Canada and South Sudan: Coming to Grips with “Juba Good”1
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Map by MC ChartrandMap by South Sudan and the environs. Canada and South Sudan: Coming to Grips with “Juba Good”1 by Chris Young Major Chris Young, CD, MA, is an armoured officer and a My aim in this article is to explore, based upon my personal member of the Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians) with experiences, why the UN lost the initiative in South Sudan, and over 40 years in an Army uniform. A former Editor-in-Chief of the how the dysfunctional mindset developed. I will also provide my Canadian Army Journal, he is currently posted to Riga, Latvia as thoughts on how UNMISS could work to regain the initiative (and Chief, Information Operations within the Task Force Latvia (TFL) its credibility), based upon my own experiences as a military Strategic Communications (StratCom) cell. In December 2019, liaison officer (MLO) operating from the capital Juba, during the he successfully defended his Ph. D. history thesis at Concordia period from November 2016 to May 2017. Included in that latter University, Montréal, and is completing his final dissertation portion will be my thoughts with respect to Canada and its role revisions. This article is based upon his 2016 United Nations in UNMISS going forward. deployment to South Sudan. By way of background, my prior UN experience was with the Introduction UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia for the period from July 1993 to July 1994.2 I was fortunate enough he United Nations Mission in South Sudan, or to re-deploy back into Bosnia in 1996, as part of the NATO UNMISS, is a mission with many problems, a Stabilization Force, serving as the Strathcona Battle Group faction number of which have allowed a level of dys- operations officer, and I was able to see what can be accom- functionality to emerge that threatens to become plished when a mission has the will and means to force change. permanent. Not surprisingly, many of those who In my opinion, both the will and the means to effect change in Tdeploy on UNMISS end up frustrated and demoralized, unable South Sudan is missing from UNMISS. to affect change to a mission that has, in the minds of many, passed its ‘best-before date,’ if indeed it ever had one. Why this Background has happened is quite simple: UNMISS has lost the initiative in South Sudan, and has accepted as an organization that it is ornings in South Sudan are quite calming. The temperature reactionary and not proactive in its approach to peacemaking. Mis comfortable, the nightly burnings of trash and excre- ment are mostly complete, and the smoke and smell have largely dissipated. Also, the birdlife is extraordinary before people 16 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 2020 GLOBAL COMMITMENTS UN multimedia photo #114862 photo UN multimedia A Canadian soldier serving with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, stands guard amongst destruction in Croatia, 1 September 1993. are up and about in numbers. And yet, mornings in South Sudan can also hit one in the pit of the stomach. Waking in South Sudan is much like being trapped in the same way that Bill Murray’s character was in the movie Groundhog Day. Conflict in South Sudan remains the order of the day, and the United Nations (UN) remains as impotent as the day before. Unrelenting poverty, the inabil- ity of the country’s leadership to make any headway with Eric Lafforgue/Alamy Stock Photo/2AH0PWB Stock Eric Lafforgue/Alamy respect to the peace Longhorn cows in a Mundari tribe camp, Central Equatoria, Terekeka, South Sudan. Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 2020 17 process, and the lack of any meaningful progress towards conflict in June 2004 with the establishment of a specialized improving the country’s situation make each day much like UN mission, the UN Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS), the last. which was essentially designed to negotiate for the introduction of a UN peace support mission. It was not always like this… Indeed, on 9 July 2011, South Sudan appeared full of promise and was receiving good Following the success of the IGAD and UNAMIS in facilitating support from the international community and the UN when it the passage of the CPA, the UN created the UN Mission in the Sudan became the 54th independent state in Africa following 20 years (UNMIS) in March 2005, with a mandate of supporting the imple- of civil war. That civil war had taken an estimated three million mentation of the CPA. The mission was 10,000-person strong, and lives before it was ended by means of the Comprehensive Peace it included some 700 civilian police officers plus a civilian mission Agreement (CPA) concluded with Sudan. As is too often the component. UNMIS was not able to deploy into Darfur as a result case, initial optimism would quickly be dashed: governance and of resistance from the government of Sudan and, in July 2006, the economic issues, coupled to