Aaron Berman, Will Ryan, and Jim Wald Trench Warfare

A Comparative Analysis of Civil War and World War I Trenches

Lauren Fraser 4/30/2013

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1: “A Soldier’s Life for Me”…Life in the

Trenches ...... 7

Chapter 2: The Building of the Trenches ...... 32

Chapter 3: European Observations and the

Trenches of WWI ...... 55

Conclusion: ...... 79

Bibliography ...... 85

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Trench Warfare A Comparative Analysis of Civil War and World War I Trenches

Intro:

Trench warfare, or occasionally “siege warfare”, is often defined as a form of “occupied fighting lines” in which soldiers are protected by field works from an opposing front’s artillery and small-arms fire. One tends to picture trench warfare as two large armies bogged down due to heavy artillery and unable to do more than move gradually inch by inch across a battlefield; or of men leaping out of trenches to dash headlong into immense fire and certain death. Sometimes considered representative of futility in war, trench warfare has become synonymous with stalemates in the midst of conflict, of the wearing down of enemy forces until they are unable to continue from lack of arms or morale, and of a form of warfare that is nothing more than senseless slaughter in less-than-stellar environments.

Trench warfare is so often associated with World War I because its usage was such a prominent characteristic.

Tactically and strategically, the use of trenches for defensive purposes was not particularly new by 1914. Field fortifications – forts, strongholds, and even trenches – have Page | 3

been in sporadic usage throughout warfare as far back as the

Romans, although not to the same extent as during the First

World War. The closest comparison to that reliance on defensive earthworks by two opposing fronts occurred 50 years earlier during the American Civil War.

Trench Warfare in the Civil War:

The Civil War is often considered the first “modern” war; its technological advancements in things like weaponry and engineering revolutionized the way military affairs were – and would be – conducted. It was the largest and bloodiest war on

American soil – the first to be fought by American citizens against American citizens. From the Civil War came the notion that wars would no longer be fought by the “professional soldier” as found in Europe, but by conscripted men. No longer would wars be waged by small, easily-managed armies but would pit entire countries against another. No longer could one consider a military engagement a “gentlemanly affair” full of grandiose charges across open fields. No longer would a reliance on offensive tactics solely suffice in bringing about an end to a war.

As stated earlier, even by the Civil War the use of entrenchments was not a new concept. The early years of the

Civil War saw sporadic usage of fortifications by both Union and Page | 4

Confederate forces, although the Confederacy made better and more frequent use of them than did the Union. Due to the widespread application of weapons with far greater rates of fire and accuracy than previously seen, commanders were well aware of the practicality of defensive earthworks as a use of cover against small ammunitions and artillery, not to mention as a way to reduce casualties (assuming one did not charge headlong out from behind said cover).

The use of trenches was first commented upon at the Battle of Fredericksburg in 1862, and was even seen at the Battle of

Gettysburg in 1863. “The tendency was for combatants to dig in either before an engagement (due often to a commander’s decision to remain on the defensive) or immediately after a pitched battle (due often to soldiers’ emotional reaction to the shock

1 of combat)”. But it wasn’t until 1864, when Ulysses S. Grant strove to capture Richmond and destroy Robert E. Lee’s Army of

Northern Virginia once and for all, that both the Union and the

Confederacy would come to rely on a defensive tactic that, while once used tactically, would later be used strategically.

Although it did not last as long as the First World War’s

Western Front, Grant’s Overland Campaign was a brutal two months in which the reliance on entrenchments, the inability to breach

1 Earl J. Hess, Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), xiii Page | 5

superior defenses, and the subsequent losses of life that resulted from reckless charges into open territory could be seen as a prelude to what Europe would experience fifty years later.

Thesis:

In this paper, I will make comparisons between the experiences of Civil War soldiers and WWI soldiers in the trenches, as well as compare the ways both groups of soldiers built and organized their trenches. I will look at how trench culture developed in both wars, exploring the concept of whether or not said culture was a product of their surroundings as well as a way for soldiers to deal with traumatic situations.

I will also explore the theory that Civil War trench warfare could have been a precursor to that of World War I because of the similarities in trench design, materials used, and the names of the different aspects of the trenches. Europe was fully aware of the increased reliance on entrenchments and fortifications that developed during the later years of the

Civil War. Countries like Britain, France, and Germany had sent their own military observers to obtain information about the military tactics and innovations of America, and yet they failed to fully grasp the importance of what had changed in regards to warfare as a result. Page | 6

It is this fact that will be another focus of this paper.

Despite the many acclaimed observers that Europe sent to America during the Civil War, how was it that none of them took away the important lessons the Civil War had to offer in regards how wars would be fought in the future? Why, despite all evidence to the contrary, were the European powers so set in their desire to fight an offensive war that they chose to disregard the fact that changing technologies no longer made it possible for that to be the only viable tactic? And yet, trench warfare still had a prominent presence on World War I battlefields. By the end of this paper I hope to figure out how, even over a 50 year timespan, that these two wars fought on two different landscapes by very different people wound up relying so heavily on the same defensive structures and strategies.

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Chapter 1: “A Soldier’s Life for Me”…Life in the Trenches

For soldiers in both the Civil War and World War I, life in the trenches was anything but glamorous. In fact, to say it was even remotely tolerable was a bit of a stretch. The hellish conditions of the trenches themselves, combined with the added stresses of inevitable combat, was enough for even the most veteran of troops to feel that their situation was hopeless.

It can be safe to assume that, if asked, none of the soldiers from either conflict would readily admit that their times spent in these earthworks were the “best moments of their military lives”. There are a number of similarities in the experiences of the men in the trenches of both conflicts – facing natural elements, diseases, infestation, etc. However, just because these groups faced similar problems that does not suggest that all trench experiences were the same. For all the hardships, the men made basic attempts to make the best of their situations. However, the amount of time soldiers spent in their respective earthworks made all the difference in the way they experienced trench life.

For soldiers in World War I, the amount of time spent in the trenches was dependent on “how active the area was, whether attacks were in progress, and the total number of troops Page | 8

available.”2 Time spent in the front lines, or rotating between the front and reserve trenches also varied among British,

French, and German troops. With these factors in mind, the longest period of time in which a group of soldiers remained in the front-line trenches was for 51 straight days. However, it was generally typical for soldiers to remain in the front lines for anywhere between a few days to a week or more. In many cases, soldiers would remain in the same general location for months, but they were still able to move from the front lines to the reserve trenches.

For soldiers during the Civil War, being constantly on

the move prevented them from truly getting “settled” into their

trenches. Trench warfare during the Civil War did not have the

same lack of movement as trench warfare did during World War I,

as entrenchments were still used primarily as a means of

defense. To use the Overland Campaign as an example (since,

comparatively, it was the period of time during the Civil War in

which the reliance on trench warfare was similar to that of the

Western Front), the longest a soldier remained in the same

trench was for 8 days – specifically, from June 4-12 after the

Battle of Cold Harbor. Because of the difference in time spent

in the entrenchments, the experiences of a Civil War soldier

2 Stephen Bull, Trench: A History of Trench Warfare on the Western Front (Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 94 Page | 9

were considerably less harsh than those of their World War I

counterparts. But again, both groups still faced similar

hardships. “[in the trenches] men lived a life of primitive instincts – fear, hunger, thirst – and with the physical extremes, deafening noises, sudden flashes, extreme cold, agonizing pain.”3

Such hardships were not simply limited to within the

trenches for, with the exception of combat, they existed outside

them as well. In fact, simply traveling to and from various

trenches was difficult for soldiers in both the Civil War and

World War I. In each case, soldiers marched anywhere between

fifteen to twenty miles – more so for some soldiers in the

Overland Campaign – in full gear and without light, from one

location to the next, and often with little to no rest. For men

in World War I, at most they would be granted “ten minutes rest

every hour”4, while a soldier during the Overland Campaign remembered how after one particularly harrowing march, “three or four hours only had the weary boys to rest..and the bugles sounded the advance.”5

Another similarity was the times at which both groups of

soldiers would travel to and from various trenches. Typically,

3 John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 44 4 Ibid, 32 5 Gordon C. Rhea, Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002), 50 Page | 10

troops would move locations at night to avoid detection by the enemy. Although it was a good strategy, often – at least, in the case of the Overland Campaign – they would be traveling most of the night and then have to dig in upon arrival (which meant even less sleep then what they were occasionally granted over the course of the march itself), and were expected to participate in an enemy engagement the following day. While soldiers in the Overland Campaign had to travel through the untamed wilds of Virginia swampland, soldiers in World War I traveled through communication trenches to get to the ones on the front lines. And although the concept of traveling at night was hard, to do so when confronted by the elements of nature was even more harrowing.

For both Civil War and World War I soldiers, one of the worst things they had to deal with in the trenches was the natural elements. The main difference though was that Civil War soldiers didn’t have to worry about nearly as much of nature’s cruelty as the men of World War I, again going back to the issue of time spent in their respective trenches.

Still using the Overland Campaign as the primary example in this case, the only elemental extremes soldiers had to deal with was the dry heat of Virginia’s summer mingled with occasionally heavy rainfall. When it came to the heat, a combination of long marches and the fact that uniforms were often made of wool or Page | 11

heavy cloth resulted in many soldiers collapsing from heat

exhaustion. The rain, however, was their biggest obstacle.

Soldiers recalled “wading for miles through standing water”6 on roads that had either been flooded due to previous rains or in the midst of rainfall. For soldiers in charge of moving heavy artillery guns and, mud was especially unwelcome. Depending on the type of battery (either a 12-pounder battery or a 6-pounder battery) soldiers would have to manually transport a number of cannons and howitzers. A 12-pounder battery would include four

12-pounder guns and two 24-pounder howitzers, while a 6-pounder battery would have four 6-pounder guns and two 12-pounder howitzers7. One soldier later wrote in regards to transporting

artillery, “After a time our gun wheels went up to the hub, and we had to turn to, there in the dark, and prize our guns outs;

nearly lift them bodily out of the mud;..and by the time day

dawned we were as wet and muddy as the roads..”8

In the trenches of WWI they faced a similar plight,

particularly when it came to rain. On the Western Front, rain

was especially unbearable. For British soldiers, their two

“greatest enemies, in every season except summer, were water and

6 Gordon C. Rhea, Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002), 59 7 Jack Coggins, Arms and Equipment of the Civil War (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2004), 64 8 Gordon C. Rhea, Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002), 59 Page | 12

mud.”9 In the midst of heavy rainfall, trenches wound up nearly ankle-deep in mud. In many cases, the water and mud-level rose even higher. It wasn’t uncommon for water to be at least a foot deep at the bottom of a trench, nor was it particularly rare for men to find themselves thigh-deep in water or mud. In the worst case, the freezing waters and risen waist or armpit-high, and men would find themselves forced to stand there “for days”. As one soldier put it, “The mud makes it all but impassable, and now sunk in it up to the knees, I have the momentary terror of

10 never being able to pull myself out.”

