Immigration to Russia: Inevitability and Prospective Inflows1

Home , Immigration, Immigration to Russia

Grigory Ioffe and Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya2

Abstract: A U.S.-based geographer joins a senior Russian demographer in an effort to explore the potential flows of immigrants to Russia (principally from the Commonwealth of Independent States and to a lesser extent from China) to stem the country’s recent population decline and compensate for looming decreases in the country’s working-age inhabitants. More specifically, they examine the demand for immigration to Russia and assess the likelihood of three possible scenarios (high, medium, and low) to meet that demand by 2026. Particu- lar attention is paid to the likely interplay of immigration and domestic migration in terms of its effects on the future distribution of migrants among Russia’s federal districts. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F220, J110, J210, J610. 6 figures, 4 tables, 33 references. Key words: Russia, CIS, Moscow, immigration, natural population dynamics, working-age population, labor supply, negative natural increase, regional population loss, interregional migration, migration policy, job creation.

etween 1992 and 2008, Russia’s population shrank by 6.6 million people, a result of Bdeaths exceeding births by 12.6 million and immigration exceeding emigration by 6.0 million (Chislennost’, 2009). Having reached a peak of almost 1 million people in 1994, net immigration subsided to 119,000 people in 2004, but “negative natural increase”3 continued and is not likely to be reversed in the foreseeable future. Since the early 1990s, a number of specialists, most recently Murray Feshbach (2008) and Timothy Heleniak (2009), have commented on different aspects of Russia’s demographic dilemma. Whereas Feshbach’s primarily emphasizes Russia’s health crisis, he also weighs in on the poor prospects for an upswing in births in Russia: the number of females aged 20 to 29 is expected to peak at about 13 million around 2012–2013 and then plummet to some 7 or 8 million in the next decade. Anatoliy Vishnevskiy (2009), a leading Russian demographer, echoed Feshbach’s observation in a recent interview, suggesting that “when population is not growing it is los- ing drive” (ibid.). In addition to examining Russia’s exceedingly low birth rate, Heleniak’s (2009) survey of Russia’s demographic parameters calls attention to the exceptionally high mortality of working-age men, and highlights the fact that Russia already has the world’s

1The research on which this paper is based was supported by a grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII. The analysis and interpre- tations contained herein are those of the authors. 2Respectively, Professor of Geography, Radford University, Radford, VA 24142 (gioffe@radford.edu) and Chair, Migration Laboratory, Institute for Economic Forecasting, Russian Academy of Sciences and Co-director, Center for Migration Research, 47 Nakhiomovskiy Prospekt, 117418 Moscow, Russia ([email protected]). 3Population specialists in English-speaking countries do not seem to favor the term “natural decrease,” instead preferring “negative natural increase.” The situation is different in Russia, where the terms yestestvennyy prirost and yestestvennaya ubyl’ are deemed equally acceptable.

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second-largest stock of international migrants (mostly from the post-Soviet countries).4 Hele- niak also reviews the evolution of Russia’s post-Soviet immigration policy, invokes the UN’s 2001 projections of the level of immigration to Russia required to compensate for the upcoming decline of its working-age population5 (WAP), and characterizes the reversal of centuries- old domestic migrations to the Far North and East. Taking Heleniak’s survey as a point of departure, this paper addresses four questions: What causes and sustains the demand for immigration to Russia? What are the legal, illegal, and semi-legal elements of current immigration? What are the possible scenarios of immigration to Russia until 2026, the year for which the Russian Federal Bureau of Statistics (Rosstat) is currently making its own projections? And what is the likely interplay of immigration and domestic migration, and the consequent distribution of domestic and international migrants among Russia’s federal districts (Okrugs) in 2026?

WHY DOES RUSSIA NEED IMMIGRANTS?6

Thus far, only one of several turning points in the dynamics of Russia’s population has been publicized; namely, that it began to decline in 1992. From 1992 to 2008, immigration compensated for a little less than half (47.7 percent) of the excess of deaths over births. Indeed, in the 1990s, Russia received an unprecedented influx of 4.5 million migrants from the former Soviet republics (Fig. 1). The inflows during both the following (2000–2008) and the preceding (1980s) periods were much smaller—1.5 million and 1.9 million, respectively. Most analysts do not think that Russia’s depopulation will end before the middle of the 21st century, although one of Rosstat’s scenarios (referred to as high in Table 1 and matching the official demographic policy document) does postulate an earlier reversal of population decline. However, Russian demographers consider this scenario overly optimistic (UNDP, 2009), primarily because of its excessive assumption about rising fertility (see Table 1, compiled by the authors from Demograficheskiy, 2008, pp. 532–540). In 2007, Russia’s population change reached a second turning point that thus far has not received much attention. Prior to 2007, Russia’s WAP continued to grow as the balance between those entering the working age group and those exiting it remained positive. In 2007, retirements and premature deaths were for the first time ever not compensated by people entering the WAP—a delayed effect of the consistently low birth rate. While in that year, the net decline of working-age Russians amounted to just 300,000, this decline was twice as large in 2008; and from 2011 to 2017, the WAP decline is projected to exceed 1 million annually (Fig. 2). Between 2009 and 2026, Russia’s WAP will shrink by 17 million, a figure equivalent to 24 percent of Russia’s total employed population in 2009. This contraction lends itself to more accurate forecasting than the total population’s decline, because almost all people who

4The analysis of potential source regions for migration is a separate research undertaking that lies beyond the scope of the present paper. Nonetheless, some basic facts indicate that there will be no shortage of donor regions (both within and outside Russia) until at least 2026, the endpoint of projections outlined in this paper. For example, the migration potential of titular ethnic groups of the Russian Federation (e.g., Russians, Tatars, Chuvash, etc.) resid- ing in the Near Abroad (i.e., CIS) alone is roughly 6 million (Zayonchkovskaya, 2005). This number does not include the titular nationalities of the former Soviet Central Asian republics, where joblessness is pervasive and population growth still rapid, albeit declining. And most probably the migration potential of northern China is much greater. At present, the Federal Migration Service of Russia enumerates 1 million official migrants in Russia from source countries outside of the CIS. 5The working-age population in Russia consists of men aged 16 to 60 and women aged 16 to 55. 6In this paper, the word “immigrants” refers to international migrants only, and not to incoming domestic migrants. 106 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

Fig. 1. Components of Russia’s population change, 1980–2008 (thous. people).

