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Lessons of the War in Ukraine for Western Military Strategy

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Lessons of the War in Ukraine for Western Military Strategy CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 242, April 2019, Editor: Fabien Merz Lessons of the War in Ukraine for Western Military Strategy NATO is prioritizing conventional military capabilities to deter Russian encroachment on the alliance. Western planners and strategists view the war in Ukraine as a key benchmark that defines future capability requirements. As a result, various adaptive processes are underway within national armed forces. By Niklas Masuhr When Russian intervention forces occu- pied the Crimean peninsula in February 2014 in a coup de main, NATO was still committed in Afghanistan. After more than ten years of counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, the crisis in Ukraine triggered a reorientation towards its original purposes of defense and deter- rence. During the same year, at the NATO summit in Wales, it was decided to enhance the speed and capability with which NATO forces could respond to a crisis. The subse- quent Warsaw summit in 2016 added rotat- ing multinational contingents in its eastern member states in order to signal the entire alliance’s commitment to their defense. Be- low these adaptations at the level of NATO, national armed forces are being reformed and rearranged because of the shift in threat perception. This analysis focuses on the mil- US Army paratroopers during NATO exercise Swift Response on Adazi military ground, Latvia, June 9, 2018. Ints Kalnins / Reuters itary forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. The tactics and ca- pabilities Russia has brought to bear in eastern Ukraine in particular serve as the benchmark according to which these West- deliberately designed to offset Western cations in Iraq and Afghanistan, neither ern forces are being shaped. strengths and to capitalize on NATO’s could be counted on in a potential clash weaknesses since 2008. One major element with Russian troops, significantly increas- Russian Warfare of these “New Look” reforms was techno- ing the risk of casualties. At first glance, stabilization missions such logical; in particular, a focus on highly as those in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to modern standoff weapons such as long- During Russian operations that led to the be more complex tasks for militaries to ex- range cruise missiles, anti-ship and anti-air occupation of Crimea and the escalation in ecute than conventional combat against missiles, and equipment designed to dis- Donbass, respectively, the government ob- foreign peers. However, a revived Russian rupt enemy radio and satellite communica- scured and denied the involvement of its military is posing fundamental challenges tions. While Western forces enjoyed unim- troops. The Kremlin touted units deployed to NATO and its members, as it has been peded air superiority and secure communi- to Crimea as “local resistance fighters”, and © 2019 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 1 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 242, April 2019 entire army formations supposedly consist- example via a Western military interven- that a quick, surging military effort can de- ed of “volunteers currently on vacation”. In tion. As such, they allow Russian forces to feat any adversary appears to have become reality, Russia pursued its objectives in both be deployed with a low footprint, primarily a thing of the past. The reaction is a broad- theaters through a combination of local relying on local proxies, special operations ening of the conceptual sphere in which sympathizers and Russian troops that at forces, or private contractors while rein- the US Army conducts operations. This least initially consisted of low-footprint forcing the appearance of a local resistance means that next to the traditional domains special operations and expeditionary forces movement – as opposed to an outside mili- of air, sea, and land, the new domains of without insignia to keep the narrative of tary intervention. outer space, cyberspace, and the electro- local resistance alive as long as possible. magnetic spectrum are viewed as relevant Apart from this focus on deniability and It should be noted, however, that the Rus- domains in which to conduct warfare. The ambiguity, the coup de main in Crimea and sian interventions in South Ossetia, nascent doctrine designed to deter Russia later Russian operations in the Donbass Ukraine, and Syria have been, and continue and China in the future, Multi-Domain have little in common. The Crimean opera- to be, executed in vastly different contexts Operations, seeks to synchronize activities tion in particular, carried out by light expe- with distinctly identifiable approaches. Ac- in all domains quicker and more effectively. ditionary forces, is a unique case since its cordingly, it is not possible to codify Rus- success was in part enabled by a local popu- sian military action in a “playbook”, as is Additionally, the Pentagon expects future lation that largely viewed the existing Rus- often assumed. Similarly, conceptual pillars