Joint Force Quarterly Inside Issue 66, 3Rd Quarter 2012

Issue 66, 3rd Quarter 2012

Achieving Force Resilience

Offensive Cyber Joint System Assessments

Joint Force Quarterly Inside Issue 66, 3rd Quarter 2012

Editor Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D. JFQ Dialogue Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz 2 From the Chairman Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Developing Joint Force Officer-Enlisted Leadership Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley 4 Capacity for the 21st Century Visual Design Editor Tara J. Parekh By Curtis L. Brownhill Copy Editor/Office Manager John J. Church, D.M.A Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich Forum Director, NDU Press, Frank G. Hoffman Design Jeremy Swanston, John Mitrione, 6 Executive Summary U.S. Government Printing Office Printed in St. Louis, Missouri 8 Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain Operations: by Where Do Space and Cyberspace Fit? By Vincent Manzo 15 Shadow Boxing: Cyber Warfare and Strategic Economic Attack By Soren Olson NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross-component, professional military and 22 Offensive Cyber for the Joint Force Commander: It’s Not That Different academic publishing house. It publishes books, By Rosemary M. Carter, Brent Feick, and Roy C. Undersander journals, policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and special reports on national security strategy, defense policy, interagency Special Feature cooperation, national military strategy, regional security affairs, and global strategic problems. 28 Resilience: The Result of a Totally Fit Force By Rhonda Cornum, Thomas D. Vail, and Paul B. Lester This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this 35 Spiritual Fitness: A Key Component of Total Force Fitness journal may not be reproduced or extracted without By Patrick J. Sweeney, Jeffrey E. Rhodes, and Bruce Boling permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever Commentary material is quoted from or based on its content. 42 Technological Strategy in the Age of Exponential Growth By Carlo Kopp COMMUNICATIONS Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force 48 Forging Jointness Under Fire: Air-Ground Integration in Israel’s Lebanon and Quarterly online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more Gaza Wars on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of By Benjamin S. Lambeth JFQ articles, and access to many other useful NDU Press publications. Constructive com- 54 Airpower Dollars and Sense: Rethinking the Relative Costs of Combat ments and contributions are important to us. By Lee T. Wight Please direct editorial communications to the 62 Science vs. the Art of War link on the NDU Press Web site or write to: By Milan Vego Editor, Joint Force Quarterly National Defense University Press 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2504) Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319

Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 Email: [email protected] JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu

3rd Quarter, July 2012 ISSN 1070-0692 Features PUBLISHER GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA 71 From Niche to Necessity: Integrating Nonlethal Weapons into Essential President, NDU Enabling Capabilities MG Gregg F. Martin, USA

By Tracy J. Tafolla, David J. Trachtenberg, and John A. Aho Advisory Committee Maj Gen Joseph D. Brown IV, USAF Industrial College of the The V-22 Osprey: From Troubled Past to Viable and Flexible Option Armed Forces 80 RADM John N. Christenson, USN Naval War College By Eric Braganca Brig Gen Stephen T. Denker, USAF Air Command and Staff College 85 The F-35 and the Future of Power Projection LtGen George J. Flynn, USMC Joint Staff By Robbin F. Laird and Edward T. Timperlake VADM William E. Gortney, USN The Joint Staff Maj Gen Scott M. Hanson, USAF Air War College Col Jay L. Hatton, USMC Marine Corps War College Book Reviews RADM Douglas J. McAneny, USN National War College Col Royal P. Mortenson, USMC Marine Corps Command Keep From All Thoughtful Men: How U.S. Economists and Staff College 94 VADM Daniel T. Oliver, USN (Ret.) Naval Postgraduate School Won World War II LTG David G. Perkins, USA U.S. Army Command and Reviewed by David A. Anderson General Staff College ADM James G. Stavridis, USN U.S. European Command The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War Maj Gen Joseph S. Ward, Jr., USAF Joint Forces 95 Staff College Reviewed by Francis P. Sempa Editorial Board 96 Defiant Failed State: The North Korean Threat Richard K. Betts Columbia University to International Security Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University Reviewed by Robert Daniel Wallace COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.) National War College Mark J. Conversino Air War College Joint Doctrine Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Office of the Secretary of Defense 97 Joint Doctrine Update Douglas N. Hime Naval War College Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College Col David Lapan, USMC The Joint Staff Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.) The Joint Staff Thomas L. McNaugher Georgetown University Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College James A. Schear Office of the Secretary of Defense LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)

CONTRIBUTIONS Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address on the opposite page or by email to [email protected] “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information, see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the About the covers Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security Front cover: Soldier exits UH-60 Blackhawk in village of Darrah-I- policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; Bum, Badghis Province, Afghanistan (U.S. Marine Corps/Brian and developments in training and joint professional military Kester). Table of contents shows (left to right) Soldiers in M2 education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to Bradley Fighting Vehicles approach firing line at Nightmare Range, meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. Camp Casey, Republic of Korea (U.S. Army/Ryan Elliott); Navy The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations chaplain prays with Marines before security patrol in Sangin, expressed or implied within are those of the Afghanistan (British Royal Army/James Elmer); Navy SEALs contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of hoisted onto Air Force Special Operations CV-22 Osprey at the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Hurlburt Field (U.S. Air Force/Andy M. Kin); and Seaman stands Federal Government. watch in combat information center aboard USS Monterey (U.S. ndupress.ndu.edu Navy/Daniel Viramontes). From the Chairman Making Strategy Work

arlier this year, the President and was released, the Vice Chairman and I have down to violent nonstate actors, and they are Secretary of Defense released gathered with the Service chiefs and combat- proliferating horizontally, across advanced new strategic defense guidance, ant commanders for three full-day strategy militaries in the world. As a result, more Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: seminars in Quantico, Virginia. We used people have the ability to harm us than at any E st point in many decades. Priorities for 21 Century Defense. Six months these unprecedented forums to stress-test the on, I would like to share some of my insights strategy against some of the most challenging Another compelling feature of our time about making the strategy and about making security scenarios we may face as a nation. is a new fiscal reality. Cost has reemerged as the strategy work. This is exactly how it is supposed to work. an independent variable in the U.S. national Strategy is essentially about choices— Strategic choices are not made in isola- security equation. We have often defined our choices about how to achieve our aims with tion. Instead, they are informed by a context. desired endstates before fully considering the resources available to us. A sound strategy Once made, choices have consequences that the cost. The money was there for us. As we reconciles ends, ways, and means. Strategic create new context. It is an iterative process— advance on the joint force that we will need coherence, however, does not just happen. that never ends. In this respect, strategy is as in 2020, we must consider cost sooner in our Rather, it results from dialogue and debate. much emergent as it is deliberate. decisionmaking. We need to be more afford- Our new defense strategy emerged from just The context we confront today can best able in every possible way. such a collaborative process. The Service be described as a security paradox. True, geo- Within this context, the strategy makes chiefs, who are charged with developing the political trends are ushering in greater levels choices that are already being put to work. I force for the strategy, were heard early and of peace and stability worldwide. But destruc- will highlight three, but there are more. First, often. The combatant commanders, charged tive technologies are also available to a wider we are mainlining capabilities that have really with executing the strategy, all weighed in. array of adversaries. Destructive—and dis- come into their own over the last decade. And we were all afforded extraordinary access ruptive—technologies are proliferating down Among these are cyber, special operations, to our civilian leaders. Since the strategy and out. They are proliferating vertically, and intelligence, surveillance, and recon- DOD (Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo)

Chairman receives update from commanding general, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, at new Kabul compound

2 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu DOD (Glenn Fawcett) NEW from NDU Press for the Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies

Strategic Perspectives, No. 10 Leo Michel’s Cross- currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests examines some of the new challenges faced by France in the evolving international security environment. Because Chairman speaking at the Law of the Sea Convention forum in Washington, DC the French believe strongly in their need to naissance. We are not just sustaining our policies hinder our ability to build trust and preserve “strategic investments in them; we are exploring new make new friends. Effective partnering can independence,” ways to organize and employ them. Each is be achieved with a modest investment. For accepting defense cooperation with others potent in its own right, but when integrated that investment, we can expect an exponential is a cross-current that continues to make French into a global networked joint force, they create return in cooperation. strategists uncomfortable. Nevertheless, some worry options that simply did not exist before. The real test of this strategy is not in the that if America rebalances its security interests away Second, we are rebalancing toward the choices we made, but in putting the choices from Europe, where will France find capable and willing partners to help protect its security interests? Asia-Pacific region. Of course, we never left. to work. I am confident that we will pass this Michel documents how the recent Libyan conflict But security and socioeconomic trends speak test for one simple reason—leadership. The brought to light many of the cross-currents that are to the region’s growing consequence. For young men and women charged to carry out shaping French defense policy. France is proud of now, this shift in focus is more about think- the lion’s share of this strategy are among the its military’s performance in Libya, and it perhaps ing than it is doing. That said, we are doing best leaders in the history of the U.S. Armed validated Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to reengage fully some important things. The reintroduction of Forces. They prove daily that they have the with NATO in 2009, but the conflict also exposed our Marines to Australia is just one example. minds, mettle, and muscle necessary for its France’s dependence on U.S. military capabilities, We are also looking at our overall presence success. For that reason, above all others, I the country’s lack of confidence in Germany and the with an eye toward diversifying our relation- am absolutely convinced that this strategy European Union as serious military partners, and its ships and activities. At the same time, we are will meet the Nation’s needs for the future, determination to improve defense coordination with affirming the value of several longstanding sustaining the trust put in us by the American the United Kingdom. alliances throughout the region. people to defend them and our country. JFQ Third, we are expanding the envelope of cooperation. When we network within MARTIN E. DEMPSEY and beyond government, we add capacity General, U.S. Army and capability, and we gain credibility. In the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff future, we need to complement standing institutions and alliances with startup, purpose- driven communities of interest. Innovative partnering means working with old allies in new ways, boosting regional security architectures, and building on public-private efforts. It also means getting out of our own Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications way. Security assistance reform is past due. at ndupress.ndu.edu Our export control and intelligence-sharing

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 3 contractors, and international nongovern- Developing Joint Force Officer-Enlisted mental organizations. st Leadership Capacity for the 21 Century Command Team Relationship The cornerstone of the Armed Forces By Curtis L. Brownhill professional military model and the emula- tion of many a nation is our commitment As a part of my efforts to assist the sionally inadequate. To reach full capacity, the to the strong and proven officer-enlisted Chairman in moving the joint force toward Department of Defense (DOD) must institute leadership relationship resident within each where we need to be in 2020, I have seen the a comprehensive joint enlisted development Service. This unique capacity is a direct need to improve the quality of joint training concept that is commensurate with what result of a lineage of honor and service, as and education for our enlisted leaders as they our enlisted force is already doing (validated well as nearly four decades of collective increasingly find themselves confronting the throughout a decade of war). It needs to begin and determined professionalization of the problem of operating in joint formations and early in a military career and be proportionate all-volunteer force. Furthermore, the evolu- staffs around the globe. While their Service to predetermined levels. tion of the NCO and petty officer from the training and education have prepared these traditional support leadership (what to do) leaders for their tactical missions, their train- Why Joint Enlisted Education Is role to one of empowerment and responsibil- ing and education in joint operations have yet Needed ity (how to think) role is matched only by the to meet the same standard. Chief Brownhill The 21st-century joint operating envi- unquestioned trust and confidence placed expresses many of the concerns I have heard ronment (JOE) is complex and can be gener- in them by the officers of their respective from enlisted leaders in my travels as the ally characterized as a globalized, demograph- Services. Today, NCOs and petty officers, Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman ically emergent world with interdependent regardless of Service, not only enhance the (SEAC). I am certain that the Chairman and economies; shared and competing interests of chain of command but are also responsible I will continue to seek the best possible joint developed and developing states; unpredict- for a strong chain of communication in a far training and education opportunities for the able failed states, rogue states, and nonstate more complex environment than in the past. entire enlisted force as we adapt the entire actors; and ideologically based international At the root of the U.S. military officer- joint force to meet the challenges ahead. terrorist networks fueled by dangerous his- enlisted leadership relationship is the foun- torical animosities enhanced by technology. dational concept of unity of command based —Sergeant Major Brian B. Battaglia, The dynamic nature of the JOE is the on trust and confidence and grounded in USMC, SEAC new normal. For the U.S. Government and mission accomplishment. This critical reality the Armed Forces, the scope and duration ensures continuity of mission and author- of current and future operations and mis- ity as an essential element of U.S. military cross the globe, our all-volun- sions will require tremendous flexibility and doctrine and is intrinsic to each Service’s teer joint force remains fully the ability to adjust to meet global threats. core competencies and creeds. In essence, engaged in operations to keep Clearly, given the magnitude of our strategic the battle will continue in the absence of the A our homeland secure, defeat objectives, our enlisted leaders, alongside officer. For U.S. military NCOs and petty global enemies, set conditions for global sta- our officers, will be called upon to meet officers, this is a well-defined concept that bility, and establish and maintain long-term these challenges. We should anticipate more ensures unit integrity, discipline, and overall multinational security partnerships. This responsibilities to be placed on the shoulders effectiveness. Our NCOs are professionally remarkable joint force, led by a professional of our noncommissioned officers (NCOs) developed to reach this standard. Difficulties officer and senior enlisted leader corps, con- and petty officers. This new and enduring arise, however, when proven officer-enlisted tinues a legacy of greatness. environment will demand adequate educa- leadership relationships, time-tested unity Our military is a learning organization, tional preparation for all military leaders. of command, and communication quali- and advancements in joint capability have The JOE will shape our military doc- ties, seemingly easy to execute within their matured over the 26 years since passage of the trine and resultant Service force structures respective Services, must expand (often Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense based on the strategic ways, means, and rather quickly) for leadership in joint and Reorganization Act of 1986. However, the U.S. ends as determined by each combatant com- coalition organizations. Government has yet to realize the act’s full mander. Additionally, an interdependent potential due to an institutional underinvest- joint force will require a well-trained joint Goldwater-Nichols—The Next Step ment in the joint development of its profes- battle staff in which NCOs and petty officers Goldwater-Nichols was not an endstate sional enlisted corps. “Just in time” training can and should play an increasing role. In in itself but an important first step in the is both operationally shortsighted and profes- any given operational area, our military direction of a fully integrated joint force. As leaders are immersed with U.S. interagency a first step, it was not focused on expanding Chief Master Sergeant Curtis L. Brownhill, USAF partners and allies in building long-term the joint aspect of the enlisted corps. Rather, it (Ret.), is the former Command Senior Enlisted security cooperation partnerships (Phase 0 was principally focused on defining the com- Advisor, U.S. Central Command (2003–2007). He shaping). The JOE also demands the ability batant command lines of authority, improving retired on August 1, 2007, after 34 years of service. to integrate the efforts of DOD civilians, joint operations and planning, and developing

4 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu officers capable of leading joint forces in the corporal and is a component of the officer- and rebuilders must remain focused on their future. The drafters of the law may well have enlisted leadership team. primary military specialties. Most impor- included a joint enlisted development focus Unfortunately, for too many enlisted tantly, any strategy must strike a necessary had they been able to predict the second- and leaders regardless of Service, especially and desirable balance between traditional third-order effects of a quarter-century of senior enlisted leaders, the leap from Service- Service culture and identity and the unique collective joint development of our officers centric tactical-level focus to joint/combined/ leadership demands resident within the joint (by law) and over three decades applied to the interagency operational focus and mission force. The endstate of the strategy is to build professional evolution of the enlisted corps. exposure is immense. Many simply cannot upon what gives us our known strengths and Goldwater-Nichols redirected a adapt and overcome the unknown and can capacities in order to make us even more Service-centric military to become joint in only find comfort in their Service-laden effective for the future. planning and execution of operations, as foxhole. They are not incapable of adapt- DOD should establish and adapt joint well as developing officers from each Service ing—far from it; they simply have not been courses of study at the E-6 to E-9 grades at educated in the reality of joint operations. As provided available joint education and prepa- both Service and joint educational institu- a result, the majority of our nation’s military ration that provides confidence in leading tions, which provide the opportunities to officers are steeped in joint doctrine and well forces other than their own. They, like com- grow student intellectual capacity at all levels. prepared to lead in a joint-combined opera- missioned officers, must have education, Such education should be accredited by civil- tional environment. However, while our offi- training, and seasoning to a level appropriate ian educational institutions and linked to cers (company grade, field grade, and senior) and proportionate to the environment in advancement and consideration for selected continue to depend heavily on their enlisted which they will operate and lead. joint duties. As an institution, DOD should leaders to complement and enable them to feel comfortable in affording opportunities for be comprehensively effective, their enlisted The Way Ahead selected enlisted leaders to attend appropriate leaders have not been adequately prepared Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff levels of existing joint professional military for the same environment. Instruction (CJCSI) 1805.01, Enlisted Profes- education institutions traditionally reserved The operational analysis of the past 10 sional Military Education Policy, is limited as for junior and field-grade officers. Joint years reveals that the joint professional en- a forcing function to achieve full potential for curriculum within the enlisted professional listed corps, specifically midgrade and senior a comprehensive joint development process military education institutions of each Service enlisted leaders, complements the officer for the enlisted corps. However, as a policy, should also be redefined and developed in joint competencies of strategic-mindedness, it may be considered “directive enough” to ways that encourage “cross-pollination” of critical thinking, skilled joint warfighting, accommodate the joint development of our students on a large scale. process development, and planning in the junior and midlevel enlisted members with At a joint-minded level, we need to tactical and operational battlespace and on a proper focus. On the other hand, CJCSI rethink our Service personnel systems, which joint force staffs. And they do that with little- 1805.01 falls well short as a policy (as opposed could enhance the ability to ensure that our to-no formal joint development opportuni- to a law) when addressing compelling joint joint force commanders have the best pos- ties. Complementing is fine, but enabling development requirements of senior enlisted sible considerations for critical joint-enlisted should be the goal. leaders and staff NCOs performing duties at leadership and staff NCO positions in the A recognized term—the strategic corpo- operational and strategic level organizations. future. While a policy would work for junior ral—is a means of illustrating that the tactical As we work toward the necessary end- and midlevel enlisted grades, legislation might decisions made by Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, state of joint enlisted leaders, we must under- be required to ensure that our senior enlisted Airmen, and Coastguardsmen may indeed stand that any strategy to accomplish that leaders are afforded the necessary advanced have strategic impacts. It is a realistic term should be pursued in a diligent manner that joint professional military education. that can be applied to all grades and levels, but recognizes that it is essential to achieve joint The U.S. officer-enlisted leader rela- it fails to acknowledge two key issues: capacity appropriate to the joint operational tionship and unity of command ethos is a environment. We must remain aware that the cornerstone of our strength and success as a ■■ If a corporal’s actions could have strength of the joint team lies in the unique- military. However, by simply sustaining it as either a positive or negative strategic effect, ness of the ability of the Services to apply their it currently is, as opposed to advancing it to then how was the corporal developed for the capabilities at the decisive point to promote where it needs to go, we are setting the condi- task he was given? synergy of effort and accomplishment of the tions for failure in meeting the leadership ■■ When a corporal looks up from a dif- Nation’s objectives. Furthermore, no strategy demands of the 21st-century joint operating ficult or complex task for guidance, purpose, should dilute the distinction between the environment. We require a new national and strength, it is the NCO or petty officer he status of officers and enlisted members; it vision and a broadened military culture that sees first. must instead complement it. This strategy is consistent with this century and for this all- cannot negatively affect command structure volunteer joint force. We need to be confident These are important considerations. or degrade a Service’s Title 10 responsibilities in taking the necessary bold steps in provid- The NCO or petty officer could reasonably be to organize, train, and equip forces. ing appropriate levels of joint development termed the operational staff sergeant. Thus, Any strategy should be proportionate for the enlisted force to complement our joint our critical focus really must be on the opera- to the scope of each enlisted grade, keeping officers and to advance the capabilities of the tional staff sergeant who leads the strategic in mind that our young warriors, enablers, total joint force. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 5 Executive Summary

colleague of mine who teaches where one of my Academy classmates—the strategies to better defend and use the similar at the National War College first female graduate of any U.S. military domains of space and cyber. Recent Air recently returned from his academy to reach the rank of general—was Force Academy graduate Second Lieuten- annual visit to Afghanistan. promoted. In the summer of 1976, just 150 ant Soren Olson suggests our cyber defense A women entered the Air Force Academy with This trip was different however as he was efforts to protect our national infrastructure traveling with his seminar students. Before 10 times that many men. More than half of need substantial review and attention to they departed, I wondered just what would these women went on to graduate, with one prevent what he believes will be a likely become of them given the fluid situation achieving the highest rank possible some 32 massive attack in the near future. Rosemary there, at least from what we read in the press. years later. The U.S. military has two such Carter, Brent Feick, and Roy Undersander Of course, given my own brief but instructive women academy graduates at that rank, and outline the requirement and suggest specific tour in Kabul in 2008, I knew that often the as far as I am aware, we are the only nation ways to integrate cyber operations below the facts on the ground are hidden here at home that does. These women represent the best in joint force commander level, building on the because the lenses of the media are never able all of us as Americans, confident in manner argument offered by Brett Williams in JFQ in to capture the full scope of events anywhere. and able to achieve a path to success regard- 2011. Cyber and space discussions continue While there is no doubt that danger of less of the challenges they face. The sniper to be among the most active topic areas based different kinds exists both in Afghanistan in the photograph in this column is a person on JFQ submissions and reader feedback. and here at home, nothing replaces the value of similar character and achievement. As of With the increasingly important and of seeing the situation with one’s own eyes. this writing, the media are reporting on a needed focus on the overall health of mili- Many question the expense of sending pro- lawsuit to remove the remaining restrictions tary members, veterans, and their families, fessional military education (PME) students on women in combat, and the Marines are especially those affected by our recent con- on foreign or even domestic travel. Given evaluating women’s fitness for combat duty. flicts, the Special Feature section provides the chance to see more with one’s classmates I suspect we will all learn that our national two substantial articles that reinforce the than what one experienced in the past—even defense is based on capability to get the Chairman’s efforts to effectively address this if it means covering the same ground as mission done regardless of other concerns. issue. While a specific Service program, the before—is without doubt an invaluable expe- In his From the Chairman column, approach on resilience discussed by the USA rience for which no other means can substi- General Martin Dempsey discusses the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness leadership tute. Even with a combined number of over a process and outcome of our national leaders’ team of Rhonda Cornum, Thomas Vail, and dozen tours in Iraq and Afghanistan among development of the new strategic defense Paul Lester offers extensively researched this seminar, there were some who had expe- guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leader- findings and commonsense recommenda- rienced neither. The value of this new and ship: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. The tions for how senior leaders can dramati- shared experience was, as the commercial Chairman offers a valuable set of insights cally improve the lives of the people they says, priceless. I have encouraged my col- into the changing nature of strategy at lead. Discussing a specific component of league to urge these students to write about the national level and what it will take to individual fitness, Patrick Sweeney, Jeffrey their experiences so that others may benefit, effectively execute it. Continuing to speak Rhodes, and Bruce Boling offer insights on even if only to debate the issues of where for the enlisted force within the joint force, the role religion plays in the overall health of we go next in Afghanistan or the world of Sergeant Major Brian Battaglia presents the military personnel. 2020, which the Chairman is now seeking commentary of Chief Master Sergeant Curtis In the Commentary section, we to understand. Experiences not evaluated L. Brownhill, the former Command Senior welcome back four JFQ veterans with their and shared are lost. Many of those in PME Enlisted Advisor, U.S. Central Command, on insights on several important and continu- classrooms today will soon be in positions to the need to provide better joint education for ing themes in joint warfare that will likely guide civilian leadership to achieve success- our enlisted leaders. be catalysts for others to respond with their ful decisionmaking on strategy, policy, and This edition’s Forum brings us the views. First, from Australia, Carlo Kopp even crisis management. Whether in the War thoughts of an experienced National Defense provides a guide to developing effective College classroom or elsewhere, we continue University researcher, a brand new officer, strategies during the era of exponential to receive many insightful submissions that and a joint professional military education growth of new systems that characterizes continue both to inform and discuss the team, all focused on the growing area of the current information age. Next, Benjamin ever-changing nature of jointness, the joint cyber. From the Center for Strategic Research Lambeth provides an in-depth analysis of force, and the global challenges we face. in the Institute for National Strategic Studies recent Israeli combined arms campaigns I was also recently reminded of how far at the National Defense University, Vincent with enduring lessons for students of joint- we have traveled in the past few decades and Manzo suggests that the U.S. Government ness. As the discussion over budgets and the how far we have to go as I attended an event needs to focus on an integrated effort to seek Services continues to heat up, Lee Wright

6 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu EliasonEliason U.S. Air Force (Daniel Hughes) U.S. Air Force

Staff Sergeant Alyssa Gomez, the ninth female sniper in the Air Force, demonstrates how a camouflaged ghillie suit blends into surroundings at Nevada Test and Training Range compares the relative costs of recent conflicts to be received by operational squadrons. efforts. These future senior leaders took the and suggests airpower has not always been Robbin Laird and Edward Timperlake time and effort to write about issues they given its appropriate due. Finally, adding to discuss the operational and tactical signifi- thought were important. I firmly believe his already rich offerings to the journal on cance this system will have for the future there are even more authors interested in strategy, operational planning, and thinking battlespace. As several states continue to field topics related to jointness waiting for their about doctrine, Milan Vego discusses the ballistic missile systems with the potential moment to do the same. ancient but constant tension between science to attack other nations, the ability of missile As an editor of a military journal, I and art in the profession of war. defense systems to counter these emerg- frequently have the opportunity to work Having received a number of excellent ing threats has been a major focus of U.S. with both experienced and novice authors submissions on specific technology, our Fea- national military strategy. who want to get their ideas and experiences tures section brings them together for review As always, we have our regular joint to our audience. I am always asked, “What and comment. Now beginning to appear in doctrine update, which in this issue com- should I write about for JFQ? What issues do significant numbers in combat and stability pletes the three-part series on multinational you want to publish?” My answer is always environments, nonlethal weapons still have command by George Katsos; and to close out the same: Write about what you know and a long way to go to convince many of their the issueof JFQ, we present three insightful what you think you need to have others utility. Tracy Tafolla, David Trachtenberg, book reviews. understand. Ask questions and offer answers. and John Aho discuss the background and We have just completed the annual Talk about your experiences and what you current state of development and employ- Secretary of Defense and Chairman of have learned directly as well as what you ment of this growing family of options for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay have learned from others. Frequently, when joint operations. After a turbulent and con- Competitions, and the winning essays will I am in the classroom, I ask students what troversial development period, the current appear in the October edition. The judges, our military world would be like if someone state of play with the CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor many of whom are longtime veterans of other than Carl von Clausewitz had taken aircraft is discussed by Eric Braganca. As this contest, believed as a group that this the time and effort to write about war. Sud- with many defense acquisition programs, year’s submissions from PME students denly, writing a short essay for a military only when fielded will the true value of a were among the best they have seen. The journal doesn’t seem too difficult a task by capability be known. Another system still key to these students’ success is the fact comparison. JFQ experiencing similar rough air, the Joint that they wanted to compete. In the end, Strike Fighter F-35 aircraft is now beginning everyone who reads JFQ benefits from their —William T. Eliason, Editor ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 7 Forum | Deterrence and Escalation

Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain Operations Where Do Space and Cyberspace Fit?

By Vincent Manzo

In most real conflicts the potential escalation sequence is more like a ladder that has been bent and twisted out of shape with all sorts of extra and odd protuberances added on, which vitally affect how the conflict does or does not climb it. . . . Controlling escalation will depend crucially on identifying the particular twists and protuberances of that conflict’s misshapen ladder.1

U.S. East Coast photographed from International Space Station

DOD

NASA

8 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Manzo

arfare has become even more complicated since Richard Smoke wrote this U.S. Navy W description of escalation in 1977. The National Security Space Strategy describes space as “congested, contested, and competitive,” yet satellites underpin U.S. military and economic power. Activity in cyberspace has permeated every facet of human activity, including U.S. military operations, yet the prospects for effective cyber defenses are bleak. Many other actors depend on continued access to these domains, but not nearly as much as the United States. For this reason, some analysts argue that China’s opening salvo in a conflict with the United States would unfold in space and cyberspace. Worst-case scenario assessments conclude that such an attack might render the United States blind, deaf, and dumb almost exclusively through nonkinetic means, although it is unclear how effective attacks SM-3 Block IA missile launched from USS Hopper to intercept subscale short-range in the space and cyber domains would be in ballistic missile fired over Pacific Ocean an actual military conflict. How do concepts such as escalation, deterrence, and proportionality apply in such a context? What “odd protuberances” would counterspace and cyber attacks create in an escalation ladder? What are the salient thresholds for cross-domain attacks? And what exactly does cross-domain mean? This article explores these questions using the illustrative example of a hypotheti- cal U.S.-China conflict because both countries possess diverse strategic capabilities that span air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. a maneuverable satellite) is not. Striking a could even argue that a precision conventional Defining Cross-domain: Platforms or surface ship with a conventional air-launched strike is a cross-domain attack, regardless of Effects? cruise missile is a cross-domain attack, whether the attacking platform and target Cross-domain is an ambiguous term. whereas an attack on the same target with a are in the same domain, if it utilizes satel- U.S. doctrine identifies land, air, and sea as sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is not. lites and computer networks. By the same domains. Recent U.S. national security policy Defining cross-domain by platforms demon- reasoning, characterizing a cyber attack—as and strategy documents recognize space strates that cross-domain operations are not opposed to cyber exploitation—against and cyberspace as distinct domains as well.2 new. Air attacks on naval forces, naval attacks U.S. military computer networks as single- Assuming that all five are strategic domains, on air forces, and attacks from both domains domain is misleading. If successful, such an there are at least two different ways an action on ground forces are common in modern attack would have important cross-domain could cross domains. warfare. Indeed, in many instances, a cross- effects: it would undermine the air, ground, Cross-domain could be defined accord- domain operation might simply be the most or naval forces that depend on the degraded ing to the platform from which an actor expedient option. As an example, a nation computer networks. These indirect effects in launches an attack and the platform on which under attack by SLCMs might, for a variety of other domains are often the primary purpose the target resides. Destroying a satellite with a reasons, be able to attack the adversary’s naval of cyber attacks.3 The same logic applies to ground-launched antisatellite (ASAT) missile assets more quickly with aircraft than with attacks with co-orbital ASATs; even if the is a cross-domain attack, whereas destroying submarines and surface ships. platforms are in the same domain, the effects one with a co-orbital ASAT (for example, This definition might be too simplistic. are cross-domain. Most U.S. military forces on land, in the Thus, cross-domain can also be defined Vincent Manzo is a Research Analyst in the Center air, and at sea make use of cyber and space according to the effects of an operation. Under for Strategic Research, Institute for National assets, and most complex missions integrate this approach, an attack is cross-domain if its Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. contributions from multiple domains. One intended consequences unfold in a different ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 9 Forum | Deterrence and Escalation

of the attack and U.S. objectives rather than the domains involved. Thus, the United States deters attacks, regardless of whether the attacks cross domains, by threatening responses that will likely cross domains and differ from the initial attack. Given that cross-domain deterrence is neither new nor rare, the real question under- U.S. Air Force (Michael R. Holzworth) U.S. Air Force lying recent interest in the topic is: How can the United States mitigate vulnerabilities that stem from its dependence on space and cyberspace? Both are offense-dominant domains where U.S. defenses are inadequate and policymakers are uncertain about how to credibly threaten to impose costs on aggressors and deny benefits of attacks. Although potential adversaries depend on space and cyberspace less than the United States does, this does not explain why threats to respond to counterspace and cyber attacks in other domains are considered less credible than cross-domain responses to air, land, or sea attacks. Pilot conducts preflight check of F-16CJ Shared Framework for Assessing Pro- domain than its target. This definition illu- Cross-domain Operations portionality and Escalation in Space minates that inter-domain relationships (our and Deterrence and Cyberspace own and our adversary’s) create strategic vul- These definitions highlight the A concept Thomas Schelling explored nerabilities.4 For example, U.S. precision con- fact that military actors frequently cross in Arms and Influence is a useful starting ventional strike operations depend on access domains. Indeed, U.S. military posture is point for answering these questions. Schelling to multiple domains. A potential adversary inherently cross-domain: U.S. offensive and argued that deterrence threats are more might be incapable of destroying U.S. aircraft defensive weapons are distributed across comprehensible to potential adversaries, and or nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines, air-, sea-, and ground-based platforms; thus more credible, if they are proportionate but it might be able to attack the space and space and cyber assets are ubiquitous in U.S. with and connected to the actions they are cyber assets that enable these platforms to military operations and engender advan- intended to deter: destroy targets. This appears to be the logic tages in other domains; and it is highly underlying China’s interest in counterspace unlikely that future U.S. conflicts will There is an idiom in this interaction, a ten- and cyber attacks: such attacks shift the con- unfold exclusively within one domain. From dency to keeps things in the same currency, flict to domains where China’s offensive forces this perspective, U.S. deterrence is inher- to respond in the same language, to make the have an advantage over U.S. defenses, thereby ently cross-domain too: when the United punishment fit the character of the crime. . . . altering U.S. capabilities in domains (air and States threatens to respond to actions It helps an opponent in understanding one’s sea, for example) where China would other- that endanger U.S. and allied interests, it motive, and provides him a basis for judging wise be at a disadvantage.5 This cross-domain threatens, albeit implicitly in most cases, what to expect as the consequences of his own approach would be ineffective if U.S. air, sea, cross-domain responses. The platforms actions . . . the direct connection between and ground forces did not depend heavily the United States employs, the targets it action and response helps to eliminate the upon space and cyber assets. Without this attacks, and the effect of the attack might be possibility of sheer coincidence and makes one link, China would be unable to translate U.S. in different domains and might differ from appear the consequence of the other.7 vulnerability in space and cyberspace into an the domains utilized in and affected by the operational impact in other domains. Cross- adversary’s initial attack. Of course, such communication domain attacks thus enable an actor to best By the same logic, the United States requires that countries interpret military utilize its strengths and exploit an adversary’s traditionally deters attacks in general, without actions and reprisals similarly—in other vulnerabilities in some instances. Reports distinguishing between attacks that cross words, that they communicate through a that the United States considered launching domains and those that do not. Naval attacks shared idiom of action. a cyber attack at the start of North Atlantic on naval forces are not inherently more or less Schelling also acknowledged that break- Treaty Organization operations in Libya dangerous than air attacks on naval forces. ing a pattern of behavior (that is, escalation) suggest that the U.S. military also perceives The United States attempts to deter both, might be necessary in some circumstances cross-domain attacks as useful for exploiting and the means, target, and scale of the U.S. “to catch an adversary off balance, to display adversary vulnerabilities.6 response to either would depend on the effects unreliability and dare the adversary to

10 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Manzo respond in kind.” Even then, however, a Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James against the adversary’s air defense network. shared understanding of limits, norms, and Miller testified that U.S. responses to coun- The logic underlying this policy is that the expected responses creates a necessary frame terspace attacks “could include necessary and United States might employ ISR aircraft over of reference by which actors distinguish proportional responses outside of the space the adversary’s territory to compensate for between proportionate and escalatory behav- domain.”10 Yet there are a variety of types of the lost satellites. Attacks on the air defense ior: “Breaking the rules is more dramatic, counterspace attacks and even more potential network would be necessary to ensure that and communicates more about one’s intent, nonspace targets for U.S. reprisals. A common the aircraft could effectively penetrate the precisely because it can be seen as a refusal to framework would help planners determine country’s airspace. This policy is propor- abide by rules.”8 which “nonspace” responses best correspond tional because the United States is restoring The idiom of military action was never with counterspace attacks of varying scope its lost ISR capability, thereby denying the as coherent, communicable, and universally and severity. benefits of the ASAT attack. However, the recognized in reality as it is in Schelling’s The absence of a shared framework U.S. response would be different from the prose. Nevertheless, during the Cold War, between the United States, allies, and poten- adversary’s attack. Instead of responding in there was a generally accepted escalation tial adversaries undermines deterrence and space, the United States would attack targets ladder from conventional to chemical and increases the potential for miscalculation. on or around the adversary’s homeland. To biological to nuclear weapons. Within a Effective deterrence requires that U.S. officials further complicate the situation, the United conventional conflict, there has been an influence potential adversaries’ perceptions States might use conventional weapons understanding that escalation can occur by of the likely consequences of the actions the to destroy the air defense network even if broadening the geographical area of fighting, United States wishes to deter. The United the initial ASAT attack was nonkinetic. expanding the targets attacked (for example, States might threaten to respond to a par- Without a shared framework, potential shifting from narrow military to broader soci- ticular type of attack in space or cyberspace adversaries might consider this deterrence etal targets), and increasing the intensity of by employing different capabilities against threat illogical and therefore not credible. If violence (for example, using more bombs per different targets in other domains. Such deterrence failed, they might perceive such sortie or shifting to more destructive conven- threats, however, are less likely to resonate a U.S. response as arbitrary and escalatory. tional weapons). The salient thresholds differ as credible with potential adversaries if they Even with a shared framework, they may in every conventional conflict. do not understand U.S. assumptions about still consider this response as escalatory, but Unfortunately, countries lack a shared how domains are linked and why a particular they would also understand it to be a likely framework for interpreting how counterspace response is a logical and proportional reaction consequence of employing ASATs against the and cyber attacks fit into an escalation ladder. to the initial attack. United States before authorizing an attack. Competition and vulnerability in space and As an example, imagine the United To be clear, a shared framework would cyberspace are new relative to land, air, and States threatened to respond to ASAT attacks not and could not prescribe set actions for sea. Countries have less experience fighting on U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and every imaginable scenario. Rather, it would wars in which space and cyberspace are part reconnaissance (ISR) satellites with attacks define a generic escalation ladder, a tacit or of the battlefield. Unlike conventional and nuclear weapons, experts are less certain about the precise effects of attacks in these domains.9 For these reasons, a widely shared framework for judging how counterspace and cyber attacks correspond with interactions in other domains and, more broadly, with political relations between potential adversaries during peacetime, in crises, and in wars does not yet exist. Without one, decisionmakers will have difficulty distinguishing between U.S. Marine Corps (Benjamin R. Reynolds) proportional and escalatory attacks and reprisals that cross from traditional strategic domains into these newer ones and vice versa. The absence of a shared framework within the U.S. strategic community com- plicates effective cross-domain contingency planning. Developing coherent, effective, and usable options for responding to attacks in space and cyberspace requires that military planners in the different Services and combatant commands possess similar assumptions about cross-domain proportionality and escalation. For example, Principal Deputy GPS-enabled Blue Force Tracker tactical operations center kit allows commanders to track forces in field ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 11 Forum | Deterrence and Escalation

loosely defined code of conduct that would framework? Must responses to kinetic ferences, contrasting strategic objectives, dif- give decisionmakers a better sense of which attacks also be kinetic to be proportional? ferences in force structure and doctrine, and actions and responses are expected and Is a kinetic response to a nonkinetic attack differing strengths and vulnerabilities can accepted in real-world scenarios and which always escalatory? Can a cyber attack be cause decisionmakers in the United States and would cross thresholds that escalate the proportional to a cruise missile strike? How other countries to reach different conclusions situation. This would pave the way for more do officials compare attacks that strike about proportionality and escalation.11 This coherent cross-domain contingency planning targets in some domains and affect capabili- challenge is not new, but the uncertainties in within the U.S. Government and U.S. deter- ties and events in other domains? Counter- emerging strategic domains discussed in the rence threats that potential adversaries per- space and cyber attacks can vary widely in previous paragraphs might exacerbate it. ceive as clearer and more comprehensible and intensity, from the equivalent of a tap on Imagine that China interferes with U.S. credible. The United States would also have a the shoulder to a fist in the face. Clearly, satellites via nonkinetic means (laser-dazzling better understanding of the calculus of poten- the mere act of extending the conflict into or jamming) during a military crisis that has tial adversaries in their efforts to deter U.S. these domains is an insufficient metric for yet to escalate into an armed conflict. The actions. Cultivating such a shared framework evaluating attacks and calibrating responses. United States might attempt to undermine is a constructive goal for the future because Rather, the real-world effects of such attacks, China’s ability to attack U.S. satellites, perhaps deterrence, crisis management, and escalation both within the domain of the attack and in by scrambling its space-tracking data through control would be easier if different countries other domains, should determine whether a cyber attack. One could argue that this interpreted proportionality, connectedness, they are escalatory and which responses response is proportional because it is limited and escalation similarly. Engaging the U.S. would be appropriate. to systems that China is already employing strategic community in a thorough dialogue against the United States and does not cross on these issues is the first step toward achiev- Variables in a Shared Framework the kinetic threshold. On the other hand, one ing this goal. Forming a deterrence working Cultivating a shared framework between could argue that attacking in a new domain group of regionalists, functionalists, and legal potential adversaries for assessing effects is escalatory, opening the door to reprisals experts might be a fruitful approach to start- and formulating appropriate responses is and counterreprisals in cyberspace and other ing this conversation. difficult regardless of how many domains are domains. Would Chinese officials distinguish What would be the basis for assessing involved. U.S. and foreign officials interpret between attacks on military computer net- counterspace and cyber attacks in a shared events through different prisms. Cultural dif- works and computer networks that support the regime’s domestic security operations? If not, they might interpret this “proportional” response as an existential assault, especially if they believe that U.S. cyber attacks will cause collateral damage to computer networks other than the one targeted. U.S. Air Force (Dana Hill) U.S. Air Force What if the initial Chinese ASAT attack is kinetic? Would U.S., allied, and Chinese officials perceive a nonkinetic response against China’s space tracking capability as weak even if it succeeded in protecting U.S. satellites? On the other hand, would kinetic attacks on the ASAT weapons China is employing be proportional? Or would crossing the geographic threshold (assuming the targets are on mainland China) make this response escalatory? One could argue that a symmetrical response—a kinetic attack on a Chinese satellite—is proportional. However, if satellites play a smaller role in Chinese military operations, one could also argue that such a response is less than proportionate because it does not impose comparable operational costs on China.12 The balance between offense and Airman installs computer in new ISR defense in these domains will also influ- center at Langley Air Force Base ence perceptions of effects, escalation and proportionality, and optimal deterrence strategies. For example, if offense continues

12 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Manzo to dominate in space and cyberspace and potential adversaries want to attack U.S. assets in these domains precisely because they are the U.S. military’s “soft under- belly,” U.S. stakes in any conflict would

grow exponentially after such attacks occur Casey) U.S. Army (Sean P. because the effects in other domains would be profound. As a result, U.S. officials might feel pressure to take preemptive action prior to such an attack, or they might take risks to quickly terminate a conflict and punish the adversary in its aftermath. The linkage between vulnerabilities in space and cyberspace and the effectiveness of U.S. capabilities in other domains that makes U.S. satellites and computer networks high-value targets also makes the threat of a strong reprisal more credible: it would be proportionate to the effects of the attack. Conveying this to potential adversaries would be a central component of a deterrence strategy. Emphasizing this link might even enhance the credibility of the U.S. commitment to retaliate. Alternatively, the United States might become capable of denying adversaries the benefits of attacks in these domains through cyber defenses and substituting Soldier documents lay of the land with GPS camera in Afghanistan terrestrial assets for satellites. In this case, U.S. deterrence strategy would strive to A related issue is whether U.S. reac- effects of attacks and exploitation differ convince potential adversaries that they tions to cyber exploitation during peace- might be a first step toward establishing a cannot affect U.S. ground, air, naval, and time would affect deterrence in crises. threshold between the two. This message nuclear forces by attacking satellites and Though the technology and operations of would reinforce that deterrence has not computer networks. Such a message might cyber exploitation and cyber attacks are failed because the effects of exploitation make U.S. threats to respond offensively similar, the goals and effects are different: in cyberspace have not yet warranted U.S. appear disproportionate and less credible, exploitation extracts information from military responses in other domains. It but this would be a worthwhile tradeoff computers and networks without autho- clarifies the types of actions that the United if the United States developed a defensive rization; attacks destroy, degrade, or alter States is attempting to deter. advantage in space and cyberspace. them to achieve effects in other domains.13 Some strategists may conclude that pro- Decisionmakers will also perceive But news outlets frequently describe inci- portionate counterspace and cyber responses attacks in space and cyberspace differently dents of cyber exploitation against the U.S. are impossible because escalation control in depending on the context. Attacks on Government as cyber attacks and evidence these domains is too difficult. There is an military satellites and computer networks of an ongoing war in cyberspace.14 Conflat- “infinite number of scenarios that are neither might be expected and accepted once a ing these operations contributes to the indicative of a minor harassing incident of conventional war has started. But similar impression that U.S. deterrence has already jamming nor strategic attack” in space and attacks might trigger a conventional con- failed. Potential adversaries might conclude cyberspace.15 Assessing the effects of such flict if they occur prior to hostilities, when that U.S. threats to respond to cyber attacks attacks and choosing appropriate responses both countries want to prevent a crisis from in other domains lack credibility based on amid the stress and confusion of a military escalating into a war but are concerned how the United States reacted to previous crisis might be difficult. U.S. and foreign about being left blind, deaf, and dumb exploitation operations. This perception officials likely will have differing views about by a first strike in space and cyberspace. might affect how they calculate risks and the severity of nonkinetic disruptions that Proportionality and escalation are relative benefits of cyber attacks in crises. How can defy easy categorization, and the obstacles concepts: actions that are escalatory during U.S. officials publicly convey that cyber to developing a common framework might crises might be proportionate in limited exploitation and attacks pose different be too formidable. Furthermore, the effects wars and underwhelming responses as the threats and require different responses, of sophisticated attacks on satellites and scope and intensity of a conflict increase. especially given the overlap between the computer networks might be indiscriminate two? Emphasizing that the real-world and too difficult to predict. In this case, a ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 13 Forum | Deterrence and Escalation deterrence strategy could emphasize that to potential adversaries would contribute to Van Tol with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinev- limited counterspace and cyber attacks carry more effective deterrence and crisis man- ich, and Jim Thomas, AIRSEA Battle: A Point-of- an intolerable risk of misperception, miscal- agement. JFQ Departure Operational Concept (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, culation, and unintended escalation. Evoking 2010), 17–47; Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s “threats that leave something to chance,” U.S. Notes Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and their Impli- cations for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: actions that are escalatory 1 Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation RAND, 2007), 51–60. 6 during crises might be (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 252. For reports of U.S. debates about launching 2 See Department of Defense (DOD), Quadren- a cyber attack against Libya, see Eric Schmitt and proportionate in limited nial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Thomas Shanker, “U.S. Debated Cyberwarfare wars and underwhelming DOD, February 2010), 33–34, 37–39; The White in Attack Plan on Libya,” The New York Times, responses as the scope House, National Security Strategy (Washington, October 18, 2011, and Ellen Nakashima, “Pentagon and intensity of a conflict DC: The White House, May 2010), 22; DOD, Officials Had Weighed Cyberattack on Gaddafi’s National Security Space Strategy (Washington, DC: Air Defenses,” The Washington Post, October 18, increase DOD, January 2011); The White House, Interna- 2011. 7 tional Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence and Openness in a Networked World (Washington, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 146–149. officials could credibly argue that they are 8 DC: The White House, May 2011); DOD, Depart- Ibid., 150–151. uncertain about what they would do because 9 ment of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyber- For a discussion of expert uncertainty sur- such attacks would involve “a process that space (Washington, DC: DOD, July 2011). rounding intended and cascading effects of cyber is not entirely foreseen . . . reactions that are 3 A 2009 National Research Council report attacks, see National Research Council, 121–128. 10 not fully predictable . . . decisions that are defined cyber attacks as deliberate actions that James N. Miller, testimony for the House not wholly deliberate . . . events that are not “alter, disrupt, degrade, or destroy adversary Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on fully under control.”16 Of course, expressing computer systems or networks or the information Strategic Forces, March 2, 2011. 11 trepidation about unintended escalation and/or programs resident in or transiting these For a theoretical/historical study of the could backfire. Adversaries may conclude systems or networks,” whereas cyber exploitation causes and implications of doctrinal differences in U.S.-China relations, see Christopher P. Twomey, that threatening such attacks would yield is extracting information from computer systems The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deter- U.S. concessions. or networks without authorization. The report demonstrates that the intended effects of cyber rence Failure in Sino-American Relations (Ithaca: attacks occur in other domains: “Direct or immedi- Cornell University Press, 2010). Conclusion 12 ate effects are effects on the computer system or This example demonstrates that symmetrical Many weapons systems and most network attacked. Indirect or follow-on effects and asymmetrical responses to attacks in space and military operations require access to mul- are effects on the systems and/or devices that the cyberspace are not synonymous with proportionate tiple domains (land, air, sea, space, and attacked computer system or network controls or and escalatory responses; however, since sym- cyberspace). These linkages create vulner- interacts with, or on the people that use or rely on metrical responses attack the same type of target abilities that actors can exploit by launch- the attacked computer system or network . . . the with the same type of weapon in the same domain ing cross-domain attacks; the United States indirect effect is often the primary purpose of the as the initial attack, it likely would be easier for may seek to deter such attacks by threaten- attack.” National Research Council, Technology, different countries to reach similar assessments about whether such responses are proportionate or ing cross-domain responses. Yet both the Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition escalatory. Assessing asymmetric responses against U.S. Government and potential adversaries and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities (Washington, targets in the same domain as the initial attack— lack a shared framework for analyzing how DC: National Academies Press, 2009), 80. 4 For more on interdomain relationships and which might attack the same type of target with concepts such as proportionality, escala- vulnerability, see Mark E. Redden and Michael P. different types of weapons, different types of targets tion, credibility, and deterrence apply when Hughes, Global Commons and Domain Interrela- with the same type of weapon, or different types capabilities in space and cyberspace not tionships: Time for a New Conceptual Framework? of targets with different types of weapons—might only enable operations in other domains INSS Strategic Forum 259 (Washington, DC: be more difficult. Assessing asymmetric responses but also are part of the battlefield. The real- National Defense University Press, October 2010). against targets in different domains than the world effects of attacks that strike targets in 5 For a discussion of the role of space, coun- attack would likely be the most difficult because it space and cyberspace and affect capabilities terspace, and cyber capabilities in China’s military requires a shared standard for determining equiva- and events in other domains should be the strategy, see David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saun- lencies across domains. 13 basis for assessing their implications and ders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strate- National Research Council, 149–152. 14 For example, Michael Riley and Ashlee determining whether responses in different gic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washing- Vance, “Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race,” domains are proportionate or escalatory. ton, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), chapter 3; James Dobbins, David C. Gompert, Bloomberg Businessweek, July 20, 2011. Integrating actions in the emerging 15 David A. Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell, Conflict Susan J. Helms, “Schriever Wargame 2010: strategic domains of space and cyberspace with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies Thoughts on Deterrence in the Non-Kinetic with actions in traditional domains in a for Deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), Domain,” Air Force Space Command High Frontier clear escalation ladder would be a first 5–7; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual 7, no. 1 (November 2010), 14. 16 step toward more coherent cross-domain Report to Congress, Military and Security Develop- Schelling, 95. contingency planning within the U.S. Gov- ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010 ernment. Communicating this framework (Washington, DC: DOD, August 2010), 22–37; Jan