Table 1. Official Rosstat Population Projection to 2026, Including Low, Medium, and High Scenarios

Scenarios Indicator/(year) Starting value Low Medium High

Population, millions (2009) 141.9 129.4 137.0 145.1 Total fertility ratea (2007) 1.406 1.379 1.68 1.89 Life expectancy at birth, years: Men (2007) 61.4 62.4 63.8 67.8 Women (2007) 73.9 75.1 75.8 77.6 Net migration, thous./year 257 200 Gradual rise Gradual rise (2008) to 450 to 690 aThe total fertility rate measures the average number of children a woman will have during her lifetime.

will enter the WAP group by 2026 have already been born. This adds certainty to the prediction of a drastic decline in the WAP and makes labor arguably the most deficient factor in Russia’s economy. The prospect of growing immigrant communities has not yet been fully accepted by the Russian public or even by its politically active population. For example, activists from Russia’s national-patriotic camp maintain that there is no objective need for immigration; rather, they have insinuated that “a well-paid campaign” (Krupnov, 2005) and ploys of foreign institutions and organizations are bent on selling Russians “a demographic policy that is contrary to our interests” (Beloborodov, 2005). A 2006 national survey revealed that only 4 percent of Russians viewed immigration as the way to solve Russia’s demographic problem (Rossiyane, 2006). According to Sergey Mironov, the Chair of Russia’s Federation Council, “it is quite possible to ensure that not 100 but 250 million people will live in Russia in 2050,” but recruitment of a foreign labor force can be considered only “as an extraordinary and short-term measure” (Mironov, 2005). But is this really the case? IOFFE AND ZAYONCHKOVSKAYA 107

Fig. 2. Dynamics of Russia’s working-age and total populations, 2005–2026 in the absence of migration.

Even a cursory glance at the Russia-without-immigrants scenario leads one to doubt its plausibility. In 2003, when the WAP was still growing, labor shortages were reported at 42 percent of Russia’s production units (Gimpelson, 2004), and in the Moscow subway one could encounter a billboard beginning with the sentence, “We have a lot of money but no people.” Thus far, not a single country has experienced steady economic growth with a shrinking labor force. For that reason, one might watch Japan, where population began to decline in 2005 but immigration policy continues to be highly restrictive. However, the possible opening of Japan’s labor market may not necessarily provide a cue to the situation in Russia, where labor productivity is much lower than in Japan. Even an overly optimistic assumption of 7.2 percent annual growth in Russia’s labor productivity has been shown to result in a GDP decline totaling 10 trillion rubles by 2020 if the deficit of labor is not compensated by immigration (Arkhangelskiy et al., 2005). One has to also consider that technological advances usually allow release of labor from production, particularly from industry whose share in Russia’s workforce has been declining in any event—in 2008 it accounted for only 16.8 percent of the total (Rossiya v Tsifrakh, 2009, p. 98). In contrast, services tend to expand, and gains in service-sector employment have more than offset job losses in industry and agriculture. This has been the trend in the West, and Russia appears to have followed suit. For example, from 2004 to 2007, overall employment in Russia increased by 1,612,000 people, while employment in agriculture declined by 505,000 and in manufacturing by 419,000 people. Over the same period, however, employment in retailing increased by 870,000 and in other services by 1,216,000 people. The number of people engaged in construction also rose—by 531,000 (Rossiyskiy Statisticheskiy, 2008, p. 138). Thus, the magnitude of employment gain in services plus construction was more than twice as large as the loss of industrial and agricultural jobs. Some participants in the debate over Russia’s demographic situation reduce its essence to a zero-sum game—raising fertility or boosting immigration. Clearly, Russia could ben- efit from rising fertility, but there has been no policy-induced reversal of a downward trend in fertility anywhere in the world.7 Even if bonuses meted out since 2007 by the Russian

7Post-war baby booms may be viewed as qualified exceptions. 108 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

government for a second and additional child ultimately prove to increase fertility, a couple of decades will pass until the more numerous newborns reach working age. Consequently, the idea that Russia’s bright economic future may not be achievable without attracting a large number of immigrants is sinking in, as evidenced in the 2006 amendments to the 2002 immigration law (enacted on January 15, 2007), which simplified registration requirements for foreigners, wrested registration away from the jurisdiction of endemically corrupt Russian police, and made it easier than before to obtain authorization to work.

CATEGORIES OF IMMIGRANTS IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

Following a surge in the early 1990s, recorded immigration to Russia quickly receded. After a nadir of 119,200 immigrants in 2004, their number rose again, to 297,200 in 2008. To a large extent this rise was influenced by a change in the method of recording migration. Since 2007, immigration statistics have included not only immigrants moving to Russia for permanent residency, but also temporary immigrants who have resided at least one year in the country. However, selective surveys and personal observations suggest that the actual number of immigrants in Russia exceeds the recorded total by an immense margin. Any approximation of the actual number of immigrants is subject to debate. Aside from roughly 300,000 recorded migrants per annum who arrive for permanent residency in Rus- sia, there are about 600,000 business migrants.8 Incoming and outgoing flows of foreigners pursuing other goals (e.g., those with tourist and homestay visas) tend to balance out. Labor migrants9 form another recorded component. Following the liberalization of the migration law, this group rose from 1.0 million in 2006 to 1.7 million in 2007 and 2.4 million in 2008. Several surveys have shown that whereas prior to 2007 legal labor migrants accounted for 10–15 percent of the total number of foreign labor migrants in Russia, after the new migration law was adopted their share increased to 15–25 percent (Vitkovskaya et al., 2009). This means that the illegal component is still quite large, primarily because most employers reject employees’ requests to formalize their hire. According to a joint report of the International Organization for Migration, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and Russia’s Federal Migration Service, the 2007 law significantly boosted the share of immigrants registering their stay in Russia (to 75 percent), but the share of legitimate labor immigration does not exceed 30 percent of the total (ibid.).10 If the aforementioned share (ca. 30 percent) is indeed correct, then the overall number of labor immigrants in Russia is somewhere between six and seven million people, comprising 8–10 percent of Russia’s total employed population. Because some non-working dependents live with labor immigrants, the overall number of immigrants is between seven and eight million people. This estimate is fairly conservative, for two reasons. First, the selective surveys on which it is based never extend to all shadow employers in the area that the surveys cover. Second, the estimate does not include migrants employed as household workers; if such workers are not employed by an agency and are attached to a single household, they are not supposed to obtain an employment authorization card. Such workers probably number in the hundreds of thousands in Moscow alone. According to available surveys, roughly 70 percent of labor migrants are men (Zayonchkovskaya et al.,

8These are determined as the incoming minus outgoing foreigners with business visas: 596,000 in 2006, 604,000 in 2007, and 635,000 in 2008, according to annual editions of Chislennost’ (2006–2009). 9This group comprises foreigners who register their stay in Russia and receive authorization to work. 10In other words, for the most part immigrants come to Russia and stay legally, but the vast majority of them continue to work illegally. IOFFE AND ZAYONCHKOVSKAYA 109

2009, p. 32); according to an unpublished data obtained from the Federal Migration Service, the share of men is even higher, namely 84 percent. The same source assigns 40 percent of labor migrants to construction, 7 percent to industry, 7 to agriculture, 20 to retail, and the balance to other services (ibid., p. 34). These numbers provide a basis for several tentative generalizations. First, recorded immigration in Russia is a small part of the total inflow of immigrants. Second, there is high demand for foreign labor. Third, the fact that most immigrants work illegally and some stay illegally underscores the shortcomings of Russia’s immigration “policy” (to the extent that a genuine policy exists).11 As a result, recorded immigration can hardly be considered a reliable basis for prediction. Fourth, Russia nonetheless is able to attract the necessary number of immigrants. Flawed application of immigration law, more than the size of the flow per se, likely affects the quality of immigrants and the share of legal immigrants in the total inflow. Finally, the demand for labor to some extent can be satisfied through labor migration.

