large­ in­2008;­and­from­2011­to­2017,­the­WAP­decline­is­projected­to­exceed­1­million­annually­ (Fig.­2).­Between­2009­and­2026,­Russia’s­WAP­will­shrink­by­17­million,­a­figure­equivalent­ to­24­percent­of­Russia’s­total­employed­population­in­2009.­This­contraction­lends­itself­to­ more­accurate­forecasting­than­the­total­population’s­decline,­because­almost­all­people­who­ 4The­analysis­of­potential­source­regions­for­migration­is­a­separate­research­undertaking­that­lies­beyond­the­ scope­of­the­present­paper.­Nonetheless,­some­basic­facts­indicate­that­there­will­be­no­shortage­of­donor­regions­ (both­within­and­outside­Russia)­until­at­least­2026,­the­endpoint­of­projections­outlined­in­this­paper.­For­example,­ the­migration­potential­of­titular­ethnic­groups­of­the­Russian­Federation­(e.g.,­Russians,­Tatars,­Chuvash,­etc.)­resid- ing­in­the­Near­Abroad­(i.e.,­CIS)­alone­is­roughly­6­million­(Zayonchkovskaya,­2005).­This­number­does­not­include­ the­titular­nationalities­of­the­former­Soviet­Central­Asian­republics,­where­joblessness­is­pervasive­and­population­ growth­still­rapid,­albeit­declining.­And­most­probably­the­migration­potential­of­northern­China­is­much­greater.­ At­present,­the­Federal­Migration­Service­of­Russia­enumerates­1­million­official­migrants­in­Russia­from­source­ countries­outside­of­the­CIS. 5The­working-age­population­in­Russia­consists­of­men­aged­16­to­60­and­women­aged­16­to­55. 6In­ this­ paper,­ the­ word­ “immigrants”­ refers­ to­ international­ migrants­ only,­ and­ not­ to­ incoming­ domestic­ migrants. 106 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS Fig. 1.­Components­of­Russia’s­population­change,­1980–2008­(thous.­people). Table 1.­Official­Rosstat­Population­Projection­to­2026,­Including­Low,­Medium,­ and­High­Scenarios Scenarios Indicator/(year) Starting value Low Medium High Population,­millions­(2009) 141.9 129.4 137.0 145.1 Total­fertility­ratea­(2007) 1.406 1.379 1.68 1.89 Life­expectancy­at­birth,­years: Men­(2007) 61.4 62.4 63.8 67.8 Women­(2007) 73.9 75.1 75.8 77.6 Net migration, thous./year 257 200 Gradual­rise Gradual­rise­ (2008)­ to 450 to 690 aThe­total­fertility­rate­measures­the­average­number­of­children­a­woman­will­have­during­her­lifetime. will­enter­the­WAP­group­by­2026­have­already­been­born.­This­adds­certainty­to­the­predic- tion­of­a­drastic­decline­in­the­WAP­and­makes­labor­arguably­the­most­deficient­factor­in­ Russia’s­economy.­ The­ prospect­ of­ growing­ immigrant­ communities­ has­ not­ yet­ been­ fully­ accepted­ by­ the­Russian­public­or­even­by­its­politically­active­population.­For­example,­activists­from­ ­Russia’s­national-patriotic­camp­maintain­that­there­is­no­objective­need­for­immigration;­ rather,­they­have­insinuated­that­“a­well-paid­campaign”­(Krupnov,­2005)­and­ploys­of­for- eign­institutions­and­organizations­are­bent­on­selling­Russians­“a­demographic­policy­that­is­ contrary­to­our­interests”­(Beloborodov,­2005).­A­2006­national­survey­revealed­that­only­4­ percent­of­Russians­viewed­immigration­as­the­way­to­solve­Russia’s­demographic­problem­ (Rossiyane,­2006).­According­to­Sergey­Mironov,­the­Chair­of­Russia’s­Federation­Council,­ “it­is­quite­possible­to­ensure­that­not­100­but­250­million­people­will­live­in­Russia­in­2050,”­
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