Lessons of the War in Ukraine for Western Military Strategy

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 242, April 2019, Editor: Fabien Merz

NATO is prioritizing conventional military capabilities to deter Russian encroachment on the alliance. Western planners and strategists view the war in Ukraine as a key benchmark that defines future capability requirements. As a result, various adaptive processes are underway within national armed forces.

By Niklas Masuhr

When Russian intervention forces occu- pied the Crimean peninsula in February 2014 in a coup de main, NATO was still committed in Afghanistan. After more than ten years of counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, the crisis in Ukraine triggered a reorientation towards its original purposes of defense and deterrence. During the same year, at the NATO summit in Wales, it was decided to enhance the speed and capability with which NATO forces could respond to a crisis. The subse- quent Warsaw summit in 2016 added rotat- ing multinational contingents in its eastern member states in order to signal the entire alliance’s commitment to their defense. Be- low these adaptations at the level of NATO, national armed forces are being reformed and rearranged because of the shift in threat perception. This analysis focuses on the mil- US Army paratroopers during NATO exercise Swift Response on Adazi military ground, Latvia, June 9, 2018. Ints Kalnins / Reuters itary forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. The tactics and capabilities Russia has brought to bear in eastern Ukraine in particular serve as the benchmark according to which these West- deliberately designed to offset Western cations in Iraq and Afghanistan, neither ern forces are being shaped. strengths and to capitalize on NATO’s could be counted on in a potential clash weaknesses since 2008. One major element with Russian troops, significantly increas- Russian Warfare of these “New Look” reforms was techno- ing the risk of casualties. At first glance, stabilization missions such logical; in particular, a focus on highly as those in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to modern standoff weapons such as long- During Russian operations that led to the be more complex tasks for militaries to ex- range cruise missiles, anti-ship and anti-air occupation of Crimea and the escalation in ecute than conventional combat against missiles, and equipment designed to dis- Donbass, respectively, the government ob- foreign peers. However, a revived Russian rupt enemy radio and satellite communica- scured and denied the involvement of its military is posing fundamental challenges tions. While Western forces enjoyed unim- troops. The Kremlin touted units deployed to NATO and its members, as it has been peded air superiority and secure communi- to Crimea as “local resistance fighters”, and

