Lange, S. 2020. A Deal over Dirt. Worldwide Waste: Journal of Interdisciplinary :25/':,'(:$67( Studies, 3(1): 1, 1–10. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/wwwj.35 -2851$/2),17(5',6&,3/,1$5<678',(6

RESEARCH A Deal over Dirt From a German-German Bargain to the Creation of an Environmental Problem in the 1980s

Sophie Lange

In the 1970s, West Berlin started to transport its waste to East-German dumpsites. By the 1980s, ­Hamburg and other West German municipalities had followed suit, depositing their waste in Schönberg landfill, a waste disposal site situated in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) barely five kilometers from the German-German border. What began as an inner-German agreement with benefits for both sides soon developed into an environmental problem for the West German government. This article focuses on the strategies with which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) tried to assuage critical voters and cope with a dumping ground at its border. It is argued that because of the demands for political action by the people living close to the dump the ‘greening’ of politics, which means the inclusion of environmental concerns on the political agenda, produced ambiguous results.

Keywords: environment; waste export; Germany; Cold War; politics; globalization

Introduction Schönberg dump (1993). But what is there beyond the In March 1986, The Economist published a commentary economic trade? Generally speaking, dumpsites emerge in entitled ‘Rubbish between Germans’, which concluded locations, both regional and global, in which the economy that West German ecologists were hard to satisfy (1 is weak.2 Thus, as Melanie Arndt (2012) has argued, any March 1986: 46). It referred to a group of Green Party environmental history must also consider the question of members who had placed two oil barrels labeled ‘dioxin’ power relations, the quest for resources and supremacy, and ‘Schönberg—toxic­ zone A’ (‘Schönberg—Giftzone at play. Scrutinizing the power relations of the actors A’) directly on the inner-German border in protest (Der involved—between the GDR and the FRG, but also within Spiegel 8/1986: 52–53). They were protesting against the the FRG itself—offers a promising approach for analyzing export of toxic waste from the Federal Republic of Ger- the Schönberg dump at its border. many (FRG) to Schönberg, a deposit site in the German Furthermore, the example of Schönberg raises much Democratic Republic (GDR) close to the West German bor- larger questions concerning the handling of (toxic) waste der. Yet the waste export which the Greens were demon- generally, the problems of industrial modernity, and the strating against had been put into place long before this interconnections between globalization and the Cold War. protest begun. Established in the 1970s, this practice was In the latter case for example, given that the waste deal ostensibly a win-win situation for both German states. between the two German states served the idea of détente The GDR’s flagging economy received payment in hard within a bipolar Cold War world (Hünemörder 2010), it currency and the FRG was able to offload some of their might also be representative­ of a different process, namely growing waste problems. ­globalization (Iriye 2013). If we presume that the rise of Although research on German-German environmental globalization is rooted in the Cold War, then the efforts by history (Kirchhof 2015; Uekötter 2018; Eckert 2019) and the two German states to come to an agreement over the on the inner-German waste deal1 is currently in vogue, the ­regulation of West German waste exports to Schönberg literature has thus far interpreted the deal between the might also be an example of how these powerful forces two states as mainly an economic transaction (Judt 2013; often overlapped and presumably reinforced each other. Krewer 2008). Previously, Matthias Baerens and Ulrich Equally important, by the late twentieth century, the von Arnswald uncovered a history of corruption by politi- continuing dynamics of the industrial revolution had cre- cians, waste companies and the Ministry of State Security ated a growing environmental problem, which included (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Stasi) in regards to the both air and water pollution, but also a growing amount of waste, especially hazardous waste produced beginning with the chemical-industrial revolution of the 1930s Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, DE (Müller 2016: 355). The production of unwanted, mostly [email protected] chemical, byproducts which could be harmful to the Art. 1, page 2 of 10 Lange: A Deal over Dirt health of both people and the environment ballooned The ‘VEB Deponie Schönberg’—The Rise of the after World War II and the West German ‘economic mira- Deal with Dirt and its Doubters cle’ (Wirtschaftswunder) of the 1950s. They formed part The issue started with a long-term contract (1975–1994) of the general rapid increase of both consumption and on hazardous waste (Sondermüll), wherein the GDR would waste in Western countries at that period (Kupper 2003; receive about 25.7 marks (approximately $10.45) per Pfister 1995). Between 1954 and 1962, sheet metal pack- ton of West Berlin’s municipal refuse, hazardous waste, aging grew by 84 per cent, hollow glass packaging by 120 demolition waste and excavation waste, deposited at East per cent and plastic packaging by 3780 per cent in West German dumpsites in Schöneiche, Vorketzin, and Deetz. Germany (Park 2004: 36). Despite this, these issues only Municipal waste as well as special, nonliquid toxic waste came to the forefront of public discourse with the crea- were both included in a fixed charge with an annual fee tion of environmental movements in several Western correction according to the rate of price increases in the countries and the emergence of environmental politics Federal Republic. The West Berlin Senate was to provide at the beginning of the 1970s (Radkau 2011: 134–137). the technical equipment for the East German dumpsites. However, waste had been regulated in the GDR since In fact, it had been standard practice since the 1950s to 1970 through the Landeskulturgesetz (Huff 2015: 172– transport West Berlin’s excavation waste (left over from 173) and in West Germany through the 1971 environ- the destructions of World War II) to the GDR (Park 2003). mental program (Köster 2017: 13, 217; Müller 2016: 355). What had changed was the payment with valuta marks.5 Since the GDR regarded waste, including toxic waste, Valuta mark was West Germany’s hard currency, which as a secondary resource, to be stored for future rather could only be exchanged into GDR marks (and not vice- than dumped (Möller 2014: 64), it took until 1978 for versa). Had the GDR survived long enough to see the end the country to establish the Giftgesetz (a regulation of of the contract in 1994, it would have received approxi- toxins). The FRG followed in 1980 with a law regulating mately 1.25 billion­ valuta marks, which translates to the use and disposal of chemicals.3 As such, it took both about 0.5 billion US dollars (Judt 2013: 71). As such, the countries nearly a decade to frame hazardous waste as externalization of its waste seemed to be the best solution an environmental problem (Gille 2007: 139) and it took for West Berlin. Considering the particular political situ- even longer for them to regulate the problem in relation ation, and thus the question of the status of the divided to each other. By the end of the 1970s, the international city of Berlin, it was necessary for the West Berlin senate waste trade flourished in response to a lack of interna- to conclude a purely commercial (and not at all political) tional ­regulations or a clear definition of what constituted agreement. This allowed for the circumvention of the hazardous waste (Müller 2016: 357). Consequently, states so-called ‘Berlin­ question’, which was part of all bilateral were forced to cope with the problem bilaterally. agreements between the FRG and the GDR: Was West Ber- The question therefore remains, what kind of impact lin a part of the Federal Republic or was it a separate, third did the waste deal have on environmental decision German unit (as the GDR believed) (Alisch 2004: 389)? making in the Federal Republic? Which strategies were As such, the contract was ultimately signed between two used in West Germany to bring order to this economic companies, ‘Berlin Consult’ in West Berlin and the ‘Berg- bargain, which was likely to be perceived as an environ- bauhandel GmbH’ in the East (Park 2004: 78–87). mental risk?4 In line with Peter Itzen and Simone Müller’s With this example from the mid-1970s in mind, the definition of ‘risk’ (2016) as ‘potential future events and East German Politburo decided in favor of a further developments caused by human actions and that are dumpsite project later that decade. Founded in 1979, the potentially harmful to human actors and their environ- ‘Volkseigener Betrieb (VEB) Deponie Schönberg’ (publicly ment’ (p. 10), two more questions arise. First, who per- owned enterprise Schönberg dump) was located about 5 ceived Schönberg as a risk? And second, what were the km from the inner-German border on the eastern side, consequences of this viewpoint? The situation at the bor- but only 14 km away from the next West German city, der should therefore be given special consideration, as it Lübeck. The soil was composed mostly of boulder clay and forced both states to communicate and exchange infor- provided space for about 168 hectares of waste. The East mation with each other. The ‘risk’ category therefore links German state took financial advantage of the calamitous not only the economy, but also technology with cultural, waste situation in the Federal Republic, which was coping political and social aspects of human everyday life (Itzen with a looming ‘waste crisis’ (Köster 2017: 1 75, 294–295; & Müller 2016: 9). It is thus worthwhile to explore how Der Spiegel 29/1983: 47).6 ‘Waste’ in this case meant both West German legislation was ‘made green’ in regard to toxic, industrial waste and household waste, which were the Schönberg dumpsite. Stephen Milder has previously dumped for the same price: 50 marks (approximately $20) argued that the nuclear protest movement triggered per ton. Thus, household waste was slightly more expen- a ‘greening of democracy’ in West Germany (2017); the sive to dump in the East, compared to West German home following example surveys the efforts by West German charges, whereas toxic waste became extremely cheap for government officials as they undertook the regulation of West German waste exporters to dispose of. In compari- a controversial waste deal whose success remains ambig- son, the disposal of chemical waste in the Federal Republic uous. Hence, the article interrogates both how societies cost about 200 marks (approximately $117) per ton.7 This perceived and anticipated risk and which strategies West pricing policy thus made the Schönberg dumpsite consid- German politicians used to cope with that risk, i.e. the erably more attractive than its Western equivalents, which waste export. also led to the export of a growing amount of particularly Lange: A Deal over Dirt Art. 1, page 3 of 10 toxic waste. The Schönberg deposit site began accepting in 1978 (Colten & Skinner 1996). The protagonists were toxic waste in 1982. Although dangerous substances such constantly confronted with new problems to respond to as highly toxic liquid chemicals, pesticides, and radioactive (Weber 2014: 119–120). Beyond the scandals, citizens waste had been excluded by the East German government, ­increasingly criticized the state and dumpsite managers hazardous waste in form of sewage sludge, oil-contami- for their inability to control toxic emissions from dump- nated soil or slag and ash from incineration was allowed.8 sites and waste incineration plants through technical and The first transport trucks