IMMIGRATION AND DOMESTIC MIGRATION

Predicting future immigration, especially its spatial distribution, is hardly possible without taking domestic migration into account. In a vast country whose “demographic blanket” is becoming increasingly thinner, domestic migration is often the major predictor of success in regional development. It is no accident that resettlement has been assigned great significance in Russia regardless of political order (e.g., feudalism, socialism, capitalism). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, domestic migration in Russia fell more than by 50 percent. Whereas in 1989, 3.3 percent of Russia’s population moved from one census- designated place to another, in 2007, only 1.4 percent did, a throwback to the limited mobility pattern in Russia prior to World War I (Zayonchkovskaya and Nozdrina, 2008, p. 48). This decline is a function of several factors, the most important of which is arguably a sweeping change in the acquisition of housing after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Throughout the final three Soviet decades, a Soviet citizen could count on either obtaining a free apartment from the state or receiving a no-interest state loan to obtain a cooperative apartment. In the latter case, most salaried people would be able to afford a monthly payment, and quite a few a downpayment. But at present one must buy a dwelling in a housing market in which prices are out of proportion with regular family income, and a mortgage, if available, comes with at least a 14 percent annual interest rate. This change drastically restricted the possibility of moving permanently and at the same time has led to replacement of (permanent) migration by circulation (i.e., migration not associated with a permanent change of residence, such as leaving home to attend college) or temporary labor migration. Based on extrapolation of survey results from seven cities of Russia (Zayonchkovskaya and Mkrtychyan, 2007), we estimate that temporary labor migration in 2002 was approximately three million people per year and by 2008 may have increased slightly. If one adds this flow to that involved in domestic migration (i.e., that associated with change in permanent place of residency), the resulting sum would roughly amount to Russia’s domestic migration on the eve of the breakup of the Soviet Union.

11After 2007, inadequate application of migration law has been a greater problem than any shortcomings in the law per se. 110 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

Just like immigration, domestic migration is not fully recorded. Because freedom of movement is guaranteed by the Russian Constitution as well by a special 1993 law,12 Russian citizens often neglect to declare a change in their place of residency, especially when they move into rented accommodations. Consequently, Russia’s rate of domestic migration may not be as low as reported in official statistics. We hypothesize that by 2026 the rate of domestic migration will rise to the 1989 level from which the downward trend started. The increase in domestic migration will be influenced by rapid expansion of employment opportunities due to shrinkage of the WAP; however, a steeper increase than we have estimated would require more affordable housing in the regions of inflow, an unlikely situation. Domestic migration can be characterized by two stable and interrelated trends: western drift and centripetal character. For the most part, net migration from most administra- tive subdivisions (oblasts, republics, krays, and okrugs) is directed to subdivisions located farther west, but the role played by Moscow (and its urban agglomeration) in the spatial redistribution of Russia’s population has become overpowering. The capital city region has of course attracted domestic migrants for decades, but European Russia’s south (particularly the Krasnodar and Stavropol’ regions) once exerted an equally powerful pull, at least until the late 1980s. Moreover, at that time the capitals of Russia’s oblast-level regions attracted up to half of the migrants from each region’s periphery. Now, instead of relocating to regional capitals or to Russia’s south, migrants tend to head straight to Moscow or its environs. In all likelihood, the Moscow region will be the only area of Russia capable of meeting its demand for labor solely through domestic migration. However, other Russian regions might meet their demand for labor through external migration (i.e., immigration), as in this type of migration the Moscow region does not dominate the supply to the same extent as domestic flows.13 Because the Russian capital is located in the western part of the country, the role of Moscow can be construed as integral to western drift as well. Yet such westward movement constitutes a reversal of the trajectory throughout much of Russian history. For roughly four centuries in the past, Russians migrated primarily east to Siberia. The first sign of reversal of that trend appeared in the 1960s. In the first half of that decade, the natural increase of the Soviet Union’s population had fallen by half (from its 1950s level).14 Since that time, the direction of migration (toward the east or west) has been related to the dynamics of the WAP within the entire country. When the growth of the WAP slowed, more job opportunities arose in the more attractive regions, and correspondingly more migrants relocated from east to west. But when WAP growth accelerated, more people relocated in the opposite direction. In the 1970s, domestic migration assumed the direction (from west to east) that the Soviet state actually wanted. Although attributed to the Communist Party’s gov- ernance, this movement was in fact due to a demographic wave resulting from the coming of age of a populous generation born in the 1950s. In the 1980s, the flow reversed again, although this time it was more than offset by growth in military contingents in Russia’s Far East. It appears that when labor is deficient, the population gains additional freedom of maneuver and

12Known as the Law “On Freedom of Movement and Choice of Place of Stay and Residence in the Russian Federation.” 13For example, from 2001 to 2005, 88 percent of the 264,300 recorded migrants in Moscow were domestic migrants. In comparison, 62 percent of the 18,300 recorded migrants to Stavropol’ Kray during this period were migrants from the Near Abroad (Zayonchkovskaya , 2008). 14The government responded to the decline by reducing mandatory military service from three to two years, eliminating the 11th grade in secondary schools, expanding evening curricula in institutions of higher learning at the expense of daytime curricula, cutting back on supplemental personnel (such as janitors and guards), and imposing draconian limitations on household farming operations. Despite all these measures, however, the outflow of urbanites from southern parts of Siberia and Far East exceeded the inflow. IOFFE AND ZAYONCHKOVSKAYA 111