For some soldiers, that fear of being unable to pull oneself out became a terrifying reality. Worse than simply being trapped neck-deep in mud was the knowledge that many could

– and did – drown in it. The danger of drowning in mud was not limited primarily to the trenches however. In truth, the risk of drowning in mud came more from the possibility of stumbling into a shell-hole than from remaining in a trench. Worse still was the knowledge that it was a slow, agonizing death. Even a shell-hole that was simply filled with water rather than mud was potential for fatalities, as one soldier wrote: “A khaki-clad leg, three heads in a row, .the rest of the bodies submerged, giving one the idea that they had used their last ounce of strength to keep their heads above

9 John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 44 10 Ibid, 45 Page | 13

the rising water. In another miniature pond, a hand still gripping a rifle is all that is visible, while its next-door neighbor is occupied by a steel helmet and half a head, the staring eyes staring icily at the green slime which floats on the 11 surface almost at their level.” Sickness and disease in the trenches was much more common for those in World War I than during the Overland Campaign.

Although soldiers in both wars often suffered from similar ailments and diseases, the reason why it was more common in the

First World War was because soldiers’ illnesses came as a result

of trench conditions rather

than from a lack of medical

knowledge, as was usually the

case for soldiers in the Civil

War.

The most common and well- known ailment soldiers were known to suffer from during World

War I was “trench foot”. Trench foot was caused from standing for hours, or days, in wet conditions – as trenches on the

Western Front were typically known to be – and being unable to remove wet socks or boots. Feet would either turn red (affected by erythrosis) or blue (affected by cyanosis) from lack of vascular supply, would develop a decaying odor (often from necrosis), and would sometimes swell. In later stages, feet

11 Ibid, 47 Page | 14

would develop open sores and blisters, which led to more

infections.

For soldiers, it didn’t take much to contract trench foot.

“Just one immersion in water, followed by a twenty-four hour

period during which the boots were never taken off was enough to

cause trench foot”12 While trench foot was more commonly

contracted in wet conditions – primarily during the winter – it

could sometimes be contracted in dry conditions, although that

was considerably rare and far less serious.

A similar condition – at least, medically – was frostbite.

Because their symptoms were so alike, trench foot and frostbite

were oftentimes misdiagnosed as the other. The worst cases of

either ailment occurred in the winter of 1914-15, in which “over

26,000 men required treatment for one or the other condition”13,

and over the course of the entire war (at least, for British

troops), “74,711 British troops were admitted to hospitals..with

trench foot or frostbite.”14

Treatment for both trench foot and frostbite was the same: keeping the feet warm and dry, and enabling men to have fresh pairs of socks that they could change daily. Some ways that units ensured that cases of trench foot were kept relatively low was to have each man be responsible for the feet of another, and

12 John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 48 13 Stephen Bull, Trench: A History of Trench Warfare on the Western Front (Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 78 14 John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 49 Page | 15

if their charge contracted trench foot there would be

disciplinary action. Washing and powdering the feet once or

twice a day was another way men would try to combat trench foot,

as well as being made to grease one’s feet before putting on dry

socks. The latter method was not received well by soldiers, as

one individual wrote: “We are standing in water up to our knees. We are supposed to take our puttees, boots and socks off, smear our feet with this substance (it is solid and cold as an iceberg), put our wet socks, boots and puttees on again, and stand up in water to our knees. Well we won’t do it.”15

If left untreated trench foot often resulted in the setting

in of gangrene, which meant that toes or, in worse cases, the

entire foot would have to be amputated. Although I was unable

to find recorded evidence of cases of trench foot occurring

during the Civil War, that isn’t to say that it did not exist.

It is entirely probable that soldiers, or even the medical

practitioners at the time, did not know what it was. Knowledge

of diseases, how they were spread, and even the means to cure

them were severely limited, and medical procedures of the time

could easily be described as barbaric. Soldiers did, however,

have experience with gangrene – not as a result of untreated

15 Stephen Bull, Trench: A History of Trench Warfare on the Western Front (Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 79

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trench foot, but as the result of infections post-amputation surgery.

Trench foot and frostbite were not the only ailments that soldiers had to suffer through during the Overland Campaign and

World War I. Disease was rampant throughout the trenches, due mostly in part to the unsanitary conditions in which the soldiers were forced to live. Although advances in medical technology and knowledge by the time of the First World War – especially in regards to the sterilization of equipment before and after use – did lessen the chances of soldiers contracting infectious diseases as a result of medical procedures (as was often the case during the Civil War), sickness continued to spread.

Sickness and disease was, if not the number one killer, the biggest killer of soldiers throughout the Civil War. Almost half of all Civil War [disease] deaths were the result of intestinal diseases – typhoid, diarrhea, and dysentery – often contracted from drinking water found at the bottom of trenches.

In fact, early into the Overland Campaign Robert E. Lee was bedridden with severe diarrhea. As one Confederate doctor put it, “chronic diarrhea and dysentery…not only destroyed more soldiers than gunshot wounds, but more soldiers were permanently disabled and lost to the service from these diseases than from Page | 17

16 the disability following the accidents of battle.” In the

Union Army alone, it was reported that “995 out of every 1000

men eventually contracted chronic diarrhea or dysentery”17

If diarrhea or dysentery didn’t kill them, then

tuberculosis or pneumonia did, but these were not the only

sicknesses that soldiers suffered from. In camps where sanitary

conditions were as equally abysmal as the trenches themselves –

if not more so – measles, chickenpox, mumps, and whooping cough

were just as rampant.

Surprisingly in World War I, cases of the common cold and

pneumonia were relatively low – in fact, common colds were

“almost unknown on the front”18. Instead, a kidney disease

called nephritis which, like most ailments in the trenches, was

caused by excessive exposure to wet and cold, was the primary

cause of non-battle casualties among soldiers.

As mentioned, the root cause of the spread of disease in

both wars was the unsanitary conditions in which soldiers found

themselves. Descriptions of Civil War camps and World War I

trenches are surprisingly similar in that both mention a steady

accumulation of filth that was not simply limited to the area

but to them men themselves. For soldiers of both the Civil War

and World War I there were few, if any, opportunities to bathe,

16 Ernest B. Furgurson, Not War But Murder: Cold Harbor, 1864 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 34 17 Dick Weeks, Civil War Medicine: Medical Care, Battle Wounds, and Disease, http://www.civilwarhome.com/civilwarmedicine.htm (Feb. 2002) 18 John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 52 Page | 18

and latrines were often delegated to the nearest and deepest shell-pit, or the very hole a man was standing in. The latter was more common for the Civil War, especially during the

Overland Campaign where simply leaving an entrenchment to answer the call of nature ran the risk of getting shot by an enemy sniper. In the First World War, early latrines were meant to be pits “four to five feet deep”19, and once they were filled within a foot of the top they were to be filled in with dirt and a new pit was to be dug elsewhere. In some cases, metal buckets were used as latrines, and once filled the contents were to be dumped or buried between the front and support trenches. Yet despite the crude attempts at waste disposal, when it came time to dig new trenches, latrine pits would inevitably be uncovered and its contents would liter the bottom of the trenches, along with whatever other refuse soldiers left behind.

Another hazard of trench life was infestation, although it was more common during World War I than during the Overland

Campaign. In both cases, however, when digging new trenches bodies from previous engagements would often be uncovered. In the case of the Overland Campaign, the location in which much of the battles took place was the site of the Peninsula Campaign fought by George B. McClellan two years prior. For many soldiers – on the Union side especially – they were going back

19 John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 52 Page | 19

into familiar territory, having been veterans of that earlier campaign. For those soldiers, digging trenches and suddenly uncovering bones of lost comrades not only served to lower morale but was yet another brutal wake-up call into the reality of their situation – that, at any moment, they could wind up like their friends who they had buried two years ago.

In World War I, the bodies uncovered in the digging of new trenches were much more recent, which was what led to infestation and further disease. In many cases, bodies were simply buried where they fell, so if a part of a trench collapsed or a new one was being dug they would still be decomposing when uncovered. Bodies became such a common sight in the trenches that people soon found themselves sitting upon, sleeping beside, and even using for protective cover the remains of their fallen comrades.

The presence of still-decomposing corpses in the trenches was the reason why infestation was a more common sight for soldiers during the First World War than for soldiers in the

Civil War. The corpses, along with remnants of food that lingered at the bottom of trenches, would attract rats – both brown and black ones – to the trenches. One soldier described them as, “Huge rats. So big they would eat a wounded man if he Page | 20

20 couldn’t defend himself.” In a quest for food, soldiers found

that rats were bold enough to venture into a dugout regardless

of whether or not it was occupied, and at night were privy to

rats climbing “over the faces of sleeping men, sometimes

burrowing under their blankets or snuffling for food in their

pockets.”21

If well-fed on a steady diet of leftover scraps and

bloated corpses, the rats would multiply in number at an

alarming rate – “one couple might produce some 880 offspring in

a year”22. Their presence not only served to contaminate whatever food they got into, but aided in the spread of disease, particularly Weil’s disease, which was usually the result of water that had contaminated with animal urine coming in contact with open wounds or the eyes. Weil’s disease, or infectious jaundice as it was also known as, was also common among troops during the Civil War.

Another trench infestation during World War I was lice.

For men, the presence of lice was a constant to which there was no cure. Individual means of ridding oneself of lice varied from constantly scratching or running a lit candle along one’s clothes – the latter “learnt with practice”23 and usually

resulting in many burnt clothes. Organized attempts at getting

20 John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 54 21 Ibid, 54 22 Ibid, 54 23 Ibid, 56 Page | 21

rid of lice fared no better than the soldier’s own personal

methods. One such attempt was the Divisional Baths, in which

once a week (if they were so lucky) men would bathe in hot water

for about fifteen minutes while their uniforms were put through

a “Foden Disinfector” or delousing machine. Unfortunately for

most men, the delousing process failed to rid the clothes of a

majority of the lice eggs, so upon receiving their uniforms back

they would once again be reduced to scratching.

Another attempted method, suggested by the War Office, was

to use a chemical on soldiers’ undergarments that would “kill

any louse that came into contact with it”24. But, like all other attempts, it too failed. The only thing that resulted from the chemical was that the men developed harsh rashes leaving them with no other option but to remove those articles of clothing.

Like everything else soldiers in the trenches came into contact with, lice also carried their own diseases: specifically, one known as trench fever. The different armies had their own names for it. Among British and French troops it was called trench fever or “pyrrexhia of unknown origin”25 which,

despite being the same disease, were often diagnosed separately.