started to bring non-toxic chemical means since the mid-1970s. waste to the dumping ground in 1980, sparking almost By the mid-1980s, waste engineers and politicians instantaneous protest on the Western side of the border. admitted that they lacked sufficient knowledge about The protest against Schönberg must be understood in the the dumpsites, and demanded that more research to broader context of West German apprehension of landfills be done.9 By 1982, for example, dumping grounds like and waste incineration plants in general. At the beginning the one in Schönberg—with layers of different stone, of the 1970s, the news magazine Der Spiegel published toxic waste and household waste, but no additional seal- evidence of the inappropriate handling of toxic waste, ing—was no longer considered suitable by West German sparking awareness of dangers lurking nearby. In 1971, experts.10 The critics of the Schönberg dump did not the discovery of toxic sodium cyanide on a municipal consider that the Western safety standard was changing solid waste dump in Gerthe, a neighborhood in the town rapidly at the time and had not been the standard, par- of Bochum (FRG), ignited public outrage (34/1971: 59). ticularly in the East, when the negotiating process began Similarly, in 1973, Spiegel reporters uncovered a large net- in 1979/1980 (Köster 2017: 277). As it became clear that work of special waste entrepreneurs in Hanau (FRG) who even experts did not understand the dynamics inside were illegally disposing toxic materials in the ­countryside, dumping grounds, citizens began to perceive them as in various rivers and the sewage system (40/1973: 24–32; risks, and thus refused to live near them (Köster 2017: 41/1973: 104). In parallel, public environmental con- 208, 237, 243–245; Gille 2007: 159). The danger of a sciousness was also on the rise (Köster 2017: 208). Akin future catastrophic event determined social expectations to the responses by West Berliners (Judt 2013: 68), West and actions which finally coalesced into political action German citizens did not want to live near dumping as including citizens in the political processes for deci- grounds and began to protest against initiatives to build sion making through, for instance, public hearings (Beck them in their neighborhoods. These NIMBY-protests— 2007: 29; Weber 2014: 121). ‘not in my backyard’—impeded the construction of new This state of knowledge forms the backdrop for the regional dumping grounds and thereby inadvertently­ protests against the dumping ground in the GDR by West encouraged the export of waste. Germans, in particular by the inhabitants of Lübeck. The Schleswig-Holstein Minister for Nutrition, Agriculture West German Protest and Concern and Forests Günter Flessner, conveyed the doubts of his Schönberg was more problematic due to its location near constituents in a letter to the Federal Minister of Inner- the inner-German border. For its administration, the inter- German Relations Egon Franke on 12 August 1982: He nal waste problem was solved by outsourcing it to another wrote that the inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein were country (though this categorization was not totally in line concerned that the bottom of the dump was not thick with the official West German position with regard to the enough to contain all contamination, allowing toxins GDR as a sovereign state). Yet what looked like a prag- to eventually seep beneath the border and poison their matic, economically sound solution for the federal govern- ground water. In so doing, the contaminated water would ment became an environmental problem on the regional ultimately seep into the Mulde river, which flows into the level. As Schönberg was located so close to Lübeck, West Pahlinger Mühlenbach creek, which itself flows into the ­German activists transferred the perceived dangers and Wakenitz, a small river that provides Lübeck with its drink- anticipated risks of dumpsites in the Federal Republic to ing water (Federal Archives, BArch, B 137, Vol. 10375). the East German dumping ground, thereby creating a situ- Similarly, the city of Hamburg also received severe criti- ation where the externalization of waste and NIMBY-style cism from environmentalists because it deposited toxic, protests overlapped. dredged sludge from the harbor basin in the GDR landfill. Furthermore, the knowledge about and attention to Moreover, Lübeck (in the state of Schleswig-Holstein) sent toxic materials on landfills and in waste incineration about 600 tons of industrial waste to Hamburg’s waste plants spread very quickly during this period, as scientific incineration plant each year, the end product of which studies about dumpsites and hazardous waste began to be was about 10–20 tons of toxic scoria (bad ash), which published. Experts realized that the combination of waste Hamburg (a city-state) would deliver to Schönberg—caus- on dumpsites caused massive problems: The—sometimes ing outrage in the city of Lübeck (Der Spiegel 18/1988: new—materials reacted with each other, causing fires to 16). Hence, these issues exposed the divisions between break out, toxic gases to escape or polluted water to seep West German Länder (states) on how to handle the waste out (Köster 2017: 174, 188). Another important exam- problem. ple, which became crucial for the global environmental Local residents in West Germany were also frustrated movement was the toxic waste scandal in Love Canal by the rising number of trucks transiting through Lübeck (USA), when people discovered that their homes and and the small border town of Schlutup, and the concur- a school had been built on a former toxic waste facility rent rise in noise pollution. Since members of the West Art. 1, page 4 of 10 Lange: A Deal over Dirt