relocates to preferred regions (i.e., those with more favorable climate and living conditions). But when the supply of labor exceeds demand, people relocate to regions that still offer jobs (i.e., Siberia and the Far East). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, western drift and the centripetal character of domestic migration strengthened, and the demographic situation in the years to come will likely reinforce these trends further. One often hears that the most labor-deficient Russian region is the Far East. This belief is rooted in the notion that although the colonization of Siberia and the Far East lasted four centuries, no equitable population distribution was achieved, and the farther from the country’s center, the thinner the “demographic blanket.” But contrasts in population density are not always the most reliable indicator of labor shortages. One can in fact argue that in the regions of old colonization, particularly in the Central Federal District (CFD), the demographic situation is more dire than in the Far East.15 In the CFD, population decline in the absence of migration will likely be steeper than elsewhere. Even more significant is the fact that from 2008 to 2026 the WAP in the CFD will in the absence of migration decline by 27.0 percent, whereas in Russia as a whole it will fall by 20.4 percent. Figure 3 projects the rates of WAP decline by Russia’s oblast-level regions, showing that the regions of old colonization, particularly the CFD (excluding its south) as well as Leningrad, Pskov, and Novgorod oblasts (of the Northwest) are expected to sustain the steepest declines. The CFD is the country’s most developed area, which competes with the Far East and other federal districts for labor, needing (since the late 1960s) a steady inflow of migrants to compensate for its steep decline in WAP. Before that time, the CFD was a migration donor, sending migrants to all other regions in the Russian/Soviet polity for several centuries. But by the mid-1960s, its pool of labor had been exhausted, and the district became a migration magnet whose attraction has been directly proportional to its WAP dynamics. In fact, two of Russia’s federal districts are the polar opposites—the CFD draws people from all other districts, and the Far East sends people to all other districts. Each district located west of the Far East loses migrants in favor of still more western districts and receives partial compensation through migration from the east. The Far East sustained the heaviest loss in domestic migration—753,000 during the intercensal period from 1989 to 2002.16 Interestingly, CDF’s gain of 787,000 people through domestic migration between the two most recent censuses (1989 and 2002) was almost exactly equal to the Far East’s loss, so that the antipodal positions of these districts in domestic migration can be expressed numerically. Having contributed 28 percent of CDF’s migration gain, the Far East was the CFD’s greatest donor.17 More recent trends presented in Table 2 reveal that in 2007–2008 net gains in domestic migration were recorded only in the CFD and Northwest. But almost half of the Northwest’s migration gains were “forwarded” to the CFD, and the magnetic attractions of these two migration gainers are not comparable. All other federal districts have registered net losses. Figuratively speaking, these days Siberia begins at the Volga River. The CFD absorbed almost

15For example, in the CFD, the rate of natural increase is more negative than in the Far East (–5.8 people per 1000 versus 1.0 people per 1000 in 2008), and the share of people of retirement age is higher (23.9 versus 17.1 percent). 16Roughly one-third of these people left the Far East for the CFD, 22 percent for the South district, 15 for the Volga District, and 15 percent for the Siberian District. The latter, however, managed to compensate for 30 percent of its loss through outmigration from the Far East, while the Urals District compensated for half of its own outflow by inflows from Siberia and the Far East. 17It appears to be unrealistic to expect the resumption of eastern drift in Russia’s domestic migration, if for no other reason that the most economically developed and attractive federal district of Russia competes for labor with the Far East and other districts. 112 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS 47; 23; 35; 56; = = = =

regions to Novgorod Ust’-Orda Sverdlovsk Kamchatka Saratov 11; Ryazan’ 86; Key 66; 96; Belgorod = Chechnya = 46; = = 22; Khanty-Mansiysk = 33; 55; = = = 76; regions. Amur = Irkutsk

Orel Leningrad Samara 95; 85; 21; = Ossetia = 10; = 45; Russian = Novgorod = Komi-Permyak Tyumen’ for North 65; 75; Oblast Evenki = = Penza

54; Nizhniy 84; = Khabarovsk 44; Petersburg = = 32; migration Perm’ 94; St. Tomsk Moscow = = of 8; 64; 74; 20; = = = = Kirov Volgograd absence 31; City Omsk 43; = Primorskiy the = Orenburg

Murmansk (Dolgano-Nenets) 73; in 93; 7; = 63; = = Moscow Karachayevo-Cherkessia = 2008 19; Chuvashia Taymyr in 53; = Astrakhan’ = 30; 83; Vologda Kurgan Chukotka 42; = = 6; Novosibirsk = 62; = 92; = 72; = population Kostroma = that 18; Nenets Mordovia Tatarstan = of 5; Krasnoyarsk 29; = 41; Udmurtia = = Kabardino-Balkaria Yevreyskiy 82; Kemerovo 61; = Kaluga = 52; 91; 71; = = 17; = percentage a = Mariy-El Kalmykia as Arkhangel’sk Khakasia 27; (kray) 39; 4; = = = (Yakutia)

81; 2026 Ingushetia Ivanovo = Bashkortostan in Altay 51; 16; Komi 59; Sakha = = 70; Tuva 3; Tambov = = Yaroslavl’ = 89; 80; 38; = = = 26; population = Rostov Dagestan Vladimir Karelia Republic 58; 50; 15; Tula Lipetsk = = =

Buryatia Aga-Buryat 25; Altay 37; okrugs): 78; = = working-age

88; 68; = = =

plus Bryansk

Adygeya Stavropol’ Tver’ Kursk 13; 48; Chita 57; units 24; = = Projected 36; = = = 87; = Yamal-Nenets Chelyabinsk Pskov Fig. 3. Fig. 77; 12; 67; (oblast-level = Ul’yanovsk Smolensk Voronezh Krasnodar = = = 97; Koryak 98; Magadan 99; Sakhalin 100; Kaliningrad =101. Buryat IOFFE AND ZAYONCHKOVSKAYA 113

Table 2. Net Domestic Migration between the Federal Districts, 2007–2008 (in thous. people)

Federal districts Center Northwest South Volga Urals Siberia Far East

Center – –18.1 –34.7 –51.7 –18.0 –28.3 –21.6 Northwest 18.1 – –5.6 –7.1 –5.7 –9.4 –7.2 South 34.7 5.6 – –7.5 –1.3 –13.6 –9.7 Volga 51.7 7.1 7.5 – 6.8 –4.9 –3.9 Urals 18 5.7 1.3 –6.8 – –7.6 –2.3 Siberia 28.3 9.4 13.6 4.9 7.6 – –5.1 Far East 21.6 7.2 9.7 3.9 2.3 5.1 – Total 172.4 16.9 –8.2 –64.3 –8.3 –58.7 –49.8

Source: Compiled and calculated by authors from Chislennost’, 2007 and 2008.

