ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY AUTUMN 2006

ISSUE 64 THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE ISSN 1355-1523 FLIGHT1 SAFETY COMMITTEE

The Official Publication of THE UNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE

ISSN: 1355-1523 AUTUMN 2006 ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY

FOCUS is a quarterly subscription journal devoted to the promotion of best practises in contents aviation safety. It includes articles, either original or reprinted from other sources, related Editorial 2 to safety issues throughout all areas of air transport operations. Besides providing information on safety related matters, FOCUS Chairman’s Column 3 aims to promote debate and improve networking within the industry. It must be emphasised that FOCUS is not intended as a substitute for regulatory information or company The Sweet Spot, or did you really get away with that landing 4 publications and procedures. by Alex Fisher, GAPAN

Editorial Office: Ed Paintin Airport Safety When it comes to the Crunch, 5 The Graham Suite Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking, It’s a Team Game! Surrey. GU24 8HX by Sue Scott - Manager, Safety for Airport Services, NATS Tel: 01276-855193 Fax: 01276-855195 e-mail: [email protected] Web Site: www.ukfsc.co.uk NATS Safety Notice 8 Office Hours: 0900 - 1630 Monday - Friday EXT 01/2006 Use of Satellite Phones to alert UK ATC of an RTF failure

Advertisement Sales Office: UKFSC The Graham Suite, NATS Pilot RTF standards 9 Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking, Surrey GU24 8HX Tel: 01276-855193 Fax: 01276-855195 UKFSC Members List 10 email: [email protected] Web Site: www.ukfsc.co.uk Office Hours: 0900 - 1630 Monday - Friday Flight Outside Controlled Airspace - A Guide 12 Printed by: by The BALPA ATS Study Group Woking Print & Publicity Ltd The Print Works, St. Johns Lye, St. Johns, Woking, Surrey GU21 1RS NATS Mode S in the Terminal Control Centre 16 Tel: 01483-884884 Fax: 01483-884880 Bill Casey - NATS Adrian Price - NATS ISDN: 01483-598501 e-mail: [email protected] Web: www.wokingprint.com Liabilities in a Sick World 19 FOCUS is produced solely for the purpose of by Peter Coles - BLG Hong Kong Office improving flight safety and, unless copyright is indicated, articles may be reproduced providing that the source of material is acknowledged. Reducing the Chance of a Mid-Air Collision in the 21 North Atlantic Opinions expressed by individual authors or in by Steve Kirby, Senior Research Analyst - NATS advertisements appearing in FOCUS are those of the author or advertiser and do not necessarily reflect the views and endorsements of this journal, the editor or the UK Flight Safety Annual Seminar 24 Committee.

While every effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained herein, FOCUS accepts no responsibility for any errors or omissions in the information, or its consequences. Specialist advice should always be sought in relation to any particular Front Cover Picture: Cessna 172 of Flight Images Aerial Photography Company circumstances. painted in high visibility dark blue/yellow paint scheme

1 Editorial

Disruptive Passengers

During the mid 1990s the number of with drugs, prescription or recreational. the event. This information and the Disruptive Passenger Incidents was Perhaps it is time to change the law to terminology is then used when writing starting to attract the attention of the include the effects of drugs and alcohol. their statement for the police. Often when . The United Kingdom Flight providing their statements cabin staff Safety Committee formed the Disruptive This may take some time but it is worth subtly change information and this later Passenger Working Group to look into starting now before drugs become much provides a loophole for the accused when this issue and to make recommendations. more of a problem. they get to court. The result of this working group was the production of a “Guide to Handling The UK Airport Police Commanders Group Operators may have developed their own Disruptive Passengers”. on behalf of ACPO has recently launched a form that their cabin crew are new Disruptive Passenger Protocol. The required to use. It would be beneficial to In 1998 the UKFSC planned to hold its Commanders Group represents 59 airports compare these forms to ensure that the Annual Conference on the subject of in the United Kingdom and Northern company form does record all the Disruptive Passenger Behaviour. Just prior to . Many of these do not have a information required by the police. Or simply this Seminar in October, a cabin attendant permanent police presence and are to just accept the use of the police flying with a charter carrier was attacked on serviced from the local police station. designed form. board the aircraft and hit by a passenger with a bottle causing serious damage to her The national protocol is not a panacea to The Crown Prosecution Service recently person. This incident hit the news and the problem of disruptive passengers. It held a Seminar at Heathrow where issues attracted press attention to the Seminar. sets out a base line or standard through relating to how to make the framing of which the police and Crown Prosecution charges more effective were considered. During 1999 the UK Civil Aviation Authority can communicate and collaborate The CPS has taken over the role of charging started to collect disruptive passenger effectively with the industry throughout the from the police. The CPS are hoping that by information and introduced a form to collect country to prevent disruptive passenger framing the charges better and by collecting this information. The form was embraced behaviour and robustly enforce the law. all the relevant evidence they will be able to by the airlines with the aim of collecting secure more successful prosecutions. valuable information and as a means of The Airport Commanders Group cannot producing statistics previously not available. force airlines or airport authorities to act in It is unlikely that we will ever eliminate a particular way. What it can do is disruptive passenger events particularly The police introduced procedures for encourage local police commanders to sit as airports and operators continue to dealing with disruptive passengers when around the table with airport service serve alcohol before and on flights. In the aircraft landed. The resulting court partners to develop a constructive addition we are likely to see an increase cases had mixed results. working relationship and a clear in the use of recreational drugs, which memorandum of understanding. may cause a corresponding increase in The past six years have seen a steady disruptive behaviour. We must therefore rising number of Disruptive Passenger The fact that an airport does not have a make every effort to co-operate with both incidents mainly caused by the permanent police presence does not the police and the CPS to ensure a higher consumption of alcohol consumed prior to prevent the local police commander from rate of successful prosecutions. and during flight and the inability of implementing the new protocol. passengers to smoke on board the aircraft. Operators who have not had contact with the police at their UK destination airports During the period 2002/3 the law was are encouraged to do so. Good changed increasing the penalty for communication at an early stage of the disruptive passenger behaviour in order operation may make for a much better to give the police more power. relationship in the event of assistance from the police being required. The number of incidents continues to rise, prosecutions continue but some villains Police has developed a form have escaped serious sentences by for cabin staff to use for their original claiming that the small amount of alcohol notes, having experienced a disruptive consumed had reacted with medication passenger incident. The purpose of these they were taking. There is nothing in the notes is to ensure that all the relevant act or the Air Navigation Order that deals information is recorded very shortly after

2 Chairman’s Column

What’s on the Menu? by Ian Crowe, Willis Ltd

I was recently chatting with a retired the “menus” were changing. actions, questioning previous activities Captain who has over 40 years and providing solutions that really work. experience in this industry. In his youth, In this developing aerospace business he had always wanted to fly and was very the menu is constantly changing for all of We all know the phrase “aviate, navigate excited about the prospect of operating a us. Certain philosophies of operation and communicate”. This embodies the shiny new B727. Having passed all the have changed, some for the better. concept of risk management by requirements he was cleared to operate identifying, analysing and categorising as an FO, looking forward to a long and What should always be on the menu is risk to achieve safe operation. This exciting career. safety, which is sometimes easy to miss, phrase is easy to understand and being crowded out by these new prioritise. Without understanding risk Technically demanding to operate but a demands. however, the priorities may change and joy to fly, his thirst for professional the concepts of safety and safe operation knowledge and understanding For engineers, the new menu items now are lost. (encouraged by his crew) knew no include more component replacement; for bounds. air traffic controllers more automation; for My previous column was entitled the risk cabin crew more responsibilities; for flight of complacency. Introducing the The day of his first flight came with the crew more operational management; for concepts and disciplines of risk into our sad news that a close family member had airport operators more aircraft; for daily “menus” of operation must surely been involved in a car accident. Our aviation authorities more legislation and reduce complacency and improve the FO’s problem was, should he visit this for airlines more demands from overall safety of our business. family member or operate the flight? He shareholders. decided to operate the flight. However, his DFO found out what was going on As a risk adviser I view safety from a and the visit took place. By the way, the different perspective. I believe safety is a family member made a full recovery. sub-set of risk, so let us introduce an additional entry to the main course menu Over time as aircraft and systems - RISK. became more sophisticated, he noticed a change in the attitude of some junior flight Understanding risk and the impact it can crew. Rather than asking about the have on operations brings with it its own operation of the aircraft, one of the most set of disciplines, in a life these days that regular questions posed was “What’s on often lacks discipline. the (first class) menu”? What does adding risk to our routines He appreciated that times were changing mean to us in the safety business? and with it the need to adapt to new Perhaps a change in the way we operational procedures. In other words complete a task, self analysis of our

UKUK FLIGHTFLIGHT SAFETYSAFETY COMMITTEECOMMITTEE OBJECTIVESOBJECTIVES

■ To pursue the highest standards of aviation safety. ■ To constitute a body of experienced aviation flight safety personnel available for consultation. ■ To facilitate the free exchange of aviation safety data. ■ To maintain an appropriate liaison with other bodies concerned with aviation safety. ■ To provide assistance to operators establishing and maintaining a flight safety organisation.