14 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu OLSON

Underground petroleum and water resources near Denver City, Texas, make distinctive land-use patterns SHADOW

BOXING NASA-JSC Cyber Warfare and Strategic Economic Attack By Soren Olson

First attack the enemy’s strat- culture of strategic fads (for example, hybrid effects. Moreover, with two of the three major war, fourth-generation warfare, irregular war, exploits in the Siemens software that Stuxnet egy, then his alliance, next his counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism) attacked remaining unpatched several years army, and last his cities. and our force-centric threat assessment indi- later, the willingness of private companies cate that changes in the character of war and to protect critical infrastructure systems is —Sun Tzu, The Art of War corresponding implications may be missed. called into question.1 These two observa- The character of war now undeniably involves tions combine to suggest that cyber warfare .S. critical infrastructure and attacks against economic and domestic will not respect traditional institutional resources are open to assault infrastructure and cyber methods will be the responsibilities. Indeed, one must wonder if by “clever and persistent” cyber weapons of choice. it might be unwise to leave defense against U attacks. Such attacks could dra- Lacking the flashy nature of weapons strategic-type attacks—by foreign nations matically affect the supply chain of our most systems, protection of domestic infrastructure and others—to private companies and the strategic resource, petroleum. Two decades and economic systems does not command a domestic security apparatus. of warnings concerning cyber vulnerabilities sufficiently high priority in strategic planning. Many authors use pre- and post-9/11 to inherent in U.S. infrastructure have effectively While the Department of Defense (DOD), characterize a shift in a how terrorism was gone unheeded. Bureaucratic constructions Department of Homeland Security, and other viewed. Prior to September 2001, terrorism such as U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBER- parts of the U.S. strategic community have was largely seen as a criminal behavior.2 After COM) create the illusion of security but do begun to respond to the threat posed by cyber the impact of terrorism was demonstrated, it not address the true problem. As we focus on warfare, more needs to be done. Action must became a matter of national defense. Similarly, creating effects in the enemy, we largely ignore be taken despite domestic infrastructure and cyber security must be thought of in terms of the effects the enemy can create in us. Our economic systems being run by civilians and before and after Stuxnet; the tendency to view outside traditional DOD jurisdiction. the use of cyber weapons as criminal must be Second Lieutenant Soren Olson, USAF, is a graduate Further complicating the issue of replaced with a view that sees their use against of the Department of Military and Strategic Studies jurisdiction is the Stuxnet program. Stuxnet any U.S. interest as a hostile act. at the United States Air Force Academy. He is demonstrated conclusively that nationally currently undergoing pilot training at Columbus Air developed cyber weapons are being directed Force Base. at civilian targets in order to achieve strategic ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 15 Forum | Shadow Boxing DOD (Cherie Cullen)

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, General C. Robert Kehler

Evolution of a Weapon altered the character of war. Cyber warfare is In 1991, the National Research Council Of the challenges facing U.S. strategists, one of these. stated, “Many disasters may result from the tendency to dismiss vulnerabilities inher- Change in the character of war is intentional attacks on systems, which can ent in domestic infrastructure is likely the always noticeable after the fact, but the be prevented, detected, or recovered from most insidious. The hubris with which cyber development of the technologies and through better security.”9 The report called for vulnerabilities are viewed is well illustrated by methods that are the basis of the change a coherent strategy. Six years later, a Presiden- the following: is not. The roots of shifts in warfare are tial committee noted that there was still no often present and undergoing develop- coordinating agency as had been previously Cyber attacks have a potentially important ment for years prior to their first decisive recommended. Oddly, it asserted that con- role to play against unprepared and unlucky employment. Use of railroads, telegraphic trary to the 1991 report, the nature of cyber adversaries that have enough sophistication to communications, and headlong assaults threats was still poorly understood.10 In 2001, acquire and grow dependent upon informa- into fortified positions during the Civil War arguments about the relative strengths of tion systems but not enough to defend them foreshadowed operations in World War I.6 defense and offense in this new domain11 were against a clever and persistent attack.3 The Germans tested coordination of ground so indecisive that a congressional subcommit- and air elements in the Spanish Civil War, tee recommended the cyber security of critical U.S. domestic infrastructure is dependent years before it was employed on a large scale U.S. infrastructure and networks be left to the on cyber technologies,4 and dismissing or against the Polish and French in World private sector.12 limiting the cyber threat to existing con- War II.7 Similarly, the Yom Kippur War Advocates for relying on private indus- cepts of warfare will ensure we are unpre- in 1973 used airpower to pin and hammer try to defend critical infrastructure should pared and unlucky. ground formations—a technique that would recall that businesses cannot always be Many assert that advances in technology be used nearly 20 years later in Operation relied on to serve national interests. Private fundamentally change our world. Similarly, Desert Storm.8 In each example, the years companies are unquestionably patriotic and when new technologies, weapons, and tactics between initial development and large-scale responsible, yet strategists must not forget are observed, many strategists call them implementation served only to increase the the names of projects, companies, and people revolutions in military affairs (RMA). These lethality of the final product. Cyber warfare synonymous with short-term focus: the Ford RMAs are asserted to change how warfare is has been developed and tested in a similar Pinto, Enron, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, and conducted.5 Regardless of RMA’s utility as a manner to these examples, and reports have Bernie Madoff. Nor can strategists discount concept, some developments in warfare such consistently warned of the danger such the possibility of a private company intention- as technology, weapons, or methods have warfare poses. ally leaving cyber vulnerabilities for its own

16 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu OLSON exploitation or at the direction of another In March 2009, Forbes described a resources, such as petroleum infrastructure, national power. In light of these concerns, it cyber espionage ring known as “GhostNet.” have been unable to even keep abreast with would seem unwise to place the mandate of GhostNet is thought to have infiltrated revealed vulnerabilities of supervisory control national defense on private industry, particu- the government networks of 117 nations.18 and data acquisition systems (SCADA).25 They larly when the stakes are high and the ability Such intrusions demonstrate the capabil- are not prepared for the onslaught that history or willingness of companies to defend against ity of foreign attackers to penetrate criti- dictates will be orders of magnitude greater cyber weapons, such as Siemens in the case of cal defended networks over long periods. than any cyber attack previously employed. Stuxnet, is questionable. Finally, the Stuxnet worm was discovered Historically, nations that import energy Despite past errors, there is no ques- in July 2010 and is an example of cyber from sources prone to invisible attacks do not tion that U.S. cyber capabilities are increas- warfare coming of age. In a situation where fare well. In World War II, U.S. submarines ing, particularly with the recent creation traditional military attack was politically intentionally targeted Japanese petroleum of USCYBERCOM. However, apologists impractical, this complex series of 1s and 0s imports.26 After 2 years of invisible battering, for current cyber defense efforts should is asserted to have seriously damaged or even less than 28 percent of oil shipped reached consider this recent assessment of U.S. cyber delayed the Iranian nuclear program.19 Japan.27 Furthermore, the “loss of raw materi- defense efforts by the Government Account- Despite its demonstrated capability als and petroleum and inability to transport ability Office: to produce kinetic effects, the true signifi- items to the front lines lay at the heart of cance of cyber warfare lies in its strategic Japan’s weakening ability to maintain effective U.S. Strategic Command has identified that application. Cyber warfare is ideally suited military strength.”28 In the face of a sustained DOD’s cyber workforce is undersized and to Sun Tzu’s definitive order of attack when and coordinated attack, it is nearly impossible unprepared to meet the current threat. . . . engaging an enemy: “First attack the enemy’s to completely defend an expansive network It remains unclear whether these gaps will strategy, then his alliance, next his army, and against an invisible enemy. be addressed since DOD has not conducted last his cities.”20 With cyber warfare, the true danger lies a more comprehensive department wide An adversary looking to attack the strat- in the ability of an enemy to coordinate dis- assessment of cyber-related capability gaps egy of the United States should first determine parate actors and launch them against global or established an implementation plan or what it seeks to protect. Security of energy interests while simultaneously attacking U.S. funding strategy to resolve any gaps that may domestic petroleum infrastructure. In the late be identified.13 1500s, England used privateers to attack the the anonymity of cyber Spanish economy by raiding the gold-laden Twenty years of disaster, investigation, and warfare allows coordinated vessels sailing out of Central America. More policy change have repeatedly led to the same “submarine”-like attacks recent examples are the American use of the regrettable outcomes. against the physical and cyber Contras and mujahideen during the Cold Refinement of cyber warfare continued aspects of the U.S. petroleum War, as well as the Soviet support of Central even as this dark comedy of concern and inac- supply chain American guerrillas. Among pawn employ- tion played out. By 1999, one defense official ments, the Russian use of “patriotic” hackers stated the Federal Bureau of Investigation against the Georgian banking and commu- (FBI) was investigating some 6,080 daily supplies is the driving priority of current U.S. nication systems in 2008 is most applicable.29 attacks that were recorded on DOD computer foreign policy, and trillions of defense dollars Each example points to the malleability of systems.14 In 2001, researchers at Dartmouth have been spent on maintaining access to independent groups by a greater power. University predicted that cyber attacks would Middle East oil supplies.21 It is a cruel irony The value of pawns in cyber warfare is be the asymmetric weapon of choice for that in spite of this investment, persistent that they further complicate attribution. A hostile groups and countries well into the vulnerabilities in the oil supply chain dem- power can find and map vulnerabilities and future.15 In 2003, the Guardian commented onstrate that the U.S. commitment to critical then coordinate strikes using intermediaries. that U.S. Federal organizations were expe- resource defense remains lacking.22 Past mapping of network and infrastructure riencing such a staggering number of cyber vulnerabilities has not been treated as an act attacks on critical networks that the attacks Crude Threat of war. Thus, while the source of information were code-named “Titan Rain.”16 At this As the world’s largest consumer of enabling the attacks may be known, so long point, the Federal Government began pon- petroleum, the United States is unable to as the originating hostile power uses pawns, dering whether commercial cyber networks supply its demand from domestic sources. there would be little direct action the United should be considered critical infrastructure Accordingly, some 36 percent of imports States could undertake. and thus protected, but it took little significant come from concentrated overseas routes Today, the spread of al Qaeda affili- action. A 2005 Presidential committee found and another 27 percent is transported into ates and other armed groups results in more that the “computers that manage critical the continental United States via overland pawns willing to attack American interests. U.S. facilities, infrastructures, and essential pipelines.23 Even domestic petroleum depends This is the opportunity that a coordinating services can be targeted to set off system-wide on the domestic pipeline system. The ability nation-state would offer such groups: failures, and these computers frequently are to attack or defend this global and domestic accessible from virtually anywhere in the petroleum supply network rests on computer It should be clear that the energy infrastructure world via the Internet.”17 systems.24 Commercial guardians of critical of the United States is its lifeblood, and as such, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 17 Forum | Shadow Boxing it is one of the most critical of all infrastruc- loss of service, loss of stakeholder confidence, system to system across counties, states, and tures. The assets of the oil and gas industry are or the failure of the business itself.”32 regions in a hub-to-hub progression.34 thus clear targets for economic jihad.30 Similarly, the anonymity of cyber When examining the layout of the U.S. warfare33 allows coordinated “submarine”- petroleum infrastructure, concentration of Somali pirates are already using infor- like attacks against the physical and cyber pipelines run by SCADA systems at logistics mation from within shipping companies to aspects of the U.S. petroleum supply chain. hubs are clear domestic chokepoints. There seize vessels off the Horn of Africa.31 These The proliferation of armed groups along are six primary hubs in the United States. pirate groups have demonstrated a willingness global shipping routes could allow an These hubs are vulnerable to cyber sabotage to act on information received concerning anonymous actor to coordinate an equivalent directed either at the SCADA systems or the the vulnerabilities of Western shipping com- submarine campaign against the physical power grid supporting the hubs, as was dem- panies. Modern pirates, armed with inside links of the global oil supply chain. This cam- onstrated in 2007 when “an ice storm knocked information, do token amounts of damage paign of resource disruption would be aided out power to the hub in Cushing, Oklahoma, compared to the havoc an anonymous, mali- by direct cyber attacks against the SCADA shutting down four crude oil pipelines [and] cious state actor could generate with a coor- systems that run petroleum logistic hubs in halting transport of roughly 770,000 barrels of dinated campaign. However, direct physical the United States. oil per day.”35 attacks augmented by information procured Logistics hubs serve as gateways for Though little known now, the 1982 from cyber warfare are only one part of the regional supply. They are characterized by U.S. cyber attack on the Trans-Siberian oil threat: “The reliance on cyber technologies interconnections among many pipelines and, pipeline used a Trojan program that caused creates the opportunity for interrupted com- often, other modes of transportation—such an explosion within the pipeline equivalent munications, false or misleading transactions, as tankers and barges, sometimes rail, and to a 3-kiloton weapon: “The U.S. managed fraud, or breach of contracts, and can result in usually trucks, especially those used for local to disrupt supplies of gas and consequential transport—that allow supply to move from foreign currency earnings of the Soviet Union U.S. Air Force (Lou Hernandez) U.S. Air Force

Anacortes Oil Refinery at base of Mount Baker, Washington

18 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu OLSON for over a year.”36 Though this example shows In 2007, total world oil production amounted attack, such as a vulnerable supply line that that cyber warfare’s kinetic effects can be to approximately 85 million barrels per day provides a vital strategic resource. Second, fearsome, such are not necessary to cause (bbl/d), and around half, or over 43 million the use of cyber against strategic resources catastrophic economic damage. bbl/d of oil, was moved by tankers on fixed is in accordance with Sun Tzu’s maxim “to maritime routes. The international energy defeat the enemy without fighting and, when Fear of Fear? market is dependent on reliable transport. necessary, to win first, and then fight.” These Deliberate attacks by a nation-state, The blockage of a chokepoint, even temporar- two concepts support the idea of removing using a combination of cyber weapons ily, can lead to substantial increases in total a strategic resource via asymmetric and and traditional arms, have already been energy costs. In addition, chokepoints leave anonymous means. The example of subma- directed at economic targets. The addition oil tankers vulnerable to theft from pirates, rine warfare in World War II, interdicting of cyber means and economic targeting to terrorist attacks, and political unrest in the strategic resources, though not anonymous, the character of war was first demonstrated form of wars or hostilities as well as shipping demonstrates the ability of economic target- by the Russians: accidents.38 ing by an invisible opponent to bring a great power to its knees. When Russia invaded Georgia, a large One commentator asserts that cyber However, the cyber warfare foreshad- portion of its military operations focused not attacks also look for “digital chokepoints,” owed by Stuxnet and envisioned here would on securing the areas inhabited by ethnic Rus- such as the electrical grid. As he explains, require resources in numbers that are avail- sians but on Georgian ports and facilities for “Cyberspace is complex terrain, but the same able only to state actors.42 Furthermore, such handling oil and gas. Unstable ground condi- idea obtains: squeeze a vulnerable throat.”39 an indirect approach is distinctly contrary tions, augmented by cyber attacks, soon made Cyber warfare, like submarine warfare, is to typical Western strategy.43 Whose hand all of the Georgian pipelines seem unreliable. ideally suited to closing chokepoints. This should the United States expect to wield Meanwhile, 2 days after the invasion began, approach was successfully employed by the cyber warfare against its interests? It stands to reason that the nation with the clearest motive and intent is the most likely to challenge the active defense for infrastructure systems would take years of reigning superpower. development before they could be trusted to match modern The idea of using cyber warfare to strike offensive weapons at an unanticipated target, such as strategic resources, is perfectly in line with the Chinese concept of warfare known as shashoujian:44 the Turkish section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Cey- United States against the Japanese; planners “Once strengths and weaknesses have been han pipeline was attacked by local militants, must anticipate a similar attack against the identified and assessed, the strengths can be supposedly on their own initiative. One result U.S. oil supply chain if only because of the avoided, and the weaknesses can be targeted of these developments was that BP Azerbaijan potential for catastrophic damage. An inci- for attack using shashoujian.”45 shifted its oil transport to the Russian Baku- dent that closed the Strait of Malacca even Since 2004, China has conducted at Novorossiisk pipeline, even though the costs temporarily would reroute 50 percent of the least 14 major cyber attacks, including Titan were double those of the Georgian pipelines.37 world’s shipping and cause further doubts Rain and GhostNet, on targets ranging from about the reliability of energy transport. The ExxonMobile and the German chancellor Cyber warfare was employed to leverage potential economic damage from a coordi- to Indian and DOD military networks.46 a target that was purely economic. BP shifted nated cyber campaign executed on global oil The signs of weapon development have been its oil contracts based on perception; physical chokepoints by a major power—or on domes- noted, and the call for economic weaponiza- compromise of the Georgian pipeline was not tic chokepoints—is inestimable.40 tion by Chinese experts has gone out: “It is necessary. Due to the influence of percep- only necessary to break with our mental habit tion, Georgia experienced serious economic Shadow Puppets of treating the weapons’ generations, users, damage with no physical destruction of Cyber weapons, potential proxies, and combinations as being fixed to be able to infrastructure. and supply chain vulnerabilities all exist. turn something that is rotten into something Given the ease with which economic What remains to be examined is what might miraculous.”47 The authors later give an damage can be inflicted on a single economic motivate an actor to coordinate such a example of what might be accomplished with target, in this case a pipeline, one can see how campaign. Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz such an approach: the global system the United States relies on suggest what might cause such a campaign is at risk. Furthermore, proliferation of pawns against U.S. petroleum supplies. First, con- On October 19, 1987, U.S. Navy ships attacked would make it easy for a power to use them sider Clausewitz’s assertion that “Strong an Iranian oil drilling platform in the Persian to coordinate attacks against the maritime fortifications force the enemy elsewhere.” Gulf. News of this reached the New York Stock routes and land-based logistic hubs used for Even in economic decline, the U.S. military Exchange and immediately set off the worst transport of petroleum. Only a few of these has demonstrated its ability to fight in three stock market crash in the history of Wall attacks would need to succeed to undermine conflicts on the opposite side of the world.41 Street. This event, which came to be known as the foundation of the international energy This military strength forces potential Black Monday, caused the loss of $560 billion system and reliable transport: opponents to find a more effective angle of in book value to the American stock market.48 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 19 Forum | Shadow Boxing

Though this is an inaccurate claim, the this inability to immediately fix a problem 9 National Research Council, Computers validity of the statement is irrelevant insofar should not deter strategists from considering at Risk: Safe Computing in the Information Age as the Chinese believe it is true. the uncomfortable implications of an infra- (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1991), 2–3. Admittedly an attack by the Chinese structure that is indefensible against modern 10 President’s Commission on Critical against the international links of the U.S. cyber weapons and might not be reliable in Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: petroleum supply chain would injure their case of limited or full-spectrum conflict. Protecting America’s Infrastructures (Washington, 49 own economy. For this reason it seems We must recognize that while there are DC: The White House, October 1997), 78, avail- unlikely they would attack international links significant vulnerabilities among the links in able at . except as a prelude to full-scale war with the the U.S. oil supply chain, they are but symp- 11 Professionals for Cyber Defense, letter to United States.50 However, the theory of eco- toms of a larger problem. Warnings about President George W. Bush, February 27, 2002, nomic interdependence should not be used as cyber warfare have been present for years, but available at . a shield to dismiss the possibility of economic reminiscent of another prominent defense 12 General Accounting Office, Critical Infra- cyber attack. Prior to World War I, the theory failure prior to 9/11, actions taken remain structure Protection: Significant Challenges for circulated that nations would not go to war as insufficient. In light of these facts, we face the Developing National Capabilities, report to the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and the economic devastation would be too great, uncomfortable truth that China, as well as Government Information, Committee on the Judi- yet it proved wrong. other nations, possesses a weapon, and our ciary, U.S. Senate, April 2001, available at . Shadows’ War its shadow. JFQ 13 Government Accountability Office, Defense The destructive potential of cyber Department Cyber Efforts: DOD Faces Challenges warfare in the economic, social, and physi- in Its Cyber Activities, report to Congressional cal realms demands that it be accorded the Notes Requesters, July 2011, available at . 1 Paul Roberts, “Many Stuxnet Vulnerabilities afford nuclear weapons. Defending against 14 “Guarding Cyber Pentagon,” CNN.com, Still Unpatched,” Threatpost.com, Kaspersky Lab available at . be overwhelmed through mass or unconven- War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 25. 15 Michael Vatis, Cyber Attacks During the 3 Martin C. Libicki, “Cyberwar as a Confi- tional delivery. Unlike nuclear weapons, the War on Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis (Dart- dence Game,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 1 anonymous and diffuse nature of cyber war mouth, NH: Institute for Security Technology (Spring 2011), 134. may make deterrence impossible. Studies, September 24, 2001), available at . DC: The White House, May 2009), 3, available at defense is the proliferation of potential 16 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Titan Rain: How . via cyber means. When this combines with ian, September 4, 2007, available at . the success of repeated enemy infiltration Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment 17 President’s Information Technology (Titan Rain), the global scope of infiltrations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Advisory Committee, Cyber Security: A Crisis of (GhostNet), and the kinetic effects (Stuxnet), Budgetary Assessments, 2002, from Office of Net Prioritization (Arlington, VA: National Coordina- no defense should be expected to withstand Assessment, 1992), 3, available at . is well developed, and active defense for War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, development before they could be trusted 18 Paul Maidment, “GhostNet in the 1989), 20. to match modern offensive weapons. Active Machine,” Forbes.com, March 29, 2009, available 7 Rainer Waelde, The Experience of the defense must not be the first focus. Instead, at Blitzkrieg html>. vulnerabilities, creating backup systems, Doctrine” and Its Lessons for the Transforma- 19 William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David determining opponent cyber capabilities, tion Process (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army E. Sanger, “Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in and solving the attribution problem must Command and General Staff College, 2003), 25, Iran Nuclear Delay,” The New York Times, January take priority. available at . cyber defense and the conundrum that Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 8 Steven Baxter, “Arab-Israeli War October DOD faces in the form of a mandate for 77–78. 1973: Lessons Remembered, Lessons Forgotten” national defense and a prohibition against 21 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” (Master’s thesis, Naval War College, 1994), avail- domestic operations are not issues that can Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March–April 2006), 82. able at . tions were created by national law, they can Dove,” in Special Providence: American Foreign only be solved by national law. However,

20 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu OLSON

Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Journal 236, no. 2 (February 2009), avail- Routledge, 2002), 110. able at . “How Dependent Are We on Foreign Oil?” Energy 37 U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit (US-CCU), in Brief (Washington, DC: Department of Energy, special report, Overview by the US-CCU of the June 24, 2011), available at . 2008, available at . 38 Center for Strategic Studies cessing Review (London: Touch Briefings, 2005), Energy Information Agency, World Oil Institute for National Strategic Studies available at . at . 26 Navy Department, Section III: Japanese 39 Austin Bay, “Grab the Planet By the Strategic Perspectives, No. 9 Anti-Submarine Warfare and Weapons, War Throat,” RealClearPolitics (April 22, 2009), John Parker’s Russia Damage Report, no. 58 (Washington, DC: U.S. 8, available at . recent history of WDR58/WDR58-3.html>. 40 Energy Information Agency, 4. Russia’s relationship 27 W.J. Holmes. Undersea Victory: The Influ- 41 Referring to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. with Iran, the outsize ence of Submarine Operations on the War in the 42 Holger Stark, “Mossad’s Miracle Weapon: personalities involved, Pacific (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 425. Stuxnet Virus Opens New Era of Cyber War,” Der and how the United 28 Michel T. Poirier, “Results of the American Spiegel Online, August 8, 2011, available at . state. As Vladimir . Strategy Is to Make War While Avoiding a the presidency, 29 David Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study: Battle,” Armed Forces Journal 143 (November will he replay his Georgia 2008,” Small Wars Journal, January 6, 2005), available at . during which Russia negotiated the S-300 air defense blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf>. 44 Most commonly translated as “Assassin’s system contract with Tehran? Or will he continue 30 James J.F. Forest, Homeland Security: Pro- Mace,” it refers to the Chinese search for weapons Russia’s breakthrough in finding common ground tecting America’s Targets, Vol. III: Critical Infra- that are undetectable prior to use and cause such with the United States on Iran seen under former structure (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing damage as to make retaliation by the victim President Dmitriy Medvedev, who tore up the S-300 contract? Although Russia did not close the door Group, 2006), 136. impossible. to engagement with Tehran, Moscow voted for 31 Giles Tremlett, “This Is London—The 45 Jason E. Bruzdzinski, “Demystifying new, enhanced sanctions against Iran at the United Capital of Somali Pirates’ Secret Intelligence Shashoujian,” in Civil-Military Change in China: Nations Security Council and it continues to insist th Operation,” The Guardian, May 11, 2009, available Elites, Institutes, and Ideas after the 16 Party that Iran cooperate fully with International Atomic at . (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic in Putin’s resentment of U.S. power and suspicion of 32 National Petroleum Council, Securing Studies Institute, 2004), available at . “step-by-step” engagement with Iran is more of a Energy, June 2001). 46 Richard Stiennon, “A Brief History of regional issue. This paper details many salient issues including the history of the S-300 air defense system 33 U.S. Naval Institute and CACI Interna- Chinese Cyberspying,” Forbes.com, February between Russia and Iran, the recent Arab Spring, tional, Inc., “Cyber Threats to National Security: 2, 2011, available at withdrawal from Symposium I—Countering Challenges to the firewall/2011/02/11/a-brief-history-of-chinese- Afghanistan, and American missile defense systems Global Supply Chain,” March 2, 2010, available cyberspying/>. in countries bordering Russia. at . stricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy 34 Allegro Energy Group, “How Pipelines America (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Pub- Make the Oil Market Work: Their Networks, lishing House, February 1999), 20. Operation and Regulation,” a memorandum for 48 Ibid., 190. the Association of Oil Pipelines and American 49 Unless the attack affected only the domestic Petroleum Institute’s Pipeline Committee, U.S. petroleum distribution network. December 1, 2001, 7. 50 Nations that export oil or have little stake 35 “Ice Storm Trips Power, Paralyzes Key U.S. in the international system (Iran, Venezuela, Oil Hub,” Reuters, December 11, 2007, available at Russia, and North Korea) could execute cam- . little self-damage; indeed, the resulting petroleum Visit the NDU Press Web site 36 Eric J. Byres, “Cyber Security and the market instability might be economically advanta- for more information on publications Pipeline Control System,” Pipeline & Gas geous to these actors. at ndupress.ndu.edu

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 21 Forum | Offensive Cyber Offensive Cyber for the Joint Force Commander

NASA Defense Meteorological Satellite Program NASA Defense Meteorological It’s Not That Different

By Rosemary M. Carter, Brent Feick, and Roy C. Undersander

Satellite view of power distribution

The instruments of battle are transactions. The strike is one of the first strategic capability for cyber superiority,4 the publicized employments of offensive cyber as cyber domain must be rapidly synchronized valuable only if one knows an integrated part of a military operation and with the other warfighting domains. A full how to use them. demonstrates the powerful impact of these understanding of the features, capabilities, types of attacks on private sector business.3 limitations, and impacts of the cyber domain 1 —Charles Ardant du Picq The cyber domain consists of four oper- may be years away, but actionable knowledge ating areas: providing capability, protecting of this domain at the operational level will n 2008, as part of the campaign against that capacity, exploiting within the domain, not be achieved as long as cyber operations the Republic of Georgia, Russia con- and conducting offensive operations that remain segregated from the other warfare ducted a series of widely publicized are also referred to as computer network mission areas. I cyber attacks. The attacks were not attack. The areas of “provide” and “protect” The assertion that cyber operations are against purely military target sets. For 19 are the most mature because our day-to-day different is the most common argument for days, cyber warriors conducted distributed information technology operations require a denial-of-service attacks against Georgia’s secure and functioning cyber domain. This Colonel Rosemary M. Carter, USA, is a Internet infrastructure and defaced public article focuses instead on offensive cyber Communications Officer on the Army Staff. Colonel Brent Feick, USAF, is a Senior Policy Advisor for the and private Web sites.2 The initial impact was capability, which is the newest segment of Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense a virtual cyber-blockade against the govern- the domain but is rapidly maturing. Unlike for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security ment of Georgia that reduced the country’s airpower, where development was limited Affairs, Integration, and Defense Support of Civil ability to lead internally and stifled its ability to nations with significant industrial and Authorities. Captain Roy C. Undersander, USN, is the to gain international sympathy. A second- financial resources, the cyber warfare arena Executive Officer of Naval Air Station Jacksonville, order effect was that the National Bank of is inexpensive and characterized by state Florida. The authors collaborated on this article Georgia shut down its Internet connections and nonstate actors limited only by creativ- while attending the Joint and Combined Warfighting for 10 days, stopping all electronic financial ity and the Internet. Therefore, to maintain School at the Joint Forces Staff College.

22 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Carter, feick, and undersander segregating cyber from the other domains. defense. While this is an important aspect, it flicted. For example, under Title 10, a joint Cyber is different just as the solid terrain of leaves the Armed Forces in a state of flux with force commander is authorized to collect the land domain differs from the physical regard to integrating offensive capability. As intelligence on an adversary for operational structures of air and space domains. Speed of is to be expected, conduct of cyber attacks is preparation of the environment (OPE). In the action is also different in cyber. Events occur a sensitive issue. International organizations cyber domain, this task becomes mired in law and situations develop faster than the human such as North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- because the same capability used to exploit mind can observe, orient, decide, and act.5 tion (NATO) Watch advocate for a ban on is also used to attack, and there is no way to But this is not the first time in the history of offensive cyber operations altogether because demonstrate intent within the effects of the warfare that the speed of conflict has changed. the domain is so pervasive that offensive task.10 Because of the legal concerns, collec- The introduction of fighter aircraft and space operations could quickly escalate beyond the tion to date is done under Title 50 authorities, capabilities changed the military decision intended virtual boundaries with devastating which severely limit military capacity and calculus, yet these capabilities were not in global impact.8 Cyber activity is also being compel a centralized approach to these types themselves sufficient justification to segregate addressed through international anticrime of intelligence. If Service cyber components the domain. In fact, initial efforts to isolate channels,9 but care must be given to provide were allowed to conduct OPE on behalf of the space from the other domains were overcome separate and distinct definitions for acts of joint force command for targeting, offensive as our understanding of the domain matured. crime as opposed to acts of war. Without cyber options could be much more integrated The purpose of this article is to analyze the international rules, some countries have and timely. As it is, joint force planning staffs challenges of cyber policy, targeting, and the started to set precedent by their actions, dem- routinely lose national-level support due to planning process to argue that offensive cyber onstrating ethics that differ from ours. Stan- higher priority tasking from the National is not so different from other capabilities, and dards of conduct for cyber warfare similar to Intelligence Priority Framework. Agencies that it must be fully integrated at the joint those for other aspects of war are required. supporting national tasking are highly skilled force command level to ensure unity of effort The United States should draft a declaratory but have limited resources; hence, they do not and maximize effectiveness. policy that establishes lines we do not intend have excess capacity to meet DOD require- to cross in the cyber domain and that we ments. Section 954 of the National Defense The Need for Rules expect an adversary to adhere to as well. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 201211 starts U.S. policy, authorities, and doctrine The U.S. Code is another source of to address DOD authorities for offensive cyber for military operations in the cyber domain guidance for DOD. The authorities of Title operations, but it is vague enough that debates are not mature. The International Strategy for 10, The Armed Forces, and Title 50, War and over Titles 10 and 50 will still occur. Its lack of Cyberspace6 (May 2011) and the Department National Defense, were established prior to clarity indicates that the thinking of policy- of Defense (DOD) Strategy for Operating in the existence of the concept of cyberspace, makers and lawmakers is still too traditional Cyberspace7 (July 2011) are a start, but both so translating them to the cyber domain is for this newest domain. documents focus almost entirely on cyber extremely complex and not yet fully decon-

DOD White House ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 23 Forum | Offensive Cyber

General Keith Alexander, USA, ties and help inform recommended changes component of mass and unity of effort, bring- commander of U.S. Cyber Command prior to a military crisis. ing integrated capabilities to bear during all (USCYBERCOM) and director of the phases of operations—shaping, deterring, National Security Agency (NSA), announced The Targeting Process seizing the initiative, dominating, stabilizing, in October 2011 that DOD is currently Military operations require effective and enabling civilian authorities. staffing rules of engagement for the cyber targeting to identify objects or entities for The targeting process is as critical for domain from which his command will engagement or action. To be effective, these the cyber domain as it is for the domains of provide guidance to the DOD cyber force.12 targets must be linked to the commander’s land, sea, air, and space because we expect These rules of engagement are an important intent. In accordance with Joint Publication our adversaries to have as complex a military step, but they are not sufficient without 3-60, Joint Targeting, the principles for joint cyber capability as our own integrated with training and rehearsals to validate and targeting are focused, effects-based, interdis- civilian networks. Additionally, other targets, inculcate them into operational ethos. ciplinary, and systematic.14 The joint targeting to include manufacturing plants, logistics Per DOD Directive 5100.01, the process is cyclic and relies on target system systems, and power generation facilities, are Services and combatant commands have analysis and assessments to establish func- dependent on the cyber domain to function authority to man, train, and equip cyber- tional relationships among the adversary’s properly and effectively.15 The characteristics space forces to enable joint force com- political, military, economic, social, infor- and sophisticated intricacies of cyber make manders to perform decisive operations.13 mational, and infrastructural systems. The it tempting to isolate cyber targeting from Tactics, techniques, and procedures for process includes both target system elements the larger effort. There are some compel- computer network attack are maturing. and target system components to be inclusive ling arguments for this approach. First, the What are needed now are plans to inform of all elements of the adversary’s power. It is domain requires specialists, some of whom defense leadership and other policymakers dependent on staff judge advocates to ensure will never wear the uniforms of our Armed how these capabilities integrate to achieve that targets are in compliance with the laws Forces. There are few cyber specialists, so military and national endstates. Planning of armed conflict and the rules of engage- the vision of a consolidated cohort of cyber will drive understanding of current authori- ment. The targeting process is an essential targeteers ready to converge on a designated

Artist conception of National Cyber Range in development by DARPA

DARPA

24 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Carter, feick, and undersander threat is appealing. Consolidating resources capabilities. This should be a two-way street, It is incumbent upon USCYBERCOM to also facilitates centralized training, which benefiting other warfare operators and, just enable joint force staffs to fully contribute in is attractive in a resource-constrained envi- as important for cyber operators, opening this environment and understand the posi- ronment. Finally, the shared connectivity avenues of approach in other domains that tive and negative effects of cyber operations between adversary and civilian or commer- otherwise would be closed in the cyber on friendly forces, on the adversary, and on cial cyber space argues for keeping cyber tar- domain. While cyber information can fit into noncombatants in their area of responsibility geting inside of a compartmented community the targeting process, there are some manual during all aspects of targeting. with a small number of personnel knowledge- manipulations that need to take place until able on the efforts. However, none of these the targeting community catches up with new Operational Planning arguments is sufficient to overcome the risks policies and the supporting technology. Larger than the targeting process is associated with lack of integrated targeting First, the military targeting process overall planning for an operation. Today, a at the operational level. This integration is is geographically focused to the point that limited understanding of the cyber domain fundamental and cannot be achieved during the Modernized Integrated Database, a artificially constrains military planners. the execution phase. database for all military targeting, only Many planners perceive that DOD does not The commander and his staff must fully references targets by geographic position. have authority to do offensive operations in understand both the friendly and adversary This poses problems for a cyber operator the cyber domain. However, the real issue is cyber domains to the same degree they under- who may have a virtual network as a target. that the authorities are not understood or del- stand the other domains. As with any limited The Intelligence Community is aware of this egated down. Joint force commanders need to resource, the global force management system shortfall and working to make the database develop integrated plans with offensive cyber should prioritize and allocate the cyber force more flexible. Second, access to signals intel- operations to help shape policy and build a based on priorities and risk. Training for ligence (SIGINT) data is too constrained. norm of authorities and rules of engagement specialized forces will always be a challenge. Joint planners must have access to these for military cyber attack, but their planners do However, training difficulties should not drive operational capabilities. Leaders should our country is currently more willing to drop a bomb on an demand flexibility and creativity from the force providers in their training programs, not adversary than break his computer from a warfighting commander with limited access to the domain until operations are reports in a timely manner if they are to not know the domain well enough to develop imminent. Efforts now to decentralize and have a full understanding of the operational these plans. The discussion becomes circular. optimize cyber training will also reap ben- environment. SIGINT data should be Civilian policymakers want to know exactly efits for the operational force by establishing pushed from NSA, not pulled. Once targets what DOD intends to do and commanders virtual environments that can test training, are identified, raw SIGINT may even need perceive that they cannot do anything because exercises, scenarios, and contingency plans. to be shared in order to maintain a target on they do not have the authority. Risk is associated with the negative the joint target list. With this, the value of the J5 Planning second- and third-order effects of targeting an Finally, a tiered approach to identifying Directorate and deliberate plans come into adversary’s cyber space with civilian and com- targets in the cyber domain must be adopted. play. The more fidelity joint force command- mercial cyber activities operating in the same There is an authorities question nested in ers can put into offensive cyber planning, the space. This risk is the strongest argument for this as well, but a joint force commander, easier it will be to articulate potential new integrating cyber targeting within the com- with the help of all-source intelligence and authorities with sufficient time to integrate mander’s larger targeting effort. The Georgia a military cyber component, may produce them into the plan. Often, intelligence agen- case study provides an example of these risks. Internet-facing targets to hold at risk. These cies will not be supportive of specific targets, Whether or not the cyber attackers intended are targets that are accessible directly from citing a concern over loss of intelligence. for the Georgian National Bank to cease elec- the Internet (as opposed to a closed network) However, this is a moot point at the planning tronic transactions, the impact was the same. and would constitute the first tier. OPE on tier stage, and planners should not let this, or the Unintended consequences of a limited cyber one targets would not involve national intel- lack of authorities, defer their planning if the attack may impact the financial instrument of ligence assets, but would help refine questions target will help meet an objective. It is better power in waves of effects generated by actual that can focus national assets on the harder to have a plan available in times of crisis damage, perceived damages, or, as in Georgia, problems for the military, and thus would be from which to have the intelligence gain/loss loss of confidence. Commanders must under- the second tier. Many agencies are skeptical and legal discussions than to be caught with stand the most dangerous and most likely of the utility of Internet-facing targets, but no options when the government is prepared effects of cyber operations within their areas the Georgia attack, where the known cyber to take action. of responsibility. These effects must syn- targets were Internet-facing, is an example of Unique features of the cyber domain chronize with the entire operation to protect their utility. The target list was even posted have encumbered deliberate cyber planning DOD friendly forces and the civilian population. on the Internet. This discussion demonstrates in the past. The following generic scenario Joint force commanders must integrate that there are some differences in dealing with demonstrates the methodology and the information from the cyber domain into cyber targeting information, but in general it unique features. A planner determines that their joint targeting process to synchronize fits into the Joint Publication 3-60 construct. Effect A can be met either by dropping a joint ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 25 Forum | Offensive Cyber direct attack munition on Target 1, a building, the case of Target 1, a planner may go 1 or 2 Finally, if a computer network attack or by conducting a cyber attack on Target 2, years between conducting maintenance. The is not planned for standalone delivery, the a router. In both cases, the planner uses intel- structure of the building rarely changes and it capabilities must be synchronized with the ligence to link the target to the effect, deter- will not move. However, Target 2 may receive other capabilities brought to bear by the joint mine access, pick the appropriate capability, a software upgrade 3 months after identifica- force commander. U.S. Strategic Command and maintain the target in the joint target list. tion that makes the weapon developed for it (USSTRATCOM) is responsible for or is However, it typically takes much more intelli- obsolete. As a result, if the planner is serious assigned many of the nonkinetic capabilities gence preparation to develop Target 2 because about holding this target at risk, the mainte- in DOD, and its planners must work alongside our culture is so focused on geographic nance cycle must speed up significantly. joint force planners to provide the com- targets that it takes an extra level of intel- In a Joint Force Quarterly article, Major mander the most successful attack options lectual energy to broaden the aperture. If the General Brett Williams, USAF, stated that and courses of action. This effort must include planner can obtain imagery of Target 1, then “our understanding of nonkinetic effects USCYBERCOM, a subunified command it is simply easier for a weaponeer to plan for a in cyberspace is immature.”16 This is a fair under USSTRATCOM that is assigned kinetic solution and hold that target at risk. statement and frankly one of the biggest DOD cyber forces. During the integration In determining access, we see the barriers for decisionmakers who grew up process, joint force planners must develop second difference. Access to Target 1 may waging kinetic war. Our country is currently an appreciation for the synergies between constitute a bomber flying through or avoid- more willing to drop a bomb on an adversary USCYBERCOM and the other components of ing a surface-to-air missile threat. This is a than break his computer, which stems from USSTRATCOM. Additionally, because cyber well-understood problem and is addressed two issues. First, as discussed earlier, the attacks may have global implications as well as by the tactical force. In the case of Target 2, access must be established through the cyber with new fiscal constraints on the horizon, our ability to make domain by cyber operators, who are limited. To do this, the command requires cyber OPE the best use of cyber capabilities is even more important or exploitation authorities as discussed. This is often where targeting in the cyber domain Nation is concerned about escalation without the intended regional effects, it is imperative stops due to limited NSA resources and com- set standards. Second, decisionmakers are that these options also be vetted collectively petition with national priorities. If Service not likely to experiment with a cyber attack through the DOD and interagency communi- cyber components were conducting cyber when lives are on the line and collateral ties. This is a coordinating task that must preparation of the environment under Title damage is not well known. Until DOD be completed by U.S. Strategic Command. 10 at the joint force commander’s direction, makes the cyber attack option as tangible for USSTRATCOM’s Joint Functional Com- many of these issues would be resolved. As it a decisionmaker as dropping munitions, and ponent Command–Global Strike started a is, these differences add up to a longer time- can prove it will meet or exceed the effect of model for this, but it is immature and requires line to develop the target. a kinetic option without catastrophic col- refinement and expansion. As military profes- The third difference is the capability lateral effects, the decisionmaker will choose sionals, we have recognized the need to work itself. The United States has a finite number the kinetic option every time. To remedy closely with interagency partners to fully of types of kinetic weapons to attack physi- this, planners must develop high-fidelity achieve desired endstates and ultimately the cal targets. Using the right combination and cyber attack options that are part of an inte- national strategy. Cyber warfare is no differ- number of weapons, and based on experi- grated solution and can be tested on ranges ent and may be one of the most compelling ence, it is easy to quantify the level of damage prior to execution. This will allow the cyber reasons for interagency cooperation because that these weapons inflict, which aids in the community to establish a historical database agencies outside of DOD have authorities in decisionmaking process. By contrast, cyber to provide the confidence and statistical data the cyber domain and may have interest or weapons are customized for each target, required for decisionmakers to choose the even cyber attack options developed for a par- which makes it difficult for decisionmakers nonkinetic options. ticular target. These tasks must be normalized to use experience to visualize the mode of To summarize deliberate planning, into the joint interagency coordination group attack and its effects. Many cyber weapons the primary reason that some organizations process to become a force multiplier for DOD. are also based on specific software versions, push back on cyber planning to this level of so if the version changes, the weapon may no detail is the increased level of effort to develop Recommendations longer be effective. the target and the volatility of the target. This article makes the case for integrat- The fourth and most significant differ- However, if joint force commanders want to ing offensive cyber at the joint force command ence is maintaining the target, the process in normalize cyber attack and have a reasonable level. The list of recommendations below is which the intelligence and planning teams expectation of successfully executing it as a designed to generate the discussion necessary routinely review the intelligence and endstates part of combined fires, deliberate planning to fully develop these details. Lead agencies to ensure that the target still meets the desired is a must. Likewise, cyber operators need to identified are based on the authors’ under- effects and nothing has changed that requires embrace this concept as well lest they become standing of current roles and responsibilities. new weaponeering. This is a common task irrelevant, especially when effects cannot 1. DOD must delegate proper authori- for any target on the joint target list; the dif- be brought to bear where and when they are ties to USCYBERCOM and its components ference is the volatility of the cyber target. In needed for the commander.17 to shorten the development time of targets,

26 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Carter, feick, and undersander streamline cyber operational preparation of All future U.S. military operations will 5 Colonel John Boyd, USAF, “Destruction the environment, and increase throughput of include the cyber domain. Cyber is where and Creation,” September 3, 1976. Boyd’s concept the Intelligence Community. we coordinate joint functions and control of the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act) was developed and presented through a series of 2. USSTRATCOM/USCYBERCOM weapons systems. We must operate securely briefings and lectures. His paper, “Destruction and must ensure that organizational and across the cyber domain and commanders Creation,” provides scientific justification for deci- information-sharing policies are optimized must protect it. Of equal importance is our sionmaking without describing the OODA process to support and include joint force planners. ability to operate offensively within this in detail. Several books on the life of Boyd provide This includes devising methods to share raw domain to ensure dominance, restrict the additional detail on the concept and a five-slide set SIGINT for timely maintenance of targets on offensive cyber capabilities of the adversary, titled “The Essence of Winning and Losing” dated a joint target list. and leverage cyber as a force multiplier. June 28, 1995, that defines the OODA loop is attrib- 3. The Intelligence Community must With new fiscal constraints on the horizon, uted to Boyd. update applications and procedures associated our ability to adapt and make the best use of 6 International Strategy for Cyberspace: Pros- with the Modernized Integrated Database to these cyber capabilities is even more impor- perity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World accommodate nongeographic targets. tant. Offensive cyber operations must be (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2011). 7 Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Wash- 4. Joint force planners must incorpo- integrated into the joint force commander’s ington, DC: Department of Defense, July 2011). rate high-fidelity offensive cyber plans into plan, and his planning and executing staffs 8 Ian Davis, NATO Watch, “Ban on offensive their deliberate plans. USCYBERCOM must must understand the desired effects. As cyber operations needed,” available at . empower joint planners. The objective is to opportunity to correct current deficiencies 9 Convention on Cyber Crime, ETS 185, have planners with knowledge of cyber capa- in an integrated approach through deliber- Council of Europe, November 23, 2001, available bilities, limitations, and basic concepts for ate planning and the targeting cycle. This at . 5. DOD must establish policy that for new language in key policies, laws, and 10 Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence allows joint force planners to take advantage treaties. The United States must act quickly Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 of nontraditional cyber information sources. because the clock is ticking and the adver- Debate,” Journal of National Security Law and Commercial companies are assessing many of sary is learning. Offensive cyber—it’s not Policy, October 17, 2011; and University of Texas Law School, Public Law Research Paper, available the same problems and could be leveraged to that different. JFQ at Social Science Research Network, available at provide critical information. . 6. DOD must resource joint force 11 The National Defense Authorization Act for Notes commands to test offensive cyber attacks Fiscal Year 2012 was signed by President Obama on on virtual cyber ranges. The targeting com- December 31, 2011. The bill is available at . Ancient and Modern Battle, 8th ed. (French), trans. 12 Donna Miles, “Doctrine to Establish Rules the cyber equivalent to the kinetic Joint John Greely and Robert C. Cotton (New York: Mac- of Engagement Against Cyber Attack,” American Munitions Effects Manual, which provides millan, 1920). Forces Press Service, October 20, 2011, avail- a probability of damage based on target/ 2 Eneken Tikk et al., Cyber Attacks Against able at . 7. DOD, in conjunction with the U.S. Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 13 Department of Defense (DOD) Directive Government, must develop a declaratory November 2008), 4–5. 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and policy for cyber warfare. It is time for the 3 Scott Borg and John Bumgardner, Overview Its Major Components (Washington, DC: DOD, By the US-CCC of the Cyber Campaign Against United States to lead an international dia- December 21, 2010). Georgia in August of 2008, A US-CCC Cyber logue on cyber warfare, perhaps modeled 14 Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting Special Report, August 2009, available at . 15 Benjamin Lambeth, “Airspace, Spacepower, 8. USSTRATCOM must devise a 4 Cyber superiority is comparable to air supe- and Cyberpower,” Joint Force Quarterly 60 (1st method to track nonkinetic options for global riority, which is defined in Joint Publication 1-02, Quarter 2011), 46–53. impact and incorporate these nonkinetic Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Wash- 16 Brett Williams, “Ten Propositions regarding attack options and associated targets into the ington, DC: The Joint Staff, as amended through Cyberspace Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly 61 synchronizing efforts of the joint force com- November 15, 2011), as “that degree of dominance (2nd Quarter 2011), 11–17. mander’s plan. in the air battle of one force over another which 17 Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. 9. USCYBERCOM must standardize permits the conduct of operations by the former Debated Cyberwarfare in Attack Plan on Libya,” and its related land, sea and air forces at a given the interface between joint force planners The New York Times, October 7, 2011, available time and place without prohibitive interference by and interagency partners for targeting. This at . that permits the conduct of operations by land, technical interagency team may be war- sea, air, and cyber forces without prohibitive cyber ranted. The team should be responsive to the interference. joint force commander. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 27 Special Feature | Resilience

BG Rhonda Cornum, USA, speaks at first Master U.S. Army (C. Todd Lopez) U.S. Army (C. Todd Resilience Training course, Fort Meade, Maryland

Resilience The Result of a Totally Fit Force By Rhonda Cornum, Thomas D. Vail, and Paul B. Lester

s the Nation’s war against terror behavioral outcomes attributable to stress and and maintaining psychological strength is has unfolded over the last poor coping. Active surveillance has docu- critical to maintaining the Nation’s ability decade, each Service has shown mented increased rates of obesity; tobacco, to wage sustained combat and contingency A evidence of higher levels of drug, and alcohol abuse; family violence; operations. While fully recognizing that stress. Increased operational tempo has been a sexual assaults and other felonies; psychologi- treatment of personnel suffering physical ubiquitous part of military service thus far in cal diagnoses; and suicide, especially among and psychological injuries and disease is the 21st century. Repeated deployments have junior members of the force. vital, DOD has also recognized it is at least required junior Servicemembers to represent In response, the Department of Defense as important to prevent injury and disease. the Nation’s interests with foreign populations (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs while performing dangerous tasks that extend have dramatically increased assets dedicated Brigadier General Rhonda Cornum, USA (Ret.), is the beyond their training. This has contributed to helping Servicemembers who are experi- former Director of Comprehensive Soldier Fitness. to “stress on the force.” Personnel who have encing negative behavioral health outcomes. Colonel Thomas D. Vail, USA (Ret.), is the former not deployed face different stressors, as do These departments will continue this effort as Deputy Director of Comprehensive Soldier Fitness. family members and civilians remaining in long as there is a need. But as it became clear Major Paul B. Lester, USA, is the former Director of the United States. It is not surprising that all that the current war was a long-term struggle, Research, Development, and Program Evaluation for Services have experienced increased negative DOD increasingly recognized that building Comprehensive Soldier Fitness.