Table 3. Western Drift across Russia’s Federal Districts, 1991–2008 (thous. people)

Gain (+) or loss (–) in migration exchange between:

a Years European Siberia and and Asianb Urals and Urals and European plus Siberia Far East federal European other Asian the Urals and the and all other districts districts districts districts Far East districts

1991–1995 514.2 –94.6 30.1 –130.4 63.8 –383.1 1996–2000 415.2 –47.5 38.2 –164.2 45 –286.6 2001–2005 274.1 –37.1 23.9 –139.9 6.3 –127.3 2006–2008 174.6 –27.1 14.4 –95.2 6.7 –73.3

aEuropean districts = Center, Northwest, South, and Volga. bAsian districts = Urals, Siberia, and the Far East. Sources: Compiled by authors from annual volumes of Chislennost’, 1992–2009.

all migrants from the South, 70 percent from the Volga and Urals, and more than 40 percent from Siberia and the Far East. Siberia, the Far East, and the Volga districts have become the major migration donors for western Russia in general, but especially for the CFD. The western drift in domestic migration has persisted throughout the entire post-Soviet period (Table 3), and the deepening deficit of the WAP does not offer evidence that this trend will be reversed in the foreseeable future. In most cases, losses from domestic migration were compensated by inflows from the countries of the CIS. But as immigration from the CIS declined, the attractiveness of the CFD continued to increase. Between 1989 and 2002, it accounted for 60 percent of positive net migration (both domestic and international) into Russia, absorbing practically all the population redistributed among the country’s federal districts from 2001 to 2008, and over half of the country’s immigrants. In the overall inflow into the CFD, domestic migration exceeds immigration. The share of the domestic component in the overall net migration to the CFD was particularly high from 2001 to 2006 (Fig. 4) but continued to be significant thereafter. 114 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

Fig. 4. Net migration to the Central Federal District (left axis) and the percentage share of the domestic component (right axis), 1994–2008.

Although the net inflow into the CFD had declined since 1994, it has been on the rise again since 2001, whereas that for every other federal district has oscillated around zero. Almost all of the domestic inflow into the CFD (and since the mid-1990s, almost all incoming immigrants) has been absorbed by Moscow and Moscow Oblast. Thus, migration within Russia has become overwhelmingly centripetal. In 2008, 47 of Russia’s 80 regions18 have registered positive net migration. If one were to sum these 47 region-specific incre- ments, the share of Moscow and Moscow Oblast would constitute 37.4 percent of the total.19 Prior to the aforementioned change in recording rules, the centripetal character of migration was even more striking. Thus, in 2006, positive net migration was recorded in 32 regions, with Moscow City and Oblast accounting for 46.5 percent of the total.20 Some weakening of Moscow’s magnetic pull as well as a broadening of the set of regions with positive net migration could be detected in 2007 and 2008. The change probably reflects the fact that it is more difficult in the Moscow region than elsewhere in Russia to obtain permanent residency. A complementary perspective on centripetal growth is provided by Figure 5, which shows that since 1999, net migration to Moscow has been commensurate to net migration to Russia as a whole. It is almost as if Moscow is a state of its own. Indeed, it is now viewed all across Russia as the Inner Abroad—not only because it is so expensive to live there (unless one is in possession of living space) but also because for many Russians and people from the Near Abroad migration to Moscow is an alternative to migration to the Distant Abroad (countries outside the former Soviet Union). While the centrality of Moscow in Russia may seem obvious, its pivotal role in the national migration system may not be fully recognized. If it were, the well-publicized intent of the Moscow City Government to cut back on recruitment of foreigners and replace them by domestic migrants (Inorodnoye, 2007) would be seen as destructive for Russia as a whole.

18Oblasts, republics, krays, plus the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. 19The corresponding statistic for 2007 was 36.1 percent. 20A similar situation prevailed in 2004 and 2005. IOFFE AND ZAYONCHKOVSKAYA 115

Fig. 5. Net migration to Russia and to Moscow City and Oblast (in thousands).

Moscow City and Oblast already absorb from one-third to one-half of all domestic migrants. Even St. Petersburg, Russia’s second-largest city, is no competitor to Moscow, absorbing in 2008 (together with the Leningrad Oblast), 12.8 percent of the positive net migration of Russia’s regions.21 In 2008, the combined share of the two capital regions (and their respec- tive oblasts) in positive net migration of Russia’s regions was 51 percent, approaching two- thirds in 2006 when the old migration recording rules were used. If one extrapolates current trends, the WAP will not be able to be replenished by domestic migrants in any federal district except the CFD. And even then the CFD will need to receive 6 million migrants before 2026 just to compensate for the projected shrinkage of WAP. But to accomplish that, one would have to mobilize the migration potential of the entire country. Under such circumstances, Siberia and the Far East would remain migration donors to the CFD, even if we were to assume that immigration would rise to ca. 400,000 per year by 2021–2025 as projected in Rosstat’s median scenario, which anticipates population decline in every federal district, particularly in Siberia and the Far East.

PREDICTING RUSSIA’S MIGRATION TO 2026: THREE SCENARIOS

Our projections of net migration (domestic and international) by federal district are not derived from a statistical model, but rather are based on six assumptions that follow from the previous discussion. We thus assume that (1) immigration is the only way to compensate for the upcoming deficit in the WAP; (2) the CFD will continue to absorb at least half of all international migrants to Russia;22 (3) the shares of other federal districts in the

21Although Russia’s northern capital attracts migrants from all over the country, only from the regions of the European North and the neighboring regions of Pskov, Novgorod, and Karelia does it attract more migrants than Moscow. 22In fact, the CFD’s share in net international migration (immigration) will rise to almost two-thirds if the overall number of immigrants coming to Russia does not increase significantly, and will decline only slightly only if the overall number of immigrants increases. 116 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

