Catastrophic Bioterrorism— What Is to Be Done?

CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY Catastrophic Bioterrorism— What Is To Be Done? by Richard Danzig CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY FORT LESLEY J. McNAIR WASHINGTON, D.C. August 2003 Catastrophic Bioterrorism— What Is To Be Done? by Richard Danzig AUGUST 2003 CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON, D.C. The Center for Technology and National Security Policy The Center for Technology and National Security Policy was established in 2001 to analyze national security issues that are significantly affected by technology. Its staff composition is designed to create synergy between senior scientists and defense policy analysts. The Center provides private advice to the Department of Defense, publishes articles, and hosts conferences. Its major programs include: military transformation, information technology, defense science and technology, biological sciences, social science modeling, and curriculum support. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. This publication is cleared for public release, distribution unlimited. Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without further permission, with credit to the author and the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University. For additional information call (202) 685–2529 or visit our Web site at http://www.ndu.edu/ ctnsp/index.html. Research and writing for this paper were completed in June 2003. Contents Introduction vii Section 1 Why Bioterrorism Warrants Exceptional Preparation 1 Section 2 The Absence of a Common, Systemic, Operational Understanding 3 Section 3 Creating a Common, Systemic, Operational Understanding: Four Cases for Planning 5 Section 4 Some Initial Observations and Recommendations about Two Capabilities in the Context of the Anthrax and Smallpox Cases 7 Section 5 Capabilities 19 Section 6 Conclusion 21 Endnotes 22 Appendix: Acknowledgments and List of Experts Consulted 29 About the Author 31 Introduction t is now widely recognized that terrorists may inflict recommends that, in the near term, we focus on four great trauma upon us by using biological weapons particular cases to guide Federal agencies in their I(bacteria, viruses, or toxins1) against America’s preparations for bioterrorism directed against our civilian populations. There is, however, no common civilian populations.3 (In the course of the paper, 12 perception of how this problem should be defined and particularly salient recommendations are advanced.) countered. In the language of today’s business consult- It also shows how to counterbalance the difficulties ants, neither the “problem space” nor “the solution that come with this approach by, among other things, space” has been well mapped. In military terms, we do establishing a “case 5 committee.” not have an “operational concept.” In common sense The fourth section begins the recommended terms, we have not established a method of focusing effort of analyzing cases and capabilities. It does this our efforts, testing alternative strategies, setting by focusing closely, in two of the cases, on two kinds requirements, and determining priorities. of capabilities that are important to our biodefense. This paper is designed to show how we can do This analysis yields concrete—and in my judgment, these things. It is organized in five major sections. imperative—recommendations for countering these The first section shows why bioterrorism threats. Most significantly, this discussion is an illus- demands extraordinary preparation. tration of the rewards of the method I am proposing. The second develops the argument that current The fifth section identifies 10 capabilities that we preparation is flawed by the absence of a common, sys- must improve if we are to successfully counter bioter- temic, operational understanding of bioterrorist rorism. It is a map of the contexts in which I believe threats. Though different aspects of the problem (for we should apply the techniques illustrated in the pre- example, the ability to weaponize certain agents, the ceding section. A broad and fruitful planning effort value of vaccines, the potential contributions of detec- will, I believe, evolve from assessing these capabilities tors, or requirements for hospital beds) are at least par- in the context of selected cases. tially understood, the whole is not linked into a unified I will participate in this broad effort, but seek by concept of operations. Our agencies operate now like the publication of this document to engage others in independent fingers, each poking at a problem, while this work, whether in their own organizations, with the hand is unable to grasp the task in totality.2 one another across organizations, or in collaboration The third proposes that we coordinate our efforts with me. by establishing a set of common planning cases. It Section 1 Why Bioterrorism Warrants Exceptional Preparation number of studies have identified American could (and did) ground airliners. Later, we flew vulnerabilities to terrorism. Around the globe, fighter aircraft over our cities. In the longer term, we Aterrorists have attacked airplanes, ships, trains, took security measures that significantly impede buses, office buildings, embassies, markets, theaters, hijacking. As a result, any further attacks of this mag- resorts, monuments, government officials, business- nitude will probably need to employ different people, and individuals who simply happened to be in weapons in a different manner. the wrong place at the wrong time. Rarely have such When the anthrax letters were mailed, 11 people attacks involved biological weapons.4 Why then do contracted inhalational anthrax, 5 of whom died. Call these weapons warrant extraordinary attention? this “5/11.”Although the number of casualties was Many have observed that biological weapons are limited, the national security vulnerabilities made “a poor man’s atomic bomb.” A single biological apparent by 5/11 are greater than those associated attack can kill a great many people, while the tech- with 9/11. This is because of reload. Attackers who use nologies to develop and deliver these weapons are rel- biological weapons probably can avoid prompt detec- atively inexpensive, accessible, and difficult to detect, tion and stockpile or replenish resources that permit much less interdict. However, an additional attribute repeated attack. Making a gram of readily aerosolized of bioterrorism would, if commonly recognized, anthrax spores in a weaponized 1-to-5-micron range amplify these concerns. I call this phenomenon is a technical challenge, but, once production is “reload.” To understand it, contrast the 9/11 air accomplished, it is a much lesser challenge to make 1 hijacking attacks with the anthrax letters that fol- kilogram. And it is not a significant challenge for a lowed in the fall of 2001 and even more pointedly terrorist organization that can make a kilogram to with the outdoor (aerosol) biological attacks that make 10 or 100 kilograms.5 Nor, absent exceptional could occur in the future. luck, do we have effective means of interdicting a bio- After inflicting a national trauma on 9/11, the logical attack, even if we know that one has already attackers could not promptly repeat their achieve- occurred and that others are on the way.6 This is espe- ment. They had consumed resources that were diffi- cially true with respect to outdoor (aerosol) attacks. cult to replenish (trained pilots willing to sacrifice While we can shut down our mail system (with great themselves). Even more significantly, the modality economic consequence—think how taxes and bills are that they used depended, in some measure, on sur- paid and parcels are shipped), we cannot shut down prise. Once alerted to this technique, we had some the atmosphere. ability to counter it. Passengers on the fourth 9/11 air- The gram of anthrax mailed to Senator Patrick craft fought back. (Months later, passengers and crew Leahy reportedly contained one trillion spores of similarly overpowered a terrorist attempting to set off anthrax. Since inhalation of 8,000 to 10,000 spores is a bomb concealed in his shoe.) National authorities generally regarded as likely to be lethal for the average 2 Catastrophic Bioterrorism: What Is To Be Done? person,7 a gram perfectly effectively and efficiently Acts of terror may achieve political ends by physi- disseminated outdoors under optimum weather con- cal destruction, but they operate primarily in psycho- ditions and inhaled by an unprotected population logical and political dimensions. Instrumental terror- theoretically could kill 100,000 people. Outdoor dis- ists aim to disable governments by diverting semination in liquid or powder form would not be resources, enhancing divisiveness, and undermining difficult. Of course, a perfectly efficient distribution the confidence of citizens in their government. Ulti- and exposure rate would not be achieved. All calcula- mately, if a government cannot protect its citizens, tions of infection and lethality associated with biolog- acts of terror sap their targets’ will to persevere in ical weapons are uncertain,8 but a reasonable approxi- policies the terrorists oppose. Viewed this way, terror- mate planning premise is that a gram of anthrax ists and

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