German troops referred to it as Wolhynian Fever, Five Days

24 John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 57 25 Ibid, 57 Page | 22

Fever, Polish, Russian, Intermittent, or Meuse Fever.26 Although there was no cure for the disease until the end of the war, it wasn’t particularly fatal. The only debilitating effect it had was that the six-week to three-month recovery period was a serious drain on manpower.

The least debilitating but still annoying aspects of trench life suffered by soldiers were flies, nits, and the overwhelming stench in the trenches. During the summer months of both the

Civil War and World War I, flies swarmed the trenches in mass droves, as attracted to the remnants of food and corpses left out in the open as the rats had been, carrying with them a strong odor of death and leaving maggots in their wake. Nits, like lice, were common among soldiers during World War I, infesting men’s hair and bringing more diseases such as scabies, boils, and other ailments of the skin. As for the stench of the trenches, it was a combination of a variety of things – the contents of latrines, rotting food, body odor from unwashed men, chemicals spread in attempts to minimize infection or rid soldiers of lice, flies, and other varmints, and of course decomposition.

Paul Fussell quotes Theodor Ropp as saying that the

American Civil War was the first “in which really large numbers

26 Ibid, 57 Page | 23

of literate men fought as common soldiers.”27 Although a lot of writings about war experiences emerged long after said wars were over, a number of memoirs and poetic works also emerged from within the trenches as well; the latter usually written by ordinary soldiers whom history would probably never remember.

The literary works of the men from the trenches are, perhaps, one of the most lasting remnants – aside from the trenches themselves – of what life was like.

Soldiers used writing as a way to express themselves; to give voice to opinions, questions, and thoughts that, in other circumstances, they couldn’t otherwise state, as well as to recount their own personal experiences. Civil War accounts were not necessarily limited to time spent in entrenchments, but ranged in topics from feelings of dissent or homesickness, daily camp life, injuries, etc. They spoke of morale, of cowardice, of slavery, and of imprisonment.

Take, for instance, the medical practices of the Civil War.

As mentioned earlier, battlefield medicine was, for lack of a better term, archaic in the respect that, looking back on it, it would be hard to discern whether or not a soldier would have been better off before or after receiving medical attention. It is not often that one can find a first-hand account that not only describes the events of a battlefield, but one that does so

27 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 157 Page | 24

from the perspective of someone suffering from a debilitating injury. In his diary, Lt. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote what could have been his last thoughts on the battlefield; his words potentially shared by many young men who were not so fortunate to have survived: “—Shot through the lungs? Let’s see – and I spit – yes – already the blood was in my mouth…What should I do? Just then I remembered and felt in my waist coat pocket – Yes there is was – a little bottle of laudanum which I had brought along – But I won’t take it yet; no, see a doctor first – It may not be as bad as it looks – At any rate wait till the pain begins.”28 Other soldiers documented their thoughts in letters home; regaling their loved ones with anecdotes from camp or the after- events of a battle. In one such letter, a soldier recounts one night during the siege of Vicksburg: “I have a touch of intermittent fever. Hundreds of the boys are under the care of the doctor for chills and fever. We are drinking water a little better than poison…The cannonading about Vicksburg is fiercer than ever. Las night the doctor gave me some infernal stuff for my fever that kept me awake. It must have been midnight before I got to sleep. I lay with the flap of my tent thrown back watching the shells from a hundred mortars, making a fiery half-circle as rising like a flaming rocket, they circled and fell into the city; then followed the explosion. How can those people sleep? I should think the people of

28 Michael A. Bellesiles, A People’s History of the U.S. Military (New York: The New Press, 2012), 96-97 Page | 25

that city would be perishing for sleep. There has not been an hour the three weeks past but shells have been bursting in every part of the city.”29 Much of the writings that came out of World War I trenches were more along the lines of poetry rather than diaries and letters, but the premise behind the writings was very much the same as it was in the Civil War. Again, the soldiers of WWI used literature and prose as a way to express opinions and thoughts that they couldn’t otherwise share, not to mention as a way to cope with being in abysmal situations. But what makes

Civil War writings different from WWI writings was the way they did so. In their writings, Civil War soldiers held almost nothing back in their descriptions of what was going on around them. They got straight to the point and vocalized in great detail in both letters and diaries. Although letters frequented the trenches of WWI, soldiers were often not allowed to provide too much detail to friends and family at home about where they were and what was happening; forcing soldiers to provide only vague descriptions and essentially put on a “brave front” – alluding that they were happy and that all was well.

In a sense, the poetry that emerged from within the trenches was a way to supplement an inability to accurately vent one’s frustrations about their situation, as well as describe trench life without giving away too much. The poetic language

29 Ibid, 101 Page | 26

allowed soldiers to describe watching comrades die from disease

or gas or artillery, participating in sieges or full-out

assaults, or general day-to-day activities in ways devoid of

overly-gruesome detail, but they were still able to accurately

convey the harshness of their current reality. Siegfried

Sassoon was one such soldier who was able to convey his feelings

about warfare through the use of poetry. “In winter trenches, cowed and glum, With crumps and lice and lack of rum, He put a bullet through his brain. No one spoke of him again. You smug-faced crowds with kindling eye Who cheer when soldier lads march by, Sneak home and pray you'll never know The hell where youth and laughter go.”30

Trench Culture:

History defines culture as a set of beliefs and rituals

passed down from generation to generation within the same

circles, thus fostering a sense of community. “Trench culture”,

while perhaps not exactly something passed down from generation

to generation, still consisted of various shared beliefs and

rituals that brought these soldiers together into a kind of

makeshift family; united in a desire to retain some semblance of

normalcy and make the best of an undesirable situation.

30 Siegfried Sassoon, Suicide in the Trenches, accessed April 5, 2013 http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/suicide- in-the-trenches/ (January 3, 2003) Page | 27

Civil War “trench culture” was found more within camps than in actual entrenchments, but still served the same purpose.

Both Union and Confederate troops passed the time between battles with similar activities. Troops would play pranks on one another, celebrate holidays like Christmas and Thanksgiving, throw parties, and even gamble; anything to avoid feelings of homesickness or boredom or avoid thinking about inevitable battles.

One of the most popular past times – especially in the

South – was music. Bell Irvin Wiley states, “The men who wore blue, and the butternut Rebs who opposed them, more than

American fighters of any period, deserve to be called singing

31 soldiers.” Many soldiers left for war bringing with them violins, guitars, banjoes, etc. Armies on both sides had battalions with their own bands, and soldiers would often perform in duets or form glee clubs that performed for the entire company, singing regular favorites like “Home Sweet Home” and “Dixie” for the Confederates, and “Yankee Doodle” and “The

Battle-Cry of Freedom” for the Union. Even Gen. Robert E. Lee remarked that he didn’t believe that they could “have an army without music.”32

31 Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank (US: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1951), 157 32 Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 157 Page | 28

Another shared past time among both Union and Confederate

troops was literature, although it was more popular with Union

soldiers. Both groups of soldiers took an interest in

newspapers; however they were more readily available to Northern

troops than their Southern counterparts. However, both Union

and Confederate soldiers enjoyed reading the classics when they

could obtain them – the Bible, works by Shakespeare, The Count

of Monte Cristo, Paradise Lost, etc. But, as mentioned, reading

was a more popular and available activity among the Union.

There were a number of reports of entire battalions having their

own libraries or organizing “literary associations”. One

soldier from Massachusetts wrote, “We have a library of about

33 500 or 600 volumes of good reading…”

Along with literature and music, sports were yet another popular (and shared) activity. Union and Confederate soldiers would engage in familiar sports like boxing, wrestling, leapfrog, and baseball. Hunting was another favorite activity.

However, one of the most interesting activities partaken by both

Northern and Southern troops (that wound up being eerily similar) was snowballing. A Confederate soldier, Lt. T Otis

Baker described one snowballing incident in his diary: “About the latter hour 9 A.M. two lines of battle were formed by the 10 & 44 Regts which charged the…[camp] of the 41st Miss. –

33 Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank (US: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1951), 156 Page | 29

The result of the battle was the dispersion of the 41 who for a short time fought stubbornly, the capture of their Colonel and several other officers and the occupation of their Regimental Parade. – In the afternoon they again advanced upon our camp in three columns, having previously made an insolent demand for the unconditional surrender of the army of the East, as we were called, allowing us but ten minutes in which to decide. The demand being refused a hot attack was made and after an engagement of half or three quarters of an hour terminated in their repulse. Their losses were their commandr in chief, their three corps commanders, besides several other officers of rank, and two of three stands of 34 colors.”

A Union soldier recorded a similar snowballing incident: “Both regiments formed a line of battle, each officered by its line and field officers, the latter mounted. At the signal the battle commenced; charges and counter- charges were made, prisoners were taken on either side, the air was filled with white missiles, and stentorian cheers went up as one or other party gained an advantage. At length victory rested with the Vermonters, and the Jersey boys surrendered the field 35 defeated.”

World War I “trench culture” had similar elements of that of the Civil War. Reading, while not as popular among World War

I soldiers as it had been during the Civil War, was still a common enough past time by a few soldiers. Popular literature

34 Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 65 35 Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank (US: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1951), 170 Page | 30

for soldiers were often works provided by religious

organizations, newspapers, or books scavenged from buildings;

some divisions would even form their own libraries.36

When not on the front, entertainment was also somewhat similar to that of the Civil War. Music and sports were widely popular forms of entertainment for soldiers, and usually came in the form of government sponsored programs for the entire battalion. Team sports like football, rugby, or cricket were just a few pre-programmed activities meant to “foster military cohesion.”37

The celebration of holidays was another facet of trench

culture that was shared by both Civil War and World War I

soldiers alike. The Western Front, in 1914, experienced what

was known as the “Christmas truce” in which soldiers from both

sides exchanged gifts and souvenirs, and even had a soccer match

in the middle of no-mans-land.

The trench cultures of these two wars were remarkably

similar, despite being 50 years apart. They helped to boost

morale, relieve boredom and feelings of homesickness, and

strengthen the bonds of the soldiers serving together by making

the trenches seem more like home. In a similar way to how

writing was a method of dealing with the trauma of warfare, the

36 Stephen Bull, Trench: A History of Trench Warfare on the Western Front (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 87 37 John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 142 Page | 31

culture that developed in the trenches brought a sense of much- needed normalcy to a completely abnormal situation.

For soldiers in both the Civil War and World War I, trench life was nothing to be desired. It was a cold, wet, disease- ridden experience from which there was seemingly little to no reprieve other than death at the hands of an enemy that, unbeknownst to them, was suffering in very much the same ways.

Between Civil War experiences and those of World War I, it is difficult to say which group of soldiers suffered more.