3 The Sweet Spot, or did you really get away with that landing? by Alex Fisher, GAPAN

Many pilots are sports players, and are familiar with the concept of the sweet spot. It is that point on the bat or racket where the ball flies off with a wonderful effortless ease. You may wonder what on earth that has to do with landings, but the connection is very close, though not always appreciated. I recall clearly years ago a meeting where recent Flight Data results were being discussed and a number of firm (>2g) landings appeared. The training manager was naturally concerned that the fleet was thumping from the CoG, the bat still moves back through a right angle and just think where the odd airplane through the ‘surface film but it rotates too. The amount of rotation the pilot, the CoG and the wheels of a of concrete’, but he was far more worried depends on the distance of the point of typical airliner are. The crew sit well at how few firm arrivals were reported in contact from the CoG and the moment of forward of the CoG, and the wheels are a the Tech Log. The same discussion just inertia of the bat. The figure (thanks to short distance behind (the wheels must be took place, years later, in the UKFSC. wikipedia) shows the situation where a behind the CoG or the aircraft would sit on While pride might have played some part bar (or bat) is suspended from a wire its bum on the ground). So any impulse at in the lack of reporting, there are sound along which it is free to slide. It shows the wheels caused by them striking the physical reasons why the landing could that a blow right at the end of the bat, ground, produces an upward acceleration be misjudged by pilots sitting at the far moves the CoG to the right, but causes through the CoG (where the FDR records front of the aircraft. Enter the sweet spot. sufficient rotation to move the pivot point it) but also some downwards acceleration, at the top to the left. A blow further up the due to rotation, at the pilot’s seat. Whether The basic physics are easy to bar causes less rotation and so the pivot or not the wheels are exactly at the CoP understand. Whenever a bat hits a ball, point slides to the right. Somewhere does not matter; what is important is that an impulse is imposed on the bat by the between these two blows, the rotation of the impulse felt by the pilot is always less ball (and vice versa). That impulse always the pivot exactly equals the movement of than that felt elsewhere. Conversely, all accelerates the centre of gravity of the the CoG and the pivot remains stationary those sitting behind the CoG enjoy the bat. If the ball hits the bat at its centre of (and the bat rotates around the pivot as if translational impulse plus an impulse due gravity (CoG), all the motion of the bat is it were fixed). If one were holding the bar to rotation. So if your estimate of the ‘translational’ i.e. without any rotation. If at the top when the force was applied at excellence of your landing differs from the the ball hits the bat anywhere else, away that point, there would be no cabin crew’s, they might actually have a force or feeling of the blow; the point. blow has been applied at the Sweet Spot (or Centre of Finally, our FDR showed that the ‘hottest’ Percussion, CoP, for those who firm landings were less likely to be remember their A level Physics). reported than the rest. Again ruling out (For the true pedant, it should be pride, this might be because the faster noted that some sportsmen find landings mean a lower attitude and, the shot is sweeter if the pivot is because the CoG is some distance above further up the wrist, which the wheels, a slightly further forward means a sweet spot may not be position of the CoG relative to the wheels. exactly at the CoP but the This might just heighten the CoP effect. principle is the same). Conversely a firm arrival following a prolonged flare feels more ‘solid’. What is the connection with landings? Just turn everything

4 Airport Safety When It Comes To The CRUNCH,

It’s a Team Game! by Sue Scott - Manager, Safety for Airport Services, NATS

Depending upon the type of airspace and the flight rules being flown, the respective safety responsibilities of pilots and controllers are usually clear. However, on the ground – it’s not always so obvious.

I was asked to write this article following a short presentation I made at an aviation forum recently, and duly grabbed the opportunity to raise awareness of a subject that is causing us some concern. One of the topics I had been talking about was the issue of who has responsibility for preventing collisions between aircraft, vehicles and obstructions on an airport manoeuvring area. Point of Collision Early in 2005, NATS embarked upon a programme of changing the way we where this is not always the case. One or vehicle or with an obstruction. evaluate and improve operational safety such area of concern is that of ground Investigation into recent collisions has within our organisation. We have always collisions, where taxiing or towed aircraft indicated differences in understanding prided ourselves on our strong safety have collided either with another aircraft between drivers, pilots and controllers record and have constantly sought to further improve our safety performance. As part of this work, we have been looking closely at those incidents which, following investigation, have been assessed as having a high safety significance to our operation, whether or not caused by us.

Much of this work has focussed upon “high profile” subjects, such as Runway Incursions, Level Busts and Airspace Infringements. A great deal of activity has gone into working out how to achieve a reduction in both the occurrence rate and severity of these incident types. However, while a great deal of our work has focussed upon those issues where we have an obvious and direct responsibility, we have also widened our scope to assess those safety issues Point of Collision

5 clearance. On taxiing past T1, the port As with most accidents or incidents, both side wingtip of the B767 sliced through events occurred as a result of a number the tailfin of the B737, the second aircraft of causal and contributory factors. holding at T1, causing significant However, an important fact to emerge damage. from these investigations is that, in both these cases, the driver or pilot concerned Another example occurred at Heathrow was operating in the belief that, as they when a Boeing B747-436, which was had ATC approval to proceed, they were being towed from the maintenance area clear of obstacles and other aircraft. to Terminal 1, collided with a stationary Airbus A321 holding at Holding Point The Manual of Air Traffic Services ETTIV behind an Airbus A330. specifies that while an air traffic control service is provided for the purpose of The tug crew had been instructed to preventing collisions in the air, it is proceed via Link 26 and turn left onto provided for the purpose of assisting in taxiway “A”. The A321 was taxiing for preventing collisions on the manoeuvring departure on Runway 27L and had been area. instructed to hold at ETTIV. Upon arrival Photographs taken from AAIB Report 11/2004 at ETTIV, the crew brought the aircraft to a When controlling traffic in the air, the alike, regarding who is responsible for halt behind a A330, also holding. When duties and responsibilities of ATC are maintaining wingtip clearance from other the B747 under tow turned left and began usually well defined, dependent upon the aircraft or obstructions, when to proceed along taxiway A, its port side type of operation. However, the situation manoeuvring on an airport’s surface. wingtip “clipped” the tail of the A321. changes during ground movement operations upon the manoeuvring area. It One example occurred in November 2004 at Manchester when a B767-204 which was taxiing for departure from Runway 24 Left collided with the tailfin of a stationary B737-300. The B737 was holding for departure at Holding Point T1 behind a British Aerospace RJ100. The B767 had just crossed Runway 24R at D1 and was also taxiing for departure from Runway 24 Left. On first contact with the Air Departures controller, the B767 pilot was asked whether a departure from Holding Point VA1 would be acceptable.