entire army formations supposedly consist- example via a Western military interven- that a quick, surging military effort can de- ed of “volunteers currently on vacation”. In tion. As such, they allow Russian forces to feat any adversary appears to have become reality, Russia pursued its objectives in both be deployed with a low footprint, primarily a thing of the past. The reaction is a broad- theaters through a combination of local relying on local proxies, special operations ening of the conceptual sphere in which sympathizers and Russian troops that at forces, or private contractors while rein- the US Army conducts operations. This least initially consisted of low-footprint forcing the appearance of a local resistance means that next to the traditional domains special operations and expeditionary forces movement – as opposed to an outside mili- of air, sea, and land, the new domains of without insignia to keep the narrative of tary intervention. outer space, cyberspace, and the electro- local resistance alive as long as possible. magnetic spectrum are viewed as relevant Apart from this focus on deniability and It should be noted, however, that the Rus- domains in which to conduct warfare. The ambiguity, the coup de main in Crimea and sian interventions in South Ossetia, nascent doctrine designed to deter Russia later Russian operations in the Donbass Ukraine, and Syria have been, and continue and China in the future, Multi-Domain have little in common. The Crimean opera- to be, executed in vastly different contexts Operations, seeks to synchronize activities tion in particular, carried out by light expe- with distinctly identifiable approaches. Ac- in all domains quicker and more effectively. ditionary forces, is a unique case since its cordingly, it is not possible to codify Rus- success was in part enabled by a local popu- sian military action in a “playbook”, as is Additionally, the Pentagon expects future lation that largely viewed the existing Rus- often assumed. Similarly, conceptual pillars conflicts to be fought in a “grey zone”. This sian naval base at Sevastopol as legitimate. of contemporary Russian warfare revolve means a space between peace and war in around traditional arguments put forth by which military means are deployed covertly However, in eastern Ukraine, a similar ap- Soviet military theorists, even if in recent and merge with intelligence and propagan- proach resting on a minimal Russian pres- history the emphasis has been placed more da activity – as observed in Crimea and ence was markedly less successful, as sepa- on non-military and unconventional means. Donbass. In those crisis scenarios, prema- ratist militias were driven back by the As such, the often implied image of a ‘new ture or disproportionate military action on Ukrainian army despite being supplied Russian way of war’ does not hold up. the part of Western forces risks a loss of with weapons from Russia. In order to sal- public legitimacy and could serve as a justi- vage the military situation, Russian armed US Land Forces fication for open (or at least less covert) forces conducted two large-scale offensives The US Army has undergone several sig- Russian intervention. To be able to respond in August 2014 and January 2015 involv- nificant transformations in recent years, to such conditions, the US Army has estab- ing thousands of troops, which enabled each designed to focus the force on a par- lished Security Force Assistance Brigades, Moscow to negotiate favorable ceasefire ticular challenge in line with national secu- consisting of experienced soldiers capable agreements at Minsk. In combat, these rity priorities. The last of these transforma- of training and advising friendly countries’ troops primarily used massive artillery fire tions was the attempt spearheaded by troops within their own borders. For one, to destroy Ukrainian units from afar. Sepa- prominent generals, such as David Petraeus, this step intends to bolster the host mili- ratist militias were deployed as screening to rearrange the Army’s structure and doc- tary’s ability to resist encroachment or out- forces to reduce casualties among Russian trine in order to conduct counter-insurgen- right invasion – the Ukrainian army could cy, stabilization, and counter- be a potential candidate – without high In eastern Ukraine, a similar terrorism operations. However, material costs. On the other hand, the approach resting on a minimal with the Russian military re- Army considers forward-deployed training turning to the forefront of US missions to be an advantage if US or Russian presence was markedly threat perceptions, planners and NATO troops are sent to reinforce the host less successful. thinkers have realized that old nation in the event of a crisis. The assump- assumptions and dogmas are tion is that the training teams would al- obsolete. Previous assumptions ready have forged links with the local mili- regulars and to spot and identify targets for about how to fight a conventional war cen- tary and population, which would enable the artillery. Additionally, Russian forces tered on the notion of US superiority in ev- reinforcing units to operate more easily in were equipped with anti-air systems and ery relevant element of modern warfare, in the relevant socio-political context – sophisticated electronic warfare equipment particular through air superiority and as- deemed a necessity in a “grey zone” context. in order to keep the Ukrainian air force at sured real-time communications. bay. The core of Russian regulars was only However, the escalation into conventional used in combat against significant Ukrai- However, the recent Russian investments fighting seen in eastern Ukraine points to nian targets using traditional equipment mentioned above have leveled the playing the risks associated with not preparing for such as main battle tanks, as well as mod- field, especially its anti-air weaponry, long- this kind of warfare. Accordingly, the US ern communications and reconnaissance range artillery, and electronic warfare capa- Army has started to adapt its troops’ train- drones. bilities designed to jam US satellite and ing and equipment in order to ensure supe- radio communications. US Army doctrinal riority over Russian contingents. For ex- Besides its ground forces, the modernized documents since 2014 make this problem ample, Army troops are being trained to Russian military is equipped with standoff quite explicit. The main assessment is that conceal themselves from drone-mounted weapons such as ballistic missiles and air- Russia and China in particular have found modern sensors and to operate without re- and sea-launched cruise missiles – not to a way of employing military force that off- al-time communications and navigation. In mention Moscow’s large arsenal of strate- sets US superiority and capitalizes on flaws terms of equipment, the US land forces are gic nuclear weapons. These long-range sys- in the US logic of war. As such, Russian primarily attempting to regenerate their tems explicitly serve to deter a local conflict operations in Ukraine have obvious global artillery capabilities for effective suppres- from escalating at Moscow’s expense, for implications for the Pentagon. The notion sion of any Russian counterpart, if neces-