Advances in medicines perhaps made it easier for some to deal with the diseases presented to them, but the situation in its entirety was nothing short of barbaric. Yet out of all the things to come out of trench warfare, perhaps the writing is the most inspiring thing. Besides having been a way for soldiers to cope with the filth and disease that permeated the trenches – and war in general – the letters, diaries, memoirs, and poetry that survived throughout the years are some of the few things that can truly provide some sort of window into the life these men had to endure.

Page | 32

Chapter 2: The Building of the Trenches

In the Civil War, for both Union and Confederate forces, those primarily responsible for the design and construction – or, at least, overseeing the construction – of trenches and defensive earthworks were members of their respective engineer troops. Along with the construction of earthworks, engineers were also responsible for building pontoon and railroad bridges, destroying enemy supply lines, building roads, conducting topographical surveys, and providing accurate maps. Although both the Confederacy and the Union had their own Engineer Corps, their levels of efficiency – especially in regards to the construction of both offensive and defensive field fortifications – were vastly different.

Corps of Engineers:

Created in 1779 by the Second Continental Congress, the

Corps of Engineers was an integral part of the Civil War in maintaining each army’s ability to function. Institutionalized in 1802 with the creation of the U.S. Military Academy at West

Point, its status achieved through its strong connection with the school resulted in a curriculum that was “heavily oriented Page | 33

towards engineering.”38 For instance, in 1842 it was decided

that the assistant professor of engineering would be required to

go through postgraduate training in military engineering. The

course, taught by Dennis Hart Mahan – the foremost expert in

fortifications in the US – required students to design a

fortification for a site and then plan an attack against it39.

Politically, West Point’s initial goal in focusing on

engineering was to produce well-trained engineers who could go

back to civilian life and still maintain their technical skills.

Therefore, the Corps of Engineers was primarily in charge of

West Point and much of its faculty members were also part of the

Corps. By the time of the Civil War, many of the big names in

the military – individuals like George McClellan, George Meade,

P.T.G. Beauregard, and Robert E. Lee – were all members of the

Corps of Engineers or had received some form of training in that

field.

There were two engineering corps at the start of the Civil

War – the general Engineering Corps and the Corps of

Topographical Engineers, which was created during the War of

1812; the latter being responsible, at first, for mapmaking, but

during the Civil War was responsible for conducting

“explorations, surveys, and reconnaissance’s of uncharted areas

38 Earl J. Hess, Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 1 39 Ibid, 1 Page | 34

and sites for defenses.”40 Both were eventually combined into

one Corps of Engineers by 1863 for “reasons of efficiency.”41 It

was far easier to simply have all available engineers work on

topography rather than designate a whole separate unit for the

job; plus by combining both corps it increased the number of

available engineers.

The Delafield Commission:

What might have been one of the most important

contributions to the study of field fortifications conducted by

the Corps of Engineers was the Delafield Commission of 1855-56.

The three officers involved in the Commission – Maj. Richard

Delafield (for whom it was named), Maj. Alfred Mordecai, and

Capt. George B. McClellan – were originally supposed to observe

the military operations of the Crimean War, but instead their

actions resulted in the Delafield Commission being the first to

not only observe several countries but also the first to see

“the immediate aftermath of operations.”42 From April 11, 1855

to April 28, 1856, the three officers observed military

operations in England, France, Prussia, Poland, Russia, Berlin,

Vienna, and Constantinople; each of them covering different

aspects of these operations – Delafield concentrating on

40 “Engineers in the Civil War,” last modified on March 7, 2002, http://www.civilwarhome.com/engineers.htm 41 Ibid 42 Earl J. Hess, Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 3 Page | 35

engineering, Mordecai on artillery and ordinance, and McClellan on cavalry and various other military matters.

In Delafield’s report, he made some note on the use of fortifications. Although much of his focus was on seacoast forts, he did notice the effective use of field fortifications as well; especially among the Russians, who were the first to use what would become known in the Civil War as “rifle pits” – which were small pits or shortened trenches that held singular to small groups of riflemen – and who managed to hold their own for eleven months against superior numbers and artillery. Yet, despite Delafield’s commentary on the efficiency of what he deemed “temporary field fortifications, with inexhaustible supplies of the munitions of war”43 it had very little effect on the thoughts and actions of military officers in the years leading up to the Civil War. The reports from the Delafield

Commission had been distributed among the military, but provided little if no recommendations as to how they should change or improve tactics and operations on the battlefield. If anything, the Delafield Commission only served to prove that while the

American military was still growing in its conduct and understanding of warfare, they lacked the ability to foresee new methods that could change the way their military might operate, and take the initiative in meeting those changes.

43 Ibid, 4 Page | 36

Theories and Tools:

Despite the Delafield Commission’s lack of influence, there were still theories circulating throughout the pre-Civil War military as to the role of field fortifications and whether or not they should be used for offense or defense on the battlefield. As Dennis Mahan was still the leading expert on fortifications – and would retain his engineering position at

West Point until 1871 – it was his expertise that was often referred to, although not often followed by field commanders.

In regards to the use of field fortifications, Mahan believed that armies should use what he called an “active defense”, where one would “use field fortifications to create a defensive position, entice the enemy to attack it, and damage him significantly. Then, follow up with a counterattack that would be sure to take the enemy position and scatter or decimate the opposing army.”44 At the time of its conception it was a good theory, but it was not practical. It required one to know that their enemy would be lured in to attack. It also required one to have an army that would be convinced to dig in rather than immediately attack which, if ones troops were primarily made up of gung-ho, young recruits eager to prove themselves, urging them to be patient would prove rather difficult.

44 Ibid, 6 Page | 37

As for tools, Mahan was also primarily responsible for

providing military manuals that related to fortifications. For

both pre-Civil War and during the Civil War, what qualified as

fortifications included “breastworks” (a barrier created on the

ground’s surface from materials gathered from the surrounding

area), “earthworks” (trenches and parapets dug into the earth),

or using existing features (buildings, stone fences, etc.) as

cover. In his manuals, Mahan believed that fortifications

should be “effective as a physical barrier to the attacker and

give an opportunity to the defender to use his weapons most

effectively”45, and advised methods on how to both attack and

defend field works. He also provided detailed instructions on

how to construct these fortifications, from breaking down the

different components of earthworks and making suggestions as to

how to shape them better for defense to describing different

obstacles or “artificial obstacles” to place in front of works

to “delay and frustrate the advance of an enemy force.”46

Despite Mahan’s expertise on fortifications, his theories and manuals might as well have been obsolete by the Civil War.

In regards to his theories, Mahan failed to take into account the gradual changes in military affairs that, by the start of

45 Ibid, 9 46 Ibid, 9 Page | 38

the Civil War, would have a major affect. Specifically, there

were two changes.

The first was the potential that the now widespread use of

rifle muskets could alter military tactics. Before the Civil

War, rifles and muskets were two separate types of firearms –

the former having an advantage with accuracy due to the “rifled”

barrel, or the grooves cut into it that sent the bullet into a

stabilized spin upon being fired, and the latter having an

advantage with a greater rate of fire. By giving a musket a

“rifled” barrel, it combined the strengths of both weapons into

a single deadly machine. The grooved barrel allowed for the

musket to fire at a much deadlier range (200-500 yards rather

than the 50-75 yards of a smoothbore), and because they were

quick to load it made them much easier to use and required a

minimum amount of training. 47 Also, over the course of the

Civil War different types of rifle muskets were developed; one of the most popular (among Union troops) being the Spencer repeating rifle, which, with its 7-round magazine, could effectively fire 14-20 rounds per minute as opposed to the 2-3 rounds per minute of a traditional muzzle-loader.48 The

introduction and widespread use of these new weapons meant that

47 “Rifled Musket”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rifled_musket 48 “Spencer Repeating Rifle”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spencer_rifle Page | 39

suddenly troops could inflict sufficiently more casualties than in previous wars with very little effort.

The second was the fact that the large numbers of volunteer troops recruited at the start of the Civil War were trained in only basic, linear formations, and field commanders had to effectively learn how to direct large numbers of troops across battlefields with obstacles that prevented the use of such formations. As for the manuals, it was much more straight- forward. His suggestions on how field fortifications should have been used were based on theories that had never before been tested on a battlefield, and thus were considered to be unrealistic. Mahan’s theories and manuals had very little impact on the way Civil War commanders dealt with the use of fieldworks. They chose, instead, to rely more on improvisation.

Union Engineers:

By 1864 and the start of the Overland Campaign, the U.S.

Army Corps of the Engineers (who, by this point, had integrated the Corps of Topographical Engineers into their ranks) was under new leadership. Previously, the chief engineer of the entire corps was Brig. Gen. Joseph G. Totten, who had been in charge of the corps since 1838. However, upon his death in April, he was replaced by none other than Richard Delafield – the man for whom the Delafield Commission was named. At the time of the Overland Page | 40

Campaign, he was sixty-six years old and well past the age at which one should be on the field. Therefore, most of the engineer officers accompanying the Army of the Potomac were relatively young in comparison; a few of them had even only recently graduated from West Point, thus having no field experience49.

On the field, the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac during the Overland Campaign was a West Point graduate by the name of James Chatham Duane. Other engineer officers who served during the campaign included Cyrus B. Comstock (who was a part of Grant’s headquarters staff), George L. Gillespie, James St.

Clair Morton, and Peter Smith Michie (chief engineer for the

Army of the James). Their duties included lying out and supervising the construction of fortifications, as well as topography; however they were also occasionally called to perform actions outside the field of engineering, such as reconnaissance and guiding troops to new positions.

At the start of the Civil War, there were only 48 officers in the Corps of Engineers, eight of whom had retired. The Corps of Topographical Engineers, back when it was still a separate unit, consisted of only 45 officers and had no enlisted men.

Despite efforts to try and increase the numbers of men within

49 Earl J. Hess, Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 1 Page | 41

both corps, they were barely able to recruit enough troops to

fill its ranks.50 Known as the U.S. Engineer Battalion, and

consisting of four companies (one created pre-Civil War, and

three created after the battle of Fort Sumter), they were mostly

used to construct bridges and roads, however there often came

times where they were used on the battlefield as infantry

troops. In comparison to other Union field armies, the Army of

the Potomac had more engineers serving amongst its ranks,

however in truth they didn’t have enough men to handle all the

tasks required of them throughout the Overland Campaign. Along

with the U.S. Engineer Battalion, the Army of the Potomac also

had a number of volunteer units; the two specific ones being the

15th New York Engineers and the 50th New York Engineers. By the

time of the Overland Campaign, the Volunteer Engineer Brigade

only consisted of the men of the 50th New York Engineers.51

Along with regular and volunteer units, the Army of the

Potomac also had pioneer units who were used to remove

obstructions, repair roads during campaigns, help construct

trenches and latrines, and bury the dead after engagements.