The aircraft was subject to a “slot time” and this manoeuvre would allow the aircraft to depart ahead of at least one of the aircraft holding at T1. Having accepted VA1 for departure, the B767 pilot was then given taxi instruction via taxiway “V” for VA1. Both the captain and the co-pilot could see the two aircraft holding at T1 but did not believe there was any problem relating to wingtip Photographs taken from AAIB Report 11/2004

6 is not always possible for ATC to exercise So that’s okay then, wingtip clearance 4. RT discipline; We’ve all heard, or the same level of control which it can between aircraft manoeuvring on the maybe even been part of heated during airborne operations. Other than ground is no concern of the controller – exchanges over the RT; sometimes when operating according to Low Visibility it’s all down to the pilot or the driver? Not arising from irritation over requests to Procedures, where a more positive level entirely; at NATS we are working on a confirm information or clearances. of control of traffic on the surface is campaign to highlight the issue of ground Not only is this unprofessional, it required, a controller is not necessarily collisions and raise awareness of could potentially deter people from aware of all traffic on the manoeuvring individual responsibilities. A poster querying instructions when unsure. A area – many airport vehicles are allowed campaign is planned. This is aimed little tolerance goes a long way. to “free range”. Neither is the controller primarily at pilots and drivers but we are Controllers – a request to confirm always in a position, either visually or with also doing much to improve controller something is not the pilot trying to the assistance of technology, to assess awareness. The following points are second-guess your judgement. Pilots accurately the distance between aircraft aimed at everyone involved in operation – when a controller asks for a which may be operating in close proximity of aircraft or vehicles on the manoeuvring complete read-back, it’s for a good on the surface. The size and dimensions area: reason and not pedantry! of a major airport, coupled with the position and geometry of manoeuvring 1. Pilots: If your taxi clearance requires Like the title says; it’s a team game! In aircraft, can mean visual assessment of you to pass another aircraft, possibly this industry, regardless of our role or wingtip clearance from the control tower already at a holding point or pushed organisation, we all have a moral is not an easy task. Additionally, although back from stand. check: is there responsibility to do everything we can to a large number of airports have Surface room to pass? If you are not sure ensure that we provide a safe and Movement Radar (SMR) installed, this then tell ATC and request further efficient working environment. Lets look technology is not yet sophisticated guidance. out for each other! enough to allow accurate assessment of distance between aircraft or vehicles. 2. Drivers; be aware of other traffic and obstructions around you. ATC may The Air Navigation Order specifies have approved the movement of the “notwithstanding any air traffic control aircraft under tow, but you are still clearance, it shall remain the duty of the required to ensure you maintain commander of an aircraft to take all wingtip/fuselage clearance from other possible measures to ensure that his aircraft and obstructions. aircraft does not collide with any other aircraft or with any vehicle”. 3. Controllers; It is not always possible to assess clearance distances between Also, the Civil Aviation Publication all traffic operating on the surface. CAP637, entitled “Visual Aids Handbook” However, the visibility from the tug or states: “Taxi holding points are normally from the aircraft can also be limited; located so as to ensure clearance and the airfield can look very different between an aircraft holding and any on the ground than it does from the aircraft passing in front of the holding tower. Traffic and RT loading aircraft, provided that the holding aircraft is permitting, exercise caution when properly positioned behind the holding authorising taxi or tow manoeuvres position. Clearance to the rear of any which will bring aircraft into close holding aircraft cannot be guaranteed. proximity. If a non-standard or When following a taxiway route, pilots are unusual manoeuvre is being expected to keep a good lookout and are authorised, consider alerting the pilot responsible for taking all possible to other aircraft in the vicinity. measures to avoid collisions with other aircraft and vehicles”.

7 NATS Safety Notice EXT 01/2006 Use of Satellite Phones to alert UK ATC of an RTF failure

Over the last year the number of The AIP currently provides the following GEN 3.6.6states reported radio failure incidents in UK guidelines/information to operators: airspace increased from 65 to 81, an 4.1 For aircraft flying in the London, Scottish increase of 25%. and Shanwick FIRs/UIRs, in the event ENR 3.2.2.11 states that all other means of communication With the heightened awareness in have failed, dedicated satellite voice airborne security, ATC’s inability to Essential information may be relayed by telephone numbers for the London contact an aircraft experiencing an RT ATC using the ACARS/Data Link. Pilots ATCC (Mil) and Scottish ACC D & D Failure could lead to that aircraft’s may endeavour to use alternative sections and for the Shanwick OAC interception by the Ministry of Defence. methods for communicating with ATC have been programmed into the such as HF. Aeronautical Ground Earth Stations of In order to ensure the safety of aircraft the Inmarsat Signatories. experiencing RT failure within the London The Distress and Diversion Cells (D&D) and Scottish FIRs, pilots and operators serving the London FIR/UIR and the 4.2 The allocated airborne numbers for are able to use the following satellite Scottish FIR/UIR may be contacted by use via the aircraft satellite voice telephone numbers to contact ATC. phone by aircraft that have approved equipment are as ollows: installations that can access the UK These telephone numbers connect telephone network. (b) Shanwick Radio 425002 To be used directly to the appropriate UK Distress for aircraft communications failure. and Diversion Cells (D&D) who then alert The telephone numbers are as follows: (c) London D & D 423202 the appropriate ATC unit and Ministry of London D&D Tel:01895-426150 (d) Scottish D & D 423203 Defence confirming your RT failure. Scottish D&D Tel:01292-692380

8 NATS Pilot RTF standards

NATS has recently conducted a seven day otherwise cleared. For example, on a current level and the cleared level. r/t survey at the four ATC centres in the UK Standard Instrument Departure that When making such an initial call and the and at the 15 airports where NATS provide involves a stepped climb profile, the aircraft is not in level flight, the call shall ATC services. The survey was aimed at initial climb level will be the first level include the aircraft identification determining how frequently air traffic specified in the profile). followed by the cleared level only. controllers have to confirm a cleared level because this has not been included in the When making such an initial call and the first transmission by a pilot and how often On first contact following a frequency aircraft has been assigned a speed, this they detect and correct an incorrect pilot change information shall also be included. read back of a level change clearance. 9.2 Unless otherwise instructed or where When the ATC sector is an approach unit, During the seven day survey period 1454 paragraph 9.1 applies, when changing typically denoted by the airport name and reports were collected. 73% of these communication channel to an ATC unit the suffix Approach, Director or Radar, the reports involved a pilot failing to correctly (including changes within the same ATS initial call by arriving must contain aircraft state their cleared level on first contact with unit), the initial call on the new frequency type information and the ATIS letter. ATC. When pilots fail to report their cleared shall include aircraft identification and level on first contact the air traffic controllers level only. *First en-route ATC unit is the first are required to ask for the information frequency after the tower frequency which leads to additional r/t calls. 20% of When making such an initial call and the irrespective of suffix i.e. London Control, the reports involve a pilot incorrectly aircraft is in level flight but cleared to Radar, Luton Approach etc reading back a level change clearance or another level, the call shall include the stating an incorrect level on first contact. aircraft identification followed by the

By ensuring that the content of the first r/t exchange with each ATC sector contains in association with the correct information and by ensuring that the readback of clearances is correct Nigel Bauer & Associates pilots can reduce the risk of a level bust occurring and assist in reducing QUALITY MANAGEMENT FOR OPERATORS * frequency occupancy levels. JAR-OPS Quality Systems, documentation & auditing 5 days - LGW - 11 Sep, 27 Nov, 12 Feb 07

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9 Members of THE UNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE

Full members Air Seychelles CAA Ben L’Esperance Dave Lewis - MRPS Chairman Sarah Doherty - Safety Data Dept. Willis Ltd ALAE Ed Bewley - Flight Operations Ian Crowe Dave Morrison CargoLux Airlines Vice-Chairman Astraeus Ltd Mattias Pak BMED John Denman Robin Berry Cathay Pacific Airways BAA plc Rick Howell Treasurer Francis Richards Air Contractors CHC Scotia Capt. Anthony Barrett-Jolley BA Connect Mike Whitcombe Capt. Ed Pooley Non Executive Director CityJet RAeS BAE SYSTEMS Reg. A/C Capt. Tom Murphy Peter Richards Alistair Scott Cranfield Safety & Aegean Airlines BALPA Accident Investigation Centre Capt. Dimitris Giannoulatos Carolyn Evans Graham Braithwaite

Aer Arann Belfast Intl. Airport CTC Service Aviation (LAD) Capt. Paddy Callahan Alan Whiteside John Dunne

Aer Lingus BMED DARA Tom Curran Robin Berry Richard Allen

AIG Aviation bmi regional DHL Air Jonathan Woodrow Peter Cork Peter Naz

Airclaims UK Ltd Paul Clark Steve Hull Capt. Jacqueline Mills

Air Contractors British International easyJet Capt. Anthony Barrett-Jolley Capt. Terry Green Capt. Lance Jordan