number of immigrants to Russia will not undergo significant change;23 (4) the western drift and centripetal character of domestic migration will continue; (5) any increase in the number of immigrants coming to the CFD will result in a commensurate decrease in the number of domestic migrants to that federal district24 (so while the western drift and centripetal character of domestic migration will continue, they may be weakened by the rise in immigration); and (6) while we believe that domestic migration will eventually increase from its current low level (1.4 percent of the population) to its 1989 level (3.3 percent), this does not necessarily apply to net migration between federal districts: if immigration rises, an increasing number of domestic migrants will likely move within federal districts. Although all three scenarios outlined in Table 4 are based on these assumptions, the key difference among them that triggers all other differences is the volume of net international migration into Russia. The low scenario results from the extrapolation of present migration trends and compensates for 15 percent of the upcoming WAP decline in Russia as a whole. According to this scenario, net migration to the CFD will increase from 180,000 per annum in 2007–2008 to just 250,000 per annum from 2009 to 2026. Under this scenario, all the (inter- district) domestic migrants and two-thirds of the immigrants will relocate in the CFD. The total net migration to that district will amount to 4.7 million people over the entire period, including almost 2.3 million immigrants. Even so, only a half of the upcoming WAP decline in the CFD will be offset through migration. These outcomes will result from the CFD’s share in Russia’s net immigration rising from 48 percent in 2007–2010 to 61 percent over the period 2011–2026, as well as from the CFD’s intake of domestic migrants from all other regions of Russia. Net migration will be positive in the Northwest (due to Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast), South (due to Krasnodar Kray), and Volga (due to Tatarstan and Samara Oblast) districts. Whereas the migration-induced growth in the CFD will be achieved through almost equal contributions from domestic migration and immigration (2.4 million and 2.3 million people, respectively), growth in all other districts is possible only through immigration because the retention of a huge deficit in the WAP in the CFD means that no weakening of the centripetal trend in Russia’s population movement can be expected. The major region of outflow will be Siberia—a peculiar replay of the 1960s situation. The outflow from the Far East will probably lessen because its migration potential will be all but exhausted. Immigration will only partly offset losses from Siberia and the Far East attributed to domestic migration, which will amount to 1.5 million people from 2007 to 2026. The low scenario is catastrophic for Russia because in addition to the meager compensation for decline of the WAP via immigration, the population of all federal districts will decline due to negative natural increase. Even the CFD, the most attractive federal district, will experience an acute deficit of labor. From this perspective, the high scenario is much more favorable to Russia. According to that scenario, the country will receive a total of 12.9 million immigrants by 2026, which will compensate for half of the nationwide WAP decline25 and 90 percent of the WAP decline in

23Although an increase or decrease in the share of the CFD cannot but alter the shares of the rest, the rank order of the remaining six districts’ shares (in total net international migration) will remain the same as at present: South, Volga, Urals, Northwest, Siberia, and the Far East. 24This assumption is based on the fact that native Russians generally cannot compete with immigrants from the CIS and China in the low-skilled labor market in the CFD, where job openings are most numerous. For example, very few Russians would be willing to accept menial employment in construction, street sweeping, trash collection, etc. and earn as little as the Central Asian and other CIS workers in these occupations. Native Russians compete more effectively in the medium-skilled labor market, and largely dominate that for highly skilled labor. 25Readers are reminded that working-age immigrants account for 70 percent of the total number. IOFFE AND ZAYONCHKOVSKAYA 117

Table 4. Projected Net Migration across Russia’s Federal Districts, 2007–2026 (thous. people)

Federal districts Scenario Low Medium High

Russia 3880 7260 12910 Center 4740 5760 7920 International 2260 3990 6650 Domestic 2480 1770 1270 Northwest 110 390 880 International 150 310 720 Domestic –40 80 160 South 210 720 1440 International 500 940 1640 Domestic –290 –220 –200 Volga 190 620 1560 International 530 920 1820 Domestic –340 –300 –260 Urals –70 390 850 International 260 540 970 Domestic –330 –150 –120 Siberia –690 –270 140 International 250 450 600 Domestic –940 –720 –460 Far East –610 –350 120 International –70 110 510 Domestic –540 –460 –390

Source: Author calculations and projections. the CFD. Under this scenario, we envisage the lowering of the CFD’s share in immigration from 48 percent (low scenario) to 52 percent. As a result of the high-level compensation for the WAP decline in the CFD, many more immigrants will locate in other districts (than under the low scenario) and the CFD’s pull on domestic migrants will decrease by half. Our high scenario distinguishes potential regions of exodus. For example, in two federal districts—the South and Volga—rural populations are still numerous; consequently, the outflow from these regions will decline only by 25–30 percent (compared with the low scenario). In contrast, in the Urals, where the rural and small-town population is almost exhausted by previous migration and where Russia’s largest oil and gas reserves are located, the out-migration will lessen more significantly. The mitigating effect of the increased immigration will be at its lowest in Siberia and in the Far East. The level of compensation for the district-specific WAP declines will remain low even under our high-immigration scenario. Only in the South will it reach 60 percent, and in the Northwest, Volga, and Urals districts it will be within the 30–40 percent range. The increased immigration will compensate for only about 10 percent of the WAP decline in Siberia and the Far East, and only by the end of the period, after 2020. Nationwide, the effect of our high immigration scenario (Fig. 6) on WAP decline still displays significant spatial contrasts, although they are somewhat less than in the case of the absence of migration (Fig. 3). In the Far East, only Khabarovsk Kray is likely to see its situation improve from the high-immigration 118 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS regions migration to net key map, The this For populations. immigration. for working-age scenario current high their to our to proportion according in 2008 in regions by that of disaggregated percentage a as then and 2026 4) in (Table population districts federal working-age

the for Projected Fig. 6. Fig. determined was numbered on the map can be found in caption for Figure 3. IOFFE AND ZAYONCHKOVSKAYA 119

scenario relative to other regions. In Siberia, the same can be said of Novosibirsk Oblast. The demographic situation also will improve in the southern part of the Vogla District as well as in the southern part of the CFD. Overall, however, even our high-immigration scenario suggests an inadequate supply of labor in much of Russia. The medium scenario is by definition a mid-point between high and low: it envisions almost a doubling of net migration to Russia (7.3 million people) compared with the low scenario (3.9 million people) but is well short of the high scenario (12.9 million). Conse- quently, under the medium scenario the WAP decline will be compensated by slightly more than half in the CFD and by 30 percent nationwide. The scenario includes the possible effect of the realization of the 2006–2012 “compatriots’ resettlement program”26 now under way in Russia, although thus far the number of newcomers covered by this program has been far short of the established targets (Bovt, 2009). Should the program’s performance improve between now and 2012, it may boost the inflow of immigrants to the regions of Russia adja- cent to the CIS countries of their origin and thus partly offset the centripetal population shift. Compared with the low scenario, the migration losses incurred by Siberia and the Far East will decline by half, and net migration to other districts will increase perceptibly. However, the plausibility of the medium scenario depends strongly on the scale of (temporary) labor migration to the CFD, Siberia, and the Far East to replace domestic out-migration. In our judgment, only the high scenario will tangibly mitigate the labor deficit in Russia. Any fewer immigrants (than envisioned by that scenario) will lead to further contraction of the populated space, stagnation and subsequent decay of Russia’s ever-expanding east (which now includes the Urals), further decline in economic output outside the energy sector, and drastic limitations affecting retirement and other social programs.