Pioneers were often men who were pulled from the ranks, but

50 Earl J. Hess, Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 11 51 Earl J. Hess, Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 8 Page | 42

sometimes free black laborers were hired to do the work as

well.52

Confederate Engineers:

Like many things in the Confederacy at the start of the

Civil War, building an Engineer Corps had to be done from

scratch. They created their own Corps of Engineers in 1861, but

like their Union counterparts they barely had enough men to

handle the number of responsibilities and duties that the army

required of them. Also unlike their Union counterparts, they

did not have a separate corps for topographical engineers, thus

requiring all available engineers to produce maps as well as the

other technical duties required of military engineers.53

There was one man responsible for making the Confederate

Engineer Bureau into a reputable institution; Lt. Col. Jeremy F.

Gilmer, who became chief engineer of their respective Engineer

Corps in 1862 and remained so until the end of the war, and was

(like many others) a graduate of West Point and already a member

of the Corps of Engineers. His predecessors, all of whom had

been temporary, had been lacking in the experience required to

lead an engineer corps. Under Gilmer’s leadership, the corps

not only managed to increase its budget, but Gilmer only

52 Earl J. Hess, Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 16 53 Ibid, 17 & 21 Page | 43

appointed those he felt were best qualified for positions, provided subordinates with advice on field fortifications, and spoke with the Confederate War Department and Congress with any concerns he had about engineering.54 He increased the number of engineers within the corps and even issued general orders clearly detailing the responsibilities of the engineers in the field.

The chief engineer for the Army of Northern Virginia during the Overland Campaign was another West Point graduate, Maj. Gen.

Martin Luther Smith. A topographical engineer, Smith also provided general orders that detailed the duties of all field engineers serving with Lee. Those duties included the need to, at all times, sketch the terrain, note distances, the location of streams, the condition of crossings for infantry and wheeled vechicles, the availability of campsites and good defensive positions, and if within sight of enemy troops, locate their position, make note of weak and strong points, and make sure that defending troops properly connected with their flanks. 55

Unlike in the Army of the Potomac, engineer troops in the

Army of Northern Virginia were meant work separately from pioneer units that already existed within Lee’s army. Duties of pioneer troops, however, were surprisingly similar to that of

54 Ibid, 20 55 Earl J. Hess, Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 13 Page | 44

their Union counterparts – repairing roads, digging trenches and

latrines, and burying the dead after engagements. Also, like in

the Union army, the physical work of constructing fortifications

was done by infantry units while the engineers were primarily

responsible for laying out lines or dictating where they should

be laid.56

Although both armies drafted free blacks to work as

laborers, the Confederate government also attempted to utilize

the use of slaves as another source of labor. Slave owners

would be paid $20 a month to part with slaves for up to sixty

days – although service would be extended if owners delayed in

sending their slaves – and would be compensated if their slaves

were either injured or killed during service. Although each

state within the Confederacy was required to produce up to

20,000 workers, the idea of even temporarily parting with their

slaves was so unpopular among slave owners that many states

simply chose not to comply.

Confederate Advantage:

When it comes to comparisons in strength between the Union

and the Confederacy, a general assumption is that in a majority

of cases the Union would have the advantage. After all, they

56 Hess, Field Earl J. Hess, Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 24 Page | 45

didn’t have to build a new nation completely from scratch and they also had access to more resources. When it came to their engineers this was definitely the case. The Union maintained control of the original engineer corps established at West

Point, and through them gained a larger portion of experienced officers at the offset of the war – only 7 of sixty-five West

Point cadets who joined the Confederate army were members of the

Corps of Engineers.57

Although both armies suffered from a shortage of engineers, it was the Confederacy that better adapted to supplement its numbers. Whereas the Federal army’s means of gaining new engineers was to simply employ untrained soldiers into that field, the Confederacy mandated that each field division have an assigned company of engineer troops. Those troops were taken from within the field divisions and selection was based on their experience in either mining or construction trades, thus ensuring that they were at least somewhat qualified (or at least had the skill required) to do the necessary work.

The ability to produce superior numbers was not the only way in which Confederate engineers outshone those in the Union.

The level of commitment rebel engineers put towards creating, constructing, and improving their field fortifications over the

57 Shaun Martin, “Confederate Engineers in the American Civil War,” Engineer 30, no. 4 (2000): 42-46, http://search.proquest.com/docview/196442103?accountid=28180 (accessed December 22, 2012).

Page | 46

course of the war was far greater than their Federal

counterparts; and while it didn’t win them the war, their

creativity and innovativeness on the battlefield in regards to

their fortifications changed the very nature of the battles in

the Civil War. Early on in the war, the Confederacy recognized

the usefulness of trenches and fortifications, while it took the

Union until the last legs of the war to fully appreciate what

fortifications could do if used effectively. Confederate

engineers managed to successfully utilize the effectiveness of

fortifications for not just defensive purposes, but for

offensive tactics as well58.

Geography:

Before going into the actual construction of field

fortifications, it is important to make a note of the geography

of Civil War campaigns. Field commanders were often forced to

make modifications to troop movements, deployments, and tactics

based on factors such as “the strength of a military force,

range and capability of available weaponry, and existing

obstacles and advantages of terrain.”59 And as far as engineers

were concerned, knowledge of terrain would have a major effect

on how earthworks were constructed.

58 Ibid, 42-46 59 Clarence R. Geier and Kimberly Tinkham, “Cultural Landscapes and Collateral Damage: Fredericksburg and Northern Spotsylvania County, Virginia, in the Civil War,” in Historical Archaeology of Military Sites: Method and Topics, ed. Clarence R. Geier et al. (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 167 Page | 47

On the topic of terrain, natural topographical features are

not the only things to take into account as to how they affected

the field of battle; especially when it comes to the Civil War.

Civil War battles were not fought in open territory still

untouched by the progress of man. More often than not, large-

scale warfare would take place in people’s own backyards – or,

at least, close enough to human civilization that the sounds and

smells of the battlefield could reach noncombatants. With that

in mind, terrain in this regard also includes man-made

formations such as roads, farms, houses, etc. which also served

to alter the ground on which battles were forged.

The fighting ground on which much of the Civil War –

specifically the Eastern Theater – occurred was actually

relatively small; primarily a 100-mile space between Richmond,

Virginia and Washington D.C60. It was a small enough arena that

troops often found themselves returning to locations where they

had previously fought before, as was the case with the Overland

Campaign, where veteran troops returned to the site of the

Peninsula Campaign that was fought two years prior. That

“arena” was essentially split into three geographical regions:

60 Hess, Field Earl J. Hess, Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 25 Page | 48

the Atlantic Coastal Plain, the Piedmont, and the Shenandoah

Valley.61

The Atlantic Coastal Plain, or Tidewater, was a flat, sandy ground that stretched along the coast. It made up 25% of

Virginia’s landmass, averaged about 100 miles wide, and had an elevation of 300ft above sea level. The soil of the Coastal

Plain was a mixture of sand and clay, and supported forests of mostly cedar and pine trees.62

The Piedmont covered about one-third of Virgina, and its

most important feature was the 4-10 mile wide borderline that

separated it from the Coastal Plain. That border was known as

the Fall Line and it stretched directly from Washington D.C. to

Fredericksburg, Richmond, and Petersburg. Elevations along the

Fall Line ranged from 300 to 500 feet, whereas elsewhere it

ranged from 800 to 1200. Unlike the Coastal Plain, forestation

consisted more of oak trees than cedar and pine.63 The

importance of the Fall Line had less to do with its

topographical advantages however, and more with the fact that

its location served as a direct link to both the Union and

Confederate capitols, and thus made it a prime target for

ensuing campaigns.

61 Ibid, 25 62 Ibid, 25 63 Ibid, 26 Page | 49

The final region, the Shenandoah Valley, was one of the six valleys that made up the Great Valley of Virginia. Made up of a number of sandstone ridges, the valleys themselves were mostly grassland that was the result of limestone and shale that lay underneath the surface.64

In the early campaigns of the Civil War the fighting was drawn to either one or two regions, usually either the Coastal

Plain or the Shenandoah Valley. Except for at the Fall Line,

Union troops tried to avoid fighting in the Piedmont because it kept them further away from Richmond. It was along the Fall

Line that the Overland Campaign took place; an area covered with dense forests and undergrowth with elevation that ranged from a high 350ft to a low 100ft.

The reason why noting geography and terrain is important in regards to the construction of field fortifications is because, when it came to most Civil War battles, the military action was spontaneous. There were very few instances where the terrain of a battlefield was specifically or “deliberately shaped or prepared to attract or protect against anticipated military action.”65 Meaning, military forces knew beforehand that a battle was to take place at a certain location and constructed their fortifications accordingly. The battles

64 Ibid, 26 65 Clarence R. Geier and Kimberly Tinkham, “Cultural Landscapes and Collateral Damage”, 167 Page | 50

during the Overland Campaign were instead influenced by the already existing conditions of the battlefield itself. Battle locations were purely coincidental, and thus field commanders and their engineer troops were left to their own initiatives on how to effectively exploit the natural materials available to them in regards to fortifications and military tactics.

The Building of the Trenches:

Defensive fortifications (outside of forts and strongholds) were considered to be anything that could effectively shield a soldier from oncoming bullets – meaning that defensive structures ranged from anywhere between fallen trees to stone walls, so long as a soldier could hide behind them. Because it was the Confederacy who, early on, recognized the importance of defensive structures and fortifications, most examples of Civil War trenches come as a result of Confederate engineers. It was their trenches and their innovations both defensively and offensively that made a strong impact in military operations during the Civil War and in the years after.

In pre and early Civil War military engagements, the traditional standard of trench design was known as a “straight- line” trench; named, as one might assume, from its appearance as it was essentially a straight line carved into the landscape from which men would stand and shoot at an opposing force. But Page | 51

in 1862 at the Battle of Fredericksburg, a Confederate Brig.

General by the name of Cadmus Wilcox developed a new style of defensive trench – one that both served him well and soon became the new standard of trench design for the rest of the Civil War and afterward. Also named for its appearance, it was known as a

“zigzag” trench66. Defensively, the zigzag trench was far superior to the straight-line in that it allowed for fewer casualties. With the straight-line trench, if an enemy force were to breach its defenses all they would have to do was fire down the line and they could wipe out the entire defending force. Similarly, if an artillery strike were to hit a straight-line trench the results could be equally as devastating. If an enemy were to breach a zigzag trench then they would have a harder time wiping out the entire unit as they would only be able to see the section they were in. The same went for artillery strikes, as with a zigzag trench they were more likely to hit dirt than the entire defending force.