German Green Party and other environmental groups against the dumpsite the environmental movement had in the West could hardly protest the dumpsite itself, to work through their political representatives to initiate they focused on the border and the export of waste—by diplomatic steps to fulfill their demands (Kaijser & Meyer ­blocking the roads to Schönberg. Moreover, about 10,000 2018: 10–11). ­people signed a petition calling for a referendum in Lübeck to block the export of this waste. About 800 pro- 'Political Waste Tourism' testers demanded access to the administration’s files, and Between 1980 and 1986, at least eight Western delegations the local newspaper, the Lübecker Nachrichten, published visited the Schönberg dumpsite (Table 1). GDR officials a series of articles on ‘The Schönberg landfill—a ticking spoke of ‘political tourism’ in response to the high num- timebomb?’ (6 March 1983 in BArch, B 295, Vol. 37001). ber of local West German politicians, who, for their own The protest never lost its NIMBY-character: Protesters were political reasons, wanted to personally inspect the deposit mainly from the area in and around Lübeck. There was site most likely to receive their municipalities’ (toxic) no larger national nor cross-border protest movement as waste.13 The frequency of their visits was in direct contrast seen, for example, in the contemporaneous anti-nuclear to the experience of East Germans, who were forced to protests (Milder 2017, Tompkins 2016). watch one West German delegation after another visit a While West Germans feared the pollution of Lübeck’s dumpsite they were not allowed to come close to it. The drinking water, East Germans were concerned that the West German Green Party, instead, was the first to speak of countryside up to the Baltic Sea spa facilities would be ‘toxic waste tourism’ in a press release from 26 February­ contaminated by toxic water at the dumpsite—a worry so 1986: ‘Greens want to legally ban toxic waste tourism’ acute that the permanent deputy of the FRG in the GDR, (Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis, AGG, B.II.1, Vol. 885), mean- Hans Otto Bräutigam, caught wind of it and reported it ing the migration of the material, i.e. the waste export. By to his superiors in Bonn in March 1985 (BArch, B 136, understanding the interconnections between ‘Toxic waste Vol. 21547, Part 8). This concern was also articulated by tourism’ and ‘political tourism’—‘political waste tour- GDR environmentalists at a seminar in Schwerin in 1985, ism’—the circulation not only of material but also of West in petitions (Eingaben) to GDR officials,11 and in let- ­German politicians between the two countries becomes ters written by East German environmentalists to West clear. In comparison to other environmental problems in German politicians, in which they protested the import the GDR, this intense visiting procedure was unique in the of toxic and municipal waste from Western countries into environmental history of the two countries—although it is the GDR. However, they also wanted the GDR to deposit not an unusual practice in the global waste trade. its own toxic waste on this dumpsite, as it was the best The continuing exchange between the two countries equipped in the country.12 In addition, since 1982, any fulfilled two major functions: Firstly, it fostered détente information about the environment had been classified in and the ‘special’ German-German relationship. During the GDR (Huff 2015: 241–242). But, unlike cases from East the Cold War, particularly in the 1980s, the two German and West Berlin (Kirchhof 2015), contacts between envi- states endeavored to maintain lines of communication ronmentalists from Schönberg (GDR) and Lübeck (FRG) in response to rising tensions between the superpowers remained rare in this case, which does not mean that no after the modernization of atomic missiles and the soviet information was exchanged at all, though this might be invasion in Afghanistan in 1979. Economic relations, worth further exploration in the future. Nevertheless, including smaller-scale negotiations over the dumping receiving information about the Schönberg dump seemed ground in Schönberg, were favoured as a substitute to to be a common goal by environmentalists in East and political interactions across the Iron Curtain (Kirchhof & West, the future existence of this dumping ground McNeill 2019: 7). Secondly, the exchange should help to remained all the same different. appease West German critics of the waste export, all the Schönberg’s location also reveals another facet of West while securing a dumping ground for West German waste. Germany’s border policy: Since the Federal Republic In particular, local politicians, mainly from Schleswig- refused to accept the GDR as a sovereign country, it Holstein and the city of Lübeck, requested the opportu- encouraged relations between the GDR and the various nity to visit, arguing to GDR officials that they needed to neighboring Länder (states), rather than with the federal directly inspect the site to legitimize transport allowances government itself, in an attempt to frame the GDR as and to calm down the fears of their voters (Report on a just another state, thus signaling the ties between East visit to Schönberg, 2 November 1983, BArch, B 288, Vol. and West Germany (Wentker 2007: 410). However, the 381, Part 5). On home turf, on a political hearing with a Schönberg case became too politically sensitive to leave citizen’s initiative in Lübeck on 11 January 1984, Flessner the issue to the Minister President and Environmental explained that it was better to keep control of the situa- Minister of Schleswig-Holstein alone. Furthermore, the tion by sending waste to the dumpsite, visiting on a regu- border situation sheds light on another the issue: in tak- lar basis, and thus being able to demand improvements ing the externalized, toxic waste from the FRG, the GDR than to be out of the business entirely (Ibid.). The waste also outsourced at least half their risk in deposing it in was coming no matter what: In the 1980s, France, the the borderland to the Federal Republic rather than in Netherlands, Austria and other countries started to send the middle of its territory. Thus, the