DISCUSSION

The pivotal assumption underlying this study is the imperative to compensate at least in part for the upcoming decline in the WAP through international migration. But any estimate of that need may seem unreliable without invoking planned investment and considering how it relates to the projected demand for newcomers and its geography. Likewise, one may question whether Russia has a migration policy that would address the country’s needs. And finally, taking both considerations into account, which of the scenarios presented above is most plausible? It is unlikely that the geography of new job creation can change the geography of migration in Russia, because the decline in the WAP promises to be the most dramatic in that federal district whose attractiveness (an accumulated effect of lasting development) is second to none. In other words, even without commissioning new production capacities there will be plenty of vacancies in the existing ones. In Russia, Gosplan’s famous dictum that “investment into production begets people” (to be employed in that production) stopped working about four decades before the 2007 commencement of the decline in the WAP. For that reason, no inflow of young labor to Russian agriculture occurred even after its share in overall investment had climbed to 28 percent, as it did in the early 1980s (Ioffe, 1990). Similarly, Siberia and the Far East were officially designated as labor deficient (trudodefitsitnyye) despite an upward trend in capital investment. In 2008, Russia’s Institute for Regional Policy published a survey of 1400 large (>$100,000,000) investment projects (Dostatochno, 2008), which by 2020 are expected to

26Adopted by presidential decree of June 22, 2006. 120 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

create 3.2 million new jobs. Together with smaller-scale projects, the overall growth in the number of jobs is expected to be roughly 7 million by 2020. In other words, 7 million new jobs will have been created by the time the WAP will have declined by 14 million without immigration. This projected growth is well above what can be accommodated even by our high-immigration scenario. The survey’s authors emphasize that interregional competition for labor in Russia will intensify, and the winners of that competition will be regions that are able to expand affordable housing, adapt education programs to local needs, and offer the most attractive aid packages to migrants. This set of criteria does not include the enormous dispar- ity in the regions’ pull factors at the start of this race for domestic migrants, a gap that can be bridged only in part if at all. According to the survey, the list of 20 regions with the highest projected job creation is topped by Leningrad Oblast, with 230,000 new jobs by 2020. Our data suggest that out of that list, only Moscow and Leningrad oblasts as well as St. Petersburg can succeed in attracting domestic migrants, thus exacerbating the labor deficit elsewhere. It may also be that Voronezh, Nizhniy Novgorod, Sverdlovsk, and Novosibirsk oblasts will receive some migrants from within Russia, but there is practically no chance for most of the remaining 12 regions (especially Irkutsk, Orenburg, and Chelyabinsk oblasts, and Krasnoyarsk Kray). These and other regions can only count on immigrants from abroad. Of the 15 regions with the highest rate of job creation (as opposed to the total number of new jobs), two ethnic homelands of the North Caucasus, namely Adygey and Karachayevo-Cherkessia, can probably rely on regional labor reserves. But five regions of the Far East (Amur, Yevreyskaya, Sakhalin, and Kamchatka oblasts, and the Sakha/Yakut Republic) on the same list can rely solely on immigration, and the same applies to a very significant degree to such CFD regions as Kostroma, Voronezh, and Lipetsk oblasts, as well as Perm’ Oblast of the Urals district. The demand for labor that these investment projects would generate cannot be satisfied by our high scenario. Throughout the 1990s, Russia arguably was one of the most open countries in the world in terms of both emigration and immigration. This open-door practice was accompanied by highly inaccurate recording of immigrants and by various forms of their exploitation (e.g., forced labor, human trafficking, and fraudulent recruitment schemes). Many Russians, however, accustomed to the long-lasting closed-country regime of the USSR, became increasingly wary of “too many” foreigners in their cities. Prompted by growing public unease, the Russian government moved to the opposite extreme and introduced rigid immigration controls. Adopted in 2002, the Federal Law “On the Legal Status of Foreigners in the Russian Federation” erected substantial barriers to the lawful stay and employment of immigrants.27 Employment authorization, a separate process, was to be procured by the prospective employer; it was impossible to even solicit an employment authorization without the residential approval stamp in the passport. However, this offered a substantial outlet for corruption. In every major Russian city, intermediary services offered residential registration and employment authorization for a significant fee, some of which was used to bribe the police. This situation narrowed immigrants’ legal room for maneuver and boosted corruption; the recorded component of immigration consequently shrank. Those who endured this routine can fully appreciate the changes adopted in 2006 and that went into effect on January 15, 2007. Based on the 2006 amendments to the 2002 law (Federal’nyy, 2006) and on the newly adopted law “On Records of Foreign Citizens and

27To legalize their presence in Russia, foreigners were required to register within 72 hours of arrival for at most a 90-day stay. Two applications had to be completed—one filled out by the immigrant and another by the owner or person leasing the dwelling in which the foreigner would reside. The applicant and his/her host would then visit a local police department and receive the approval stamp in his/her passport. IOFFE AND ZAYONCHKOVSKAYA 121

Persons without Citizenship in the Russian Federation,” temporary migrants no longer must apply for registration and receive a stamp in their passport. Instead, within 72 hours they must simply notify the Federal Migration Service of their arrival.28 The initial period of temporary stay has been extended from 90 to 180 days, and can be extended to one year upon request. Equally important, obtaining an employment authorization card has become much easier as well. According to the 2006 amendments, it is to be handed to the applicant (by the local office of the Federal Migration Service), not to his/her employer, which means that one can start job hunting on his/her own without being attached to a certain employer. The employment authorization changes thus far apply only to CIS migrants entering Russia without a visa, but this is an understandable preference as the CIS countries are the major source regions of the migrant labor force. These changes produced almost immediate positive effects, but also a backlash from members of Russia’s bureaucratic class, including Moscow’s Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov (2007; Inorodnoye, 2007), which triggered partial restoration of constraints; the global financial crisis has exacerbated the situation as well. One positive effect was more complete migration records. In 2007, 8 million entries for temporary stay were recorded,29 and 1.7 job authorizations were granted to temporary migrants (up from 1.0 million in 2006). Whereas prior to 2007, surveys showed that almost half of all labor migrants were unregistered, in 2007 only 15 percent were. Also, before 2007 some 15–25 percent of all labor migrants worked legally, whereas after 76 percent of migrants had job authorization. Third, the tax base of the foreign labor force has doubled (Zayonchkovskaya et al., 2009, p. 58). Although the rights of migrants and their freedom to maneuver have thus expanded, this does not guarantee their legal employment. Moreover, the new job authorization program has cast additional light on the dual nature of Russia’s job market, especially on the ample opportunities for shadow employment. In 2007, about 40 percent of migrants authorized to work were hired unofficially (Zayonchkovskaya et al., 2009, p. 58)—that is, a perfectly legal migrant may still turn out to be an illegal worker and may even not be aware of it. This situation is often used by Russian officials when demanding that the old restrictions be restored. Today, restrictions continue to operate through the centralized assignment of numerical quotas on the foreign labor force (beyond the quotas, no job authorizations are to be provided). The overall quota is determined through a complicated and multi-layered mechanism not backed by any serious methodology. Only large businesses can get their need in foreign labor registered, whereas small businesses—let alone individuals who wish to hire foreign construction workers and nannies—cannot break through. The 2008 quota of 1.8 million foreign workers was exceeded before the end of June—in some regions as early as in April. Before the decision to increase the 2008 quota, employers had to either slow down or terminate their activity, or hire workers illegally. This unfortu- nate experience led to a steep increase in the 2009 quota to 3.9 million workers. However, the emerging global financial crisis prompted a decision to cut that quota in half (Gritsyuk, 2008). Responding to situations in which employers actually laid off Russians but retained foreigners who worked longer hours and were paid less, in December 2008 Russia’s trade