There are a number of different components that go into trench construction. First there was the “fill”, which consisted of logs, fence rails, or stones that were piled up along the intended line before the actual digging began. The

“parapet” was a protective mound of dirt excavated from the

66 The Associated Press, "Civil War Zigzag Trench Will be Preserved." Daily Press, Sep 19, 1993, http://search.proquest.com/docview/342682256?accountid=28180 (accessed December 22, 2012).

Page | 52

“ditch” that usually wound up covering the “fill”, and was held up by a wall of logs, planks, sandbags, and stones known as the

“revetment”. There were various ways engineers would construct these ditches. There were front, or exterior, ditches, and then there were rear, or interior, ditches. An exterior ditch work was usually in front of the parapet, while a rear-ditch work was behind it67.

Front (exterior) Ditch Work Rear (interior) Ditch Work

Each type of ditch work had its advantage. Exterior ditch works were usually constructed when engineers had time to prepare their fortifications, and its advantage was that it gave soldiers another level of defense in that it may as well have served a similar purpose to a moat. Rear-ditch works were the typical rifle trenches that were able to be quickly built on the battlefield, and its advantage was the speed at which it could be dug. Also, rear-ditch works were often dug deep enough that a soldier would be allowed to stand behind the parapet and

67 Museum of the Confederacy, “Civil War Fortifications Tour”, April 5, 2003, 1 Page | 53

balance their gun on top of it, granting them extra protection from enemy fire68.

Zigzag trenches were not the only innovations the

Confederacy made when it came to field fortifications in regards to defensive strategies. As a way to counter the deadly accuracy of enemy sharpshooters, engineers invented what was known as a “head log”, which was a long piece of hardwood placed atop the parapet and supported by blocks which raised it high enough for a soldier to slide his musket beneath it while still protecting the soldiers’ head from enemy fire. In other cases, those blocks would be replaced by skids that were laid down at the rear of the trench so if the head-log was knocked off it would roll down the skids without causing injury to the soldiers behind it.69 Another example of innovative defensive trenchwork, first started by Confederate General Joseph Johnston, was the construction of up to three lines of fieldworks, including one at the rear lines.70

Despite primarily waging a defensive war, Confederate engineers were still able to create and employ innovative offensive strategies with their fieldworks. One offensive tactic was the creation of skirmish lines that gradually moved closer to enemy works and protected itself by a series of

68 Ibid, 1 69 Shaun Martin, “Confederate Engineers in the American Civil War,” Engineer 30, no. 4 (2000): 42-46, http://search.proquest.com/docview/196442103?accountid=28180 (accessed December 22, 2012). 70 Ibid Page | 54

individually dug rifle pits that were later connected into a simple rifle trench and then enforced. Another innovation was a device known as a “sap roller”, which was a large cylindrical basket filled with rocks and soil and closed at both ends.

Soldiers aiding in the construction of trenches and other fortifications – who were also known as “sappers” – would roll the baskets until they were directly in front of Union lines, thus granting troops the ability to move into enemy works in the middle of an engagement and construct their own rifle trenches while being simultaneously shielded from enemy fire.71 Even the use of obstacles like fallen branches and strung-out telegraph wire made their first appearances during the Civil War.

The ingenuity and innovativeness of Civil War engineers – especially Confederate engineers – made a lasting impact on the effectiveness of entrenchments and fortifications not only during the Civil War but for future trench warfare. Many of the devices and trench designed created and used during the Civil

War would reappear – albeit occasionally improved upon by 50 years of advanced technology – in the First World War.

71 Ibid Page | 55

Chapter 3: European Observations and the Trenches of WWI

Fifty years before the outbreak of World War I, trench

warfare went from sporadic usage to being institutionalized as a

viable defensive tactic on the battlefield. While nowhere near

as large in comparison as World War I, for its time the American

Civil War was considered to be the first “modern” war in both

advances in technology and the tactics and techniques used to

bring warfare to an entirely different level than previously

experienced.

The historical association of trench warfare with the First

World War can be viewed as having to do primarily with the fact

that never before was it used to as large of an extent, but the

later years of the American Civil War – from 1863 to 1865 – were

described by a German observer as “the period of the spade and

ax, when field fortifications ruled the battlefield.”72 With

that in mind, there is potential to find a parallel in the

extent to which trench warfare was relied upon in the Civil War

to that of World War I; and similarly, comparisons between their

respective trenches might suggest that one had some influence

over the other.

72 Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), 64 Page | 56

Civil War Observers:

Just like how the American government was interested in understanding the military operations of Europe during the

Crimean War, European governments were equally interested in the operations, tactics, and strengths of the American military during their own major war. Whether it was for political or, in individual cases, personal reasons, each of the top military powers in Europe – Britain, France, and Prussia (what is now

Germany) – had their own stake in a desire to observe and learn more about how Union and Confederate forces conducted their military campaigns during the Civil War.

There were a few ways in which European soldiers could obtain eyewitness information about the Civil War. One was through newspapers, due to the constant contribution of war correspondents who first gained notice during the Mexican and

Crimean Wars. In some cases, European correspondents observing the war would provide their own accounts of the goings on for their respective publics. Britain, for example, received the frequent controversial writings of Sir William Howard Russell with the Times; while French newspaper Le Moniteur also maintained regular correspondence73.

Other sources included published narratives of individuals who had visited America during the war. In a lot of those

73 Ibid, 7 Page | 57

cases, the narratives came from European soldiers who actually saw military service among either Union or Confederate troops.

However, the narratives only provided a limited amount of information; their only significance being that they were published either during or shortly after the war. There were also reports and various notes from official military observers

– a source that many soldiers and civilian students of war found to be far more gratifying as far as receiving viable information was concerned.

Although foreign officials were often well-received by both the Union and the Confederacy, and both sides were often willing to share technical information, actually observing Confederate operations under an official capacity often proved difficult.

Along with refusing to recognize the Confederacy as an independent country, the United States government, rather than fearing the foreign observers would trade military secrets, suspected many of actually being “rebel sympathizers”. As a result, foreign observers often found that the only way to gain access to the Confederacy was to sneak through the Union blockade74.

British Observation:

74 Ibid, 12 Page | 58

British interest in American military operations stemmed from a mixture of political and personal reasons. Politically, the English hoped that by observing the way America conducted themselves militarily they could obtain strategies and technologies to help rectify their own military shortcomings that had come to light after the Crimean War. Also, after the

Trent Affair – an international, diplomatic incident that occurred shortly after the offset of the Civil War in which a

Union naval ship removed as “contraband of war” two Confederate diplomats headed for Great Britain off a British mail carrier – they believed that there was potential for a future war with the

United States. Personally, despite English distaste for slavery, there were many members of the British army who were sympathetic towards the Confederacy. In comparison to other

European observers of the Civil War, Britain obtained the most complete account of military operations as they were the only ones to fully observe from both sides of the conflict75.

One of the first British observers of the American Civil

War was a retired veteran of the Crimean War, Maj. General Sir

George Bell. He arrived in September 1861 and stayed long enough to observe McClellan’s Army of the Potomac to form his own opinion of it, stating:

75 Ibid, 14 Page | 59

“The Federal army is increasing every day in strength and discipline, the men are strong, stout, and healthy, in fine feather, and 76 ready to prime and load.”

However, Bell did not remain with McClellan’s army long enough to witness any actual fighting.

Another British observer who spent time among both Union and Confederate forces but also did not witness any actual combat was the Marquis of Hartington who, with his brother Lord

Edward Cavendish, observed the battlefield of Antietam (ten days after the battle) and encamped above Fredericksburg. Like Bell,

Lord Hartington also commented on the usefulness of new regiments as “soldier material”, but believed that their usefulness could only be found if there were qualified officers to train them77.

A prominent, yet “unofficial”, observer was Lt. Col. James

Arthur Lyon Fremantle, who spent three months traveling with the

Confederacy; most notably with Robert E. Lee at the Battle of

Gettysburg. Fremantle’s observations tended to focus more on

Confederate infantry than anything else, marveling at how “with the most perfect nonchalance”78 veteran soldiers would conduct themselves under fire.

76 Ibid, 15 77 Ibid, 19 78 Ibid, 22 Page | 60

Along with the few unofficial observers, the British War

Office did send individuals to America in a more official

capacity. Due to the War Office’s interest in the American

Civil War being related primarily to its technical aspects,

almost all of their observers were either members of the Corps

of Royal Engineers or the Royal Artillery79. This and the fact that the skill of America’s Corps of Engineers held significant influence over the course of the Civil War could lead one to assume that British observers took note of not only advancements made in weaponry but defensive tactics as well.

Most, if not all, British observers seemed to share an initial opinion of the Civil War soldier in general, specifically those of the Union. Lord Hartington, in his observations, described them as “…very jolly and in good

80 spirits, but they had no drill whatever.” Another observer,

Captain Charles Cornwallis Chesney, called the Union army of

81 1861 an “armed and dangerous mob.” For the British, it all

came down to a lack of discipline. Unlike in Europe, where

soldiering was still considered to be a profession, the ordinary

soldier of the American Civil War was still, first and foremost,

a civilian. However, as leadership changed and the Union army

79 Ibid, 23 80 Ibid, 19 81 Ibid, 103 Page | 61

gradually improved in discipline and military capability, those

opinions also changed to a more favorable tone.

Another shared opinion among British observers was that

neither the Union nor the Confederacy knew how to correctly use

cavalry. Civil War cavalry was known to fight dismounted and

typically with the use of firearms which, to observers like

Chesney and Fremantle, were not the “traditional manner” –

meaning on horseback, charging forward into infantry with the

use of a sabre or lance. According to Chesney, the tendency for

American cavalry to fight on foot was “most detrimental to their

usefulness, and likely to be confirmed into an evil tradition.”82

It wasn’t until after the Civil War that some observers recognized the advantage that repeating firearms gave the

American cavalry. One such observer, Maj. Henry Havelock, noted that a reason why the Union cavalry was so effective was “by making a liberal use, dismounted, of their repeating rifles.”83

Although British observers paid attention more to U.S.

Coastal forts when it came to engineering, they did make note of

the use of field fortifications and their effectiveness. One

observer, Sir John Burgoyne (who was Inspector General of

Fortifications), was so impressed with the earthworks

constructed in the Civil War that in 1870 he claimed that

82 Ibid 104 83 Ibid, 111 Page | 62

“earthworks would provide the best fortifications..” and believed that with the increasing use of rifled arms and a subsequent need to more cover that entrenching tools should

“become standard issue.”84 Yet, despite their acknowledgement, very few observers actually recognized the significance entrenchments had on Civil War battles. If anyone did predict that there would be a greater reliance on entrenchments in future wars, that realization was not attributed to the Civil

War. Instead, in regards to fortifications in general, the

Civil War was just “one step in a general trend in warfare.”85

Prussian Observation:

Prussian observations of the Civil War were vastly different from those of Britain. Unlike Britain, who sympathized with the South, almost all of Prussia sympathized with the Union cause. In fact, around 200,000 ethnic Prussians actively served in the Union army throughout the Civil War.86

However, the war gained less attention in Prussia than it did in the Britain or France because Prussia was involved in its own military affairs. That aside, despite the large number of eyewitnesses to the Civil War, surprisingly few accounts actually made their way to the Prussian public. Most accounts

84 Ibid, 44 85 Ibid, 108 86 Ibid, 53 Page | 63

tended to be about the writer’s own experiences during the war,

rather than about the technical aspects of the American military

itself.