Air Mauritius Emerald Airways Capt. Francois Marion Fred Holloway

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Advertisment Sales Office: FlightLine Capt. Derek Murphy UKFSC, The Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport, Flyglobespan Chobham, Woking, Surrey. GU24 8HX. Capt. Steve Brown Tel: +44 (0)1276 855193 [email protected] Flyjet Ltd Stefan Kondak

10 GAPAN Rolls-Royce Plc Bond Offshore Helicopters Capt. Alex Fisher Phillip O’Dell Tony Duff

GATCO Ryanair Bond Offshore Helicopters (Maint) Richard Dawson Capt. George Davis John Crowther

GB Airways SBAC Capt. Rob Alabaster Martyn Graham - Secretariat Capt. Derek Whatling Vic Lockwood - FR Aviation Goodrich Actuation Systems Ltd Bristow Helicopters Eng. Gary Clinton ScotAirways Andy Evans Paul Calder Gulf Air Co Eurocypria Capt. Manin Al Said Shell Aircraft Capt. Constantinos Pitsillides Grant Campbell Hong Kong Dragon Airlines Ltd Airways Kwok Chan Singapore Airlines Capt. Spyros Papouis Capt. Patrick Lee Independent Pilots Association flybe. Peter Jackson Smiths Aerospace Neil Woollacott Dr. Marvin Curtiss Jet2.com flybe. Aviation Services Rob Trayhurn SR Technics Ireland Ltd Chris Clark Frank Buggie Irish Aviation Authority MOD Harry McCrink Superstructure Group DASC Capt. Michael Evans Eddie Rogan DASC Eng. Wg Cdr Ian Woodhouse Capt. Stephen Gates TAG Aviation (UK) Ltd QinetiQ Ken New Flt. Lt. Jackie Doncaster Gary Hodgetts TAM Brazilian Airlines QinetiQ Eng. Capt. Marco Castro Keith Wigmore Lufthansa Consulting GmbH Capt. Simon Searle The Boeing Co. RAeS Thor Johansen Peter Richards Malaysia Airlines Capt. Ahmed Zuraidi Thomas Cook Airlines RAeS Eng. Capt. Roger Chandler Jim Rainbow plc Simon Butterworth Thomsonfly Ltd Jez Last Co-opted Advisers Monarch Airlines Capt. Tony Wride Airways AAIB Gavin Staines Capt. Margaret Dean MyTravel Chris King Willis Ltd CHIRP Ian Crowe Peter Tait NATS Paul Jones GASCo Group members John Thorpe Penauille Servisair Keith Gibson bmi Legal Advisor David Barry Vanessa Leigh NetJets Barlow Lyde & Gilbert Capt. Catherine Thompson bmi Eng. Tom Webster Royal Met. Society PrivatAir Dr John Stewart Capt. Patrick Danalet bmi baby Jeremy Purry Qatar Airways Norman Tregaskis

11 Flight Outside Controlled Airspace – A Guide by The BALPA ATS Study Group

IFALPA and BALPA, are opposed to As a result a pilot who is more used to of the sky can be seen, if you twist your the operation of controlled and the protection of controlled airspace (with head. For this reason alone the “see and uncontrolled or unknown traffic in the its prescribed separation standards) be seen” principle is a poor one. Visibility same airspace as this malpractice might be surprised to see aircraft passing in the UK is often weather limited and has contributed to several accidents closer than he/she is used to. Military and military aircraft might be doing 450 knots and numerous airprox incidents and GA pilots are used to being close to other in an area where civil aircraft are limited to therefore is a constant threat to air aircraft, and even if they acquire visual a maximum of 250 knots. Sadly there safety. Controlled and uncontrolled contact at a good distance, might avoid have been collisions between civil and or unknown traffic should be you by a margin that they are perfectly military machines and we wish to reduce effectively segregated, and therefore comfortable with while you are not. In the chances in the future. Military airborne the operation of normal commercial such cases a collision is never in collision avoidance equipment is being air transport outside controlled prospect but one party might be developed too slowly. airspace or equivalent airspace concerned for their safety. providing a known traffic There are a large number of gliding and environment, should be avoided. Be aware of the military Low Flying parachuting sites in the UK. Parachutists System that covers most of the open FIR might drop from 12,000 ft or so and are Class ‘A’ airspace is the ideal but is not from the surface to 2000 ft agl. Tornado perfectly entitled to drop through cloud always a practical solution for many formations of 8 - 10 aircraft travelling at though probably do not often do so for areas, particularly in the UK. IFALPA 450 knots, particularly in the area north of their own safety. Ensuring clearance of disapproves of commercial operations in Newcastle are not uncommon. While one such areas while scanning the sky, less than Class ‘C’ airspace. obviously has to pass through this layer operating complex aircraft equipment and to land, it would be prudent to avoid communicating with the crew is not easy. Class ‘D’ is quite prolific in the UK where extended transits below 2000 ft agl and In the open FIR it is often a requirement fortunately it is operated almost as though try to ensure that final descents are of airmanship to talk to more than one it were Class ‘C’. VFR traffic in Class D is contained as much as possible within an ATS agency at a time as you penetrate given avoidance advice , and this airfield’s local CAS (ATZ, CTZ or CTA). instrument procedures such as around becomes a mandatory instruction in order Sheffield. Overall the workload becomes to keep VFR traffic clear of IFR flights (the very high. only difference between C and D in the Lookout UK is that in Class D separation minima between IFR and VFR are not prescribed). Most airliners have relatively poor Quadrantal Rule “lookout facilities”. The full sphere of view is 4pi steradians and we can only see One should be aware of the quadrantal Airprox Issues about 10% of that. How poorly placed we rule used by aircraft flying IFR outside are is brought home to one sitting in a CAS which reduces planned vertical When one crosses the line between modern RAF fast jet where perhaps 50% separation to 500 ft from the 1000 ft we controlled and uncontrolled airspace (the open FIR), one moves from a known Track ICAO UK traffic environment into one based VFR Recommended Only ultimately on visual sighting (possibly with the assistance of TCAS), where significant NE } 3,500…5,500… 3,000…5,000… volumes of traffic are unknown to any SE } Easterly 3,500…5,500… 3,500…5,500… ATC provider. SW } 4,500…6,500… 4,000…6,000… NW } Westerly 4,500…6,500… 4,500…6,500… ATC will no longer have a complete picture of traffic around you, and you will only be IFR Mandatory informed of aircraft known to them. NE } 1,000…3,000… 3,000…5,000… Excluded from their knowledge will be SE } Easterly 1,000…3,000… 3,500…5,500… aircraft working other agencies, below radar SW } 2,000…4,000… 4,000…6,000… cover or not operating their transponders NW } Westerly 2,000…4,000… 4,500…6,500… (the latter equally negates TCAS).