28 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Cornum, Vail, and Lester

Use of body armor, malarial prophylaxis, and different from traditional clinical psychology, This instruction was not written in immunizations are all accepted measures much of which focuses on abnormal behavior a vacuum. Over the same time period, the U.S. Army (C. Todd Lopez) U.S. Army (C. Todd to prevent physical illness and injury. Daily and mental illness. At least for the military, Services had individually recognized the same physical training (PT) has long been accepted whether the issue is physical or psychological need. They were at various stages of designing as important to building physical assets health, a mere absence of disease or infirmity or implementing fitness plans when the letter including speed, endurance, strength, and is a necessary but insufficient condition; of instruction was published. The Army had flexibility. These physical assets allow better success, as we see it, is making sure that every- devoted much of 2008 and 2009 to designing performance on the battlefield. But only in one has the education, training, and opportu- a strategy to improve the psychological fitness the past few years has DOD recognized that nity to develop and maintain optimum health. of the entire Service. Designated Comprehen- enhancing baseline psychological strength In 2009, former Chairman of the Joint sive Soldier Fitness (CSF), this strategy was and fitness could improve performance on Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen tasked not directed at individuals with behavioral the battlefield as well, and that it thus might the Uniformed Services University and health problems. Rather, the CSF mission was reduce the incidence of negative psychological Samueli Institute to develop a framework for a to improve the baseline psychological strength and behavioral outcomes. more holistic view of “fitness.” The concept of of the force by synchronously developing and There has been a fortunate collision Total Force Fitness (TFF, pronounced tough)1 deploying psychological skills training and between the need to increase the psychological is the result of this work, as shown in figure 1. education along three lines of effort: institu- strength of the force with the science allow- On September 1, 2011, Admiral Mullen signed tional, leader-led, and individual. Simultane- ing that to occur. A significant amount of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruc- ously, CSF was to develop and implement an research has been completed in the past two tion (CJCSI) 3405.01, “Chairman’s Total Force assessment tool to give individual Soldiers decades that outlines how to enhance the Fitness Framework,” requiring each Service a confidential azimuth check on their own psychological fitness of a healthy popula- to use the TFF framework to enhance and/ psychological fitness. Moreover, the Army tion—that is, personnel without any diagnosis or refine its current fitness program. This leadership, after removing individual Soldier or symptom complex. The discipline of posi- instruction tasks each Service to provide identification, could use the aggregate results tive psychology, defined as “scientific study appropriate medical support, training, equip- longitudinally to determine the effect of of the strengths and virtues that enable indi- ment, and supplies for implementing the education, training, deployments, and other viduals and communities to thrive,” became Chairman’s policy, allowing the uniformed policy decisions on the psychological health of recognized as a legitimate degree-producing Services complete flexibility on how these the force. Army-wide deployment of CSF was branch of psychology in 2004. This is quite measures are accomplished. launched October 1, 2009. Figure. Shield of Health Figure 1. The Shield of Health: Eight Domains of Fitness

SOCIAL

Social support BEHAVIORAL Task cohesion PHYSICAL Social cohesion Strength Substance abuse Family cohesion Endurance Hygiene Flexibility Risk mitigation Mobility

Coping Awareness TOTAL Heat/Cold Altitude PSYCHOLOGICAL Beliefs/appraisals ENVIRONMENTAL Decisionmaking FORCE Noise Engagement FITNESS Air quality

Food quality Access Nutrient requirements Immunizations Service values Supplement use Screening Positive beliefs Food choices Prophylaxis Meaning making Dental NUTRITIONAL Ethical leadership MEDICAL Accommodate diversity

SPIRITUAL

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 29 Special Feature | Resilience

Figure 2. Actual Distribution of Global Assessment Tool Scores for Army Population

125,000 Composite

100,000

75,000

50,000 Surveys Taken

25,000

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Score

Development of the assessment tool, justified” response patterns). Furthermore, the importance of entering combat with a content of the material to be taught, and the there are few differences across demographics strong baseline of psychological health; not method of delivery was informed by many (for example, rank, gender, and education). doing so will have an effect on Soldiers when of the leading psychological experts in the Additionally, GAT scores across the Army they return from deployment. When taken Nation. A special issue of American Psy- Components (Active, National Guard, and together, we now know the GAT is in fact chologist in January 2011 was devoted to the Reserve) are also similar. In short, there is measuring psychological assets that relate to science behind the development of the entire a normal distribution of resilience and psy- success or failure in the military. CSF initiative.2 The present article is in no chological health across the Army when the In parallel with releasing the GAT for way intended to repeat that scholarly work. entire population is analyzed. Army-wide usage, CSF also launched the Instead, it discusses the results after 2 years of However, the distribution of scores Master Resilience Trainer (MRT) course. This CSF implementation, what has been learned changes when we look at special populations. 10-day in-residence course gives first-line about the fitness of Army personnel, and Using data culled from a hypermassive data- supervisors, primarily noncommissioned the effectiveness of education and training base known as the Person-Event Data Envi- officers (NCOs), the opportunity to both learn to enhance psychological fitness. Lastly, the ronment (PDE), which connects data together and learn to teach proven resilient thinking potential for further application of psycho- from across DOD, we found that GAT results skills that are validated by social scientists logical assessment and strength training in are strongly related to both positive and nega- as being effective. The MRT course employs the Army and in the rest of DOD is discussed. tive behavioral outcomes of interest to the a train-the-trainer format. Here, our master military. For example, we learned that Soldiers resilience trainers learn the resilience skills Major Components of CSF who are caught using illicit drugs, committing and then fan back out across the Army to First, a self-assessment devise known violent crimes, or committing suicide are— teach them to the Soldiers they lead. This as the Global Assessment Tool (GAT) was not surprisingly—concentrated at the bottom train-the-trainer methodology is important developed and tested. Comprising 105 ques- of the psychological fitness curve. for two reasons. First, a train-the-trainer tions, it takes 15 minutes to complete. At this Conversely, personnel selected for format is cost-effective given that it does time, the GAT has been completed more than below-the-zone promotions, command not add to the Army’s total force structure 2.1 million times by over 1.5 million users, sergeant major, and command are over- (that is, the Army does not have to hire 5,000 and over 700,000 Soldiers have taken it more represented in the upper 25 percent of new trainers). Second, this format embeds than once. The GAT measures psychological psychological health. Moreover, we used the the training within the backbone of our assets (rather than psychological symptoms PDE to learn that attrition from basic training Army—the NCO corps—the very leaders who or deficiencies) in four important domains: is 3 times higher for Soldiers who enter the understand Soldiers best and are responsible emotional, social, family, and spiritual. The Army in the bottom 10 percent of psychologi- for training them. results have an expected distribution; that is, cal fitness compared to the top 90 percent. Our MRTs learn 13 critical resilience few people score low, making it a fairly typical We also found that Soldiers in the upper 90 skills. One of the first lessons taught is the bell-shaped curve with the greatest number percent of psychological health have approxi- “ATC” model. This model teaches that of those surveyed achieving about 75 percent mately one-third the rate of post-traumatic behavior is based on a sequence of events: of the maximum possible score (figure 2). stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms as Soldiers there is an Activating event, which leads to a We know that most Soldiers (86 percent) in the bottom 10 percent when they return Thought, which then leads to Consequences. take it seriously (that is, no “left or right from deployment. This clearly underscores Consequences can be emotions or behaviors,

30 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Cornum, Vail, and Lester

which can be managed. This model, which is standing that he did his best and that he can thinking skills taught by MRTs is the same based on extensive experimental and clini- continue to do “good” by getting back out as the basis of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, cal work, explains how two individuals can and using his skills. The event itself was the a well-recognized technique for combating experience the exact same event but manifest same: there was a severely wounded patient, a depression, anxiety, and PTSD. That basis is different emotions and behaviors. Once they medic rendered aid, and the patient died. But simple: it is “the idea that our thoughts cause understand the sequence, people can learn to the consequences were different. Of course, our feelings and behaviors, not external reframe how they think using more accurate this same scenario is played out at every level things, like people, situations, and events.”3 assumptions and beliefs. of care. But physicians, especially surgeons, The guiding principle at CSF is that the time As a real world example, imagine a typically spend a decade in training before to learn something new is not in the midst of combat medic giving aid to a badly wounded they are faced with the absolute responsibility a crisis. The Army now understands that the Soldier, yet the Soldier ultimately dies. The of a seriously wounded Soldier’s life. Asking a time to learn these skills is beforehand, and activating event is the Soldier dying of wounds 20-year-old medic within 2 years of graduat- therefore Soldiers should learn and practice whose severity the medic had no control over. ing from high school to have the same level these “thinking skills” during their normal Yet if the medic’s thought is “It’s my fault he of objectivity and maturity as a 30-year-old lives and while facing smaller challenges. It died—I don’t know what I’m doing—I cost surgeon is perhaps an unrealistic expecta- will then be easier to draw on them during that guy his life,” then the likely consequence tion—but it is an expectation that is inherent a truly significant challenge. This is exactly of his thinking is guilt, shame, and perhaps, in combat. It is therefore our responsibility to in line with what Soldiers frequently say depression. The medic may then “self-med- teach these skills deliberately and preventively in combat: “The shooting started, and my icate” with drugs or alcohol to assuage these before Soldiers are faced with these challenges. training just kicked in.” In the Army, we negative emotions, leading to a downward It is important to recognize that the now recognize how important it is that Sol- spiral of thoughts with negative consequences. value of competence with these skills is in diers have all the training needed to be more If, on the other hand, the medic thinks “I did no way unique to the military context; they successful both in combat and in life, not everything I knew to do, and sometimes an apply equally whether the person is a secre- just the tactical and technical skills. injury is so severe I cannot save the guy,” the tary or a sniper, and whether the challenge Certainly, many people learn these consequence is likely to be sorrow, but not is professional or personal. One colonel things without formal education. They learn guilt or shame. at Fort Bragg told us, “As a father with a from the examples of parents, grandparents, Moreover, while the short-term behav- 20-year-old son and 19-year-old stepson, and experiences, and this is likely a signifi- ioral consequence of sorrow may be tears, the I think the program would be valuable for cant factor in why we see a wide spectrum long-term consequence will be the under- all teenagers.” In reality, the basis for the of resilience in our data. But regardless of U.S. Army (Jason Fetterolf)

Soldiers perform four-count flutter kicks during physical training, Fort Bliss, Texas

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 31 Special Feature | Resilience U.S. Army (Kimberly K. Fritz)

Fort Lee senior chaplain teaches resiliency during new 9-week course using biblical principles

the level of competence with these skills on training could work in the average opera- practices and distributes both a printed and entry into the military, the training is nev- tional unit without causing harm. Given that, virtual implementation guide for unit lead- ertheless valuable. First, it allows Soldiers we stood up a robust data analysis cell that ership. Additionally, MRTs going through who already have skills to recognize when to provided CSF with evidence of the program’s the course now spend more time on proper use them and to capitalize on them, which effectiveness. Constant data analysis allowed program implementation. reinforces their use. Second, Soldiers who CSF to make minor program changes as A vital commonality in units success- already have the skills learn to teach them, required. Another challenge facing us was fully implementing resilience training is that resulting in a more successful team rather local training management. Initially, as the training is led by recognized unit leaders. than just successful individuals. Third, MRTs were trained and returned to their In parallel with this, we recommend that this training gives everyone in the Army a units, we recognized that many of them MRTs talk to their commanders and training common vocabulary with which to discuss were not formally trained in how to properly planners as soon as they graduate to get the emotionally significant issues and may help plan, schedule, and implement a program resilience course on the training calendar. to destigmatize the entire concept of psycho- such as CSF. Given that, CSF published clear But a second, equally important aspect of suc- logical health. training guidance that helped the MRTs cessful implementation is co-opting the first- implement the program within battalions line supervisor level of leadership because Some Lessons Learned and brigades. those leaders are our best way of diffusing on Implementation Yet even from the beginning, pockets the resilience lexicon. They are also likely the How the program is implemented in of light began to emerge. For example, in best suited leaders for describing to junior the field is probably the most important units where resilience training was instituted enlisted Soldiers how to make meaning of the matter to examine. We are all familiar with as a regular, habitual event that was on the training and incorporate the skills into daily things that seemed to work well when a training calendar and had proper command life. That is usually done by first teaching the professional did them, but the results were emphasis, commanders reported that Soldier skills to the first sergeants and platoon ser- quite different when we tried them at home. behavior gradually improved. One unit at Ft. geants of the unit, making “Resilience Teach- In most cases, the outcome is better when Leonard Wood required 2 hours of training ing Assistants,” or RTAs, out of the senior the task is performed by a professional. As per week and witnessed a marked reduction enlisted leadership of each small unit. These Comprehensive Soldier Fitness rolled out in Soldier attrition. The Eighth United States RTAs are helpful when the MRT is leading across the Army, we had to accept that a sub- Army in Korea sent MRTs as a mobile train- small group training because they serve as a optimal solution in some areas would have ing team to reach the entire force in small bridge for the MRTs to Soldiers who are new to be acceptable in the short term in order to groups and showed a sharp drop in discipline to resilience training. These Soldiers then see get the training to those needing it most. For issues. Elsewhere, one brigade commander that the leadership has a basic understanding example, we recognized that Master Resil- went from 10 days of physical training every of, and has bought into, resilience training. ience Training would be taught by leaders 2 weeks to 9, with 1 day devoted to the other This helps to enhance the training experi- who likely had little training in psychology. “PT,” which they refer to as psychological ence during practical exercises and role- Therefore, it was vital to ensure that the training. The staff at CSF collects these best playing assignments.

32 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Cornum, Vail, and Lester

Using Science to Evaluate the Program ience and psychological health scores—as lexicon, those could easily be converted for At the same time the program was measured by the GAT—improve significantly use by other Services. The coping, commu- instituted across the Army, a parallel initia- more than units that did not have MRTs. nication, and decisionmaking skills taught tive of program evaluation was launched. Specifically, units with MRTs witnessed by MRTs are all equally applicable whether The Army was committed to ensuring the improved Soldier-reported emotional fitness, the individual is military or civilian, and program was effective and was prepared to coping characteristics, quality of friendships, without regard to Service affiliation. These modify it. One challenge was that CSF could and character strengths, while catastrophic are, after all, commonly needed life skills not train enough MRTs fast enough to meet thinking was significantly reduced. that help us all regardless of the uniform we the Army’s demand. While this was initially When the analysis was confined to each wear. seen as a threat to the program, it became an younger Soldiers (18–24 years old), the Additionally, CSF has already reached opportunity to apply science to determine effects were three to four times larger than out to other Services and offered them the program’s effectiveness. Quite simply, the seen in older Soldiers, and improvements training opportunities. For example, the Air throughput constraints of the MRT course were seen in more areas measured by the Force’s Air Combat Command has partici- naturally created a wait list control group to GAT. Specifically, the younger cohort pated almost since CSF’s inception, and to be compared against units who had MRTs. showed increased optimism, organizational date CSF has trained 110 Air Force MRTs By deliberately tracking where MRTs were trust, adaptability, family fitness, and family and 22 higher level training facilitators, assigned, and comparing the subsequent satisfaction in the units that had MRTs. and it has trained Navy and Marine Corps GAT scores of the brigades who had MRTs This suggests that MRT skills accelerate the personnel as well. The GAT and resilience embedded in them with brigades that did development and maintenance of psycholog- modules are offered free of charge and not yet have them, the potential effect of the ical health in younger people and bring them are available to anyone who is part of the training on psychological health was mea- closer in line with the psychological health Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting surable. Initially, the evaluation was planned of those who are older and more experi- System regardless of Service affiliation. to continue for 3 years, but it was ultimately enced. As previously noted, we also wit- Lastly, an opportunity exists within shortened to 15 months. Subsequently, those nessed greater effects in units that regularly the fact that the Army is rapidly becoming brigades on the wait list were moved up in did the training, selected confident leaders self-sufficient in training resilience. Over the priority at the conclusion of the evaluation. to deliver it, and had command emphasis on next few years, the CSF directorate will off- We felt compelled to end the evaluation MRT skill training. Because some of these ramp much of the external support the Army needed to successfully stand up a force-wide resilience development program, and it will while the training modules and videos use actors in Army soon take full operational control of training uniforms who use Army lexicon, those could easily be converted MRTs. Army culture has steadily accepted for use by other Services the importance of resilience training, and the CSF lexicon is rapidly diffusing across Army units. Likewise, the Army is invest- because, as commanders shared the value of brigades are still deployed, determining the ing in other smaller programs endorsed by having MRTs with other commanders who effect on postdeployment and reintegra- other Services, such as mindfulness training did not have them, demand for MRTs grew tion is still in the future. Nevertheless, it is used by the Marine Corps, and this is also dramatically, and it became obvious that we noteworthy that using the scientific method being done under the banner of CSF. Other needed to “surge” MRT production to get the allowed CSF to determine that the improve- training development continues in additional trainers spread across the force more rapidly. ments were due to the MRT skill training domains of psychological health. Accord- To answer the demand, an aggressive mobile and not to organizational factors such as ingly, CSF was intentionally positioned training team method was initiated. quality of unit leadership and unit cohesion. to serve as a catalyst of change within the For a variety of reasons, all data Army. Much has been learned, the sunk cost analyses were done by independent scientists Taking CSF Purple has largely been paid, and CSF is poised to who had no vested interest in seeing Com- Does Comprehensive Soldier Fitness transfer this knowledge to other Services if prehensive Soldier Fitness succeed, but this nest within the CJCS instruction for the desire exists. situation parallels a critical cultural norm developing Total Force Fitness? There are within the Army—when it comes to train- obvious links between the eight domains of Conclusions ing evaluations, units do not formally assess fitness embraced by the CJCSI and the five Comprehensive Soldier Fitness is, as it themselves. What can be said about the effect dimensions of CSF. While the CSF program was intended to be, a continuously evolving of having MRTs doing psychological fitness was developed by and for the Army, there strategy. For example, an assessment of the training in an operational environment? is nothing Service specific about it. For individual’s physical health is being added First, we can say that the skills taught by example, the GAT only references “the to the feedback everyone gets on the GAT MRTs have a measurable positive effect on Army” and “units” a few times, so it could this year. Taken together, a matrix of health some of the most important characteristics of easily be adapted to the other Services. indicators including percent body fat, PT test psychological fitness of the force. Units that While the training modules and videos use score, blood pressure, lipid profile, sleep and conducted MRT skill training saw their resil- actors in Army uniforms who use Army smoking habits, and the number of chronic

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 33 Special Feature | Resilience U.S. Air Force (D. Myles Cullen) U.S. Air Force

Soldiers review Master Resilience Trainer course curriculum at University of Pennsylvania

medications and diagnoses give a rough resources should be concentrated to best do while taking no action; rather, it must estimate of how physically healthy a person effect change in the desired direction. An focus on problems that really do exist and be actually is. This “score” is then compared example is our finding that social isolation willing to take action when it can. There are to how healthy the person could be if all the and loneliness are two individual factors that plenty of problems needing attention, and parameters were optimized. The person gets were most divergent between Soldiers who programs focused on preventive health strat- individualized feedback indicating what subsequently functioned well and those who egies such as Comprehensive Soldier Fitness he or she can do to sustain the factors that did not. Other factors such as organizational have demonstrated that such problems are are good and improve the factors that are trust were identical between these two popu- actionable. JFQ not. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness is in the lations. When taken together, knowing this process of establishing online links between served as the impetus to fund research on Notes the individual factors comprising the physi- training interventions aimed at building the 1 Wayne B. Jonas et al., “Why Total Force cal domain and the real experts in each area skills to make and maintain healthy relation- Fitness?” Military Medicine, vol. 175 (August 2010), in order to give each Soldier the best infor- ships, rather than how to enhance organiza- 6–13, available at . the force today. Surveillance of the physical all of DOD to assist senior leaders in focusing 2 American Psychologist 66, no. 1 (January and psychological strengths and vulnerabili- resources where they are most needed. 2011). ties within the entering cohorts is constantly As resources dwindle, greater reliance 3 Albert Ellis, Reason and Emotion in Psycho- being analyzed to determine which factors must be placed on using the behavioral sci- therapy (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1962). are associated with attrition, retention, ences to determine resource allocations—to and performance. When the psychological place a spotlight on where efficiencies exist strengths and vulnerabilities of Soldiers who and where the Services might get their manifest a specific outcome (positive or neg- greatest return on development. The joint ative) are compared with the rest of the force, force cannot afford to solve problems that the results should be used to inform where do not exist or simply observe problems that

34 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Sweeney, Rhodes, and Boling

U.S. Army (Russell Gilchres) Spiritual Fitness

Soldier returns to command post after patrol of village of Paspajak, Logar Province, Afghanistan

A Key Component of Total Force Fitness

By Patrick J. Sweeney, Jeffrey E. Rhodes, and Bruce Boling

Wars may be fought with ommanders throughout history The development of spiritual fitness also have understood the importance helps mitigate moral injury to Servicemem- weapons, but they are won of the human spirit to overcom- bers by fostering the strength of will to behave by men. It is the spirit of the C ing challenges and great odds to achieve victory. General Patton’s words high- men who follow and of the Colonel Patrick J. Sweeney, USA, is a Professor light that the outcomes of battles and history in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and man who leads that gains often rest in the strength of spirit of Soldiers, Leadership at the United States Military Academy. the victory. Sailors, Marines, and Airmen. Leaders have Dr. Jeffrey E. Rhodes, of Creative Computing the responsibility to facilitate the development Solutions, Inc., is contract support for the Defense —General George Patton of each member’s human spirit to ensure he Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health has the spiritual fitness necessary to accom- and Traumatic Brain Injury. Master Sergeant Bruce plish the mission, bounce back from adversity, Boling, USAF, is assigned to 325th Operational and make meaning out of his experiences. Support Squadron, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 35 Special Feature | Spiritual Fitness U.S. Navy (Nicolas C. Lopez)

Sailors attend Easter sunrise service aboard USS Carl Vinson

in accordance with individual and organi- TFF concept encompasses eight domains: nection with others, and the quest to realize zational values. Moral injuries occur when physical, medical, environmental, social potential. In this sense, the human spirit Servicemembers perpetrate, fail to prevent, (including family), behavioral, spiritual, propels people forward to take on chal- or bear witness to acts that transgress their psychological, and nutritional. The program lenges to further growth, serves as a guide to values or beliefs. Such moral and ethical chal- also concentrates on bolstering the fitness determine what is right and wrong, serves as lenges can shatter an individual’s beliefs about of units, families, and communities. This a source of courage and hope, and provides “the rightness of the world,” degrade trust in article introduces a framework to assist the strength of will to live with integrity leaders, and breed a sense of disillusionment Department of Defense (DOD) leaders and and meet responsibilities. The development and moral conflict. personnel in understanding and developing of the human spirit is about shaping the A 10-year war on terror has stressed spiritual fitness. essence of character.1 our forces and families to the point where Spirituality refers to the continuous members are bending and swaying under Definitions journey people take to discover and develop the pressures of multiple deployments and Before developing a common frame- their human spirit. It is the process of separation from family and friends. In an work for understanding spiritual fitness, searching for the sacred in one’s life; dis- effort to address stress-related issues that the three terms need to be initially defined: covering who one is; finding meaning and Armed Forces are facing and to enhance the human spirit, spirituality, and spiritual purpose; establishing interconnectedness effectiveness of the force, the Chairman of fitness. The following definitions are broad with others and, if one so believes, with the the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed the enough to include the diversity of spiritual divine; and charting a path to create a life creation of Total Force Fitness (TFF, pro- practices in DOD and also precise enough to worth living. While the definitions of spiri- nounced tough). This program challenges avoid ambiguity. tuality and religion are sometimes blurred, Service leaders to reorient their thinking The human spirit is the essence and they are two distinct concepts. Spirituality and training programs and to adopt a new animating force of the individual. It is the is both a process and path people use to holistic prevention paradigm to bolster mili- deepest part of the self, which includes one’s discover their inner selves and develop their tary readiness and force preservation. Under core values and beliefs, identity, purpose in human spirit. Religion refers to institutions this proposed paradigm, total fitness is more life, vision for creating a meaningful life, that propose and promote specified belief than just an appreciation for and develop- knowledge and truth about the world (per- systems. It is one approach people can use in ment of members’ physical prowess. The spective), autonomy to lead one’s life, con- the process of developing their spirit.2

36 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Sweeney, Rhodes, and Boling

Spiritual fitness refers to an indi- developmental model that is within the law. their current perspectives. A broad, complex vidual’s overall spiritual condition. A The domain of the human spirit consists of worldview promotes openness to diversity spiritually fit person has the ability to the psychological and social components and enhances individual adaptability to continuously gain understanding of who depicted in the figure below. operate in dynamic and culturally diverse one is in terms of core values and identity; These components are interrelated, settings.4 Worldview needs to be the central live in accordance with core values; find and taken together they promote the devel- target of development in any program pre- purpose and meaning in life; be open to and opment of the human spirit. The model paring leaders, Servicemembers, civilians, continuously seek education and experi- provides leaders and mentors insights on and family to meet the psychological and ences that broaden one’s view of the world; how to best facilitate their own and others’ social demands of operating in dangerous manage thoughts, emotions, and behavior; development. A description of each compo- environments, serving the Nation, and be uplifted by strong connections with nent of the domain of the human spirit and having loved ones serving away from home.5 others; demonstrate the strength of will its relevance to development follows. Core values define who the person is and resilience to persevere when faced with Worldview consists of an individual’s and what the person stands for. They serve challenges and adversity; make meaning most central core values and beliefs, as a guide in determining right from wrong out of their experiences; and exercise the identity, character, and sense of purpose and appropriate behavior, especially in autonomy to create a meaningful life that and meaning. Worldviews are the lenses ambiguous and dynamic situations. Core will realize one’s full potential.3 people use to view and interpret events, values serve as a reservoir for a person to determine how to act, and make meaning draw strength and courage to fulfill his Domain of the Human Spirit Model from their experiences. They are largely duties and live with integrity. For Service- The domain of the human spirit shaped through the socialization processes members, living daily by the mottos or the model provides DOD personnel a common of the organizations that a person has been core values of their Service branches may be framework and language to understand a member of, such as family, schools, teams, the most fundamental examples of practic- and discuss human spirit development. belief groups, communities, and military ing spirituality. Connecting to something The model was created by examining what organizations. Servicemembers develop beyond oneself is a central component of develops when people engage in spiritual their worldviews by seeking out experi- spirituality and the main theme for these practices. By focusing on the psychological ences such as overseas assignments, college mottos and values. The Air Force’s core targets, the model goes beyond any par- courses, volunteering for nonprofits that values—“Integrity first, Service before self, ticular means or approaches people use to serve the underprivileged, traveling, and and Excellence in all we do”—explicitly develop their spirit to create a universal seeking diversity in friends who challenge stress the importance of putting service

Conceptualization of the Domain of the Human Spirit

Spiritual Fitness Outcomes

Societal and Self-awareness ■■ Values-based Behavior Organizational (reﬂection and introspection) ■■ Strength of Will Cultures ■■ Resilience

■■ Purpose and Meaning in Life

■■ Uplifting Relationships Worldview (purpose, vision, ■■ Openness and Acceptance truth, meaning) Sense of Agency Social Awareness and Connection to Others ■■ Quest for Knowledge and Truth (ownership, self- (respect, empathy, efﬁcacy, and proactive compassion,transcendence, ■■ Enhanced Motivation to Leverage engagement) Core Values Identity and support networks) and Beliefs Skills to Realize Potential

■■ Greater Satisfaction and Commitment CHARACTER ■■ Increased Happiness

Adapted from Patrick J. Sweeney, Sean T. Hannah, and Self-regulation Self-motivation Don M. Snider, “The Domain of the Human Spirit,” in (emotion, thought, (internal consistency, Forging the Warrior’s Character: Moral Precepts from the and behavior control) hope, optimism) Cadet Prayer, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008).

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 37 Special Feature | Spiritual Fitness for the collective good before self-service. self-relevant information.7 The following four to serve something greater. Contributing to The Army’s recruiting motto—“Army facets provide DOD members a common the common good of the Nation and Service Strong”—implies that the collective body of identity: warrior, person of character, servant provides members with a sense of purpose all Soldiers is greater than the individual. of the Nation, and global citizen.8 and a way to make a difference with their lives, The Navy core values—“Honor, Courage, which provides a sense of meaning. This com- and Commitment”—are all spiritual virtues ■■ Warrior is used to describe DOD mitment to serve the citizens of the country that the Service asks its members to practice members who view themselves as people also entails a sense of duty and a commitment daily for the greater good of the unit and who take on tough challenges, place duty with liability in terms of time, effort, and the Navy. And the Marine Corps motto— first, complete assigned tasks, never quit or potential injury. “Semper Fidelis”—demands its members to accept defeat, and never leave a fellow member ■■ Members who perceive themselves as be “Always Faithful” to each other and the in need. While each Service understands global citizens not only take on the responsibil- Corps. These mottos and core values share “warrior ethos” somewhat differently, once ity to serve and assist in making their local a basic tenet of spirituality: an individual members integrate the Service’s understand- communities and the Nation better, but they understanding of and experience with that ing of warrior ethos into their identities, they also assume the responsibility to contribute to which transcends the self. This spiritual approach duties and living with a proactive, making the world a better place. This entails practice of fulfilling Service mottos and fol- resilient, learning, and winning spirit.9 an active commitment to increase individual lowing core values supports a framework for ■■ A person of character is an individual understanding of the issues facing the various managing daily unit demands, and provides who views himself as having the responsibil- levels of community they belong to and engage a commitment for Service membership and ity to seek the truth, decide what is right, and in activities to solve problems. Global citizens mission accomplishment.6 demonstrate the courage to act with integrity work to bring about the change they would Identity is a multifaceted psychological in all aspects of his life. The ideal state is to like to see in their communities. construct consisting of values, traits, knowl- have each member of the DOD team perceiv- edge, experiences, memories, and expecta- ing himself as a person of character.10 Character is shown through consistent tions that influence how a person views ■■ DOD members who view themselves moral and ethical actions for the purpose himself and his role in the world. Identity as servants of the Nation foster the commit- of maintaining congruence with individual influences and controls the processing of any ment necessary to step beyond self-interest and organizational values and beliefs. This DOD (Linda Hosek)

Military family in play area at Warrior and Family Support Center, Brooke Army Medical Center, San Antonio

38 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Sweeney, Rhodes, and Boling U.S. Air Force (Rachel Martinez) U.S. Air Force

Members of Air Force Special Tactics Squadron pray before starting 821-mile march to honor fallen comrade Tim Davis

integration of values and beliefs into self- a framework to find the strength of will to sitting in a quiet location, meditating, hiking, identity assists in forming and strengthening serve and make meaning out of adverse or watching the sun rise or set, and biking. The character. DOD members’ characters provide traumatic experiences. type of activity or location is not important: the moral compass to guide decisions and Self-awareness involves reflection and the keys are solitude and quiet time to reflect behavior, which is especially important when introspection, which enhance development of and assess the inner life. Through self-aware- the potential for use of lethal force exists. the human spirit. Through these processes, ness, people gain the ability to chart and focus They behave in a moral and ethical manner people gain insights into their most pressing their quest to develop their human essence.12 because to do otherwise would violate their questions about life: Who am I? What is my Sense of agency means that people sense of self. Thus, in all settings and situ- purpose in life? How do I create a life worth assume responsibility for the development ations within DOD, leaders and members living? Who do I want to become? What can of human spirit and that they have confi- with demonstrated character clearly establish I believe in? How can I create a life that will dence they can successfully guide this quest. the moral and ethical boundaries to ensure make a difference and lead to happiness? And Agency empowers individuals by providing that operations are carried out within the what happens after I die?11 Answers to these a sense of control over the development law, and in combat settings, within the rules introspective questions help individuals take of their spirit.13 DOD organizations can of engagement. responsibility for the development of their better facilitate a sense of agency by provid- Providing Servicemembers the oppor- human spirit, form and shape their world- ing access to various resources including tunity to serve and actually teaching purpose views and characters, and create identities. formal education opportunities that expose and meaning in serving is important in pre- Through dedicated reflection, people discover Servicemembers to topics relating to the paring and sustaining DOD members to meet and build their human spirit. Reflection development of the human spirit, traditional the challenges of leading, operating in, and and introspection are important for people and online libraries that are well resourced supporting operations in both dangerous and to make sense out of their own and others’ with diverse materials, access to chaplains, safe areas of operation. Purpose is a power- experiences and, in the process, create new and free use of spiritual and human develop- ful motivational force that gets members to meaning and knowledge about themselves ment centers. Leaders must understand and transcend self-interest and face the risks of and the world. People use various activities to appreciate that spiritual development is an injury or death in order to serve others. Core facilitate reflection and introspection such as individual journey and that there are mul- values linked with a sense of purpose provide journaling, listening to music, working out, tiple paths to developing one’s spirit.14

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 39 Special Feature | Spiritual Fitness

Self-regulation is the ability to monitor, core values and beliefs, identity, and the Techniques for Leaders to understand, assess, and control one’s achievement of their purpose.20 Encourage Spiritual Fitness thoughts, goals, emotions, and behavior, or Social awareness and connection to Promote Organizational Culture. the ability to lead the self.15 Self-regulation is others refers to an individual’s realiza- Clearly communicate core organizational a prerequisite to practice integrity, authentic tion that relationships with others play an values and purposes and discuss how con- leadership, and development as both a leader essential role in the development of the ducting business by these values enhances and a person.16 There are three components human spirit. To harness the developmental both the organization and its people. An to self-regulation: standards, monitoring, and power of relationships, an individual needs organization that serves a higher purpose willpower. Standards consist of individual to have the skills and abilities necessary to and has a moral and ethical culture has the core values, identity expectations produced connect with people in a positive manner. potential to positively influence members’ by various facets (character, servant of the These basic social skills and abilities worldviews, especially concerning purpose, Nation, and global citizen), and the organi- include respect, empathy and compassion, values, and identity. zational ethical guidelines and core values.17 transcendence of self-interests, effective Ask Reflective Questions. In daily Monitoring is simply individuals watching communication, and trust of others.21 Posi- interactions, ask questions to get members their behavior and comparing it against their tive connections with others are critical for to think about and question how they view standards. Willpower is the ability to change development and social resilience.22 Support the world to include assumptions, values, behavior to persevere in living by a cultural networks are critical in assisting indi- purpose, life vision, liability associated standard or by achieving goals. Willpower is viduals in meeting life’s psychological and with serving, emotional reactions, behav- a limited resource that gets depleted with use social challenges, especially when leading ior, and morality. These daily reflective and fatigue.18 Self-regulation plays a pivotal and operating in dangerous and stressful prompts have the potential to enhance role in allowing DOD members to meet contexts, as well as in managing stress and members’ self-awareness, agency, self-regu- unique challenges, particularly in dangerous promoting resilience. The bonds that unite lation, and worldviews. Conducting reviews and high stress contexts. people in social networks are based on after significant organizational events is an Self-motivation refers to the ability to trust. Social support networks also serve as opportunity to raise reflective questions. motivate oneself to act with integrity even powerful motivational forces to encourage In units that apply lethal force, prompt in situations of risk and to persist toward Servicemembers to behave courageously members to reflect on how they would one’s vision of creating a life worth living and honorably. make sense out of taking another human’s even when faced with challenges. DOD The journey to develop one’s spirit is life, the potential of losing their own lives, members want to continuously expand influenced by multiple levels: individual and giving orders that result in the loss or internal sources of motivation to drive self-development, relationship networks, injury of a group member. Model Respect. Assume that all social support networks serve as powerful motivational forces humans have value and that value systems are honored by understanding and learning to encourage Servicemembers to behave courageously and from people who hold different beliefs and honorably practices. Respecting others and being open to diversity creates opportunities for DOD their actions and quests to develop their and organizational cultures. Most people’s members to experience and share different spirit. An individual’s belief that he has the worldviews are shaped by their families, perspectives that encourage reflection and ability to control the development of his philosophical or faith groups, schools, the expansion of worldviews. spirit also enhances internal motivation. teams, communities, and society. Groups Encourage Meaning-making. Promote Another important source of internal moti- possess, communicate, and hold members opportunities to share perspectives and vation comes from the integration of core accountable to a set of common values, rationale for making decisions, especially values into individual identities. People are norms, assumptions about how to operate if the decisions have moral or ethical motivated to behave congruent with their and function, collective identity, and implications. Sharing perspectives exposes values in order to preserve their sense of purpose—or culture.23 Living and working members to a different perspective, rein- self.19 Striving to achieve a worthy purpose in various organizational cultures creates forces how the organization’s values are put is also a powerful internal motivating force social realities that influence members’ into action, and encourages open commu- that influences people to act in accordance perceptions of what is right and wrong, nication. These meaning-making sessions with their individual and organization what the values are to lead and live by, how are good forums for exposing members to values. In DOD operations, members’ self- we should treat each other, what provides multiple perspectives to help them learn and motivation impacts strength of will, physi- meaning to work and life, and what are make meaning out of their experiences. cal and moral courage, resilience to stress noble purposes to pursue. Leaders can Empower and Challenge. Provide and adversity, meaning-making, and trust promote organizational culture to assist in members experiences that will challenge development. The strength of members’ reinforcing each member’s development of their perspectives and skills. Overseas will or spirit rests in their motivation their worldviews and the various psycho- assignments, temporary duty in another to act in a manner consistent with their logical attributes that support these views. country, working with members from another culture, and working on a diverse

40 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Sweeney, Rhodes, and Boling team are opportunities to broaden members’ 5 Ibid., 64–66. 6 worldviews. Alfred Bandura, “On the Psychosocial NEW Network Connection Checks. Estab- Impact and Mechanisms of Spiritual Modeling,” from NDU Press International Journal for the Psychology of Religion lish uplifting relationships with group 13, no. 3 (2003), 167–174. for the members and encourage subordinate 7 Hazel Markus and Elissa Wurf, “The Center for Strategic Studies leaders to do the same. Regularly check to Dynamic Self-Concept: A Social Psychological Per- Institute for National Strategic Studies ensure all members are connected to the spective,” Annual Review of Psychology 38 (1987), group’s social network. When operating in 299–337. dangerous areas, social support provides 8 United States Military Academy (USMA), members with strategies to manage stress, Building the Capacity to Lead: The West Point Strategic Forum 277 make meaning out of their experiences, System for Leader Development (West Point, NY: Grand Strategy and sustain perseverance, bolster resilience, and USMA, 2010), 9–14. International Law 9 promote post-adversity growth. Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership: Com- Nicholas Rostow examines petent, Confident, and Agile (Washington, DC: Offer Resources. Provide members U.S. grand strategy—the Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006), with access to and time to use resources 4–10. calculated relationship such as spiritual well-being centers, chap- 10 Ibid., 10–11. between means and large lains, enhancement performance centers, 11 Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person ends—and the need to and places to practice their beliefs. That way, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), 164–181. develop and implement leaders can facilitate the development of 12 Sweeney, Hannah, and Snider, 67–68. it in an international subordinates’ human spirit. 13 Albert Bandura, “Social Cognitive Theory: legal context. The An Agentic Perspective,” Annual Review of Psychol- Conclusion ogy 52 (2001), 1–26. historical scope of The spiritual fitness of DOD members 14 Sweeney, Hannah, and Snider, 68–71. this paper is wide, and the author 15 is a critical component of force readiness. Roy F. Baumeister, The Cultural Animal: draws cogent conclusions about the importance of The domain of the human spirit model Human Nature, Meaning, and Social Life (New international law and a state’s power and values, York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 310–315. provides DOD with a common framework with examples from Thucydides’ Melian dialogue, 16 David Day, Michelle Harrison, and Stanley and language to think about, discuss, and Halpin, An Integrative Approach to Leader Develop- Napoleon’s total war, George Washington’s Fare- take purposeful action to enhance members’ ment (New York: Taylor & Frances Group, 2009), well Address, the Monroe Doctrine, the death of spiritual fitness within the law. Individuals 191–194. U.S. isolationism at Pearl Harbor, and how nuclear can use the model to assess their own spiri- 17 Richard Ryan and Edward Deci, “On Assim- weapons helped define the Nation’s vital interests tual fitness and to design plans to enhance ilating Identities to the Self: A Self-determination and reinforced respect for basic legal principles the development of their spirits. It empowers Theory Perspective on Internalization and Integrity of international conduct. Since World War II, members and leaders as active participants within Cultures,” in Handbook of Self and Identity, in strengthening the spirit of the force. ed. Mark R. Leary and June P. Tangney, 253–272 international law has never been far from U.S. Leaders have an array of simple techniques (New York: Guilford Press, 2003). grand strategy because it has helped avoid a nuclear 18 they can use daily. Promoting spiritual Baumeister, 310–315. confrontation, preserve the balance of power in 19 Augusto Blasi, “The Development of Iden- fitness is a vital component of the DOD TFF Eurasia, and prevent another world war. tity: Some Implications for Moral Functioning,” initiative and fully complements growth in in The Moral Self, ed. Gil G. Noam and Thomas E. the other seven domains. JFQ Wren, 99–122 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). 20 Sweeney, Hannah, and Snider, 55–99. Notes 21 Rogers, 37–38. 22 John T. Cacioppo, Harry T. Reis, and Alex 1 Patrick J. Sweeney, Sean T. Hannah, and Don J. Zautra, “Social Resilience: The Value of Social M. Snider, “The Domain of the Human Spirit,” in Fitness with an Application to the Military,” Ameri- Forging the Warrior’s Character: Moral Precepts can Psychologist 66, no. 1 (2011), 43–51. from the Cadet Prayer, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd 23 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture J. Matthews, 23–50 (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2008). and Leadership, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2 Ken I. Pargament, Spiritually Integrated 2004), 3–23. Psychotherapy: Understanding and Addressing the Sacred (New York: Guilford Press, 2007). 3 Sweeney, Hannah, and Snider, 23–50. 4 Patrick J. Sweeney and Michael D. Mat- thews, “A Holistic View of Leading in Dangerous Contexts,” in Leadership in Dangerous Situations: A Handbook for Armed Forces, Emergency Ser- vices, and First Responders, ed. Patrick J. Sweeney, Michael D. Matthews, and Paul Lester (Annapolis, Visit the NDU Press Web site MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011). for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 41 NASA Center for Climate Simulation “Discover” supercomputer contains 15,000 processors NASA (Pat Izzo)

Technological Strategy in the Age of Exponential Growth

By Carlo Kopp

Dr. Carlo Kopp is an Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, a Senior Member of the Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, and a Member of the Association of Old Crows.