border between East their toxic as well as municipal waste to Schönberg as and West Germany also shaped the transboundary prob- well. By 1982, about 400,000 tons of waste had already lem of the waste export. Instead of protesting directly been brought to Schönberg. By 1985, the total amount Lange: A Deal over Dirt Art. 1, page 5 of 10 had risen to 900,000 tons, including 100,000 tons from Nevertheless, the ‘political waste tourism’ did not remain Western European countries other than the Federal the only effort of West German politicians to solve the dif- Republic (Der Spiegel 8/1986: 52). ficulties of the need to export waste. In allowing these delegations access that they denied their own citizens, GDR officials—falsely—hoped to directly The 'Greening' of Politics? counteract West German media reports of the dumpsite In November 1982, Peter Christian Germelmann, a deputy by presenting FRG politicians with a positive image they in the Ministry for Inner-German Affairs, concluded that could carry back to the Federal Republic (information­ ‘… in relation to the GDR, a new environmental problem about the visit of FRG-experts in Schönberg, 28 October has come into existence that must be settled’ (BArch, B 1983, BArch DL 266, Vol. 1690: 85–91). During these 136, Vol. 18833). What seemed like a new discovery on visits, most West German experts and politicians praised the part of the political class had long since arrived in soci- Schönberg, making comments including ‘such a hazard- ety: By 1980, the forest dieback, air and water pollution, ous waste dump would have been no different and equally noise pollution at the Frankfurt airport had all made envi- carefully laid out on federal territory’15 or that they had ronmental issues part of the social discourse (Uekötter­ the ‘impression that the landfill meets a high Western & Kirchhelle 2012), which now expanded to include the safety standard’.16 It is, of course, difficult to evaluate the export of toxic waste. And it raised the inconvenient ques- authenticity of these statements, in light of the need to tion of who was responsible for the waste trade and its maintain access to the dumpsite for FRG waste. Back at legislation—the states or the federal government? home, these politicians did not publicly acknowledge that According to West German law, each state is solely the GDR provided a better quality dumping ground than responsible for the disposal of its waste, so long as the those available in the FRG. Thus, they mainly drew atten- federal government does not have a reason to intervene tion to their talks with GDR experts, giving the impression (Köster 2017: 217–218). But the federal Ministry of the that they had everything under control, and demonstrat- Economy was responsible for handing out any legal foreign ing that they took citizens’ concerns over environmental exchange permits (devisenrechtliche Genehmigungen), pollution and its potential risks caused by the Schönberg which were a necessity for any bilateral trade agreements dump seriously. In this vein, Müller and Itzen (2006) with the GDR. All contracts were concluded between point out that risk in the German legal system signifies Hanseatische Baustoffkontor, a West German company, rather a ‘weak form of danger’ which—unlike actual dan- and Intrac, a company owned by the office of Commercial ger—demands no state action, since ‘risk’ implies a hazard Coordination (Kommerzielle Koordinierung, short KoKo), that is less likely to occur (p. 9), which might explain the a secretive department within the East German Ministry politicians’ attachment to the waste trade with the GDR. of Foreign Trade. As such, three different West German

Table 1: West-German Delegations to the Schönberg Dumpsite, 1980–1986.14

Time Meeting of experts/Visits Actors involved 24 June 1980 Meeting of experts, East Berlin, East and West German experts, delegations of the Foreign Office companies involved 21 November 1980 Meeting of experts and visit East and West German Experts 9 November 1981 Visit Experts from Schleswig-Holstein and the media (FRG) 22 June 1983 Visit Journalists (FRG) 28 October 1983 Meeting of experts and visit Experts from Schleswig-Holstein and the media (FRG) 29 March 1984 Meeting of experts Members of the Schleswig-Holstein state parliament (SPD) with delegates from the GDR Ministry of For- eign Affairs and the Ministry for the Environment and Water Management 18 April 1985 Visit Local SPD and CDU politicians and a citizens’ initiative from Lübeck 29 November 1985 Meeting of experts and visit Members of the Schleswig-Holstein subcommittee for Agriculture and Environment (SPD, CDU, Greens); citizens' initiatives; media; and other government experts (FRG) 17 April 1986 Meeting of experts and visit FRG government experts; GDR-delegates from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and the Environment and Watermanagement, Intrac Company 4 September 1986 Visit Members of the Green Party 12–13 November 1986 Visiting East/West delegation to Schönberg (GDR)/Herfa-Neurode (FRG) Dumpsites, meet- ing of experts in Lübeck Art. 1, page 6 of 10 Lange: A Deal over Dirt ministries simultaneously laid claim to governing waste and the total amount of solvent-containing waste (such deals and its inherent environmental politics: The Ministry as paint residues, gas cleaning compound, lime sludge, of the Interior was responsible for the environment in and solvent-containing residues) that would not exceed 3 general, waste issues were regulated by the Länder (state) per cent. Radioactive substances, hospital waste, animal agencies, and, the trade deal with the GDR remained the ­carcasses, and pesticides were forbidden.21 The GDR would responsibility of the Ministry of the Economy. have accepted the catalog in order to protect her economic The whole discussion surrounding the export of toxic interests, but the FRG could not. The content of the cata- waste—including the protest and the real or election log was much more extensive