Barker et al. J Surveill Secur Saf 2021;2:4265 Journal of Surveillance, DOI: 10.20517/jsss.2020.22 Security and Safety Original Article Open Access Rethinking the adversary and operational characteris- tics of deniable storage Austen Barker, Yash Gupta, James Hughes, Ethan L. Miller, Darrell D. E. Long Baskin School of Engineering, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA. Correspondence to: Austen Barker, Baskin School of Engineering, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA. E-mail:
[email protected] How to cite this article: Barker A, Gupta Y, Hughes J, Miller EL, Long DDE. Rethinking the adversary and operational characteristics of deniable storage. J Surveill Secur Saf 2021;2:42-65. https://dx.doi.org/10.20517/jsss.2020.22 Received: 8 Jul 2020 First Decision: 7 Dec 2020 Revised: 21 Jan 2021 Accepted: 22 Feb 2021 Published: 27 May 2021 Academic Editor: Xiaofeng Chen Copy Editor: Xi-Jun Chen Production Editor: Xi-Jun Chen Abstract Aim: With the widespread adoption of disk encryption technologies, it has become common for adversaries to em- ploy coercive tactics to force users to surrender encryption keys. For some users, this creates a need for hidden volumes that provide plausible deniability, the ability to deny the existence of sensitive information. Previous deni- able storage solutions only offer pieces of an implementable solution that do not take into account more advanced adversaries, such as intelligence agencies, and operational concerns. Specifically, they do not address an adversary that is familiar with the design characteristics of any deniable system.