42 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edundupress.ndu.edu Kopp

here can be little doubt that the where performance per dollar multiplies over While we have seen strong improvements definitive technological strategy time. The best known example is Moore’s Law, in jet and rocket propulsion since their advent problem at this time is how to deal under which the density of microprocessors in modern military systems during the 1940s, Twith exponential growth in digital doubles over an 18- to 24-month period.2 The jet engine fuel efficiency has improved over technologies. Exponential growth is producing behavior observed is, in mathematical terms, that time by a factor of three at best, while effects that are pervasive across the global indus- no different to that observed in continuously rocket propellants have improved in specific trial base and having an impact on almost every compounded interest in finance. The gains impulse only by a slightly better margin. aspect of developed societies in both construc- experienced in one time interval set the start- Improvements in structural materials, either in tive and destructive ways. While exponential ing point for the next. As a result, the gains are weight or strength, have also been on a similar growth is producing important changes in how continuous and can be enormous over periods scale over a half-century of continuous research societies and their respective militaries function, technological strategies underpinning the definition and development of contemporary exponential growth is seldom sustained indefinitely and usually weapons systems are frequently not well aligned ceases when some bounding condition is encountered with the seismic growth in the basic technologies employed in such systems. Whenever the evolu- of time. Moore’s Law presents the best example and development. Much the same can be said tion of a technology base outstrips technological in recent times where computing power in of chemical explosives, armor materials, and strategy and operational technique, there is handheld devices now matches or exceeds that many other pivotal technologies used in mili- potential for disaster in battle. Excellent case of the largest computer systems built and used tary systems. studies exist where formerly new weapons were during the 1960s at costs which are trivial in A common misconception is that deployed and used without a well-defined tech- comparison with their predecessors. computer software grows exponentially in nological strategy or commensurate conceptual In practice, exponential growth is seldom performance over time. While software has coupling with tactics, operational technique, and sustained indefinitely and usually ceases shown evidence of exponential growth in raw theater-level strategy, resulting in difficulties and when some bounding condition, determined complexity, this is typically at the expense of often failure. by physics or mathematics, is encountered, computational efficiency and thus the speed Exponential growth in digital technolo- or when research and development funding with which a computation can be performed. gies used for information-gathering, process- collapses due to shifts in a commercial market- When considered against the technology ing, storage, and distribution is arguably the place or government funding priorities. base in military use today, technologies with defining trend in this decade, yet it is frequently An important observation is that unlike exponential growth behavior are uncommon. not well understood. Some observers regard many laws in hard science, which have a basis Even so, they have forced significant changes such growth with unbounded optimism.1 A in mathematics and physics, “exponential and will continue to do so. common misconception is that exponential growth laws” have no such basis and represent growth is pervasive, but this is seldom true. an empirical generalization of the observable Exponential Growth in Computing Even within rapidly evolving areas, exponential interaction of technology and social behavior. Technology growth may be limited to a small number of Unlike laws in hard sciences, which are immu- Computer hardware is at the heart of constituent components in larger systems. table, exponential growth laws may collapse the information age and pervades all digital To appreciate the manner in which at any time if the social conditions producing technologies used for information-gathering, exponential growth affects technological them change.3 processing, storage, and distribution, often strategy, the inevitable starting point is to In recent decades, the sustained expo- in ways not obvious to the casual observer. determine how exponential growth works, nential growth in digital technologies used for Whether we look at embedded computers in and which technologies grow exponentially information-gathering, processing, storage, military equipment, consumer devices of all and which do not. Only then is it possible to and distribution shows that the market for shapes and sizes, or traditional desktop and divine the broader and deeper implications consumer and industrial digital equipment has server computers used for data processing, at of the problem and its concomitant effect on yet to saturate, and key physics bounds have yet the heart of all of these devices are one or more technological strategy, operational strategy, and to be encountered. processor chips—each a single-chip computer. ultimately, grand strategy. Nearly all processor chips exhibit growth fol- This article explores the social and tech- Nonexponential vs. Exponential Growth lowing Moore’s Law, and with a half-century nological effect termed exponential growth, Nonexponential growth is the more of empirical data to prove it, Moore’s Law has contemplates how it affects military systems common situation across the technology become a defining driver for planning within and technological strategy, and considers a base. This is important because most military the computer industry. number of related problems in aligning techno- systems comprise many components, few of Moore’s Law exists because the technol- logical strategy with an exponentially growing which will grow exponentially. Technologies ogy used to fabricate processing chips, whether technology base. that are mechanical or chemical, such as struc- based on silicon or other more advanced mate- tural materials, aerodynamics, hydrodynamics, rials, is centered in photolithography, which is Exponential Growth Laws and all forms of propulsion, do not exhibit used to sculpt the features that form the tran- The term exponential growth describes exponential growth because the underlying sistor switches within the chip, permitting the an observed effect in some basic technology, physics do not permit it. fabrication of ever smaller transistors over time ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 43 COMMENTARY | Technological Strategy in the Age of Exponential Growth

military applications. Currently, this area is Chief of Naval Research addresses dominated by three technologies: encompassing Naval Science, Technology, Engineering semiconductor memories, rotating magnetic and Mathematics Forum “hard” disks, and rotating optical disks, such as the CD-ROM and DVD. All of these technologies have exhibited strong and sustained exponential growth in storage density, comparable to or stronger than seen in processing chips. Semiconductor memories such as modules used in computers, nonvolatile flash memories used in USB thumbdrives, and digital camera SDHC cards all follow Moore’s Law and will closely track growth in processor technology. Rotating magnetic hard disks follow Kryder’s Law, with strong sustained exponential growth in recent years. Similar growth is observed in optical storage technologies.8 While data storage density has been strongly exponential, access times, or how long it U.S. Navy (John F. Williams) U.S. Navy (John F. takes to find an item of data, have not been. The mechanical nature of rotating media has at best as photolithographic technology improves. estimates more than 11 years into the future are seen access times halved over the last two decades. Smaller transistors typically switch faster, dis- scarce because unexpected breakthroughs can While the use of semiconductor cache memories sipate less power, and permit more complex and often will result in unpredicted outcomes.6 on such drives has much improved access times for internal structures on the chip.4 Therefore, it is possible that unexpected and frequently used data, infrequently used data will Until recently, Moore’s Law tracked intractable obstacles may be encountered later or continue to suffer the speed limitations imposed by true both for the density of processors and sooner than current estimations. mechanical designs ever since the 1960s. for how quickly they could execute, producing exponential growth in chip density and Unfounded Optimism in Parallel Exponential Growth in Networking switching speeds. The actual improvements in Processing Technology computing performance were frequently better When a processor is not fast enough to Networks have been a central part of than exponential, as increasingly sophisticated solve a problem, the most common solution is the explosive growth seen in information performance improving architectural features to employ more than one processor—a tech- technologies over the last two decades and could be employed. A reality little appreciated nique known as parallel processing whereby indeed have been a prominent feature of the outside the computer architecture community the computing workload is split across multiple high operations tempo paradigm of network- is that a contemporary processor chip in an processors. Unfortunately, not every type of centric warfare (NCW). In fixed cabled iPhone, notebook, or iPad/Kindle has an computation can be easily split up to permit networks, especially those using optical fibers, internal architecture not unlike a mainframe or faster computation. The optimism surround- growth has been exponential due in part to the supercomputer of the 1960s or 1970s. ing the use of computational clouds and other enormous bandwidth of optical fiber and in part The technology base, however, is highly parallel systems is frequently unrealistic, to the photolithographically fabricated semicon- approaching the limits of photolithographic as such systems will not realize any perfor- ductor laser chips employed. In such networks, techniques. At this time, internal heat dissipa- mance gain if the problem to be solved does not exponential growth will continue until hard tion is putting limits on how fast processors “parallelize” readily. This has been understood limits are encountered in laser fabrication. can switch internally. This has resulted in the by computer scientists since Gene Amdahl pub- The performance of wide area wireless increasing use of multicore or parallel processors lished his now famous 1967 paper.7 radio networks, pivotal in military systems, where a single chip hosts two, four, six, or many When Moore’s Law eventually plateaus, is generally not growing exponentially in more processors or cores, rather than a much the fallback strategy of aggregating vast throughput performance and never will. Many faster single core. More important, transistor numbers of processing cores to improve per- advocates of NCW appear to have assumed sizes are approaching the limits of what physics formance will only produce effect for some otherwise. While Edholm’s Law argues for permits and where quantum physical effects types of computations. In many applications, exponential growth in wireless technologies begin to impair operation. Current estimates Amdahl’s Law will present an intractable such as WiFi and WiMax, it fails to consider by the industry suggest that Moore’s Law, using obstacle to further performance growth. the critical constraint of transmission range, a photolithographic fabrication techniques, may central need in military networks.9 hit hard limits within 5 to 15 years, assuming no Exponential Growth in Storage The dichotomy between cabled optical significant physics breakthroughs in other areas.5 Technology networks and wireless radio networks reflects To place this in perspective, a rule of thumb in Storage technologies are in many respects the different transmission physics that apply to science-based futures predictions is that reliable as important as processing technologies in many guided versus unguided transmission media.10

44 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Kopp

Radio frequency transmission effects thus often at rates faster than exponential growth in Impact of Exponential Growth and impose much stronger limitations on data hardware can accommodate.11 Such complexity Evolutionary Strategies throughput than the density of the chips in the growth is endemic in both civilian and military Exponential growth produces positive equipment used within the link or the network. software products, whether intended for office and negative effects. In digital technologies Increasing congestion across the radio fre- or real-time embedded applications. The causes used for information-gathering, processing, quency spectrum presents further difficulties, are partly accidental and partly essential.12 storage, and distribution, it has produced its which will not be overcome easily. Another Accidental complexity and its growth greatest positive impact in ISR applications problem unique to military radio networks is partly the byproduct of attempting to and military communications and network- is resilience to hostile jamming, always at the maintain compatibility with legacy software ing. Other areas have also seen major posi- expense of data throughput. and hardware interfaces and data formats tive impacts, such as navigation systems, while accommodating new interfaces and weapons guidance, vehicle control and Exponential Growth in Optical and data formats, as well as new features and management systems, and, most recently, Radio Frequency Sensor Technology operating modes. In a sense, this effect is akin directed energy weapons. Digital imaging chips have produced a revolutionary impact in consumer and professional photography, as well as military lateral evolution can frequently produce highly disruptive intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance effects, as the new solution will often exploit systemic (ISR) applications. No differently, MMIC (Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit) weaknesses in an opponent’s capabilities technology has produced similar effects in consumer wireless products, as well as military radar and passive radiofrequency sensors. to increasingly complex DNA in evolving The most common negative effect is the Both technologies, fabricated using the same biological organisms—adaptation requires premature obsolescence of digital processing photolithographic techniques as processor growth in complexity. Essential problems in chips embedded within weapons systems, chips, have exhibited exponential density software development relate to the problem forcing frequent hardware upgrades and often growth, but much slower than that observed in being solved, encompassing the complexity expensive software changes to maintain the processors and memories. of the problem, and the typically asymptotic supportability of the equipment. Where not The more sedate growth observed is an behaviors of algorithms. addressed properly, this has significantly con- inevitable byproduct of the need to accom- Far more problematic, however, are tributed to the life-cycle costs of maintaining modate unique design constraints, such as the other accidental causes of growth, which and operating equipment. photosite performance in optical chips or elec- more often than not reflect undisciplined Positive effects are typically produced in trical impedance matching in MMICs. These requirements by customers and vendors two distinct ways. The first and most frequent constraints are frequently much stronger than alike. Whether a commercial product is being is by a linear evolution strategy, where the per- gains arising from density improvement. dressed up with features to expand its market formance, capability, compactness, reliability, footprint, or a military system is being over- or functionality of some existing system or The Nonexponential Realities of Soft- featured to satisfy the wish lists of multiple subsystem is improved or enhanced by replace- ware Algorithms stakeholders with diverse agendas, the effect is ment of a legacy technology with an exponen- Computer algorithms used in software the same, and the problem is rooted in human tially growing new technology. It is termed do not commonly display exponential perfor- social behavior rather than technology. linear, as the growth follows an earlier direct or mance growth and, given the mathematical This problem has been understood for linear evolutionary pattern in the technology. realities involved, never will. The observed decades, yet no common solution has been The second and less frequent way in improvements in performance are mostly devised to overcome it. The competitive which exponential growth produces impact is asymptotic, where progressive refinements internal dynamic of groups defining designs, through lateral evolution strategy, where new over time push the performance of the or implementing them, is at the root of the technology presents opportunities to devise algorithms ever closer to some fundamental problem. Individuals seek to improve the entirely new solutions to longstanding, or mathematical limit in ever smaller incre- product or attach their personal signature to entirely new problems, reflecting the Edward ments. Prima facie, this would suggest that it by adding to it, a problem arising in product de Bono model of “lateral thinking.”13 Lateral overall performance of hardware and soft- definition and/or development. For the evolution can frequently produce highly dis- ware should improve exponentially over time foreseeable future, the outlook for improved ruptive effects, as the new solution will often as hardware performance tracks Moore’s Law. military software applications performance is exploit systemic weaknesses in an opponent’s The reality is otherwise. not good, as the primary cause of the bloat- capabilities that cannot be easily overcome by The most pronounced effect we see in ware problem is rooted in the internal social established means. software performance over the last three decades dynamics of organizations rather than in any There is an abundance of good case is the “bloatware problem,” where software basic technology. In this respect, the power studies to be considered. Linear evolution progressively grows in complexity over time, of software to be rapidly adapted becomes a includes the use of monolithic chips in visible soaking up any gains in hardware performance, weakness in its own right. band and infrared imaging systems, where

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 45 COMMENTARY | Technological Strategy in the Age of Exponential Growth

Technological strategists use advanced technology to outmaneuver and often economically defeat opponents by forcing disproportionate expenditures in peacetime and disproportionate attrition in wartime. Most technological strategists are gifted scientists or engineers by training with a talent for strategic

U.S. Army (Jennifer Spradlin) thought and considerable natural creativity. While technological strategy is not a strong feature of contemporary Western defense planning, it remains a central feature of highly successful corporate players within the electronics and computing industries. The astounding resurgence of Apple, via its innovative Mac, iPod, iPhone, and iPad product families, represents without doubt the best Netherlands air force pilot checks RecceLite recent commercial case study, an effort that was tactical reconnaissance pod at Kandahar largely driven by Steve Jobs, who was both a Airfield, Afghanistan, prior to mission gifted engineer and a strategic thinker.17 It is abundantly clear that technological strategy can be explained, codified, and systematically taught. However, the historical smaller, more sensitive, more reliable, and higher of high-peak power emissions in larger AESA record suggests that genuine breakthroughs resolution sensors have yielded revolutionary radars became the enabler for this technique, require a strong element of talent and vision. improvements against legacy wet film technol- which has considerable long-term potential As a result, a fundamental challenge to most ogy. The advent of Gallium Arsenide radio given the established trends in AESA design.15 organizations is that the talent required to frequency chips for use in radar has seen revo- The third case study concerns the use of produce outstanding results in technological lutionary improvements in the transition from solid-state laser diodes and doped optical fiber strategy tends to be scarce and must be nur- legacy mechanically steered radar and com- amplifier technology, both initially developed tured and developed. munications antennas to contemporary Active for communications applications as optical Effective technological strategists must Electronically Steered Array (AESA) antennas. pump technology for electrically powered high- have deep expertise in the technological Three recent case studies of lateral evolution are power laser weapons. Both of these technolo- areas of interest, considerable experience to worth careful consideration, as they show how gies have been adapted to develop pumping know what can and cannot be built, and an a shift in basic technology becomes an enabler sources for laser weapons that overcome the understanding of what will and will not work in areas that were not even considered when the historical “magazine depth” problem associated operationally. They must also possess the gift new technology was developed. with chemically pumped lasers that depend on for strategic thought. Accomplished past prac- The first case study considers the the in situ chemical propellant supply. titioners across the Western defense industry emergence of gigapixel imagers, such as the All of these case studies present capability include Vickers’s Barnes Wallis, who devised Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency/ surprises to opponents of the United States that the modern bunker-busting bomb, Lockheed’s BAE System Autonomous Real-Time Ground will significantly complicate their operations in Kelly Johnson and Northrop’s John Cashen, Ubiquitous Surveillance Imaging System, combat situations and demonstrate the highly and within the Armed Forces the often contro- which aggregates hundreds of consumer com- disruptive effects that can be produced by versial yet gifted Colonel John Boyd, who was modity megapixel-class cell phone imaging lateral evolution. able to articulate and effectively propagate his chips to permit simultaneous wide angle, revolutionary vision of energy maneuverability. high-resolution imaging of large areas. The Technological Strategy and the The inevitable consequence of failing to designers of these cell phone camera chips Technological Strategist practice good technological strategy is that oppo- had no conception of the military potential of The discipline of technological strategy nents will produce breakthroughs. A smart oppo- the devices. Yet the technology has significant has been part of warfare for millennia but nent will produce repeated “capability surprise” long-term potential across a wide range of was without doubt most actively practiced events to an advantage, as the United States did ISR applications, not only in counterinsur- during the Cold War when the United States to the Soviet Union, contributing crucially to the gency environments.14 confronted a technologically competent and eventual bankruptcy of the Soviet bloc. The second case study focuses on the use often highly creative peer competitor in the of high power AESA radars to produce radio Soviet bloc. The seminal work on modern Technological Strategy vs. Exponential frequency weapons effects intended to disrupt or technological strategy dates back to the most Growth electrically damage opposing aircraft or guided intensive phase of that contest during the The presence of exponential growth in weapon sensors or systems. The availability latter 1960s.16 key current technologies is a double-edged

46 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Kopp sword because these technologies have been In a period of exponential growth in Electronics,” Physics Letters A 305, no. 3–4 (Decem- commodified and are globally accessible in many critical technologies, maintaining an ber 2002), 144–149. the commercial marketplace. A Russian or advantage over nascent technological peer 6 J. Birnbaum, “The Next 50 Years,” ACM97 Chinese weapons developer will have access competitors requires that technological strat- Conference Talks, Association for Computing to much of the same basic technology as his egy be a tightly integrated component of the Machinery, 1997. 7 Gene M. Amdahl, “Validity of the Single Processor Approach to Achieving Large Scale Com- a smart opponent will produce repeated “capability surprise” events puting Capabilities,” from the proceedings of the to an advantage, as the United States did to the Soviet Union April 18–20, 1967, spring joint computer conference, AFIPS 1967 (Spring), 483–485, New York, NY, 1967. 8 Chip Walter, “Kryder’s Law,” Scientiﬁc Ameri- peers in the United States. This represents capability development cycle and that an ample can, July 25, 2005. a leveling of the technological playing field population of gifted technological strategists 9 Steven Cherry, “Edholm’s Law of Bandwidth,” unseen since World War II. For instance, the exists both within government organizations IEEE Spectrum, July 2004. well-developed Russian technological strategy and within the contractor community. If the 10 Unguided media depend on antenna design, intended to defeat U.S. airpower is disciplined United States wishes to retain its primacy in radio propagation through the atmosphere, hostile and well-considered, leverages exponential modern nation-state conflicts, technological radio frequency jamming, emission stealthiness, growth in key technologies, and displays a strategy must be restored to the prominence it and Shannon’s information theory. See R.C. Hansen, deep understanding of critical ideas and how enjoyed during the Cold War period. JFQ “Fundamental Limitations in Antennas,” Proceedings to leverage globalized exponentially growing of the IEEE 69, no. 2 (February 1981), 1934–1939; technologies.18 Notes R.K. Crane, “Fundamental Limitations Caused by RF On a level playing field, with exponential Propagation,” Proceedings of the IEEE 69, no. 2 (Feb- growth in critical technologies, the player who 1 The best example is Ray Kurzweil’s The Sin- ruary 1980), 196–209; and C.E. Shannon, “A Math- can best exploit talent to an advantage—all gularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology ematical Theory of Communication,” Bell System else being equal—will inevitably win. For the (New York: Viking, 2005). Kurzweil’s “singularity” Technical Journal 27 (July, October 1948), 379–423, United States and its technologically competent is a projected future point in time where machine 623–656. allies, this period should be one of critical intelligence exceeds human intelligence. While 11 Niklaus Wirth, “A Plea for Lean Software,” reflection. Many recent high-profile program- the science underpinning Kurzweil’s projections is Computer 28, no. 2 (February 1995), 64–68; and Joel matic failures display numerous symptoms of frequently weak, his work has stimulated important Spolsky, “Strategy Letter IV: Bloatware and the 80/20 poor practice and implementation of techno- ethical, philosophical, and strategic arguments about Myth,” March 23, 2001, available at . later development, beginning in the decade 2 Gordon E. Moore, “Cramming More Compo- 12 Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., “No Silver Bullet: following the end of the Cold War. Moreover, nents onto Integrated Circuits,” Electronics, April 19, Essence and Accidents of Software Engineering,” poor understanding of exponential growth and 1965, 114–117. Computer 20, no. 4 (April 1987), 10–19. concomitant early component obsolescence has 3 In a strict scientific sense, exponential growth 13 Edward de Bono, The Use of Lateral Thinking contributed to severe life-cycle cost problems laws should not be called “laws” but rather “curves.” (London: Cape, 1967). across a wide range of programs. A more exact model is that these laws are convolu- 14 Graham Warwick, “ARGUS: DARPA’s A good case can be made that these tions of multiple S-curves for specific technologies All-Seeing Eye,” February 10, 2010, avail- failures directly reflect the diminished role of employed. See Murrae J. Bowden, “Moore’s Law and able at . environment, where imperatives other than ogy Management 8, no. 1 (Winter 2004). 15 See, for instance, D.A. Fulghum, “Hornet’s defeating peer competitor nation-states became 4 Carver Mead and Lynn Conway, Introduction to Electronic Sting,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, ascendant and dominant, while the last genera- VLSI Systems (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1980). February 26, 2007, 24–25. tion of Cold War–era technological strategists 5 R.W. Keyes, “Fundamental Limits in Digital 16 Stephan T. Possony et al., The Strategy of Tech- progressively retired from government service Information Processing,” Proceedings of the IEEE 69, nology (1970), available at . ments trained or appointed. damental Limits of Silicon Technology,” Proceedings 17 Richard Gourlay, “Strategy: How While entities such as the Defense of the IEEE 89, no. 3 (March 2001), 227–239; K.K. Steve Jobs Changed the World,” Businesszone, Science Board and respective Service science Likharev, “Classical and Quantum Limitations on August 30, 2011, available at . perform roles that are essentially advisory Switch Scaling: A Gedanken Model,” Proceedings of 18 Carlo Kopp, “Evolving Technological Strategy rather than serving as directly integrated and the IEEE 91, no. 11 (November 2003), 1934–1939; in Advanced Air Defense Systems,” Joint Force Quar- organic components of the capability develop- and Laszlo B. Kish, “End of Moore’s Law: Thermal terly 57 (2nd Quarter 2010), 86–93. ment cycle, where technological strategists (Noise) Death of Integration in Micro and Nano were most active during the Cold War. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 47 COMMENTARY | Forging Jointness Under Fire

Cargo drop from C–17 to remote forward operating base, Afghanistan

U.S. Air Force (Adrian Cadiz) U.S. Air Force (WilliamU.S. Air Force Greer)

IDF participate in training exercise Forging Jointness Under Fire Air-Ground Integration in Israel’s Lebanon and Gaza Wars

By Benjamin S. Lambeth n July and August 2006, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) waged a 34-day war against Hizballah, an Iranian proxy terrorist organization based in Lebanon, in response to a raid by a team of Hizballah combatants into I northern Israel that resulted in the abduction of two Israeli soldiers to be held as hostages. That escalated response, code-named Operation Change of Direction, ended up being the most disappointing IDF performance in its nearly six-decade history in that it represented the first time a major war had ended without the achievement of a clear-cut military victory by Israel. Benjamin S. Lambeth is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. This article is an The main reason for the IDF’s poor showing in that campaign was the excerpt from his Air Operations in Israel’s War against failure of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his government to size up the Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in enemy correctly, set achievable goals, apply a strategy suited to the attainment Gaza (RAND, 2011), available at . fault, however, was a near total breakdown in the effective integration of air

48 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Lambeth and land operations that had been allowed counteroffensive. One problem that persisted Command bore responsibility for all targets to develop in Israel after the onset of the throughout most of the campaign had to do and operations from the yellow line south- Palestinian intifada in 2000 and the almost with the division of responsibility between ward to Israel’s northern border. Everything exclusive fixation of IDF ground forces on that the IAF and Northern Command, which north of the line up to the Litani was the IAF’s domestic uprising ever since. oversaw ground operations, for dealing with responsibility as the supported command in A little more than 2 years later, the IDF the enemy’s Katyushas and other short-range the hunt for medium-range rockets. The IAF conducted a more satisfactory campaign rockets that rained continually into northern could only attack identified short-range rocket against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in which the Israel throughout the course of the fighting. launch areas south of the line if it received problems of air-ground integration that had In this division of labor, the IAF was the sup- prior permission from Northern Command. been unmasked during the second Lebanon ported command for servicing Hizballah’s Much as in the case of American kill- war were all but completely corrected. The medium- and long-range rockets, virtually all box interdiction and CAS inside the roughly net effect of that success was to replenish of which were kept north of the Litani River similar FSCL during the 3-week major combat Israel’s stock of deterrence that had been badly beyond the area where most of the ground phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a predict- depleted in the aftermath of the IDF’s more fighting was taking place. For its part, North- able problem arose in the relatively thin band uneven performance in 2006. ern Command was the supported command of battlespace between the yellow line and with primary responsibility for negating the Israel’s northern border. Upward of 70 percent A Wakeup Call in Lebanon Katyushas and other shorter-range rockets of the short-range Katyushas were stored in At the time Operation Change of Direc- that were stored and operated mainly within and fired from this region, yet any attempted tion first got under way on July 6, 2006, its battlespace most closely adjacent to the IAF operations against them required prior neither IDF ground forces nor the Israel Air Israeli border.2 close coordination with Northern Command Force (IAF) had had any first-hand experi- Because so much of the war during because IDF troops were also operating in that ence against a well-armed opponent such as its last 2 weeks entailed combat in or near battlespace. For a time, there was a serious Hizballah after the country ended its 18-year built-up villages, there was no fire support disagreement between the IAF and Northern military presence in Lebanon in 2000. Its coordination line (FSCL) to manage IAF CAS Command over the placement of the yellow only use of force during those 6 years had consisted of recurrent low intensity policing operations against the intifada in the West for battlespace management, the IDF used designated kill boxes Bank and Gaza Strip. On the premise that in a common geographic grid reference system the era of major wars against first-tier Arab opponents was over, at least for the time being, IAF leaders, with ground-force concurrence, operations in southern Lebanon. However, line, with the IAF wanting the line moved had removed their fighters from the close air once the ground fighting got under way, there southward, as far away from the Litani as pos- support (CAS) mission area altogether. There was a terrain bisector just north of Israel’s sible. Moving the line thusly would enable the even was a signed contract between the IAF border with Lebanon that was analogous to IAF to conduct the barest minimum of coordi- and Israel’s ground forces affirming that the the FSCL in its effect on the efficiency of joint nation with Northern Command in the course latter would provide any needed fire support operations. At IAF insistence, a “yellow line” of its pursuit of time-sensitive targets. North- with their own organic artillery and rockets, paralleling Israel’s northern border not far ern Command, for its part, wanted the line leaving the IAF free to concentrate exclusively south of the Litani River was drawn on maps placed as far northward as possible, out of an on whatever independent deep battle mis- used by both services to allow IAF aircrews understandable concern that it would other- sions might be assigned by the General Staff.1 unfettered freedom to attack Hizballah’s wise bear the brunt of any criticism that might Throughout the years since the IDF withdrew medium-range rockets as they were detected arise after the war ended for having failed to from Lebanon, it conducted no exercises in and geolocated on the premise that if there address the Katyusha threat satisfactorily.4 which its joint command and control system were no commingled IDF troops in that bat- In the end, Northern Command pre- was tested from top to bottom in a realistic tlespace, there would be no need for the IAF to vailed in this disagreement. The line was training environment. As a result, ground conduct time-consuming prior close coordina- occasionally moved in small increments by force preparation for any combat challenges tion of any attacks with Northern Command mutual consent between the two services, other than countering the intifada had lapsed and its field commanders.3 but it mostly remained fixed at around 4 to badly, and operational integration between the This yellow line occasioned many of 5 miles north of the Israeli border, where it IAF and Israel’s ground forces had become all the same interservice disagreements regard- embraced most of the terrain in southern but nonexistent. ing the control of joint battlespace that have Lebanon that contained Hizballah’s dispersed Not surprisingly in light of that lapse, long plagued American joint combatants Katyushas, yet within which the IAF could the IAF encountered numerous challenges at the operational and tactical levels. Yet it not operate without prior coordination with in providing effective air support to Israel’s was accepted by Northern Command as the Northern Command. Only toward the cam- ground forces once the campaign against most convenient means for deconflicting the paign’s end was the mission of attacking targe- Hizballah shifted from standoff attacks alone respective taskings assigned to Israel’s air and table short-range rockets assigned directly to to a more joint and coordinated air-land land forces. In this arrangement, Northern the IAF in the interest of circumventing that

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delay in the sensor-to-shooter cycle. Accord- in connection with the IDF’s relatively slow- attack helicopters owing to IAF reluctance ingly, only a few short-range rocket storage motion effort against the intifada, the IAF to employ those aircraft at lower altitudes and launch sites were hunted down and neu- commander insisted at first on micromanag- and closer slant ranges in the face of an ever- tralized by either service.5 ing air operations at the tactical level so as present threat posed by enemy antiaircraft There also was a recurrent struggle to ensure the closest possible control over artillery and man-portable infrared-guided between the IAF and Northern Command for them in the interest of avoiding any untoward surface-to-air missiles.9 tactical control of various IAF CAS assets. One collateral damage incidents, much as U.S. For battlespace management, the IDF example of such disagreement concerned who Central Command did regarding responsive used designated kill boxes in a common should control IAF attack helicopters working strike operations conducted from time to time geographic grid reference system much along with IDF ground units—the IAF or the by allied aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone the lines of American practice in joint air- engaged ground commander? On the books, over southern Iraq for nearly a decade.7 ground operations.10 That approach proved there was formal joint doctrine for such a situ- As the campaign progressed, however, to be problematic at times, however, because ation that the IAF had agreed to regarding the a consensus gradually developed between the ground commanders often lacked a clear allocation of tactical control. In accordance IAF and Northern Command that both attack picture of their battlespace. For their part, with that joint doctrine, tactical control of and utility helicopters should be treated as airborne aircrews could never be sure that attack helicopters could be delegated by the the ground commander’s assets when it came friendly ground troops were not inside a given IAF to a ground commander for 24 to 48 to tactical control and that risk management kill box. Fortunately, no fratricide occurred hours. In addition, there was a published pro- concerning the commitment of helicopters as a result of IAF attack operations within kill vision for the assignment of air liaison officers in the face of enemy fire should be conducted boxes controlled by Northern Command. (ALOs) to IDF formations at the division level by means of a mutually agreed-upon contract In all, as attested by these and similar who were empowered to approve air support between the engaged ground commander and examples, most IAF officers would readily requests from their supported units.6 those helicopter pilots tasked at any moment agree with the retrospective conclusion that However, such doctrinal contracts on to work his particular problem. In the end, the IDF’s “ability to use close air support paper often broke down in practice. Habitu- the IAF concluded that the most effective [had] declined in recent years, largely due to ated almost entirely by its limited base of approach would be to make its helicopters the degeneration of the liaison system that recent experience in providing on-call CAS available on demand by the requesting ground [had been] established in the past between commander while retaining operational the air force and the ground forces.”11 On control of them at all times.8 this point, the Winograd Commission estab- A different situation prevailed, however, lished by Olmert to assess his government’s when it came to the integration of fixed-wing and the IDF’s performance throughout the fighters into the IDF’s ground scheme of campaign found that IAF support to ground

Israel Air Force maneuver. Tactical control of IAF F-15s and combat operations had revealed “many flaws” F-16s invariably remained the sole preroga- emanating from multiple shortcomings in tive of the IAF’s main Air Operations Center planning, readiness, and training.12 It further (AOC) throughout the war. One of many found that those flaws were the result of con- problems encountered in this particular area scious prior investment choices by a succes- of joint operations entailed the use of unfa- sion of IDF chiefs to concentrate ground-force miliar terms of reference by fighter aircrews readiness almost exclusively toward meeting and ground combatants. Often the same the immediate needs of combating Palestinian targets had as many as three different names terrorist operations in the occupied territories. depending on whose maps were being referred Regarding the air support provided to. Also, the engaged ground commander to friendly ground troops during the IDF’s often would not know whether a requested war against Hizballah, the commissioners target had been successfully struck. noted “significant deficiencies” in peacetime The management of airspace directly training for cross-service integration.13 They above the ground fighting worked out reason- also determined that those failings were ably well, despite the presence of as many as attributable to the IAF and to the ground 70 aircraft simultaneously operating over forces in equal measure because neither had southern Lebanon at any time. Regarding planned nor exercised the requisite measures helicopters in the lowest altitude blocks, for proper air-ground coordination during achieving the needed deconfliction turned their normal peacetime training in recent out to have been simply the result of an even- years. For his part, the IAF’s commander at Then–Major General Dan Halutz, Israel Air tual IAF decision to stay out of the process. the time, Major General Eliezer Shkedy, later Force, became Israel’s first airman to become In time, IAF helicopter pilots came to work explained that a major factor behind this lapse IDF chief of staff as lieutenant general fairly harmoniously with the ground forces, in joint peacetime training was simply the fact responsible for Israel’s military forces although ground commanders repeatedly that it was “hard for the IAF to practice CAS complained about inadequate support from with a ground force that isn’t practicing.”14

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Incorporating Lebanon’s Lessons If there ever was an instance of lessons indicated by a disappointing combat performance becoming truly lessons learned and U.S. Air Force assimilated by a defense establishment in preparation for its next challenge, the IDF response to the insights driven home by its experience during the second Lebanon war offered a classic case of institutional adaptability and self-improvement. The often badly flawed attempts at air-ground integration once the land offensive entered full swing drove home forcefully the fact that each service’s expectations of the other were in dire need of adjustment. Those well-intentioned missteps further confirmed that because of their failure to train together over the preced- F-16I Sufa multirole fighters participate in training over Nevada ing 6 years, the IAF and Israel’s ground forces spoke different languages and had become entities that did not even know each other. Accordingly, in the early aftermath As another outgrowth of the IDF’s Another lesson highlighted by the of the ceasefire in Lebanon, IDF leaders disappointing experience, it became apparent ground fighting in southern Lebanon was moved with dispatch to assess and correct the to all that the IAF had evolved by that time the need for the IAF to think, plan, and train revealed deficiencies in joint force readiness into two almost separate air arms within the in closer conjunction with Israel’s ground that, by then, had come to be widely rec- same service—its fixed-wing fighters and its forces. For 6 years, as a result of the IDF’s ognized as having figured prominently in attack helicopter community—in terms of preoccupation with the intifada, the IAF had accounting for the war’s less than decisive mindset and culture. It also became apparent put itself out of the business of CAS provi- outcome. That comeuppance got the atten- that a similar divide had come to separate the sion and found itself forced to rediscover tion of the IAF and Israel’s ground forces in IAF and Israel’s ground forces when it came the most basic principles of the mission equal measure, both of which lost no time in to their respective techniques and procedures as the IDF’s operations against Hizballah pursuing a better approach to joint combat at the operational and tactical levels. The unfolded. Prompted by that arresting experi- that would address the identified insufficien- two services planned and trained almost as ence, the IAF moved to convene periodic cies and in duly preparing the IDF for its though the other did not exist. Recognition roundtable discussions in the campaign’s next test. As a first order of business, the IDF of this across service lines soon led to a series early aftermath, in which IAF squadron and Directorate of Operations (J-3) organized and of joint command post exercises between IDF brigade commanders would engage in led a systematic lessons learned effort that the IAF and Israel’s ground forces aimed at capability briefings and solutions-oriented brought together senior leaders from all three inculcating a new pattern of regular joint discussion of identified joint issues. services to correct those deficiencies and to contingency planning and training.16 In connection with this unprecedented revise and update joint tactics, techniques, One conclusion driven home by the dialogue, the IAF also flew a select few IDF and procedures.15 IAF’s rocky experience with CAS delivery brigade commanders in the back seats of The IAF also took new looks at its in Lebanon was the criticality of having fighters so they might gain a more intimate existing practices when it came to seeking an authoritative senior representative appreciation of the strengths and limitations better ways of conducting integrated combat attached directly to the commander of all of high performance aircraft in air-land oper- operations. Throughout most of the second IDF regional land commands as, in effect, ations. In these repeated instances of search- Lebanon war, General Shkedy had insisted the designated head of an Air Component ing cross-service engagement, there was little on retaining close control of IAF attack Coordinating Element to the land compo- petty parochial swordplay over doctrinal dif- helicopters that were supporting IDF ground nent. There was often a lack of sufficient ferences and related issues. On the contrary, operations out of an understandable concern understanding by the ground commander all participants appeared genuinely commit- that even a single major tactical error, such of what the IAF could and could not do ted to forging a more common language and as an egregious friendly fire incident, could on his behalf. All too often, the tendency better mutual understanding.17 have a disproportionate strategic downside was to ask for a particular platform or In addition to these initiatives, the effect. Yet the inefficiencies introduced into type of munition rather than for a desired IAF, for the first time in 6 years, began a attack helicopter operations as a result of this combat effect. The most important next regular regimen of joint training with IDF insistence until the campaign’s last days were step toward ameliorating that assessed defi- ground forces. Before long, combat units in later acknowledged by all to have been a self- ciency was widely seen as the institution of both services in ever increasing numbers inflicted source of friction that demanded a serious air-ground dialogue on a routine found themselves training together in live immediate corrective attention. basis in peacetime. exercises featuring scenarios that often ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 51 COMMENTARY | Forging Jointness Under Fire involved the participation of tanks and attack helicopters with the ground scheme deconflicted the airspace over each brigade’s other armored vehicles. of maneuver. This greatly improved perfor- area of operations. As these teachings from the IDF’s sober- mance was a direct result of the heightened Each brigade also now had the support ing experience in Lebanon were gradually interaction between the two services that had of a dedicated attack helicopter squadron, being assimilated, the Olmert government first developed during the early aftermath of which provided a pilot to the TACP who com- began redirecting its attention to Hamas as the second Lebanon war. municated with airborne attack helicopter the next regional troublemaker that would During Operation Change of Direc- aircrews. To reduce the workload on brigade eventually require a substantial response tion, IAF attack helicopters and UAVs had commanders and on Air-Ground Coordina- by the IDF. That hardcore sect of radical been under the tactical control of the IAF’s tion and Cooperation Unit at IAF Headquar- Palestinians who ruled the Gaza Strip as a de forward AOC collocated with Northern ters, TACP members were authorized to call facto enemy enclave within Israel’s borders Command until almost the very end. In in air support on their own initiative. ALOs had repeatedly fired short-range rockets into Operation Cast Lead, those assets were now also had constant access to real time stream- southern Israel’s population centers in a con- instead directly subordinated to IDF brigade ing UAV imagery. New operating procedures tinuing display of defiant hostility ever since commanders, with each now able to count allowed attack helicopters to deliver fire support in some cases to within 100 feet of friendly troop positions.22 the brigade headquarters enjoyed substantial autonomy from To be sure, IAF attack helicopters retain higher headquarters both at Southern Command and in Tel Aviv an independent deep-strike responsibility for which they remain under the tactical control of the IAF commander. When their immedi- the government of Ariel Sharon voluntarily on dedicated, around-the-clock support ate tasking is on-call CAS, however, they are withdrew both its forces and all civilian Israeli from them on request.19 By the time the now controlled directly by those brigade com- inhabitants from Gaza in 2005. counteroffensive against Hamas had become manders who are the intended beneficiaries Finally, in December 2008, the govern- imminent, the IAF attack helicopter force of their support.23 In a clear response to its ment decided that it had had enough of that has essentially become army aviation in the lessons learned from Lebanon, IAF leadership sometimes lethal daily harassment and chose manner in which it was employed.20 consented to assign to each involved brigade to proceed with a determined effort to put an For the first time in Operation Cast a TACP including at least one terminal attack end to it. By that time, both the IAF and IDF Lead, the brigade headquarters was the nerve controller with the rank of major or lieuten- ground forces were ready with a new reper- center of combat activity, and it enjoyed ant colonel to ensure that all would have their toire that had been carefully honed through substantial autonomy from higher head- own dedicated fighter, attack helicopter, and repeated joint planning efforts and large-force quarters both at Southern Command and UAV support. As a result of this changed IAF training exercises over the preceding 2 years. in Tel Aviv. Regarding air operations, the mindset, the application of airpower in inte- brigade headquarters controlled all IAF attack grated air-land operations, which had been A Better Showing in Gaza helicopter and UAV assets, along with some centralized in the IAF’s main AOC through- The IDF counteroffensive against F-15s and F-16s. To ensure the most effective out most of the second Lebanon war, was now Hamas, code-named Operation Cast Lead, exploitation of airpower in support of ground pushed down to the brigade level and, in some began on the morning of December 27, operations, the ground commander, an IDF cases, even lower.24 2008, with an air-only phase that lasted 8 brigadier general, had constantly at his side Furthermore, during the IDF’s counter- days. The campaign next featured an air- an IAF colonel who saw to the uninterrupted offensive against Hizballah in 2006, the IAF supported ground assault into the heart provision of direct air influence on the plan- commander’s personal approval had been of Hamas’s main strongholds in the Gaza ning and conduct of combat operations. The required for IAF aircrews to conduct CAS in Strip, followed by an endgame consisting supporting presence of other IAF officers in so-called danger close conditions, meaning of a unilateral ceasefire declared by Israel the brigade headquarters further contributed that friendly forces were 600 meters or less on January 18, which Hamas honored with to the enhancement of trust and understand- from a designated target. In the subsequent a reciprocal ceasefire announced 12 hours ing between Southern Command’s air and Gaza operation, IAF terminal attack control- later. Repeatedly throughout the air-land land components.21 lers assigned to engaged ground units were portion of the campaign, IDF ground In addition to these improved arrange- cleared to grant that approval, which natu- maneuver elements supported the IAF ments at the brigade headquarters level, rally entailed a great deal of personal respon- rather than the other way around by shaping every participating ground-force brigade sibility on their part.25 Also, in a major depar- Hamas force dispositions and thereby creat- had an embedded Tactical Air Control Party ture from its practice throughout the second ing both targets and a clear field of fire for (TACP) comprising five IAF team members Lebanon war, the IAF’s main AOC this time IAF fighters and attack helicopters.18 who sorted raw information and converted it was completely out of the command-and- At both the operational and tactical into actionable intelligence for time-critical control loop other than for transmitting rules levels, the extent of cross-service cooperation targeting. Each TACP included both an attack of engagement and special instructions to displayed by the IAF and IDF land forces was helicopter pilot and a fighter pilot or weapons participating IAF aircrews. Most nonpre- unprecedented when it came to the integra- systems officer as assigned ALOs. TACP planned targets were now nominated by IDF tion of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and members also coordinated CAS attacks and brigade commanders.

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In all, the IDF showed in its conduct of country’s lower intensity counterinsurgency [Common Grid Reference System]: Keys to Success Operation Cast Lead that it had ridden a clear preoccupations of the moment. for CJSOTF West,” Special Warfare, April 2005. 11 learning curve from the second Lebanon war By the same token, on the force- Colonel Gabriel Siboni, IDF (Res.), “The Military Campaign in Lebanon,” in The Second to Gaza when it came to refining an effec- employment front, the IDF’s proven approach Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives, ed. Shlomo tive air-land battle repertoire. In the lead-up toward ensuring the fullest possible exploita- Brom and Meir Elran, 65 (Tel Aviv: Institute for to its campaign against Hamas, the IDF, tion of airpower during its subsequent Gaza National Strategic Studies, 2007). having drawn the right conclusions from its campaign 2 years later has direct relevance 12 “Arms, Combat Support Units, and Special earlier experience in Lebanon, envisaged a to continuing U.S. combat operations in Operations,” in Final Winograd Report on the Second joint campaign from the first moments of its Afghanistan. It is testimony to the need for Lebanon War (Reston, VA: Open Source Center, Feb- options planning. It further showed a willing- decentralized control of air assets against ruary 2008); see also “The Air Force, Lessons,” ibid., ness to run greater risks by putting attack hybrid opponents such as the Taliban, along para. 30. The Winograd Commission was named for helicopters into airspace above hot areas on with a duly empowered air command and its appointed chairman, Judge Eliahu Winograd, a the ground that were concurrently being control entity below the level of the AOC retired president of the Tel Aviv District Court. 13 serviced by bomb-dropping fighters, thereby staffed by airmen of appropriate rank and “Recommendations for the IDF,” in Final Winograd Report. increasing the effectiveness of its CAS efforts. experience to provide effective air influence in 14 Interview with Major General Eliezer Shkedy, It also went from providing on-call CAS to joint warfare at the tactical level.28 The IDF’s IAF Headquarters, Tel Aviv, March 27, 2008. offering up proactive CAS, in which the IAF Gaza experience further bore witness to the 15 Barbara Opall-Rome, “Interview with Major took the initiative by asking, via daily phone merits of getting the most skilled and credible General Eliezer Shkedy, Commander, Israel Air and conversations with the engaged brigade air operators out of the AOC and deployed Space Force,” Defense News, May 19, 2008. commanders, what they needed rather than forward as ALOs working directly with those 16 Interview with Brigadier General Yohanan waiting passively for emergency requests on the ground in need of on-call air support Locker, IAF, Tel Nof Air Base, Israel, March 29, 2009. for on-call CAS from IDF troops in actual in the sort of fourth-generation warfare that 17 Interview with Brigadier General Ya’akov Sha- contact with enemy forces.26 has been the principal form of American harabani, IAF Headquarters, Tel Aviv, March 31, 2009. 18 For their part, IAF aircrews found joint force engagement since the end of major “Operation ‘Cast Lead’: IAF Missions and their exertions in actual combat to have been combat in Iraq in 2003. JFQ Operations,” briefing charts provided to the author by Brigadier General Nimrod Sheffer, IAF, Head relatively undemanding, thanks in large part of the Air Division, IAF Headquarters, Tel Aviv, to their earlier cooperative training with IDF Notes March 31, 2009. ground forces that familiarized them before- 19 1 Interview with Brigadier General Yohanan Barbara Opall-Rome, “Major General Ido hand with virtually any friction point that Locker, Israel Air Force (IAF), Tel Nof Air Base, Nehushtan, Commander, Israel Air and Space might arise. After it was over, CAS delivery Israel, March 29, 2009. Force,” Defense News, August 3, 2009, 30. 20 by the IAF was uniformly adjudged to have 2 David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Learn- Interview with Colonel Meir (last name been more than satisfactory, reflecting a clear ing on the Fly: Israeli Analysts Call for More withheld), Commander, Doctrine Department, IDF payoff from the intensified joint training and Flexibility and Renewal of Basic Combat Skills,” Ground Forces, at an IDF installation near Tel Aviv, associated cross-service trust relationships Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 3, March 30, 2009. 21 that the IAF and IDF had both cultivated 2007, 63–65. The 2008/09 Gaza Conflict—An Analysis, during the 2 years that followed the end of the 3 Interview with the Head of the IAF’s RAF Waddington (United Kingdom: Air Warfare 27 Campaign Planning Department during Opera- Centre, The Air Warfare Group, 2009), 5, 7. second Lebanon war. 22 tion Change of Direction, Tel Nof Air Base, Israel, David Eshel and David A. Fulghum, “Two Steps Forward . . . Israeli Technologies and Coordina- So What for Us? March 29, 2009. 4 Fulghum and Wall, 63–65. tion Detailed in Gaza Strip Combat Analyses,” Avia- As for its teaching value for the U.S. 5 Major General Isaac Ben-Israel, IAF (Res.), tion Week & Space Technology, February 9, 2009, 61. joint community, the successful IDF response 23 The First Israel-Hezbollah Missile War [in Hebrew] Interview with Brigadier General Gabriel to its disappointing performance in Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, May 2007), 64. Shachor, IAF (Res.), Palmachim Air Base, Israel, in 2006 showed convincingly how an adap- 6 Interview with the Head of the IAF Cam- March 31, 2009. 24 tive military organization determined to paign Planning Department, IAF Headquarters, Tel Interview with Major General Eliezer improve its readiness and repertoire can Aviv, March 26, 2008. Shkedy, IAF (Res.), Tel Aviv, March 26, 2009. 25 muster the needed wherewithal not only to 7 For further discussion on the latter count, Interview with the commander of 160 Squad- identify and understand but also to learn and see Michael Knights, Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and ron, Palmachim Air Base, Israel, March 31, 2009. 26 Ibid. profit from lessons offered by a flawed but the Birth of the Modern U.S. Military (Annapolis, 27 Interview with the former deputy com- instructive combat experience. With respect MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 213–217. 8 mander of 105 Squadron during Operation Change to the opportunity costs incurred by the Interview with Brigadier General Gabriel Shachor, IAF, Palmachim Air Base, Israel, March of Direction, Palmachim Air Base, Israel, March 31, IDF’s excessive fixation on the intifada until 27, 2008. 2009. corrective measures were introduced, there 28 9 Alon Ben-David, “Israel Introspective after For a further development of this point, see the is a cautionary note here for all U.S. leaders Lebanon Offensive,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August informed and thoughtful commentary by Lieutenant who would continue deferring needed invest- 23, 2006, 18–19. Colonel Jeffrey Hukill, USAF (Ret.), and Daniel R. ment against potential near-peer challengers 10 For a concise description of that U.S. practice, Mortensen, “Developing Flexible Command and in years to come in order to concentrate all see Colonel Robert B. Green, USAR, “Joint Fires Control of Air Power,” Air and Space Power Journal of our limited defense resources against the Support, the Joint Fires Element and the CGRS (Spring 2011), 53–63. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 53 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter U.S. Air Force (Rusty Baker) U.S. Air Force

Airpower Dollars and Sense Rethinking the Relative Costs of Combat

By Lee T. Wight

ince the end of the Cold War terms of their relative “costs” (see table). It argue that airpower can be decisive against and the realization that few then makes prescriptive recommendations for an adversary led by a single charismatic adversaries can compete directly future American policy based on airpower’s individual or leadership group by decapitat- with American conventional apparent lower “costs” and its potential ability ing the leader(s), resulting in a collapse of the S 2 military power, the term asymmetric warfare to enable indigenous ground forces. organization. Regardless, there are those has become a staple of the contemporary who maintain airpower alone cannot ever be lexicon. Yet asymmetric warfare is hardly a Can Airpower Be Decisive? decisive and its primary purpose is to provide new concept. Ever since man learned that a A reasonable but critical analyst might supporting fires, intelligence, and mobility club improved his ability to batter his fellow argue that airpower’s ability to win wars to the land elements that must close with the man, he has sought an asymmetric edge over depends heavily on the nature of the adver- enemy to achieve victory. his opponent. Once aviation was added to sary, objectives of the conflict, and capabilities Logically, objectives are the key to the military arsenal, visionaries imagined at hand. For example, he could argue that air- determining when victory is achieved. If bypassing the indecisiveness of trench warfare delivered nuclear weapons proved decisive in conquering a country or retaining territorial to strike directly at the heart and home of the ending the World War II conflict with Japan. integrity is the objective, significant land enemy. Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell took Others may argue that even absent an inva- forces will likely be required. If regime change the concept further—possibly to airpower’s sion of the Japanese homeland, the Japanese is the objective, however, can that be achieved immediate detriment—and argued airpower would have eventually collapsed from the without the physical occupation of an enemy’s alone could win wars, igniting a debate which combined effects of Curtis LeMay’s firebomb- territory by American forces? Recent events rages unchecked to this day.1 This article ing campaign and the starvation being forced in Libya confirm this potential, while Kosovo illustrates how history has rendered the on the Japanese people by the air and naval and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghani- “decisiveness” argument moot and studies blockade of their islands. Contemporary air- stan offer earlier but similar precedents. eight contemporary military operations—half power theorists such as John Warden would Although the specified objectives of Enduring of them land-centric and half air-centric—in Colonel Lee T. Wight, USAF, is Chief of the Air Force Strategy Division (A8XS) on the Air Staff at the Pentagon.