than existing regulations campaign-related doubts of local politicians—made the in West Germany. Technically and politically, it was not West German government nervous. In response, officials appropriate for the federal government to force the GDR attempted to explicitly demarcate the divide between to comply with requirements for the landfill, which were the responsibilities of the states and those of the federal considered ‘technically unsecured’, even in the Federal government. Thus, effective 1 February 1983, the state Republic, where research about dumpsites was still ongo- agencies (Landesbehörden) were tasked with evaluating ing.22 Consequently, the catalog was not adopted and did all permit requests coming from the states themselves— not become a component of the waste deal with the GDR. except the transit of waste from other Western countries. In addition, the rumor—which would eventually become As such, each state was now fully responsible for evalu- known as the ‘Seveso scandal’—that 41 tons of construc- ating all requests for permits, allowing them to express tion debris contaminated with dioxin was transported to their doubts about specific applications and ultimately to Schönberg, further spurred on the protests. Despite ram- refuse them.17 pant speculation to the contrary, it is nearly indisputable As a consequence, this administrative move that these barrels were burned by the Basel-based ­chemical ­strengthened the environmental over the economical company Ciba-Geigy in June 1985.23 But in the aftermath character of the waste export. In 1986, for example, offi- of the Seveso toxic waste scandal, dioxin became the catch cials in Schleswig-Holstein reportedly refused approxi- word for the environmental protest movement in West mately 15% of the permit requests for Schönberg.18 In Germany (Köster 2017: 286; Der Spiegel 6/1984: 62–65). 1988, state agencies issued about 400 civil charges against Between the ongoing protests and the still unclear respon- permit requests having—presumably—declared incorrect sibility between federal and state governments, it became materials.19 After all the handwringing, these were mea- imperative for the West German federal government to ger results. Nonetheless, already in 1986, the Christian introduce a new federal law on waste. Democratic Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, Uwe Furthermore, in a paper from April 1983, the Ministry Barschel, followed the court’s decision on some of these of the Interior concluded that a lack of control over the transport interdictions without raising any objections export of (toxic) waste would carry severe economic and and temporarily stored the rejected waste otherwise. In ecological consequences: First, West German dumpsites contrast, the Minister of the Environment for Hesse (and and waste facilities would have to compete with the VEB Green Party member), Joschka Fischer, aimed to exploit Deponie Schönberg, likely causing them to function at less all legal opportunities to send the state’s hazardous waste than to full capacity. Second, the domestic West German and household waste to Schönberg as—according to him industry would have no incentive to develop new meth- at that time—no better ecological options existed, and ods for the reuse and recycling of their (toxic) leftovers. he faced strong opposition against the building of new Third, the Federal Republic was about to lose face within dumpsites in his own state of Hesse.20 Thus, in Schleswig- the European Community where they had long argued in Holstein, politicians not only engaged with protest, they favor of a restrictive handling of the waste export issue adjusted their habits and political decisions somewhat in (disposal in the country in which it originated) while prac- response, likely due to the proximity of the state to the ticing the opposite (export to the GDR) at home. Fourth, Schönberg dumpsite itself (Hesse is about 600 kilometers the increased amount of waste—up to 900,000 tons per further away) as did the government of Hesse in reaction year since1985—also became harder to control, especially to its own state opposition. as the Federal Republic became a transit country for waste At the time there was still no treaty with the GDR that from other Western nations as well.24 Finally, in 1983, included a clear understanding of which types of toxic the Green Party was elected into parliament for the first waste were (or were not) allowed for disposal within the time, putting renewed pressure on the other parties and GDR (Dicke 1986: 107). Over the course of 1983 and 1984, the federal and state governments in charge to stop the Schleswig-Holstein Minister for Nutrition, Agriculture and export of toxic waste. Forests Günter Flessner, attempted to establish a ‘Positive- Taking all this into account, in 1985 the Ministry of Negative-Catalog’ with the GDR and the West German the Interior developed a third amendment to the federal federal government, which would explicitly record which waste law that would regulate the import and export of toxic substances and which contaminated materials would (toxic) waste—the so-called ‘Schönberg-Novelle’ (amend- or would not be accepted, in what form, and how much. ment)—by requiring written confirmation from the For example: oil-contaminated soils should not exceed dumpsite that it was designed to accept the declared toxic 3 per cent pollutant content; mixed landfills on a five materials. Providing such a document was not a problem meter thick waste layer could only hold soluble pollutants for East German officials, and had even been proposed as that did not exceed 1 per cent of the original substance a solution by the authorities at KoKo in reaction to the Lange: A Deal over Dirt Art. 1, page 7 of 10 amendment (BArch, DL 266, Vol. 1358: 180). Within the culatory system that produced less waste and engaged in East German Ministry for the Environment and Water more recycling. Management there were also contrary positions, with The