Russian armed forces along Deterrence and Deniability The British army’s changed priorities are reflected in its aspirations with regards to equipment and procurement. During operations in Afghanistan, the introduction of mine-resistant transport vehicles was fast-tracked; conversely, the focus is now on upgrading the Challenger main battle tank and Apache attack helicopter fleets. In the air, Eurofighter Typhoon jets have been modified with ground-attack capabilities. Apart from these equipment-related changes, British forces are stepping up training programs in the Norwegian arctic in order to assist in the defense of NATO’s northern flank. Royal Marines in particular are expected to reacquire arctic warfare skills after conducting more than ten years of counter-insurgency.

With regard to operating in a “grey zone” conflict, the British military has made two major adaptations. For one, a new unit (77 Brigade) was stood up that is designed to confront strategic propaganda, especially within digital media, and to conduct information operations itself. Additionally, the sary, and to bolster ground-to-air defenses. In its planning for a potential land conflict British army, much like the US Army, al- All these competencies had been con- in Europe, the British military aims to be beit on a smaller scale, concentrates the sciously allowed to atrophy during the long able to deploy a full division into Eastern ability to train, advise, and assist foreign period of counter-insurgency. Europe by 2025. As such, London’s plans militaries overseas. These Specialised Infan- are in line with a Europe-wide move to- try Battalions are thus designed to relieve The example of the US is well suited to il- wards organizing land forces in smaller bri- the regular infantry of the burden of train- lustrate the dilemma in which Western gades, which emphasize quick deployment, ing missions in Africa, the Middle East, forces have found themselves since 2014. but in larger divisions. While brigades fit a and Europe. An excessive focus on conventional mili- threat perception that is dominated by re- tary tasks invites the danger of losing po- gional crises and instability, they are not as The Bundeswehr litical footing within an ambivalent or even suitable for traditional defense scenarios Similar to its allies, Germany views the de- hostile population if operations become against a peer adversary. Next to the larger terrence of Russian encroachment on east- necessary. Conversely, a population-centric “mass” of divisions, Western armies tend to ern NATO states as the Bundeswehr’s pri- focus carries the risk of a potential adver- organize support capabilities, such as artil- mary task in the foreseeable future. In sary escalating with traditional military lery, engineers, and air defense, at the divi- order to do so, the German Defense Min- means and creating facts on the ground. As sion level – thus, multiple brigades share istry has announced several course changes such, all of NATO is faced with a difficult these units. Within this division, all capa- with regards to increasing personnel and balancing act, being confronted with both bilities deemed necessary are intended to be equipment after years of quantitative de- “grey zone” and traditional military threats, placed under one command to operate au- cline. Berlin has realized that previous cuts as evidenced by British and German at- tonomously or – explicitly so – as part of a have hit the military’s conventional side tempts at coping without a vast defense larger US corps or a multinational battle- particularly hard, which it now seeks to re- budget. group. Specifically, the planned division is to vive – even though stabilization missions consist of two heavy armored brigades are officially deemed of equal importance. The UK: Flexibility as a Solution equipped with tanks and two mobile “medi- As such, the army’s currently hollowed-out The British military still finds itself in a -pe um-heavy” Strike Brigades, equipped with divisions are supposed to be reinforced in- riod of regeneration following the 2010 de- newly procured systems. Especially a modu- crementally, and ready to be fully fielded by fense budget cuts that were part of former lar armored vehicle, Ajax, and modern ar- 2032. In a first step, the Bundeswehr wants prime minister David Cameron’s austerity mored personnel carriers. The emphasis on to contribute a fully staffed and equipped policy. Since 2015, British national security mobility can be explained by the relative brigade to NATO’s Spearhead Force by and military planning documents have be- lack of geographic flashpoints in the ongo- 2023. However, these aspirations are con- come more confident in tone, while certain ing standoff between NATO and Russia – tingent upon a significant and sustained core capabilities, such as carrier-based avia- accordingly, combat units have to be able to increase in defense spending – which, as of tion, are being rebuilt (CSS Analysis Keo- react quickly and flexibly within a wide area. early 2019, is anything but assured. hane No. 185, February 2016). Fiscal con- Additionally, the Russian military has prov- cerns, however, continue to play a decisive en that the combination of modern sensors In addition to plans for increasing the size role for British defense, despite the deteri- and heavy artillery poses a great threat to of the German armed forces, two innova- oration of the security environment. stationary or cumbersome formations. tive approaches stand out: Germany’s focus