54 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Wight

Comparison of Recent U.S. Air- and Land-centric Military Operations

Direct Costs U.S. Casualties2 Civilian (FY10$)1 Strategic Objectives Conflict Type Duration (D: dead) Casualties3 (M: million; B: Objective(s)4 Achieved? (W: wounded) (estimated) billion; T: trillion)

Preserve 486,000– government Vietnam Land 1956–1975 $677B–$1.04T 58,236(D)/153,452(W) No 1,200,000 of South Vietnam

Panama 1989 Regime Land 7 days $287.5M 23 (D)/322 (W) 500 Yes (Just Cause) change

Iraq 1991 Liberate Air 42 days $97.7B 148 (D)/467 (W) 1,000–5,000 Yes (Desert Storm) Kuwait

Air + Kosovo 1999 Stop ethnic Indigenous 78 days $19.6B 0 (D)/0 (W) 500–5,000 Yes (Allied Force) cleansing ground

Regime Afghanistan 2001– Air + change/ 2003 (Enduring Indigenous 2001–2003 $42B5 109 (D)/137 (W) 3,100–3,600 destroy Yes Freedom I) ground terrorist infrastructure

Regime Iraq 2003 change/foster Yes/ Land 2003–2011 $800B 4,400(D)/32,000(W) 34,832–793,663 (Iraqi Freedom) democracy, Unknown liberal values

Afghanistan Foster 2004 (Enduring Land 2004–2014? ~$958B6 ~2,160(D)/~20,000 (W)7 10,960–46,0008 democracy/ Unknown Freedom II) liberal values

Protect Libya 2011 Air + 8 months, 8 civilians/ Partially/ (New Dawn/ Indigenous $1.1B 0 (D)/0 (W) 9–859 days regime Yes Unified Protector) ground change

1. All costs are approximate as referenced in the text and converted to fiscal year 2010 dollars using previously described methodology. 2. Numbers are for U.S. forces only, although coalition/friendly forces generally suffered losses also, but at lower rates. Breakouts by nationality are available at Web sites icasualties.org and wordIQ.com. Fatalities are combat-related only, where available. Most wounded numbers do not specify origin of the injury, but are presumed to be combat-related. 3. Numbers are estimated as cited and described in the text. They include postulated minimum and maximum numbers and are those attributed to U.S./coalition military combat operations, not those due to ethnic cleansing, civil war, disease outbreaks, and so forth, even though those may be related. 4. Although complete objectives are detailed in the text, this table illustrates only the major specified or implied strategic objectives. 5. “Estimated War-Related Costs, Iraq and Afghanistan,” November 22, 2011, available at www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0933935.html. 6. Estimated through 2014, less 2001–2003 costs previously referenced. 7. Estimated numbers if present trends continue through 2014, less approximate Operation Enduring Freedom numbers for deaths. 8. Actual high estimate is 49,600 corrected to account for Operation Enduring Freedom figures cited in the same estimate. 9. Nazish Fatima, “NATO accused of having minimized civilian casualties in Libya,” AllVoices.com, May 14, 2011.

Freedom were aimed at removing the Taliban’s the latter. Certainly a strong argument could land force presence in support of subsequent military capability, removing the regime from be made that airpower was the most signifi- stability operations.6 The 2005 Taliban power was at least an implied objective imme- cant, if not completely decisive, contributor resurgence in Afghanistan eventually led to diately following the 9/11 terror attack on the to expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait during a significant expansion of American, NATO, U.S. homeland. These objectives were success- Operation Desert Storm.5 and other coalition land forces deployed fully completed using airpower to back indig- there, resulting in a “surge” to over 150,000 enous ground forces (the Northern Alliance) What about Land Forces? land troops to interdict the terror networks supported by a cadre of U.S. special forces.3 Even casual observers of current events of al Qaeda and its affiliates, while setting What if the objective of combat is forcing a are aware of several recent land-centric conditions for the return of security and regime to alter such policies as committing approaches to regime change for affecting an governance to the Afghans in support of genocide or acquiring nuclear weapons? adversary’s strategic decisionmaking. Forcible the current version of Operation Enduring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) regime change using a U.S.-led ground force Freedom.7 By contrast, Operation Just Cause air operations over Kosovo were an example (although supported by the full spectrum of featured a relatively small U.S. land force of of the former during Operation Allied Force, joint fires including a large air component) approximately 21,000, supported lightly by while Israeli air raids on both Iraqi and Syrian was accomplished during Operation Iraqi airpower, to rapidly effect regime change in nuclear facilities4 were airpower approaches to Freedom and led to an even larger American Panama by capturing Manuel Noriega.8 As all ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 55 COMMENTARY | Rethinking the Relative Costs of Combat

B-2 Spirit U.S. Air Force (Christopher Bush) U.S. Air Force

of these examples illustrate, under the right disrupted since October 2001, but the cessa- agreement. Fiscal issues have become one circumstances, either predominantly air- or tion of all terrorist operations in Afghanistan of the most critical calculi for military and land-centric operations can be successfully is something that is likely beyond the poten- political decisionmakers today. used to achieve national military objectives. tial of military operations to achieve.11 Money aside, there are other costs to Notably, this article lists cases in which military operations. Traditional statecraft The Limits of Military Power both air- and land-centric military opera- measures military actions in terms of the Everything has its limits. Military tions have achieved their objectives, as well cost to the nation in “blood and treasure.” power is certainly not an exception to this as several in which success has been or may Whether the cost in terms of blood in this rule. In all of these studied operations, mili- prove elusive. While success is certainly pos- context refers directly to deaths, injuries, tary forces achieved operational objectives. sible, one should also recognize that either or long-term rehabilitation, war always has Even in Vietnam, U.S. forces won almost form may also prove indecisive or fail entirely. a human toll. These human and economic every significant military engagement. As This article does not intend to argue that one costs, combined with the conflict’s dura- history has shown, though, tactical mili- form of warfare can prove more decisive than tion and perceived effect (or lack thereof) tary victories failed to achieve the strategic the other. Astute policy analysts recognize on the American public, shape what is often political objective of preventing the fall of there are some tasks unsuitable for military described as the U.S. “center of gravity”— the South Vietnamese government. While actions alone that must involve other levers public opinion. Indeed, in a democracy, this the Just Cause operations appear to have of national power in order to have real poten- ultimately determines how long the govern- been successful on both military operational tial to succeed. Therefore, we turn to the ment will remain engaged in a conflict. Thus, and political strategic levels, other examples central thesis of this article, a comparison of with our definition of cost as national blood are less clear cut. Desert Storm is gener- the relative costs of land- versus air-centric and treasure, this article first compares recent ally regarded as an overwhelming military operations—independent of their potential or land- and air-centric military operations to success; however, it is debatable whether the actual success. determine which might be considered more stated national policy objectives of “ensuring cost effective in the national interest. the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and What Do Military Operations Cost? other Persian Gulf nations” and “[ensuring] Those who continue to debate whether Costs of Land Operations the safety of American citizens abroad”9 air-centric operations can be successful risk Looking first to Iraq (Operation Iraqi are achievable by any military means, let being labeled pedantic or parochial and miss Freedom), where the U.S. presence has recently alone whether or not Desert Storm air and the point entirely in today’s financial climate. been declared over by President Barack land operations contributed positively or Former President Bill Clinton famously stated, Obama,13 the most frequently advanced dollar negatively to either of them. Likewise, while “It’s the economy, stupid!” In the current cost estimates are in the neighborhood of the military was able to end the regime of budget environment, that statement could $800 billion, although some observers note Saddam Hussein during Iraqi Freedom, equally apply to military operations. With ongoing medical treatment and replacement defending the American people requires the U.S. deficit at a record $15 trillion,12 the equipment could bring the eventual total to more than an invasion of Iraq, an action that Department of Defense is already executing over $4 trillion.14 Total U.S. casualties number history may ultimately judge as indecisive.10 approximately $400 billion in cuts. At least around 32,000 over a period of almost 9 years, Enduring Freedom operations share the same that much more is anticipated for the next 10 including approximately 4,400 deaths.15 In challenge. Terrorist operations and training years, especially now that the congressional terms of objectives, a tyrant was removed, the camps in Afghanistan have certainly been budget “super committee” has failed to reach Iraqi people were liberated, and Iraq did not

56 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Wight acquire nuclear weapons. Long-term stability, A much easier example to assess is the forces, with an estimated total cost of £31.67 by any observer’s estimate, is fragile at best and 1989 U.S. intervention in Panama (Operation billion (approximately $50.67 billion), includ- whether the state ultimately survives intact is Just Cause). There, approximately 20,000 ing aid, follow-on peacekeeping, and recon- anyone’s guess. Assessing whether the invasion ground troops, supported to some degree by struction.32 The direct U.S. cost was approxi- achieved the stated objective of defending the airpower, engaged in a week-long operation to mately $15 billion (approximately $19.6 billion American people has been widely debated and capture Manuel Noriega. At a cost of 23 U.S. in 2010 dollars), not including subsequent is much more difficult to assess. troops killed, approximately 322 wounded, foreign aid and peacekeeping costs.33 Since Operations in Afghanistan (Enduring several helicopters lost,21 and approximately 1999, the United States has provided over $1.2 Freedom) continue, and if American forces $163.6 million in direct costs22 (estimated billion in assistance for Kosovo reconstruc- remain as projected until at least 2014, it to be approximately $287.5 million in 2010 tion, restoring self-governing institutions, will have taken 13 years in total (albeit dollars),23 regime change occurred. Noriega and a viable economy.34 At the conclusion of several of those years were low intensity was captured, and after serving prison sen- NATO combat operations, Serbian forces were while operations were focused in Iraq), and tences in the United States and France, has driven out of Kosovo and Serbian President if trends continue, it will cost upward of $1 been returned to Panamanian custody to face Slobodan Milosevic unconditionally accepted trillion, approximately 2,300 deaths, and additional charges for allegedly murdering the peace terms presented by European approximately 20,000 wounded.16 While it political opponents.24 After the intervention, Union and Russian envoys.35 Milosevic was is imprudent to assess objectives from an the United States additionally pumped several subsequently arrested in 2001 for war crimes, operation yet to be completed, so far thou- billion dollars into the Panamanian economy tried in The Hague, and eventually died in sands of terrorists have been killed and the to facilitate recovery.25 custody.36 Similar to recent NATO operations Taliban have certainly been removed from in Libya, an indigenous ground force aided leadership of the government. Yet they are Costs of Air Operations by NATO airpower gained effectiveness still present in the country, remain active, Turning to air-centric operations, the toward the end of the operation and may have and may eventually be reincorporated opening stages of Desert Storm consisted contributed in part to Milosevic’s eventual into the government (by Afghan choice). of over a month26 of airstrikes, credited capitulation. Much like Iraq, a crystal ball is needed to with so gutting the Iraqi ground forces Turning to the post-9/11 response to al determine whether democracy, rule of law, that they placed “Iraq in the position of a Qaeda in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom), and human rights will ultimately bloom tethered goat,” according to the war’s air the air-centric portion of the operation, from the seeds planted by the International boss, General Charles Horner, USAF.27 A where the United States enabled the Northern Security Assistance Force, and doubters will land force built around 17 divisions and Alliance forces with support from U.S. and continue to cite the strong tribal structure approximately 500,000 coalition soldiers and British special forces on the ground, ran from of Afghanistan and limited history of an marines required only 100 hours to expel approximately October 7, 2001, through the effective or accepted national government.17 the decimated Iraqi forces from Kuwait.28 start of Operation Anaconda in March 2002, The proverbial elephant in the room During the operation, 20 airmen were lost (14 in terms of these types of large, land-centric battle-related), and there was a total of 293 occupations is, of course, Vietnam. Almost U.S. fatalities (148 battle-related fatalities) 20 years of conflict there cost approximately with 467 wounded.29 When President George

60,000 U.S. Servicemembers killed or missing W. Bush announced the operation complete, U.S. Air Force and over 303,000 wounded. Direct dollar cost all Iraqi forces had been withdrawn from estimates vary between $130 and $200 billion Kuwait, the legitimate government of Kuwait (approximately $677 billion and $1.04 tril- was restored, and the security and stability of lion in 2010 dollars),18 with an approximate Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations indirect dollar cost at least equaling that in were ensured for the near term.30 Cost esti- terms of rehabilitation, debt interest, and mates in this case are difficult to determine, payments to veterans and their families.19 as multiple nations participated and some Despite this investment and the valor of those costs were eventually reimbursed to the involved, in the final analysis, the effort failed United States; regardless, direct U.S. costs to prevent the South Vietnamese government are estimated to have been between $47.5 from falling.20 In fairness, however, success or and $61 billion with the General Accounting failure of the “proxy war” against the Soviet Office estimating total costs at approximately Union must be judged in the context of the $61.1 billion31 (approximately $97.7 billion in eventual U.S. Cold War victory and subse- 2010 dollars). quent collapse of the Soviet empire. Whether Kosovo (Allied Force) took 78 days of or not the will of the United States to engage combat operations, with the loss of an F-16, in Vietnam at that cost ultimately affected the an F-117, and zero U.S. lives, and is estimated outcome of the larger strategic contest must be to have cost £2.63 billion (approximately $4.2 considered but can never be proven. billion) in direct costs for all NATO military Billy Mitchell

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 57 COMMENTARY | Rethinking the Relative Costs of Combat when significant U.S. ground forces began to or goods or services in exchange, is likewise however, as the land-centric Operation Just be introduced—although the operation offi- difficult to decipher. Furthermore, some cost Cause required only a week for completion. cially ran through May 2003 when Secretary reports only include direct costs, while others Another aspect to consider is the long- of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the are “total” costs. term sustainability of the changes imple- end of Afghan combat.37 Its original objec- Deciding the total cost of an operation is mented by the military operations. The gains tives were the destruction of terrorist training somewhat subjective, as one has to draw a line in Iraq are fragile, nascent, and easily revers- camps and infrastructure in Afghanistan, at some point regarding veteran’s compensa- ible, as they also appear to be in Afghanistan capture of al Qaeda leaders, and cessation tion, survivor and social security benefits, to date. A counterargument to extended of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.38 As reconstruction, and foreign aid. Some of these American presence is the development of a a result of these actions, the Taliban were factors are never completely known or they perceived dependence on the United States so driven from power and al Qaeda opera- continue to develop through the lifespans long as its forces perform security and gov- tions were significantly disrupted, although of those who participated in the operation. ernance tasks for a population that is either Osama bin Laden survived in Pakistan until Total costs, in theory, would also include all uncommitted or ambivalent to the changes (at 2011. During the operation, approximately of the research and development costs of the least from a liberal, human rights, and democ- 140 total coalition casualties were suffered weapons systems and equipment used, along racy perspective). As with the experience in through the end of 2003, with 109 of them with the weapons themselves, as well as the Vietnam, there is a strong possibility that U.S. lives lost.39 Costs to date are estimated training, education, and accession costs of the many if not all of these changes may fail upon at $443 billion along with 1,523 U.S. military personnel who employ them. the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. While lives lost.40 Overall, of course, the results Furthermore, all costs must be normal- it is again far too early to tell, there is a strong remain a work in progress and history will ized for the effects of inflation in order to argument to be made that in airpower-centric judge their eventual success or failure. provide a relevant basis of comparison. For actions where airpower enabled an indig- In the example du jour—Libya—air- operations spanning several years—such as enous ground force (Kosovo, Libya, Endur- power protected, to a degree, the civilian Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—direct and ing Freedom), ground forces had more of a populace from slaughter by Muammar Qad- indirect costs for each year of the operation personal stake in the outcome because they hafi’s supporters, enabled regime change, and would have to be calculated and similarly shared in both the sacrifice of combat and facilitated the overthrow of Qadhafi himself adjusted to arrive at a total cost—a project the fruits of victory. They also remain long (whether or not that was a specified objective worthy of its own study. after U.S. or other foreign combat forces are of the operation). The cost was zero American After considering all of the above withdrawn—leading to a higher level of com- or NATO lives lost, one F-15E lost, and about factors, it becomes apparent that when commitment to the changes for which they fought $1.1 billion in direct costs over the course of paring the relative costs in terms of treasure, and potentially making them more sustain- the 8-month conflict.41 One relatively unique the most useful monetary metric is the able over the long term. One could also make aspect of the Libya operations was the rapid generalization that dollar costs increase as a the argument that even if the operations ulti- handover of combat operations to NATO, function of the time required to complete the mately prove indecisive, whether spearheaded placing the United States in an active but sup- operation and the amount of American forces by either air- or land-centric means, the lower porting role.42 committed to the fight. Generally speaking, as cost operations would still be a better choice supported by each of the cases considered in from an American perspective. Adding Up the Costs this article, we can conclude that shorter dura- Additionally, the supporting role tem- A review of these land- and air-centric tion operations cost less financially. As previ- plate used in Libya may also have the benefit operations shows fairly clearly that some costs ously noted, time may also be relevant—but of reducing indirect reconstruction and are an “apples to oranges” comparison—so not necessarily decisive—in terms of its effect rebuilding costs. In a U.S.-led operation, there different in some cases that one might say on U.S. public opinion. The American public appears to be a long-term sense of owner- an “apples to transmissions” analogy is more has supported long-duration conflicts: almost ship of the problem, similar to the retail “you apt. As far as monetary or treasure costs 20 years in the case of Vietnam and over 20 break it, you buy it” mantra. As previously documented, all U.S.-led air- or land-centric operations have entailed significant recon- airpower has been able to achieve results significantly faster, struction costs. However, in Libya, there does and thus was less costly than land-centric means not appear to be the same sense. The U.S. decision to yield political leadership of the NATO-sponsored operation to the United go, in some cases, units failed to document years combined in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Kingdom and France (while still providing the them to such an extent that even the General most costly operations have included large bulk of the support, enabling operations, and Accounting Office was unable to accurately American ground forces. In this context, initial strikes) may reduce the long-term costs determine costs.43 In other cases, costs were airpower has generally been able to achieve to U.S. taxpayers.45 reimbursed (or planned to be reimbursed) by results significantly faster, and thus was less Although attempting to reconcile the other nations.44 Whether or not the U.S. Gov- costly in terms of treasure than were land-cen- financial costs of these operations is difficult, ernment ever received full reimbursement, tric means. No rule is without its exception, this study does make abundantly clear that

58 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Wight U.S. Air Force (WilliamU.S. Air Force Greer)

A-10 Thunderbolt

in terms of blood costs, airpower-centric it was described as “the world’s largest arms casualties—regardless of the predominantly operations have been dramatically cheaper for market,”48 making it the largest military in air- or land-centric nature of the combat. friendly forces. Despite the tremendous reduc- the Middle East, including over 700 modern Considering short-duration operations tion in land force casualties from Vietnam military aircraft.49 Furthermore, the Soviet- on one hand, the week-long land-centric inva- (approximately 60,000 killed) compared to trained Serbian air defenses were highly sion of Panama reportedly caused about 500 either Iraq or Afghanistan (approximately capable, effectively integrated, and, for the civilian casualties.53 A similar figure is noted 6,200 total killed to date), these reduced most part, willing to fight. In fact, NATO by Human Rights Watch for Allied Force, casualties pale in comparison to the combined never gained air supremacy and suffered the although other estimates range between 1,200 costs of the air-centric operations of Kosovo, loss of one of its most technologically sophis- and 5,000.54 Another relatively short-duration Enduring Freedom, and Libya, which featured ticated aircraft—a “stealth” F-117.50 Even combat operation, Desert Storm, resulted in an unprecedented loss of zero U.S. or NATO Afghanistan had air defenses that troubled civilian deaths allegedly ranging from 1,000 lives. From an airpower perspective, Desert the Soviets during their occupation.51 That to 5,000.55 The standard-bearer for low civil- Storm only took the lives of 14 aviators in American airpower achieved such incredible ian casualties, however, may be the recently battle-related deaths, for a loss rate that was results in those conflicts at such a low cost concluded Libya operation, in which only a “lower than normal training” according in blood and the fact that other adversaries few civilian deaths were reported as a result of to General Horner.46 By comparison, even chose to concede air dominance rather than NATO combat.56 the shortest land-centric operation studied fight is exactly the point. American airpower On the other hand, as one might here, Just Cause, cost 23 killed and over 320 is a tremendous asymmetric advantage and predict, longer duration operations tend to wounded.47 To put that in perspective, less has proven that it can achieve results at costs have significantly higher associated civilian American blood was spilled in four complete other means cannot match. casualty figures. While again subject to a air-centric operations, totaling over 3 years of wide number of estimations, Afghanistan combat, than was lost in a single, 1-week land- Everyone Matters civilian death figures are placed by one centric conflict. When coldly calculating the “military” source at approximately 2,777 in 2010 alone, A critic might argue that these low costs of an operation, it can be easy to over- although the U.S. military has been fighting casualty figures were the result of the air- look the fact that noncombatants traditionally there since 2001.57 This casualty figure is centric conflicts occurring against an oppo- pay an equally heavy or even heavier cost in similar to the total estimated for the duration nent that was unable or unwilling to directly blood than the military participants on either of Desert Storm. Furthermore, the numbers face American airpower. The ultimate ease side.52 While accurate civilian casualty sta- for Iraqi Freedom, where a low estimate of of the coalition victory in Desert Storm tistics are notoriously difficult to obtain and 34,832 dead to a high estimate of 793,663,58 tends to obscure the fact that prior to 1990, their interpretation is wildly speculative, the and Vietnam, with estimates ranging from Iraq had the world’s fifth-largest military, “faster is better” mantra related in this article 486,000 to over 1.2 million fatalities, illustrate including a substantial and integrated air regarding the cost of military operations also the far end of the spectrum.59 Interestingly, defense, and had added so much capability appears relevant in terms of reducing civilian the Iraq and Afghanistan data are especially ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 59 COMMENTARY | Rethinking the Relative Costs of Combat telling, inasmuch as coalition forces have which having the world’s best land forces is 6 Jim Garamore,“Rumsfeld Lists Operation placed an especially high priority on avoiding the only guarantee of success. Iraqi Freedom Aims, Objectives,” American Forces such casualties and friendly combatants are This article is not intended to argue for Press Service, March 21, 2003, available at . using the latest in precision weaponry under the abandonment of our unmatched land 7 “Obama Announces Quick Surge and Exit very strict rules of engagement.60 force capabilities. Under the right circum- Plan,” Fox News, December 2, 2009, available at Thus, despite all efforts to reduce the stances, both land- and air-centric operations . almost inevitable that some will die as individually or in combination. However, as 8 See “Operation Just Cause,” GlobalSecurity. org, available at ; and Air Combat Informa- our nation will likely always need a full complement of military tion Group, Central and Latin America Database, Panama, 1989, Operation “Just Cause,” available at capabilities spanning the range of military operations . 9 General Accounting Office (GAO), “Opera- tion Desert Storm Objectives,” in Operation Desert collateral damage of military conflicts. purse strings tighten to the breaking point Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, June 12, However, the data reviewed here appear to and one assesses long-term security challenges 1997, appendix V, available at . ing, shorter conflicts can reduce the number abroad in large numbers, it appears that in 10 Garamore. of civilian casualties. If airpower indeed can many future conflicts, airpower may offer 11 “History of Operation Enduring Freedom.” shorten a conflict, then it can also reduce American taxpayers the best return on their 12 See . the cost in terms of civilian blood indirectly investment of blood and treasure. When given 13 Ben Feller, “Iraq War Over, U.S. Troops involved in these hostilities. a choice—as an accountant and a certain Coming Home, Obama Says,” Associated Press, former President might say—it is the bottom October 22, 2011. 14 Implications line that really matters. JFQ David R. Francis, “Iraq War Will Cost Returning to President Clinton’s exhor- More Than World War II,” The Christian Science Monitor, October 25, 2011, available at . that airpower—in terms of blood and treasure 15 Scott Key, “Airpower, Jointness, and Transforma- Department of Defense, Operation Iraqi as defined in this article and under certain tion,” Air and Space Power Journal (Winter 2003), Freedom, New Dawn, Enduring Freedom Casualty circumstances—while not the sole answer to available at ; and Randy Kee, defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf>. 16 and generally more rapid solutions to many “Brig Gen Billy Mitchell’s Continuing Legacy Ibid. 17 national security challenges. Moreover, when to USAF Doctrine,” Chronicles Online Journal, Dave Schuler, “What Are Our used to enable indigenous ground forces, such October 25, 2011, available at . OutsidetheBeltway.com, August 10, 2009, commitment and a more enduring outcome. 2 David R. Mets, The Air Campaign: John available at . An airpower-centric approach may also offer Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists, rev. 18 Oregon State University Political Science less long-term entanglement, reducing the ed. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, April 1999), 59–60. Department, 2011, “Individual Year Conversion perceived need for the United States to effec- 3 See “History of Operation Enduring Factor Tables,” available at ; and “Presi- tables>. All dollar costs cited in this article were It is worth restating this does not mean dent Bush Announces Military Strikes in Afghani- converted to 2010 dollars using the methods that airpower is a panacea for all political ills, stan,” GlobalSecurity.org, available at Vietnam War: guarantee against any future American mil-011007-usia01.htm>. Day by Day (New York: Bdd Promotional Book Co., or civilian loss of life. It is also critical to 4 David E. Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, 1989), which uses the $150 billion direct cost figure; th note that senior decisionmakers may not “Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts and 25 Aviation Battalion Web site, “History of Vietnam,” available at , which uses $130 billion, but references forces exclusively. The nature and makeup available at . a Cornell University study that calculated $200 of forces required will always depend on 5 For a debate over the relative importance billion in direct costs. the desired objectives and the situations at 20 of airpower vis-à-vis ground forces, see Richard P. “Vietnam War Casualties,” available hand. Capable indigenous ground forces Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War at . 21 airpower. Our nation will likely always need 1992); and Martin Wojtysiak, “Another View of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, a full complement of military capabilities Myths of the Gulf War,” Aerospace Power Journal Operation “Just Cause”: The Incursion into Panama, spanning the range of military operations, (Fall 2001), available at . Just%20Cause/JustCause.htm>.

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22 GAO, Panama: Cost of the U.S. Invasion 36 Sylvia Poggoli, “Milosevic: The Life and available at ; GAO, September 1990), available at . plates/story/story.php?storyId=5257846>. mized civilian casualties in Libya,” AllVoices.com, 23 Oregon State University Political Science 37 “History of Operation Enduring Freedom.” May 14, 2012. Department, 2011. 38 Ibid. 57 Jim Michaels, “Taliban Behind Most 24 “Noriega returns to Panama a largely forgot- 39 “Operation Enduring Freedom,” iCasualties.org, Afghan Civilian Casualties,” USA Today, June ten man,” Associated Press, December 11, 2011. available at . 22, 2011, available at . $1.1 billion. See “Just the Facts,” available at . war-costs-soar-obama-troops-announcement/ Research Service, August 27, 2008), available at 26 The actual length of the air campaign is story?id=13902853>. . The debatable. Randy Roughton’s dates result in 37 days 41 Julian E. Barnes and Adam Entous, “NATO most commonly accepted figures appear to be those and other sources show 38 days, but a GAO report Air Strategy Gains Renewed Praise,” The Wall compiled by the “Iraq Body Count,” which shows lists 43 days. See Randy Roughton, “Desert Storm Street Journal, October 21, 2011, available at . Clearly that number is higher when extrapolated to Commanders as They Planned Gulf War Strategy,” 42 Adam Levine, “Lead from Behind or Leave the present. Airman Magazine, January 1, 2011, available at That Strategy Behind in Libya,” CNN.com, October 59 For a historical assessment of civilian casual- ; and GAO, Operation Desert Storm: Evalua- com/2011/10/21/lead-from-behind-or-leave-that- argument that airpower can reduce the risk of tion of the Air Campaign, Letter Report, “Appendix strategy-behind-in-libya>. civilian deaths, see Meilinger. For a wide-ranging V: Operation Desert Storm Objectives,” NSIAD- 43 GAO, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. estimation of civilian deaths during the Vietnam 97-134 (Washington, DC: GAO, June 12, 1997), 44 “The Cost of Kosovo”; and GAO, Evaluation conflict, see “Vietnam War Casualties.” available at . 45 Max Boot, “Did Libya Vindicate ‘Leading Afghan Casualties,” The New York Times, Sep- 27 Roughton. From Behind’”? RealClearWorld.com, September tember 16, 2008, available at . Persian Gulf War,” available at . from_behind_99654.html>. 29 Roughton. 46 Roughton. 30 GAO, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of 47 U.S. Army Center of Military History. the Air Campaign. 48 “Iraqi Army,” GlobalSecurity.org, available 31 See, for example, “Desert Storm, Operation,” at . clopaedia/hutchinson/m0031881.html>; and “15 49 Department of State, “Iraq,” available at Year Anniversary of Start of First Gulf War, Desert . Storm,” available at , which lists the Department of Defense as the Journal, June 3, 2002, available at . (Washington, DC: GAO, September 1991), lists 51 Rebecca S. Grant, “The Afghan Air War,” $47.1 billion as the total funding requirement and Air Force Association, September 2002, available at $61.1 billion as total incremental costs, although . the report states the lower figure may be overstated 52 Phillip S. Meilinger, “Lowering Risk: Air and documents the challenges with units failing to Power Can Reduce Civilian Casualties,” Armed record incremental costs of the operation; available Forces Journal, July 2009, available at . forcesjournal.com/2009/07/4079006>. 32 “Kosovo War Cost £30bn,” BBC News, available 53 “Operation Just Cause.” at . 54 “Kosovo: Civilian Deaths in the NATO 33 “The Cost of Kosovo,” The Economist, Air Campaign,” Human Rights Watch, February May 27, 1999, available at . country,,HRW,,SRB,,3ae6a86b0,0.html>. 34 U.S. Agency for International Development, 55 Francis. “Kosovo,” available at . 31 End to Libya Mission,” Defense News, October 35 “Operation Allied Force,” GlobalSecurity.org, 28, 2011, available at ; Amnesty allied_force.htm>. International, “NATO Urged to Investigate Civilian Deaths during Libya Air Strikes,” August 11, 2011,

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ShinyCapstar.com Science vs. the Art of Germans confront Serbs in World War I (drawing by Richard Caton Woodville) War

eople generally do not feel comfortable with uncer- By Milan Vego tainty. Hence, there is a constant search in life—including in the military—for deriving various principles Por rule sets and making things more controllable and predictable. Since ancient times, militaries have been engaged in an endless quest for certainty in the command in war.1 They have striven War is an art and as such is not to precisely know all the key elements of the situation including the enemy force and its intentions and reactions to their own actions. susceptible of explanation by Warfare as a Science The idea that the conduct of war is a science is almost as old as fixed formula. warfare itself. In ancient times, military theorists started to search for certain principles and rules guiding the conduct of war. During —General George S. Patton the Renaissance, art, music, philosophy, government, science, and warfare underwent a gradual but profound transformation.2 In that era, Europeans rediscovered the military treatises written by ancient military theorists, specifically Xenophon (430–354 BCE), Julius Dr. Milan Vego is Professor of Operations in the Joint Military Operations Caesar (100–44 BCE), and Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (4th Department at the Naval War College. century CE). The classical legacy formed the intellectual background

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in ballistics. The most influential practitioner Saxe argued that without knowledge of the of siegecraft was the French Marshal Sébastien human heart, one is dependent on the favor of Le Prestre de Vauban (1633–1707). He used his fortune, which sometime is inconsistent.13 understanding of geometry, architecture, and gunnery to advance the science of fortifica- The Enlightenment Era, 1750–1800 tions.6 In his 30 years of professional activity, The scientific revolution of the 17th Vauban personally designed a number of century, and the beginning of Newtonian fortresses and conducted nearly 50 sieges—all science in particular, led to widespread belief of them successful.7 among European intellectuals that the human The Italian-born Austrian field marshal mind is capable of mastering all realities. Raimondo Montecúccoli (1609–1680) was Another influence during the Enlightenment one of the most influential practitioners and was French neoclassicism, which taught that theorists in the late 17th century. He was one of each art is governed by certain universal and the first who tried to explain warfare “scientifi- immutable principles and rules.14 cally.”8 Montecúccoli observed that like all sci- Military officers, mostly from the ranks ences, the science of war aims to reduce experi- of nobility, became influenced by the philo- ences to universal and fundamental rules. sophical, intellectual, and cultural trends of The French marshal Jacques-Francois de the late 18th century. They concluded that war, Chastenet, Marquis of Puységur (1656–1743), like other sciences, has to be studied system- was a distinguished soldier who undertook atically, and then a clear and universal theory a systematic treatment of war. He believed of war could be created. Hence, the military that experience was not the only approach to profession must be studied theoretically and understanding war. Puységur’s intent was to not only by using combat experiences. This reduce warfare to a set of rules and principles, new emphasis on the study of war resulted as had already been done for sieges.9 Like in a significant increase of published works Montecúccoli, he observed that war was the dealing with military theory. most important of all sciences and arts. He Dominant ideas in military thought further claimed that war during his life lacked during the Enlightenment were rudiments a systematic theoretical study, with people of appreciation of the political side of war, relying on tradition and personal experiences. especially in Prussia under Frederick the In his view, field warfare needed to be made Great (1712–1786); the realization of the role as scientific as siegecraft had been by Vauban. of psychological factors in combat; and the Hence, the emphasis should be on the study unprecedented application of pseudoscientific of geometry and geography and their applica- principles to the study of warfare.15 The most tions to the art of war.10 important military theorists of the Enlighten- The writings of French military ment were Count Turpin de Crissé (1709– theorist and soldier Jean-Charles de Folard 1799), Paul Gideon Joly de Maizeroy (1719– (1669–1752) were the main precursors of 1780), Frederick the Great, Pierre-Joseph de and source of historical reference for military “enlightened military thought.” Folard was Bourcet (1700–1780), Jacques Antoine Hip- thinking until the end of the 18th century.3 fascinated with classical Greece and Rome. polyte, Comte de Guibert (1743–1790), Henry The scientific revolution in the late 17th He examined war from a scientific perspec- E. Lloyd (1720–1783), and Dietrich Heinrich and 18th centuries was the result of new ideas tive in order to discover universal principles Freiherr von Bülow (1757–1807). and advances in physics, chemistry, astronomy, guiding its conduct. He also addressed In the late Enlightenment era, military biology, and medicine. Because of great think- psychological dimensions in combat. His theory was dominated by the advocates of ers such as Isaac Newton (1643–1727), scientific writings influenced many military theorists the so-called geometrical or mathematical discourse took the preeminent role in reorder- and practitioners of the Enlightenment era, school. These proponents firmly believed that ing society within Western civilization. There such as Maurice de Saxe, Frederick the Great, the true art of war was not in fighting bloody was a closer association with technology.4 The and Napoleon Bonaparte I (1769–1821).11 Saxe battles but in conducting skillful maneuvers first techno-scientific revolution in European (1696–1750) was one of the most successful to checkmate the enemy through calculated warfare was articulated around a clockwork generals of the era of musketry. He wrote the marches and movements.16 The ideal was to metaphor, which became the symbol of order, famous Reveries on the Art of War (1757). In defeat the enemy not by fighting a bloody battle regularity, and predictability. The clock concept the preface, he stated that “war is a science but to skillfully outmaneuver him. Strategy was was emulated by European militaries as exem- so obscure and imperfect that custom and based on abstract mathematical foundations. plified by Frederick the Great (1712–1786).5 prejudice confirmed by ignorance are its sole The commander was required to be like a chess Moreover, bombardments and for- foundation and support; all other sciences are player capable of mastering all combinations, tifications became increasingly guided by established upon fixed principles . . . while this while the army in the field was like a figure on a geometrical principles and the great advances alone remains destitute.”12 To understand war, chessboard. Personal and creative performance ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 63 COMMENTARY | Science vs. the Art of War

the advent of decisive warfare as practiced by Hannibal, leader of Carthaginian forces, transiting river to the French revolutionaries and Napoleon I. battle against Rome in Second Punic War However, the proponents of the military ideas of the Enlightenment did not lose influence. Their ideas were largely adopted, although in a modified form, by Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779–1869) and the Austrian Archduke Charles (1771–1847). In fact, the great majority of military theoreticians in the 19th century based their ideas on the theories developed during the Enlightenment.24 The Swiss-born French general Jomini avoided the trend of developing increasingly complex geometric systems of warfare, yet he built his theories on foundations laid in the Enlightenment. This, in turn, led him to take a fundamentally reductionist and predictive approach.25 Jomini wrote that “war in its ensemble is not a science, but an art, and strategy in particular may be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of positive science but this is not true if war is viewed as a whole.”26 He argued that tactics are the only part of war that can be subjected to fixed rules.27 Jomini sought to identify universal principles central to the art of war and to on the battlefield did not play a great role. The In his view, the modern conduct of war was discern them through his study of the cam- actions of the great captains were explained by based on lines of operation and the introduc- paigns conducted by Frederick the Great. In their adherence to rules of the art of war.17 tion of firearms.21 Bülow provided mathemati- his seminal Summary of the Art of War (1838), The Welsh general and theoretician cally precise theory. He firmly believed that Jomini wrote that there are some fundamen- Henry E. Lloyd was one of the strongest pro- his theories could offer the key to victory by tal principles of war that cannot be deviated ponents of the scientific approach to the study enabling scientific precision of the outcome from without danger, while their application of war. He compared the army to a mechani- before armies engaged in battle. He claimed has been always crowned with success.28 He cal device, which, “like all other machines,” to discover mathematical secrets of strategy provides a list of four maxims that made an is composed of various parts. Its perfection and established them as a science. In Bülow’s overarching principle; even seemingly simple depends first on its parts, and second, on the view, “From now on, there will be no need principles consisted of a set of subordinate manner in which these parts are arranged. of crude considerations and the hazardous tenets. Although he revised his system of He wrote that war is a branch of Newtonian trial of battle in order to plan and decide the principles, he never significantly diverged mechanics. Lloyd believed that the exact fate of campaign. If the attacker relied on an from the ideas that he developed by studying knowledge of the country, as well as the science unsound base [of operations], the defender Frederick the Great’s campaigns through the of position, camps, and marches, were essential could force him to retreat without resorting lenses of Lloyd and Bülow.29 disciplines to be mastered by a general.18 to battle.” Battle was made unnecessary by the Despite his obvious fixation on the Unlike the other representatives of the scientific perfection of strategy: “War will be principles of war, Jomini recognized the geometrical school, Lloyd was one of the no longer called an art, but science. . . . The importance of moral factors in war. In his first thinkers who highlighted the need to art itself will be a science, or be lost in it.”22 In view, these factors prevented a theoretical pay attention to the morale of the troops. contrast to Lloyd and some other theorists of determination of tactics. He firmly believed This was evident in his discussion of human the Enlightenment, who alongside the scien- that despite technological changes, “strat- passions as motivating factors including tific parts of war left room for the creativity egy alone will remain unchanged, with the fear, honor, shame, and desire for riches. He of a genius, Bülow asserted that “the sphere principles the same as under Scipios and wrote that the most powerful of all is the of military genius will at last be so narrowed, Caesars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they love of liberty and religion.19 that a man of talents will no longer be willing are independent of the nature of the arms and The Prussian officer Freiherr von Bülow, to devote himself to this ungrateful trade.”23 organization of the troops.”30 one of the most influential theorists of the Archduke Charles, the son of Emperor Enlightenment, wrote Spirit of the New System Postmilitary Enlightenment Era Leopold II, was regarded as one of the best of War (1799). He reinforced Lloyd’s scientific The views of the proponents of the generals of the Habsburg monarchy and of approach or geometric science of strategy.20 geometrical school were proved false with Continental Europe as well. The Archduke

64 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Vego was also one of the better known military power was based on weapons and military The effects-based warfare proponents theorists of his era. His work was based on the equipment whose quality was dependent on embraced so-called systems of systems ideas of the late Enlightenment. In his Prin- the status of the development of what he and analysis (SoSA) to assess situations and then ciples of Higher Art of War (1806), he stated other Marxists called “production forces.”36 identify centers of gravity. SOD is based on that “The principles of the science of war are The Soviet obsession with scientific both general systems theory and complex- few and unchanging. Only their application Marxism-Leninism and its attendant preoc- ity theory.38 Design itself is defined as a is never the same. Every change in the condi- cupation with history, laws, principles, norms, “repeatable methodology of reasoning that tions of armies; in their arms, strength and positions, and every new invention, involved a different application of these rules.”31 In his Fuller wrote that scientific methods are a common sense Principles of Strategy (1814), Archduke Charles approach on how to know the truth about the past and how also adopted almost entirely Bülow’s general theory of war and his geometrical concept of we can apply this truth to the conditions that surround us now operations, but with less emphasis on mathematical aspects.32 The view that the conduct of war is and rules and its attention to “objective” algo- helps commanders understand how to change largely a science and not an art was not rithms and formulae all artificially reduced the a complex-adaptive system.”39 Its declared limited to Jomini’s interpreters and follow- dynamics of the battlefield to a sterile process purpose is to bridge the gap from the situation ers. One of the leading military theorists in more akin to calculus than human struggle.37 that exists at the beginning of an operation— the 20th century, British General J.F.C. Fuller that is, the observed-system—to the situation (1878–1966), was also a firm believer that Modern Theories when operations end—that is, the desired the conduct of war is largely a science. He Traditionally, the Western approach system. The design uses some theoretical was much influenced by Lloyd’s theories. In to conducting war has been influenced by aspects of SOD and EBO but supposedly does his Foundations of the Science of War, Fuller the Newtonian quest to identify universal not rely on either concept to achieve its main wrote that scientific methods are a common laws of combat by which all problems can be purpose.40 Proponents of design acknowledge sense approach on how to know the truth resolved and the results of combat predicted. that warfare is a complex, adaptive system about the past and how we can apply this Hence, extensive efforts are made to quantify rather than a closed system. This, in turn, truth to the conditions that surround us now everything in war. Since the mid-1990s, the makes anticipating and evaluating the effect and that will probably exist during the next systems (or systemic) approach to warfare has of one’s physical actions on the enemy’s war.33 Fuller asserted that war is as much a gradually emerged as the dominant school behavior a significant challenge.41 science as any other human activity because of thought in the U.S. military, most other it is built on facts and that war must be Western militaries, and the North Atlantic Quantifying the Unquantifiable reduced to science before it can be practiced Treaty Organization (NATO). This was exem- Since the advent of the modern era, correctly as an art.34 plified by the wide acceptance in the United there have been numerous attempts to apply The Marxist-Leninist theoreticians States and NATO and some other militaries some elements of quantitative analysis to believed that war was essentially based on of the claims by advocates of network-centric understanding the sources of victory. This is scientific principles. Vladimir Lenin’s (1870– warfare (NCW)/network-centric operations especially the case with those who view the 1924) predilection for dialectical-materialist (NCO), effects-based operations (EBO)/ conduct of war as a science. Claims have been principles of objectivism, regularities in the effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), made that the use of various quantifiable nature of society, and the possibilities of and systemic operational design (SOD), which methods is more “objective” than using the knowledge strongly influenced the post-1917 mutated to operational design and ultimately commander’s judgment and experience. Yet development of Soviet military theory. Lenin’s to design. Since their heyday in the early this is not true because, among other things, philosophical views were compatible with 2000s, the influence of NCW/NCO advo- the decision of what to measure is highly more objective scientific methods in military cates has been greatly diminished. U.S. Joint subjective. Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) affairs and led toward the development of mil- Forces Command officially abandoned the warned that so-called mathematical factors itary foresight. Hence, in the Soviet military, more mechanistic elements of EBAO in the can never find a firm basis in military calcula- virtually every aspect of military affairs was summer of 2008. However, some theoretical tions. In his view, war most closely resembles a influenced by Lenin’s ideological views.35 The aspects of EBAO were retained in the main game of cards.42 main reason for those and for similar beliefs U.S. joint doctrine documents and are still The Russians relied on various mathe- was an unbounded faith in the extraordinary used, although in a modified form, by NATO. matical solutions to military forecasting prob- value and impact of materiel on the conduct of A common characteristic of NCW/EBO/ lems since the late 19th century. The Soviet war. Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), one of the SOD is that they are based on new and largely propensity to use mathematical methods early and influential Marxist military theo- unproven technologies. They were adopted was the result of more than 75 years of study, reticians, believed that all great revolutions in without proper testing and were not backed self-criticism, and refinement.43 The Russians warfare were the result not of great masters by empirical evidence. They reflect the neo- derived multiple combat models for optimiz- of war but of inventions of better weapons Newtonian, not the Clausewitzian, view of the ing courses of action and predicting relative and changes in materiel. For him, military nature of war. rates of advance on the battlefield. These ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 65 COMMENTARY | Science vs. the Art of War measurements were based on the outcomes Systems analysis (now known as policy independence of execution.53 The use of of major operations and battles in the Great analysis) is another quantifiable method metrics is highly subjective because higher Patriotic War (1941–1945). The Soviets con- used in the public sector and adopted by the authority arbitrarily selects which aspects of sidered their methodologies dialectically and military. This method is concerned with the the situation should be counted and evaluated. scientifically sound and, moreover, consistent allocation of resources and is aimed to maxi- But even if the metrics are correctly deter- with Marxist-Leninist teachings. By the early mize the value of objectives achieved minus mined, it is often difficult to evaluate hidden 1960s, the mathematics of armed conflict was the value of resources used. In business, elements in the situation. categorized as a branch of Soviet operations this reduces itself to maximizing profits.49 The proponents of the systems research, the social science that rationally By using mathematical methods, analysts approach to warfare also rely on some organizes goal-directed human activity.44 The systematically emphasized quantifiable quantifiable methods to evaluate the combat Soviet operations research tried to reduce aspects of warfare, which were susceptible to potential of the opposing forces and the certain tactical and technical aspects of mili- being integrated into mathematical models rate of accomplishing one’s objectives. For tary science to measurable objective indices so and input-output calculations. Anything example, the effects-based warfare propo- decisions could be made or substantiated. The that could not be quantified was therefore nents expanded the use of various metrics Soviets especially emphasized the so-called excluded. Such elements of the commander’s compared with their use in the traditional correlation of forces method as a tool for personality as intuition, courage, and will- Military Decision Making Process. The main tactical and operational commanders to make power were devalued.50 quantifiable methods used in EBO are so- sound decisions. This method dealt with One of the strongest advocates of called measures of merit. These are in turn direct or numerical comparisons of forces, systems analysis in the U.S. military was divided into measures of effectiveness and quantification of selected battlefield elements, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. measures of performance. and mathematical expressions or equations During his tenure (1961–1968), he extensively related to those elements in such a manner as used systems analysis for making key deci- War as an Art to support decisionmaking.45 Yet the Soviets sions pertaining to force requirements and The view that the conduct of war is largely an art is not entirely new. Several military theorists during the Enlighten- Clausewitz warned that so-called mathematical factors can ment, notably Saxe and Lloyd, realized the never find a firm basis in military calculations great importance of psychological factors in warfare. Yet they never went a step further and viewed warfare as complex and full of did not rely solely on quantitative methods weapons design and procurement. McNa- uncertainty, chaos, unpredictability, and such as correlation of force and means. They mara is perhaps best known for using quan- even irrationality. also took into account the enemy’s use of sur- tifiable methods not only in assessing the The most dramatic changes in military prise and deception.46 progress of the war in South Vietnam but in theory that led to a more refined view of In the West, various mathematical making decisions based on these methods— warfare occurred in Germany in the late 18th methods known as operations research (OR) that is, trying to conduct war as a science and early 19th centuries. The major cultural were used for enhancing the effectiveness rather than an art. The Pentagon applied the trends in Germany were romanticism, nation- of certain weapons and developing tactics so-called body count as the principal mea- alism, and idealism. German romanticism in their employment. The origins of OR are surement to determine what the United States challenged the fundamentals of the French- found in World War I. In 1914, the British should be doing to win in Vietnam while dominated Enlightenment’s worldview. It mathematician F.W. Lanchester devised the putting U.S. troops at the least risk.51 Yet such was opposed to the French cultural and so-called N-square law, which quantified the metrics proved meaningless. The statisti- political imperialism. It led to the awaken- relationship between victory and superiority cal indicators pointing to U.S. success were ing of German national sentiment. German in numbers.47 The OR was used in the United frequently erroneous and misleading. The thinkers of the “counter-Enlightenment” Kingdom in the late 1930s to find a solution models on which war managers relied were believed that concepts of knowledge and to the seemingly impossible problem of suc- equally faulty. Trapped in the mindset that reality are fundamentally false, or at least cessful defense against the enemy’s air attacks the war was a purely technical problem, U.S. exaggerated. For them, the world was not on the British Isles. In World War II, OR was high officials failed to grasp the sheer deter- simple but highly complex, composed of generally used in scarce radar stations and mination of their opponents and the extent of innumerable and unique elements and events, in devising the optimal search techniques the success of their political strategy.52 and always in a state of flux. They were not as and the size of convoys in antisubmarine The Pentagon’s emphasis on business enthusiastic about Newtonian science.54 The warfare (ASW). OR also reduced the loss rate practices has led since the late 1990s to an German Romanticists increasingly focused of convoys when analysts realized that larger extensive reliance on various “metrics” in on the inherent complexity of nature. They convoys could travel more safely.48 The United evaluating progress toward accomplishing argued that this complexity could not be States followed the British lead and used OR objectives on the battlefield. These quanti- explained by the Newtonian scientific model. in greatly increasing the effectiveness of mine fication methods in essence have replaced The German Romanticists took a historical warfare, ASW, and air attacks. the commander’s judgment, intuition, and approach to their understanding of reality.