12 are more familiar with - apart from Charts Leaving Regulated Airspace anything else this can upset TCAS. For VFR traffic the quadrantal rule is only The ? million topographical chart is Aircraft will normally be instructed to leave advisory For flights within class G probably the most suitable chart for controlled airspace at a specific fix or airspace in the UK, the quadrantal rule planning and navigation outside cleared direct to a fix or airfield outside applies to all IFR flights above 3,000 ft (or controlled airspace in the UK. regulated airspace. Even if given direct to the transition altitude). your destination, once you leave Some pilots (probably most operating regulated airspace, it is your responsibility Consider the following scenarios for flight commercial services) will have one of the to remain clear of any other regulated in class G airspace variety of electronic navigation systems airspace, danger area, or airspace available, ranging from handheld GPS restriction. On some occasions, a radar (NB: The table is for flight below 24,500 ft units (even though not an approved aid) service might have been pre-arranged as above 24,500 ft is class B airspace in to full Flight Management Systems (FMS). with a military or other air traffic service the UK, and therefore controlled airspace) Even the simpler systems will usually unit. You will be given a contact have some form of moving map frequency and sometimes a squawk Thus the UK has significant, albeit notified, capability, and it will be rare that no change. When this has not been differences from the ICAO Standards and deviation from the pre-planned route is arranged, it is up to you to try to get Recommended Practices (SARPS) with needed, for weather or traffic. A moving some level of service from an air traffic regard to cruising levels for flight. map will make the task of regaining the service unit that operates in the area, or route simpler but even the more as a last resort, a flight information sophisticated systems will not usually service from London/Scottish Information. Briefing show controlled or other restricted Unless otherwise instructed, if you are not airspace. These should be prepared in receipt of a radar service, you should Some pilots operating outside controlled carefully and accurately prior to flight, as squawk the conspicuity code 7000. airspace will have briefing data provided they will simplify the navigation task. It is by their operator. This data might be unlikely that you will carry a ? million on filtered and this filter might rely on a the aircraft but we would recommend Crossing and Joining Regulated person who is not a pilot. Alternatively that you check it before departure and Airspace you might need to obtain your own place and note the hazards, such as briefing material. Sources of briefing parachute/ gliding sites. You will then You must obtain a crossing clearance for material are NOTAMs, the AIP (Air Pilot) need to note the relative position of such any danger area or airspace restriction and AICs. In Class ‘G’ airspace you will hazards either on the ‘fix’ page of the and a crossing or joining clearance for need to look through the ‘Navigation FMS if practical, or note the relative any regulated airspace well before Warning’ NOTAMs that you would not position of the hazard to a waypoint entering, irrespective of the level of air normally examine when remaining in contained in your FMS flightplan. traffic service you are receiving when in controlled airspace. Class G airspace. The air traffic service unit that is providing you with a service Any operational frequency that might be FMS Integration might obtain the clearances for you, but needed should be found as part of the you must check and not assume that they briefing. It is not sufficient to rely on being FMS eases the navigation task as long as will. If you do have to obtain the passed from one agency to another. If any required route data has been pre- clearances yourself, they can be possible identify any part of the route entered. Liaison with ATC might be requested by free calling the appropriate where it will be necessary to work more improved through accurate ETAs and air traffic control unit responsible for the than one frequency simultaneously and position reporting. airspace. When free calling, have the plan how this will be handled. following information available: Much briefing material is available on the FMS handling must not distract from look- Internet, but some familiarisation is out. Even where an operator has an Callsign, aircraft type, departure point, needed to obtain this effectively. agreement with NATS that the best destination, the point at which you wish to possible service will be provided, not all cross/join, an estimate for that point, and traffic will be known to ATC. the level you want to be at. You must request the clearance well in advance,

1913 ideally 10 minutes before the airspace service (RAS subject to the controller’s RAS and RIS boundary, and remain clear until a workload). clearance has been issued. To join the Receipt of RAS provides a known traffic airways system, try to get the air traffic There may be limitations to either service and known intentions environment (i.e. service unit you are working, to get the the controller provides due to the limits of like Radar Control inside controlled clearance for you. If this is not possible, radar cover, weather or other radar clutter, airspace) but only against RAS and RIS then call London/Scottish Information for traffic density, if the radar performance is participating aircraft. Therefore, the a joining clearance, giving at least 10 suspect or if the controller is using SSR intentions of non-participating aircraft, minutes notice, as it can take a long time only. Most have published hours of cover, even if squawking what is termed a to get a clearance this way. It is still your though a service might be available “validated & verified” (by another ATC responsibility to get a flow control slot, if outside these hours on a ‘call and see’ unit) SSR code (that is, one which has a one is required, before asking for a basis. LARS coverage on weekdays during Mode-C readout that is taken as being joining clearance. On a final point, it is the daytime currently takes in most of correct) might not be known, with the not guaranteed that you will get a mainland Britain with the exception of SW result that quite violent avoiding action crossing or joining clearance issued, so and the West of . However might have to be passed if the other you will need to have a contingency plan there has been a general reduction in aircraft suddenly changes course or to cover this. LARS cover as military airfields are height. Controllers endeavour to “co- rationalised, and cost considerations bite ordinate” such flights if they affect at civil units. Requesting a service from a someone receiving RAS, and in doing so Lower Airspace Radar Service (LARS) unit which is not listed as a LARS provider agree a temporary course of action to might be unsuccessful. maintain prescribed separation. However, In many cases the transfer of radar service if the other aircraft is simply squawking will be seamless and the only indication LARS can be used by aircraft en route in the 7000 or 7001 for example, it is not that one has left controlled airspace will FIR below FL95. Whenever possible they will possible to undertake this inter-unit co- be the change of service provided from be handed over from controller to controller ordination because the aircraft might not radar control to radar advisory or radar in an area of overlapping radar cover. be under the control of any ATS unit and information. However where the executive Details are in the UK AIP ENR section 1.6.3. even if in R/T contact, would not be ATC unit is not equipped with radar (e.g. identified anyway. Therefore, once again Inverness/Sheffield), one may be able to violent avoiding action might need to be make use of LARS from an adjacent unit. Middle Airspace (Radar) Service passed if the other aircraft suddenly If doing so, one must clearly state the fact changes course or height – not that executive control is with another Middle Airspace (Radar) Service is recommended for passenger comfort!! authority to avoid as far as possible, available subject to unit tasking and conflicts of ATC clearances. This will workload between FL100 and FL245 ATCOs find that many civil flight crew - usually entail the use of two VHF radios, outside controlled airspace except for especially those who did not come into so due regard must be given to the CRM flight along advisory routes, for flight civil flying via a military route - do seem to aspects of having two sets to monitor in a within the NORCA (Northern Off-Route equate RAS in the FIR with radar control busy phase of flight. Also if any turns Co-ordination Area) and for flight within in Class A, but the question of known given under a RAS would involve a the Sumburgh FISA (Flight Information intentions is a subtle but crucially deviation from one’s inbound clearance, Service Area). Like LARS, it consists of important element when receiving RAS. this must be approved by the executive RAS or RIS provided by military area ATCOs do not believe RAS in Class G is controller who may well be applying radar units (LATCC Military and Scottish any substitute for having adequate procedural control – the extra R/T involved Military), some military airfield units (e.g. controlled airspace that provides a known may lead one to the conclusion that a RIS Boscombe Down) and some civil units traffic and a known intentions is more appropriate. (e.g. Warton RASA) Radar Advisory environment. Service Area). This is for example, the LARS is provided by designated military service that a military aircraft receives If you are in receipt of a RIS the controller and civil ATSUs up to FL95 within from Scottish Military or LATCC Military will advise the bearing, distance and if approximately 30 nautical miles of the between FL100 and FL245 in the area known, the level of conflicting traffic, but radar head. The service available is a also served by Pennine Radar. unlike RAS no avoiding action will be radar advisory or radar information Details are in the UK AIP ENR section 1.6.4 offered. The pilot is wholly responsible

14 for maintaining separation from other remember is of course that all of the be all of the traffic as there is no aircraft, whether or not the controller has basic principles of good CRM apply. obligation in Class G to either transpond passed traffic information. Because there are so many factors which or talk to anybody, and remember the Details in the UK AIP ENR section 1.6.1 must be given a high priority there is no algorithims of TCAS which will remove See also AIC 71/2001. substitute for recognising where the traffic displayed in certain cases, although periods of high workload are likely to be, still always giving RAs when required). and then briefing thoroughly in advance - Flightdeck Workload and Situational be that on the ground or through a timely Finally there are enormous benefits in Awareness and relevant approach briefing. It is developing a good knowledge of Air important not only that note is taken of Traffic Services and the varied It should be clear from much of the areas of activity such as parachuting and responsibilities of, and limitations placed foregoing that the considerations involved gliding sites etc. but that the full on, controllers in the various types of in flying outside CAS are many and implications are understood by the crew airspace. This is particularly vital for those varied. It becomes obvious that all of members (e.g. gliders flying cross country of us who spend most of our time in these factors will have a significant may be found at any position or level, not controlled airspace who might have too bearing on the crew’s level of situational just near gliding sites). Even a little high an expectation of the service being awareness (SA) and overall capacity. knowledge of how other airspace users operate is useful The basic principles of CRM are now well in anticipating potential established and understood within the conflictions. Think about relative flight crew community but it is important speeds and maneuverability (or to bear in mind that many UK operators lack of!) of other types of traffic - spend the bulk of their time operating remember all those most basic inside CAS where there is a certain Rules of the Air? Do you use, or predictability to the ATC service provided, does your operator promote, a the types of traffic involved and the likely more formal outside scan when future movement of this traffic. A outside controlled/regulated familiarity with standing agreed levels and airspace? For example, the ATC sectorisation all enhances this amount of outside scanning mental picture to the benefit of the entire might be radically different over crew’s overall level of SA. the Vale of York compared with the North Atlantic. In contrast the traffic situation outside CAS can be extremely varied and Similarly a really thorough dynamic. The combination of high knowledge of the types of workload due to phase of flight (climb, airspace to be used, service descent or approach) with the available and the limitations of requirement to maintain a good lookout, that service is vital - this can be remain clear of terrain (particularly in comprehensively briefed on the ground provided outside CAS. ATS units are those areas without the backup of ground (is there an ICAO Airspace Classifications always very keen to see pilots on radar cover) and possibly work a number chart in your Ops/Briefing room?). familiarisation visits and the mutual of frequencies all adds significantly to the Discussing in advance which ATS units benefits are immense. The more that crew’s workload. The obvious danger is (e.g. LARS) will be used and which pilot pilots and controllers can learn about that this can lead to one or all crew will work which frequencies, will mean each other’s operational problems and members becoming overloaded with a less decision making during a busy limitations the more realistic will be the subsequent breakdown in crew period. Also where appropriate it can be expectations we have of each other. communication and cross-cockpit useful just to monitor a frequency even if monitoring. there is no requirement to work it, this together with judicious use of TCAS can So how best to manage this additional help to build up a picture of surrounding workload? The first important point to traffic (but always remember this will not