conflicts to be fought in a “grey zone”. This sian naval base at Sevastopol as legitimate. of contemporary Russian warfare revolve means a space between peace and war in around traditional arguments put forth by which military means are deployed covertly However, in eastern Ukraine, a similar ap- Soviet military theorists, even if in recent and merge with intelligence and propagan- proach resting on a minimal Russian pres- history the emphasis has been placed more da activity – as observed in Crimea and ence was markedly less successful, as sepa- on non-military and unconventional means. Donbass. In those crisis scenarios, prema- ratist militias were driven back by the As such, the often implied image of a ‘new ture or disproportionate military action on Ukrainian army despite being supplied Russian way of war’ does not hold up. the part of Western forces risks a loss of with weapons from Russia. In order to sal- public legitimacy and could serve as a justi- vage the military situation, Russian armed US Land Forces fication for open (or at least less covert) forces conducted two large-scale offensives The US Army has undergone several sig- Russian intervention. To be able to respond in August 2014 and January 2015 involv- nificant transformations in recent years, to such conditions, the US Army has estab- ing thousands of troops, which enabled each designed to focus the force on a par- lished Security Force Assistance Brigades, Moscow to negotiate favorable ceasefire ticular challenge in line with national secu- consisting of experienced soldiers capable agreements at Minsk. In combat, these rity priorities. The last of these transforma- of training and advising friendly countries’ troops primarily used massive artillery fire tions was the attempt spearheaded by troops within their own borders. For one, to destroy Ukrainian units from afar. Sepa- prominent generals, such as David Petraeus, this step intends to bolster the host mili- ratist militias were deployed as screening to rearrange the Army’s structure and doc- tary’s ability to resist encroachment or out- forces to reduce casualties among Russian trine in order to conduct counter-insurgen- right invasion – the Ukrainian army could cy, stabilization, and counter- be a potential candidate – without high In eastern Ukraine, a similar terrorism operations. However, material costs. On the other hand, the approach resting on a minimal with the Russian military re- Army considers forward-deployed training turning to the forefront of US missions to be an advantage if US or Russian presence was markedly threat perceptions, planners and NATO troops are sent to reinforce the host less successful. thinkers have realized that old nation in the event of a crisis. The assump- assumptions and dogmas are tion is that the training teams would al- obsolete. Previous assumptions ready have forged links with the local mili- regulars and to spot and identify targets for about how to fight a conventional war cen- tary and population, which would enable the artillery. Additionally, Russian forces tered on the notion of US superiority in ev- reinforcing units to operate more easily in were equipped with anti-air systems and ery relevant element of modern warfare, in the relevant socio-political context – sophisticated electronic warfare equipment particular through air superiority and as- deemed a necessity in a “grey zone” context. in order to keep the Ukrainian air force at sured real-time communications. bay. The core of Russian regulars was only However, the escalation into conventional used in combat against significant Ukrai- However, the recent Russian investments fighting seen in eastern Ukraine points to nian targets using traditional equipment mentioned above have leveled the playing the risks associated with not preparing for such as main battle tanks, as well as mod- field, especially its anti-air weaponry, long- this kind of warfare. Accordingly, the US ern communications and reconnaissance range artillery, and electronic warfare capa- Army has started to adapt its troops’ train- drones. bilities designed to jam US satellite and ing and equipment in order to ensure supe- radio communications. US Army doctrinal riority over Russian contingents. For ex- Besides its ground forces, the modernized documents since 2014 make this problem ample, Army troops are being trained to Russian military is equipped with standoff quite explicit. The main assessment is that conceal themselves from drone-mounted weapons such as ballistic missiles and air- Russia and China in particular have found modern sensors and to operate without re- and sea-launched cruise missiles – not to a way of employing military force that off- al-time communications and navigation. In mention Moscow’s large arsenal of strate- sets US superiority and capitalizes on flaws terms of equipment, the US land forces are gic nuclear weapons. These long-range sys- in the US logic of war. As such, Russian primarily attempting to regenerate their tems explicitly serve to deter a local conflict operations in Ukraine have obvious global artillery capabilities for effective suppres- from escalating at Moscow’s expense, for implications for the Pentagon.
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