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Soldiers return fire during firefight with Taliban forces in Barawala Kalay Valley, Afghanistan U.S. Army (Cameron Boyd) U.S. Army (Cameron

All comprehension was seen as the subjective troops; therefore, they are a major factor in of German romanticism, he saw the world result of the dynamics of one’s time and place. the conduct of war.57 Berenhorst believed that differently from the military thinkers of These and similar ideas led German intellec- war, in contrast to mathematics or astronomy, the Enlightenment. He was also greatly tuals to believe that reality does not conform could not be formulated as a science. He con- influenced by Scharnhorst’s pragmatism and to universal laws or principles.55 sidered various rules and principles derived relativist approach. He considered war as a The new cultural trends that started from experiences as artificial and dogmatic. complex and unpredictable phenomenon. as a reaction to the Enlightenment also had They were often applied indiscriminately to a Clausewitz believed only in broad generali- considerable influence on German military changed situation.58 ties, none of which consistently held true in theorists and practitioners, notably Georg Scharnhorst viewed the systems of the fog and friction of actual combat.61 He Heinrich von Berenhorst (1733–1814), Johann conducting operations that were fashionable argued that a system fails to account for the Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755–1813), and in his day as artificial and one-sided. The art “endless complexities involved” in war and Clausewitz. The first work that challenged the of war was a practical science and its meaning therefore results in a theoretical construct that prevalent ideas of the military Enlightenment could only be based on the study of reality. If bears little resemblance to the actual practice was Berenhorst’s three-volume Reflections that link is broken, then the art of war leads to of war.62 Hence, he considered any attempt on the Art of War: Its Progress, Contradic- abstractions.59 In his essay “The Use of Mili- to reduce the complex phenomena of war to tions and Certainty (1796–1799). Berenhorst tary History, the Causes of Its Deficiencies” a simple system of universal principles as an observed that the ancient Greeks and Romans (1806), Scharnhorst wrote that great generals exercise in futility.63 brought the art of war to the pinnacle of throughout history studied the principles of Clausewitz believed that war belongs perfection. For him, they were more “artistic” the art of war. Some branches of this art are to the domain of social life; it is neither a than anyone else.56 He wrote that during the even susceptible to mathematical formulation, science nor an art. It is not a science because Enlightenment, the art of war, like the rest of but others are dependent on circumstances it is a matter of action, and it is not an art the sciences and arts, advanced knowledge and cannot be studied mechanically. This is because it exerts itself not on inanimate or and supported innate talent. In his view, the why study alone without genius will never passive human material but on reacting, living art of war is not based on immutable laws make a great general.60 force.64 Clausewitz wrote that the “art of war but rather is associated with the unknown Clausewitz was the first theoretician must always leave a margin for uncertainty and uncontrollable modifications of the who systematically presented a philosophy in the greatest things and in the smallest. The human spirit. Moral forces animate the of war in all aspects. Influenced by the ideas greater the gap between uncertainty on the

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 67 COMMENTARY | Science vs. the Art of War one hand and courage and self-confidence on which in addition like fog or moonlight, a multitude of acts, could ever be compressed the other hand, the greater the margin that gives the objects an exaggerated size and a into a formal system of rules and principles. can be left for accidents.”65 grotesque view.”76 He pointed out that the This cultural premise was introduced by The human factor largely determines only situation a commander can know fully Clausewitz.84 The Germans considered what is called the “nature” of war—those is his own. The commander’s knowledge warfighting more of an art than a science. constant, universal, and inherent qualities of the enemy’s situation is often based on They believed no one could control events in that characterize any war throughout the unreliable information. His evaluation a war. Any war is full of ambiguity, confu- ages. The nature of war is unchangeable therefore may be mistaken and can lead him sion, and chaos. In a war, the absolute cannot regardless either of shifting motives and to assume that the enemy has the initiative be achieved, nor can uncertainty be mastered. forms of war or of technological advances.66 when in fact he himself could have it. Such A margin must always be left for uncertainty. Human behavior is a major part of the nature a faulty appreciation is as likely to lead to Moltke explained that in war, “everything of war. Clausewitz’s greatest contribution to ill-timed action as to ill-timed inaction.77 was uncertain; nothing was without danger, our understanding of war was his analysis Clausewitz argued that friction is the only and only with difficulty could one accom- of the importance of the human factor and concept that quite generally fits the differ- plish great results by another route. No the psychological element in particular in ence between real war and war on paper.78 calculation of space and time guaranteed the conduct of war. He wrote that warfare He argued that this “tremendous friction, victory in this realm of chance, mistakes, and is shaped by human nature, complexities of which cannot as in mechanics, be reduced to disappointments. Uncertainty and the danger human behavior, and limitations of human a few points, is everywhere in contact with of failure accompanied every step toward and physical conditions. The material and chance, and brings about effects that cannot the objective.” The Germans accepted the psychological aspects of a war form an organic be measured, just because they are largely confusion of battle as an unending source of whole; they are inextricably linked.67 He wrote due to chance. Friction is the force that potential opportunities and built a command that war is not the action of a living force on makes the apparently easy so difficult.”79 and control philosophy, known as the mission a lifeless mass but the collision of two living Friction encompasses uncertainties, errors, command (Auftragstaktik), in which that forces that interact.68 Victory does not consist accidents, technical difficulties, and the potential could be realized through decen- only in the conquest of the battlefield, but unforeseen, and their effects on one’s deci- tralized decisionmaking.85 in the destruction of the physical and moral sions, actions, and morale.80 During the interwar years (1919–1939), fighting forces.69 Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., stated that the Germans considered war a free and The principal psychological features most of what constitutes the operation of creative activity, or an art. It makes high of any war are hatred, hostility, violence, armies is essentially grounded in science, demands on human personality. At the uncertainty (or fog of war), friction, fear, while the art comes to the fore when the wills same time, warfare is founded on scientific danger, irrationality, chance, and luck.70 For of opposing commanders meet.81 For him, the principles. New weapons dictate ever- Clausewitz, a war was a trinity composed of scientific method was anathema. He held that changing forms. Their appearance must be primordial violence, hatred, and enmity—a nothing in war is certain. Therefore, in war as anticipated and their influence evaluated. Afterward, they must be put in service quickly. Combat situations are diverse; they Clausewitz’s greatest contribution to our understanding of war change often and suddenly and can seldom was the importance of the human factor and the psychological be anticipated in advance. Incalculable elements have a decisive influence, particu- element in particular larly as one’s own will is pitted against the independent will of the enemy. Friction and errors are daily occurrences.86 blind natural force.71 Clausewitz observed in art there “exist no general rules; in neither Clausewitzian views on the true nature that danger is “a part of the friction of war can talent be replaced by precepts. And given of war remain valid today. The human and without accurate conceptions of danger the uncertainty of war, Moltke concluded that element is the single most critical aspect of one cannot understand war.”72 Moreover, war strategy could not be more than a system of warfare. Human nature has changed little is “the realm of physical exertion and suffer- expedients.”82 He created an environment that despite vast changes in military technologies. ing.”73 It is full of chances and probabilities cultivated creativity, improvisation, inventive- Warfare is too complex and unpredictable within which the creative spirit is free to ness, and open-mindedness.83 an activity to be taken over by machines or roam.74 Clausewitz wrote that nowhere do During the tenure of Field Marshal explained and managed by pseudoscientific accidents have such a free playing field as in Moltke, Sr., as chief of the Prussian/German theories. Only the human brain is fully war. Not only its objective but also its subjec- Great General Staff (1857–1888), the Clause- capable of reacting in a timely and proper tive nature makes war a gamble.75 witzian teachings on war were widely shared fashion to the sudden and unanticipated Clausewitz observed that “The great by the Prussian/German theorists and changes in the situation and countering the uncertainty of all facts presents a peculiar practitioners. The Germans believed that no enemy’s actions and reactions. The enemy difficulty in war, because all actions take sphere of human activity, conditioned as it has his own will. He can react unpredictably place in something virtually akin to dusk, was by its historical setting and dominated by or irrationally.

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The timing and scope of irrationality is progressively diminished when they are 13 Ibid., 294. 14 cannot be predicted or measured. Irratio- applied at the operational and strategic levels Cited in Gat, 31. 15 nal decisions on either side in combat can of war where intangible elements play a major Miakinkow, 29. 16 Guenther Blumentritt, Die Gedanklichen have significant consequences on both the role in the course and outcome of war. Grundlagen des Alten O.K.H in O.v. Natzmer, Die course and the outcome of a war. Perceived In short, there is a huge difference Gedanklichen Grundlagen des OKH und deren Aus- irrationality is often the reflection of one’s between using science and technology wirkungen auf seine Organisation. Ein Schlusswort cultural values in evaluating the enemy’s to enhance the combat potential of one’s zur Gesamtarbeitt “OKH,” December 1949, ZA/1 actions and reactions. An enemy commander forces and applying scientific methods in 1935 P-041kk, Freiburg, i.Br, Bundesarchiv- Miliaterarchiv, 10. 17 Reinhard Hoehn, Scharnhorts Vermaechtnis during the interwar years, the Germans considered war a free (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag, 1952), 67. 18 and creative activity, or an art Cited in Armstrong Starkey, War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700–1789 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 57. 19 Ibid., 58. is a product of a different society, traditions, the conduct of war. Our knowledge and 20 Mark T. Calhoun, “Clausewitz and Jomini: and culture. Hence, he may make decisions understanding of warfare is a science, Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military that are considered irrational although they but the conduct of war itself is largely an Theory,” Army History, no. 80 (Summer 2011), 25. are fully consonant with his own societal art. This will not change in the future 21 Gat, 81. values and military culture. Psychological regardless of scientific and technological 22 Ibid., 84. states of the individuals or groups and their advances. As in the past, the character of 23 Ibid. possible reactions under stress cannot be war will change, even dramatically, but 24 Ibid., 142. entirely known. This is even more true when the nature of war as explained by Clause- 25 Calhoun, 27. dealing with enemy forces. witz will not. Warfare would be relatively 26 Cited in Gurbachan Singh, “The Science of simple, predictable, and controllable but for War,” available at . The question of whether the conduct psychological elements. JFQ 27 Cited in Gat, 115. of war is largely a science or an art is by no 28 Singh. Notes means settled. This is mainly due to the 29 Calhoun, 27. inherent human proclivity to seek certainty in 30 Cited in Gat, 115–116. 1 Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of all domains of social life, including warfare. 31 Ibid., 101. Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Another factor is the influence of Newtonian 32 Ibid., 104. Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 33 Cited in Singh. scientific theories and almost blind faith 2009), 9–10. 34 Anthony John Trythall, “Boney” Fuller: in the power of advanced technologies. Yet 2 Donald E. Neill, “Ancestral Voices: The Soldier, Strategist, and Writer, 1878–1966 (New numerous attempts to make the conduct Influence of the Ancients on the Military Thought Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1977), 115. of war largely or exclusively a science have of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century,” The 35 James K. Womack, Soviet Correlation of repeatedly failed. Warfare is too complex, Journal of Military History 62, no. 3 (July 1998), Forces and Means: Quantifying Modern Operations chaotic, and unpredictable to be conducted 488. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Mili- by using scientific methods, no matter how 3 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought from tary Studies, U.S. Army Command and General the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford advanced. This is not to underestimate or Staff College, 1990), 13–14. University Press, 2001), 9. ignore the importance of science in military 36 Herfried Muenkler, Ueber den Krieg. 4 Cited in Bousquet, 15. affairs. Science and technology were and will Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel ihrer 5 Ibid., 38. remain major factors in the ever-changing theoretischen Reflexion (Weilerswist: Velbrueck 6 Neill, 507. Wissenschaft, 2002), 128–129. character of war. History is replete with exam- 7 Ibid., 506. 37 William P. Baxter, The Soviet Way of ples where science and technology have made 8 Thomas M. Barker, The Military Intellectual Warfare (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, the difference between victory and defeat. and Battle: Raimondo Montecúccoli and the Thirty 1986), 242. Scientific methods should be extensively Years’ War (New York: State University of New 38 Cited in William G. Cummings, Operational used in explaining the phenomena of war in York Press, 1975), 5. Design Doctrine: Hamstrung or Footloose in the general and all its aspects. Sound theories of 9 Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napo- Contemporary Operating Environment (Toronto: war are based on the use of scientific methods. leonic Warfare: The Theory of Military Tactics in Canadian Forces College, April 30, 2007), 74. Eighteenth-Century France (New York, AMS Press, Various business models can be successfully 39 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Doctrine 1968), 16. applied in managing military organization, Series, Pamphlet 10, Design in Military Operations. 10 Cited in Gat, 37–38. force planning, and designing of weapons. A Primer for Joint Warfighters (Norfolk, VA: Joint 11 Eugene Miakinkow, “A Russian Way of Quantifiable methods can be useful in assess- Warfighting Center, September 20, 2010), 3. War? Westernization of Russian Military Thought, 40 Ibid. ing and enhancing the use of individual 1757–1800” (MA thesis, Waterloo, Ontario, 2009), 19. 41 Justin Kelly and David Kilcullen, “Chaos platforms and their weapons/sensors and their 12 Cited in J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Versus Predictability: A Critique of Effects Based tactics. However, the utility of such methods Science of War (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1926), 24.

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Operations,” Australian Army Journal 2, no. 1 Gilbert, 202 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University NEW (Winter 2004), 90. Press, 1986). 42 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. 81 Daniel Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War: from NDU Press Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Knopf, Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, for the 1993), 97. 1993), 172. Institute for National Strategic Studies 43 Womack, 84. 82 Gabriel Serbu, “The Dangers of Anti- 44 Ibid., 2. Intellectualism in Contemporary Western Armies,” 45 Ibid., 32. Infantry (November/December 2010), 45. 46 Ibid., 81. 83 Ibid., 47. 47 Cited in M. Kirby and R. Capey, “The 84 Gat, 332. Air Defense of Great Britain, 1920–1940: An 85 Hughes, 175. Operational Research Perspective,” The Journal 86 Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, eds., of the Operational Research Society 48, no. 6 (June On the German Art of War: “Truppenfuehrung” 1997), 558. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 17. 48 Bousquet, 141. 49 Ibid., 149–150. 50 Ibid., 151. 51 Robert McNamara with Brian Vandemark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1995), 237–238. 52 Bousquet, 157. 53 Dieter Stockfisch, “Im Spannungsfeld zwischen Technologiefortschritt und Fuehrungs- Strategic Perspectives, No. 9 verstaendniss. Auftragstaktik,” Marineforum 12 (December 1996), 13. John Parker’s Russia and the Iranian Nuclear 54 Gat, 144. Program studies the recent history of Russia’s 55 Calhoun, 27. relationship with Iran, the outsize personalities 56 Cited in Gat, 154. involved, and how the United States has an effect 57 Ibid., 155. on Russia’s dealings with the Persian state. As 58 Vladimir Putin returns to the presidency, will he Ibid., 156. 59 replay his 2004–2008 approach to Iran, during Reinhard Hoehn, Scharnhorts Vermaechtnis which Russia negotiated the S-300 air defense (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag, 1952), 73. system contract with Tehran? Or will he continue 60 Gat, 168. Russia’s breakthrough in finding common ground 61 Calhoun, 25. with the United States on Iran seen under former 62 Ibid., 28. president Dmitriy Medvedev, who tore up the 63 Ibid., 27. S-300 contract? Although Russia did not close the 64 Trythall, 116–117. door to engagement with Tehran, Moscow voted 65 Clausewitz, 97. for new, enhanced sanctions against Iran at the 66 Michael Sheehan, “The Changing Character United Nations Security Council and it continues to insist that Iran cooperate fully with Interna- of War,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An tional Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. Parker’s Introduction to International Relations, ed. John paper also factors in Putin’s resentment of U.S. Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 216, 4th ed. power and suspicion of American motives. While (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). the U.S.-Russia relationship continues toward a 67 Clausewitz, 216. diplomatic “reset,” Russia’s “step-by-step” engage- 68 Ibid., 86. ment with Iran is more of a regional issue. This 69 Cited in Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz paper details many salient issues including the (London: Random House, 2002), 81. history of the S-300 air defense system between 70 Sheehan, 216. Russia and Iran, the recent Arab Spring, Iran’s 71 Cited in Ian Roxborough, “Clausewitz and nuclear development, U.S. withdrawal from Af- ghanistan, and American missile defense systems the Sociology of War,” The British Journal of Sociol- in countries bordering Russia. ogy 45, no. 4 (December 1994), 625. 72 Clausewitz, 133. 73 Ibid., 116. 74 Cited in Roxborough, 625. 75 Clausewitz, 96. 76 Cited in Heuser, 89. 77 Clausewitz, 95. 78 Cited in Heuser, 88. 79 Clausewitz, 139–140. 80 Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” in Makers of Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear at ndupress.ndu.edu Age, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon Craig, and Felix

70 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Tafolla, Trachtenberg, and Aho

Nonlethal grenade used during Non-Lethal Individual Weapons Instructors Course, U.S. Africa Command U.S. Marine Forces Africa (Lydia M. Davey) Africa (Lydia U.S. Marine Forces

From Niche to Necessity Integrating Nonlethal Weapons into Essential Enabling Capabilities

By Tracy J. Tafolla, David J. Trachtenberg, and John A. Aho

Colonel Tracy J. Tafolla, USMC, is Director of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate. David J. Trachtenberg is President and CEO of Shortwaver Consulting, LLC, and was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from 2001 to 2003. Colonel John A. Aho, USMC (Ret.), is a Senior Policy Analyst at American Systems Corporation. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 71 FEATURES | From Niche to Necessity

he Department of Defense (DOD) The recently released Strategic Defense Guid- Device, and Portable Vehicle Arresting Barri- conducts U.S. military operations ance notes that U.S. forces must be increas- ers and Running Gear Entanglers, designed to in accordance with internationally ingly flexible and adaptable to deal with a stop moving vessels. Trecognized and accepted laws and dynamic security environment that “presents More sophisticated nonlethal weapons principles governing the use of armed force. an increasingly complex set of challenges are being developed with greater operational Those laws demand that the employment of and opportunities.”4 In both asymmetric and range, scalable to a variety of needs, to force be judicious, proportionate to the threat, conventional environments, avoiding non- provide a layered defense against potential and tempered wherever possible by the deliber- combatant casualties has become increasingly threats. These include airburst nonlethal ate avoidance of noncombatant casualties. important to the success of military opera- munitions, pre-emplaced electric vehicle The principle of civilian casualty avoidance is tions. Nonlethal weapons can play a signifi- stoppers, and nonkinetic active-denial embedded in the Fourth Geneva Convention of cant and strategic role in accomplishing this technology. Active-denial technology, 1949 and reflects an agreement among civilized and helping to achieve mission success. which delivers precision nonlethal effects nations that, while highly destructive, warfare at extended ranges, offers promise in crowd should not be conducted indiscriminately. What Are Nonlethal Weapons? control, area denial, and other applications. Indeed, a new DOD Law of War Manual is A current working definition of Active denial uses millimeter wave technol- being drafted, reinforcing America’s adherence nonlethal weapons is “weapons, devices, and ogy to create an invisible beam of directed to these standards of conduct. munitions that are explicitly designed and energy that produces a strong heating sensa- U.S. restraint in the application of lethal primarily employed to incapacitate targeted tion on the surface of the skin, which is com- force is not unusual. For example, during personnel or materiel immediately, while pletely reversible once an individual moves North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to reflexively out of the beam’s path. operations against Serbia in 1999, thousands personnel, and undesired damage to property Although applicable to a broad range of Serbs acting as “human shields” stood on in the target area or environment. [Nonlethal of contingencies, nonlethal weapons are bridges in Belgrade and Novi Sad to protect weapons] are intended to have reversible neither a panacea nor a substitute for lethal the structures from allied bombing attacks effects on personnel or materiel.”5 DOD policy force, and this article is not meant to exag- that would have killed civilians and been a recognizes that the use of nonlethal weapons gerate the potential of nonlethal weapons to public relations disaster.1 The U.S. military may occasionally result in injurious or lethal accomplish mission objectives. Their purpose is to complement the lethal capabilities in the warfighter’s toolkit. Some current nonlethal contemporary military operations are unlike previous wars systems have technical and operational limita- where success was measured in purely military terms tions, including range, mobility, and weight considerations that necessitate tradeoffs and impact their usefulness and operational suit- has sought to exercise restraint in operations effects, though that is not the intended ability to the warfighter. Those limitations, in both Iraq and Afghanistan.2 More recently, outcome. Their use reflects an approach to however, can be reduced through targeted U.S. forces supporting NATO air operations warfare that seeks to reconcile the objective of investments in science and technology. against Libya took extensive precautions to defeating the enemy with the moral impera- avoid civilian casualties.3 tive of sparing innocent lives. Challenges and Roadblocks Contemporary military operations are The current generation of nonlethal DOD began to focus coherent atten- unlike previous wars where success was mea- weapons includes counterpersonnel and tion and resources on developing nonlethal sured in purely military terms. The impor- countermateriel capabilities used for control- capabilities as an outgrowth of U.S. humani- tance of winning “hearts and minds” is now ling crowds or stopping or diverting vehicles tarian assistance efforts in Somalia in 1995, growing. Today’s wars are mostly irregular on land and vessels at sea. They provide esca- which highlighted a need for capabilities conflicts fought not against countries but in lation-of-force options that allow U.S. forces short of lethal means. In 1996, Congress complex environments against terrorists and to determine intent of potentially hostile indi- directed the establishment of an executive extremists who wear no uniforms and operate viduals and groups and modify behavior. agent for the DOD Non-Lethal Weapons within the civilian populace—often in a delib- Examples of counterpersonnel systems Program in order to provide oversight on erate attempt to shield themselves from attack currently used include dazzling lasers—optical joint nonlethal matters, maintain insight and maximize propaganda opportunities distracters useful for temporarily overwhelm- into the various independent Service efforts, from civilian casualties. ing an adversary’s visual sense by emitting eliminate duplication and program redun- Tomorrow’s wars will likely see U.S. a bright flash and glare effect—and acoustic dancies, and facilitate the fielding of nonle- forces involved in a range of contingen- hailing devices that emit loud warning tones thal weapons capabilities. The commandant cies from traditional to irregular warfare or clear verbal commands over long distances. of the Marine Corps was given this task, and operations. Former Secretary of Defense Also in use is an array of nonlethal munitions, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate Robert Gates set DOD on course for a “rebal- grenades (and their delivery systems), and was established to conduct day-to-day man- anced” military that is better postured to Tasers. Countermateriel systems include spike agement of joint programs and coordination succeed in nontraditional operations while strips, caltrops (heavy-gauge steel-puncturing of Service-unique programs on behalf of the preparing for other types of contingencies. spikes), the Vehicle Lightweight Arresting executive agent.

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Dazzler directed-energy weapon used for signaling or as nonlethal deterrent to hostile forces approaching ship U.S. Navy (Luciano Marano)

Since then, significant progress has in terms of civilian lives saved, mission Game-changers and Champions been made in developing nonlethal tech- objectives achieved, strategic goals accom- Translating new, cutting-edge technologies and fielding existing off-the-shelf plished, and international support attained nologies into fielded systems has historically capabilities. Despite their relevance to among allies and partners who appreciate been difficult. Though the Global Position- today’s contingency operations, however, efforts to protect civilians. Unfortunately, ing System (GPS) is ubiquitous today, its nonlethal weapons remain an underutilized nonlethal weapons have not yet been fully future was far from assured during its initial asset. Institutional resistance, bureaucratic embraced by military leadership and the development. GPS was criticized as costly inertia, competition with legacy programs policy community. and unnecessary, a General Accounting for funding, inadequate training, doctrinal Importantly, in some quarters of the Office6 (GAO) report was highly critical, and shortcomings, unclear requirements from the military, there is a cultural aversion to non- its budget was cut. The individual Services Services, and practical impediments to field- lethals. This is understandable in light of the pursued their own incompatible navigation ing—such as technological hurdles and insuf- military’s training as a fighting force whose and timing options. It was only through the ficient quantities of nonlethal systems with mission includes locating, closing with, and vision of GPS advocates that funding was greater standoff range—have impeded a more destroying the enemy. It requires a shift in restored and the program was successful. thorough integration of nonlethal capabilities mindset to convince the Nation’s warriors Similarly, as the importance of into the total force. In addition, fostering a that employing tools that allow for mission unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to intel- greater understanding of the role and utility accomplishment without loss of life or highly ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of nonlethal weapons as an irregular warfare destructive lethal fires where possible will not missions has increased, so has resistance enabler, vice a niche capability commonly weaken the force. to shifting budgetary resources away from associated with force protection missions, Without a broader-based understand- manned to unmanned platforms. Yet despite remains a significant challenge. ing of their value and a stronger commit- an initial reluctance to fund aircraft without The total cost of the DOD Non-Lethal ment to their fielding, nonlethal weapons are pilots, the Air Force today “is training more Weapons Program, including all joint and unlikely to recognize their full potential for pilots for advanced UAVs than for any other Service-specific investment, is roughly meeting the requirements of U.S. military single weapons system.”7 $140 million annually. Yet the return on strategy or the operational dictates of contin- History is replete with similar examples this investment can be disproportionate gency operations. where visionary approaches encountered ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 73 FEATURES | From Niche to Necessity practical roadblocks. Billy Mitchell’s vision of prevented the hijacking of two vessels in the even more people against our broader decisive airpower independent of land and sea Gulf of Aden within 24 hours of each other, mission. Thus, the disciplined application forces was roundly criticized. And while today’s but also enabled the capture of 16 pirates of force is consistent with our values and operations continue to demonstrate naval without injury to them or to crew mem- international law, increases our chances of and land force indispensability, many credit bers12—a telling demonstration of their value strategic and operational success, and more Mitchell’s vision as a key contributor in the in combating piracy and saving lives. effectively advances national policy.”13 Non- development of the modern-day aircraft carrier As the U.S. military is called upon to lethal weapons are responsive to the National and widespread acceptance and employment assist in humanitarian assistance/disaster Military Strategy’s direction. of carrier-based air combat—an outcome that relief operations overseas, nonlethal weapons In Afghanistan, civilian casualty would have been unlikely in the absence of a can also be useful for crowd control and to avoidance has become a central warfighting high-level commitment to the concept. deescalate tensions before violence erupts, requirement. The tactical directive governing The future of military technologies is helping U.S. forces maintain order during the the use of force acknowledges that civilian often driven by cost, yet too often cost is con- distribution of food, water, and medical sup- casualties have “strategic consequences” and fused with value. GPS, UAVs, and the aircraft plies to survivors after a natural disaster. calls the protection of Afghan civilians “a carrier have proven their value despite the Future concepts of warfare may dictate moral imperative.”14 It states, “Every Afghan relative expense of developing them. Similarly, the need for more innovative approaches civilian death diminishes our cause [empha- the value of nonlethal weapons for meeting to meeting mission requirements, placing sis in original]. If we use excessive force or mission requirements in today’s challenging greater stresses on commanders’ freedom of operate contrary to our counterinsurgency and complex military operational environ- maneuver and freedom of fires as well as flex- principles, tactical victories may prove to be ments may outweigh the costs of developing ibility and versatility in the force’s response strategic setbacks.”15 these novel technologies. capabilities. And any future vision for nonle- The negative consequences of civilian thal weapons must include a fully integrated casualties are magnified by the instantaneous Lessons for Tomorrow inventory of scalable effects capabilities in transmission of information, enabled by The utility of nonlethal weapons which an individual weapons system can be technology, and driven by the demands of in irregular conflicts, peacekeeping, and “dialed up” commensurate with the scenario an instant news cycle. Video and images of humanitarian operations is more than theo- faced. The ability to isolate and segregate grieving families and destroyed homes can retical. As retired Lieutenant General Emil R. appropriate targets through nonlethal means exacerbate negative perceptions of American Bedard, USMC, has noted, “Every warfighter may take on added importance, along with military might. Greater reliance on nonlethal eventually realizes that non-lethal weapons the ability to deny an adversary from seeing, weapons can help mitigate this effect. The tactical employment of nonlethal weapons can have other strategic benefits. the ability to temporarily deny an adversary’s use of infrastructure For example, the ability to temporarily deny through nonlethal means allows it to be reactivated later an adversary’s use of infrastructure through nonlethal means not only allows it to be reactivated at a later date but also saves money in are vital in creating the effects needed to hearing, communicating with, or reinforcing the long run by avoiding the need to rebuild. defeat an adversary.”8 Their use in Somalia troops on the battlefield. Likewise, employment of nonlethal devices in the mid-1990s was credited with dissuad- Because nonlethal weapons are appli- or nondestructive fires to prevent enemy ing mob violence that previously had led to cable to a broad range of missions the U.S. vehicles from crossing a bridge means that violent clashes between U.S. forces and Somali military is likely to encounter, their potential the bridge need not be destroyed by costly demonstrators.9 During peacekeeping opera- utility across the range of military operations munitions. It also allows it to be used by tions in Kosovo in 2000, U.S. forces effectively is increasing. To meet this growing utility, friendly forces, thus avoiding future U.S.- diffused an explosive situation by using their transformation from force protection borne reconstruction costs. nonlethal weapons during a confrontation tool to force application capability to comple- Estimates of the U.S. costs of recon- with a crowd of hostile Serbs in the town of ment lethal effects is required, along with struction in Iraq highlight the strategic Sevce.10 And in Afghanistan and Iraq, nonle- their institutionalization across the doctrine, benefit that could be provided by the wider thal weapons have played an important role. organization, training, materiel, leadership use of nonlethal weapons. By March 2011, the As one Army officer noted, their use “sends and education, personnel, and facilities United States had spent approximately $61 a strong message without the need to employ domains. Eventually, they may become as billion on Iraq reconstruction, which included deadly force.”11 essential an enabler of mission success as GPS. repair to economic infrastructure damaged in Though important for irregular warfare the conflict (for example, restoring electricity, missions such as counterinsurgency, nonle- Tactical Uses, Strategic Impacts communications, transportation, water, oil, thal weapons have much broader applicability The 2011 National Military Strategy and gas).16 While not all of these costs could across the full range of military operations. emphasizes the importance of civilian have been prevented through more extensive For example, as a counterpiracy capability, casualty avoidance: “The risk we assume by use of nonlethal capabilities, significant the use of nonlethal counterpersonnel tools minimizing collateral damage to innocents expenses might have been avoided if damage such as the acoustic hailing device not only is balanced by a reduction of risk to turning to Iraq’s infrastructure had been minimized

74 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Tafolla, Trachtenberg, and Aho U.S. Marine Corps (Daniel Balmer)

Marine demonstrates capabilities of X26E Tazer

by the application of appropriate and effective capacity to affect outcomes from the tactical forces.21 Many occur at entry control points, nonlethal technologies and capabilities. level to the strategic. convoys, and other controlled access areas. Likewise, in Afghanistan, the costs of As former International Security Assistance reconstruction to the U.S. taxpayer have been The Afghanistan Experience Force (ISAF) Commander General David significant, with the Special Inspector General Nearly a decade after the start of Petraeus noted, “Counterinsurgents cannot for Afghanistan Reconstruction reporting Operation Enduring Freedom, noncombatant succeed if they harm the people they are that these costs have exceeded $85.5 billion.17 casualties continue to strain the U.S.-Afghan striving to protect.”22 Wider use of nonlethal While some of these costs are directed toward relationship, undermining efforts to develop capabilities in such scenarios could mitigate establishing civil governance institutions the trust and confidence of the Afghan this risk, allowing U.S. forces who must make and other elements essential to the building people. This strain was recognized by Interna- split-second decisions to “pull the bullet back” of a democratic society, some portion of this tional Security Assistance Force Commander should they engage suspicious individuals spending has been allocated to repair and General John R. Allen, who noted in his 2011 later deemed to be noncombatants. rebuild property and infrastructure damaged Tactical Directive that “Every civilian casualty Although some U.S. forces in Afghani- or destroyed in the counterinsurgency. is a detriment to our interests and those of the stan are equipped with nonlethal capabilities, In addition, monetary restitution to Afghan government, even if insurgents are their overall availability remains limited. grieving family members when innocents are responsible. We must redouble our efforts to As General Joseph Dunford, assistant com- accidently killed and the costs of sheltering eliminate the loss of innocent civilian life. . . . mandant of the Marine Corps, has stated, the those whose property is destroyed in kinetic We must never forget that the center of gravity “demand for effective nonlethal weapons right engagements could be minimized through the in this campaign is the Afghan people; the now exceeds the inventory. . . . Squads and wider application of nonlethal means. citizens of Afghanistan will ultimately deter- platoons that are interacting with people [in In short, the use of nonlethal weapons mine the future of their country.”18 Former Afghanistan] want to take decisive action but can have a strategic “multiplier effect” by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral limit the possibility of injuring civilians.”23 avoiding collateral damage to property and Mike Mullen warned, “Lose the people’s trust, U.S. combatant commands have sought infrastructure, minimizing unintended and we lose the war.” to expand the availability of nonlethal civilian casualties, overcoming negative per- Civilian casualties in Afghanistan rose weapons, though progress has been slow. ceptions of the United States, denying oppor- 15 percent from 2009 to 2010 and another 8 Recent surveys of deployed units indicate tunities for enemy propaganda victories, percent from 2010 to 2011,19 yet three out of significant shortfalls in nonlethal weapons and minimizing long-term reconstruction four civilian casualties are caused by Taliban education, knowledge, training, and avail- costs. Perhaps no other capability allows for a and insurgent forces.20 Nevertheless, so-called ability. Accordingly, U.S. Central Command broader range of employment options across escalation-of-force incidents are the primary recently reemphasized predeployment train- a wider spectrum of contingencies with the cause of civilian casualties by coalition ing requirements for nonlethal weapons. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 75 FEATURES | From Niche to Necessity

Without Service institutionalization of our culture and accept the importance, of these capabilities must also be communi- nonlethal weapons training and equipping, and sometimes preeminence, of non-lethal cated from the top down. deployed forces will continue to be called effects.”25 This is not the equivalent of upon to exercise what some have called “dumbing down” U.S. military capabilities. Signs of Progress “courageous restraint” to minimize unin- Nor is it a reflection of what some have called Notwithstanding the limitations of tended casualties and damage. While such a “softer military.”26 As former USCENT- current systems and the challenges noted restraint has contributed to a 26 percent COM Commander General Anthony Zinni, above, there appears to be a broad-based foun- drop in the number of coalition-caused USMC, noted, “Non-lethal weapons when dation of support for greater investment in civilian casualties, it has also been contro- properly applied . . . make the United States and employment of nonlethal weapons—from versial, raising concerns that it limits the more formidable, not less so.”27 senior leadership to deployed units to policy- ability of troops to protect themselves and Unfortunately, misunderstandings and makers and opinion leaders. Several combat- thus increases their risks. Some have noted mischaracterizations of the effects of nonle- ant commanders have now included nonlethal that restraint in the application of lethal thal weapons are common. New technologies weapons on their annual Integrated Priorities force on ethical grounds “transfers risk” often raise ethical, cultural, and political List. General Chiarelli has also noted that “In from enemy combatants and noncombatants concerns. The challenge of deploying a new a counterinsurgency, non-lethal effects are as to U.S. forces and that this creates “a false technology is that it is not well understood important as—and, at times, more important dilemma where one must choose between and is easily subject to mischaracterization, than—kinetic effects.”28 Then–Major General non-combatant lives, which have value, and especially in underdeveloped societies where Richard Mills, commander of ISAF’s Regional soldiers’ lives, which do not.”24 Here, also, cultural, ethnic, and religious differences Command–Southwest, stated, “I am a sup- the greater availability of nonlethal weapons may be exploited for political purposes by porter of non-lethal weapons. I would like to may help alleviate these concerns. America’s adversaries. see some suite of those weapons provided to The effects of unintended civilian In response to a request from an opera- us over here.”29 At the unit level, one Army casualties reach beyond the local population. tional commander, an Active Denial System officer who served in Iraq and Afghanistan The accidental killing of innocents can have was shipped outside of the continental United commented, “To back away from applying a traumatic effect as well on young troops States—and was later ordered to return non-lethal weapons in irregular warfare risks who must forever live with the consequences stateside, having never been used. Although sending the message that the United States of their actions. The United States must do the system has been demonstrated as safe in is incapable of either developing [a nonlethal all it can to provide its uniformed men and more than 11,000 tests on 700 human vol- weapons] arsenal or determining how to women in harm’s way with the tools they need unteers and does not cause any long-term or employ [nonlethal weapons], or is reluctant to complete the mission and avoid inadvertent permanent health issues, the newness of the to attempt a form of warfare that involves death or injury to noncombatants. technology, coupled with concerns over its dealing with dissatisfied people as human mischaracterization as a “microwave” weapon beings and not simply as targets.”30 Setting the Record Straight that “fries,” “cooks,” or sterilizes its targets, Congress has also expressed bipartisan Communicating effectively about resulted in a lack of willingness to employ support for nonlethal weapons. The Ike nonlethal weapons and how they can assist it. This experience highlights the power of Skelton National Defense Authorization Act the warfighter in achieving the objectives of perceptions to shape policy and reinforces the for Fiscal Year 2011 called for the procure- U.S. military strategy is a critical prerequisite importance of ensuring they are based on fact ment and fielding of nonlethal capabilities to to gaining acceptability and support for rather than myth. “improve military mission accomplishment these capabilities. This effort, however, will Shaping the information environment and operational effectiveness” in counterin- be handicapped without the more active is just as important as shaping the military surgency operations.31 engagement of senior-level military and environment. Strategic communication The House Armed Services Committee civilian leaders. is essential for generating understanding (HASC) in particular has highlighted “the Accepting nonlethal weapons as an and advocacy of technological solutions to value of non-lethal weapons in reducing risks integral element of the warfighter’s toolkit contemporary military/operational issues. to the warfighter and to non-combatants in requires a cultural shift that is counterintui- A bottom-up approach, including at the current and prospective contingency opera- tive to the military, which understandably unit level, is a necessary but not sufficient tions.”32 The committee urged DOD “to accelerate its effort to field such systems, including active denial technologies; to ensure adequate restraint in the application of lethal force on ethical grounds funding for the non-lethal weapons science “transfers risk” from enemy combatants and noncombatants to and technology base; and to develop policy, U.S. forces doctrine, and tactics for their employment.”33 The HASC also expressed concern that DOD “does not fully appreciate the important role emphasizes the use of lethal force. As former condition for success in achieving greater non-lethal capabilities can play in helping to Army Vice Chief of Staff General Peter acceptance and integration of nonlethal ensure mission success,” arguing that “bud- Chiarelli noted, “if we’re really serious about weapons capabilities into current and future getary trends do not reflect an urgent need for fighting an insurgency, we have to change military planning and operations. The value non-lethal capabilities.”34

76 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Tafolla, Trachtenberg, and Aho U.S. Army (Phillip Valentine) U.S. Army (Martin Greeson)

M5 Modular Crowd Control nonlethal munition used to incapacitate large groups with flash bang and Soldier loads 40mm nonlethal rounds into impact of rubber balls launching system during training in Iraq

In 2004, the Council on Foreign is increasingly likely to confront.40 Moreover, ■■ help determine intent and provide Relations called for “incorporating . . . non- the employment of nonlethal capabilities to important deescalatory options for warfighters lethal capabilities more broadly into the support antiaccess/area-denial operations between shouting and shooting equipment, training, and doctrine of the is recognized in the new Joint Operational ■■ avoid negative consequences that U.S. armed services,” concluding that doing Access Concept. could emerge as a result of the use of lethal so “could substantially improve the United force including to young troops where the States’ ability to achieve its goals across the Conclusion costs of a wrong decision on the use of force full spectrum of modern war.”35 In 2007, a Many future conflicts are likely to be can be psychologically devastating RAND study highlighted the “inadequacy” of unconventional and irregular and take place ■■ be applicable to anticipated contingen- nonlethal capabilities and the negative politi- in environments where it is difficult to distin- cies and changes in the strategic environment cal fallout from killing noncombatants.36 In guish between combatants and noncomba- ■■ conform to U.S. military strategy 2009, RAND called for a range of capabilities tants. Conventional operations may also occur ■■ be consistent with the moral principles that are scalable for maximum effectiveness, in urban environments within close proxim- that guide U.S. military actions concluding that “creating and mainstream- ity to civilians and critical infrastructure. In ■■ reflect an American approach to war ing this capability requires vision, initiative, these circumstances, nonlethal weapons can that is compliant with international law and its commitment, and persistence on the part of play an increasingly useful role in support of requirement to use force judiciously, propor- those soldiers’ civilian and military leaders.”37 U.S. military goals and objectives. Yet this tionately, and discriminately And Brookings Institution scholar Michael transformation is unlikely to happen without ■■ reduce unintended civilian casualties O’Hanlon has argued, “Rather than ask our a greater understanding of the tactical and and inadvertent damage to property troops to make a choice between being at risk strategic benefits of these weapons. ■■ avoid expensive reconstruction costs and taking actions that could kill innocent Nonlethal weapons are not a substitute associated with rebuilding infrastructure Afghans and set back the war effort, we for the application of lethal force. When damaged as a result of traditional kinetic mili- should give them the [nonlethal] tools they employed, nonlethal weapons are always tary operations need to do their job.”38 backed by lethal means. As an adjunct to ■■ help achieve mission success. More recently, a report by the Center for lethal force, however, they can be a power- Strategic and Budgetary Assessments noted ful addition to the warfighter’s toolkit. For To accomplish these objectives, the that nonlethal weapons—including directed- example, nonlethal weapons can: value of nonlethal weapons must be better energy technologies—can play a valuable appreciated by everyone from the civilian role in countering the antiaccess/area-denial ■■ close the gaps in existing counterper- and military leadership down to the operator strategies of adversaries.39 It is precisely sonnel and countermateriel capabilities on the battlefield. Because of their trans- these kinds of threats that the new Defense ■■ create a more capable and versatile formative strategic benefits across a range Strategy Guidance argues the United States force without loss of lethality of military operations, the role nonlethal ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 77 FEATURES | From Niche to Necessity weapons can play in likely future contin- the general public. Such advocacy is essential the law enforcement community, as “less lethal” or gencies should be explicitly referenced in to highlight the growing relevance of nonle- “less than lethal” weapons. In 1996, the term “non- policy and strategy documents such as the thal technologies and the ability of nonlethal lethal weapons” was established in DOD lexicon and formally codified in DOD Directive 3000.3, Quadrennial Defense Review.41 Persistent weapons to help achieve the objectives of “Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons,” available at myths must be dispelled with dispassionate U.S. military strategy. Although the top . The term non-lethal weapons also appears in Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint nonlethal weapons provide capabilities with unique value that Staff, November 8, 2010, as amended through may offset their monetary cost March 15, 2012), available at . Admittedly, the term is not always a best fit in describing the capability and Nonlethal weapons must be affordable, acknowledged the importance of avoiding is arguably unappealing to the combat arms com- reliable, and scalable to circumstances. They noncombatant casualties to mission success, munity. The continued expansion of the nonlethal weapons portfolio may require reconsideration of should be operationally effective, suitable to there has yet to be an explicit public articula- the term. a variety of scenarios, adaptable to current tion of the role nonlethal weapons can play 6 The General Accounting Office was subse- weapons systems, and provide improved capa- in accomplishing this task. That would be quently renamed the Government Accountability bilities and increased range. Moreover, they an important step as DOD reconciles its Office. must be available in sufficient quantities to military strategy, plans, and programs with 7 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, speech make their investment worth the cost. fiscal realities. at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, All of the Services must integrate Like our experiences with the Global CO, March 4, 2011. nonlethal weapons more broadly into their Positioning System and the unmanned aerial 8 E.R. Bedard, Non-Lethal Capabilities: Real- doctrines, training, exercises, and deploy- vehicle, the transformation of nonlethal izing the Opportunities, Defense Horizons 9 (Wash- ments. Greater acceptability of nonlethal weapons from a niche capability to one with ington, DC: NDU Press, March 2002), 1. 9 capabilities will not occur unless forces are scalable effects useful across the spectrum Cited by Paul R. Capstick, “Non-Lethal properly trained and equipped to use them. of contingencies depends on those with the Weapons and Strategic Policy Implications for 21st Century Peace Operations” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. They should be treated as an integral compo- vision to see their broad-based, across-the- Army War College, February 26, 2001), 9. nent of the warfighter’s capabilities from the board utility in helping achieve mission 10 As a commanding officer of the U.S. peace- beginning, not a costly add-on down the road. success. And their effective integration into keeping contingent stated, “The non-lethal rounds Integration of nonlethal weapons can enable the warfighter’s toolkit will not only help us achieved a tremendous effect: Everyone backed greater freedom of maneuver for the force achieve our strategic and tactical goals and up immediately and settled down.” See Lieutenant and will enhance the array of fires available to objectives but will also help us remain true to Colonel James Brown, commanding officer of the facilitate the offense. our core values as a nation. JFQ Army’s 709th Military Police Battalion, quoted in The capabilities provided by nonlethal Eric Adams, “Shoot to Not Kill,” Popular Science weapons can help enable mission success Notes (May 2003), 90. 11 across the full spectrum of conflict—from Colonel Douglas A. Tamilio, Project 1 “Human Chains Guard NATO Targets,” irregular warfare to more traditional con- Manager for Soldier Weapons, cited in DOD Non- BBC News, April 9, 1999, available at . Today’s Operations (Quantico, VA: DOD, 2011), 11, from their employment must take the lead in 2 See, for example, George Will, “Futility available at . importance of tracking and highlighting inci- Illumination,” Jewish World Review, June 20, 2010, 12 Ibid., 9. dents where nonlethal weapons have avoided available at . States of America (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of successfully deescalated the potential for vio- 3 Cheryl Pellerin, “Gates Cites Efforts to Avoid Staff, February 2011), 7. lence cannot be overestimated. Civilian Casualties in Libya,” American Forces 14 International Security Assistance Force Most importantly, cost should not be Press Service, March 23, 2011, available at . provide capabilities with unique value that ‘Disciplined Use of Force,’” August 1, 2010, avail- 4 Department of Defense (DOD), Sustaining able at . tion of this fact is needed to develop the requi- Defense (Washington, DC: DOD, January 2012), 1. 15 Ibid. site levels of advocacy and sustained funding 5 This updated definition appears in DOD 16 Special Inspector General for Iraq Recon- that allow them to be integrated more fully Directive 5210.56, “Carrying of Firearms and the struction, Quarterly Report to the United States into the “rebalanced” force of the future. Use of Force by DOD Personnel Engaged in Secu- Congress, April 30, 2010, available at . within the defense bureaucracy, among key corres/pdf/521056p.pdf>. Nonlethal weapons have 17 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan decisionmakers and leaders, and throughout also been referred to by some, including within Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United

78 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Tafolla, Trachtenberg and Aho

States Congress, April 30, 2012, available at . House of Representatives, on H.R. 2647, National 18 COMISAF’s Tactical Directive, November Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, 30, 2011, available at . House of Representatives, on H.R. 5136, National Center for Transatlantic Security Studies 19 See Alissa J. Rubin, “Taliban Causes Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Most Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan, Report 111-491, May 21, 2010, 228. U.N. Says,” The New York Times, March 35 Graham T. Allison et al., Non-Lethal 9, 2011, A15, available at . Also Relations, 2004), v. see United Nations (UN) Assistance Mission in 36 See David C. Gompert et al., War by Other Afghanistan and Afghanistan Independent Human Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabili- Rights Commission, Afghanistan: Annual Report ties for Counterinsurgency, RAND Counterinsur- 2010—Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, gency Study, Final Report, MG-595/2-OSD (Santa March 2011, available at ; and UN Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations and Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Press Release, Populations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 133. “Civilian Casualties Rise for Fifth Consecutive Year 38 Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Troops Need Not in Afghan Conflict,” February 4, 2012, available at Shoot in Afghanistan,” The Brookings Institu- . . Strategic Forum 277 Release. 39 Mark Gunzinger with Chris Dougherty, 21 See Dan Fox, “Improving Capabilities for Outside in: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Grand Strategy and International Law Joint Urban Operations,” PowerPoint briefing, U.S. Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats (Washington, Nicholas Rostow examines U.S. grand Joint Forces Command, 2007. DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess- 22 Statement of General David H. Petraeus ments, January 2011). strategy—the calculated relationship before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 40 DOD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership. between means and large ends—and the March 15, 2011, 9, available at . ance documents. For example, the Joint Operating scope of this paper is wide, and the author 23 James K. Sanborn, “Dunford: Marines Concept for Countering Irregular Threats pub- draws cogent conclusions about the im- Will Continue to Be Needed,” Marine Corps lished in 2011 declared, “Most activities to counter portance of international law and a state’s Times, April 14, 2011, available at . lethal activities conducted with other partners.” total war, George Washington’s Farewell 24 See, for example, Tony Pfaff, “Risk, Military See DOD, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Address, the Monroe Doctrine, the death Ethics, and Irregular Warfare,” Foreign Policy Threats Joint Operating Concept, version 2.0 Research Institute E-Notes, December 2011. (Washington, DC: DOD, May 17, 2010), 27, avail- of U.S. isolationism at Pearl Harbor, and 25 Cited in Richard L. Scott, “Non-Lethal able at . Nation’s vital interests and reinforced ment,” Army Magazine (April 2010), 22. respect for basic legal principles of inter- 26 Bedard, 2. national conduct. Since World War II, 27 See Dennis B. Herbert, “Non-Lethal Weap- international law has never been far from onry: From Tactical to Strategic Applications,” Joint U.S. grand strategy because it has helped Force Quarterly 21 (Spring 1999), 89. avoid a nuclear confrontation, preserve 28 Scott, 22. the balance of power in Eurasia, and pre- 29 Dan Lamothe, “2-Star Supports More Use of vent another world war. Non-Lethal Weapons,” Marine Corps Times, Febru- ary 2, 2011, available at . 30 Scott, 21. 31 See Section 1078 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383), January 7, 2011, available at Visit the NDU Press Web site . at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 79 FEATURES | V-22 Osprey

MV-22 Osprey takes off from USS Bataan in Mediterranean U.S. Navy (Julio Rivera)

The V-22 Osprey From Troubled past to viable and flexible option

By Eric Braganca

fter a few years of staying out of the limelight, the V-22 is back in the news because of a recent crash in Morocco that claimed the lives of two Marines and as the object of press and congressional inquiries for possible budget cuts.1 After A 10 years of expanding defense spending, military programs are again challenged to justify their funding and existence. American involvement in Iraq is over, Osama bin Laden is dead, and the President has vowed to begin withdrawing from Afghanistan soon. Does America still need the V-22? Yes. The American people deserve the best value for their dollar on any program during any time period despite any budget realities, and the V-22 has slowly and quietly become a solid, efficient performer. But there are still critics who do not know the quiet truths about the V-22.2 It has an enviable safety record (despite the most recent crash), is cost-efficient, and has the flexibility to take on new roles and missions to handle our continued global security demands. No single aircraft is the answer to all of America’s needs, but the V-22 offers the best troop-transport capability now and through the next decade.