location of the Schönberg dump at the border some advocating for the refusal of incoming waste.25 That seems to be the essential reason why any change needed discussion remains to be explored and is beyond the scope to come from the Federal Republic itself. Its proximity to of the article here. Lübeck triggered an anticipated risk and NIMBY protest. So, continuous visits by West German local politicians Unlike the cases of West Berlin or other federal states, the seemed to remain the best way to keep some control over border location forced local politicians to engage with the dumpsite and to convince the East German regime to the matter, to demand visits of the dump and to foster adhere to Western safety standards. On 7 September 1987, communication about it between both sides of the Iron a German-German environmental agreement was finally Curtain. At the same time, change to waste legislation and signed in Bonn,26 which officially included the exchange waste export control had to be carried out by the federal of information about dumpsites as it had been practiced government as well. as part of earlier ‘political waste tourist’ visits. Despite its Nevertheless, questions on the technical aspects of the weaknesses, this institutionalization of ‘political waste risk category remain unanswered: which safety standards tourism’ between the two German states was probably did the GDR implement in the Schönberg dumpsite after the maximum achievable by West German politicians expert meetings with West German delegates? Did the with regard to the dumpsite. As there were at the time no GDR Ministry of Environment and Water Management international regulations yet, both could fashion bilateral try to oppose the economic department of KoKo within regulations according to their own interests. the socialist system? How did both German states influ- In 1989, the ‘Basel Convention on the Control of ence the Basel Convention with their experience, but also Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and with their interests in maintaining their waste deal? At the Their Disposal’ was signed to regulate the trade with toxic time being, the present article suggests that, rather than waste internationally. That same year, the fall of the Berlin an economic win-win situation, the dump of Schönberg is wall allowed protesters from East and West Germany to more adequately understood as a border issue, including work together in their attempt to close down the dump- the struggle of West German authorities to give a green site, leading to East Germans to join voices with the West appearance to a ‘dirty’ deal, and East-Germans who more Germans. This would end in a disappointment: Renovated or less give in to the demands from the West to secure and modernized, the VEB Deponie Schönberg (renamed their foreign currency income. the ‘Deponie Ihlenberg’) still exists today and is one of the largest toxic waste facilities in Europe—no longer in the Notes border region but in the middle of the country. 1 See also Jonas Stuck’s work on ‘Toxic Divide? The Hazardous Waste Trade between the Two Germanys, Conclusion 1970–2000’ within the Research Group ‘Hazardous The attempted ‘greening’ of the economic waste deal, thus Travels. Ghost Acres and the Global Waste Economy’ at the inclusion of environmental concerns, in West Ger- the Rachel Carson Center in Munich. many at the beginning of the 1980s had several causes: 2 See Interview with Simone Müller by Birgit Kruse: ‘Müll The protests that sprung up around the issue of toxic ist ein Machtinstrument’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15 July waste was a major motivator for West German politicians 2019 [online access at https://www.sueddeutsche.de/ to adjust their course of action, bolstered by the new infor- muenchen/muenchen-muell-abfallexport-schwellen- mation provided by emerging scientific research about laender-1.4520471 last accessed 7 August 2019]. dumpsites. Moreover, the constant struggle for votes, in 3 Paulenz, H and Elstner, P 1980 Giftgesetz der DDR particularly with the emergence of the Green Party, also Rechtsvorschriften mit Kommentar, Berlin: Akademie- led to a more careful handling of ecological concerns. Verlag; Gesetz zum Schutz vor gefährlichen Abfallstof- With this slight turn towards environmental concerns fen (Chemikaliengesetz, ChemG), 16 September 1980, within political discussions, the West German government Bundesgesetzblatt, Part I, Vol. 58, pp. 1718–1728. attempted to fix the chaotic economic deal in order to 4 This article is based on a presentation held in the assuage its critics. Conversely, the states—especially Hesse workshop ‘Is toxic waste the price of modernity or is and ­Hamburg—needed to maintain the option to export it a sign of a misdirected development?’ at Shanghai their (toxic) waste, thus reinforcing the economic side University (China) 25–27 October 2018. of the agreement, including the low price of exporting 5 Political Archive in the Foreign Office, PA/AA, B2, Vol. waste to the GDR. Ultimately, through continued contacts 197, Paper by Detlev Karsten Rohwedder. with GDR experts, the ‘political waste tourism’ remained 6 Federal Archive, BArch, DY 3023/1440: 282, Günter the best way to control the potential risks created by the Mittag to Erich Honecker, 23 January 1979. Profit toxic waste export. That being said, by focusing only on should be secured through long-lasting contracts an orderly, legal and environmentally friendly export to about waste with West German cities like Hamburg Schönberg, the West German government missed the and Lübeck. opportunity to correct their own misguided response to 7 Robert Havemann Gesellschaft, RHG/TH 2/9, modern industrial developments, ignoring the necessity— Martin Irion, Naß oder trocken? Behauptungen und identified by the Ministry of the Interior—of creating a cir- Fakten über den Stand der Rauchgasreinigung bei Art. 1, page 8 of 10 Lange: A Deal over Dirt