Two of the most prominent German observers of the Civil War

were Otto Heusinger and Captain Justus Scheibert. An unofficial

observer who served in the 41st New York Regiment in the Union

Army, Heusinger documented his experiences with the intention to

give the Prussian public a better idea of a war he felt was

being ignored (as mentioned earlier, due to their own concurrent

military engagements). Unlike other European observers,

Heusinger grasped the significance of Civil War techniques early

on. Along with an appreciation for the effectiveness of rifled

muskets as well as commenting favorably on the use of dismounted

cavalry troops, Heusinger not only acknowledged the growing

reliance on the use of entrenchments on the battlefield but also

recognized their importance as a defensive tactic in warfare.87

Scheibert, on the other hand, was a member of the Prussian

Corps of Engineers whose job was to observe “the effect of

rifled artillery against earth, masonry, and iron.”88 Besides being an official military observer, Scheibert differs from

Heusinger in that he was also a Southern sympathizer. Although

87 Ibid, 54 88 Ibid, 60 Page | 64

technically ordered to accompany the Union army, Scheibert spent most of his time observing the Confederacy.

In his notes, Scheibert claimed that the gradual evolution of Civil War infantry occurred in three phases. The first phase, according the Scheibert, was made up of “improvised tactics, inadequate discipline, and uneven leadership”89 – all of which, as agreed upon by most European observers, culminated at the Battle of First Bull Run. The second phase (1862-1863) was one in which, after much improvement in organization, training, and discipline by both armies, there came an emergence of linear tactics. For Scheibert, traveling amongst the Confederacy he viewed this phase as one in which the Confederates took strategic initiatives and acted more on the offensive.

As for the third phase (1863-1865), it was Scheibert who described it as the “period of the spade and ax..”, noting that the Confederate reliance on entrenchments was due primarily to the fact that the overwhelming numbers Lee faced left him no choice but to turn to defensive tactics. Although Scheibert was not a fan of the extensive use of entrenchments, he did acknowledge their effectiveness, noting: “the superiority of…[defensive] tactics over all other means of fighting was demonstrated to the point that all attempts made to

89 Ibid, 64 Page | 65

employ different tactics failed 90 completely.”

Like Britain, although German soldiers acknowledged the use entrenchments had during the Civil War, they did not fully appreciate their significance. As far as they were concerned, the idea that entrenchments would ever be used to the extent that they were during the Civil War never crossed their minds.

Trenches as a tactic were “of value primarily to raw troops and militia.”91 The Prussian military mindset was that a military victory could not be obtained if one only fought a defensive war; and that was what an extensive use of entrenchments suggested. Oddly enough, it was civilian students of the Civil

War rather than soldiers who later recognized the significance of entrenchments, and the impact they would have on future wars.

One individual, a Polish banker named M. Bloch, said that with the new advancements made in artillery and machine guns they had become “so deadly that flesh and blood must evade them by some means, and would probably take to trenches.”92 Another civilian, a novelist named Karl Bleibtreu, also anticipated how entrenchments would shape the nature of battle, going on to state, “Lee’s trenches, running for many miles along the river

90 Ibid, 65 91 Ibid, 131 92 Ibid, 140 Page | 66 banks or through the forests anticipate…what can well make its

93 appearance in the war of the future.”

French Observations:

France was in a different position militarily than Britain or Prussia at the time of the Civil War. Whereas Britain was looking for military reforms and Prussia was on the verge of its own military endeavors, France (at the time) had no reason to change its current military conduct. This was primarily due to the fact that most military forces – the Union and Confederate militaries included – fashioned themselves after the French style; from regulations to even uniform design. Any initial interest in the Civil War was simply out of general curiosity rather than a want of understanding.

The French actively refused to send any official observers to America during the early years of the Civil War, so any initial information they received came from an observer from the

Swiss military, Major Ferdinand Lecomte. Lecomte’s reports were the only ones to have been published and widely distributed while the Civil War was still ongoing rather than being published shortly afterwards. Lecomte, like most early observers of the war, was immensely critical of the Union Army of the Potomac. He disapproved of the way politics influenced

93 Ibid, 142 Page | 67

the assignments of high ranking officers and, like other observers, noted that shoddy performance was due to “lack of authority in the generals…”94 Unlike most observers, Lecomte barely mentioned cavalry tactics in his report – or tactics in general, choosing to focus more on organization and equipment instead. He had a high appreciation for Civil War firearms as well as the resulting large-scale use of field fortifications; but like almost all other observers, Lecomte did not feel that the latter was something worth taking away.

It wasn’t until 1864 that the French government finally sent over their own official observers. One observer was a

Colonel in the French Artillery Corps by the name of Francois

DeChenal. Just like Lecomte and other European observers,

DeChenal criticized the Union’s lack of an organized general staff. However, he was greatly impressed with other aspects of the army such as its engineers, weaponry, and even camp conditions.95

DeChenal differed from other European observers when it came to his evaluation of tactics, especially the tactic of entrenchments. Unlike his fellow observers, he actually recognized their significance during the Civil War. In his notes regarding Union infantry he states:

94 Ibid, 86 95 Ibid, 94 Page | 68

“Hardly has the army halted…before it is entrenched without waiting for the engineer officer;…if the position has to be held, all these rough works are perfected and lines and redoubts are built which are quite as artistic as the best of military 96 constructions.”

Just like with Britain and Prussia, some French critics of the Civil War did acknowledge the use of field fortifications.

However, there were very few individuals who actually, along with acknowledging their use, also recognized their significance in not only the Civil War but in the future of warfare. One individual, P. Poullet, went so far as to exclaim that when it came to West Point’s teachings of military engineering “the

Americans had shown themselves to be our masters.” In Poullet’s opinion, the widespread use of entrenchments during the Civil

War was one of its most “significant tactical developments” and argued that the use of trenches, rather than ridding a soldier of their desire to fight, would “enable a general to withhold substantial reserves until the time had arrived to deliver a counterattack.”97

However, it was Captain L. Auger of the French engineers who was the first to truly understand the impact that Civil War entrenchments would have on future military conduct, as well as the circumstances that led to the rise in their use. According

96 Ibid, 96 97 Ibid, 153 Page | 69

to Auger, the development of trench warfare in America was “an

affair of circumstances, experience and improvisation.”98 It was modern weaponry with its increased rate of fire more than a need to supplement a lack of numbers that led to the widespread use of trenches during the Civil War, and it was this fact that, as far as Auger was concerned, would make the use of defensive tactics like trenches “the true mode of combat of the future.”

According to Auger, “…the attack, instead of placing all confidence in numbers and élan, will have to proceed with slowness, gain ground gradually, and consolidate each step.”99

Misreading the Civil War:

Despite all the different observations and detailed

reports, one thing remains clear from all European observations.

Set in their beliefs that their own military ways were “best”,

the governments of Britain, Prussia, and France and the men they

sent overseas failed to understand the new developments that

arose from the American Civil War – especially those in regards

to trench warfare.

The European countries instead chose to focus on issues

such as the uses of cavalry and the organization of troops, but

even then they ignored the developments that occurred during the

98 Ibid, 166 99 Ibid, 167 Page | 70

Civil War and their future implications. Cavalry troops during the Civil War became known as “mounted infantry”, and although some observers approved of this tactic others believed that

America did not understand the true purpose of cavalry. Despite the advances in weaponry – which was what made dismounted cavalry so effective – many in Europe still believed that cavalry was nothing without a horse and a sword. Some individuals even went so far as to claim that the reports of the increased rate of fire in modern weaponry were exaggerated and that massed cavalry charges would still prevail in future wars.

Another thing to note is that each of these countries still believed in the idea of the professional soldier. As such, they frowned upon the American method of recruitment; the use of untrained volunteers to fill the ranks of the military. Again

Britain, France, and Prussia failed to grasp a major lesson of the Civil War – that future conflicts would be fought on a much larger scale than previous wars.

A French soldier, Captain De Thomasson, who studied the

Civil War, described his country’s military thought pre-1914 as

“the passionate cult of the offensive.”100 This phrase also accurately describes the military ideals of both Britain and

Prussia as well. All three countries were of the shared opinion that the only effective way to not only fight but win a war was

100 Ibid, 165 Page | 71

to do so from an offensive stance. To fight in a way that relied heavily on defensive tactics such as trenches would, according to many within the military, strip their soldiers of any sort of “fighting spirit”. Just like the pre-Civil War engineers of America, they failed to grasp the importance that modern weaponry would have on the evolution of war – that greater firepower would lead to greater casualties and that the only way to counter this was through the use of protective cover.

World War I Trenches:

Following the Battle of the Aisne (Sept. 14, 1914), World

War I ceased being a war of movement and for almost four years entrenchments dominated the battlefields. Known as the “Race to the Sea”, combined French and British forces attempted a series of maneuvers in the hopes to outflank and subsequently break through German entrenchments, but to no avail. The Western

Front soon became a static line of trenches stretching nearly

400 miles from Lorraine, France to the North Sea on the coast of

Belgium. Page | 72

Although each country had their own manuals describing

trench layout and design, on a very basic level all three

countries – Britain, France, and Germany – relied on the same

general pattern of trenches. In each case, the front of the

trench was called the “parapet” and was usually measured about

10ft. Like the trenches of the Civil War, trenches of World War

I were either dug down into the earth or they were built upwards

using whatever materials were handy. In World War I, regardless

of whether or not trenches were dug or built, the last 2-3ft of

the parapet would be made out of sandbags101. Despite their

name, sandbags were rarely ever filled with sand. The preferred

materials were earth or clay102. Because of the obvious

difficulty of being able to see/fire over the top of a 10ft high

trench, carved out of the wall at the bottom of the trench was a

101 John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 13 102 Ibid, 12 Page | 73

2-3ft high ledge called a fire-step. The back of the trenches were called the parados, and like the parapet was also built with sandbags. And in order to prevent the walls of the trench from subsiding, they would use sandbags and timber (Britain and

Germany) or hurdles or bunches of cut twigs (France) as revetments103.