Surprising Safety Record Many who are familiar with the history of the V-22 recall the early years of its develop- Lieutenant Colonel Eric Braganca, USAF (Ret.), is ment when a series of high-profile crashes nearly caused the Department of Defense (DOD) to a Consultant on Joint Operations with Whitney cancel the program. Richard Whittle, in The Dream Machine,3 gives an excellent accounting of Bradley and Brown. His last military assignment those days and the terrible impact they had on the people involved. The new tilt-rotor design was as Chief Systems Engineer for the CV-22 in the and challenging military requirements demanded numerous compromises to save weight and Joint Program Office. increase speed as well as survivability in combat environments. A series of crashes and the tragic

80 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Braganca loss of lives as the program rushed to meet experienced an engine fire since the improved seemed superficially credible until exam- military timelines caused a redesign of critical hydraulic lines have been installed. While ined more closely. One completely false components. The “new” V-22 began flying the improved lines are good, the new blower claim was that the V-22 would not be sup- again in 2001 and has slowly become one of will prevent the hydraulic pressure changes portable on Navy ships such as the CH-46s the safest combat aircraft in the Marine Corps and is an even better solution. The crews and it was replacing. However, Marines have inventory. The redesign of some key areas of passengers who fly in the V-22 deserve this deployed more than three squadrons on the aircraft in 2000 and 2001 made a dramatic level of safety and protection, and they are ships in the last 2 years, including a Marine improvement in the safety of the aircraft. now getting it. Furthermore, improving safety air element on the USS Kearsarge that used These improvements made an immediate, continues to be a part of the V-22 program. its V-22s to rescue an F-15 pilot who ejected although unheralded, improvement in its Before the Marine crash, which is still over Libya in March 2011. Another claim safety. The V-22 went from near extinction under investigation, the Air Force lost a CV-22 that falls into the “half-truth” category is to becoming one of the safest aircraft in the in April 2010 during a combat mission in that V-22s cannot autorotate (the method Marine vertical-lift inventory. The Marine Afghanistan supporting special operations helicopters use to land when all engines Corps accident rate for all of its aircraft forces. This crash was terrible for the families fail5). It is true, but irrelevant, that the V-22 since 2001 (the last 10 years) is just under 2.5 who lost loved ones, but it did highlight how cannot autorotate. The whole truth is that mishaps for every 100,000 flight hours. far the V-22 has come in openness and trust the V-22 has a larger flight envelope where Before Morocco, the Osprey’s crash in the aircraft by the people who fly it and it can survive a dual-engine failure than the rate was half that and slightly better than the venerable CH-46, which it is replacing in Marine squadrons. To have a new aircraft the V-22 went from near extinction to becoming one of the with a radically new design sustain a 10-year safest aircraft in the Marine vertical-lift inventory safety record better than other aircraft that are much better understood is exceptional. Even with the Morocco fatalities, the V-22 fly in it. Sadly, 4 people died, but 16 survived flight envelope of any comparable aircraft. accounts for only 6 deaths out of the 600+ that even though the aircraft broke apart during If both engines fail while it is flying fast have occurred in rotary-wing mishaps since the catastrophic impact with the ground. The (called “airplane mode”), the V-22 can glide 2001. Rotary-wing operations remain highly joint command responsible for the mission like any fixed-wing aircraft, obviating the dangerous, and the V-22 is no exception. launched the CV-22 that night into a chal- need for autorotation. So the only risk is Ospreys have flown over 100,000 flight hours lenging weather environment in a remote when both engines fail while the V-22 is in with over half of that coming in the last 3 mountainous target area against a hostile “helicopter mode” (with the prop-rotors/ years. During that time, V-22s have completed force. They were confident that the V-22 was engines pointed upward). V-22s spend the numerous deployments to Iraq, Africa, and capable and safe. Two Air Force safety boards vast majority of their time operating in Afghanistan, and also have performed excep- reviewed the crash circumstances and found airplane mode and use helicopter mode tionally well in high-profile missions such as that the extreme environment—high altitude, only when taking off and landing. Every the rescue of an American pilot in Libya and darkness, and featureless terrain—was the aircraft ever made has some combination supporting the bin Laden raid in Pakistan. most likely cause of the crash. While one of the of low speeds and altitudes that should be In the last few years, the V-22 experi- boards suggested an engine failure might have avoided because a loss of engine power will enced fires around the engines due to leaking contributed, the board lacked evidence. A joint not allow a safe landing. Even helicopters hydraulic fluid dripping onto hot metal. government and industry technical investiga- have speed-altitude combinations that do Because the V-22 has an engine and rotor tion of one of the engines indicated no failure; not allow a successful autorotation landing. system that tilts during every takeoff and the other engine was not recovered. A govern- Because of its power and speed, the V-22 landing, there are larger and different stresses ment review of the crash data (speed, altitude, spends less time in these “avoid” regions put on components in those areas than in fuel status) showed that an engine failure was than helicopters, making the V-22 less other aircraft. In response to those problems, highly unlikely and would not have caused likely to experience a crash from a dual- government and aircraft manufacturers the crash. Based on that technical review, Air engine failure—meaning safer operations implemented hardware and software changes Force Special Operations Command publicly for crew and passengers. to detect and prevent the leaks. Initially, the discounted an engine failure as the cause.4 V-22s started with a questionable safety fixes just notified the crew that the hydraulic The CV-22 returned to combat missions a few record as the manufacturers and military system was about to leak and shut down that days after the crash and continued operating testers learned about the new, unique tilt- part of the system. Follow-on improvements in the extreme Afghanistan environment rotor machine. But since the redesign of the installed better hydraulic lines in key areas, without incident—the commanders, crews, aircraft, the 1990s record of crashes has been which prevented the leaks. After a series of and passengers did not lose faith in the air- replaced by 10 years of exceptional safety tests, engineers learned that a blower, driven craft. The V-22 community did not shy away and a continued focus on making the aircraft by the hydraulics, was causing extreme pres- from open and public scrutiny of the safety or safer. Despite the poor reputation earned by sure changes in the hydraulic system. This usefulness of the aircraft. those early years, the V-22 community devel- blower is soon to be replaced throughout Numerous other claims about the oped and maintained an openness to accept- the fleet even though the aircraft has not V-22 have proven untrue. Some claims ing scrutiny even when the worst happened. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 81 FEATURES | V-22 Osprey

hour than other options, it is more efficient because it can carry more passengers a greater distance. The CH-46 costs $4,600 per hour to operate, but carries half as many passengers as the V-22 and travels slower and not as far. The CH-46 costs $3.17 per passenger-mile. U.S. Air Force (Andy M. Kin) U.S. Air Force The CH-53E, the Marines’ heavy-lift helicopter, can carry extremely heavy loads on its cargo hooks (sling-loaded below the aircraft) but carries the same number of passengers as the V-22 (like the V-22, the CH-53E can carry more troops when loaded without seats, but this analysis uses troops-in-seats for comparison since this is the officially approved measure). The CH-53E costs the Navy SEALs hoisted onto Air Force Special Operations same to operate hourly as the V-22 but travels CV-22 Osprey at Hurlburt Field slower and therefore not as far, so it costs $3.12 per passenger-mile. The Navy’s newest H-60 version—the MH-60S—costs much less per hour (just over $2,500), but it can carry only seven passengers and also has a shorter Affordable Transportation V-22s have carried as many as 35 troops range. The MH-60S costs $2.84 per passenger- Recent congressional inquiries have when the seats were removed and the troops mile. The V-22 costs almost $11,500 per focused on the cost of the V-22.6 This is not were secured using tie-downs on the floor. A hour and can carry 24 passengers at speeds surprising given the current financial climate. Marine squadron on a ship would need more over 250 knots—nearly twice that of fully- When V-22 costs are evaluated against what than two-and-a-half times as many H-60s to loaded helicopters. The V-22 costs $1.75 per the military would need as an alternative, it carry the same number of troops as a single passenger-mile. proves an effective and efficient aircraft for V-22. A V-22 can also fly twice as fast, which These cost numbers do not include the DOD and the Nation. To make a fair com- means it can go twice as far in the same time. V-22 program office’s recent cost-reduction parison, the V-22 must be examined using A squadron equipped with H-60s would need initiatives, which garnered DOD’s 2011 David initial purchase costs for a comparable fleet more than twice as many aircraft to go half as Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award for of replacements, but also including operating far. To extend the range of the H-60, the mili- exemplary innovations and best practices in and maintenance costs as well as personnel tary would need air refueling support (such as the defense acquisition process by decreasing costs needed to support operations—what the C-130s) or additional ground refueling assets the cost per flying hour over 15 percent.9 In military calls life-cycle cost. (tanker trucks/personnel and security). When 2010, the Osprey flight-hour cost was reduced Each new Marine MV-22 costs factoring in these additional costs for the to $10,400 per hour and as low as $9,400 approximately $74 million. The Air Force’s same warfighting capabilities, the V-22 life- per hour for the first half of 2011. Using the CV-22 variant costs more—approximately cycle cost is cheaper than an H-60 or other 2011 rate, the Osprey cost-per-hour drops to $84 million each—because it has added comparable options. This comparison is why $1.43—half of the H-46 and H-60 rates. And avionics such as a terrain-following radar the military stuck with the V-22 even when it these rates do not include the costs of addi- and advanced defensive systems to protect had its early problems. tional support assets that alternative solutions it against radar and infrared missiles. This The civilian transport world uses differ- would require, such as additional air refuel- seems high compared to the $16 million price ent measures of efficiency than the military ing, fuel trucks, personnel, and so forth. The tag for each Army basic H-60M. But a more does. The government focuses on the overall H-53s can carry heavier external loads, so the advanced H-60, with defensive equipment cost, while the for-profit world focuses on Osprey cannot assume the Marines heavy-lift and networked global communications for the comparative advantage of the available role for moving artillery, vehicles, or other tomorrow’s combat operations, costs much options. The airline industry measures the large equipment. But in the passenger-moving more. And when a basic H-60 is modified for efficiency of an aircraft using a formula that role, the V-22 is far cheaper than the alterna- a combat role, the price grows dramatically. takes into account the cost to fly a specified tives currently in the military inventory. If the Egypt bought four such H-60s in 2008 for mission, the number of passengers it can military only needs to move small numbers $44 million each,7 and the Air Force’s combat carry, and the distance flown—cost per avail- of troops short distances, the H-60 is more replacement program is buying 10 H-60s able seat-mile. Employing a similar formula efficient. But the Marines, Army, and special that are expected to cost $40 million each using the maximum range of different operations forces routinely need to move after modifications to make them combat aircraft, it is possible to compare the cost- larger forces and prefer to base as far from the effective.8 That is almost half as much as a efficiency of the different options. enemy as possible. single V-22, but an H-60 can hold only 7 to 10 The Marine Corps did this analysis and Recent criticisms have focused on the troops while a V-22 can hold 24; in combat, found that while the V-22 costs more to fly per cost of the V-22 but have failed to account for

82 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Braganca the expense of its rivals. The cost of each V-22 is higher than alternative aircraft, but this ignores the fact that DOD needs fewer V-22s to accomplish the same mission. The V-22 is cheaper than other options using both a life- cycle cost and a cost-per-available-seat-mile analysis. It is quantifiably safer and cheaper (Markus Maier) U.S. Air Force than alternative vertical-lift options, and it also provides the desired qualitative advantages for today’s and tomorrow’s military needs.

Future Operations Combat operations are complete in Iraq and should be winding down in Afghanistan in the next year or two. Already the United Air Force CV-22 Ospreys take off from Kirtland Air Force Base States is focusing on other areas of the world both for counterterrorism and for the potential of larger operations against more developed threats. As America transitions to these tasks, the V-22 becomes an even greater asset. With its ability to operate from Navy ships, it of decreased reliance on sometimes question- actions with more medical equipment while improves the country’s ability to defend ship- able allies is incalculable. the aircrew moves the patient directly from ping lanes, conduct small counterterrorism DOD is looking at aircraft for a number the battlefield to the trauma center faster and missions, and participate in larger operations of missions that have traditionally been seen without the need for a transfer to a longer- against larger forces where greater connectiv- as needing helicopters. Each Service is looking range aircraft. The V-22 is tailor-made for ity and defensive capabilities are needed. for replacements to existing aircraft because this lifesaving combat mission. In 2008, Colonel Glenn Walter, USMC, current options have reached the end of their The Navy is looking for a replacement wrote that the V-22 would enhance military service-life or need greater capabilities. The for its small fixed-wing aircraft carrier operations by exploring all nine principles V-22 offers a highly competitive option for resupply aircraft, the C-2. The V-22 can do of war.10 His analysis stands today and is each of these demands, but many within DOD this mission as well. Although not a complete reinforced by the last 4 years of V-22 combat have shied away from considering it because replacement for the C-2, the V-22 can add operations. The Air Force Osprey variant of misperceptions shaped by the colored new mission areas that the C-2 cannot do, can avoid detection to surprise an enemy history of the aircraft. With the safety and such as resupplying noncarriers ships (with with advanced detection systems such as cost advantages easy to see, the V-22 should helicopter pads) and long-range overwater integrated defense networks found in China, move to the front of the line for all the Ser- rescue. Despite having only a handful of air- Iran, and North Korea. Since V-22s can be vices in some key areas. craft, the C-2 achieved a logistics advantage based farther away from their targets than The Air Force has been looking because it shared many common parts with alternative systems, troops will be safer for a combat search and rescue (CSAR) the Navy’s early warning and command air- from enemy attack—that is, ships launch- replacement to its HH-60. The Service has craft, the E-2. This meant that the C-2 shared ing V-22s can remain farther away from a small fleet of highly modified H-60s with space for people and parts aboard an aircraft antiship missile launchers. The improved aerial refueling probes, internal fuel tanks, carrier and achieved some economies of defensive systems of the CV-22 also provide advanced navigation systems, improved scale with logistics and training. Because greater security by protecting the troops defensive systems, rescue hoists, and long- the Marine Corps and Air Force are already from ground and air threats as they transit range communication capabilities. As using V-22s, these economies of scale will to and from targets. We have learned that already described, the V-22 is superior to the exist if V-22s take over this mission area, access to bases is increasingly difficult and H-60 in all these areas. And since the Air too. V-22s have established worldwide logis- frequently requires political and military sac- Force has already paid for the development tics chains ashore and afloat. The Marines rifices to secure the basing rights necessary and test costs of these upgrades on the V-22, operate a jointly manned training center in to conduct certain operations. As we face a it could start buying combat-ready aircraft North Carolina training Marine and Air future of more counterterrorist missions such rapidly (although that is not an easy prospect Force aircrew and maintainers. The loss of as the one that killed bin Laden, the United in the current fiscal environment). The commonality with the E-2 will be balanced States may not have readily available bases increased speed of the V-22 also improves by commonality with a larger fleet of Marine next door such as Afghanistan provided. the CSAR force’s chance of arriving within and Air Force V-22s. Should the United States lack that advantage the golden hour—that first hour when the The Army is beginning to focus on for future high-priority missions in areas opportunity to save a life is greatest. A CSAR developing a new, faster helicopter.11 Accord- such as the Pacific Rim or Africa, the V-22 V-22 has more cabin room than an H-60 ing to Major General Anthony Crutchfield, becomes invaluable. The political advantage so a medical team could perform lifesaving director of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 83 FEATURES | V-22 Osprey

Excellence, the Army wants an aircraft that reasonable costs without having to wait years tilt-rotor concept, was no exception. More “flies faster, longer, carries more payload, for new development. lessons can be learned, but with over 100,000 requires a smaller logistical footprint and is flight hours (half of those in the last 2 years), more survivable.”12 The current development Conclusion the V-22 has become safer, cheaper, and more has focused on an aircraft much like the The V-22 has a troubled past that capable than other options for America’s cancelled RAH-66 Comanche, a helicopter- includes crashes, development problems, and troop-carrying role. JFQ type aircraft with a small rear-facing propel- high costs. But the improvements incorpo- ler that pushes the aircraft to faster speeds rated into the modern V-22 have resulted in Notes than current helicopters. One prototype is an unparalleled and enviable safety record 1 Marcus Weisberger, “Where Will Budget already flying, but it has no troop-carrying for a combat aircraft. The V-22 community Ax Fall?” Defense News, January 16, 2012; Jennifer capability. And while this development has continued to strive for safer airplanes Rubin, “Obama Needs a Defense Budget to Match offers new opportunities and capabilities, it and has demonstrated a level of openness His Vision,” The Washington Post, March 29, 2011; is not slated to be ready until 2030, leaving that is refreshing and indicates confidence John Feffer, “One Creature That Deserves Extinc- the Army with a 20-year capability gap. In in its usefulness. After years of criticism tion: The V-22 Osprey,” Foreign Policy in Focus, the interim, the Army could use the V-22 to for being expensive, the V-22 is showing February 25, 2011, available at ; William Hartung, “Libya Makes the with the safety and cost advantages easy to see, the V-22 Case for Lower Military Spending,” HuffingtonPost. should move to the front of the line for all the Services com, March 22, 2011, available at . 2 “Assessment of Impacts of Budget Cuts,” expand the mission set of faster vertical-lift that it is cheaper to buy and operate than letter from House Armed Service Committee aircraft by integrating more weapons and other vertical lift aircraft for the long-range Republican Staff to Chairman Howard “Buck” electronic systems to meet its needs while troop-carrying role. It rapidly became a McKeon, September 22, 2011. it continues to develop its next-generation high-demand asset in Iraq and Afghanistan. 3 Richard Whittle, The Dream Machine: The helicopter. For example, the Army could However, the V-22’s advantages go far beyond Untold History of the Notorious V-22 Osprey (New immediately begin using V-22s for its our current conflicts. It can succeed in mis- York: Simon and Schuster, 2010). medical evacuation mission. In a role that is sions around the world from discrete coun- 4 Bruce Rolfson, “USAF Generals Clash over similar to the Air Force’s CSAR mission, the terterrorist raids to small-scale conflicts to CV-22 Crash,” Defense News, January 10, 2011. 5 advantages are compelling. Once introduced major fights against technologically advanced Mark Thompson, “V-22 Osprey: A Flying to the aviation inventory, the Army could nations. It offers benefits to all of these mis- Shame,” Time, September 26, 2007. 6 Jeremiah Gertler, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Air- then expand the V-22 role into other areas sions with enhancements to the military craft: Background and Issues for Congress, RL31384 planned for future developmental aircraft. principles of mass, maneuver, surprise, secu- (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, This would allow the Army to conduct rity, and simplicity. As DOD and Congress March 10, 2011); Michael J. Sullivan, V-22 Osprey risk-reduction development and evaluation look to manage a burgeoning budget while Aircraft: Assessment Needed to Address Operational of Army-unique equipment, which will maintaining the world’s best military force, and Cost Concerns to Define Future Investment, decrease the time to integrate them on new the V-22 should rise to the top of the list of GAO-09-692T (Washington, DC: Government aircraft. This will mitigate the problems systems needed for today and tomorrow. Accountability Office, June 23, 2009). experienced with the Littoral Combat Tilt-rotor aircraft are not ready to 7 “Egypt—UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters,” Ship (where the Navy has experienced transform aviation, as some have claimed. But Aerospace and Defense News, available at . 8 Marcus Weisberger, “USAF Nears OK for next-generation helicopter requires years of budget from bankrupting the country. It $40M Rescue Helos,” Defense News, September 26, development and testing before beginning to proves itself every day for the Marines and 2011. develop the advanced avionics, using V-22s special operations troops who have come 9 2011 Defense Acquisition Workforce now can accelerate some of those capabilities to rely on it and are developing new ways to Awards, available at . The V-22 offers the military many uses without the need for the lengthy develop- 10 Glenn Walters, “MV-22B Osprey: A Stra- options for many different missions. When it ment and testing of basic aircraft that delay tegic Leap Forward,” Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2nd was first developed, some saw it as the future all new programs and cost billions of dollars. Quarter 2008), 16–19. 11 of all aviation, both military and commercial. All new types of aircraft have experienced Michael Hoffman, “US Army Outlines Next That utopian vision has not come to pass, but development problems as the builders and Vert-Lift Aircraft,” Defense News, April 25, 2011. 12 Ibid. the V-22 does offer some concrete advantages users tried to learn how to fly and use them. right now for each of the Services’ pressing Early fixed-wing aircraft took years to develop aviation needs. In these fiscally challenged into useful machines, as did jets, spacecraft, times, the V-22 offers safe capabilities at and helicopters. The V-22, with its radical

84 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Crewman directs BF-04, a Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II, after vertical landing on USS Wasp, as second F-35 approaches U.S. Navy (Tommy Lamkin) U.S. Navy (Tommy

and The F-35 the Future of Power Projection

By Robbin F. Laird and Edward T. Timperlake

Dr. Robbin F. Laird is a Military and Security Analyst, the co-founder of Second Line of Defense, and a Member of the Editorial Board of Contributors, AOL Defense. The Honorable Edward T. Timperlake is the Editor of Second Line of Defense Forum and former Director of Technology Assessment, International Technology Security, Office of the Secretary of Defense. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 85 FEATURES | The F-35 and the Future of Power Projection

he F-35 is called a joint strike counterair defense missions. It also provides Colonel Dave Berke is becoming a key F-35 fighter (JSF), and its ability a key gap-filler capability between the now squadron commander, but he provided an to work with, leverage, and retired F-117 and the exceptional capabilities interview while at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) T enhance the capability of power of the F-35 against increasingly lethal mobile regarding his experience with the F-22 and how projection forces is at the heart of the next air defense systems. For example, SA-10s and he saw the plane as part of the ongoing revolu- 20 years of rebuilding U.S. and allied forces. SA-20s can be dismantled, moved, and ready tion in re-norming air operations. The “geriatric condition” of U.S. forces and for action in a short time. The trend line is In response to a question about what the past 10 years of ground combat in faraway toward rapid mobility in the adversary’s air the fused sensor experience is all about in areas make it clear that a fundamental defenses, and mobility in this domain means fifth-generation aircraft and how the whole reconstruction is required. Yet much of the that the incoming strike aircraft must be able capability of an aircraft is not really an F series discussion inside the Beltway treats the F-35 as to execute target identification, target acquisi- but a flying combat system, Berke provided if it were simply a tactical aircraft replacement tion, and strike missions virtually simultane- the following explanation: for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps ously. A key aspect of the new fifth-generation fleets. It is really a “flying combat system” aircraft is its onboard machine processing I think you’re hitting the nail on the head with rather than a tactical aircraft, which allows capability, which allows the pilot to perform what the JSF is going to do, but it’s also what the United States and its allies to look at power operations simultaneously that historically the Raptor missions have already morphed projection in a very different way.1 It also required several platforms operating sequen- into. The concept of Raptor employment covers allows the United States and its allies to get the tially. But the limited number of F-22s ensures two basic concepts. You’ve got an antiaccess/ best value out of their forces. that the F-35 will be the dominant fifth-gen- global strike mission; and you have the integra- The F-35 will replace multiple aircraft eration aircraft both in terms of numbers and tion mission as well. And the bottom line is that in the fleet, and by so doing, it will create in its availability in a coalition environment. the integration mission is our bread and butter. significant economies of scale and savings. From the standpoint of thinking through 21st- When I say “us,” I’m talking about the Air The aircraft is 80 percent common across century air operations, the ability of the F-22 Force and the F-22. Most of our expected oper- the fleet, and savings come from software and F-35 to work together and to lead a strike ating environments are going to be integrated.3

As a pilot with significant operational fourth-generation aircraft join the fray as areas of the experience across the legacy fleet, Berke battlefield are cleared of the most lethal threat systems provided insight into how the fifth-generation solution was different: commonality, new approaches to digital force will be central to U.S. core capabilities It’s a major evolution. There’s no question maintenance, and flight-line enhancements for projecting power and will be a crucial role about it. My career has been in F-18s, but I and improvements. Possibly the F-35’s most of the 21st-century Air Force. also flew F-16s for 3 years. I was dual opera- important capability is its ability to combine For the Air Force, the largest stakeholder tional in the Hornet and the Viper when I was information with Aegis systems and other in the F-35, the challenge and opportunity is a TOPGUN instructor. I am now coming up command and control systems operated by to blend the F-22s with the F-35s in creating on 3 years flying Raptors. I was also on carri- allies worldwide. This sharing capability will a “re-normed” concept of air operations. For ers for 4 years, so I’ve done a lot of integration not only enhance combat capability but also example, the F-22 and F-35 will work together with the Navy and a lot of integration with dramatically change the way the United States in supporting air dominance—to “kick in the the Air Force. Three years flying with the Air can work with its allies. This article discusses door” to open the enemy’s battlespace—for the Force has been pretty broadening. several aspects of the change, which is disrup- insertion of a joint power projection force. Here For me, it’s a great experience to see the tive in nature. If the culture of thinking about the F-22 largely provides the initial strike and similarities and difference between the Services. combat does not change, and we think of this guides the initial air dominance operations; the Navy and Marine aviation is very similar. as the next iteration of what the Services will F-35 supports the effort with stealth and sensor USAF aviation is very different in some ways. have for combat aircraft, the entire revolution capabilities able to operate in a distributed I actually was with the Army for a year as FAC will be missed. network, providing strike; intelligence, surveil- [forward air controller] in Iraq as well. So from lance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and capabili- a tactical level, I’ve got a lot of tactical opera- Anticipating the “Re-Norming” ties to suppress enemy air defenses as well as tor experience with all three Services—Navy, Revolution attack shore defenses against maritime projec- Army, and the Air Force. This has been really The F-22 has been deployed for several tion forces. Fourth-generation aircraft join the illuminating for me having the experience with years, and its evolution is having a signifi- fray as areas of the battlefield are cleared of the all of the Services in tactical operations. Obvi- cant impact on rethinking air operations. most lethal threat systems, expediting partici- ously I will draw upon that experience when I The decade or more of deployment prior to pation and increasing survivability by linking fully engage with the JSF. But flying a Raptor, the F-35 will provide a significant impact into the fifth-generation networked situational the left, right, up, down, is just flying; flying on the F-35 and its concept of operations.2 awareness. An excellent insight into the role of is flying. So getting in an airplane and flying The primary task of the F-22 is air-to-air the F-22 in anticipating the F-35 was provided around really is not that cosmic no matter what dominance followed by core competence in by a Marine Corps F-22 pilot. Lieutenant type of airplane you’re sitting in.

86 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Laird and Timperlake

But the difference between a Hornet or So that speaks to an entirely different the technological advance of stealth itself. As a Viper and the Raptor isn’t just the way you not just physical architecture, also personnel Lieutenant General David Deptula, USAF turn or which way you move the jet or what is architecture, but more importantly leadership (Ret.), constantly reminded his Service and the best way to attack a particular problem. paradigm and approach to solving a problem. others, the “F” before the F-22 and the F-35 is The difference is how you think. You work You now are far more able to remove fat somewhat of a misnomer. There are signifi- totally differently to garner situational aware- layers of intermediate data processing and cant generational changes in the way indi- ness [SA] and make decisions; it’s all different you’re able to sic a force of very capable assets vidual combat aircraft and fleets of aircraft in the F-22. With the F-22 and certainly it will on an objective. handle data and can make decisions.7 be the case with the F-35, you’re operating at We’re able dynamically to adapt in the Stealth on this aircraft is a function of a level where you perform several functions middle of that process and make appropriate the manufacturing process; it is not hand built of classic air battle management and that’s a decisions in support of your objective far more into the aircraft and maintained as such. It is whole different experience and a different kind effectively than if you had just sent planes out a characteristic of high-tolerance manufactur- of training. . . . on a specific task.5 ing, and as such, stealth will be maintained in In the Raptor, the data is already fused the field, not in the factory or depot. This is into information thereby providing the situ- In other words, the F-22 has paved the revolutionary in character. ational awareness. SA is extremely high in the way for the F-35, and integrating the F-22 with At the heart of the F-35 is a new F-22 and obviously will be in the JSF; and it’s the F-35 will be a core contribution of the Air comprehensive combat systems enterprise.8 very easy for the pilot to process the SA. Indeed, Force in shaping innovative combat capabili- The F-35 is the first combat aircraft that the processing of data is the key to having high ties for the United States and its allies in the sees completely around itself. The Electro SA and the key to making smart decisions. decade ahead. Both planes are shapers of an Optical Distributed Aperture System (DAS) There’s virtually no data in the F-22 that you entirely new approach to combat capabilities makes this happen, and it allows the opera- have to process; it’s almost all information.4 across the joint and coalition force. tor or the fleet managers to see hundreds of miles away on a 360-degree basis. The Air Force pilots have underscored some The F-35 Is More Than Stealth, More combat system enterprise allows the aircraft of the changes articulated by Berke and have Than a Weapons System to manage the battlespace within this seam- reinforced the need for culture change to get The F-35 joint strike fighter is often less 360-degree space. Unlike legacy aircraft, a different air combat and overall combat defined by its stealth characteristics, and which add systems that have to be managed capability into the Nation’s 21st-century force the debate revolves around whether one by the pilot, the F-35 creates a synergy structure. An interview with three senior needs “a high-end aircraft” or, if one is pes- workspace where the core combat systems Air Force pilots at Langley AFB in late 2010 simistic, whether “stealth is really stealthy.” work interactively to create functional underscored the significance of the change. The pilots—Lieutenant Colonel Damon Anthony, Major James Akers, and Lieutenant integrating the F-22 with the F-35 will be a core contribution of Colonel Steve Pieper—provided an under- the Air Force in shaping innovative combat capabilities for the standing of how classic combat operations United States and its allies built around the use of Airborne Warning and Control Systems and the Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC) will be modified as Although interesting, such discussions miss outcomes; for example, jamming can be new aircraft reshape operational capabilities. the point. Stealth is an enabler for this air- performed by the overall systems, not just by As Lieutenant Colonel Pieper put it: craft, not its central definition. As a Marine a dedicated electronic warfare system. F-18 pilot put it: The F-35 is a flying combat system inte- I think the most difficult and the most painful grator and in a different historical epoch than set of shifts will be organizational. They will I would say low observability is a capability the F-15s, F-18s, and F-16s. The 360-degree relate to the people who are now forced to set or is an asset to the platform, but the plat- capability, coupled with the combat system relinquish operational strategic decisions to form as a whole brings a lot by itself. There enterprise, explains these historic differences folks like us in the room, which has always are situations where low observability will be on a per plane basis. The ability of the new been the case. very important to the mission set that you’re aircraft to shape distributed air operations So tactical decisions have always had operating in. And then there will be situations collectively is another historic change that the operational strategic and national impact. where the ISR package or the imaging package United States and its allies need to make, espe- The difference is that organizationally, we’ll be that comes with that aircraft, the ability to cially with the growing missile, air defense, forced to reconcile that notion, and understand see things, will be more important; that will and offensive air capabilities in the global that the individual who’s charged with those change based on the mission set and how you market space and battlespace. The legacy tactical decisions will now have the kind of define the mission.6 combat aircraft have added new combat sub- information that was previously only available systems over a 30-year period. These evolved nearly fused but far more imperfectly fused Moreover, one of the challenges facing aircraft and their new subsystems are additive, in the CAOC. That information will now be the F-35 is that it is often described using iterative, and sequential. The resulting config- distributed in the battlespace. historical aviation words, generally obscuring urations are built over the core foundational ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 87 FEATURES | The F-35 and the Future of Power Projection Courtesy (Paul Weatherman)

F-35A Lightning II over Rogers Dry Lakebed, Edwards Air Force Base

aircraft. All of the legacy U.S. aircraft with the and identification). This is a flexible radio from the ground up to be an EW aperture for latest modifications, when offered for foreign frequency system that enables the aircraft to electronic protection, electronic support, which sale, were rejected in India’s fighter competi- operate against a variety of threats. The other is sensing, passive ops, and electronic attack.9 tion for the much newer European fighters, core combat systems, which interact to create the Eurofighter and Rafale. the combat systems enterprise, are the Active A way to look at the cross-functionality The F-35 was built with a foundation Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, of the combat systems is to think past the that allows interactivity across the combat DAS, Electrical Optical Targeting System narrow focus of additive systems. A system systems, permitting the forging of a combat (EOTS), and electronic warfare (EW) system. is added to do a task. The pilot needs to use system enterprise managed by the computer As Pete Bartos, a former Strike Eagle Pilot that system to manage the task. With the F-35 on the aircraft. Said another way, F-35 core now with Northrop Grumman, put it: interactive systems, the pilot will perform combat systems are interactive with one a function without caring which system is another, creating a synergistic outcome and When this plane was designed, the avionics actually executing the mission. For example, capability rather than providing an additive- suite from the ground up, the designers looked for electronic warfare, including cyber, he segmented tool. The aircraft’s systems are at the different elements that can be mutually could be using the EOTS, EW system, or built on a physical link, namely, a high- supporting as one of the integration tenets. AESA radar. The pilot really does not care, speed data bus built on high-speed fiber For example, the radar didn’t have to do and the interactivity among the systems optical systems. To provide a rough com- everything; the Electrical Optical Targeting creates a future evolution whereby synergy parison, legacy aircraft are communicating System didn’t have to do everything. And they among the systems creates new options over a dial-up modem compared to the F-35 were designed together. and possibilities. Furthermore, the system system, which is equivalent to a high-speed Fusion is the way to leverage the other rests on an upgradable computer with chip broadband system. The new data bus and sensors’ strengths. To make up for any weak- replacement, allowing generational leaps in high-speed broadband are the facilitators of nesses, perhaps in the field of regard or a computational power. this fully integrated data-sharing environ- certain mode, a certain spectrum, with each The F-35 provides a flexible architecture ment on the aircraft. While legacy aircraft of the sensor building blocks, they were all similar to a smart phone. With the F-35, we have had similar subsystems, integration designed to be multifunction avionics. define a synergy space to draw on the menu of was far less mature. For example, the AESA is an MFA—a applications. And the F-35 combat systems are Connected to the other combat multifunction array. It has, of course, the built to permit open-ended growing capabil- systems via the high-speed data bus is the standard air-to-air modes, the standard air-to- ity. In mathematical analogies, we are describ- CNI system (communications, navigation, ground modes. But in addition, it’s really built ing something that can create battlespace

88 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Laird and Timperlake

“fractals,” notably with a joint force able to command, control, communications, comput- and jamming side of the equation, which the execute distributed operations. The aircraft is ers, ISR, and his resultant decisionmaking Prowler guys think about. And you have the a facilitator of a more robust combat environ- (C4ISR-D) and employment or action. From multi-role approach of the F-18 guys.11 ment than was available with legacy aircraft Boyd’s theory, we know that victory in the and command and control. This change air or, for that matter, anywhere in combat is What General Davis discussed con- requires pilots to rethink how to operate. F-35 dependent on the speed and accuracy of the cerning the new pilot culture is shaped in performance and its pilot allow a revolution combatant in making a decision. The better large part by bringing EW into the cockpit. along the information axis of combat, or what support the pilot in a combat aircraft receives The Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics might be identified as the “z-axis.” from his information systems, the better the Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1) is currently working combat engagement outcome. The advantage to shape that new pilot culture. MAWTS-1 Operating on the Z-axis: Shaping a New goes to the better information enabled. Pilots pilots and trainers are looking at the impact Pilot Culture have always known this, but the revolution- of the V-22 and F-35 on the changes in The design characteristics blended ary fifth generation, designed in C4ISR-D, tactics and training generated by the new together prior to the F-35 have been constantly requires a similar advancement in how pilots aircraft. MAWTS-1 is taking a much older improving range, payload (improved by approach their work. curriculum and adjusting it to the realities system and weapons carried), maneuverability In addition, today’s industrial learning of the impact of the V-22 and the anticipated (measured by “P Sub s”), useful speed, and curve to improve sensors, system capability, impact of the F-35. range (modified by VSTOL [vertical short and weapons carried is likely flatter than MAWTS-1 is highly interactive with the takeoff and landing]—a plus factor). The F-35 that required to build another airframe, and various centers of excellence such as Nellis is also designed with inherent survivability it may be a new American way of industrial AFB, Eglin AFB, and the Navy/Marine test factors; first, redundancy and hardening, surging.10 The U.S. arsenal of democracy community at Pax River, as well as the United and then stealth. Stealth is usually seen as the may be shifting from an industrial produc- Kingdom, in shaping F-35 transition. In fact, fifth-generation improvement. Nevertheless, tion line to a clean room and a computer the advantage of having a common fleet will reducing the F-35 to a linear x-y axis improve- lab as key shapers of competitive advantage. be to provide for significant advances in cross- ment or to stealth misses the point. The F-35 is This progress can be best seen in move- Service training and evolutions in concepts taking technology into a revolutionary three- ment out the z-axis. The Air Force F-22 of operations. Additionally, the fact that dimensional situational awareness capability. pilot community has been experiencing this MAWTS-1 is studying the way the Air Force This capability establishes a new vector for revolution for some time, and their lessons trains combat pilots to fly the F-16 in shaping TacAir (tactical air) aircraft design. This can learned are being incorporated into a pilot’s the Marine F-35B Training and Readiness be measured on a z-axis. F-35 training. Learning from those experi- Manual is a testimony to a joint-Service Traditionally, the two dimensional ences as well as those of the legacy fleet, the approach. This is extremely important in how depiction is that the x-axis is time and the y-axis is performance and captures individual airplanes that tend to cluster in the better support the pilot in a combat aircraft receives from his generation improvement. Each aircraft clus- information systems, the better the combat engagement outcome tered in a “generation” is a combination of improvements. Essentially, the aeronautical design “art” of blending together ever improv- Marine Corps recognizes that a new pilot MAWTS-1 addresses the future. An emerging and evolving technology eventually culture will emerge because of operating on ing approach may well be to take functions creates improvements in a linear fashion. The the z-axis. General Jon Davis, 2nd Marine and then to redesign the curriculum around F-35 is not a linear performance enhance- Aircraft Wing commander, underscored those functions. For example, the inherent ment over legacy or fourth-generation fighter that three pilot cultures are being rolled into capabilities of the emerging F-35 C4ISR-D aircraft. When we consider information and a very new one. The commander linked this cockpit with 360-degree SA may turn out with the speed at which it can be collected, fused, to generational change: appropriately designed data links to be a force presented, and acted on in the combat envi- multiplier in the tactical employment of the ronment, those who possess this advanced The F-35B is going to provide the USMC MV-22 Osprey and the helicopter community, decision capability will have a clear advantage. aviator cultures in our Harriers, Hornets and and reach back to Navy combat forces afloat.12 While this is not a new concept, having Prowlers to coalesce and I think to shape an been originally conceived in John Boyd’s innovative new launch point for the USMC avi- Northern Edge 2011 famous OODA (observe, orient, decide, and ation community. We are going to blend three The F-35 can be understood as a combat act) loop, the information dimension of outstanding communities. Each community aircraft that can operate and manage combat combat aircraft design now is so important has a slightly different approach to problem- space within a 360-degree radius for more that it forces us to gauge the value of such a solving. You’ve got the expeditionary basing than 800 miles. A recent operational test weapons system along the z-axis, which is the that the Harrier guys are bringing to you. You of the F-35 radar and the DAS occurred in pilot’s cockpit OODA loop axis. This OODA have the electronic warfare side of the equa- Northern Edge 2011, a joint and combined loop ability is measured as the combined tion and the high-end fight that the Prowler exercise that serves as a focal point for the capability the pilot gains from integrated guys think about and the [communications] restructuring of U.S. power projection forces. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 89 FEATURES | The F-35 and the Future of Power Projection

As the results from the exercise are evaluated, Until proven otherwise, America still has the provided a logistical linchpin that allowed military leadership and program managers most capable EW and, to use an older phrase, the ARG to stay on station and the Harri- should be able to make a definitive judgment ECCM (electronic counter-countermeasures) ers to create greater sortie generation rates on the way ahead for the program now, not in fighting force in the world. So being tactically and quicker operations tempo. The use of some distant future. In both Northern Edge “validated” in an American-designed exercise the Osprey in the operation underscored 2009 and 2011, the air combat baseline was is the gold standard. Northern Edge exercises the game-changing possibilities of the ARG being re-normed and the limitations of legacy provide operational—not test—environments. in littoral operations in the future. The key aircraft were well highlighted when compared Block 2 is ready for Marine F-35B initial point is that the sea base, which in effect is to newer systems. Northern Edge validated, operational capability. In 2009, Block 2 was represented by the ARG, can provide a very in real time, the ability of American and soon the first improvement up the z-axis, and pilots flexible strike package. Given their proxim- allied TacAir fleets to give total concurrent from MAWTS (the Marine equivalent of ity to shore, the Harriers could operate with SA to each combat pilot. In a robust jamming TOPGUN) are paying close attention. Block significant sortie rates against enemy forces. operating environment, the F-35 radar and 3—the next step up the z-axis—demonstrated Not only could they come and go rapidly, but the information they obtained with their LITENING pods could be delivered to their the use of the Osprey underscored the game-changing ship and be processed and used to inform the possibilities of the ARG in littoral operations next strike package. Commanders did not need a long command and control or C4ISR chain to inform combat. This meant that DAS separated themselves from the pack and that the radar worked effectively in sea surface Muammar Qadhafi’s ground forces would not have initiated a new era in thinking about search and ship target track. If American have moved far from the last positions Harri- combat operations. TacAir forces afloat can see an enemy, they ers noted before the new Harriers moved into As an F-35 joint program office release will kill that enemy. Block 4 is the next step attack positions.15 underscores, this is not only about the up for “Three Dimensional Warriors” and This combination of compressed C4ISR ability of airpower to operate in a robust a z-axis cockpit. A fighter pilot knowledge- and sortie rates created a deadly combination EW environment in which cyber conflict able about Northern Edge, when asked about for enemy forces and underscored that using is a key dimension, but it is also about the DAS, stated that it had a feature of “passive sea bases in a compressed strike package had ability of an airborne capability to support ranging.” When asked what that meant, he clear advantages over land-based aircraft still maritime operations: casually remarked, “Shooting people off your several hours from the fight and dependent on tail and all that stuff.”14 C4ISR coming from hundreds or even thou- This year provided an opportunity to observe sands of miles away. One more point about the performance of the F-35 JSF systems in Operating Differently: A Peek into the the ARG’s operations is that the Osprey and multiple robust electronic warfare scenarios. Future Harrier worked together closely to enhance The AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned Rediscovered operationally during combat capabilities. One aspect of this was array radar and AN/AAQ-37 distributed recent maneuvers off the shores of Libya is the ability of the Ospreys to bring parts and aperture system were mounted aboard what the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)— support elements to the Harriers. Instead of Northrop Grumman’s BAC 1-11 test aircraft. what we prefer to call the “agile response waiting for ships to bring parts, or for much Making its debut, the AN/AAQ-37 DAS group”—can do with transformational slower legacy rotorcraft to fly them out, the demonstrated spherical situational awareness aircraft. The aircraft in this case was the Osprey, traveling at 300 miles per hour, could and target tracking capabilities. The DAS is Osprey, but the Osprey paired with the F-35B bring parts from land bases to keep up with designed to simultaneously track multiple air- will make the Gator Navy not just a troop the Harrier’s operations tempo.16 craft in every direction, which has never been carrier but a capital ship. It is harder to find The highly visible pilot rescue mission seen in an air combat environment. a greater value proposition than adding the certainly underscored how a vertically A return participant, the AN/APG-81 F-35B to the fleet and turning amphibious launched aircraft working with the Osprey AESA, demonstrated robust electronic “tigers” into air combat “lions.” The ARG off of the ARG can create new capabilities. protection, electronic attack, passive maritime is experiencing fundamental change, with The elapsed time of authorization to the and experimental modes, and data-linked air new ships and new planes providing new recovery of a pilot and his return to the USS and surface tracks to improve legacy fighter sit- capabilities, and these new capabilities are Kearsarge was 43 minutes. This rescue took uational awareness. It also searched the entire congruent with recent Libyan operational place even though the Air Force had a rescue 50,000 square-mile Gulf of Alaska operating experiences. Given the Marines’ battle hymn, helicopter aboard USS Ponce. It was not used area for surface vessels, and accurately detected it seems that “the shores of Tripoli” can have for two reasons: It would have gotten to the and tracked them in minimal time.13 a whole new meaning for the evolution of the pilot much later than an Osprey team, and the U.S. force structure. command and control would have been much The C4ISR-D capability in each cockpit The ARG was used in several unprec- slower than what the Marines could deliver.17 takes the F-35 out of the linear fifth-genera- edented ways in the Libyan operation. First, The key to the Marines’ command and tion development path. The F-35 radar was the V-22 Osprey was a key element of chang- control was that the pilots of the Ospreys and validated in a tactically relevant environment. ing how U.S. forces operated. The Osprey Harriers planned the operation together in

