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Exclusionary Rule: United States V Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 65 | Issue 4 Article 3 1975 Exclusionary Rule: United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Exclusionary Rule: United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), 65 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 460 (1974) This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. TnE JouRNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 65, No. 4 Copyright @ 1975 by Northwestern University School of Law Printedi;n U.S.A. EXCLUSIONARY RULE United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) In United States v. Calandra,' the Supreme exclusionary rule may be invoked by a witness Court again2 considered the application of the before a grand jury proceeding to bar ques- 7 exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings. tioning based on illegally seized evidence. In reversing two lower court decisions the Su- Two early cases, Boyd v. United States,8 preme Court held that a grand jury witness and Weeks v. United States,9 involved applica- was not entitled to invoke the exclusionary tion of the exclusionary rule."' Both decisions rule in refusing to answer questions based on held that no unreasonably or illegally seized an illegal search and seizure. In a subsidiary evidence could be used in federal criminal question the Court also denied the witness the cases. The holdings stressed the purpose of the right to interrupt the grand jury proceeding in fourth amendment's principles" as they affect order to have a hearing on the legality of the 7 United States v. Calandra, 465 F2d 1218 search. (1972). The court of appeals agreed with the A warrant was issued to search Calandra's lower court's finding that the search and seizure of place of business, the Royal Machine & Tool Calandra's place of business were unlawful. 465 F.2d at 1226 n.5. The Supreme Court, while not in Co., pursuant to a grand jury investigation of accord, failed to contest this finding. It also failed gambling operations. On execution of the war- to consider the order to return Calandra's prop- erty. rant, the agents found no gambling parapher- 8 116 U.S. 616 (1886). nalia but seized records of a loanshark operation 9 232 U.S. 383 (1914). and various books and documents concerning 10 In Boyd, the government claimed that the plaintiffs had fraudulently imported goods into the the suspected loansharking activity. United States and thus forfeited the merchandise. Calandra was subpoenaed to testify before a Plaintiffs entered a claim for the goods and grand jury but refused, invoking his fifth pleaded that the goods had not become forfeited as alleged. Claimants brought an invoice for the amendment privilege against self-incrimination. goods to court to show quantity and value but re- Having received a grant of transactional im- fused to relinquish it to the district attorney argu- munity,3 Calandra moved for suppression and ing that in a forfeiture suit no evidence can be 4 compelled from the claimants themselves and any return of the illegally seized evidence. Follow- statute compelling such evidence is unconstitu- ing a hearing in which Calandra reiterated tional. In Weeks, plaintiff was convicted on the charge that he would not answer questions based on of using the mails for the purpose of transporting the illegally seized evidence, the district court certain coupons or tickets representing chances or granted respondent's motion to suppress5 and shares in lottery or gift enterprises. Police officers arrested him without a warrant at his place of further ordered that respondent need not an- employment while other police searched his room swer any of the grand jury's questions based twice. While there, they took possession of various 6 papers and articles. No warrant was issued for ei- on that evidence. The Court of Appeals for ther search. Weeks later filed a "Petition to Re- the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the turn Private Papers, Books, and Other Property" alleging that they were being held unlawfully. The 1414 U.S. 338 (1974). court directed the return of non-pertinent material 2 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 but refused to rule on the pertinent material. (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 9 Among the evidence entered at trial, over Week's (1973). objections, were lottery tickets and statements 3 This grant was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § with reference to the lottery. 2514 (1971). 31 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV: 4 This motion was made pursuant to FED. R. The right of the people to be secure in their Cram. P. 41 (e). persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 5 The district court based its decision on the unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not grounds that the affidavit supporting the warrant be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but was insufficient and that the search exceeded the upon probable cause, supported by oath or af- scope of the warrant. In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. firmation and particularly describing the place 737 (N.D. Ohio 1971). to be searched, and the persons or things to 6 Id. at 746. be seized. 19741 SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1974) the very essence of constitutional liberty and that the subpoena was the fruit of the illegal 7 security. 2 Justice Bradley, writing the opinion search.' in Weeks, not only found that the exclusion of In 1961, in a five-to-four decision, the Su- illegally seized evidence enforces the basic preme Court, in Mapp v. Ohio'8 declared that principles of humanity and civil liberty's but the exclusionary rule was constitutionally man- also felt that if the court admitted such evi- dated and therefore had to be followed by all of dence, it would sanction illegal activity by pub- the states.19 The Court viewed the fourth lic officials charged with upholding the amendment as the embodiment in the Constitu- Constitution.' 4 To refuse to return the evidence tion of a principle prohibiting unwarranted after timely objection violated the individual's searches and seizures. The Court then con- constitutional rights. 5 cluded that the exclusionary rule best accom- 0 plished this prohibition. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States 20 was the major case in this area, prior to the Eight years later in Davis v. Mississippi, Court's decision in Calandra. In that case fed- Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the eral agents, during a warrantless search of a Court, held that fingerprints taken from an il- business, had seized several documents belong- legally detained defendant were inadmissible as ing to the Silverthornes. The lumber company evidence. 2' Here, however, the Court stated the owners, under indictment at the time, moved objective of the exclusionary rule as a sanction the lower court to have the documents re- to redress and deter overreaching governmen- turned on the ground that the search was un- tal conduct prohibited by the fourth amend- constitutional. The court granted the motion ment. Relying principally on Bynum v. United 22 and ordered the documents returned. A federal States, the Court stressed that the overriding grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecum to consideration of the exclusionary rule is to the owners ordering them to produce and turn prohibit any gain to those who violate fourth over the documents seized. The owners refused amendment safeguards. It is irrelevant that the and were held in contempt. The Supreme evidence obtained during such seizure and de- Court reversed the contempt citation, holding tention is itself trustworthy, that equivalent ev- 2 idence can conveniently be obtained, or that it 3 See Lord Chandler's judgment in Entich v. may be relatively easy for the government to Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029. 13 Justice Bradley relied extensively on Brain v. 17 Justice Holmes in his opinion stated: United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). [T]he essence of a provision [the fourth 34 The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to amendment forbidding the acquisition of evi- put the courts of the United States and Fed- dence in a certain way] is that not merely ev- eral officials in the exercise of their power idence so acquired shall not be used before the and authority, under limitations and restraints Court, but that it shall not be used at all. as to the exercise of such power and author- Id. at 392. ity, and to forever secure the people, their 18 367 U.S. 643 (1961). persons, houses, papers and effects against all '9 Historically, there has been a difference of unreasonable searches and seizures under the opinion among the state courts as to whether the guise of the law. This protection reaches all exclusionary rule is merely a judicially made rule alike, whether accused of crime or not, and of evidence or whether the Constitution mandated the duty of giving to it force and effect is ob- this rule. Before 1961, states had, by their choice, ligatory upon all entrusted under our federal accepted or rejected such a rule. system with the enforcement of the laws. The 20 394 U.S. 721 (1969). tendency of those who execute the criminal 2l An eighty-six year old white woman who had laws of the country to obtain conviction by allegedly been raped described her assailant as a means of unlawful seizures and enforced con- Negro youth.
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