on NATO’s Framework Nations Concept order to retain flexibility, mission packages vestment in a thinned-out Bundeswehr. (CSS Analysis Zapfe/Glatz No. 218, De- are being created that will be attached to Doctrinal emphases tend to be similar, usu- cember 2017), and the creation of “mission deployed units to contribute relevant expe- ally centered on improving reaction and packages” to give the forces more flexibility. rience and equipment without the unit it- deployment speed and preparing for mod- The former concept describes the perma- self having to be specialized. ern “grey” conflicts in which civilian and nent integration of allied troops into Ger- military actors converge. man command structures. This authority Regarding the dimensions of procurement does not extend, however, to automatic de- and equipment, the main aim is to regener- However, tangible differences can be deployment decisions, which remain under ate previously cut capabilities. The German tected – a vastly higher defense budget evi- the jurisdiction of national gov- dently gives the US Army the ability to ernments and parliaments. Each of the three analyzed states conduct a much broader and deeper mental French troops placed under is visibly attempting to leave and material modernization than its Euro- German command would not pean counterparts. As such, German and automatically be activated to behind the era of counter- British military forces are both seeking to conduct combat operations as insurgency and to embark on offset fiscal pressures by emphasizing the part of the German unit. Ac- need for a flexible military instrument. On cordingly, the main advantage of modernization programs. the British side, this can be seen in the ar- the concept lies in enabling al- my’s quest to deploy a medium-heavy divi- lied national military forces to train with a army is set to receive new artillery systems, sion, whereas the German military banks much larger higher scope and scale than including an increase in its munitions heavily on its appeal as a framework nation they could aspire to individually – and to stockpile, as well as new infantry equip- and the added benefits of mission packag- practice skills required for conducting joint ment. Additionally, the fleet of aging heavy es. Apart from those similarities, the Brit- operations over long distances. For exam- transport helicopters is to be replaced by ish appear to be closer conceptually to their ple, since being integrated into the Royal modern models. Another big-ticket defense transatlantic “cousins” than the Germans Dutch Marines, Germany’s naval infantry project is the replacement of the Tornado are. The perceived blurring of traditional has had access to an amphibious warfare aircraft and its ground-attack capability. military domains (sea, air, land) with the ship, a type of vessel the German navy does information and social space is less pro- not have. Financial and Cultural Divergence nounced in the German case. In addition, Each of the three analyzed states is visibly Berlin does not appear to view low-intensi- Secondly, the Bundeswehr views unit spe- attempting to leave behind it the era of ty attempts at subversion and encroach- cialization for a specific type of mission, counter-insurgency and to embark on ment into allied territory as a problem that such as stabilization operations, as a luxury modernization programs geared towards should necessarily be confronted by mili- it cannot afford, instead opting for a single territorial defense, even though stabiliza- tary means. set of forces to conduct all relevant mis- tion operations are still viewed as relevant sions. For example, an infantry battalion is tasks in strategic documents. Relevant ca- Niklas Masuhr is researcher in the Global Security assumed to be capable both of conducting pabilities are being rebuilt, whether they Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at patrols in Mali and contributing to deter- involve German or US artillery assets, the ETH Zurich. His research focuses on contemporary rence and defense in the Baltic states. In restructuring of the British Army, or in- conflict and military strategy.

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