Sondermüllverbrennungsanlagen, Landwirtschaft und 20 See Kriener, M 1986 Das deutsch-deutsche Giftmüll- Umwelt, 24 January 1988, RIAS I 6.35-7.15. Desaster. Die Tageszeitung (taz), 26 September, p. 3; 8 BArch, DK 5, Vol. 2110, Guido Thoms, 20. Sitzung N.N. 1986 Giftmüll. Salz in der Suppe. Der Spiegel, 8, des Beirats für Umweltschutz beim Ministerrat der 17 February, p. 52–53; Urban, R 1987 Messel oder der DDR, 28 December 1981. For allowed and prohibited Müll-Notstand. Die Zeit, 9 October [online accessed materials, BArch, DY 3032/1440, Alexander Schalck- at https://www.zeit.de/1987/42/messel-oder-der- Golodkowski to Günter Mittag, 27 November 1979, muell-notstandt last accessed 14 October 2019]. pp. 346–347; and Information über die Abnahme 21 BArch, B 137, Vol. 10375, Part 9, Katalog der zur von Abfallstoffen aus der BRD und Westberlin durch Deponie Schönberg/DDR zu verbringenden bzw. die DDR sowie Vorschläge über Möglichkeiten der von der Ablagerung ausgeschlossener Abfallarten, Erhöhung von Valutaeinnahmen aus der weiteren Deponiebetrieb und Sickerwasserbehandlung (Positiv- Abnahme von Abfallstoffen, undated, presumably Negativ-Katalog). 1980, pp. 356–360. 22 See BArch, B 295, Vol. 36999, Part 9, Gerhard 9 For example: BArch, B 295, Vol. 10719, Part 1, ­Christian ­Feldhaus to Günter Flessner, Sonderabfalldeponie Lenzer, press release by the CDU/CSU-caucus in Schönberg/DDR, 5 May 1984. ­parliament on the problems of the renovation of old 23 See N.N. 2007 Die Fässer von Seveso. Neue Zürcher hazardous landfills in the Federal Republic, 16 January Zeitung, 23 September, p. 4; Uekötter, F and 1985. Kirchhelle, C 2012 Wie Seveso nach Deutschland 10 See BArch, B 288, Vol. 382, memorandum about an kam. Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 52, p. 324. expert talk with a GDR-delegation, 17 April 1986; In 1976, there was an explosion at a chemical com- Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis, AGG 92 A Joschka Fischer, pany in Seveso, northern Italy. In 1983, 41 tons of Carl-Otto Zubiller, Länderarbeitsgemeinschaft Abfall toxic waste disappeared on its way to its final dump- (LAGA), October 1989. ing ground. Rumor had it that the barrels had been 11 E-Mail correspondence between the author and transported to Schönberg, but they were finally found Michael Beleites, 11 September 2019; for example: in an abandoned slaughterhouse in Anguilcourt- RHG, TH 2/9, Eingabe an den Ministerpräsidenten le-Sart (France). See, Gaul, R and Gehrmann, W (not specified who), Wismar, 3 February 1989. 1983 Im Giftschrank wird aufgeräumt. Die Zeit, 29 12 The GDR had still about 9.800 ‘wild’ dumping grounds April, p. 7. in 1989 (Wolle 1999: 212). See also RHG, TH 2/9: 99, a 24 BArch B 102, Vol. 376575, Part 4, Ministry of the letter of protest by the East German Ecumenical Center Interior on the waste deposit site Schönberg/DDR, 21 for Environmental Labor (Ökumenisches Zentrum für April 1983, with Annex 1: Departmental meeting on Umweltarbeit). 9 November 1982; See also Political Archive, PA/AA, 13 For ‘Polit-tourism’ according to the GDR, see Federal ZA, Vol. 132332, Report to the Ministry of the Interior Archives, BArch, B 288, Vol. 382, Bundesministerium by the Ständige Arbeitsgemeinschaft Abfall on its 37th für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, expert talk with the session, 28 August 1983. GDR about Schönberg and Herfa-Neurode, 12–13 25 See for instance, BArch, DK 5, Vol. 781, Projektgruppe­ November 1986. VIII, Herrmann, Bericht über die Anstrengungen 14 BArch, B 136, Vol. 18833, Part 1 and 2; B 288, Volumes der Genossen zur Sicherung hoher Valutaerlöse 381, Part 5 and 382, Part 7 and 8; DL 226, Vol. 1690: aus Abschlüssen mit dem Nicht-Sozialistischen 85–91; B 295, Vol. 36999; BArch, DK 5, Vol. 4935 as Wirtschaftsgebiet (NSW), 10 May 1983. well as the Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis, AGG, B.II.1, Vol. 26 ‘Vereinbarung zwischen der Regierung der 2037. ­Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der 15 See BArch, B 136, Vol. 18833, Part 2, Peter-Christian Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über die wei- Germelmann, Verbringung von Abfall aus der Bun- tere Gestaltung der Beziehungen auf dem Gebiet des desrepublik Deutschland in die DDR, 11 December Umweltschutzes’, Bulletin der Bundesregierung, Nr. 83, 1980. 10 September 1987, pp. 716–717. 16 See BArch, B 136, Vol. 18833, Part 2, Hans-­ Henning Kaysers,­ Besuch der Sondermüll-Deponie Acknowledgements Schönberg/DDR am 9.11.1981, 16 November 1981. Many thanks to the Federal Archives in Koblenz and Berlin 17 BArch B 102, Vol. 376575, Wagner, Waste Dump Lichterfelde, the Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis and the ­Robert Schönberg/DDR, 21 April 1983. Havemann Gesellschaft as well the Political Archive for 18 See Maletzke, E 1986 Müll statt Marzipan. Die Zeit, 7th providing access to the material. March, p. 2. My deepest gratitude belongs to Dario Prati, Daniel 19 See BArch, DL 226, Vol. 1819: 20, Information über die Grimshaw and especially Julia Sittmann, Catherine Beratung mit Experten der BRD zu den geologischen Pockock and Iris Borowy for their careful copyediting and und hydrologischen Bedingungen der Deponie encouraging comments. ­Schönberg (Bezirk Rostock), 5 July 1988; Bornhöft, P 1989 Kieler SPD-Regierung – ‘Schad nix, nützt nix?’. Competing Interests Die Tageszeitung (taz), 6 May, p. 13. The author has no competing interests to declare. Lange: A Deal over Dirt Art. 1, page 9 of 10

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How to cite this article: Lange, S. 2020. A Deal over Dirt. Worldwide Waste: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 3(1): 1, 1–10. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/wwwj.35

Submitted: 20 May 2019 Accepted: 10 November 2019 Published: 29 January 2020

Copyright: © 2020 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Worldwide Waste: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies is a peer-reviewed open access journal published by Ubiquity Press. OPEN ACCESS