28This can be done by mail from any post office, which provides a blank migration form and certifies that it is filled out correctly. The address for the stay may not necessarily be the address of actual residence but that of a place of work or of a recruitment agency. A migrant attaches a copy of his photo-bearing passport page to that form and a copy of an immigration stub received at the border crossing. Once the form is accepted by the postal clerk, the migrant receives a stub attesting that he or she has registered. 29In 2008, 9.2 million foreign migrants were recorded in Russia (Bud’te, 2009), and 4 million during the first six months of 2009. 122 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

union leader Mikhail Shmakov called upon the government to issue a temporary ban on hiring foreigners (ibid.). For 2010, the announced quota is 2 million workers, a limit that includes a 0.7 million reserve that may be used.30 The liberalization of foreign labor hiring practices sustained a major setback in February 2009, when the Federal Migration Service issued directive (prikaz) No. 36, which initially authorizes foreigners with visa-waivers31 to work for 90 days. After that, they may submit a finalized employment agreement and may be authorized to work for one year at most.32 Although the purpose of this amendment—much like the entire practice of assigning quotas—is to protect domestic labor, it is unlikely to attain this goal. Rather, it will pressure both employers and immigrants to bypass the law and open new opportunities for corruption. The fact that the recent liberalization of immigration practices has already been subject to setbacks casts doubt on Russia’s readiness to respond to what may well be its existential demographic challenge. The nature of immigrant job-hunting channels, of media coverage, and of public debate over immigration increases that doubt. Currently, more than 70 percent of labor migrants find work through relatives and friends, about 15 percent through unlicensed private mediators, and only 10 percent through official employment agencies (Zayonchkovskaya et al., 2009). Members of the immigrant labor force have limited access to the justice system and cannot protect their rights. Xenophobia (in Russia often called migrantophobia) is rampant and bolstered by the media. The titles of media articles such as “In Russia Every Tenth Labor Migrant Has Tuberculosis” (V Rossiii, 2007) or “Labor Migrants Bring to St. Petersburg Tuberculosis and AIDS”(Trudovyye, 2009) are as widespread as they are misleading. In 2007, tuberculosis was found in every 125th (not 10th) migrant, and AIDS was diagnosed in every 534th (Zayonchkovskaya et al., 2009). Migrantophobes claim a high crime rate among labor migrants. However, in 2007 migrants committed only 1.4 percent of recorded criminal offenses in Russia—a slight decline from 2006 (e.g., see Zayonchkovskaya et al., 2009, p. 45). Conversely, crimes against foreigners in Russia are on the rise. Whereas migrants are for the most part caught stealing, crimes against migrants are usually more grave, including brutal slayings. From January to May 2008, 126 assaults on foreigners were recorded in Moscow; 72 resulted in fatalities. The most frequent crime victims are Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, and Azerbaijanis. Migrantophobes also invoke cultural distance between major groups of migrants and Russians.33 According to a 2007 survey by the Levada Center, only 12.5 percent of Russians have a favorable attitude toward immigrants, whereas 22 percent are hostile (Trudovaya, 2008). The mantra of Russia’s regional leaders’ continues to be “if we come up with the right pay, we will find workers at home.” But while some employers will, most will not—a reality that has not yet sunk in. Even public debates among social scientists do not always indicate an understanding of Russia’s demographic challenge. For example, Izvestiya’s report from the roundtable on immigration held in Moscow’s Polytechnic Museum on November 29, 2009,

30The national quota includes a 250,000 quota for the city of Moscow (down from 392,000 in 2009; Rossiya vdvoye, 2009). As stated above, Moscow, like no other place in Russia, is able to meet its labor demand by hiring Russian nationals. 31I.e., people from the CIS countries except Turkmenistan. 32Actually only for nine months, as the one-year term includes the initial 90-day period. For a second (year-long) authorization, a specific employer must be listed. This means that, after a short period, the requirement of attachment to a specific employer has been reinstated. 33This problem is quite real but no more serious than that faced in other immigrant-receiving societies. IOFFE AND ZAYONCHKOVSKAYA 123

is couched in “pro versus con” terms as if some genuine alternative to immigration exists (Priyakhina, 2009). There are strong indications that Russia’s top leaders understand that for Russia immigration is not an option but an essential; however, no reasonable policy can hinge on the good intentions of the political élite alone; at least some public consensus is required. This particularly applies to immigration policy, which must be enforced across the entire country, and by low-level bureaucrats. Not only is there no consensus; all too many Russians are in denial. The issue of immigration has not yet been adequately examined, and that is arguably the main reason why Russia lacks a coherent immigration policy. As there has been a sequence of inconsistent immigration control acts, our medium scenario (implying that immigration will compensate for only 30 percent of the upcoming decline in WAP) appears to be the most realistic. Russia’s institutional behavior in the area of immigration is more reactive than proac- tive, so the low scenario is likely to be exceeded as soon as businesses across the country make their acute deficit of workers known to the upper echelons of power. In response, those in power will expand foreign labor quotas. They will also have to offer naturalization to an ever-increasing number of immigrants, first in the southern regions of the Far East, where new investment projects will require a stable labor force, and then in other regions. At the same time, the absence of a broad social consensus on immigration will continue to restrain migration from abroad and may not allow it to reach the high scenario.

CONCLUSION

In 2007, Russia’s population dynamics entered a new phase, namely decline in the working-age population. From 2011 to 2017, this decline will exceed one million people annually. Labor will become the most deficient resource in Russia, and the country’s demand for immigrants will increase. A few Russian regions appear to be better able to compensate for their decline in working-age population by attracting Russian nationals from other regions, but this will only boost demand for immigrants elsewhere. And while the country already hosts a number of international migrants (second only to that in the United States), Russian society has not yet realized that immigration is their country’s destiny and that Russia’s economic prospects (as well as perhaps its territorial integrity) may depend on it. As a result, we believe it is in Russia’s interest to resolve as soon as possible the glaring contradiction between the demographic challenges it faces and the institutional response to these challenges.

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