Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases * A
University of Pennsylvania Law Review FOUNDED 1852 Formerly American Law Register VOL. 119 MAY 1971 No. 6 THE EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN NONJURY CRIMINAL CASES * A. LEo LEvIN t AND HAEoA K. CoHEN tt It should occasion no surprise that the vast welter of doctrine which has become our law of evidence is not applied with equal rigor when a judge rather than a jury sits as trier of the fact.' At least two major policy considerations support the prevailing practice under which the exclusionary rules are applied with far less stringency if there is no jury. First, our law of evidence has long been viewed as a product of the jury system,' of the need to shelter untrained citizens from the temptation to accept uncritically that which may be unreliable and of * The authors acknowledge their indebtedness to Boaz M. Shattan, Jr., of the Class of 1972, University of Pennsylvania Law School, for his valuable research done in connection with a seminar paper on a related subject. t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1939, Yeshiva University; J.D. 1942, University of Pennsylvania; LL.D. 1960, Yeshiva University. Member, New York Bar. "'B.S. (Econ.) 1964, LL.B. 1967, University of Pennsylvania. Member, Penn- sylvania Bar. 1 C. McCoaincK, EVIDENCE § 60 (1954). See generally Davis, Hearsay in Non- jury Cases, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1970); Stone, The Decline of Jury Trial and the Law of Evidence, 3 REs JUDICATAE 144 (1947) ; Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal?, 79 HIv. L. REv. 407 (1965); Note, Exciu- sionary Rules of Evidence in Non-Jury Proceedings, 46 ILL.
[Show full text]