15 NATS Mode S in the London Terminal Control Centre. Bill Casey - NATS Adrian Price - NATS 1. Introduction and Background allows selective interrogation of aircraft that the facility to display Selected providing the potential to eliminate, Altitude has helped controllers to NATS provides Air Traffic Control (ATC) amongst other things, the synchronous intervene in situations, which might have services to aircraft flying in UK airspace, garbling of replies. Enhanced Mode S otherwise led to the erosion of standard and over the eastern part of the North enables the selective interrogation of separation. Atlantic. The London Terminal Control aircraft plus the facility to down-link It is accepted that whilst the display of Centre (LTCC) is based at West Drayton specific airborne parameters from the selected altitude is an obvious safety and is responsible for traffic below 24,500 cockpit, such as Indicated Airspeed and enhancement, aircraft label overlap and feet arriving at, or departing from, the five Selected Altitude. human workload limitation will affect the main airports close to London. For a 30 controllers’ ability to check the Selected Year period NATS, along with every other Altitude every time a vertical clearance is ATC service provider, relied on Secondary 4. Benefits of Mode S Technology issued. Time delays incurred whilst Surveillance Radar (SSR) to provide information is input into the MCP/FCU aircraft information. During that time, Improved integrity of radar surveillance reduce the controllers’ ability even further. traffic levels have increased dramatically and the availability of Mode S Down- Therefore, the requirement for aircrew to and it became vital to exploit new Linked Airborne Parameters (DAPs) have read-back all clearances and for technology, which addressed the enabled NATS to develop controller controllers to check the read-back will not limitations of SSR. In December 2005 support tools that have provided benefits be affected by introduction of Mode S NATS introduced the next generation of to the safety and efficiency of ATC and the display of Selected Altitude. SSR technology called Mode Select operations. A three year development (Mode S) into the LTCC (References 1 programme has culminated in a system and 2). The purpose of this article is to where the display of aircraft information is 7. Target Label give a short insight into Mode S, its easily assimilated and understood. The development, functions, and its Mode S tool-set consists of two main Mode S information has been displayed operational introduction. elements: the Vertical Stack List (VSL) and in the aircraft Target Labels of suitably the display of DAPs in the Target Label. equipped aircraft, on all LTCC sectors since December 2005. Fig 1 shows the 2. Traditional SSR Target Label of BMA3XF. The Mode C 5. Safety Benefits readout and intention (or destination) The previous Mode A/C SSR technology code shown in line 2 is unchanged from worked on a general ‘broadcast and For Enhanced Mode S aircraft the the previous format. (LL represents a receive’ principal that has recognised Selected Altitude entered by the crew into flight inbound to Heathrow.) As well as problems and limitations. The integrity the Mode Control Panel (MCP) or Flight traditional information, the Mode S Target of Mode A/C surveillance can be Control Unit (FCU), that feeds into the Label also displays aircraft DAPs. adversely affected by garbling of replies aircraft’s auto pilot system, can now be from aircraft close together (especially in down-linked and displayed to ATC. Mode stack airspace). In addition, Mode C S Selected Altitude is potentially one of replies have no encoded identity and rely the most useful pieces of data to prevent on the association to the correct target by Level Busts as it provides the opportunity the ground system processing. These of alerting ATC if there has been any acknowledged limitations can affect the misinterpretation of the altitude/level integrity of the information displayed to clearance. Aircrew should be aware that ATC. a controller may challenge that reading if there is any doubt over the cleared level.

3. Mode S Technology Fig 1: Mode S information in the Target 6. Display of Selected Altitude Label. There are two levels of Mode S, Elementary and Enhanced. Elementary Operational experience to date indicates

16 The MCP/FCU Selected Altitude is Fig. 2 shows a normal radar picture of the 9. Cockpit Procedures displayed in line two in the dark orange Bovingdon Hold on the left together with colour to distinguish it from the Actual an enhanced view of the same hold as The cockpit procedures for setting the Flight Level (Mode C). In Fig 1 BMA3XF depicted in the Vertical Stack List on the MCP/FCU are vital in realising the has selected 15000 feet and is passing controller’s display. By utilising the potential safety benefits of introducing Flight Level 165. integrity of Mode S derived altitude Mode S. Fig 3 shows an example of a Many pilots will select the missed reports, the tool provides a vertical typical Mode Control Panel. approach altitude once the aircraft is representation of aircraft in stack established on final approach. The Selected Altitude Selected Altitude is automatically removed from the target label before this occurs to avoid any confusion. If the system detects that the aircraft has broken off the approach and is climbing then the Selected Altitude will automatically be displayed again providing the controller with the aircraft’s airspace. So, by monitoring the VSL, the Fig 3: Mode Control Panel revised intention. controller can continuously see call-signs Down-linked Mode S parameters such as and occupied levels in the stack, even The following cockpit techniques will Ground Speed, Indicated Air Speed, and when SSR labels overlap on the radar enhance safety in the London Terminal Magnetic Heading can also be displayed display. Control airspace (Ref: 3): in line 3 of the Target Label either In the VSL, the white numbers in the individually, or in combination using a column on the left-hand side of the VSL ■ Upon receipt of an altitude clearance ‘quick-set display’ facility. In Fig 1 are the Flight Levels that are selected for from ATC, immediately set the Magnetic Heading has been selected display by the controller. The call-sign assigned/cleared altitude in the showing 135 degrees (prefixed with an ‘H’ and Mode C (height derived via Mode S) altitude select window (except when to denote Heading). of the holding aircraft are shown in green established on the ILS). in the middle two columns and the final column shows the aircraft’s Selected ■ Positively confirm the altitude 8. Vertical Stack Lists Altitude. clearance via R/T read-back. The system tracks arrivals to each of the The most innovative function in the Mode S four Heathrow stacks. Population to and Please note that many operators require Tool Set is the VSL. It has been designed exit from the vertical Stack Lists is the Selected Altitude to be cross-checked to compliment and support existing automatic with the aircraft descending in by both pilots; an action that is endorsed operations by providing controllers with the VSL as the controller issues descent by the Flight Safety Foundation (Ref: 4). enhanced vertical situational awareness in instructions. As the aircraft continues its Adherence to the above procedure will busy stack airspace. descent, its progress is automatically maximise the controllers’ opportunity to updated in the list and the aircraft is check the altitude selected in the cockpit. removed when it meets defined criteria. Controllers have been advised that there The system applies standard ATC rules is no absolute guarantee that an aircraft regarding level allocation and departure. will actually level off at or maintain the Through the use of the VSL, controllers Selected Altitude. For example an aircraft no longer need to confirm via RT that may not adhere to the Selected Altitude levels have been vacated. Thus, RT when the autopilot is being used with an congestion is reduced and stack incorrect mode or has suffered a management is enhanced. technical problem. An incorrect pressure setting on the altimeters’ subscale will also invalidate the Selected Altitude. Fig 2: The Vertical Stack list