90 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Laird and Timperlake

having bases forward-deployed, the Nation has core assets that, if networked together, are capable of making significant gains possible. Scalability is the crucial glue to making a honeycomb force possible. That is why a Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force common fleet is the crucial glue. And when “Aegis becomes my wingman” or “the SSGN [guided missile

U.S. Air Force (Ashley M. Wright) U.S. Air Force submarines] becomes the ARG fire support” through the F-35 C4ISR-D systems, a combat and cultural revolution is both possible and necessary. Basing becomes transformed as allied and U.S. capabilities become blended into a scalable presence and engagement capability. Presence is rooted in basing; scalability is inherently doable because of C4ISR enablement, deployed decisionmaking, and honeycomb robustness. The reach from Japan to South Korea to Singapore to Australia is about how allies are reshaping their forces and working toward greater reach and capabilities. For example, USAF officer “flies” the 33rd Fighter Wing by shaping a defense strategy, which is not mission rehearsal trainer for the F-35 simply a modern variant of Sitzkreig in South Lightning II during demonstration Korea and Japan, more mobile assets such as the F-35 allow states in the region to reach out, back, and up to craft coalition capabilities. In the case of South Korea, instead of strengthening relatively static ground capabilities, shaping a mobile engagement force allows for better South Korean defense as well as better regional capabilities to deal with myriad challenges likely to unfold in the decades ahead. The introduction of F-35As into the Air Force and Republic of Korea (ROK) wings the ready room of USS Kearsarge. They did the Osprey—significant combat insertion deployed to South Korea can set innovations not meet in virtual space. They exchanged capability for ground forces along with rapid in motion that can help U.S. and ROK forces information in real time and were in the same withdrawal capability. redesign and improve defense capability room. They could look at the briefing materi- within the Korean Peninsula while allowing als together. The Harriers were informed by Honeycombing the Pacific: Crafting ROK capabilities to play a greater role within fresh intelligence aboard the Kearsarge. The Scalable Forces the region. South Korea could be an ideal sea base brought together the assets and intel- A new Pacific strategy can be built area to shape a new concept-of-operations ligence to execute the mission. The Marines in part around the cultural revolution that approach. North Korea has a large but linear used their land base largely to supply the the new F-35 engenders in interconnecting force. By basing F-35As in South Korea, a sea-based air operations via Ospreys. Second, capabilities through the C4ISR-D enable- nonlinear combat system is inserted. And the having the C4ISR forward-deployed with the ment strategy. No platform fights alone, and United States can bring F-22s from Guam. It pilot as the key decisionmaker is crucial to shaping a honeycomb approach where force would then have multiple vectors to confuse mission success. structure is shaped appropriately to the local enemies about its military planning and The Navy–Marine Corps team has a problem but can reach back to provide capa- disrupt any kind of attempted linear attack. number of new capabilities being deployed bilities beyond a particular area of interest Introducing the F-35As into South or acquired that will enhance its ability to within the honeycomb is key. The strategy Korea will generate a whole new approach to perform such operations. The F-35B will give is founded on having platform presence. By linking C4ISR into a more effective deployable the Marines an integrated electronic warfare deploying such assets as those of the U.S. force. As former Secretary of the Air Force and C4ISR capability. The new landing Coast Guard (for example, the National Michael Wynne emphasized: platform docks have significant command Security Cutter—or Navy surface platforms and control capabilities. The new Littoral such as Aegis, LCS, or other surface assets) The gains are really if you have a distributed Combat Ship could provide—along with and by deploying sub-Service assets and shooter set, it’s chaos to start with because the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 91 FEATURES | The F-35 and the Future of Power Projection

North Koreans have a very linear plan. In the artillery exchange, it was a very linear plan. In the points of crossings on the borders, it’s a very linear plan. The placement of their artil- Lockheed Martin lery pieces in the mountains depicts a very linear thinking on their part. And what they can’t stand and I don’t think they have the citizenry support to actually stand [is] a nonlinear solution set. So it will cause us to essentially rethink our whole game plan because it has to involve the surrounding terrain, the surrounding military where frankly we have to show the Chinese that we’re not planning on invading them and we will stop at the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter test launches from steam North Korean border. Korea is after all the catapult for carrier suitability at NAS Patuxent River last vestige of Yalta.18

The recent decision by Japan to buy the F-35A is a significant move forward in shaping a new Pacific approach and capability. During President Barack Obama’s recent allies to draw on its support when they work The Japanese understand the opportunity to visit to Darwin, Australia, the opportunity with Australia on regional security missions. leverage the F-35 combat systems enterprise, provided by commonality across the F-35 fleet Second, Australia has the large territory and that is a key reason why the Japanese was highlighted by the possibility of build- necessary for Asian F-35 fleets to train. The down-selected the aircraft. The Japanese—a ing a hub in Darwin for sustainment of an F-35 is not a replacement tactical aircraft; it key Aegis partner—also understand the sig- allied fleet as well as ISR sharing for common is new flying combat system that will need nificant opportunity provided by integrating decisionmaking. Darwin’s strategic location significant training territory for pilots to learn the Aegis with the F-35. Combining the Aegis could become a hub of Pacific operations for how to use all of its capabilities. As an aircraft with the F-35 means joining their sensors for Australia and a place to visit for its core allies. that has EW built in, training to do cyber and wide-area coverage. Because of a new genera- Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and the United EW ops is important. As a fifth-generation tion of weapons on the F-35 and the ability to States could all become key members of an aircraft, its ability to engage “aggressors” and operate a broad wolf pack of air and sea capa- Australia-based and Australian-run F-35 hub. to “defeat” air defense assets requires enough bilities, the JSF can perform as the directing Australia rightly wishes to preserve its space to operate as well. Instrumented train- point for combat action. With the Aegis and independence in being a partner in flying the ing ranges over Australia and the contiguous its new SM-3 missiles, the F-35 can leverage F-35. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) ocean are invaluable for building the necessary a sea-based missile to expand its strike area. is joining a fleet of aircraft—F-35 As, Bs, and skills to deter any aggressor. As an added Together, the F-35 and Aegis significantly Cs—that can be deployed to Australia for benefit, Australia will gain substantial revenue expand the defense of land and sea bases. training, from bases in Singapore, South Korea, from allies when its training facilities are used. The commonality across the combat and Japan, and off U.S. ships and U.S. Air Force With the logistics facilities and the training systems of the F-35’s three variants provides a air bases in the Pacific. The entire allied team facilities, the F-35 could gain significant cash notable advantage. Aegis is a pilot’s wingman can draw upon Australian air modernization for Australia’s military modernization efforts. whether he is flying an F-35A, B, or C. Eighty to shape new capabilities for Australia and Third, the F-35 is a significant ISR asset. percent of the F-35s in the Pacific are likely to diversify support for the F-35 multinational The Aussies can build ISR collection facilities be F-35As, many of them coalition aircraft. fleet. The RAAF can go from being on its that can leverage the entire allied fleet of F-35s Therefore, building an F-35 and Aegis global forward deployed airfield to becoming a hub operating in a regional security setting. They enterprise provides coverage and capability for the F-35 fleet in several ways. can use such facilities to shape an approach to across the Pacific, which is essential for the First, given the significant commonality link other allied ISR assets to establish a hon- defense of Japan. among the three types of F-35s, a logistics and eycomb network or grid along the Pacific Rim. Moreover, the commonality of the fleet support hub can be based in the Northern If each element of the deployed hon- allows hubs to be built in the region support- Territories. The differences among naval air eycomb can reach out, up, and back for ing common operations, shaping convergent and air force air are significantly blurred by weapons, which can be directed by the z-axis capabilities. The distributed character of allied the commonality of the F-35s. This means of the F-35, a significant jump in capability, forces in the region as well as the connectivity that specific support for the As, Bs, and Cs survivability, flexibility, and lethality can which the F-35 allows as an interdependent could be generated. Based on the earnings be achieved. A scalable structure allows for flying combat system diversifies capabilities from a logistics hub, Australia will be able an economy of force. Presence and engage- with which a core adversary would have to to pay for a significant part of its own fleet ment in various local cells of the honeycomb cope. Reducing concentration of forces and modernization. And a hub is not a permanent may well be able to deal with whatever the targets is a significant enhancer of deterrence. base. As an on-call service facility, it enables problem in that vector might be. Moreover,

92 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Laird and Timperlake remembering that in the era of Black Swans, Fortunately, the country is already build- 11 “‘The Future Is Now’: Clearing the Decks for one is not certain where the next “crisis” or ing these new systems and is in a position the ‘iPad-Generation Pilots’: An Interview with Jon “engagement” might be. By being part of a to shape an effective transition to a more M. Davis,” in The F-35 Maintenance Revolution, 11. 12 For a look at the thinking of Marines at honeycomb, the U.S. or allied force can be affordable power projection capability. At Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron part of a greater whole. the heart of the approach is to move from the 1 (MAWTS-1) on the new opportunities inherent in the aircraft and new concepts of operations, see Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and the United States “Preparing for the F-35B Transition: MAWTS Re- Shapes its Curriculum,” SLD.com, October 20, 2011, could all become key members of an Australia-based and available at . 13 Tracey Saiki, “Continued Testing of F-35 JSF Sensors a Success at Northern Edge 2011,” F-35 This means that the goal is not to deploy platform-centric focus, where the cost of a Lightning II Press Release, June 27, 2011. 14 more than we need to perform to the task. new product is considered the debate point, Edward T. Timperlake, “The Northern Edge Difference: Re-Structuring the Strategic Debate,” Vulnerability is reduced, risk management is to the inherent value of new systems and SLD.com, August 31, 2011, available at . We do not have to deploy a Carrier Battle tion of how the new platforms work with one 15 “The Role of the Osprey in Operation Group or multiple air wings when an ARG another to shape the collaborative concept Odyssey Dawn,” SLD.com, September 22, 2011, is enough. By leveraging the new platforms, of operations and capabilities is central to a available at . F-35 across the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, 16 “The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and allied fleets, a new Pacific strategy can Notes and Libya: Shrinking ‘The Average Commute’: be built. This strategy meets the needs of this An Interview With Colonel Mark Desens, 1 Robbin F. Laird, “Embrace the Airpower Rev- th century and the centrality of allied capabilities, Commander of the 26 MEU,” SLD.com, Sep- olution,” Defense News, February 21, 2011, 61; and tember 5, 2011, available at . dealt largely with asymmetric adversaries with for JSF,” Defense News, September 4, 2006, 21. 17 “The Execution of the TRAP limited power projection tools. 2 Robbin F. Laird, A 21st-Century Concept of Mission over Libya: An Interview with Air and Military Operations, Defense Horizons 66 Major Debardeleben,” SLD.com, September The Way Ahead (Washington, DC: NDU Press, March 2009). 27, 2011, available at . its capabilities, the United States and its allies Cockpit: An Interview with Dave Berke,” in “Re- 18 Michael W. Wynne, “F-35As to Korea: can build the next phase of power projection Norming” Air Operations (Arlington, VA: Second Shaping a Defense Transition,” SLD.com, November within affordable limits. U.S. forces need Line of Defense [SLD], 2010), 42. 22, 2011, available at . An Interview with Damon Anthony et al.,” in “Re- deal with evolving global realities. Protecting Norming” Air Operations, 48–49. access points (the global conveyer of goods 6 “Shaping an Economy of Force,” in The F-35 and services), ensuring an ability to work Maintenance Revolution (Arlington, VA: SLD, with global partners in having access to com- 2010), 14. modities, shaping insertion forces that can 7 “A New Paradigm for Manned and pursue terrorist elements wherever necessary, Unmanned Systems,” in “Re-Norming” Air Opera- and partnering with global players all require tions, 79–82. a reinforced maritime and air capability. 8 See Robbin F. Laird et al., “Enabling Three This is thus a priority for all Services in the Dimensional Warriors,” in Three Dimensional reconfiguring effort. Balanced force structure Warriors (Arlington, VA: SLD, 2009), 36–49; and Robbin F. Laird, “A Key Foundational Element for reduction makes no sense because the force ‘Re-Norming’: The F-35 Combat System Enter- structure was redesigned for land wars that prise,” in “Re-Norming” Air Operations, 60–62. the Nation will not take on in the decade 9 “Shaping the F-35 Combat System Enterprise,” ahead. The U.S. Army can be recast by the SLD.com, March 22, 2011, available at . capabilities and competencies. 10 Edward T. Timperlake, “The United States Retiring older Service systems, vs. USSR: TacAir Lessons Learned from a ‘Hot’ which are logistical money hogs and high Cold War,” in “Re-Norming” Air Operations, 8–17; maintenance, can shape affordability. Core and Edward T. Timperlake, “The F-35B in the Per- new systems can be leveraged to shape a spective of Aviation History,” in Three Dimensional pull rather than a push transition strategy. Warriors, 2–3. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 93 BOOK REVIEWS

place among these eventual planning power What is most amazing is that the ana- brokers (for example, Kuznets, Hopkins, lysts determined the most plausible landing Nelson, Knox, Knudsen, Nathan, and date 3 days before the United States entered General Somervell), which was complicated the war. In the end, Lacey professes that it by the number of their diverging person- was economists supporting the WPB, led alities and agendas, all working toward a by economic mastermind Simon Kuznets, common endstate but often visualizing dif- supported by statistical work led by Stacy ferent ways and means to achieve it. Interwo- May, who ultimately determined the victory ven throughout are the philosophical debates program and when the Normandy landing Keep From All Thoughtful Men: that took place, such as those addressing would take place. How U.S. Economists Won World War II funding, sourcing, and mobilization require- The work involved in gaining industry’s By James G. Lacey ments, and how much of the U.S. economy collective and collaborative support for the Naval Institute Press, 2011 would have to be directly committed to war effort is another of the many interesting 280 pp. $34.95 support the war effort. Also included are the insights provided. Memories of being forced ISBN: 978-1-59114-491-5 conversations addressing assistance require- to expand production capacity in support of ments in support of Great Britain’s and the World War I, only to have to subsequently and Reviewed by Soviet Union’s war efforts. significantly scale back at great expense after DAVID A. ANDERSON The industry-by-industry assessment of the war, made industry very apprehensive and U.S. production capacity, led by statistician fearful of a similar fate. ames Lacey, a scholar of strategy and Stacy May, and the mobilization analysis, led A unique feature of the book is its national security studies, writes a fas- by Simon Kuznets, was instrumental to the appendices, which contain all the historical Jcinating book detailing the evolution fruitfulness of these discussions. They came documents that support the author’s argu- of the munitions plan (victory program) in to several notable conclusions. They deter- ment. These documents include Wedemey- support of the U.S. war effort to defeat the mined that the military had underestimated er’s victory program, Kuznets first feasibility Axis powers during World War II. The author its budgetary needs by some 50 percent. The study, and General Somervell’s written asserts that the magnitude of this undertak- country would run out of production capac- comments regarding the recommendations ing, necessitating extensive industrial mobili- ity long before it ran out of money to finance in the feasibility study. The book’s short zation of the U.S. economy, made World War munitions production. America needed to title derives from one of the many deroga- II the “economist’s war.” Lacey supports his shift large segments of the labor force from tory comments made by Somervell toward thesis by chronologically covering the major one geographical location to another to Kuznets’s feasibility study results. The reader events and activities that led to the plan’s meet military output objectives. President will find these documents valuable through- acceptance and execution. Roosevelt’s “must have” munitions were in out his reading of the book. The author first dispels the widely held direct conflict with the Nation’s production Lacey has meticulously researched an belief that Major Albert Wedemeyer, USA capacity. Diverting/creating added produc- inherently complex topic and crafted it in (later, Lieutenant General), was the origina- tion capacity to meet the President’s require- a concise and engaging way. This book is a tor of the victory program. Lacey carefully ment would adversely affect overall force must-read for 20th-century military historians, discredits historians, and Wedemeyer himself, capabilities and delay any possible landing strategists, national security studies academ- through credible scholarly forensics. He does on European soil to defeat Germany. The ics, and students. Also valuable is the author’s note that Wedemeyer proposed a plan, as he country could commit up to half of its eco- chapter in The Shaping of Grand Strategy claimed; however, it was not the one embraced nomic capacity in support of the war effort (Cambridge University Press, 2011), which he by his superiors, let alone the Franklin D. without adversely affecting the short- and/ coedited. It directly complements this note- Roosevelt administration. In fact, Lacey shows or long-term well-being of the economy. This worthy body of work. JFQ the plan to be outright wrong anyway. would be necessary to avert a protracted Lacey subsequently describes the trials war. (The author further dispels the notion Lieutenant Colonel David A. Anderson, USMC (Ret.), and tribulations of military and civilian that the American public had to make great DBA, is a Professor of Strategic Studies and the leaders as they organized and prepared the sacrifices in support of the war.) Finally, the Odom Chair of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Nation for war—progressing from a humble United States would be incapable of sustain- Staff College. ad hoc working group into the powerful War ing a European landing force able to defeat Production Board (WPB). He includes in this Germany before May 1944. History proved discussion the complex dialogue that took them astonishingly accurate.

94 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu BOOK REVIEWS

The contributors to The Shaping of politics on strategy, and the importance of Grand Strategy examine Louis XIV’s France; individual leadership to the success or failure Britain during the Seven Years’ War; Otto of grand strategy. von Bismarck’s Prussia and Germany; Britain Britain’s strategic focus shifted to impe- in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; Britain rial issues as a result of the Seven Years’ War in the 1930s and the early years of World War and the struggle with France for control of II; the United States in World War II; and the North America. Its grand strategy in the years United States in the early Cold War years. immediately before World War I changed from As Richard Hart Sinnreich points out in his the “splendid isolation” of an offshore balancer The Shaping of Grand Strategy: concluding essay, these case studies reveal no to a strategic commitment to continental allies Policy, Diplomacy, and War “patterns” of grand strategy—no precise theo- in the face of a growing German geopoliti- Edited by Williamson Murray, Richard Hart ries to explain why some strategies succeed cal threat. Later, the horrors of World War Sinnreich, and James Lacey and others fail. There are simply too many I produced British leaders in the 1930s who Cambridge University Press, 2011 variables and too much plain luck involved. sought to avoid war at almost any cost. When 283 pp. $27.99 Sinnreich quotes Bismarck on this subject: appeasement of Hitler failed, Britain turned to ISBN: 978-0-521-15633-2 “Man cannot create the current of events. He Winston Churchill, whose grasp of history and can only float with it and steer” (p. 254). understanding of the nature of Adolf Hitler’s Reviewed by Louis XIV succeeded in making France totalitarian challenge helped him formulate FRANCIS P. SEMPA the predominant power in Europe in the late and implement a grand strategy—husbanding 17th and early 18th centuries, explains John A. British resources, seeking aid from and an alli- reat powers pursue national objec- Lynn II, but his quest for absolute security ance with the United States, and allying with tives and promote and protect and his unilateral foreign policies produced Joseph Stalin’s Russia—that saved Britain and Gnational security interests by means concerted opposition among other European defeated the German threat, but alas, could not of grand strategy. This sounds obvious and powers and nearly bankrupted France. Louis’s save the British Empire. simple enough, but as Carl von Clausewitz grand strategy embroiled his country in wars The final case studies, by James Lacey wrote of war, in selecting and implementing for 51 of the 72 years he occupied the throne. and Colin Gray, examine how Franklin D. grand strategies, even the most simple things France increased its continental possessions, Roosevelt and his military chiefs devised a are difficult. That is the common thread that but at far too high a cost. successful grand strategy for global war by links the nine insightful essays collected by Louis’s grand strategy stands in stark prioritizing the defeat of Germany, invading Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, contrast to that of Otto von Bismarck, who North Africa, Sicily, then Italy, delaying the and James Lacey in The Shaping of Grand skillfully steered the Prussian/German ship of invasion of France until 1944, conducting a Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War. state during the mid to late 19th century. “No two-pronged war against Japan in the Pacific, As Williamson Murray notes in the statesman ever adjusted war to policy with a and insisting on the unconditional surrender opening essay, there is no neat, precise defini- nicer judgment than Bismarck,” wrote Halford of the Axis powers while, after the war, Harry tion of grand strategy. “The closer one comes Mackinder. As Marcus Jones notes in his essay, S. Truman and his talented advisors repeatedly to understanding what it entails, the more one Bismarck waged three short and successful made the right decisions to contain the Soviet sees how complex and uncertain in histori- wars, attained Prussian predominance through geopolitical threat by “the purposeful building, cal terms are the aspects that encompass its a united German Empire in the center of in succession, of the economic . . . political, and making and use” (p. 5). Grand strategy is Europe, and then formed alliances with other . . . military tiers of Western Security between affected by a nation’s geographical position, great powers that maintained general peace. 1945 and 1953” (pp. 233–234). historical context, the nature of its govern- Bismarck, unlike Louis, did not seek absolute When all is said and done, these case ment, and the character and capabilities of its security nor act unilaterally on the international studies show that a successful grand strategy leaders, and it encompasses political, social, stage. Instead, after 1871, Bismarck “was at pains depends on the wisdom and character of economic, and military realities. “No theoreti- to demonstrate that Germany was a satiated military and political leaders and their under- cal construct, no set of abstract principles, no state, without ambitions or intentions against standing of history as a useful but imperfect political science model,” Murray writes, “can her neighbors or territories abroad” (p. 105). guide to navigate the ship of state. JFQ capture its essence” (p. 11). Jones attributes Bismarck’s success as a strategist The essence of grand strategy can only to his “nuanced grasp” of political realities, his Francis P. Sempa is the author of Somewhere be understood by historical examples, which “Machiavellian flexibility” in pursuing Prussia’s in France, Somewhere in Germany: A Combat is why seven of the nine essays are case studies interests, and his moderation and prudence in Soldier’s Journey Through the Second World War; Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century; of successes and failures of grand strategies at conducting both war and diplomacy (p. 83). and America’s Global Role: Essays and Reviews different periods of history. “It is the under- Essays by Jeremy Black, Sinnreich, and on National Security, Geopolitics, and War. He is standing of the ambiguities and uncertain- Murray about British grand strategies during an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Middle District ties that political and military leaders have the Seven Years’ War, the decades preceding of Pennsylvania, an Adjunct Professor of Political confronted in the past and will confront in the World War I, and the prewar and early World Science at Wilkes University, and a Contributing future,” writes Murray, “that is the basis of any War II years demonstrate the dynamic nature Editor to American Diplomacy. successful grand strategy” (p. 33). of “strategic culture,” the impact of domestic ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 95 BOOK REVIEWS

those who study North Korea. This includes Korea, and the United States), North Korea discussions of military capabilities, weapons continues to look to China for support while proliferation, the Six-Party Talks on North attempting to ensure that it can survive (at Korea’s nuclear program, issues surrounding any cost) without outside assistance. North Kim Jong-Il’s successor, and the Republic of Korea’s threatening foreign policy activity Korea (ROK)-U.S. military alliance. Bechtol might be similar to other state-level patterns concludes with a treatment of North Korean observed throughout history. Examination capabilities viewed through a U.S. Depart- and comparison of North Korean activity to ment of Defense lens (using the “diplomatic, Japan’s efforts at autarky prior to World War Defiant Failed State: The North Korean informational, military, and economic” con- II, Cuba’s long history of Communist rule Threat to International Security struct) and recommendations for both a firm and isolation, or China’s modernist approach By Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. U.S. foreign policy and a strong U.S.-ROK alli- to communism and economic expansion all Potomac Books, Inc., 2010 ance to counter North Korea’s threat. These might help readers to understand the choices 288 pp. $29.95 areas are important for any analysis of North made by the Kim regime. Contrasting North ISBN: 978-1-59797-531-5 Korea and its foreign policy activities, which Korea with other “rogue” nations could help often have repercussions not only for East support Bechtol’s arguments that the North Reviewed by Asia, but for the entire world. While three of Korean threat remains both unique and dan- ROBERT DANIEL WALLACE the main chapters are expanded or rewritten gerous to U.S. interests. articles that have been previously published There are a number of other minor areas ruce Bechtol, a retired military by Bechtol, their inclusion within a single text in which the book might have been improved. officer and former Defense Intel- allows readers to gain a more comprehensive The text assumes readers have an understanding Bligence Agency analyst, is a well- view of the Democratic People’s Republic of of regional U.S. interests and military contingen- known security studies academic and an Korea (DPRK) within a single volume. cies in the region—a phrase such as “designated associate professor at Angelo State University’s Although Bechtol intentionally limits ROK forces chop to the CFC commander” Center for Security Studies. His previous his text to a discussion of the threats posed by (p. 169) might be confusing to some readers. works deal almost exclusively with the secu- the Kim regime, this narrow scope is the most Additionally, a number of Bechtol’s graphics rity dilemma that North Korea poses to the significant weakness of the book. This text fared poorly in the publishing process, although United States, its allies, and the international contains a detailed and scrupulously notated this might have been out of his control. Finally, community. This book is a continuation of study of recent DPRK threat activity (down although Bechtol provides a detailed discussion Bechtol’s efforts to describe and explain the to the grid coordinates of long-range missile of successors to Kim Jong-Il and presents two seemingly unpredictable nature of the Kim danger areas on p. 33), but lacks a much- figures that describe the Kim family (p. 105) regime, North Korea’s military capabilities, needed wider scope of analysis. For example, and its “Power Circle” (p. 118), the argument is and the future of the Korean Peninsula. This although he does briefly discuss the ascen- difficult to follow and could be clarified with the is Bechtol’s response to those who would sion of Kim Jong-Il to power (pp. 101–102), inclusion of another figure showing the hierar- discount North Korea as a threat to the United the inclusion of a more detailed comparison chy of other key (nonfamily) individuals. States and its allies. between the first transition between “the Bechtol makes a credible argument that Bechtol’s goal in this book is to “discuss Kims” (Kim Il-Sung to Kim Jong-Il) and North Korea remains a threat, but readers the main threats that North Korea presents to current efforts by the North Korean regime would benefit from a more complete discus- the national security of the United States and to establish Kim Jong-Un (Kim Jong-Il’s son) sion of the historical, regional, and theoretical its allies” (p. ix). He notes that after the Cold could help to clarify events surrounding suc- issues that surround the Kim regime. Never- War, North Korea became a “multi-faceted” cession. In describing North Korea’s military theless, Bechtol has done an admirable job of threat through its arms supply industry, threat, Bechtol correctly notes that its asym- describing actions taken by North Korea that nuclear capabilities, and uncertainty sur- metric threat is credible, but omits mention- pose a security risk for East Asia, providing rounding leadership succession (p. 2). More- ing how the current threat compares to the noteworthy information for policy analysts. over, Bechtol supports continued “hard line” DPRK’s long history of unconventional activi- The hardest part in writing about North foreign policy efforts (containment and deter- ties. Additionally, North Korea’s actions have Korea is how to research and analyze its closed rence) when dealing with Kim Jong-Il and the significant repercussions within the region, society and political system in a credible North Korean government. and the inclusion of an international relations manner. Bechtol’s book clearly demonstrates The preface states that Bechtol’s inten- perspective would help bolster Bechtol’s argu- that examining the complicated nature of the tion is not to “produce an analysis that is ments. Finally, comparisons to other Commu- DPRK’s leaders and government remains a overly focused on political science or inter- nist regimes (past or present) might allow for a difficult task for any scholar. JFQ national relations jargon, or a work that is better understanding of DPRK activities. built on theory” (p. x). Thus, the text has North Korea continues to exist as a Lieutenant Colonel Robert Daniel Wallace, USA, is the tone of both a historical narrative and a recalcitrant and isolated Cold War country, a faculty member at the U.S. Army Command and current intelligence report on North Korea’s and remains, at its very core, a sovereign General Staff College and a Ph.D. student in Kansas State University’s Security Studies Program. actions and capabilities. The main portion nation focused on state survival. Surrounded of the book explores familiar territory for by perceived threats (from Japan, South

96 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu The United Nations and Intergovernmental Organization Command Relationships: Part III of III

By George E. Katsos

reviously in Joint Force Quar- among actors); peace-building (civilian infra- a group of Presidential directives. As Com- terly, we provided command structure); and conflict prevention (action mander in Chief, the President of the United relationship overviews as they taken in advance of a crisis). Although the States always retains command authority over occur in both U.S. and multi- terms peacekeeping and peace enforcement do U.S. forces. Any large-scale participation of P 1 national doctrine. In this last installment, we not appear in the UN Charter, their legal basis American forces likely to involve combat is take a broad look at command relationships as is found in chapters VI (“Pacific Settlement ordinarily conducted under U.S. command13 they exist under normal conditions within of Disputes”) and VII (“Action with Respect or through a competent regional organiza- intergovernmental organizations such as the to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace and tion.14 Normally, the President will keep units United Nations (UN). Commanders must use Acts of Aggression”).9 formed in support of a UN mission under caution not to exchange U.S. with UN or any Within the UN mission structure, three a U.S. chain of command; however, he will other organization’s terminology. levels of command and control exist. At the make the exception of placing units under strategic level, the UNSC provides overall UN OPCON/UN tactical control of a U.S. The United Nations political direction. At the operational level, officer in a UN deputy commander position. Founded in 1945, the UN is an interna- the UN Secretary-General provides executive Within the limits of UN OPCON, a foreign tional organization of countries committed direction assisted by the Department of Peace- commander cannot change the mission or to maintaining peace and security around keeping Operations (DPKO). At the tactical deploy U.S. forces outside the operational area the world.2 Its charter is the foundational level where the military component resides agreed to by the President; separate units or document that provides the UN Security and appointed by the Secretary-General via divide their supplies; administer discipline; or Council (UNSC) with responsibilities such submissions by member states to DPKO is the promote anyone or change the internal orga- as establishing peacekeeping operations highest ranking military individual on the nization of U.S. forces. (PKOs).3 Currently with 193 member states UN force, the UN Force Commander (UNFC) In 1950, the UNSC established a UN and no standing army, the UN approaches or head of military component. The UNFC command to stop Communist aggression member states for military force contribu- reports to the special representative of the in Korea. Through the years, international tions. Member states that contribute forces to Secretary-General, also known as the chief of military presence in the Republic of Korea PKOs are called troop contributing countries mission, and exercises UN operational control (ROK) declined from worldwide to bilateral. (TCCs).4 Even though TCC forces operate (UN OPCON)10 over all military personnel Eventually, UN member states called for the under a UN command5 with blue berets or including military observers. Commanders of dissolution of the UN command in Korea and helmets with UN insignia, TCCs always retain different contingents report to the UNFC on for the establishment of a ROK-U.S. combined full command6 of their national forces and all operational matters and must not be given command system. As a result, in 1978 remain- may withdraw them at any time.7 or accept instructions from their own national ing ROK-U.S. forces transferred from UN Established by a UNSC resolution authorities that are contrary to the mission’s command to the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces (UNSCR) with the agreement between mandate.11 To reflect participation of TCCs in Command (CFC).15 If conflict arises, the CFC warring parties, a UN PKO contains binding UN PKOs, an integrated command structure commander will act in the defense of the ROK mandates with tasks such as supporting a is normally adopted. Even though collabora- and technically could act as the commander cease-fire, peace agreement, or protection of tion between TCC personnel is a strength of UN forces in Korea. When conflict occurs, civilians.8 Within the spectrum of UN PKOs, in UN PKOs, common concerns are the U.S. forces will be either under “combined five activities are carried out by UN forces: capability of headquarters staff and its inte- OPCON” and even possibly UN OPCON. peacekeeping (create conditions for peace, gration with a firm understanding of TCC Combined OPCON is a more restrictive term consent needed); peace enforcement (practices military capabilities. than U.S. OPCON, strictly referring to the ensuring peace, consent not needed); peace- employment of warfighting missions.16 making (establish equal power relationships U.S. Support and Doctrine Following military operations in The current U.S. position regarding Panama and Kuwait/Iraq in 1992, the Presi- George E. Katsos is a Joint Doctrine Planner in command over American forces engaged dent authorized National Security Directive the Joint Chiefs of Staff J7, Joint Education and in a multinational contingency operation is (NSD) 74, “Peacekeeping and Emergency Doctrine Division. This article is the last of three on rooted in Article II of the U.S. Constitution, Humanitarian Relief Policy,” outlining U.S. command relationships. Title 10 of U.S. Code,12 and further refined by support for UN peacekeeping. In 1993, Policy ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 97 JOINT DOCTRINE | Update

Review Document (PRD) 13, “Peacekeeping peace operations.22 Under a new development of legality arises.24 UN forces do require a Operations,” was drafted. It aimed to improve in U.S. policy last year, the President issued status of forces agreement with the host nation UN peacekeeping. However, PRD 13 did not Presidential Study Directive 10, “Creation of to be present in the country. come to fruition due to political pressures Interagency Atrocities Prevention Board and Established in 2002, the AU adopted resulting from U.S. casualties in the UN oper- Corresponding Interagency Review.”23 This UN doctrine as a framework for its own ation in Somalia, which was commanded by a directive identified the prevention of mass doctrine, which informs the development of Turkish general and a dual-hatted U.S. deputy atrocities and genocide as a core national the African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF who was as the commander of U.S. Forces security interest of the United States and is made up of five military brigades from Somalia. Even though thousands of American directed the creation of an atrocities preven- the continent’s five economic regional com- troops were placed under UN OPCON for this tion board to coordinate a whole-of-govern- munities and is intended for rapid deploy- mission,17 the UNFC in reality had little or no ment approach to preventing and responding ment for a multiplicity of peace operations control over these forces since the arrange- to mass atrocities and genocide. As a result, including the right to intervene in a member ment of these attached forces was intended for military doctrine on the protection of civil- state in circumstances of war crimes, geno- utilization under the U.S. deputy.18 ians and mass atrocity response operations cide, or crimes against humanity.25 Forces While Presidential directives in the is being further developed and incorporated under an AU command26 are AU OPCON27 1990s articulated policies on peacekeeping, into joint doctrine and publications such as JP to the regional organization’s force com- existing joint doctrine provided limited guid- 3-07.3. In support of this doctrine, GPOI will mander. Recently, the AU cooperated in ance. The first step toward filling that gap was play a key role in implementing the recom- military operations with the United Nations joint publication (JP) development conducted mendations of the board when it comes to by deploying in advance of a UN force in by the joint doctrine development community training peacekeepers who are often the first Sudan’s Darfur region in 2006, which was led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff J7. The increase line of defense in preventing mass atrocities. later replaced by a UN-led UN-AU hybrid of JP development began in 1993 with the operation in 2007.28 A concern of the ASF is creation of JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, and JP Other Organizations and Force that AU forces are largely underfunded and 3-07.5 (now JP 3-68), Noncombatant Evacua- Structures poorly equipped. The AU currently leads the tion Operations. In 1994, Presidential Decision When the UNSC determines that an peace operation in Somalia. Directive (PDD) 25, “U.S. Policy on Reform- operation exceeds the capabilities of the In addition to formed units, UN mis- ing Multilateral Peace Operations,” estab- United Nations, the Security Council under sions function with individual UN military lished instructions and clarified command chapter VIII (“Regional Arrangements”) of observers (MILOBS). UN MILOBS are relationship terminology for U.S. participation the charter can authorize a lead nation opera- unarmed and observe, record, and report on in peace operations. It also focused attention tion such as the UN-sponsored operations in the status of formal agreements. If a UN mili- on the need for improved dialogue and deci- Korea (U.S. led) and East Timor (Australian tary force is present, MILOBS work in con- sionmaking among governmental agencies. led). In January 1991, the Desert Storm coali- junction with the force but under a separate Less than 24 months after the release of PDD tion ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait under chain of command. Even though the United 25, joint publications on stability operations, the authority of a UNSCR. Led by an officer States has not recently provided formed units interorganizational coordination during joint now called the U.S. Central Command com- under the command of foreign commanders, operations, and foreign humanitarian assis- mander, the United States and its Western it has provided individual MILOBS to UN tance entered U.S. military doctrine.19 PDD allies operated under a parallel command missions. For US MILOBS, the Secretary of 25 also laid the basis for PDD 56, “Managing that was separate from the Arab forces com- the Army is executive agent for DOD support Complex Contingency Operations,” in 1997, manded by a Saudi commander. to UN missions, and the responsibility for which institutionalized policies and proce- When an operation exceeds UN capa- administrative control is with the U.S. Mili- dures on managing complex crises.20 bilities and is regional, again under chapter tary Observer Group in Washington. When the UN released the Report of VIII, the United Nations can authorize an the Panel on UN Peace Operations in 2000, organization to lead it. Two such regional Conclusion it exposed additional shortfalls in the execu- organizations are the North Atlantic Treaty The U.S. military will continue to tion of UN PKOs.21 In 2004, the President’s Organization (NATO) and African Union operate as a joint force and will likely partici- Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) (AU). Operating under a UN-sanctioned pate in multinational environments address- was created to assist in filling those gaps by mission in 2001, NATO took over the UN- ing conflict and human suffering around the training peacekeepers and regionally building mandated International Security Assistance world. Command relationships at all levels sustainable indigenous peacekeeping training Force in Afghanistan, which provides security will continue to challenge U.S. forces involved capacity as primary objectives. Implemented in and around the capital. Soon after, the UN in all types of operations. Recently in Opera- through a close partnership between the Assistance Mission in Afghanistan was estab- tions Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector U.S. Department of State and Department of lished as a peacekeeping mission that focused (Libya), command relationships and employ- Defense (DOD), with State in the lead, GPOI on recovery and reconstruction. While acting ment of air and maritime assets impacted five is now another mechanism like troop con- under a UNSCR, few would argue the legal- U.S. combatant commands and four Services tribution or financial assistance led by State ity of a NATO military presence; however, as well as the mission’s transfer of authority and other congressional means of the U.S. when NATO acts under its own mandate as in to the multinational community. Command- Government supporting UN and regional Yugoslavia in 1999, undoubtedly the question ers must understand the realities of different

98 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu katsos levels of command relationships within U.S. (TACOM) or tactical control (TACON) of those 15 Kyung Young Chung, “An Analysis of chains of command and how American units/personnel. OPCON includes the authority to ROK-US Military Command Relationship from command relationships are impacted when assign separate tasks to subunits of a contingent, the Korean War to the Present” (Master’s thesis, in consultation with the contingent commander U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, those commanders or forces are assigned or and as approved by the UN headquarters. Other 1989), 73–91, available at . JFQ or operations. UN TACOM (equivalent to NATO TACOM), which 16 Ibid. is the authority delegated to a military or police 17 Canna, 12. commander in a UN PKO to assign tasks to forces 18 Ibid. Notes under his command for the accomplishment of the 19 Entering into U.S. military doctrine were mission assigned by higher authority; UN TACON JP 3-07, Missions Other Than War (now known as 1 See George E. Katsos, “Command Relation- (equivalent to U.S., AU, and NATO TACON), Stability Operations); JP 3-08, which was renamed ships,” Joint Force Quarterly 63 (4th Quarter 2011), which is the detailed and local direction and Interorganizational Coordination During Joint 153–155, available at ; and “Multinational accomplish missions or tasks assigned (moreover, as Humanitarian Assistance. Command Relationships, Part II of III,” Joint Force required by operational necessities, the UNFC may 20 William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, Quarterly 65 (2d Quarter 2011), 102–104, available at delegate the TACON of assigned military forces/ “Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex . police personnel to the subordinate sector and/or Contingency Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly 24 2 See “UN at a Glance,” UN.org, available at unit commanders); and UN administrative control (Spring 2000), 93. . (ADCON), which is similar to U.S. and NATO 21 UN General Assembly and Security Council, 3 Per other nations and organizations, ADCON as well as AU administrative control Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Opera- peacekeeping operations are also known as peace (ADMCON) and is the authority over subordinate tions, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000. support operations. or other organizations within national contingents 22 The U.S. assessment level of the overall UN 4 Per the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for administrative matters such as personnel man- budget is around 27.3 percent, or $2,126,382,000. See (NATO) “NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used agement, supply, services, and other nonoperational Marjorie Ann Browne, United Nations Peacekeep- in NATO Documents and Publications,” AAP-15 missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ing: Issues for Congress, RL33700 (Washington, DC: (2010), troop contributing countries are known as ADCON is a national responsibility given to the Congressional Research Service, February 11, 2011). troop contributing nations. National Contingent Commander in PKOs. Ibid., 4. 23 This interagency effort was led by Special 5 United Nations [UN] command is the 11 Handbook on United Nations Multidimen- Assistant to President Barack Obama and Senior authority vested in a military leader for the direc- sional Peacekeeping Operations, 68. Director of Multilateral Affairs on the National tion, coordination, and control of military forces; 12 Michael Canna, Command and Control of Security Council Samantha Power, along with also known as UN operational command. UN Multinational Operations Involving U.S. Military assistance from Deputy Assistant Secretary of command has a legal status and denotes func- Forces, Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: The State of the Bureau of International Organization tional and knowledgeable exercise of authority to Atlantic Council, August 2004), 3. Affairs Victoria Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary attain objectives or goals. See UN Department of 13 U.S. OPCON is the authority to perform those of Defense/Special Coordinator for Rule of Law Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), “Authority, functions of command over subordinate forces and Humanitarian Policy Rosa Brooks, and Command and Control in United Nations Peace- involving organizing and employing commands Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans keeping Operations Policy,” Ref. 2008.4 (February and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, Janine Davidson. 2008); and Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and and giving authoritative direction necessary to 24 Janka Oertel, “The United Nations and Guidelines (New York: UNPKO, January 2008), 4. accomplish the mission. See Joint Publication (JP) NATO,” paper prepared for the Academic Council 6 Full command is equivalent to U.S. combat- 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States on the United Nations System 21st Annual Meeting, ant command (command authority), also known as (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2012), GL-11. Bonn, Germany, June 5–7, 2008, 4. COCOM, for internal matters only and NATO full Other U.S. command relationship terms include 25 Jakkie Cilliers, The African Standby Force: command; a UN Force Commander (UNFC) will U.S. combatant command (command authority) An Update on Progress, Institute for Security Studies not have full command over another nation’s forces. (COCOM), which is the nontransferable command (ISS) Paper 160 (Pretoria: ISS, March 2008), 1. See “Authority, Command and Control in United authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combat- 26 AU command is the authority to issues Nations Peacekeeping Operations Policy,” 4. ant commander to perform those functions of operational directives only within the limits of the 7 Handbook on United Nations Multidi- command over assigned forces involving organizing regional operational authority. See African Union mensional Peacekeeping Operations (New York: and employing commands and forces; assigning Peace Support Operations Standing Operating Pro- UNPKO, December 2003), 67. tasks; designating objectives; and giving authorita- cedures (Addis Ababa: AU, 2008), 1. 8 UN Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006). tive direction over all aspects of military operations, 27 AU OPCON is the authority granted to 9 Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish military commanders in a peace support opera- Guidelines, 17–18. the missions assigned to the command (GL-5). U.S. tion to direct forces assigned so the commander 10 UN operational control (UN OPCON) is TACON is the authority over forces that is limited may accomplish specific missions or tasks that are similar to U.S., African Union (AU), and NATO to the detailed direction and control of movements usually limited by function, time, location, or a OPCON: the authority granted to a UNFC in a or maneuvers within the operational area necessary combination of these elements. Another relevant UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) to direct forces to accomplish missions or tasks assigned (GL-12). command relationship is AU TACON, which is assigned so that the commander may accomplish U.S. ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority the detailed and local direction and control of specific missions or tasks that are usually limited over subordinate or other organizations in respect to movement or maneuvers necessary to accomplish by function, time, or location (or a combination); administration and support (GL-5). missions or tasks; it is delegable to subordinate to deploy units concerned and/or military person- 14 Canna, 7. commanders. Ibid., 3. nel; and to retain or assign tactical command 28 Cilliers, 7.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 99 Joint Publications (JP) Under Revision JPs Revised (within last 6 months)

JP 1-05, Religious Affairs JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats JP 3-00.1, Strategic Communication and Communications Strategy JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations JP 3-13.3, Operations Security JP 3-04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations JP 3-13.4, Military Deception JP 3-05, Special Operations JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations JP 3-13, Information Operations JP 3-14, Space Operations JP 3-16, Multinational Operations JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations JP 3-26, Counterterrorism JP 3-27, Homeland Defense JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Consequence Management JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations JP 3-60, Joint Targeting JP 3-63, Detainee Operations JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations JP 4-0, Joint Logistics JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore JP 4-02, Health Service Support JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support

100 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu NEW from NDU Press FORTHCOMING from NDU Press

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities Edited by Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders The People’s Liberation Army Air Force has undergone a rapid transformation since the 1990s into a formidable, modern air force that could present major challenges to Taiwanese and U.S. forces in a conflict. To examine the present state and future prospects of China’s air force, a distinguished group of scholars and experts on Chinese airpower and military affairs gathered in Taipei, Taiwan, in October 2010. This volume is a compilation of the edited papers presented at the conference, rooted in Chinese sources and reflecting comments and additions stimulated by the dialogue and discussions among the participants. Contributing authors include Kenneth W. Allen, Roger Cliff, David Frelinger, His-hua Cheng, Richard P. Hallion, Jessica Hart, Kevin Lanzit, Forrest E. Morgan, Kevin Pollpeter, Shen Pin- Luen, Phillip C. Saunders, David Shlapak, Mark A. Stokes, Murray Scot Tanner, Joshua K. Wiseman, Xiaoming Zhang, and You Ji.

Transatlantic Perspectives, No. 2 The United States, Russia, Europe, and Security: How to Address the “Unfinished Business” of the Post–Cold War Era Isabelle François Isabelle François provides concrete ideas for the United States, Russia, and Europe to take with them to the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012. This is a chance for the three actors to refine their relationships toward the goal of partnership and the ultimate emergence of an inclusive European security community. François provides an assessment of the NATO-Russia cooperation of the past 20 years, concluding that the relationship has yet to deliver a strategic partnership in line with each nation’s current rhetoric, documents, and political declarations. François points to a significant level of unfinished business from the post–Cold War, which will have to be addressed if there is any hope of building a whole Europe that is free, undivided, and at peace. The second part of the paper reviews the current challenges facing the NATO Allies and Russia in three main areas: reduction of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe, stalemate regarding conventional forces in Europe, and limits of cooperation in missile defense.

Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991 Steven L. Rearden’s Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991 surveys the role and contributions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from the early days of World War II through the end of the Cold War. The JCS, an organization of military advisors and planners established early in World War II, first advised the President on the strategic direction of U.S. Armed Forces in that war and continued afterward to play a significant role in the development of national policy. Because of their relations with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, a history of their activities, both in war and in peacetime, provides insights into the military history of the United States. The importance of their activities led the JCS to direct that an official history of their actions be kept for future generations to study. Dr. Rearden’s Council of War follows in the tradition of volumes previously published about JCS involvement in national policy, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Using a combination of primary and secondary sources, and adopting a broader view of previous volumes, this fresh work of scholarship examines the military implications of problems from 1942 to 1991. Although focused strongly on the JCS, Rearden’s well-researched treatise deals too with the wider effect of crucial decisions and their ensuing policies. PRISM A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations PRISM 3, no. 3 (June 2012), opens “Features” with Dennis Blair proposing ways in which developed de- mocracies can use their military-military relations to assist democratic development around the world; Colin Gray brings strategic theory to the discussion of rival doctrines about counterinsurgency; Andrea Barbara Baumann focuses on coordination of civilian and military organizations within a whole-of- government approach; Mark Sedra critiques current state-building policy and practice; Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock, and Matt Andrews discuss how some developing countries are stuck in a “capability trap”; Nadia Gerspacher and Adrian Shtuni offer initial lessons learned from MoDA in which civilians are building institutional capacity and helping demilitarize security institutions; William Upshur, Jonathan Roginski, and David Kilcullen outline a simplified yet descriptive method of assessing counterinsurgency campaigns; Lesley Anne Warner provides context for Kenya’s October 2011 invasion of Somalia; and Dov Zakheim offers five observations on the do’s and don’ts of state-building. In “From the Field,” Robert Hulslander and Jake Spivey examine Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police, while the “Lessons Learned” section features Geoffrey Lambert, Larry Lewis, and Sarah Sewall weighing CENTER FOR in about military support provided by U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines to Philippine COMPLEX OPERATIONS military operations. Closing out the issue is an interview with Álvaro Uribe Vélez, the 58th president of DIPLOMACY • DEFENSE • DEVELOPMENT Colombia (2002–2010).

PRISM explores, promotes, and debates emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. Published by NDU Press for the Center for Complex Operations, PRISM welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially civil-military integration. Manuscript submissions should be between 2,500 and 6,000 words and sent via email to [email protected].

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press National Defense University, Washington, DC