tribal divisions within the new state UN was able to convince the Sudanese to accept a hybrid UN-AU led to an unravelling of the coalition that had mission instead––the UN-AU Hybrid opera- proven successful in the drive to independence. tion in Darfur (UNAMID).3 UNAMID was By 2013, a scant two years after the declara- “By 2013, a scant established as a Chapter VII mission and given tion of independence, South Sudan was being the responsibility of supporting the implemen- two years after the ripped apart by civil strife, a civil war which tation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.4 had been seen as inevitable, at least by those declaration of This hybrid mission was intended to showcase Canadians who had been in theatre at the time. independence, South African capabilities with respect to resolving regional conflict: the UN Security Council Foreign intervention in the new country Sudan was being Resolution (UNSCR) specifically stated: “… continued initially via the Intergovernmental ripped apart by civil the Hybrid operation should have a predomi- Authority on Development (IGAD), an African strife, a civil war which nantly African character and the troops should, Union (AU) organization; it was involved in the as far as possible, be sourced from African Sudanese conflict as early as the 1990s, and its had been seen as countries.”5 activities included successful mediation that inevitable, at least by led to the 2005 CPA that ultimately resulted those Canadians who With the independence of South Sudan in South Sudan’s declaration of independence. in 2011 came the introduction of a follow-on IGAD has remained involved in mediation and had been in theatre mission to UNMIS—UNMISS—established monitoring activity until today. The United at the time.” as a Chapter VII mission with a mandate “… Nations became involved in the Sudanese to consolidate peace and security, and to help Newscom/Alamy Stock Photo/JNXRNH Stock Newscom/Alamy Walkers on an unsurfaced road in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, 14 January 2012. South Sudan gained its independence in July 2011. 18 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 2020 establish the conditions for development with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GoSS) to govern effec- tively and democratically, and [to] establish good rela- tions with its neighbours.”6 In 2013, civil war in South Sudan broke out, leading to the breakdown of the independence coalition. In December, in response to fighting in the Juba area, UNMISS troop levels were increased to 12,500, with a police component of 1,323.7 Those increases, however, GLOBAL COMMITMENTS were largely affected by transfers from existing DND photo IS2012-0004-03 by Sergeant Norm Sergeant McLean by IS2012-0004-03 DND photo regional missions, such as UNAMID. Commander Paul Earnshaw, Canadian military liaison officer to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) confers with representatives from India upon the arrival of the latter to Yambio, South Sudan, during the UNMISS mandate, 3 December 2012. Pacific Press Agency/Alamy Stock Photo/GD9BKN Stock Agency/Alamy Press Pacific A UN Security Council briefing by UN Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, held to address the South Sudan crisis, in order to address, among options, the imposition of an arms embargo and the reinforcement of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 13 July 2016. Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 2020 19 In 2014, the UNMISS mandate was expanded to include The SOI process began from a simple enough premise: the protection of civilians as a priority. In January, to support the UN believes it needs to maintain transparency in all its operations. Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the government and That concept of transparency was understood both for security and the opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army-in- safety reasons, as well as for supporting UNMISS public relations Opposition (SPLM/SPLA-IO), the UN authorized the IGAD to campaign by demonstrating, tangibly, UN operational support of deploy a monitoring and verification mechanism team to ensure the people of South Sudan. Practically, however, transparency compliance. Unfortunately, UNMISS has suffered through the became a weapon used against the UN. By providing documenta- frequent practice of Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) tion of its intended operations, including the numbers of troops massacres occurring in areas ostensibly under UN control. The involved, their vehicles, and their weaponry, the UNMISS provided most recent, in July 2016, saw the two parties to the conflict, the means by which the GoSS and the SPLA were able to exploit the SPLA and SPLA-IO, initiate fighting in the capital Juba that the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA.9 included a government troop-led assault on the internally-displaced persons (IDP) camp adjacent to the UNMISS UN House camp.