17 10. Conclusion 11. References Telephone: +44 (0)1895 426356 eMail: [email protected] The display of Selected Altitude to ATC 1. AIC105/2004 (Yellow 155) Web: www.nats.co.uk along with R/T read-back will confirm the promulgated by the CAA 11 Nov aircrew’s interpretation of the 2004. © 2006 NATS (En-route) plc, (‘NERL’). assigned/cleared level. The ability of a 2. AIC49/2005 (Yellow 171) promulgated This document contains commercially controller to check the Selected Altitude in by the CAA 23 Jun 2005 confidential information. All changes to the target label and the VSL is dependant 3. AIC4/2006 (Yellow 187) promulgated this document shall be authorised by upon workload the elapsed time between by the CAA 5 Jan 2006 NERL, including its issue, amendment the vertical clearance being issued and 4. Briefing note 3.2 issued Year 2000 by and distribution. In the event that this that value being displayed back to the the Flight Safety Foundation Approach document is superseded, or no longer controller and the aircraft label being and Landing Accident Reduction required by a designated holder, that clearly displayed. Aircrew can assist ATC (ALAR), “Altitude Deviations”. holder shall ensure its safe return to NATS. by promptly entering the new altitude in the altitude select window every time a For more information on the Mode S in vertical clearance is issued. For the LTCC please contact: Enhanced Mode S aircraft the display on the controllers’ radar displays of Selected Mr William Casey Altitude, together with VSLs, are Operational Support & Development potentially a great step forward in safety NATS, Porters Way, West Drayton, and the campaign to reduce level busts UB7 9AX, United Kingdom

18 Airline Liabilities in a Sick World by Peter Coles – BLG Hong Kong Office

Summary: The close confines of an establish special measures to be adopted If a passenger contracts a disease prior to aircraft cabin carry the potential for on- during a public health emergency of his flight then the carrier will not be liable to board transmission of diseases and with it international concern. that passenger under the Warsaw/Montreal the potential also for resulting claims liability regime if the illness then develops against the airline. Evidential difficulties In some countries, proposals are afoot to during the flight since the passenger would may defeat some claims but, where it is hold carriers directly responsible for have embarked with a pre-existing medical clear that passengers have been exposed disease outbreaks if they fail to comply condition. to an infectious disease, there is a real risk with regulations. A good example is the of carrier liability. proposed amendments to the US Code If, however, it is established that a of Federal Regulations Parts 70 and 71 passenger on board was in a contagious In 1979, 72% of passengers on one which imposes fines of US$250,000 and stage of disease and other passengers aircraft contracted influenza. The attack US$500,000 for any violation of the bring claims for illnesses they contracted rate was associated with the ventilation regulations by an individual and on board then the claimants will need to system not being in operation during a organization respectively. prove they contracted the disease on three hour ground delay. Since 1979, board the aircraft or during the period of there have been several other reported embarkation and/or disembarkation and cases of on-board transmission of Air Carrier Liability that the fact that they were exposed to the diseases. For example, in 1996 six of the disease constituted an “accident” for the 249 passengers on board a flight from Airlines have a potential liability exposure purposes of Article 17 of the Warsaw or Chicago to Hawaii were found to have to passengers (a) where the airline or its Montreal Conventions. The former issue caught the pathogenic bacterium which ground handlers know or have may well present significant evidential causes tuberculosis when they travelled reasonable cause to suspect at check-in difficulties. Without very clear evidence, it on the same flight as a woman suffering or at the gate that a passenger has an is always arguable that disease from tuberculosis. illness but fails to take any precautionary transmission could have occurred prior to steps to check that the passenger is embarkation, e.g. on public transport to medically fit to fly or deny boarding the airport, check-in queues, security check- Regulations passenger; (b) where the airline discovers points, customs, shops and restaurants. in flight that a passenger on board has an In relation to whether there has been an Airlines are expected to comply with illness but fails either to take steps to article 17 accident, the carrier does face a international health regulations, which are isolate the passenger or honour requests liability risk provided the contraction arose designed to prevent the international by other passengers for alternative as a result of an unexpected and unusual spread of disease while interfering as little seating; (c) where the airline fails to call event that was external to the passenger. as possible with travel and trade. It is their and await the assistance of medical Poor air quality in an aircraft cabin leading responsibility to be familiar with the authorities at destination before permitting to a passenger contracting pneumonia specific laws and regulations concerning disembarkation; (d) where the airline is has already been held to amount to an infectious diseases applying to notified that a passenger on one of its accident (Dias v- Transbrazil Airline 1998 passengers and shipments at points of flights had an illness but fails to take SDNY). Following the Olympic Airways v entry for each destination country, as well reasonable steps to trace all the Hussain case - in which an asthma as the laws on safety procedures and on passengers on that flight; (e) where sufferer died following exposure to release of passenger information (data passengers are infected because cigarette smoke after his request to be privacy) where they carry infectious defective equipment or systems have moved further away from the smoking agents or people. resulted in the contamination of the air section had been refused - and the supply; (f) where the airline fails to English Court of Appeal’s analysis of this The WHO’s International Health prevent sick crews from continuing in the judgment in the UK DVT litigation, it is Regulations 2005, which do not come into workplace; and, possibly, (g) failing to also open to a court to hold that an effect until 2007, will establish basic rules warn passengers of the risk of disease airline’s failure to isolate a passenger or for international coordination in the transmission during air travel and the move another passenger against a known detection, investigation and response to steps that can be taken to help prevent risk that a disease may be contracted on diseases including treatment and will infection. board is an “accident”.

19 Refusal of carriage If a flight is cancelled due to Government Conclusions action then the airline may be able to rely Many airlines reserve in their tickets and upon force majeure provisions in its Absent actual evidence of disease general conditions of carriage a right to conditions of carriage allowing it to walk transmission during a stage of right to refuse carriage to a passenger if away from its obligation to carry the transportation which airlines are necessary to comply with government passengers. Alternatively, it may be able responsible for, airlines have minimal regulations or if carriage endangers to rely upon the doctrine of frustration exposure to awards of damages although safety or health or comfort of other provided that the action of the claims will have to be defended. On the passengers and the crew. In reality, Government was not foreseeable. other hand, if there is evidence to unless the passenger discloses their demonstrate that passengers are being medical condition or is exhibiting clear If flights to which EU Regulation 261/2004 or have been exposed to an infectious symptoms, these provisions will be of little applies are cancelled, the carrier will have disease then the potential exposure to benefit to the carrier. The carrier must certain obligations including offering private law damages and government also keep in mind that there are specific passengers a choice between re-routing imposed penalties is significant. BLG air carriage regulations - like the US Air and reimbursement of the full ticket price; Aerospace has conducted an extensive Carrier Access Act or broader anti- plus assistance (phone calls, investigation into the above issues after discrimination regulations elsewhere - refreshments and accommodation); plus handling a number of SARS and influenza which may prevent refusal of carriage compensation. If flight cancellations related claims in Hong Kong. unless there is something more than just occur as a result of government action or a “reasonable belief” that someone has for other reasons outside the carrier’s an infectious disease. The carrier may control, the carrier may avoid having to need to weigh the legal consequences of pay compensation but will remain obliged refusing carriage to one passenger to provide a refund or re-routing and care against the risk of allowing them to fly and assistance to the passenger. with an infectious condition.

Flight cancellations

Flight cancellations may arise as a result a dramatic turndown in demand as we saw in Asia during the SARS epidemic. An airline’s liability for cancellation is governed by its contract with passengers and by domestic or EU law rather than international air law conventions.

Many carriers exclude or limit their liability in respect of flight cancellations in their ticket conditions of contract or general conditions of carriage. However, these are not watertight. It is always open to passengers to argue that these conditions (a) were not incorporated into the contract (an argument which often succeeds in Thailand, for example); or (b) that they amount to unfair contract terms and, therefore, are void; or (c) that they do not apply to non-performance of the contract.