In Britain, trenches were regarded as a “means to an end”; used to protect troops and enable them to use their weapons to full efficiency, as well as reduce losses. Early British trenches following the Aisne were described as: “..a succession of narrow pits capable of holding a few men. Generally they were of the narrow type, 18 inches to 2 feet wide, 104 with tiny traverses, 3 to 6 feet wide.”

The basic trench design was outlined in Britain’s 1911 edition of their Manual of Field Engineering; and although the standard instructions provided took into account variables like the average physique of soldiers within the trenches as well as the resistance of construction materials, the actual dimensions of British entrenchments varied based on opportunity, tactical employment, and conditions. The standard distance between a fire step and an elbow rest at the top of the trench was about

4’6”, and the fire step itself was to be about 18 inches wide.

103 Ibid, 13 104 Stephen Bull, Trench: A History of Trench Warfare on the Western Front (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 36 Page | 74

The standard thickness of an earth parapet – in the case that sandbags weren’t being used instead – was about 3’6”.

Instructions for German trench design could be found in their Field-Pionierdienst Aller Waffen (Field Pioneer Work for all Arms) that was also published in 1911. The typical German trench had a depth of 70 inches however, like Britain, actual dimensions and detail were dependent on outside factors – in the

German case, specifically water levels. Fire steps were 16 inches wide and walkways were 24 inches wide.105

Not much can be said about French instructions in regards to trenches except that they did not mention the use of sandbags. The French model focused more on the use of earth or wooden planks and logs to support their trenches. In comparison to British and German trenches, the French trench was significantly less refined. Many referred to them as “tumble-

105 Ibid, 39 Page | 75

down”, noting that they were “too shallow” and lacked sufficient cover; not to mention the French had a tendency to simply bury their dead where they fell so finding bodies at the bottom of a trench was not uncommon106.

World War I trenches were not simply one solitary line stretching across the Western Front, but were usually built in triple lines – the fire trench, the support trench, and the

reserve trench. Some trench systems were built with more than three lines, but this is yet another example of a commonality among the three countries. The lines were connected by a series of communication trenches dug in the same “zigzag” pattern I mentioned having been used in the Civil War, and allowed soldiers to move in relative safety from one line to the next.

106 Ibid, 41 Page | 76

Similarly, just as in the Civil War, the main trench lines were

not dug in a straight line. Rather than use the “zigzag”

pattern however, some chose to dig their trenches into a

sectioned pattern known as firebays and traverses. The firebays

were the straight section that had a length of about 10 yards,

while the traverses jutted outwards107.

Another feature of World War I trenches were dugouts or

some form of shelter for Officers and regular infantrymen to

protect themselves from both natural elements and enemy

artillery fire. Shelter ranged from simply covering the top of

the trench with a piece of wood, iron, or tarp, to a hole carved

107 John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 14 Page | 77

into the front or rear wall of the trench – the latter option

aptly named by all parties as “funk-holes”108.

Dugouts and officer headquarters among British, French, and

German trenches varied in both size and level of comfort. The depth of such dugouts depended on where in the trench lines one was stationed. For example, a dugout found in a fire trench in

1915 consisted of a 4ft by 7ft “room” with “a bed, six foot by two, and two two-foot square tables made of board and old boxes.

The walls and corrugated iron roofs were lined with sandbags and

109 two small holes were made to serve as doorway and window. ” A

dugout at the reserve line could be as deep as 30-40ft because

heavy artillery guns were typically focused on those trenches.

As far as who among British, French, and German trenches

had more habitable dugouts, the general consensus is that the

Germans were better off. Because it was the Germans who had

initially entrenched along the Western Front, they not only had

the advantage of the high ground but had a more desirable

location in which to entrench. Also, the Germans went to great

lengths to make sure that their dugouts were relatively

comfortable. German dugouts in the rear lines of the Somme were

described as “thirty to forty feet deep, connected by tunnels

and steel railway systems”, having “electric lights and

108 Ibid, 16 109 Ibid, 17 Page | 78

ventilation provided in all rooms”, and “paneled walls and planked floors.” An English soldier’s description of a captured

German dugout noted that: “The walls were boarded with neatly morticed timers, telephone wires were laid along the walls, iron girders were boxed in, ceilings were painted white, woodwork varnished, and in the officers’ quarters one even found wooden beading, carpets on the floors, and glass windows.”110

While not necessarily part of the trench itself, obstacles were another common sight on the Western Front; specifically wire entanglements. Wire was usually placed about 20 yards in front of the fire trench and was about 2ft 6 in high. In placing the wire, it was ideal to place it in its own shallow trench or behind some sort of concealment, thus leaving enemy forces unaware of its presence. Also, by having the wire be, for lack of a better term, “sunken”, it was less likely to be damaged by artillery fire111.

Although it is hard to determine whether or not the same innovations and trench designs that appeared in World War I were influenced by what observers saw in the Civil War, one has to admit that there a lot of similarities between the two; from certain designs (i.e. the “zigzag” pattern) to even the names of different aspects of the trenches themselves.

110 Ibid, 19 111 Stephen Bull, Trench: A History of Trench Warfare on the Western Front (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 54 Page | 79

Conclusion:

The American Civil War and World War I both made effective use of the defensive strategy that is trench warfare. Although similar in design and meant to serve the same purpose, the very nature of the battles in which they were used was strikingly different. The later years of the Civil War, despite the presence of entrenchments, could still be considered a war of movement (Civil War soldiers, although relying on entrenchments as a means of defense, still moved outside of them for a majority of time on the battlefield). World War I on the other hand, particularly when it comes to the Western Front, is looked upon as a war without movement – one in which soldiers would remain in the same place for weeks, months, and even years without having moved more than a couple feet across the battlefield.

This paper has explored the development and evolution of the trench warfare of both the American Civil War and of World

War I. Despite having to start from scratch, the Confederacy not only managed to create a strong and effective Engineer’s

Corps, but they surpassed the already long-established Corps of the Union in both skill and innovativeness when it came to trench construction and use. The lack of an already established and tried system allowed for the Confederacy to branch out and Page | 80

try new theories and methods of both supplementing numbers of workers (focusing on the skill of the applicants rather than family names) and of trench construction itself. Side-by-side comparisons of Civil War and World War I trenches find that most aspects of the trenches are surprisingly similar. To be more specific, when it comes to the trenches themselves, those made in World War I are either exactly the same if not slightly modified versions of the trenches developed during the Civil

War. Civil War and World War I trenches share similar patterns

(i.e. the “zigzag” pattern), similar names for various parts of the trenches, and even similar construction materials. Even everyday life during both the Civil War and World War I had shared hardships; in both cases, filth and disease were about as equally hazardous as a headlong charge over the top.

I have also explored the development of camp/trench culture during the Civil War and World War I. The reason I have specified that one was predominantly “camp culture” while the other was “trench culture” is not simply because of where the culture developed but because, just like how the entrenchments of World War I were an evolved form of those of the Civil War,

“trench culture” was a more intensely evolved version of “camp culture”. Civil War camps were temporary settlements that, in most cases, were usually located far enough away from the battlefield that they weren’t in any immediate danger. The Page | 81

trenches of World War I had a greater, more implied sense of permanence, especially for the men who resided within them.

Even though World War I bunkers were located in the rear trenches, they were still on the battlefield and were thus, albeit rarely, still subjected to artillery fire. The “camp culture” of the Civil War developed as a way for men to pass the time. The “trench culture” of World War I developed as a way for men to not only escape from the monotony of general trench life, but to forget about the harsh realities of their situation and make life as normal as one could under their abnormal circumstances.

There are undeniable similarities between Civil War and

World War I trenches. However, to say that the former had any direct influence over the latter is speculative at best. Europe either outright disregarded or misinterpreted the lessons of the

American Civil War – that increased firepower and accuracy, as well as changing demographics when it came to the numbers of those participating in active military engagements, would call for a heavy reliance upon defensive measures which included the use of entrenchments – for reasons that basically amounted to arrogance. At the time of the Civil War, and even in the years leading up to World War I, many other countries (including

America) modeled their military styles and performances on

Britain, France, and Germany. Their ways had served them Page | 82

extremely well until 1914, and so they saw no reason to change them; and they believed that the situation in America was simply a fluke that arose due to the landscape on which the Civil War was fought.

One can speculate that when European countries realized they were facing similar circumstances to that which occurred during the Civil War that their governments and top military officials looked back on the reports obtained from their own observers. Although my research states that quite a few observers made note of the use of entrenchments, they make no mention of whether or not said observers did more than just comment on their effectiveness. If any recommendations were given to military officials by their observers, it was on matters of weapons technology or cavalry not entrenchments.

Those that did recognize the importance of entrenchments either did not do so until just before the start of World War I, or they were civilian scholars of the Civil War who had no impact on the military workings of their countries.

So how do we explain how two very different wars wound up using very similar tactics? It is entirely possible that the

Civil War was a precursor to World War I trench warfare, but did not directly influence it at all; after all, the definition of

“precursor” means to proceed or lead to the development of something. It was acknowledged by Europe that many facets of Page | 83

the Civil War itself would pave the way for the future of warfare, but pre-1914 they did not believe that entrenchments were a part of that future. Europe never anticipated that they would eventually come to rely so heavily on defensive strategies that, pre-1914, they considered to be cowardice. And so, perhaps trench warfare developed during World War I for the very same reasons it did during the Civil War. Perhaps Europe, like

America, eventually realized that the advancements made in modern weaponry would result in greater casualties than in previous wars; that the use of cover and entrenchments would help to reduce casualties; and that it was more productive to err on the side of caution than to place unwarranted faith in one’s own self-perceived notions of superior morale and might.

Then again, perhaps there was influence from the Civil War, but just not as directly as the evidence seems to suggest.

Although I was unable to find evidence that European observers produced detailed descriptions of Civil War entrenchments, the fact that they are so similar suggest that some awareness as to how they were made and what they looked like was prevalent among officials during World War I. In his book, Jay Luvaas does note that after the events of World War I, a lot of soldiers and scholars went back and did a more in-depth study of the Civil

War, but who is to say that such a study did not occur soon after the start of the First World War as well? Perhaps Europe Page | 84

did eventually realize that the Civil War deserved far more credence and consideration than was given, and chose to rectify their earlier misconceptions about its importance in the future of warfare by putting its tactics to use.

Trench warfare has left its mark as an influential part of military history. From as early as Roman times to even recent years, soldiers have relied on defensive structures to reduce casualties and to withstand the onslaught of superior forces.

Despite their effectiveness, trench warfare, as evidenced by both the Civil War and World War I, are fought at a bloody and horrendous cost and serve as a brutally honest reminder of the futility and hopelessness that is often found in the face of large-scale, long-term war.

Page | 85

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