20 Reducing the Chance of a Mid-Air Collision in the North Atlantic Brief Introduction to the North Atlantic by Steve Kirby, Senior Research Analyst - NATS

North Atlantic airspace is delegated to controllers scrutinise these periodic centreline or one or two nautical mile various states that manage the airspace reports to ensure that aircraft remain offsets to the right of centreline only. on behalf of ICAO. The UK and Ireland safely separated. However, the choice is left up to the pilot. share a region of the North Atlantic called Shanwick (derived from ‘Shannon’ and The Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure ‘Prestwick’), which extends out to the Improved Navigation and Lateral recommends that pilots use all available middle of the North Atlantic Ocean. HF Overlap means to select the most appropriate radio communications operators are position to fly, including visual acquisition, based at Shannon, Ireland, whereas the The introduction of very accurate aircraft collision avoidance systems and controllers are based at NATS’s oceanic navigation systems such as global communications with other aircraft. It centre at Prestwick, in Scotland. navigation satellite system (GNSS) along allows pilots to change position more with sophisticated flight management than once in the flight, if appropriate. For The structure of airspace in the North systems has enabled aircraft to navigate example, for overtaking manoeuvres, for Atlantic is very different from, and much to such a high level of accuracy that avoiding wake vortex turbulence, or to simpler than, UK domestic airspace, for aircraft on the same track but at different avoid flying directly above or below other several reasons. levels are increasingly likely to be directly aircraft. above or below one another. This Firstly, due to passenger demands, time improved navigational performance An alternative way that pilots may zone differences and restrictions on night increases the chance of mid-air collision if implement the procedure is to choose by time flying, there are two distinct flows an aircraft deviates from its cleared level, random a position to fly (i.e., track across the North Atlantic. Most for whatever reason. The chance of centreline or one or two nautical miles to westbound aircraft leave in the getting lateral overlap has increased the right) and remain in that position for morning or early afternoon arriving in the eighteen-fold since 1977, and is set to the duration of the transit through North Americas in the late afternoon and early increase further. Atlantic airspace. This less flexible evening. Eastbound aircraft leave the approach provides less benefit than the Americas in the evening and arrive in The chance of such a lateral overlap tactical approach described above, but Europe in the morning. combined with increasing traffic levels nevertheless spreads aircraft out laterally, and density, and a relatively high number thus reducing risk of collision for all The jet stream, which changes daily, of large height deviations at present, aircraft, but particularly for the offsetting dictates the minimum time track between prompted the North Atlantic Systems aircraft. city pairs. A series of tracks are published Planning Group (NAT SPG) to introduce twice daily which coincide with the the Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure minimum time track for the most popular (SLOP) for North Atlantic region airspace The Current Take-Up of the Procedure city pairs. Typically five or so tracks are on 10th June 2004. published, and are usually parallel to one For maximum risk reduction, all flights another. This scheme is called the would be distributed evenly between the Organised Track Structure. About half of How Strategic Lateral Offsets Work three lateral positions. However, recent all North Atlantic traffic flies on this studies by NATS’s Operational Analysis structure. This is an efficient way of The Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure department have indicated that few flights managing such traffic. was introduced specifically to reduce the in the North Atlantic airspace region chance of mid-air collision by spreading routinely adopt strategic lateral offsets. Perhaps the biggest difference from out aircraft laterally (see Figure 1). It Analysis suggests that less than 10% of domestic airspace is that control is reduces the chance of collision for non- flights are adopting strategic lateral procedural, due to the fact that little radar normal events such as operational offsets at present. This take-up is coverage is available. Pilots report their altitude deviation errors and somewhat disappointing considering the positions every 10° of longitude or so and turbulence?induced altitude deviations. In substantial safety benefit, and that the the time when at these positions. NATS essence, the procedure demands that procedure has been in place for more aircraft in North Atlantic airspace fly track than two years.

21 procedures specific to the North Atlantic region.

NATS is committed to supporting and promoting collision risk reduction measures in the North Atlantic region.

Figure 1 The SLOP intends to spread aircraft out laterally with the use of two offsets to the right.

NAT SPG and NATS are trying to redress Summary this via an on-going education campaign. Recent initiatives have included the In summary, the Strategic Lateral Offset production of a training/educational DVD Procedure is designed to spread out aimed at pilots, dispatchers and others aircraft laterally in North Atlantic airspace concerned with operations in the North in order to bring a significant reduction in Atlantic (available free on application to the chance of a mid-air collision. The [email protected]), and procedure will be especially effective producing various publications for the when crews take local traffic into pilot community. consideration, using all means available to monitor other aircraft. The procedure Because more than 90% of flights remain reduces the risk of collision for non- on the track centreline, crews that normal events such as operational routinely fly 1 Nm or 2 Nm offsets in altitude deviation errors and accordance with the procedure are turbulence?induced altitude deviations. benefiting from a very large reduction in mid-air collision risk. Crews that fly track A full description of the procedure can be centreline are currently much more likely found at http://www.nat-pco.org. This site to be involved in a mid-air collision. also provides free access to the latest version of the North Atlantic Operations Manual which details this and other

22

UK FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE

A RE-EVALUATION OF AVIATION TRAINING Annual Seminar 2006

2nd/3rd October 2006 The Radisson Edwardian Hotel Heathrow

SEMINAR OBJECTIVE The complex world of modern airline operations demands the highest levels of both competence and commitment. The operation of the most advanced aircraft types and their maintenance, ground and air traffic handling, and the processing of many hundreds of passengers per flight, requires an ever-changing training commitment. Once again, the UKFSC has brought together a cross-section of experts to re-evaluate the scope of training needs and the resources required. If your company aspires to be among the best, you should attend this Seminar. PROGRAMME

2nd October 2006 2000hrs Seminar Dinner After Dinner Speaker - Paul Barron - CBE - Chief Executive NATS

3rd October 2006

0800 - 0900 Registration Session Chairman - Capt. Robin Berry - BMED 0900 - 0915 Welcoming Introduction - Ian Crowe - Chairman – UKFSC 0920 - 0945 Keynote Speech - Capt. Bob Screen - Aviation Consultant 0945 - 1020 Training Deficiencies - What the Accidents Tell Us - Dave King, Chief Inspector of Air Accidents - AAIB 1020 - 1040 Refreshment Break 1040 - 1115 Training on Automated Systems - Capt. Simon Wood – BSc, BA, MSc Director, CAA Flight Operations Research Centre of Excellence - Cranfield University 1115 - 1150 Air Traffic Controller Training Coping with Change - Suzie Rudzitis, General Manager Training & Operational Resources - NATS 1150 - 1225 Questions 1225 - 1340 Lunch 1340 - 1415 Military Training for the 21st Century - Gp.Capt.Les Garside - Beattie - Head of RAF Training 1415 - 1450 Decision Making in Command - Capt. Chris White FRAeS - Parbrook Aviation 1450 - 1505 Comfort Break 1505 - 1540 Engineering Training - Steve Pennington, Director Maintenance Training and Standards - Alteon 1540 - 1615 Cabin Crew Training for European-wide Operations - Chris Hewitt - easyJet 1615 - 1645 Questions 1645 - 1700 Closing Speech - Ian Crowe - Chairman - UKFSC 24 SEMINAR INFORMATION • Hotel Accommodation Hotel accommodation is not included in the Seminar Registration Fee. If you require accommodation please contact the hotel directly on Tel. +44 (0) 20 8759 6311

• Seminar Dinner Dress for Dinner – Black Tie

If you are unable to attend why not nominate a colleague to take your place. If so, please advise the UKFSC Fairoaks office of any changes prior to the Seminar. ✃

SEMINAR REGISTRATION FORM Please complete in full one registration form per person. (Photocopies accepted) (Please print clearly) First Name: Surname: Company: Job Title: Address:

Tel No: Fax No: e-mail:

PAYMENT INFORMATION

Seminar Fee: UKFSC Member £185 Non-UKFSC Member £235

This includes the Seminar Dinner on the even 2nd October, lunch, refreshments and car parking. This does not include hotel accommodation - please see 'Seminar Information'.

Payment is by Sterling cheque only. No credit cards are accepted. Bank transfer is available, details on request (please note an additional cost of £6 will be added to cover handling charges). The UKFSC is not VAT Registered.

Sterling cheques should be made payable to UK Flight Safety Committee.

• Do you plan to attend the Seminar Dinner on Monday 2nd October? Yes No • Do you require a Vegetarian alternative? Yes No

PLEASE SEND YOUR COMPLETED REGISTRATION FORM WITH YOUR CHEQUE TO: UK Flight Safety Committee, Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking, Surrey GU24 8HX Tel: +44 (0)1276 855193 Fax: +44 (0)1276 855195 email: [email protected] Confirmation will be sent to you on receipt of your Registration Form and payment.

25 2nd & 3rd October The Radisson Edwardian Hotel, Heathrow